MEMORANDUM TO DONALD MULCAHY FROM (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000600660001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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13 May 1986
STAT
Dear Mr. Mulcahy:
Mr. Gates appreciated the opportunity
to speak at your CIRA gathering. Enclosed
is a copy of his prepared text; you indicated
an interest in running this in your next
newsletter. Give me a call if I can be of
further assistance.
Sincerely,
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12 May 1986
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHALLENGE FOR THE 1980s
Remarks Prepared for Use by DDCI
Central Intelligence Retirees' Association
Ladies and Gentlemen. Let me first express my appreciation to you
for being invited to address this gathering on a subject that is much on
our minds, the spread of international terrorism. Today I want to share
with you how we assess this new war without borders conducted against an
enemy that is hard to find and harder still to defend against.
Terrorism is a cancer that is spreading. In 1983 we recorded about
500 international terrorist incidents; last year the number rose to about
800. The United States and its friends and allies continue to be the
primary targets. The number of persons killed or injured in 1985
exceeded 2,200 -- more than any other year, more even than the terrible
toll in 1983 when the US and French contingents of the peacekeeping force
in Lebanon were bombed. The rising casualty rate reflects the increased
use of large bombs by terrorists as well as greater willingness to harm
innocent bystanders through indiscriminate attacks.
It is terrorism of Middle Eastern origin that accounts for much of
the increase in international terrorism over the past two years. In
1983, Middle Eastern groups accounted for about one-fourth of all
international terrorist incidents. In 1985 their share had reached
almost one-half. The majority of US casualties occur in incidents
involving Middle Easterners. Middle Eastern terrorist bombs tend to be
larger, more sophisticated, and use higher grade explosives. Terrorists
from the Middle East are generally more professional and proficient in
clandestine operations and thus are more difficult to detect and stop
than other terrorists.
The high level of international terrorism by Middle Eastern groups
owes much to state sponsorship -- particularly by Syria, Iran, and
Libya. These states use terrorism and support to international terrorist
groups as instruments of domestic and foreign policy. These states
train, finance, and arm numerous dissident and terrorist groups. They
send agents and surrogates on missions around the world using terror to
attack opponents and the personnel and installations of the US and
proWestern Arab states. They use diplomatic and cultural missions to
support terrorists. We know, for example, that several senior officials
of the Iranian Government are directly involved in terrorist activity.
Libya provides aid and comfort to the notorious Palestinian terrorist Abu
Nidal whose followers were responsible for the massacres in Rome and
Vienna airports.
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You have heard the President's statement outlining the evidence for
Libyan complicity in the Berlin nightclub bombing last month. We also
have compelling evidence of Libyan involvement in other recently planned
attacks against the United States, severl of which were designed to cause
maximum casualties similar to the Berlin bombing.
-- France expelled two members of the Libyan People's Bureau in Paris
for their involvement in a planned attack on visa applicants
waiting in line at the US Embassy.
-- France subsequently expelled two disgruntled Fatah Force 17
members recruited by Libya to conduct another operation against
the United States in Paris.
-- In early April a Libyan-inspired plot to attack the US Embassy in
Beirut was aborted when the 107 mm rocket exploded on launch.
-- Turkish police in late March arrested two Tuinisians in Istanbul
who claimed they were planning on behalf of the Libyans to use
explosives against a US target in Turkey; the operation was
planned to inflict heavy casualties.
-- We have reports of well over 35 Libyan-associated threats,
including surveillance or planned attacks, against US personnel
and facilities in Europe, Africa, and Asia thus far this year. We
note Libyan-sponsored surveillance of US Embassy personnel in
Khartoum, where a State Department officer recently was shot.
Nor is the United States alone as a victim of Qadhafi's terrorist
program. British Foreign Secretary Howe has publicly charged that his
government had proof of Libyan complicity in the death of the two British
hostages in Beirut the previous day.
My remarks thus far have dwelt on Middle Eastern terrorism and
certainly that is uppermost in our minds these past few days. But I
would be remiss if I were to leave you with the impression that
International terrorism wears only a Middle Eastern garment. West
European terrorist groups were also active in 1985, and many of their
favorite targets are US or NATO-related facilties.
In West Germany, for example, sympathizers and hardcore members of
the Red Army Faction carried out more than a dozen attacks against US and
NATO targets last year, including the carbombing at the Rhein-Main
Airbase in August. West German security officials have made major
inroads against this organization but it is still capable of conducting
another major attack. A Belgian group calling itself the Communist
Combatant Cells, which first came to our attention in late 1984 when it
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conducted a series of attacks against NATO and defense related targets,
conducted some 30 attacks last year. It has been quiet since December
however when Belgian security officials arrested several of its key
members. Greek terrorists were also busy in 1985 with many of their
attacks taking the form of arson and bombings of vehicles belonging to US
military personnel in Athens. The French terrorist group Action Directe
and the Italian terrorist Red Brigades were active last year but most of
their attention was focused on domestic targets. Nevertheless, their
propaganda and political orientation is strongly anti-American and at any
time they could resume targeting US interests either singly or in
cooperation with other likeminded groups.
