THE CIA AND ACADEME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000600620031-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: REPORT

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CGNF IAL
Symbiosis
THE CIA AND ACADEME
(.,lose tics between the Central Intelligence Agency and American colleges
and universities have existed since the birth of the Agency in 1947. 'I'he. bonds
between national intelligence and the academic world actually predate the
Agency, for William J. Donovan, President Roosevelt's Coordinator of Infor-
mation, established a research team of distinguished academicians to assist him
in 1941. Donovan proposed a novel idea: have the information that he was col-
lecting, mostly from the military services and the Department of State,
analyzed not only by the intelligence components within the War and Navy
Departments but by his team of "scholars, economists, psychologists, techni-
cians, and students of finance." To head his research group, Donovan chose
James Phinney Baxter, president of Williams College and a noted specialist in
American diplomatic history.
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Research and Analysis Branch
of what became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) rapidly expanded. After
Baxter's departure in 1942, William L. Langer, the distinguished historian
from Harvard, took over direction of the branch and remained in that post
until disestablishment of OSS in late 1945.
While many of the scholars who had participated in the analytic part of
OSS returned to their campuses after the war, some remained with the
government. Those who had been in the Research and Analysis Branch were
transferred to the State Department. Then, as the Central Intelligence Group
and, after 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency grew in size and responsibil-
ity, a number of academicians who had served with OSS returned as analysts
in the new Office of Research and Evaluation.
During the great expansion of (IA following the outbreak of the Korean
War in 1950, Agency recruiters appeared in significant numbers on academic
campuses across the nation. Also in 1950, the Director of Central Intelligence.
',;eneral Walter Bedell Smith, called upon William Langer to return to
Washington to organize the new Office of National Estimates (ONE') This
office had seven board members, including four historians and an economist
drawn from the ranks of academe,' a combat commander, and a lawyer. One
of the historians, Sherman Kent, succeeded Langer as Director of ONl'; in
1952 when Langer again returned to Harvard. At roughly the same time, the
noted economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Max Millikan,
was brought to Washington to organize the economic intelligence effort in the
newly created Office of Research and Reports.
The four historians were Sherman Kent, Ludwell Montague, Dc Forrest Van Slyck, and
Raymond Sontag; the economist was Calvin Hoover.
t) i e(. 1'183 , V 9,;V7, ()o.'-1
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Meanwhile, as the Agency expanded, its recruiters turned to established
figures in the academic world for leads and referrals to the best among their
students.' Many of the personnel already on board similarly informed their
colleagues still on the university campuses of the need for and opportunities
awaiting those who had the requisite background for work in the Agency.
As a large number of,the members of OSS and the early recruits to CIA
came from prestigious private schools in the Northeast and the Far West, with
some representation from the large Midwestern universities, it is not surprising
that a clisproportiate number of the new recruits came from the same schools.
Similarly, professors who had joined the Agency often turned to their former
colleagues still on the campuses for consultation and assistance. This "old boy"
system was quite productive in providing new employees in the professional
ranks. Thus, there was an early linkage between the Agency and the Ivy
League, or similar schools.
A Souring in the Sixties
Relations between academe and the CIA were cordial throughout the
1950s. During much of that period the Cold War was at its height and the na-
tion's need for the Agency and its activities were seldom questioned by faculty
or students. There was no criticism worthy of note following the Agency's
alleged involvement in Iran in 1953 or Guatemala the following year. The
1960s were to be different.
There was some criticism on campuses over CIA involvement in the Bay
of Pigs expedition in 1961 and the barrage of denunciation increased as the
Agency, along with the rest of the government and the "establishment," found
itself under intensified attack as the war in Vietnam continued. In part to miti-
gate this opposition, the Office of Personnel in 1962 established the 1Iundred
Universities Program in which recruiters and senior officials of CIA made
presentations before selected faculty members and placement officers in an
effort to publicize CIA's role in national security and to emphasize the
Agency's recurrent personnel needs.
Meanwhile, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, aware that the
close ties that had bound Agency officials and analysts with their colleagues on
the campuses were loosening, and concerned about developments in China
(explosion of an atomic device in 1964 and the subsequent beginning of the
Cultural Revolution), asked the Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1966 to
take action to improve the Agency's expertise on China. The DDI created the
office of Coordinator for Academic Relations (CAR), a part-time job for John
Kerry King, a former' professor at the University of Virginia who had been
with the analytic part of the Agency for several years.
Beginning in 1951 and continuing for several years thereafter, the Agency tried, without
much success, to establish a ''University Associates Program--a program of using professors at
a selected list of 50 colleges and universities as consultant-contacts who would receive a nominal
fee for spotting promising students, steering them into studies and activities of interest to the
Agency, and eventually nominating them for recruitment.
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The DDl specifically charged the CAR with, inter Jilin, responsibility for
exploiting the capabilities of the various China studies centers in the universi-
ties, devising means for attracting China specialists to work for the Agency,
and developing and managing relations with academic consultants on China.
One of the nation's best China centers was at Harvard. It was logical that
the Agency would seek help from that institution. Subsequently, several DDI
analysts were enrolled in the graduate program at the Harvard East Asian
Research Center. Unfortunately, by 1967 the local chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society was aware of the participation of these analysts and a
campaign against their presence on campus was launched. Attempts by
Professor John K. Fairbank, director of the Center, to explain the difference
between operations officers and analysts at CIA fell on deaf ears.
King also set about organizing a number of "China seminars" in Boston.
New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, in which a few noted China scholars
engaged Agency experts in low-profile and informal discussions. King. during
his four-year tenure as CAR, also initiated a program of passing unclassified
reports prepared by the Agency to a select group of academicians in an
attempt to gain comment on the reports and good will for the CIA.
Despite individual examples of continuing cooperation with the Agency,
relations with academia as a whole continued to sour. The deterioration way
given impetus in February 1967 by the disclosure in Ramparts magazine that
the CIA had been funding the National Student Association for a number of
years Additional disclosures of. Agency involvement with private voluntarv
organizations and foundations resulted in President Johnson's appointment of
a three-person committee, chaired by Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Katzenhach, to review government activities that might endanger the
integrity and independence of the educational community,` Following its
investigations, the Katzenbach Committee recommended that federal af;cucic~
halt covert financial r eat iorrships with any of the nations educational or
private voluntary organizations." While the recommendation was never issued
as an executive order or enacted as a statute, it was accepted by the President
and led to major adjustments within the Agency.
Recruiters for the Agency, meanwhile, were experiencing increasing
problems on college campuses. Many of the schools that had provided superior
candidates in the past were now home for the most militant of students.
Picketing of recruiters began in 1966, rapidly spread across the nation, and
peaked in 1968 when 77 incidents or demonstrations occurred. Procedures
were changed with interviews held off campus and, whenever it appeared that
a visit might precipitate incidents, the visit was canceled. The Hundred
Universities Program was suspended in 1968.
The Academic Coordinator, working on behalf of the analytic offices,
continued to expand contacts with academicians wherever possible. By 1970,
seminars on Soviet matters were added to those on China. By 1974, scholars on
The other two members were Secretary of Health, Education, and y1'elfarc' Inhn
Gardiner and l) C1 11ichar(I If rlnis.
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Cuba and most of the rest of the world had been added to the list of
academicians with whom the CAR kept in touch. The CAR was promoting
visits by academicians to CIA Headquarters to confer with those in the DDI
having similar interests and he was assisting analysts aril administrators in
securing the participation of outside experts in Agency-sponsored conferences
arid seminars.'
Sensational allegations of wrong doing by CIA and other components of
the intelligence community, which erupted in the media in the early 1970s,
led to congressional demands for investigations and the creation in 197'! of se-
lect committees in the House, under Representative Pike, and in the Senate,
under Senator Church. (Two other groups also were formed to investigate
intelligence activities-a Commission on the Organization of the (;overnment
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, known as the. Murphy (;omniission, and a
commission appointed by President Ford and led by the Vice President, the
Rockefeller Commission.) The various investigating bodies focused much of
their attention on CIA's covert action, most of which had little to do with the
Agency's relations with academia. There was some discussion, particularly in
the Church Committee final report, which tended to lump relations with
schools along with Agency relations with the media and religious
organizations.
The final report of the Church Committee (the Pike Committee report
was never formally released) interpreted "academic community" far more
broadly than had the Katzenbach Committee. In particular, the former
focused more heavily on individuals whereas the latter had concentrated on
institutions. The Church Committee found that hundreds of academicians in
over 100 colleges, universities, and related institutions had a covert relation-
ship with the Agency providing leads and "making introductions for intelli-
gence purposes." Others engaged in intelligence collection abroad, assisted in
the writing of books and other propaganda materials, or collaborated in
research and analysis.
While the Church Committee recognized that the CIA "must have
unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can
produce," it recommended that that advice and judgment be openly sought.
The committee concluded by placing the principal responsibility for altering
the existing relationship between CIA and academe on the hacks of the college
administrators and other academic officials. "The Committee believes that it is
the responsibility of . . . the American academic community to scl the
professional and ethical standards of its members. This report on the nature
and extent of covert individual relationships with the CIA is intended to alert
(the academic community) that there is a problem.
Ilarold Ford succeeded John Kerry King as CAR in 197(1 and was followed in 1974 by
Gary Foster. In late 1976, with the reorganization of the P1)1 as Ili(, National Foreign
Assessment Center (NFAC), relations with academics were." coordinated by two professional stall
employees working full time. were the original incumbents and
were followed by Janes King and In January 1981, the author hecain CAR as
the post reverted to one-person status. In 1982, the CAR was transferred from the Office of the
DDI to the Office of External Affairs under the DCI and in mid-1983 to the newly created Pub-
lic Affairs Office.
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Academe CONFIDENTIAL
The report set off a flurry of activity within academic ranks and led to nu-
merous articles in newspapers and periodicals. Among several letters addressed
to DCI George Bush was one from William Van Alstyne, president of the
American Association of University Professors, demanding that Bush give the
same assurance against covert,use of academics that he had earlier given to
missionaries and journalists. The DCI replied that the Agency sought only "the
voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign
policy processes of the United States." Where relationships are confidential,
noted Bush, they are usually so at the request of the scholars rather than of the
Agency. He refused to isolate the Agency from the "good counsel of the best
scholars in our country."
Bush's argument was to be adopted and enlarged upon by his successor,
Stansfield Turner, who engaged in a long and eventually unsuccessful effort to
reach agreement with Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, on
relations between that university and the Agency. Bok, acting on the Church
Committee suggestion, appointed a committee to prepare guidelines to assist
members of the Harvard community in dealing with the CIA. The guideline
were accepted by Bok and published in May 1977. It was immediately
apparent that some of Harvard's concerns (unwitting employment of aca-
demics and use of scholars in preparing propaganda materials) were no longer
at issue due to changes in Agency policy and issuance of Executive Order
11905 by President Ford. There were still two issues on which no meeting of
the minds was possible. One of these had to do with what the guidelines
termed "operational use" of faculty and staff by the CIA. The other concerned
covert Agency recruitment of foreign students for intelligence purposes.
Additionally, the guidelines specified that all faculty and staff "should" report
any and all relations with the Agency to their deans, who should report them
in turn to President Bok.
Attempts by the DCI to point out that these were exceptional cases of aca-
demics who might be employed by the Agency on a strictly confidential
mission abroad because of their unique access to foreign individuals or
information failed to change Bok's mind as did Turner's contention that the
confidentiality of a relationship with an academic was frequently at the
professor's, rather than the Agency's, request. Finally, Turner pointed out that
the CIA's responsibility to provide secret foreign intelligence left the Agency
with no alternative to engaging in the activities which Bok deplored, but Bok
was assured that "the rein" would remain tight in such cases.
Publicity regarding the dispute over the Harvard guidelines allowed
Morton Halperin and John Marks of the Center for National Security Studies
to launch a campaign to have other colleges and universities adopt similar or
more stringent restrictions on intelligence activities on campuses. While some
ten academic institutions took action toward adoption of similar guidelines, in
most cases modifications were included which limited the impact of any
restriction on Agency operations. For the great majority of schools where the
issue arose, the faculty and the administration rejected any guidelines, usually
on the ground that existing regulations and practices were adequate to protect
both the institution and the individual from corruption.
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Scope of Current Cooperation
Relations between the Agency and the academic world have slowly
improved since 1977, more or less in inverse correlation to the state of East-
West relations.' The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, in
particular, opened new doors to cooperation with CIA on many campuses. The
depressed state of the economy in recent years has also been cited as a catalyst
for greater interest in Agency employment on the part of recent graduates as
well as, the cause of increased willingness to cooperate with CIA by those who
sell their services as consultants or external research contractors.
