FOR DDCI FROM EA/DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000300100001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 122
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 11, 1988
• Content Type: CABLE

STAT
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Iq
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ADMINISTRATIVETERNAL USE ONLY
9 August 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DCI Administrative Staff
SUBJECT: Payment for Charges Incurred by the
DDCI for Representational Purposes
Payment from U.S. Government funds for representational expenses
incurred by the DDCI for the purpose of conducting official business of
ed States Government is authorized under the policy set forth in
Official Reception and Representational Expenses) for the
following functions:
Date Name
Organizational Affiliation
88.06.14 Robert M. Gates (host) DDCI
D/OGI/DI
88.06.15 Robert M. Gates (host) DDCI
Eli Jacobs New York banker
88.06.22 Robert M. Gates (host) DDCI
Ronald Spiers
Robert Lamb
D/SEO
Department of State
Department of State
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 DAB
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
TO:.
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
'REMARKS:
C,
C,
tic
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
FORM NO. _ .. REPLACES FORM 36-8 (47)
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 STAT
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 The Detiuty Directnr df: C'entr:tl Intellioencc
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15 August 1988
STAT
TO: Jim McCullough, A/DDI
Helene Boatner, D/LDA/DDI
Rill Raker_ T1/PAO
DD/PAO
cademic Coordinator
D/ICS
Bill Donnelly, IG
STAT
I have been asked to do an article for The
Washington Quarterly Fall issue on the use of
intelligence at the White House. I have
significantly revised an article I did for
Studies in Intelligence in 1980.
Attached is the draft. Because the
publication deadline is short, I would appreciate
any comments, suggestions or criticisms by COB
Thursday, 18 August.
Robert 7. Gates
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Opportunity Unfulfilled
The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the white House
"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at
one goal -- producing accurate reliable intelligence.... Who
are the customers who get this finished product? At the very
top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the
Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."
Intelligence: The Acme of Skill
(CIA Information Pamphlet)
And what have our most important customers had to say about
how well we achieve that goal?
"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political
intelligence."
Jimmy Carter, 1978
"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"
Richard Nixon, 1970
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"CIA Director McCone...made recommendations for checking
and improving the quality of intelligence reporting. I
promptly accepted the suggestions...."
Lyndon Johnson, Memoirs
"During the rush of.. .events in the final days of 1958, the
Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a
Castro victory might not be in the interests of the United
States."
Dwight Eisenhower, Memoirs
A search of Presidential memoirs or those of principal
assistants over the past 30 years or so turns up remarkably
little discussion or perspective on the role played by
Directors of Central Intelligence or intelligence information
in Presidential decisionmaking on foreign affairs. What little
commentary there has been, as suggested by the introductory
quotes, is nearly uniformly critical. Similarly, in
intelligence memoir literature, while one can read a great deal
about covert operations and technical achievements, there is
little on the role of intelligence in Presidential
decisionmaking. Thus, on both sides of the relationship there
is a curious, discreet silence. As research by numerous
scholars has documented, intelligence information and
assessments, however, have played a central role in many of the
critical decisions of the last seven Presidents.
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Why the dearth of first-hand reflection and evaluation in a
major area of foreign affairs and national security history?
Partly, perhaps it is because even still there is a reluctance
to discuss what both parties perceive as sensitive
information. I believe, however, that this void is more likely
explained by factors that continue to dominate the relationship
between Presidents and the CIA and Intelligence Community:
intelligence collection and assessment are a black hole for
most Presidents and their key advisers, neither understood nor
adequately exploited; for intelligence officers, Presidential
and senior level views of the intelligence they receive and how
they use it (or not) are just as unfamiliar, giving rise to
perceptions dominated by wishful thinking and peculiar
conceit. In short, both. historically and contemporaneously,
year after year, because of ignorance, inattention, and
passivity, both the White House and CIA fail to take maximum
advantage of the opportunity for better intelligence support
for the President and decisionmaking.
As a new administration prepares to take office it is
perhaps timely to examine the relationship between Intelligence
and a President so that new officials, intelligence officials,
and others might better understand what happens at the White
House to the product of intelligence collection and analysis,
and so both the White House and CIA can work to improve
intelligence support to the President.
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To understand how intelligence is used and regarded at the
White House first requires an understanding of the context in
which it is received. The sheer volume of paperwork addressed
to the President is staggering. Federal employees in more than
200 agencies seek to draw his attention to this or that
program, proposal or vital piece of information. An
astonishing amount of their work survives departmental review
and finds its way to the White House. There these papers join
a river of correspondence to the President from countless
consultants, academics, think tanks, political contacts, family
and friends, political supporters, journalists, authors,
foreign leaders, and concerned citizens. (Lest you think such
correspondence can easily be disregarded, it is my experience
that most Presidents often attach as much -- if not more --
credibility to the views of family, (old) friends and private
contacts as they do to those of executive agencies. Vice
President Rockefeller once asked my office at the NSC if
Denmark really was planning to sell Greenland. Wondering all
the while if he was in the market, we confirmed with CIA that
this rumor from a private source was untrue. But Rockefeller
had taken it seriously.) There are many other, less innocuous
examples of Presidents and senior advisers being misinformed
where intelligence knows the facts to be otherwise.