Let me now turn to the Soviet connection. It may seem shadowy to
some, but it seems very close to me. Iran, Libya, and the Soviet Union
are hardly allies, but they share a fundamental hostility to the West.
The Soviets, who hold no moral objections to the use of terrorism and see
much of the unrest it creates as ultimately beneficial to their foreign
policy objectives, do not particpate in any international efforts to
block terrorism or to join in multilateral efforts to combat it. In
backing revolutionary causes against established governments, it is
largely a matter of indifference to the Soviets whether terrorist tactics
are used as long as the groups that commit these acts attack non-Soviet
or non-Bloc targets. The Soviets support international terrorism in a
number of ways:
-- The Soviets provide political backing, funding, and in some cases
arms and military training to groups or states such as Libya that
participate in or are linked to terrorists.
-- The Soviets have at least indirectly given material support to
groups that have committed terrorist acts in the Middle East,
Africa, and Latin America.
-- The Soviets have trained a number of personnel linked to or
belonging to national liberation groups, and they openly supply
arms to numerous governments and groups that conduct terrorist
activities. Libya is a leading example.
-- The Soviets support certain Palestinian groups, East European
states, South Yemen, and Cuba, all of whom support terrorist
groups or groups that commit terrorist acts. Bulgaria's state
trading organization KINTEX -- which is essentially a state
smuggling operation -- and Czechoslovakia's comparable
organization OMNIPOL are among the most prominent companies whose
weapons eventually have appeared in terrorist hands.
-- The East Europeans, almost certainly with Soviet knowledge and
support, provide safehaven, transit privileges and movement of
weapons and bombs for terrorists.
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Let me now turn to the problems of US intelligence analysts and
counterterrorism policymakers as they seek to tackle the problem of
international terrorism. In order to prevent terrorist plans or disrupt
their activities we need information about them, but the very nature of
terrorist groups and their activities makes this task extremely
complicated.
Terrorist groups are very small. We estimate that many number fewer
than two dozen hard core members. Although such groups may have many
more sympathizers and supporters, those persons responsible for the
spectucular bombings or assassinations are relatively few and
well-concealed. They sometimes use unwitting persons -- such as the
woman caught with a bomb in her luggage at the London airport.
Increasingly we find that people who come together to conduct an attack
were not known to each other previously and that only the leader knows
all the details of the arrangements and participants. As a result even
when we capture one of the perpetrators, he may be unable to tell us much
about the group behind the attack.
The central core of terrorist groups is tightly knit and difficult to
penetrate. Middle Eastern groups frequently have kinship, village, or
tribal links; whereas West European groups tend to represent people with
intellectual and personal ties dating from student days. In short, the
key members of the terrorist group know each other very well and
outsiders would have difficulty establishing their bona fides, making
penetration of the core group by police or intelligence agents virtually
impossible.
The operating life of any single group of terrorists is often no more
than a few years. Likewise the typical terrorist leader has a relatively
short business life, although there are exceptions who have been plying
their trade for several years. This intensifies the pressure on
intelligence collectors and analysts to quickly determine the
organization and structure of groups so prompt action can be taken
against them.
Terrorist groups are not stationary, that is they seldom operate from
fixed facilities. Terrorists may learn weapons handling and bomb
building at an insurgent camp or other such facility, but they don't need
to. A hotel room, attic, or basement would do equally well for most of
the training they need. Thus just because we learn where the "bomb
factory" was for the last attack does not mean we have a lead on where it
will be for the next one.
Terrorists frequently use rudimentary, but highly secure, operating
and communications methods. They depend on couriers and commercial
telephones. Terrorist equipment and weapons are often stolen from
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military and police stores or else purchased on the flourishing gray arms
market. Even relatively sophisticated bombs can be manufactured from
components easily purchased from a hardware store or stolen from a
commercial construction company. One distinction is worth noting here.
European terrorists by and large supply themselves. Middle Eastern
terrorists are usually supplied by their friends, including the Soviet
Bloc.
Terrorists are opportunists and quick to copy what works politically
or technially. This makes it hard to separate copycat attacks from a
campaign that is based on cooperation or links between groups.