A number of recognized authorities who could be of value to the Agency's
research effort decline all attempts to gain their assistance. Most are political
scientists, or in an allied social science, and many have expertise in the Third
World. Many scholars on the developing nations of the world, aware that
reports that they have collaborated with American intelligence could preju-
dice their research activities (including their sources), are reluctant even to
colic to Langley. Interestingly, some of these. scholars are prepared to discuss
substantive issues if an Agency analyst is willing to visit them in their homes or
at their offices.
Specialists on the Soviet Union or other communist countries have
traditionally been less reluctant to work with the intelligence commnunity,
presumably because they are believed to be in touch with the Agency anyway.
Experts on Western Europe and other developed nations, in their willingness
to cooperate with the Agency, fall somewhere between the general coopera-
tiveness of the Sino-Soviet specialists and the reluctance (d the Third World
experts.
At present the Agency enjoys reasonably good relations with academe and
gains much from its contacts with faculty and students. The Office of Training
and Education uses a large number of academics in its courses. Other offices
within the Directorate of Administration, specifically Logistics and Medical
Services, have contracts with educational institutions or with individual
academicians. This fall, 27 professors spent two and one-half days at
Headquarters in the Conference on US Intelligence: the Organization and the
Profession, conducted by the Center for the Study of Intelligence.
The Foreign Resources Division has relationships with scores of individ-
uals in US academic institutions. In all cases these links are voluntary and
Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University has written extensively on the CIA. He
maintains that congressional attempts to restrict Agency activities are strongest and most likely
to he implemented during periods of detente in East-West relations, conversely they are most
unlikely to succeed in periods of increased tension. The charting of relations between the CIA
and academe would appear likely to show a similar pattern of close ties during periods of
heightened tension between the US and USSR and strained relations during periods of detente.
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Academe CONFIDENTIAL
witting. Many of the individuals also are contacts of the DCD. These
American scholars do not "recruit" foreign students or researchers for the
Agency, but assist by providing background information and occasionally by
brokering introductions.
Many academicians are willing to provide expert assistance to Agency
analysts and the research components.
I Additionally, scores of
other academicians were willing to consult on an a oc basis, some without
reimbursement. Components within the National Intelligence Council and the
Directorates of Intelligence and of Science and Technology sponsored nearly
50 conferences during 1982 at which specialists from colleges, universities, or
"think tanks" were present.
The DDI, the DDS&T, and the NIC also sought help from the academic
world through contracts for external research, with the results usually
Since 1977, the Intelligence Directorate has also brought in
scholars, usually on sabbatical, to the Agency as contract employees to assist
analysts through an exchange of ideas, a review of written reports, and the
production of finished intelligence for dissemination to policy makers. In
exchange, these "Scholars-in-Residence" are, for one or two years, privy to
information that would never be available to them on campus.
The Supreme Court decision in the Snepp case in early 1980 had some
dampening effect on the willingness of professors to work with the Agency.
Some of them feared that if they signed the requisite secrecy agreement, their
future independence to publish would be severely restricted. Another poten-
tial Scholar-in-Residence declined to take the polygraph test, describing it as
demeaning."
The Agency also provides numerous services for the academic commu-
nity. Since 1972, unclassified CIA reports have been available to the public
and have been widely sought by colleges, universities, and individual scholars.
The FBIS -Daily Reports have long been standard items on the shelves of
many university libraries.
Requests for unclassified briefings of students or faculty members at CIA
Headquarters or on campuses normally receive a positive response. During
1982, 31 groups containing over 1,100 individuals were given briefings on
intelligence or on some substantive topic at Headquarters. In the same year, at
least 60 Agency officials spoke at various schools throughout the nation.
Fourteen college presidents were brought to Langley in 1982 to meet the
Director and other senior officials and to be briefed on Agency activities. This
program, which has generated considerable good will and understanding for
the Agency, was begun in 1977 and has involved a total of 58 presidents from
large and small schools throughout the nation, all of the schools important to
the Agency as sources for recruitment of staff employees or consultants, or for
other operational requirements.
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The Office of Personnel presently is active at approximately 300 schools.
Several offices in the DDI and DDS&T also recruit directly from colleges and
universities. Recently there has been a program, originating in the Directorate
of Operations, sending special representatives onto campuses in an attempt to
attract high-caliber career trainees.
The Graduate Studies Program, which began in 1967, provides summer
internships for students who will be attending graduate school in the fall. Most
of the 57 graduate students from 42 schools accepted in 1983 were attached to
the Intelligence Directorate. A number of "alunrui" of earlier Graduate
Studies programs subsequently became staff employees.
For undergraduates, the Agency maintains a cooperative Student Trainee
Program. The goal of this program today, as it was when it began in 1961, is to
provide a long-range method of recruiting occupational skills which are in
short supply. The program allows the student, who must be registered in a col-
lege with an established coop program, to gain practical work experience by
alternating periods of study at school and work at the Agency. Originally, the
program sought engineers exclusively but in recent years has added those who
major in computer science, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and accounting.
The Office of Equal Employment Opportunity since 1969 has been
recruiting at, and negotiating contracts with, minority schools. Faculty
members and placement officers from traditionally black schools have been
brought to Headquarters for briefing sessions.
Finally, the Agency has long: sought to gain recognition for itself as a
center for intellectual activity comparable to the best institutions in the
academic world. The claim has often been made that CIA could staff a major
university because of the diversity of disciplines represented among its
employees. Graduate degrees earned by staff employees give some indication
of the training acquired-over 600 PhDs and more than 2,300 Masters'
degrees.
To gain recognition for the Agency's employees among their counterparts
in academe, overt employees have been encouraged to participate: in meetings
of academic and professional societies. Of the over 700 attendees in 1982, a
significant number joined in panel discussions or presented unclassified
research papers.
The wide ranging program described above puts the Agency on generally
good terms with the academic community. There is, however, considerable
work for the future if CIA is to continue to count on securing the best possible
recruits for its staff employees and the participation of faculty members in im-
proving its analytic product. One of the problems, a long-term trend in
academic institutions toward ever decreasing numbers of students in area
studies programs, is currently being examined by a joint committee made up
of representatives from the universities, business, and the federal government,
including CIA.
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There is also a continuing need to improve the Agency's image at many
colleges and universities. While the number of demonstrations against CIA has
drastically diminished over the past decade, there are still occasional minor
incidents, as happened when CIA and NSA recruitment was protested at
Middlebury College last winter.
Some recent Agency activities, including expanded recruitment efforts by
substantive intelligence officers on the campuses, increased numbers of CIA
participants at academic conventions and conferences, and a growing use of
external research contracts with non-annuitants, are all valuable tools in
breaking down barriers and increasing confidence betweeen the Agency and
the academics.
One promising recent activity involves visits to selected college campuses
by intelligence officers who are seeking to locate, or create, a body of faculty
members favorably disposed toward the Agency. This is accomplished princi-
pally through conversations with faculty members and by briefings, when
requested, to classes or to faculty groups. These friendly contacts in the ranks
of academe can be of inestimable value. The goals are to have professors
remind their best students that CIA is a potential employer, to correct
erroneous accusations on campus against the Agency, and, perhaps, to identify
other faculty members who might be willing to attend conferences or
participate in substantive consultations at Langley.
There is some danger from an uncoordinated rapid expansion of recruit-
ment trips by the many Agency components now engaged in the effort. Unless
oversight of the campaign is centralized, it could result in several Agency
representatives appearing on a campus in rapid succession or even concur
rently. This "overexposure" could have negative repercussions; specifically,
irritation on the part of Agency friends and consternation among others---both
faculty and students. All recruitment visits to academic institutions should be
cleared in advance at some point within the Agency-possibly within the
Office of Personnel, possibly at the Academic Coordinator's office.
The opportunity exists, of course, for any overt employee attending an
academic convention or symposium to assist in furthering good relations for
the Agency. Understandably, many academicians are most impressed by the
participation of Agency employees on panels. Beyond that, any Agency officer
attending a professional meeting can gain good will for CIA by being friendly
and, within the limitations of security, informative about the Agency. Most
academicians are curious about CIA and grateful for any clarification of its
mission and its activities.
The occasional vigorous criticism of the Agency from faculty members or
students tends to focus on covert action. While some critics will not be satisfied
by any argument, others can be reconciled to the need for covert action
through a dispassionate explanation of its synergistic role with other more
conventional means of conducting international relations and a reminder of
the oversight function of the Congress.
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CONFIDENTIAL Academe
From the author's own experience with a number of college groups
briefed at Headquarters over the last few years, it is obvious that there is a
vital need to correct misconceptions held by a large percentage of students and
also by some faculty members. Illustrative of this point were the comments on
a short written quiz given by an Agency briefing officer prior to her
presentation before a student group. To the question, what is your reaction
and that of your classmates on campus to the words "Central Intelligence
Agency?" the recurring response was "fear."
Yet, when the briefings are over there are often voluntary expressions of
support for the Agency, inquiries regarding careers, and, from the faculty,
offers to meet with DCD or to serve as Agency consultants. If the students and
their teachers are made aware of the truly symbiotic relationship between the
academic and intelligence worlds, there is little question but that the great
majority will support the continuing efforts of what Bay Cline terms this
"peculiarly American combination of spies and scholars, working in tandem."
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Academic studies in interna-
tional relations might usefully
be supplemented by a course in
intelligence processes.
The transition in the U.S. national posture accomplished
during the first half of this century, from a seeking of security
in isolation to recognition that our national welfare depends
upon active participation in international politics, had its
corollary in the academic world. Many non-government or-
ganizations, foundations, universities, and colleges have
played an important role in increasing the public knowledge
and administrative skills prerequisite to effective U.S. action
in the international arena. A wide variety of new courses and
entire schools have been devoted to foreign affairs and inter-
national relations, and additional ones still continue to be es-
:ablished.
The new public interest in global matters has by and large,
:however, not been extended to intelligence and the principles
and processes by which it is prepared. At the end of World
War II there was, to be sure, the debate about Allied intelli-
gence in the Bulge, the congressional inquiry into the Pearl
Harbor surprise, and a good deal of general regret for the lack
of pre-war interest in intelligence, to which General Eisen-
hower contributed with comments in Crusade in Europe. But
his kind of soul-searching was confined largely to official cir-
cles. In the academic world, I believe, U.S. intelligence is
treated only in its strictly military aspect, in specialized ROTC
courses. There have been academic studies dramatizing busi-
ness espionage I and some pedagogical treatment of research
methods applicable in intelligence, but no college training in
the subject as a coordinated whole.
There are good reasons why this has been so. Intelligence
traditionally and for the most part necessarily does its work
hind the scenes, and its influence on the national welfare
.eldom strikes the public eye. Nor does this country have be-
For example Competitive intelligence, by students at the Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, reviewed in
Intelligence Articles IV 2, p. A46.
STAT
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Courses in Intelligence
hind it the centuries of international leadership which desti-
oped the acknowledged British competence in intelligence and
made the British public proud of it. Now that the Utmttx!
States has come to occupy the center of the internatiorW
scene, the role of intelligence is well recognized among on.
cials of the government; public interest and academic cam,
tern have yet to be awakened.
There are signs of a public awakening, however. Commer.
tators showed concern over faltering intelligence on Chines
Communist participation in the Korean War, on the streng i.
of the Ho Chi Minh forces in Indochina., and on the Brius_*.-
French-Israeli Suez venture. More recently a persistent a:.
widespread discussion of intelligence processes has been set c"
by the Senate inquiry into the "missiles gap." Cartoont-4?
Berryman's J. Q. Public, worried by the intelligence estimate
controversy and saying, "I wish someone would explain it to
me," seems to represent truly a deep interest and a legitimate
requirement of the U.S. citizen. The U-.2 incident and its re-
percussions at the summit are certain to give this interest &
new impetus.
It is the thesis of this paper that the awakening public
concern with intelligence offers our universities and colleges
an opportunity and a challenge-the opportunity to take ad-
vantage of a rising interest and to meet a clear need, and the
challenge to meet it effectively and thereby ultimately con.
tribute to improving U.S. intelligence doctrine and competence-
It is suggested that a good beginning could be made by es-
tablishing a basic course of study in the meaning of intelli-
gence, its significance as the foundation for policy planning
and a guide for operations, how it plays those roles, and the
principles and processes by which it is produced and formu?
lated. Such a course should not be narrowed to the specialties
of political or military intelligence, but develop broad princi-
ples applicable in all fields. It should highlight the concept
of intelligence and intelligence processes as a critical factor
in almost every form of human social endeavor-economic.
scientific, and cultural, as well as military and political-ix-
ing essentially a processing and use of facts and a making o'
judgments in a logical program for a specific purpose.
The intelligence cou
academic disciplines.
cagy, and logic, in writ
among others be used
be framed and guided
extensive and well-rot;
a few years in some 1
would need to run thi
per week, and should
at least immediately
minimized in favor
practical exercises.
course to cover the h:
special problems invo
fort by its users and
Lions. Some of these
ing courses in intern
separate advanced cot
The course in intel
dent at point of mat
advantage of employi
making it meaningfu
program. It would t
ing government serv
and of cogent interes
for careers in most I
tantly, perhaps, sin(
the will of informed (
ingredient to those s
reaching process whi
sity courses devoted
fields of public adm
tional relations.