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It is the responsibility of the Domestic Policy.Staff or
its equivalent, the NSC, other Executive offices, and the White
House itself to impose order on this avalanche of pulp and to
reduce it to manageable proportions. The NSC alone year in,
year out processes 7,000-10,000 "action" papers a year -- not
including intelligence analyses or other purely "informational"
papers. Dr. Brzezinski once asked me to calculate how many
pages of reading he sent to President Carter weekly; the total
averaged many hundreds of pages -- and among White House
offices the NSC was among the most stringent with respect to
the length and number of items going to the President. These,
then, are the first hurdles that intelligence faces: a
president with a heavy schedule, inundated by paper and demands
for decisions, surrounded by senior assistants who have as a
main role trying to keep that President from being overwhelmed
by paper; and a President with vast and varied non-intelligence
sources upon which he also relies and in which he often has
considerable confidence.
The President routinely receives only one intelligence
product that is not summarized or commented upon by someone
outside the Community: The President's Daily Brief. He
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receives this, usually via his National Security Adviser every
morning, along with a package that has varied little from
President to President: a few (3-6) State and CIA cables of
special significance; occasionally a sensitive intelligence
report from CIA; selected wire service items; State or CIA
situation reports (rarely both) if there is a crisis abroad;
and often NSC and State morning cable summaries. Contrary to
what is commonly believed, this is the only regularly scheduled
package of current intelligence the President receives during
the day. However, through the course of the day, the National
Security Adviser keeps the President apprised of significant
developments overseas and may handcarry especially important
cables directly to the President. In a crisis, the flow of
information increases. More analysis and reports will be given
the President. He will receive current intel,ligence -orally- in
meetings with his senior White House, State, Defense and
Intelligence advisers, as well as from the media -- often the
first source of information. Nevertheless, on a day-to-day
basis apart from the PDB, successive Presidents generally have
seen only that current intelligence selected by the National
Security Adviser, who works to make that morning package as
succinct and small as he responsibly can.
It was not always this way -- even in modern times. Before
the Kennedy Administration, the President, his National
Security Adviser and the NSC Staff relied almost entirely on
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CIA and State to provide incoming current intelligence as soon
as it was processed by their operations centers and circulated
to substantive officials who could decide what to send to the
White House. It was an approach that led to considerable
competition, redundancy and placed a President at the mercy of
the bureaucracies for c i-r a-t-iion:-
This system was revolutionized, however, when President
Kennedy created the White House Situation Room to which CIA,
State, NSA and the Pentagon began to provide unprocessed
intelligence information electronically -- an approach with its
own readily apparent shortcomings. (Many a time, an over eager
White House aide has run to a President with a dramatic but
unevaluated intelligence report, gotten him charged up, and
later sheepishly had to return to acknowledge the source was
poor or there had been a mistake.) Thus, the NSC and President
began receiving intelligence and diplomatic cables on
developments abroad often as soon as, and often before,
intelligence analysts. Henry Kissinger observes in his memoirs
that, "It is a common myth that high officials are informed
immediately about significant events.... It happens not
infrequently -- much too frequently for the security adviser's
emotional stability -- that even the President learns of a
significant occurrence from the newspapers." He notes that
President Nixon learned of the historic 1969 meeting in Beijing
between Kosygin and Chou En-Lai when he read about it in The
Washington Star.
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One result of the establishment of the Situation Room was a
significant diminution in the value of current intelligence
publications that to this day has not been fully grasped by the
Intelligence Community. Only analysis by experienced
intelligence specialists lent (and lends) value to current
intelligence provided the white House. Daily publications
reporting purely factual information without trenchant analysis
-- apart from Situation Reports on crises -- too often have
been duplicative, too late and irrelevant. Thanks to the
Situation Room, urgent information from abroad is often in the
President's hands before reaching the DCI, other senior
intelligence officials, and senior government officials.
Naturally, the President receives information through
channels other than the early morning folder and the occasional
cable during the day. For example, Presidents Ford, Carter and
Reagan routinely received current and longrange intelligence
analysis thrugh regular briefings by the DCI or intelligence
specialists. All DCIs also have briefed the President and his
senior advisers routinely in formal meetings of the National
Security Council. Moreover, discussion at such meetings serves
to convey information to the President from diverse sources.
The President also receives abbreviated versions of
intelligence assessments which are included in policy options
papers.
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Presidents Carter and Reagan saw fewer CIA assessments,
National Intelligence Estimates, research papers and other
longer range studies than either Presidents Ford or Nixon.