How do we in US intelligence cope with these small bands of highly
trained people, most of them fanatics, some ready to give up life itself
to do their increasingly sophisticated evil deeds? First we are
obviously acquiring as much information we can about terrorist groups
including their modus operandi, organizational structure, personnel,
support, financial, and communications arrangements, and their
relationships with other groups or state sponsors. Much of this is pure
basic research, compiling large databases, and attempting to fill in the
gaps. It is not very glamorous and the people who do it do not capture
the headlines, but it is the foundation upon which the US
counterterrorist effort rests. Continuing collection and analysis
enables us to improve our ability to detect trends in terrorist
operations and upgrade security in areas that are most likely at risk.
Continuing research allows us to determine the vulnerabilities of
terrorist groups and formulate plans for disrupting their activities.
This is not a problem for the United States alone, but a task in
which the civilized nations of the world must cooperate. With increasing
tempo and effectiveness we are developing a worldwide counterterrorist
network made up of the intelligence, security, and police organizations
of the threatened nations. They exchange intelligence, share data banks,
work together operationally, provide training and technical capabilities
to the less advanced of their number, undertake surveillance and other
intelligence assignments for each other, report their findings, transmit
alerts and warnings.
On several occasions, our warning and detailed intelligence has
directly assisted foreign authorities in capturing terrorists. Through
timely intelligence work, for example, two sophisticated suitcase bombs
were intercepted and disabled and warnings on the nature of these types
of bombs were provided promptly to intended and potential victims
worldwide. This warning led to the discovery of two more such devices by
cooperating services.
Here in Washington, we have made very good progress in developing a
system of very rapid communications to gather assessments, have reports
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tested by intelligence experts throughout our government and elsewhere,
and pass conclusions quickly to the point of the threat -- whether in the
United States or overseas.
We obviously need an international effort along the same lines,
however, for the United States is only one of an increasing number of
targets for terrorists. We also need more vigorous action by the
international community in general if we are to contain the terrorist
challenge. Western nations have on the whole been weak in applying
economic, political, and diplomatic measures to check terrorism. Too
often countries are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities
or of provoking further terrorism. There is a common, but badly
mistaken, belief on the part of some of our allies and friends that
appeasement will lead to safety. Past experience with terrorist
hijacking shows that the international community can move in concert and
that when it does it can be effective.
The terrorist depends upon two factors for success in conducting his
war on the mind. The first, and most important of these, is coverage by
the media. In this decade more people can be addressed by newspaper,
television, radio, and magazines than ever before in history. What is
more, the media is so effective that millions of people may learn of a
terrorist attack that has taken place half a world away in a matter of
minutes -- or at most, hours. It is no accident that the vast bulk of
the most heinous terrorist murders, bombings and hijackings take place --
not in isolated villages in Africa or among remote Asian tribesmen -- but
in cities that possess excellent communication links with the rest of the
world. The terrorist hopes that his deeds will be bannered on the six
o'clock news throughout most of the developed world.
The second factor that aids terrorists in their campaign is the
nature of modern urban society. The concentration of population offers
anonymity to the terrorist. Weapons and money can be obtained through an
infinite number of channels, thus preserving the terrorist's operational
security. The variety and efficiency of transportation enhances the
terrorist's mobility. Moreover, industrialized societies have more
vulnerable high-value targets -- such as computer centers, airlines,
factories, shopping arcades, and even apartment complexes. Western
democracies by their very nature are particularly vulnerable to terrorist
attacks.
I have spoken about preventive, cooperative, protective and
investigative measures. What about the terrorist himself? We must take
vigorous action to isolate him from his target -- attacking the public
mind. That is to say we must defeat the terrorists' strategy of
manipulating public perceptions. We must deny the terrorist the fruit of
his labors -- namely, the ability to exploit the media to instill in the
public feelings of uncertainty and fear. The media itself must play the
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leading role in this effort by treating news of terrorist incidents in a
more reserved fashion, and by providing strong editorials that discredit
the terrorists' actions.
In addition we should strive to instill in the terrorist those same
pervasive feelings of fear that he seeks to instill in the public -- the
feelings of constantly being the hunted, rather than the hunter. The
terrorist must at all times have the impression that his movements are
known, his plans understood, and his cells penetrated. We can do this,
as I mentioned earlier, by improving coordination of intelligence, police
and counterterrorist units, and especially by mobilizing media support to
sustain the courage of the public and to convince the terrorist that his
actions are repudiated by the public.
If we can do this, the terrorist will watch in frustration as his
power over the media dries up and, with it, his power to assault the
mind. If cut off from his sponsors, the terrorist will watch with
growing apprehension as he learns that the costs and risk of his
operations skyrocket while the impact of his actions plummets. The
futility of terrorism then will at last be made obvious to the terrorist
himself, and his devastating war on the mind and on the innocent will
slowly come to an end.
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