All too generally
and the mechanism
heart of effectiveness
conduct of internati
sions, and these mt
call intelligence. I
has the opportunity
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which devel-
tligence and
the United
ten ational
among offl-
rdemic con-
Commen-
on Chinese
;he strength
the British-
rsistent and
been set off
Cartoonist
ce estimate
explain it to
a legitimate
.t and its re-
.is interest a
ening public
and colleges
to take ad-
keed, and the
imately con-
competence.
made by es-
ng of int.elll-
icy planning
oles, and the
i and formt-
he specialties
broad princi.
the concrV,
ritical facts
)r-economk,
political_--.
I a making Cl
Dse.
Courses in Intelligence
The intelligence course would apply the teachings of many
academic disciplines. Specialists in economics, politics, sociol-
ogy, and logic, in written, oral, and visual presentation could
among others be used in the instruction. The program should
be framed and guided, however, by a competent teacher with
extensive and well-rounded intelligence experience, not merely
a few years in some particular intelligence field. The course
would need to run through two semesters at three class hours
per week, and should be offered to students at the graduate or
at least immediately pregraduate level. Lectures should be
minimized in favor of reading, discussion, conferences, and
practical exercises. It would not be proposed in this basic
course to cover the history of intelligence or to go deeply into
special problems involved in the guiding of the intelligence ef-
fort by its users and its application in the conduct of opera-
tions. Some of these subjects could be incorporated into exist-
ing courses in international affairs, others would be left to
separate advanced courses as the program developed.
The course in intelligence fundamentals, taken by the stu-
dent at point of maturity, would have the broad educational
advantage of employing and expanding his earlier learning and
making it meaningful within a single coordinated, purposeful
program. It-would be of direct value to students contemplat-
ing government service, whether in intelligence or elsewhere,
and of cogent interest to the intellectually inquisitive heading
for careers in most fields of private enterprise. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, since our government is one responsive to
the will of informed citizens, it would provide an indispensable
ingredient to those studies of the policy-making and decision-
reaching process which presently loom so centrally in univer-
sity courses devoted to creating an informed citizenry in the
Lelds of public administration, foreign affairs, and interna-
tional relations.
All too generally such courses treat only the policies made
and the mechanisms through which they are effected. The
heart of effectiveness, however, in public administration or the
conduct of international affairs is the making of sound deci-
s~ans, and these must be based on what in broad sense we
all intelligence. In present curricula the student seldom
as the opportunity to learn what kinds of raw materials are
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Courses in Intelligence
needed or how they are collected and consolidated to give tLt
unitary understanding essential in formulating sound pls
and guiding their execution.
Even a prospective business executive should learn not ox
the principles of economics, commercial and industrial orga.,*
zation, corporate finance, and the other usual subjects, but
also what kinds of facts he needs to know in applying thrst
principles and how such facts can be collected, evaluated, aw
consolidated for use in planning. Study of the intelliger
process can bring home to him the need to take into consid-
eration kinds of factors of which he might otherwise not bt
aware. For the student in foreign relations the study of L"x
production and use of intelligence is of more immediate a;.
plication, bringing out the importance of factors such as cul?
tural differences, economics, and religion, which present c-
lege courses rarely treat in a meaningful way. In short, suc:
study should round out a student's understanding of hi?
chosen field, no matter whether it lies in sociology, politic
or business, and help him to become the kind of citizen d-
manded by the role this country must now play on the storms
international scene.
The Soviets see in
differentiated and
threat to their sec,
like Soviet espiona
eersio7z in U.S. eyes.
SOVIET
Peter Deriabin, i
net pamphlet on
CIA, CIC, Naval ar
ponents of a sing]
accord with the st
U.S. intelligence
many different U.:
ticipate at one p
therefore, refer ge
niceties of burea'
tion individual c
they are likely to
this imprecision s
nate name-calling
intelligence orga
zens, officials, an
criminate poorly
cies, which have
Deriabin's book ai
Spies of the State
The espionage
depicted as being
of the State Dep,
that deals in an
Several Soviet s(
partment's Bure
son link betweer
dagger personnf
presumed to be is
the Soviet Bloc.
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The /ollotwiugr arioIr is the 1ranlnarp o/ (I drl(tr/rvl ~Iud)p pre/larerl /or lhr Cenler /or lhr ,Shrdt
1/ Ire I,' 1/i ge 1101, of the ()//U1, o/ T7 a111111g o/1 I/te ill Urre/rl 10/)If 0/ 111t, 1111Y/lt,~e'1(e d1lowna, (11 1(1(00
it0111 serurily rtclurrentrnls ccrilon the /rnrnoc oil or a /d'r cociely. H ' Ito/wr lhic slalr?tur'nl nl 1/0
/101/1/elo retil/ slinrrrlrrle /urlher Ihouihl+ X11' l/rr srrhlrrl.
James E. Knott
In discussing what I believe to he the major areas of concern that our free society
Itao evinced regarding secrecy and intelligence, I hope to make it clear that I feel there
or no final answers. They arc not problems that can he solved; they are focal points
that will demand continuing attention in pursuit of a balance which must be worked
out between the opposing factors.
The central problem which demands attention does not stem from the question
whether secrecy, intelligence, or even clandestine operations are compatible with a
free so( iety. The erntr;t1 problem is the sir'ueturc through which that tree society
ucersees its processes of .secrecy determination, intelligencc production, and the
conduct of clandestine operations.
.I his may appear to be a mechanistic conclusion, but I make it because I ant
(111\ III( that our free society is in basic agreement as to the kinds of things on which
Secrecy' is justified. I am also convinced that--if the society knew more about the
subject-there would he if consensus on the criteria which should be applied to
deciding wiicther or not a foreign clandestine operation was an appropriate actictty
Or ;t lice society. And, in complement to such agreement, there is the fact that the
trtue rind blessing of a free soeiety i, that iherv' is a constant ;end con(intting process
if defines and refines the values the sOc iety expects to he applied lay its
institutions. 'T'hese values themselves do not change radically-but neither are thew
,thsolute. They adjust to the ('Worts the 00 11 (5' is rolled upon to undertake, and ihev
adjust in particul;n' in accordancc with the threats the society feels it fares 1!1 rltlter
the Tree soeiety will rrlinrluish sonu of its freedom if that is ncecssar,. kill it
.:1! voislt to s(I re,tdlustnmot ntke nl,u e u;tr f such relinyuishn~ent is nn lunlyet
I he inherent 1e,tit01' of were) i. ilu lintil;tttrln ul ,01('50 to tl,e sweets III;' Tree
riric ;ts a whole cannot make the lurlgntcnt ,ts to whether or not infividual matters
:r lc~,i(imately kept secret It must place its trust in an oversight bode or bodies to
.t 1 in its behalf. The smaller the number of people it decides it needs to establish such
ondition of' trust, the better it will be for the secrecy system.
I he free society must have confidence that its oversight mechanisms have
tricrlu;rte access to secret material to make judgments, and that this judgmental
;lruccss is being exercised independently. There has to he trust 'chat secrecy is not
'coo used against the best interests of the fret, society; that the activities which arc
'rirn, protected by secrecy are being conducted effectively; and that necessary
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rc;ldjustlncnt o1 Ihcsc m11%ill( s ,ikcs place in co11forni;incc ,% ;h changed doitte ii
1111 (1 international circumstances It is this confidence and this trust in the oversic,hl
mechanisms which has broken down
In exploring the 111eans Ity which conlidencc ,Ind it List can be restored, the lrce
society must hear in mind the fact that its consensus does change. 'I he lessons of thr
past Intut not be ignored, but it would he an error to judge What was fornrerlc
clone--or what might be done in the futtire--by ii consensus of the current mon;eni
Deprived of historical perspective. It would also he mistaken to concentrate too much
0o Ill ctccming the ;ilinsc of SIC iii) withmii also rec ognir.ing Ili ii Ihcrc ;ire Icgi(im;itc
secrets. The free society owes it to those it holds responsible for producing secret
nformation and conducting secret activities to maintain an oversight process which
protects legitimate secrecy.
What then are some of the suggestions for improvement which should he
considered:' I have grouped them under five headings:
Pedc'%iuilror o/ Oir't'rnn e?d Secrecy
''N;ition;il sus only'' llone is 1(i in:rdctlu;Ilc base for ;t government secrets
classification system. Some suggest expanding this to "national defense or foreign
policy " Executive Order 1 1652 uses "national defense or foreign relations" and then
combines the two into "national security." However, as I have noted, the Freedom of
Information Act not only excludes from its procedures those national defense or
foreign policy secrets which have been "properly classified," but also excludes eight
other areas, such as trade secrets and certain investigatory records. Such matters ;ire
not part of the classification system, but one suspects that a good rrtany of them get
mixed up in the classification system of tlutse ;tgcncics dealing with national defense
;111(1 Ii)l cign relations ecrets.
II it ( ould be granted that there is overall confusion about governmental sec-I 1(c c
in our free society, wouldn't it be better to hose a comprchensit-e system' Or would
lot mall/ing what already exists in practice only compound the already overwhelill inc,
prol,lenis of dealing with government paper' Nicholas deli. Katicnliach. discussirn,
this only in the foreign policy field, conies down in favor of major surgery on the
classification st stem and relying "on the good sense of bureaucrats to keep
confidential what should be confidential most of the time, without employing bloated
concepts of national security to do so "* Perhaps so, hilt I hclicve the opposite course
of inclusiveness is t-worth exploration.
In an' , case, whether the lesser secrets are dropped out of the currentl)
overblown "national security"-based classification system into a ss'stent of
government-wide applicability, or whether they are dropped to the level of reliance
"on the good sense of bureaucrats," there can be no doubt of the need for draste
reduction in what has formerly been placed in the national security category. What is
needed is much greater clarity as to what this category should reallVV contain. Heuer
guidelines would help inunensety in the judgmental factor which will always be
involved At the stoic time, the nunibers of persons entitled to make such judgments
must continue to he reduced. Some such clarifications and further reductions, it
seems to ne, will he the inevitable results of current attempts to cope with the major
changes brought about by the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order
11652.
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Secrecy in a Free Society UNCLASSIFIED
Another area that needs cfarilication has to do with abuse of the classification
system On the one side, it has been much too easy to overclassify. A Subcommittee
headed by Congressinan William S. N'loonccad conducted it study in 1971 that found
there had been 2,433 investigations by government agencies of classification system
violations over it four-year period. Of these, only 2 involved cases of overclassification
and not a single administrative penalty was imposed against overclassification."*
On the other hand, great concern has been expressed about dangerous leakage in the
system-"unauthorized disclosure." No one would deny that there are legitimate
secrets which deserve greater protection. Clearly the current Espionage Act is
inadequate for this purpose. One doubts, however, that it will be improved upon until
secrecy has been reduced to the level the national consensus will feel is justified and
our free society becomes more convinced than it is at present that there are adequate
infra-executive means of airing and reconciling legitimate dissent.
Congressional Oversight
It is, of course, up to the Congress as to how it organizes its oversight role. The
current system has come under .a great deal of attack, notably from members of
Congress itself. At least some modification, and possibly even major change, in the
four-subcommittee system appears to be in the offing. Whatever means of rebuilding
trust and confidence are found, there is one primary fact of life about secrets which
must be faced: those who have been made responsible for secrets they feel are
important cannot be rxpecled to continue it osstem which endangers the secrets
I'here must be trust and confidence on both sides of a secrecy-sharing process In a
free society, the official who feels secrecy has been and will be violated cannot have
and should not have the option of evasion cif legislative oversight. His only option is to
point Out the consequences Of poor security and the fact that the activity must cease if
the secrecy necessary to its continuance cannot be preserved. And, does anyone dent
that the publicity-attracting nature of clandestine operations creates special problems
in establishing mutual Irusr ,Ind (onfidence1'
Another matter to be considered with regard to oversight are ,hc interests of the-
nicn concerned 'I he primary role of the inrclligencc community will undoubtedly
remain one dealing with mllirary, security matters. However, other fields have been
Increasingly added, notably international economics, narcotics intelligence, and
International terrorism. Further, there is it special need to view the intelligence
community as a whole, and the members of that community relate to quite a variety
Of authorization committees. There needs to be a means of promoting greater
Congressional cohesion between these differing jurisdictions.