This is due primarily to greater encouragement during the Ford
and Nixon Administrations for the NSC Staff to prepare
"Information Memoranda" summarizing for the President the
salient points of much longer intelligence papers and attaching
the full text. The only longer intelligence reports to reach
Presidents Carter and Reagan were those the DCI delivered
personally or the infrequent instances when the National
Security Adviser forwarded an exceptional one for the
President's reading. Thus, while under Nixon and Ford
virtually no major intelligence study reached the President
without an NSC cover memorandum summarizing it and perhaps
making independent comments or judgments, many more reports
reached their desks than reached Carter and Reagan. The NSC
Staff was not encouraged to forward such studies, due in large
measure of a reluctance to burden the President with additional
-- and optional -- reading, a function of very different
personal idiosyncracies.
In sum, each of the four Presidents I have observed has
received through regular channels only a tiny portion of
published intelligence and only a fraction even of analysis
specifically prepared for senior policymakers. This has placed
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a premium on the PDB -- an oft neglected opportunity -- and on
the willingness of the DCI to give important assessments
(published or oral) directly to the President or call them to
the direct attention of the National Security Adviser.
Disinterest or reluctance on the part of a DCI to take an
activist, even aggressive role in this respect is a severe --
even irreparable -- handicap to ensuring that intelligence
information and assessments are made available to or read by
the President and the National Security Adviser.
WHAT PRESIDENTS THINK OF WHAT THEY GET
Perhaps in recognition of how busy Presidents are, for
years there has been an adage at the White House that the
absence of criticism should be regarded as praise. Along these
lines, Presidential comments on intelligence assessments are so
rare that we are understandably tempted to assume satisfaction
with what is being received. Regrettably, however, this is
doubtful. Many of the infrequent comments are critical, as
illustrated at the outset of this article. I believe the
negative perceptions of Intelligence of most Presidents and
their advisers while in office or afterward are due to five
factors:
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The first and most significant is failure. Whether
Nixon's unhappiness over misestimates of planned Soviet
ICBM deployments or Carter's over failure to forecast
the Iranian revolution or untimely upward revisions of
North Korean troop strength, these Presidents -- with
justification -- believed CIA assessments either
contributed importantly to policy disasters or made
them vulnerable to later criticism. Moreover,
Presidents expect that for what they spend on
intelligence, the end-product should be able to predict
all manner of coups, upheavals, riots, intentions,
military moves and the like with accuracy.
Intellectually, they know most such specific events are
incredibly hard to...predi-ct -- and. that,-we are.
incredibly lucky when we do. Nevertheless, in the
early morning hours when the National Security Adviser
must repair to the President's study with the (usually)
bad news about such events, the Chief Executive will
not unnaturally wonder why his billions for
intelligence do not spare him surprise. Further,
Presidents want the kind of tactical intelligence that
informs and facilitates day-to-day decisionmaking and
where intelligence performance is hardest.
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-- Second, Presidents do not like internal controversy in
the Executive Branch, especially when it becomes
public. Nor do Presidents welcome debate over basic
facts once they have made a decision. Whether
Johnson's aggravation with troublesome assessments on
Vietnam, Nixon's over the public dispute between CIA
and Defense whether the SS-9 was a MRV or MIRV,
Carter's over energy estimates, or Reagan's over the
Soviet gas pipeline, these and other intelligence
debates over technology transfer, verification of arms
control, Soviet defense spending, Soviet weapons
programs and many more have caused controversy and
weakened support for policy. The White House's general
unease with CIA-originated unclassified analysis is
rooted in this dislike for what is regarded as needless
controversy. Our own citizens, not to mention foreign
readers, cannot be expected to assume that a CIA
publication does not reflect an official US Government
view -- and this confusion is of concern to the White
House and often a public relations and policy
headache. Thus, to the extent intelligence results (in
White House eyes) in internal government controversy,
problems with the Congress, or embarrassing publicity,
it will draw Presidential ire or at a minimum leave the
Chief Magistrate with unflattering and enduring
ill-will toward intelligence.
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-- Third, Presidents do not welcome new intelligence
assessments undercutting policies based on earlier
assessments. As professionals, we are constantly
revisiting important subjects as better and later
information or improved analytical tools become
available. When this results in changing the
statistical basis for the US position in MBFR,
substantially elevating estimates of North Korean
forces at a time when the President is pressing to
reduce US forces in South Korea, or "discovering" a
Soviet brigade in Cuba, it is no revelation to observe
that Presidents regard us less than fondly. Presidents
do not like surprises, especially those that undermine
policy. Intelligenc-e .is most often the bearer of such
surprises -- and pays the price such messengers have
suffered since antiquity.
-- Fourth, successive Administrations have generally
regarded with skepticism the growing direct
relationship between Congress and CIA above and beyond
the actual oversight process. In recent years, the
provision of great quantities of highly sensitive
information and analysis to Members of Congress and
their staffs has largely eliminated the Executive's
longstanding advantage of a near monopoly of
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information on foreign affairs and defense. The flow
of information to the Hill has given the Congress a
powerful tool in its quest for a greater voice in the
making of foreign and defense policy vis-a-vis the
Executive -- and Presidents cannot be indifferent to
the fact that intelligence has provided Congress with
that tool and that the White House is nearly helpless
to blunt it except in very rare cases.