Other than including people who have the trust of their Congressional
colleagues, whose composition unifies the field of intelligence yet reflects its diversified
content, who can follow methods preserving secrecy, there is the key question of how
much detail the oversight body needs. British intelligence authority John Bruce
l,oc'khart's central thesis on this question is: "the operations of Secret Services must
remain secret, but the principles by which Secret Services can best be directed and
controlled should be considered carefully, discussed, and understood by those at
(ern ernment level who are responsible for controlling Secret Services."** Not having a
'kclr \\ S ylooncead, -0perInun anri Ilclnrm of the Classiticauon Svstclic in the US.." in Frank
uul A\rishand, d, ,,, r, p,rnd lnrir{n l'uhrr (()xlrcrd t'nivrrr;il) Pcc,s, N(-sc Turk 1974) 1) 10I
-John Bruce Lockh,irl - I he Ilclatiunshilr Between .Secret Services and U,,verninenl ill a Modem
''i:ur l?/ Q %nnrnnl of Me /loy(1l 1',Iar/ hr+lrlulr In, l)r/ino' Snrrkrt. (June 1974) p_ 3
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UNCLASSIFIED Secrecy in a Free Society
parliamentary system, we in the United States need to have such consideration.
discussion, and understanding shared by the executive and legislative bodies. It is
extremely important to note that what Lockhart urges be left out of the discussion are
the details of the "operations of Secret Services." The application of such a concept to CIA
is not as radical as it might appear, inasmuch as only a portion of what CIA does is
made up of' the "Secret Service" kind of' operation-and much that is supposed to
pass as clandestine, really isn't.
Perhaps such exclusion of clandestine operations from examination may not be
found satisfactory, however. Sometimes detail is needed for making evaluations.
Sometimes knowledge of specifics is needed to be able to ask the right general
questions. l)oes examination of detail need to be seen as an ongoing process, or might
it he seen as temporary-until confidence was restored? Would examination of detail
need (o be across the board, or could the need be met by periodic or spot checks'
Could detail be restricted to one type of operation, and the others left alone?
Lastly, when an examination or follow-up probe involves very sensitive material,
does the full committee (or committees) need to be a part of such an examination'
Couldn't one or two members, possibly on a rotating basis, be assigned to the task'
Or, preferably, could such a question be transferred to some such body as the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which would then have the
responsibility of standing behind a reassurance of the oversight group. Or, could such
inquiry be undertaken by a very small number of particularly trusted and reliable
Congressional staffers? And what open record is at all possible on such matters to
help reassure the free society and improve acceptance of appropriate joint
responsibility? Could, for instance, some sort of quarterly listing of general topics
covered by oversight proceedings be made public?
Execulive Oversight
Executive oversight is not as critical a matter at the moment as legislative
oversight, but it too merits attention. The primary concern of our free society at this
time does not seem to be whether or not the Executive knows what CIA does, but
whether the Executive will be able to abuse the secret capabilities represented by
CIA. The meeting of the proolem of legislative oversight and the functioning of a
much more open Presidency should result in overcoming this fear.
This does not mean that there should be a return to the secrecy which used to
surround the clearance procedures for CIA activity. The channels for executive
approval of CIA activities should be uniform and not competitive or duplicatory, so
that no future charges of CIA selecting the most favorable channel can be made. The
channels should be publicly known, and so should the people in them. Again, it
should be as much a matter of principles rather than details on operations whenever
possible, but obviously when details are required in order to make risk/gain
assessments, they must he readily provided. Clearly, such details will be required very
often. Full knowledge can sometimes provide a better base for cooperation on the
preservation of secrets than a partial knowledge leading to shared speculation
between those partly "in the know." How often an operational activity needs to be
reviewed, and the number of people who reed to give their approval, can depend on
the type of operation involved.
The "grey" area between CIA's domestically-based but foreign-related activities
and those of the FBI must be reduced to an absolute minimum. There must be clearly
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Secrecy in a Free Society
understood procedures for an accountable ruling in case of any doubt. Domestic
activities must be governed by the standards and institutional arrangements of the
domestic scene, and it must be clear to the free society that this is the case. There
must be a very minimum of overlap between the decision-making process for domestic
activity and the decision-making process for foreign activity. The two must be judged
by different standards.
Lastly, there is the problem of efficiency and effectiveness. There is a great deal
more of the administrative side of the intelligence organizations which could be open
to Congressional scrutiny. I lowever, the major responsibility obviously rests with the
executive branch, which must continually improve its management practices. More
rigorous, not less rigorous, review by the Office of Management and Budget is
needed. Continued progress must be made on the community-wide framework of
requirements against which evaluations can be made. The techniques of evaluating
programs must also be improved. There must he evaluation in depth on a selective
basis-a requirement, a source, a station, etc.
Reducl on o/ Agency Secrr.cy
Without the shadow of a doubt, a sort of GIcsllam's Law operates with regard to
respect for security systems. If an employee is asked to treat worthless material with
the respect due only to worthwhile secrets, the had practices will drive the good
practices out of circulation Similarly, if a free society is asked to respect a security
system and then finds that the system has protected "bad" or worthless secrets, it
may well result in damage to the system's ability to protect "good" secrets. From
both the standpoint of the employee's observance of the security structures and the
free society's respect for maintaining security systems, there can be only one
conclusion: the matters which need to be kept secret must be reduced to a minimum.
For a conclusion so obviously correct for a free society, it is hard to see why there
should be any disagreement or serious problems. But it is vastly easier to state such a
conclusion than it is to implement it. It seems to me that the problems of
implementing it for the Agency stem from three main sources. The first of these is an
insufficient differentiation between the security needs of the varied personnel of CIA.
To draw again on the wisdom in this field which John Bruce Lockhart has set forth:
Those in-control of Secret Services must have a realistic and disenchanted
understanding of "security." This is not as simple as it sounds, because possibly
more follies have been committed in the name of security than in any other
governmental activity in a modern state. These broad principles must continu-
ally be borne in mind if this area of folly is to be reduced.
In secret operations there are only two degrees of security. One is the suit of
armour, where the man's identity or objective remains a total secret. The other is
the fig leaf, where a facade of respectability is imposed on functions or
individuals whose real purpose is widely known and accepted. Security trouble
arises when it is believed by those who control them that there are degrees of
security in secret operations between the suit of armour and the fig leaf. *
Those who are really operating in secret need the "suit of armor" and need every
help in keeping it impervious. Those who are operating under "fig leaf" conditions
should not be treated the .same way as those within armor. It should also be fairly
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Secrecy in a Free Society
unlikely that the "fig leaf" operator would revert to or become a truly clandestine
operator. A great many of the Clandestine Service personnel now have the trappings
which are the due of the "suit of armor" operators but they are in fact engaged in "fig
leaf" operations. The easily identified large-scale operations of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia come most easily to mind. However, this is also true of many of the liaison
arrangements with foreign intelligence services. It may also involve such new missions
as anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism activities conducted in cooperation with local
authorities.
Such "fig leaf" operations may well be fulfilling agreed and necessary functions,
they may well require some clandestine skills; and in some cases they may well be
dangerous. But they do not require the high degree of protection of identity, skills and
movements necessary for the truly clandestine operator. Add to this need to
differentiate between operators requiring "suit of armor" protection and operators
who need only fig leaves, the further dilfcrenti;rtion between operators and the rest of
the CIA personnel. I)o people who arc only handling secrets even need a fig leaf?
ibis area of difficulty can be compounded by the "one Agency" concept-the
idea of interchangcahility of Agency carvers In my personal opinion, this is a mistake
in so far as it presumes a movement from the analytical side into the Clandestine
Service. It has been done, but how often? And how many of those who did make such
a transfer actually become clandestine operators'
Possibly the greatest source of difficulty on this differentiation problem could be
the extent to which there may be an effort to hide the operators within the larger
group of Agency employees. According to Roger I filsman: "the original idea of CIA
had been to conceal the cloak and dagger activities behind the much larger mass of
`overt' intelligence work-research and estimating, monitoring foreign propaganda
broadcasts, and so on. ` I do not personally know if this was indeed the intent. To the
extent that it may be, such "cover" should be questioned as to its usefulness. At best it
far more resembles a fig leaf than it does a suit of armor. And society would really not
need to blush if this particular fig leaf were dropped.
In sum, the "one Agency" concept deserves a very hard look in terms of its conse-
quences for personnel security practices. And the degree to which the personnel
security practices of the Clandestine Service are based upon "suit of armor" assump-
tions also needs close examination. Are the justified needs of truly clandestine
operations being endangered by being too widely applied? Shouldn't the truly
clandestine be set apart as urged by another of Lockhart's principles: that the
"operational front of secret operations should be as narrow as possible?""
The second main source of problems in reducing security practices to a
minimum are what must be regarded as national bureaucratic tendencies inherent in
any organization, but particularly large ones Bringing about some uniformity in
judgmental matters is extraordinarily difficult and in practice the "lowest common
denominator" is subject to continual decline-particularly if there is no penalty for
"playing it safe'' Such penalties should be set up and used. There is no final answer, of
course, but some clearer criteria need to be set up and there must be an improvement
in systems of review-an excellent function to assign to deputy chiefs.
Another major factor to be attacked are practices stemming from tradition and
precedent. Such practices do not necessarily represent accumulated wisdom.
.11,Ismm), Aaoon, (I)nul)Icdav. Ncw Murk, 1967) 79
"* .ucktrnn, Op - i , h i.
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Sometimes they do, but they can also represent outmoded ways of doing things which
historical circumstances may have once justified-circumstances which subsequently
departed the scene. There are, for instance, "worst case" regulations. These were set
up when a "worst case" did occur or when someone had the imagination to think that
it might. Such "worst case" regulations need to be examined to see what the
probability really is of such an event occurring. All too often such regulations stay on
the books, are not enforced by the authorities, but are available as a basis for
supervisory thunder "just in case." This is dishonest administration, natural as it
may be. Another group of practices undoubtedly stem from a "weakest-link"
concept. At some particular point a given security practice may well have been set up
or reinforced to prevent it from being the "weak-link" in a chain of security practices.
Its chain may no longer exist, or other parts of the chain may have become of a much
weaker gauge. It is absolutely right to view security practices in a systems approach
now context. But differentiated now channels are possible and can be treated
differently so that what would be a "weak link" in one wouldn't necessarily be so in
another.
Besides being looked at in a systems approach chain method, security practices
should be examined as a layered concept. Is the secret at the core still a secret:' Arc
the various layers of protection ("derivative" secrets) still needed or can some of them
be relaxed or dispensed with? How many practices may have come from the re-
quirements of some other body as part of the process of establishing the mutual trust
needed for the exchange of secrets? Are these still needed?
A third main source of problems is the necessity of not disclosing too many clues
as to your intelligence successes-or lack thereof. This is what is involved in the
reluctance to disclose too much information about Agency organization or budgeting.
It is held that such information could show trends which ought to be concealed.
One suspects that some such trends would be fully evident from open policy documents,
i.e., increased concentration on the Mid-East, decreased attention to Indochina,
increased interest in economic information, etc. Further, even in the open parts of our
system, it is often very difficult to track expenditures from budget year to budget year.
Without denying that some trends merit concealment, one can't help wondering in
how much of the agency this may be a problem, and at what level of budgetary listing
it becomes a problem. Much information is justifiably withheld because it meets the
statutory protection provided in the 1949 Act for intelligence sources and methods.
But isn't there a good deal of such organizational in/orrna1wn which would not endanger
sources and methods?
Turning from organizational information, what about making more of the
intelligence end-product available to Congress and the public? If this can be done
without endangering sources and methods, or endangering what I regard as
legitimate executive leadership rights and administrative responsibilities, I feel much
more such information in an appropriately usable form should be made available
Such sharing is indeed on the increase. The more that it is possible to do this with
central intelligence, the less possible parochial manipulation through partial release
of information becomes. It has been suggested that the Congress should he able to
levy its own estimate requirements on CIA, and this is an idea worth exploring.
Procedures for promoting change
hhe discipline of the marketplace brings change. Much of what CIA does cannot
be out in the marketplace. Being responsive to a need to change and adjust poses very
UNCLASSIFIED 7
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special problems for a closed organization. There is a need not only for CIA to be
much more closely attuned to the consensus of our free society, but also for a
reinforcement of its processes of eliminating the mediocre and the outdated.
CIA has had procedures to promote change, but I believe it is fair to say that they
did not work well enough. Undoubtedly a part of the reason for resistance to change
stems from a humanitarian concern about men whose services might no longer be
required. Another part might stem from a cautious reaction to preventing an over-use
of the Agency such as had marked certain periods in the past-an over-use which can
produce failures not balanced in the public mind with successes. It might have
derived from a realization that it would be much more difficult to operate in a multi-
polar world where the choices were less clear and where the cement of common
assumptions characterizing the Cold War period would be lacking. It may well be
prudent in some cases to keep standby capabilities until you are more certain that you
won't need them. However, much necessary change didn't take place simply because
it didn't have to.
Beyond the need to reinforce external procedures of promoting change, there is a
need to examine CIA's internal methods serving this purpose. Where did
recommended change take place and where did it fail to take place? What was the
record as regards Inspector General surveys? Where was lip service paid to their
recommendations but little actually ended up being changed? There were processes
of feedback and some attempts at evaluation. What happened to these? What is the
record on Management Advisory Groups? What was the upshot of training programs
designed to help challenge assumptions and promote rethinking? There should be a
considerable body of material available for analysis on what must be one of the key
problems of secrecy and intelligence in a free society.
To conclude: free society needs intelligence It needs secrecy. But there has been
a loss of proportion, a loss of confidence and trust, and a lack of understanding on all
sides. These must be overcome because the free society needs to make wise use of the
capabilities at its command-and I include covert capabilities in this. It is high time
that a mending took place.
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NOTES ON QUALIFICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT
RESEARCH AS OPPOSED TO ACADEMIC STUDY
Government organizations for research in foreign political,
cultural, social and economic fields depend heavily on research
training programs in the academic world as sources of bright
new recruits. The meaning of research as a function is clear
to both sides, but research in government agencies has in some
details of practice moved away from the pattern of action
familiar to academic research groups. With this thought in
mind, I venture to set down a few pointers to the special
qualifications which we in Washington are finding desirable
to candidates for jobs with us.
Let me dispose of one point at once. We want young re-
cruits who are well trained in research, who know their sub-
}ects, and who know how to evaluate fresh information and
apply it to the growing pattern of knowledge which they
possess. We want them, furthermore, familiar with as many
approaches and disciplines as possible. Above all, we want
recruits who are used to looking beyond the "What happened?"
to the question "Why did it happen?" We fortunately know
that on all these matters the academic programs, especially
area programs, are in agreement with us and have precisely
these objectives in their training. These are, however, not all
the qualities for which we look.
Let me sum up our needs by saying that our recruits must
be capable of presentations that are clear, brief, bold and
prompt; that their jobs will require them to be cooperative,
patient and often anonymous. Behind these simple words
lurk serious considerations.
Government researchers work, of course, for operating offi-
dais who make decisions on action. It would be useless to
pretend that these officials are themselves all stylists; in some,
brwever, the nature and urgency of their work have produced
a direct, concise form of writing; in all, whether or not they
rte gobbledygook of their own, is a firm determination not
to master the gobbledygook of another tradition. Unfortu-
cately, we have seen no evidence that education, and especially
Llgher education, has modified its indifference to style and
Sarre. It appears that too great emphasis is still put on assim-
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Qualifications For Reseor$
ilation of learning, too little on exercises of active presentation
Facts may speak for themselves, but all too easily they miry
speak to an empty hall-and the effectiveness of a report to
helping officials varies directly with its clarity.
In the modern world, government officials are inordinate'y
busy; they simply cannot contemplate large accumulations ai
detail. This imposes a singular responsibility upon the sup.
porting researcher. He must not only accumulate informs,
tion but also condense it-and this not by compressing his
accumulation, by reducing a picture to a miniature, but by
selection and distillation. In short, he must often act not as
an amanuensis but as an authority, whose statement of can.
clusions will be guaranteed, not by a mass of footnoted detail,
but by his reputation for well founded judgments. The re-
sponsibility is flattering but awful. One of the great service
any training program can do is to insist upon practice in the
art of briefly distilling out ideas and conclusions from massive
compendia-and, indeed, there is no better device for revealing
any flaws or hollowness in externally impressive monuments.
The third quality flows from these two. Any writer will
realize that to expose his essential ideas baldly in brief compass
requires confidence. Yet the researcher is always contributing
towards decisions, and decisions require the stripping down of
qualifying factors to essential issues. Decisions further re-
quire departing from the footnoted past into a future which
cannot be documented but which must be analyzed under the
head of possible consequences. We benefit by any curriculum
which includes exercise in general ideas beyond the scope of
footnotes, and speculation beyond the confine of the docu-
mented present.
Lastly, these clear, brief, and forceful presentations have to
be accomplished under pressure. Even worse than writing a
paper that no one will read is to write one that reaches an
officer after he has made his decision-yet the succession of
crises is nowadays so close that deadlines come upon the very
heels of requests. Promptitude is, we know, part of every
course of training. Another aspect of the problem is, however,
perhaps less open to action by a training program. Decisions
can often not be postponed, and although little knowledge may
be dangerous, surely none is worse yet. The researcher may,
despite all proper planning and foresight, be called upon for
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Owlifications f
judgment four
best available,
Prompt in fulf.
Besides these
oral qualities v
He is likely to
starch jobs ar(
us to tell up-to
problems requ
,ews; the aut
which our age
under pressur(
Uon, submissic
our analysts
private resear
cooperate.
By the sam,
remain largel;
for the joint
through cons
mittee work
recognition.
remain behin~
own committ,
them. The a
superior to pi
any effect, el
upon policy.
and recruits I
Finally, we
generally knc
ment work.
ponderous, a:
annoyance a'
demic folk wl
aeternitatis-
their first wr
proclamation
words to mov
makes histo:
patience.
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For Research
inordinately
emulations of
.Pon the sup-
late informa-
npressing his
ature, but by
.en act not as
~ment of con-
)tnoted detail,
;nts. The re-
great services
)ractice in the
from massive
e for revealing
monuments.
ny writer will
brief compass
rs contributing
.pping down of
ns further re-
t future which
yzed under the
any curriculum
.d the scope of
e of the docu-
tations have to
than writing a
hat reaches an
.e succession of
upon the very
part of every
lem is, however,
ram. Decisions
knowledge may
researcher may,
called upon far
Qualificafions For Research
judgment founded on information that is insufficient but the
best available, and again he may need boldness if he is to be
prompt in fulfilling his advisory responsibility.
Besides these peculiar arts of presentation, certain more gen-
eral qualities will make the recruit happier and more effective.
He is likely to find himself in an organization where few re-
search jobs are performed by a single individual. It is not for
us to tell up-to-date academic research authorities that modern
problems require a fusion both of disciplines and of regional
views; the authorities may not, however, realize the extent to
which our agencies are organized to effect fusions of this sort
under pressure. Through often feverish processes of consulta-
tion, submission of fragmentary drafts, and joint composition,
our analysts are collaborators to a degree seldom required in
private research, and must possess well developed abilities to
cooperate.
By the same token, our analysts in their written production
remain largely anonymous. It is impossible to sort out credit
for the joint compositions that issue from our shops, though
through consultations with other officials and through com-
mittee work any analyst can very soon gain sound personal
recognition. Even in this respect, however, he must sometimes
remain behind the scenes. Higher officials, in attending their
on committees, cannot trail clouds of witnesses along with
them. The analyst must often be content with briefing some
superior to present his ideas, and obtain his satisfaction from
any effect, even though indirect, that his thought has had
upon policy. Some experts have found this procedure strange,
and recruits may well be prepared for it in advance.
Finally, we in our research agencies must be patient. It is
atnerally known that frustration is a besetting evil of govern-
ment work. The machine is very large, very complicated, very
pderous, and often very slow. It is strange, however, that
annoyance at the delays should be so common amongst aca-
bemic folk whose private work is so often performed sub specie
setcrnitatis-yet we find researchers who get miffed because
their first written words are not at once whisked into a public
proclamation. The wheels are large; it takes a great spate of
Wards to move one of them a tiny inch; but every inch it moves
ayes history. This is the reward our business offers to
patience.
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Search for reconciliation
NATIONAL INTEREST, MORALITY,
AND INTELLIGENCE
John P. Langan, S.J.
In the second book of Plato's Republic, Glaucon challenges Socrates to
expound the nature of justice and to establish its superiority to injustice. In set-
ting this challenge, he does two things: he reports the view of justice held by
the sophists, the Greek intellectuals and rhetoricians; and he tells the story of
Gyges' ring. The sophistic view of justice is put in simple terms.
By nature, they say, to commit injustice is a good and to suffer it
is an evil, but that the excess of evil in being wronged is greater than
the excess of good in doing wrong, so that when men do wrong and
are wronged by one another and taste of both, those who lack the
power to avoid the one and take the other determine that it is for
their profit to make a compact with one another neither to commit
nor to suffer injustice, and that this is the beginning of legislation and
of covenants between men, and that they name the commandment of
the law the lawful and the just, and that this is the genesis and
essential nature of justice-a compromise between the best, which is
to do wrong with impunity, and the worst, which is to be wronged
and be impotent to get one's revenge. Justice, they tell us, being
midway between the two, is accepted and approved, not as a real
good, but as a thing honored in the lack of vigor to do injustice, since
anyone who had the power to do it and was in reality "a man" would
never make a compact with anybody neither to wrong nor to he
wronged, for he would be mad.'
In this sophistic view, which in some ways anticipates Hobbes's speculations
about the state of nature, it is asserted that people will not merely do what is to
their advantage but that they will even prefer unjust activity. Because of
external pressure they will, in fact, come to accept justice only as a necessary
second-best, not as a moral virtue or value in itself. This view presupposes an
egoistic conception of human motivation, and it severs the links between human
nature (which is seen as grasping and self-centered) and virtue. It presents justice
as the result of coercion and convention, something not intrinsically valuable or
worth pursuing for itself. It lacks, however, the radical individualism of
Hobbes's famous thought-experiment, in which all the various bonds of
cooperation and organization are dissolved. Instead, as the accompanying story
of Gyges' ring makes plain, it imagines individuals who are free to work their
will on an existing society which is powerless to control them.
This article is adapted from a talk Father Langan gave in May 1983 at the Conference nn
Ethics and the Profession of Intelligence conducted by the Center for the Study of Intelligence.
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STAT
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Gyges would have made a useful, though baffling, addition to the
intelligence community. But he started out humbly enough as a shepherd,
pasturing his flock in the mountains. When an earthquake occurred, he
descended into the ground and found there a gold ring on the body of a dead
man. This ring had the remarkable property of rendering its wearer invisible.
After Gyges had checked this out carefully, he arranged to be sent back to
court to report on the flocks' progress. Being a fast worker and ambitious, "on
coming there he seduced the king's wife and with her aid-set upon the king
and slew him, and possessed his kingdom." Glaucon then draws out the
philosophical point of this tale:
If now there should be two such rings, and the just man should
put on one and the unjust the other, no one could be found, it would
seem, of such adamantine temper as to persevere in justice and
endure to refrain his hands from the possessions of others and not
touch them, though he might with impunity take what he wished
even from the market place, and enter into houses and lie with whom
he pleased, and slay and loose from bonds whomsoever he would, and
in all things conduct himself among mankind as the equal of a god.
And in so acting he would do no differently from the other man, but
both would pursue the same course. And yet this is a great proof, one
might argue, that no one is just of his own will but only from
constraint in the belief that justice is not his personal good, inasmuch
as every man, when he supposes himself to have the power to do
wrong, does wrong. For that there is far more profit for him
personally in injustice than in justice is what every man believes, and
believes truly .... 2
This text could perhaps be given a place of honor in security offices, and it
does build on certain suspicions that we have about people, ourselves
sometimes included. The story of Gyges also offers comfort to the cynical and
to the vicious; for it assures them that there is no ultimate difference between
the just and the unjust: given suitable pressures or opportunities, everyone
gives in and does what is wrong. In fact, the just may even be looked down
upon because they are more malleable, more influenced by social pressures,
less persistent and clear-eyed in pursuing their own interest. Many centuries
later, Nietzsche was to take up this line of reflection in arguing for the values
of supermen who would not be restrained by conventional moral values
designed to protect the herd. But such cynical views were not held by Plato or
by his teacher Socrates. For the challenge put to Socrates by Adeimantus, the
other interlocutor in the dialogue, is to "prove to us in argument the
superiority of justice to injustice" and "show what it is that each inherently
does to its possessor-whether he does or does not escape the eyes of gods and
men-whereby the one is good and the other evil." 3 There have been
different ways of interpreting this challenge; but the basic division is between
those who have attempted to argue that acting justly will work out to one's in-
terest or advantage (on the lines of Benjamin Franklin's maxim, "Honesty is
the best policy") and those who have held that such a claim is demonstrably
untrue and debases morality, by making it an instrument to satisfy selfish
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Morality
desires and that the position of Socrates and Plato must have been that justice
is an intrinsically better or more valuable thing. There are, I think, grounds in
Plato's text for both lines of interpretation.'
Prosperity of the Wicked
But we are not dealing here with a problem merely of Platonic exegesis,
but rather with one of the central themes of moral and religious reflection in
the West. Thus the first psalm assures us that the just man who walks not in
the counsel of the wicked "in all that he does, he prospers." whereas "the way
of the wicked will perish." (Psalm 1.1-6). But the author of the seventy-third
psalm confesses that "I was envious of the arrogant, when I saw the prosperity
of the wicked; for they have no pangs; their bodies are sound and sleek. They
are not in trouble as other men are; they are not stricken like other men."