-- Finally, I believe Presidents and their national
security teams usually have unrealistic expectations of
what intelligence can do for them. Given the
extraordinary capabilities of US intelligence for
collecting and processing information -- and the cost,
the uninitiated (including Presidents) often see
intelligence as a magic bullet. When they too soon
learn it is not, they are inevitably disappointed.
Policymakers usually learn the hard way that while
intelligence can tell them a great deal, it only rarely
-- and usually in crises involving military forces --
provides the kind of unambiguous and timely information
that can make day-to-day decisionmaking simpler and
less risky. And intelligence officers encourage such
exaggerated expectations occasionally by pretending a
confidence in their judgments they cannot reasonably
justify and by failing to be candid about the quality
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and reliability of their information and the
possibility of other outcomes. Once bitten by an
erroneous or misleading intelligence assessment,
White House officials -- including Presidents -- will
be twice-shy about relying on or accepting
unquestioningly a second.
Presidents and other principals up to the present time also
have faulted the Agency for lack of imagination in anticipating
the needs of the President and for insufficient aggressiveness
in keeping itself informed on policy issues under
consideration. Neither Presidents nor their Assistants for
National Security Affairs have felt it their responsibility to
keep senior Agency officials well informed in this regard, to
provide day-to-day detailed tasking or to provide helpful
feedback. The Agency had to depend for such guidance on what
the DCI could pick up in high-level meetings and contacts --
and the skill and interest of different DCIs has varied greatly
in both.
Indeed, this lack of feedback and, more broadly,
intelligence policy guidance from the President (and other
senior officials) in the four Administrations I,have observed
first hand has been a major obstacle to improved and more
responsive intelligence performance. If Executive Branch and
especially White House officials view Congressional influence
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on intelligence strategy, priorities and investment as
excessive, it is in part because policymakers in successive
administrations have largely abdicated their own
responsibilities in these areas. Changing the structure of the
Intelligence Community or creating a so-called Director of
National Intelligence at the White House will not remedy this
situation (and would in my view do great harm). A President
and his national security team (the Secretaries of State and
Defense, and National Security Adviser) should view
intelligence as an important asset in foreign policymaking and
should be prepared to devote the time and energy to working
with the DCI to provide useful guidance and direction to the
collection and analysis efforts of CIA and the rest of US
intelligence. Contrary to the view of those who are
apprehensive over a close relationship between--pol-icymakers and
intelligence, I believe it is not close enough -- that more
interaction, feedback and direction as to strategy, priorities
and requirements is critical to better performance, and that
this can be accomplished without jeopardizing the independence
and integrity of intelligence assessments and judgments.
Of the four Administrations, the Carter team worked most
conscientiously at a high level to inform CIA of the analytical
needs of the President and constructively to advise the Agency
of perceived shortcomings in its analysis, especially with
respect to subject, timing and form. President Carter
personally communicated his concerns and criticisms.
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Perhaps the most comprehensive White House guidance (and
indication of the President's view) in recent years was
provided by Dr. Brzezinski when he sent a memorandum to the DCI
that made the following points:
Greater attention needs to be paid to clandestine
collection targeted on the thinking and planning of key
leaders or groups in important advanced and secondary
countries, how they make policy decisions and how they
will react to US decisions and those of other powers.
Political analyses should be focused more on problems
of particular concern to the US government. Too many
papers are on subjects peripheral to US interests or
offer broad overviews not directly linked to particular
problems, events or developments of concern to the US
government.
There needs to be greater attention to the future.
More papers are needed that briefly set forth facts and
evidence and then conclude with a well-informed
speculative essay on the implications for the future:
"We expect and hope for thought-provoking, reasonable
views of the future based on what you know about the
past and present.... Analysts should not be timorous
or bound by convention."
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The Carter White House took other steps to ensure better
communication of high-level substantive concerns as well as
perceptions of analytical shortcomings. The Political
Intelligence Working Group (the Deputy National Security
Adviser, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and later the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), set up at the White
House to organize remedial action in response to the
President's November 1978 note, interpreted its charter broadly
and worked to improve and better focus field reporting by
State, CIA and Attaches; to improve the cover for CIA officers
that is so critical to good reporting; to resolve bureaucratic
impediments to good reporting; and a number of other issues
aimed at improving analysis. and-making i.t.more responsive.
part of the work of this informal group, senior staff
representatives of Dr. Brzezinski met periodically with
representatives of the Secretary of State and the DCI to review
foreign developments or issues of current concern to the
President and to provide feedback on intelligence coverage. I
believe all involved would agree that these efforts had a
salutary effect in improving communication between intelligence
and the White House and thus improving intelligence support to
the President.
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A major innovation of the Reagan Administration in this
regard was the President's decision in 1981 that his
President's Daily Brief should be provided each day also to the
vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the
National Security Adviser and later the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. They all were to have the same information as
the President. Most significantly, primarily for security
reasons, the PDB was to be delivered to these principals in
person by a senior analytical officer of CIA, who would sit
with the principal and then carry the document back to CIA.
These arrangements provided an opportunity unique in US
intelligence history for intelligence professionals to get
immediate feedback from principals, their follow-up questions,
tasking for further analysis and a sense of policymaker
priorities and concerns. Intelligence support was thereby
improved as was the understanding of intelligence officers of
policy dynamics and reality of the decisionmaking arena which
they were supporting. The principals were remarkably candid
with their CIA briefers, and their confidence to my knowledge
was never breached -- and the quality of intelligence support
was greatly enhanced.
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OVERCOMING CIA ISOLATION AND WHITE HOUSE SUSPICION
Presidents expect their intelligence service to provide
timely, accurate and farseeing information and analysis. Thus,
nearly all Presidential comments on the quality of intelligence
are critical -- prompted by our failure to meet expectations.
Indeed, all but one quote at the outset of this article was in
response to a specific situation where intelligence was
perceived to have failed to measure up. In short, Presidents
often consider intelligence as much another problem bureaucracy
to be dealt with and warily watched as it is a source of
helpful information, insight and support. The dynamics of the
relationship between the White House and CIA (not to mention
the less familiar agencies of US intelligence) and the lack of
understanding of each other's perspective and motives --
abetted by bureaucratic rivalries -- that separates them are
usually unclear to the players themselves, and much less so to
outside observers. While most journalists and academicians
focus on alleged distortions of intelligence to support
Administration policy, the players know that the relationship
actually is usually dominated on key issues by disagreement and
suspicion.
To the extent intelligence professionals are isolated (or
isolate themselves) from White House/NSC officials and are
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unresponsive to White House informational and analytical needs,
this adversarial nature of the relationship will be emphasized
and understanding of what we can and cannot do will be
lacking. Thus, the DCI and his senior managers and the White
House must both promote and maintain close personal ties
between the White House and NSC officials from the President on
down on the one hand, and the DCI and his principal
subordinates on the other. Both must aggressively seek new
ways to get intelligence information and assessments before the
President, even while experimenting with old mechanisms, such
as the PDB. White House procedures and relationships are
always dynamic; accordingly, the search for new and better ways
to serve the President must be constant.
Although the routine order of business and-internal-
organization may vary from Administration to Administration, I
would suggest several general rules:
Senior Intelligence, State, Defense and NSC officers
must establish and maintain personal contact to ensure
that intelligence officers are well informed as to the
issues of concern to the President; policy matters
under consideration in which intelligence analysis can
make a contribution; and the overall foreign and
defense affairs agenda so that the President's needs
can be better anticipated.
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The role of the DCI is central to understanding the
President's needs and conveying analysis to him. DCI
interest in analysis and aggressiveness in getting
substantive matters before the President has varied
greatly, though. Directors Webster, Casey and Turner
have worked hard at the problem, as did some of their
predecessors. Future DCIs must be persuaded that these
undertakings also are central to their role as the
President's principal intelligence adviser. Moreover,
the DCI should assume a similar role with the National
Security Adviser -- perhaps the best source of
information on issues of topical interest to the
President and the foreign affairs and defense agenda.
Finally, the importance of routine, detailed feedback
from policy meetings, briefings and conversations with
the President, Vice President, Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser and
Chairman, JCS must be impressed upon DCIs. Turner and
Webster have done this effectively. Contrary to the
views of some, we cannot properly do our work in
splendid isolation.
The responsibility for making intelligence more
relevant, timely and helpful is not that of the DCI and
senior officials of the Intelligence Community alone.
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To be sure, intelligence managers at all levels must
assume the burden of keeping up to date on events and
policy issues relevant to their area of professional
concern. Such awareness must infuse intelligence
officers at all levels. Only when priority attention
is given by all to the relevance and value of
intelligence to the consumer from President to desk
officer will intelligence analysis be better received
and, in the end, be better. But, also, the President
and his senior national security team, must take
seriously their responsibility for the quality of
intelligence support they get. They must be willing to
make time for regular dialogue with intelligence
specialists; for understanding intelligence
capabilities, the impact of-competing priorities for
collection and analysis, and major investment
decisions; and they must be willing to play an active
role in guiding intelligence strategy and determining
priorities.
The above "rules" apply to improving the quality and
usefulness of intelligence to the President. They will not
resolve the several causes of Presidential displeasure --
intelligence support of Congress, changing assessments that
have policy implications, surprises, and so forth. Even here,
however, there are mitigating steps that can be taken. For
example:
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-- Intelligence professionals should take the initiative
to let the Security Adviser or the NSC Staff know when
an estimate or other form of analysis will revise
earlier assessments and have an impact on the
President's policies. This would include, in
particular, advance warning of new and important
conclusions in military estimates.