(Psalm 73.3-5). Whether in contemplating the sufferings of job or the exile of
Israel, the oppression of the poor or the destruction of martyrs, Biblical faith,
both Jewish and Christian, has had to struggle with the double problem of the
prosperity of the wicked and the suffering of the innocent as well as with a
God who promises a land of milk and honey but first leads his people through
the desert. To put the problem in the more homely theological language of
Charlie Brown, "If we're so sincere, why do we lose so many ball games?"
Religious believers have generally proved more willing than secular
individualists to accept either communal or long-range resolutions of the
conflict between the demands of morality and the pursuit of the individual's
happiness or interest. It was Kant who at the end of the eighteenth century in-
sisted on the necessity of recognizing the fundamental difference between a
way of life aiming at happiness or satisfaction (Epicureanism) and a way of life
aiming at moral virtue (Stoicism). He held that we should regard the basic con-
cepts of these two ways of life as distinct in their meaning and as giving shape
to two quite different projects.' But Kant also went back to a view that had
been standard in the mainstream of Christian theology, when he postulated
that God "the cause of the whole of nature" contains "the ground of the exact
coincidence of happiness with morality." 6 This postulation arises precisely
from our recognition that in the present order of things virtue is not rewarded
by happiness, that happiness is not found only among the virtuous, and that
this state of affairs is unsatisfactory. The present order of the world is a "vale
of tears," in which the righteous are often not vindicated. Moral philosophy in
this century, which has been at best agnostic on religious matters, has generally
moved away from Kant's postulation that God eventually makes the virtuous
happy. It has adopted either the Epicurean and utilitarian pursuit of general
satisfaction ("the greatest happiness of the greatest number") with its willing-
ness to modify moral principles if these have negative consequences for group
happiness or the Stoic rejection of non-moral reasons and rewards for being
moral and the commitment to moral value for its own intrinsic worth without
regard to the consequences.
Much of the philosophical and theological debate over reasons for being
moral and about why justice is better for us than injustice has centered on the
destiny and hope of individuals rather than on entire societies. The Hebrew
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Morality
srae e
Bible clearly deals with the problem actable onsthe e nation lslevel tl alnBt iston
problem seems to be even more intra
the individual level. There is the famous contrast or drawn
as he later proposed to put it
early work, Moral Man and Immoral So ationa "The Not So Moral Man in His Less Moral Cloy ~mt it~ ~~ woNh of thesurviv l clture
w hether
and success do not seem to be correlated states
pursue,
involved or with the moral character of the Rpolicies do not expect nations
we are thinking about the Assyrians or the
to be deterred by moral considerations from the pursuit
se if othiw sat Chet y take to
he their national interest. We even suspect
cate case. Our realistic mentors have
nat on-sgtates.
to he behavior and pol whetheorfth
of morality are really applicable move In interpreting the actions of nations, regard justice as a lesseaevol to be tolerated
Glaucon's suspicion that nations rather than as a goal to be pursued and that in the absence of countervailing
power they would act very badly indeed. f Now it must be admitted that considerable of thesSoviet Union,
view. Nation-states do act badly-w6
Libya, Iran, Argentina, in the very utrecen past. hert in Calving inlJonathan Edwards,
h
theological warrants in Augustine, in L
in Dostovevsky for thinking very badly f bewhat ing human imposed dWo to
know
other without a rigorous social discipline
d
our own hearts well enough to understand our proneness ktenowmptation
at we are
our need of external restraints and community support. e not completely unlike GvgeS'once ebeare not taken away ings And this, of couose, is the crucial
limits that we share with other human
and between
point. It is not really possible to of draw
dark line
vil social forces. Just ascwe
rupted individuals and a realm e
l
experience ourselves as moral beings also capable
to acknow ]dgeip aentialli
capable of repentance and renewal,
ties for good and evil in our various oneiofi theadominant t ndenciesh in
conviction, it should be said, goes against middle-class radicalism, which combines
tue a distrust of organized
its a own profound
social power with a comforting sense of
Moral Value of Governments ves
mora l
things, themse
The political communities to which
order belong
rrv with them
significance and weight. In the present
the hopes of their peoples and most o{uthe nctioong as persons po sensing hudman
their survival and for their continued of the
ld
dignity. This is a point that holds tr refor gimes oronoth not. But gove nmtents that
world, whether they are morally sound are substantially just, that derive their powers from the consent of the
governed, and that do not engage in serious
valueaThis sistnot to say violations
such a
rights of their people, have a greater moral own government's behavior or its policy
not nos But itlldoesgmtplvOthat the i
experience should convince us
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Morality
maintenance of such a government is itself a morally valuable end, though not
one of absolute and overriding importance. Such a government constitutes a
political agent which can rightly be concerned about its own survival and
about its possession of the natural, political, military, financial, and intellectual
resources necessary for its own survival and for the continued well-being of its
citizens. Its exercise of authority over its citizens is constrained by legal and
moral limits; and its responsibility for their protection is itself morally weighty.
A government's concern for these matters is not merely a matter of national or
institutional selfishness or self-aggrandizement, though it can easily degenerate
into that.
The point here is not to establish that everything undertaken for the sake
of the national interest and national security is morally justifiable or appropri-
ate, but that there is a morally valuable and important aspect to the pursuit of
the national interest. This results both from the existence of an ordered polity
of any sort and from the further achievement of a substantially just political
community. It may well be, as Reinhold Niebuhr argued, that a free political
community is not capable of the altruism, self-renunciation, and moral
conversion which occasionally can be found in individuals. Or it may be that
these notions have to be applied to nations in a very extended way. Converting
a nation may be something like trying to turn a supertanker around; it takes
miles and miles. But here I am less concerned with political units as moral
actors than with their well-being and survival as morally worthy concerns.
The other side of this matter is that, however much we may hope that the
path of national interest and the path of morality may converge, we must not
make on the national level the mistakes which Kant so vehemently deplored
on the individual level, the mistakes of identifying happiness and virtue,
interest and morality. In an open and non-totalitarian form of government
such as ours, in which there is no official monopoly of ideology or of opinion
on moral and political questions, there is a publicly acknowledged possibility
both that the government may act immorally and that it may act against the
national interest. Both these weighty normative concepts are only imperfectly
grasped and haltingly implemented by even the wisest and boldest of our
leaders. There is no infallibility or incorrigibility in the practical life of any
nation, including our own. Furthermore, in the great public documents of our
political and legal culture, there has been a steadfast affirmation of a common
morality in terms of which the actions of all governments, including our own,
can be judged. There may be considerable disagreement about the theoretical
and religious foundations of this common morality as well as on applications
and interpretations of particular elements within it. But it is an essential part
of this common morality that we must show a "decent respect" not merely for
the opinions of mankind, but also for their rights; that we share a common
condition of vulnerability, need, and dignity with distant friends and foes and
with those who would prefer to be simply distant, that we are all subject to the
same fundamental moral norms. In this view there is a moral order with
regard to which the various political systems of the world have a basically in-
strumental and subordinate role and which can serve us as a basis for
criticizing and assessing these political systems. Whether we conceive this
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moral order in terms of a higher law, whether this be natural or revealed, or in
terms of orders of creation, or as a system of natural and human rights, or as a
universal common good, we affirm a set of universal moral norms which
exceed in their scope and applicability the particular set of values that
constitute the interest of any one nation.
Especially in the period since 1.945, the United States has espoused values
which are universal in scope and which are not logically restricted to
advantages for this country and its citizens alone. When we label ourselves
"the party of freedom," when we bring pressures to bear on other govern-
ments to observe human rights nouns, when we undertake to defend
embattled democracies, we renew a commitment to moral values which reach
beyond older conceptions of the national interest. This appeal to universal
moral values has been made partly to counter the comprehensive ideological
system of our adversaries and partly to legitimate the exercise of American
power. But it also comes out of deep convictions in thle American people about
the exemplary value of our own experiment in democracy and about the
universal appeal and binding force of certain values which have shaped our
own society. This moral and ideological clement in our approach to the world
has been a source of some distress to many political realists, but it has been a
constant presence in American administrations over the last fifty years, and it
is common ground to both Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan.' Just as
there is a moral element connected with the survival and well-being of any
political community, there is a further moral element connected with the
moral purposes of American foreign policy. This element is subject to debate
and revision in a way in which the continued survival of a political community
is simply not a matter for debate within that community. We can give more or
less prominence to explicitly labeled moral elements in US foreign policy. We
can expand our concept of national interest to include these moral concerns, or
we can adhere to a more classically pure conception of national interest of the
type that would have been intelligible in European chanceries of the last
century. There are arguments for and against a broader conception of national
interest, but I personally do not think that we as a people can rest content with
the narrow conception.
In either case, however, we should recognize that there are elements
whose place in the national interest is subject to decision or revision. On the
basis of experience, of changed expectations, and of altered conditions both
internal and external, nations can and do redefine their national interest. This
is often a difficult and even painful process, as we can see from looking at the
experience of our British allies; but it is always possible and is often necessary.
This process has parallels in the way we manage our personal lives and define
our personal interests, as for instance when we decide that the love or the job
of our dreams is simply unattainable. This task of redefining interest on the
national level is often difficult to get hold of since nations can be both reticent
and confused about precisely what constitutes national interest and what
means are necessary to satisfying it, In addition, reality factors of various sorts
gradually and intermittently force us to redraw the shifting line between our
druthers, our preferences, our hopes and dreams on the one hand and what we
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Morality
regard as the hard core of our interests on the other. When the discipline and
the pressure exerted by these reality factors grow weak, the line between
preferences and interests blurs. When this happens, imperial ambitions and
overextensions of power are likely to result. In the case of Gyges, this line,
like the man himself, becomes invisible. Let me observe in passing that
uncertainty and division about what constitutes our national interest and just
how military and political means are to be directed to preserve the core of
that interest are a central difficulty in working out sustainable policy in
Central America.
Framework for Policy Decisions
It should be clear that determining the national interest is a political
process that does not achieve a finished, permanently valid result. It is a
corrigible and fallible process, not totally arbitrary, but with considerable
room for freedom and discretion. Within our system it is in a crucial way the
responsibility of the administration currently in office to determine and to
articulate a conception of the national interest which is capable of generating a
working public consensus and of providing a coherent framework for policy
decisions. The executive is in an authoritative position to determine national
interest in the concrete; but it is characteristic of our political system that its
authority to do this is never beyond challenge. To make this point is not to say
that all challenges are well thought out or appropriate or justifiable, only that
they are never in principle illegitimate.
A final general point about the interplay of national interest and
morality. If something like my line of argument is correct, then conceptions
of national interest which construe it as an amoral term or as a manifestation
of collective egoism are fundamentally mistaken. I also want to argue
something like this on the individual level as well. Interest always retains
certain moral elements, even when it is directed to immoral or unjust ends. It
should not be construed on the pattern of lust as Shakespeare characterized it
in one of his sonnets-"had, having, and in quest to have, extreme"-' or on
the lines of Hobbes's insatiable desire, always craving new means "to assure
forever, the way of his future desire." 9 Interest is fundamentally a category
for adult calculation, not a rationale for the acting out of childish fantasies.
In this respect the ring of Gyges is a misleading model for thinking about
interest. Interest is not simply desire, but desire rationalized and organized
into a plan of life or direction for social activity. The coherent pursuit of
interest is not really possible without at least some of the moral virtues,
particularly temperance and fortitude.10
The picture which I have been sketching of the relationship between
national interest and morality implies that there is a significant and expand-
able overlap between the two. It is neither appropriate nor culturally
acceptable for us as Americans to develop an amoral conception of national
interest as the basis of our public policy. But this view does not in any way
exclude the possibility of serious conflict between morality and national
interest. The two notions remain logically distinct. National interest concerns
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the well-being and security of US citizens and their social institutions, whereas
morality deals with principles and rules protecting the well-being and the
rights of all human beings. Promoting the universal human interest and
observing the rules that protect it may require some sacrifice or revision of the
national interest. Conflicts can be softened somewhat by stressing long-range
rather than short-range aspects of the national interest so that short-term
sacrifices or restrictions are accepted for the sake of long-range gains. They
can also be alleviated by adopting a conception of morality as closely linked to
universal human interest, where the interest of the part is seen as a constitutive
element in the interest of the whole.
But the possibility of conflict remains real, and we can all think of many
areas in which actions aimed at promoting the national interest might well
conflict with the demands of morality. We also have to recognize that the pos-
sibilities for conflict in this area extend beyond the legitimate range of national
interest. For it can happen that particular claims are advanced as being
appropriate to or even demanded by the national interest which more careful
or more disinterested reflection reveals not really to be in the long-range
national interest. Thus proposals can be advanced under the rubric of national
interest by corporations, by ethnic and religious groups, by unions, by allies, by
pressure groups of various sorts; these can be challenged either on moral
grounds or by arguing that they are not really compatible with the national
interest. But I believe that any universalist ethic, whether it be religious or sec-
ular, Protestant or Catholic, Jewish or Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist, utilitarian
or Kantian, has to affirm the possibility of significant conflict between national
interest and moral norms. Individuals and communities committed to such
moral views have to resist efforts to identify the national interest and the cause
of virtue. White hats can and do fall off.