-- Intelligence needs to develop a mechanism for better
informing the White House about support provided to the
Congress. The intelligence agencies are part of the
Executive Branch; the DCI is appointed by and reports
to the President. It is not improper or inappropriate
for the Intelligence Community to keep the President's
foreign affairs and Congressional affairs staff more
completely and regularly advised of papers provided to
the Congress, possibly controversial testimony or
briefings, etc. Again, some of this has been done --
but a mere schedule of planned appearances or an
occasional phone call are not enough. Keeping the
Executive informed about CIA dealings with Congress is
an important aspect of building Presidential confidence
that we are not trying to undercut him or his policies
by responding to legitimate Congressional requests.
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Finally, ground rules should be developed for the
disclosure of declassified intelligence. The current
lack of a systematic approach contributes to leaks; to
White House suspicion of obstructionism, bureaucratic
gamesmanship or pursuit of a contrary policy agenda by
intelligence professionals; and concern on the part of
intelligence officers over the appearance (and
sometimes. the reality) of politicization of
intelligence by White House or other
policymaker-directed declassification of information.
These are not new problems, but they all have worsened
over the years. All, including many in Congress,
agree intelligence information undergirding policy
decisions must often be made available for public
education-or to gain support for national security
decisions. There is widespread demand for unclassified
publication of intelligence assessments or research on
issues of moment to the country. But who should make
these decisions? This is not the place to propose
solutions, but the problem exists, affects the
relationship between the President and the intelligence
agencies on the one hand and the Executive and
Legislative on the other.
The usefulness of CIA to Presidents in that area for which
CIA was primarily established -- collection, analysis and
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reporting of information -- for many years has cften suffered
because of self-imposed isolation by CIA and lack of interest,
understanding and involvement by the President and his national
security team. Self-promoting though true stories of
extraordinary intelligence successes -- untempered by candor
about problems in collection and analysis -- have in the past
led to exaggerated expectations that are inevitably dashed.
Lack of White House involvement has often left intelligence
professionals adrift, and uncertain amid conflicting priorities
and requirements, with the inevitable price in relevance and
timeliness.
CIA and the Intelligence Community represent an
extraordinary national asset. The rebuilding of the Community
over the past decade has vastly augmented our collection and
analysis capabilities and sharpened our skills. Congress has
greatly enhanced its understanding of intelligence and shown a
willingness to provide guidance and direction. It is time for
the White House to assert its proper intelligence policy
direction and guidance role and for CIA to welcome this role.
Communication and dialogue on such broad matters must be
improved. Only thus can intelligence and the use of it by the
President be improved and the concomitant opportunity to better
inform the policymaking process be seized.
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washint on.D.C.20505
17 August 1988
iL
Attached is the draft article I discussed with you.
It still needs some more work; some useful innovations
under the Reagan Administration need to be mentioned
following on page 19. There are some other places where
I need to do a little more work as well. Nonetheless,
I think this is sufficient for you to review and
comment upon.
I will be in the office until early evening Friday
and Satiirdav morninff_ Ynn can, of course, call me
at home
I am envious of your gastronomical if not your
political experiences this week.
Attachment:
As Stated
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STAT
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d Central Intelliggcncc
17 August 1988
ILLEGIB
TO: Barry Kelly
National Security Council
STAT
Attached is the draft article I mentioned on the
telephone I was asked to write for the Washington
Quarterly at Anne Armstrong's suggestion. It will
appear in late November.
Let me know if you have any comments or suggestions.
I think you will find the general approach congenial
to your own views, based on our previous conversations.
I will be providing the final version to the journal
Friday afternoon. (We are long overdue for lunch;
let's set something up.)
Attachment:
As Stated
"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"
Richard Nixon, 1970
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ADMINISTRATIVE - ID-'ERNAL USE ONLY
18 August 1988
SUBJECT: Payment for Charges Incurred by the
DDCI for Representational Purposes
Payment from U.S. Government funds for representational expenses
incurred by the DDCI for the purpose of conducting official business of
the United States Government is authorized under the policy set forth in
Official Reception and Representational Expenses) for the
Ong functions:
Date Name
Organizational Affiliation
88.07.13 Robert M. Gates (host) DDCI
Don Gregg Office of the Vice President
/S/
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
19 August 1988
TO: Roy Godson
National Strategy Information Center
Attached is the draft article I called about and Diane
described. I was asked to write it for the Washington
Quarterly, as a companion piece to those you and
Anne Armstrong are doing.
There are some places where I need to do more work.
Nonetheless, I would appreciate any suggestions or.
comments you might have. Please let me hear by Wednesday.
(P.S. Please keep to yourself and destroy after
we talk. As you will see, it's pretty candid.)
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I nAn ni] i.nnn
Distribution:
Orig.
- Addr
essee
STAT
1
- DDCI
1
- ER
STAT
1
-=
1
- D/PAO
1
- PAO Registry
1
- PAO Ames
1
-?MED(Subject)
RE: Speaking Invitation
Security Affairs Support Association
Department of State
6-7 October
Washington, D.C.