Having made these observations on the concepts of national interest and
morality as very general notions, now turn to look at the ways in which they
are affected by the adversarial world situation within which intelligence work
is carried on. From one standpoint, morality is a matter of setting limits on
what human beings may do to each other." We are not to lie, cheat, steal. In
an adversarial situation, there are normally both inner motives and external
pressures urging us to violate these norms. The test of moral character is
commonly thought to consist in our adherence to these moral norms precisely
despite the temptations created by the adversarial situation, and by our own
desires. Let us reflect at least briefly on the most violent of organized
adversarial relations, namely war. It is clear that in war morally earnest people
attempt to do things to each other which they would regard as unacceptable
and depraved in any other context (with the exception of personal self-
defense). It is also true that the organized violence of war has often brought
with it a more general breakdown of moral behavior manifest in episodes of
pillage, rape,. etc. But it has been a common basic element in Western
philosophical and theological reflections on the problem of war in the tradition
of just war theory and in the practical development within the military of
what Michael Walzer describes as "the war convention," 11 that the use of
violence and the effort to harm are to be limited even in this most starkly
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threatening of adversarial situations. This gives us a rough model from which
to construct an understanding of the place of moral limits in the more complex
and problematic adversarial situation in which a great deal of intelligence
work has to he done.
In the first place, it prepares us to admit and to expect a certain amount of
conduct which is not normally acceptable in the ordinary contexts of life, Here
I have in mind primarily the use of deception in order to preserve secrecy.
One of the unresolved difficulties in my mind with regard to this analogical
extension of just war theory is that the context of war within which violence
can justifiably be used is more clearly bounded than is the context of
intelligence work within which deception may be justified. In the second
place, deception and other departures from the norms of common morality
would then have both the need and the possibility of justification. When these
practices are justified on grounds of national interest or national security, this,
if my account of the notion of national security is correct, involves an appeal
to considerations about human well-being and social institutions which have
moral standing. Third, it is crucially important that such departures from the
norms of common morality be limited, and that they not be generalized into
the establishment of an amoral and antimoral counterculture within the
intelligence community. The decisive point is that departures from specific
moral norms, when justified by morally weighty reasons, do not constitute the
abandonment of the moral way of life or of the moral point of view. Fourth,
the adversarial relation is not conceived in the intelligence context or in the
war context as a situation in which every loss for the adversary is ipso facto a
gain for our side. Not every harm inflicted on the enemy advances our cause.
Even in war, there is a common interest in preventing the degeneration of hos-
tilities into butchery and barbarism. The acknowledgment of a common
interest is present in President Reagan's interesting proposal that we might
eventually share defensive military technology with the Soviet Union. Some
elements of this common interest are permanent and unalterable since they
arise from our common humanity and our sharing a single planetary habitat.
The general human interest in avoiding a nuclear holocaust which would
destroy our societies and which might render much of the earth uninhabitable
belongs here. Others are fleeting and depend on temporary political condi-
tions. Thus both an American president and a general secretary of the
Communist party of the Soviet Union may need an arms control agreement at
a given moment in order to manage their respective political coalitions. Others
fall somewhere in between depending on political and economic analyses and
policies which we can readily imagine changing, but which rest on relatively
stable factors in the situation, for instance, the judgments in Washington and
Moscow that a default on foreign loans by Poland is not in the interest of either
power.
Burdens on a Democratic System
Many have observed that the management of a permanent adversarial
relationship puts heavy political and psychological burdens on a democratic
political system. I would argue that these burdens are manifest on both sides of
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current debates about defense expenditures, nuclear weapons, and arms
control, and the ways in which the US can and should resist Soviet projects in
various parts of the world. Here my concern is mainly with the way in which
these psychological, political, and economic burdens may give rise to desires to
break the bounds of the adversarial relationship. They can do this in one of
two ways. First, by encouraging us to take the justice of our cause and the
moral significance of the values we want to defend as the warrant for an ideo-
logical crusade. Morality then ceases to serve as a check on the kinds of things
that we are prepared to do in the name of the good cause and the national in-
terest, and a zero-sum conception of the struggle leads us to damage the
enemy in any way possible. Second, by leading us to yearn for a new pattern
of relationships in an unrealistic and possibly dangerous way, which would
jeopardize morally significant aspects of our national interest. This is not to
deny that unilateral initiatives of various sorts aimed at improving the climate
of the relationship may not have important beneficial effects, nor is is to deny
the value of exploring imaginative routes out of current impasses. But it does
draw a line against those who regard national interest as a purely amoral
category and who would then dismiss it in favor of their own moral
aspirations.
The morally appropriate manner of conducting the adversary relationship
while both struggling to protect and to enlarge areas of common interest and
showing regard for the rights and interests of other parties is clearly a topic
that needs much fuller reflection by moral philosophers and theologians as
well as by practitioners and theorists of national policy. This requires doing a
contextual applied ethics, which takes seriously the tangled history and the
often confused and impenetrable perceptions and expectations which consti-
tute this adversarial relationship. It might even make moral theorists think a
bit more like intelligence officers.
In the meantime, how can intelligence officers think a bit more like moral
theorists about the dilemmas and complexities of their daily decisions? Here I
will simply put before you a very general set of reflections which may have a
useful orienting function. It seems to me that we can expect intelligence
officers to be aware in their decisions of considerations that bear on morality,
on national interest, on agency interest, and on personal interest. An intel-
ligence officer works within a structure of command and authority which is
given policy direction by the President and within which information is
compartmented. Moral decisions have to be undertaken with imperfect
knowledge of situations, of alternatives, and consequences. On the other hand,
agency officers by virtue of their training and ability are presumably better
equipped than most people to draw sound inferences and to reach prudent
judgments about significant issues, at least within their area of expertise.
Furthermore, it is precisely their professional task and responsibility to
provide relevant and accurate information to policy makers. This is, however,
a task to be accomplished collectively through the agency rather than
individually.
Now I would offer as a definition of the standard situation in an
intelligence officer's work the presence of a harmony among the four types of
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considerations that I have mentioned. When morality, national interest,
agency interest, and personal interest all point in the same direction, the
intelligence officer is able to confront the intrinsic and unavoidably difficulties
of his or her task of gathering and analyzing information. The requirements
that are inherent in an individual officer's carrying out this task in our
American social context, which aims at respecting and promoting individual
freedom and responsibility within effective and well-organized institutions,
can then be met without conflicts of interests and motive. This sunny situation,
of course, does not always prevail; different considerations often point in
different directions and people begin to find themselves divided, anxious, and
uncertain. What principles can be offered to guide decisions, both personal
and institutional, that involve conflicts among these different considerations?
1) Individuals in the public service within intelligence agencies are
expected to have a concept of their interest which includes morally significant
elements. They are expected to be prepared to take significant, even
catastrophic, losses affecting the non-moral elements of their personal interest.
Restraining personal interest as a motivating force and as a possible source of
distorted judgment is a fundamental moral obligation for intelligence officers.
It can be fulfilled on the day-to-day level of harmonious integration with
others in performing the various tasks of the agency or in more heroic forms
when the performance of duty involves the possibility of great dangers and
sacrifices as illustrated by the recent bombing in Beirut. Collapse of this
restraint can be extremely damaging for the agency and for the national
interest, as the Wilson case illustrates. Control of personal interest can and
should be sustained by appropriate training, supervision, and evaluation
within the agency; but in a primary and fundamental sense it remains a
matter of self-control, with all the variability and uncertainty that that
implies. Correlative to this requirement of moral integrity on the part of
agency officers is the responsibility of providing support and protection for
them and their dependents which the agency undertakes and which is so
important in sustaining morale and effectiveness.
2) Agency interest should be conceived as both a criterion and an
instrument. How well people contribute to the working of the agency and to
the accomplishment of its tasks, both of which are essential aspects of agency
interest, provides a criterion for assessing both personnel and projects. But the
well-being of a government agency is not so much a good to be valued in itself
as it is an instrumental or contributory factor for the well-being of the persons
it serves and for the pursuit of the national interest Continuing awareness of
this secondary and instrumental role should serve as a check on tendencies to
bureaucratic aggrandizement and political infighting. Here we find a cluster
of problems where the requirements of professional judgment and of moral re-
sponsibility converge, especially for senior officials. The waste of resources, the
jeopardizing of the agency's reliability and reputation as a result of politiciza-
tion or as a result of breaches of security, and adversarial relationships with
other agencies or groups within the government are, damaging toy Inng-tcrin
agency interest and have a significant moral component to them. Agency
leadership also has an important integrating function in relating the moral
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beliefs, perceptions of national interest, and personal interests of agency
officers to the themes and objectives of national policy and national interest as
articulated by the executive.
3) While it is abstractly desirable that personal interest, agency interest,
national interest, and morality all point in the same direction and that conflicts
among them should be kept to a minimum and while it is also true that, as this
paper has been arguing at some length, they are interwoven in complex ways,
we have to maintain a realistic expectation of intermittent and occasionally
severe conflicts. The root of conflict lies in the distinctions of these four types
of consideration or four elements in the practical thinking of agency officers.
Denial of the possibility of conflict is a form of self-deception and will be pro-
foundly corrupting over time. The function of moral criticism and of creative
leadership is not to deny the possibility of conflicts, but to find ways for people
to work out these conflicts in a responsible, non-disruptive way which does not
exacerbate the conflicts.
4) At this late point in the paper, I will not attempt to square the circle
and show how to effect an easy reconciliation of morality and national
interest. But let me conclude with one final suggestion, which is that we have
to distinguish between the justification of departures from standard moral
norms on grounds of national interest, departures which, if limited and
carefully justified, can be reconciled with most contemporary ways of
understanding morality,' and those situations where a particular conception
of the national interest is invoked in support of policies which bring serious
suffering or even death to large numbers of innocent people. Situations of the
second type are especially likely to produce dilemmas for intelligence officers,
dilemmas in which the demands of morality and the requirements of national
interest are felt to be in painful conflict. Resolving specific dilemmas is not
within the scope of this paper. But I would maintain that in a democratic soci-
ety such as ours the most important, difficult, and morally significant choices
about national interest and security are not made within the intelligence
community but in the public political process which this community has been
fashioned to serve. This brings us back to the gray and difficult world of
political judgment and political choice, and reminds us of the enormous
difficulty of achieving a world order structured according to principles which
will promote the interests and safeguard the rights of all, that is to say, a moral
world order.
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Morality
1. Plato, Republic, 11, 358E-359B, tr. Paul Shorty in Plato, Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Bollingen, 1961), pp. 606-607.
2. Ibid., 360A-D.
3. Ibid., 367D-E.
4. An important and influential exposition of the second line of interpretation of Plato can be
found in H.R. Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?", Mind 21 (1912),
reprinted in his Moral Obligation, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
5. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1956), pp. 115-117.
6. Ibid., p. 129.
7. Reinhold Niebuhr, Man's Nature and His Communities (New York: Scribner's, 1965), pp.
8. An interesting discussion of some of the uncertainties that arise from national declarations
of policy that have explicit moral objectives can be found in Peter L. Berger, "Democracy
for Everyone?" Commentary 76 (1983), pp. 31-36.
9. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch 11, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1968), p.
161.
10. See Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," in Theories of Ethics, ed. Philippa Foot (London:
Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 96-100.
11. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 189-195.
12. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
13. For a treatment of this issue, see my article, "Moral Damage and the Justification of
Intelligence Collection from Human Sources," Studies in Intelligence, (Summer 1981, Vol.
25, No. 2), pp. 57-64.
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CONFIDENTIAL The Press
Through 1960 Soviet economic growth was impressive while that
of the US was a little sluggish. Aided by the grain production from
the "new lands," Soviet statistical performance compared favorably
with that of the US, and the achievements of Soviet science in space
made the statistics appear even more impressive and plausible. CIA
estimates showed the growth rate of Soviet GNP to be about twice
that of the US. For industrial growth the ratio was even more unfa-
vorable to the US: in 1956-1960, 81/2 percent in the USSR against
21/2 percent in the US. The most thorough and respected academic es-
timate, that of Professor Abram Bergson of Harvard, was very close
to CIA estimates for the 1950's. Bergson calculated the average
annual rate of growth of GNP from 1950 to 1958 was 6.8 percent.
CIA's estimate was 6.5 percent.