Executive Vice President of the Security Affairs Support Association
(SASA), General John E. Morrison, has invited you to give the keynote address
at the second session of the Fall '88 Symposium on Thursday, 6 October. The
symposium will be hosted by and conducted at the'Department of State. The
proposed format is 20 minutes of remarks followed by 10 minutes of questions
and answers or any other format that you would prefer. You are asked to
direct your remarks to "the examination of potential changes in intelligence
requirements, particularly treaty monitoring, Third World activities, high
technology weapons, space programs, and Soviet conventional military forces."
The Symposium will be held at the SECRET level. Approximately 200-250 senior
people from government and industry, all US citizens will make up the
audience. Members of the media will not be present.
The overall theme of the program is "Glasnost and Perestroika -
Implications for US Intelligence." Secretary of State George Shultz is
invited to participate along with Max Kampelman, Admiral William Crowe,
General Edward Heinz, and Maynard Anderson. (See opposite for tentative
agenda.) Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Robert Lamb
will host the symposium. General Morrison would appreciate your
recommendations on other speakers who would be appropriate.
Since you are a new member of the SASA Board and this is the type of
audience that we are interested in addressing, I recommend that you accept
this invitation. If you agree, attached is a letter of acceptance for your
signature.
STAT
ADMINISTRAJ.I r INTERNAL USE ONLY
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Central Intelligence Agency
General John E. Morrison, Jr. (ret.)
Executive Vice President
Security Affairs Support Association
Suite 120, 2662 Riva Road
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
Dear John:
I accept with pleasure the Security Affairs Support Association (SASA)
invitation to address the Fall '88 Symposium on Thursday, 6 October at State
Department. I will look forward to meeting with you and the other SASA
members and their guests. A member of our Public Affairs Staff will contact
you concerning the arrangements.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/31 : CIA-RDP89GO072OR000300100001-6 0
PRESIDENT
John N. McM.t,,n
Lockheed Corp.
EXECUTIVE
VICE PRESIDENT
John E. Morrison. Jr.
The MVM Group. Inc.
SECRETARY/tREASURER
'illiant H. Parson
GENERAL COUNSEL
Daniel B. Sib-. Eq.
(Dewy. Gottlieb. Stern & Hamihon
The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
BOARD OF DIRECTORS Dear Bob:
CHAIRMAN
Mere A. Crmr
Vrtrofarp. We are now in the process of developing our program
MEMBERS f
'
or the Fall
88 Symposium which will be hosted by and
lderm.n
Jr
DepU
.
. conducted at the Department of State, Thursday and Friday
Dep. Under Sec Deferew (P)
LewrenceF.Ayas (hal f day), 6-7 October 1988 and would be extremely pleased
DefrnseM+Pp-B Agency if it were possible for you to address the attendees.
Dr. Jima H. Babcock
The MRRE Corporation
Jana 0.Btab The theme of the program, which will be presented at
"-?'n6R??"c' Corp. the SECRET classification level , is "GLASNOST and
George R.Gacter PERESTROIKA - IMPLICATIONS for U.S. INTELLIGENCE". The
Dry Securny
Dr. Roger K. EngeI
undergirding rationale for the theme is that relations
U.T.Nonden Snems,lne hAfwaan f h n IIni+esA 04- ,4. .... , - A J.L.
process of change. Whatever the changes, national security
L.t_GmEdward J.Heinz, USAF considerations will be preeminently involved.
IntdI eocc Commm rv Staff
Jimmie D. Hill
Dep. Under Sec Air Force The principal objective of our organization, as you
R.ErunHineman well- know, is to "enhance the relationships and
C e n t r a l tnuiligence A g e n c y t i n h a r C f a n i i n n I n ' " . ' .
i? 6 ...... z- -- .. _ __ -- -
,C.. academe who are involved in and concerned with the
Donald B.Jawba well-being and success of the national intelligence
Boeng Anospacr Co. aneinn in a " T - ------ _ - _ _ _ I . . . .
nav-e a special interest in learning more about the
Mii.Gcn.JohaEKuta.USAF (Ret) aforementioned changes and how they might impact our
Ears. [':,...
HuraC;p-- developments. Some changes are now perceived, others may
Gordon D..M be emerging but have yet to take definite form and still
Pacdk Sian Rewirch Corp. m e% r n m n .. n n 1 .. L... . . . . - - - - - -
IBM Symposium is to examine the aforementioned categories of
Dr. Val P.Peline changes--those that now appear to be of substance and those
Defmc Intelligence ASemy" -' examination some perspective on their implications for U.S.
, Intelligence.
%.ut t C-116 a l l u i u Lure J me l I i gence modus and program
t'., JL/9 K.-...iPe..,L
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A copy of the draftris enclosed. You will see that we
have tentatively identified you as the SESSION II Keynote
Speaker, 1315-1345 hrs., on 6 October 1988. Even as this
letter is being mailed, letters to the other speakers
identified are being dispatched at the same time. As you
can see from the agenda, we have three speaking slots for
which speakers have not yet been identified. I have
highlighted those periods and topics. Of most importance,
of course, ti gaining your agreement to participate.