Soviet Slowdown in the 1960's
By the end of 1962 the rapid growth of the USSR relative to that
of the US was widely known. CIA estimates had been publicized by
the Director of Central Intelligence (Allen W. Dulles) in open
testimony before the joint Economic Committee of Congress in No-
vember 1959. This testimony was reported in the press and was
printed in its entirety in a Congressional document. Mr. Dulles made
another public speech in December 1959 before the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers repeating the same message. This also was
widely reported in the press. However, for the following two years,
1961 and 1962, CIA estimates indicated a slowdown in growth. These
estimates had not yet been made public. Suddenly, in August of 1963,
the Soviet government began negotiating with Canada for a massive
purchase of wheat. It soon became known that the USSR had suf-
fered a severe drought and crop failure and did not have sufficient
grain reserves to feed its population. The USSR contracted with
Canada and the US for the surprising total of It million tons of wheat
for delivery in 1963 and 1964 to be paid for by sales of gold.
At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence (John A.
McCone), ORR prepared an assessment of the Soviet economy. This
was incorporated into a briefing given by the DCI to President John-
son and the National Security Council in December 1963. The high-
lights of the economic portion of the briefing were:
1. Growth of Soviet GNP in 1963 would be about 11/2 percent.
2. Growth in 1962 had already slowed, so the average of the two years
was only 21/z percent, drastically lower than the previous rates of 5 and 6
percent.
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The Press
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that
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3. Agriculture accounted for a large part of the slowdown in both 1962
and 1963 but not all of it. Industrial growth had also slowed noticeably
since 1958.
4. In trying to raise meat production, Khrushchev had prodigally used up
his surplus grain production of the preceding years, 1958-1961, and had much
smaller grain reserves than CIA had previously estimated.
5. The slowdown in industry was in large part the result of competition
of defense for scarce investment and R&D resources.
6. Cold production and stocks were significantly lower than current public
estimates.
7. The Soviet campaign to obtain long term credits from Western Europe
for the purchase of advanced Western equipment was a natural consequence
of its dwindling gold stocks.
The President was very interested in this assessment of the Soviet
economy and suggested that it be made available to the public. How
this was to be done was apparently left up to the Director.
The Press Conference
The objectives in releasing the story were fairly straightforward.
After years of hearing that the USSR was rapidly and inexorably
catching up with the US, the American public would surely be glad
to hear that this was no longer true, at least temporarily. Secondly,
the reported developments supported the US policy of discouraging
the extension of long-term credits to the USSR. Thirdly, the report
could be declassified without affecting its substance. In addition to
releasing the story, however, the Agency decided to permit reference
to itself as the source. This was uncommon but not unprecedented.
In The New York Times of 23 June 1960, page 36, an article by Harry
Schwartz had reported on some estimates prepared by CIA for a
Congressional committee. The headline had read: "CIA Forecasts
Soviet Output Will Grow 80 percent in Next Decade." The object
of allowing attribution to the Agency in 1964 was simply to get the
story on page one, if possible, rather than on page forty-one.
In short, the Agency had a good story to tell and wanted to he
,sure it was heard.
The main points in the Director's briefing appeared on 29 Decem-
ber 1963 in an article by Charles Bartlett on an inside page in the
Washington Star. This article featured the limited Soviet gold stock
and production, and the need for import credits. This was the first
time the CIA gold estimates had been made public. In the body of
the article the CIA was named as the source of the information in
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL The Press
the article. On 5 January 1964 a similar article appeared in The New
York Herald Tribune by Tom Lambert, datelined Washington. Fle
attributed his information to "intelligence analysts here."
These two articles caused no particular stir. However, on 8 Janu-
ary 1964 an article by Edwin L. Dale, Jr. appeared on the front
page of The New York Times under the headline, "Sharp Slowdown
in Soviet Growth Reported by CIA." The article reported the CIA
analysis at length and also discussed CIA's responsibility for re-
search on the Soviet economy. Dale had received no special favor or
dispensation and his article said nothing essential that was not in the
previous articles. But somehow it caused a furore. Front page, The
New York Times, with attribution! The Washington press corps raised
a
i
di
n
mme
ate clamor for equal briefing.
In response to this demand the Agency scheduled its first press
conference for the following day, at CIA headquarters. Twent
re-
y
porters attended. The conference was conducted by the Deputy Di-
rector for Intelligence, Ray Cline. A press release, entitled "Soviet
Economic Problems Multiply," was passed out. But by this time So-
viet economic problems were no longer news. The first question
asked by a reporter was, "Why? Why this public apparition, this
naked materialization of CIA?"
The DDI replied: "Well, we thought we had a good story, so ...."
Twenty eager faces radiated frank and open disbelief.
The press conference made headlines all around the world. How-
ever, the message of Soviet economic slowdown was subordinated
to speculation about CIA's motives in seeking the publicity. The most
frequently cited motives were (1) a supposed CIA-State Depart-
ment conflict over European long-term credits for the USSR-CIA
opposing, the State Department approving; and (2) an alleged at-
tempt to rebuild CIA's public reputation after the Bay of Pigs epi-
sode. The CIA-State Department rivalry hypothesis was illustrated
by the famous Herblock cartoon in The Washingtan Post which
showed a black cloaked figure offering to peddle some "hot statistics"
to a foreign service officer on the steps of the State Department
building.
The Reaction
The CIA analysis and estimates met with a mixed reaction in the
US press, among the academic specialists on the Soviet economy,
and in
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Department
ction in the
?t economy,
"The depth of this concern [with the rapid Soviet growth relative to t at
of the US) became strikingly clear in early 1964. The CIA-from which
Mr. Dulles had retired-made public its calculations for 1962 and 1963,
which showed that Soviet economic growth had slowed down dramatically,
to less than 2.5 percent annually. It added that the gap separating American
and Soviet production levels was once again widening so that Moscow's
prospects for victory in the economic competition during the foreseeable future
had dimmed substantially. A naive observer might have thought that a wave
of joy would have swept the United States at this good news. The reality
was the reverse, however, and numerous American voices were quickly
raised to criticize the CIA and its new estimates. Having finally been con-
vinced that there was such a thing as a Soviet economic threat, many Ameri-
cans seemed reluctant to believe that even temporarily Moscow had received
a setback and Washington was doing comparatively well."
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and in foreign countries. In the US many commentators accepted
the CIA position, but a substantial number reserved judgment pend-
ing further information, and a small number openly disagreed. On 9
January, the day after the first Times article by Dale, Harry Schwartz,
who was the Times' Soviet economic expert, published the results
of a telephone survey of academic experts. All five who were can-
vassed were surprised by the CIA's conclusions about rates of growth.
One said, "It is impossible." Another said, "Fantastic." On the other
hand, Professor Abram Bergson, whose own calculations of Soviet
GNP growth up to 1958 were the most widely accepted of all esti-
mates, said, "I am a little surprised but I can't rule it out." It was hard,
as Schwartz pointed out, to understand how Soviet growth could
plunge from 6 or 7 percent a year to 21/2 percent. The explanation
was primarily the decline in agricultural production for two succes-
sive years, a development not yet known to the academic specialists.'
The British press was generally doubtful of the accuracy of the esti-
mates of growth and of gold stocks. In particular, the London Ecorw-
mist thought that the proper estimate of the growth rate should be
around 5 percent instead of 21/2 percent. However, most British com-
mentators agreed that Soviet growth had slowed noticeably. The Brit-
ish press unanimously interpreted the CIA action as an attempt to
support the US policy of opposing the granting of long-term credits
to the USSR, something the British Board of Trade was eager to do.
The British, unlike some of the American press, knew that this was
also US administration and State Department policy and not just
CIA's policy.
' Schwartz's later analysis of the American reaction is interesting. The following
quote is from his book, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin, Lippincott, 1965,
pp. 33-34.
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CONFIDENTIAL The Press
The CIA press release took the Russians very much by surprise,
appearing as it did even before the official Soviet announcement on
the economic results for 1963. When these appeared later in Janu-
ary, the usual percentage increase in national income was absent.
All that was given was a figure of 5 percent growth in gross social
product. Gross social product is a heavily double-counted statistic
summing the outputs of all sectors of the economy without netting
out the intermediate sales from one producing sector to another.
In several letters to US newspapers, Soviet writers denounced CIA
on a variety of grounds but could find no answer to the 21/2 percent
GNP growth rate except to cite the announced 5 percent growth in
gross social product. When the statistical handbook, Narodnoye Kho-
ziaistvo, SSSR v godu 1963, was finally released in early 1965-sev-
eral months late-it showed the growth of national income (Soviet
definition) to be 31/2 percent for 1963, and a 4.2 percent average
for the two years, 1962 and 1963, compared to an average of 71 per-
cent for 1959-1961. National income (Soviet definition) excludes most
services, which grow slowly, and hence systematically increases faster
than national income or product' by Western definition. In the light of
that bias the Soviet announcement came closer to supporting the CIA
estimates than the Soviet economists' (or the London Economist's)
estimate of 5 percent.
The reaction of Eastern European countries was the most interest-
ing of all. As reported in a New York Herald Tribune dispatch of
10 February 1964, satellite officials accepted the CIA estimates and
were using them to oppose Soviet policies, such as economic integra-
tion through CEMA, and to support their own hopes for increased
policy independence.
In January and February 1964, the Director and his deputy for in-
telligence visited the major capitals of Western Europe, briefing the
NATO governments on the Soviet economic and military positions.
A representative of ORR accompanied them to brief economic special-
ists in the governments on the methodology and data underlying the
economic estimates. All except the British Board of Trade were
persuaded that the CIA estimates were generally valid.
The validity of CIA's analysis became generally acknowledged in
the US press after the official Soviet report on economic performance
in the first
former ski
headlines:
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are Few."
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ance of c
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nuch by surprise,
announcement on
-ed later in Janu-
::ome was absent.
,th in gross social
counted statistic
y without netting
or to another.
-s denounced CIA
:o the 21/2 percent
percent growth in
Narodnoye Kho-
early 1965-sev-
al income (Soviet
percent average
verage of 71 per-
on) excludes most
lly increases faster
on. In the light of
ipporting the CIA
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ibune dispatch of
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>pes for increased
his deputy for in-
irope, briefing the
military positions.
economic special-
ita underlying the
i of Trade were
acknowledged in
omic performance
in the first half of 1964. Harry Schwartz of The New York Times, a
former skeptic, wrote a Times story in July 1964 with the following
headlines: "Soviet Economy Seen Stumbling-Growth in Industrial
Output During First Half of 1964 Falls Short of Hopes-Bright Spots
are Few."
The US academic community was brought around by the appear-
ance of carefully explained calculations of Soviet GNP by Dr. Stanley
Cohn, of Research Analysis Corporation. Although his estimated
growth rates were not identical with those of CIA, they were reason-
ably close, and his methods and procedures were essentially the same
as the Agency's. Cohn's analyses appeared in successive volumes of
studies on the Soviet economy published by the joint Economic Com-
mittee. The latest revision of Cohn's estimates shows 4.5 percent
growth in 1962 and 2.7 percent in 1963 for an average of 3.6 percent.
The CIA gold estimate, which rested on highly classified data, was
accepted and published by the US Bureau of Mines in 1964. In due
time it was also accepted by the joint Intelligence Board in London
and by the banking community in London.
An Endorsement from Siberia
The most unexpected support for CIA's economic estimates came
from a prominent young Soviet economist, Dr. Abel Cezevish Agan-
begyan, who is the head of the Laboratory of Economic-Mathemati-
cal Methods in Novosibirsk, and a corresponding member of the So-
viet Academy of Sciences. He was one of a large number of econ-
omists who were urging radical economic reform on the Soviet leader-
ship prior to 1965. In December 1964, he delivered a private lecture
in Moscow, reportedly to the Central Committee, and again in June
1965 to the staff of a publishing house in Moscow. Notes taken by
someone present at the latter lecture leaked to the press in England
and Italy, and also were acquired by the American Embassy in Mos-
cow. These notes may not be accurate in every particular, but their
general authenticity has been substantiated.
Aganbegyan, according to the notes, vigorously criticized the op-
eration and management of the Soviet economy. In addition, he criti-
cized the statistics produced by the Central Statistical Administration
and objected to the policy of secrecy regarding economic informa-
tion. He alleged that Soviet economists are often forced to rely on
American sources. He cited the report by the American CIA on the
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CONFIDENTIAL The Press
decline in Soviet economic growth. This report, he said, was accu-
rate and the Central Statistical Agency had been unable to refute it.
The notes were disavowed by the Soviet press and by Aganbegyan.
However, he is not the only Soviet economist to have expressed grave
doubts of the State's economic statistics, either privately or in print,
Epilogue
CIA's first press conference was also its last. The Director was
earnestly advised to get CIA out of the news and keep it out.
Two years later, in October 1965, after the poor Russian harvest
of 1965, the CIA again prepared a press release on Soviet growth,
repeating estimates for preceding years and estimating growth of
GNP in 1965 at 3 percent. This time the State Department issued
the release. It was described as "prepared by the Department of
State in consultation with other interested agencies." The report of
this release did not make the front page of The New York Times.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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