Beyond that, I sorely need and request your assistance by
way of recommendations on who might be able to address the
topics for which we have no speakers as yet. If you could
give me some names, I'll do the rest and with much
appreciation.
Secretary Shultz is being invited to participate by
our host, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic
Security, Mr. Robert Lamb. The latter is also asking Mr.
Max Kampelman to join us. Also invited is the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; the
Director, Intelligence Community Staff, Lt. General Edward
Heinz, USAF, and the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense (Counter Intelligence and Security), Mr. Maynard
Anderson. When the agenda becomes completely firm,
hopefully within the next two weeks, the final version will
be forwarded to you.
One final note--we anticipate an attendance of
200-250, senior people from government and industry, all
U.S. citizens with SECRET clearances or higher. There will
be no foreigners nor press representatives.
.We will be looking forward to hearing from you.
Many, many thanks. All the best.
Encl.
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DRAT T 4 AUG:I S T 1 988
SASA FALL'88 SYMPOSIUM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
6-7 OCTOBER 1988
"GLASNOST and PERESTROIKA - IMPLICATIONS for U.S. INTELLIGENCE"
THURSDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1988
0730-0900 REGISTRATION
0900-0905 ADMINISTRATIVE ANNOUNCEMENTS
0905-0910 WELCOMING REMARKS
The Honorable Robert E. Lamb, Assistant Secretary
of State, Diplomatic Security
0915-1200 SESSION I
(An assessment of major developments in the Soviet
Union, Glasnost, Perestroika and the long term
consequences of changes in political, economic,
and military structures. Impacts on our National
and International Security interests and on
US-USSR relations).
0915-0945 Keynote Address - US-USSR RELATIONS
*The Honorable George P. Shultz,
Secretary of State
0945-1025 POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE USSR
(Speaker tbd)
1025-1040 Break
1040-1115 THE ECONOMIC UPHEAVAL
(Speaker tbd)
1115-1200 THE MILITARY SITUATION
*Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
1200-1315 Lunch
1315-1700 SESSION II
(An examination of potential changes in
intelligence requirements, particularly treaty
monitoring, Third World activities, high
technology weapons, space programs and Soviet
conventional military forces).
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1315-1345 Session Keynote Address
*The Honorable Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence.
1345-1445 ARMS TREATIES-MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES AND
REQUIREMENTS
*The Honorable Max M. Kampelman, Chief of
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the
Soviet Union, Department of State
1445-1515 COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
*Mr. Maynard Anderson, Assistant Deputy Under-
secretary of Defense, Counter Intelligence and
Security
1515-1530 Break
1530-1615
1615-1700
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES; I&W STRUCTURE AND
DISPOSTTTON_ READINESS
(Speaker tbd)
SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD (POLITICAL,
TRADE, TECHNOLOGY)
(Speaker tbd)
1700-1900 Reception
FRIDAY 7 OCTOBER 1988
0730-0900 REGISTRATION
0900-0905 ADMINISTRATIVE ANNOUNCEMENTS
0905-1200 SESSION III
(Intelligence systems forecast, fiscal prospects,
Congressional priorities and concerns and impacts
on intelligence systems).
0905-0945 NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAMS-A FORECAST
*Lt. Gen. Edward Heinz, USAF, Director,
Intelligence Community Staff
0945-1015 DoD INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS-A FORECAST
*The Honorable Gordon AE3 Smith, Assistant
Secretary of Defense, I
1015-1030 Break
1030-1145 CONGRESSIONAL-COMMUNITY ROUND TABLE
(Representatives of the SSCI, HPSCI, HAC and the
Intelligence Community)
*Invited
Closing Remarks
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' LXLCU 11 V t SLCI(L I AKIA f
ROUTING SLIP
--T Txmr~
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DO
X
2
DDCI
X
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
X
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DDO
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DDS&T
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Chm/NIC
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GC
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IG
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Compt
13
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STAT
3637 (1041)
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Ccntral Intdligenoe Agency
STAT'
Ms. Linda Crowl
The Washington Quarterly
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006
29 August 1988
Enclosed is the Deputy Director's article entitled
An Opportunity Unfilfilled: The Use and Perceptions
of Intelligence at the White House for your winter 1989
issue of The Washington Quarterly.
Mr. Gates would appreciate your not.sharing this
article with anyone prior to its publication. Also,
it is his understanding that your publication will not
be distributed until the end of November. If there
have been any changes in the understanding Mr. Gates
has with Mr. Roberts as stated above please call
immediately.
Thanks for your help.
Sincerely,
Office of the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence
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An Opportunity Unfulfilled
The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House
"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at
one goal -- producing accurate reliable intelligence.... Who
are the customers who get this finished product? At the very
top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the
Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."
(CIA Information Pamphlet)
What have our most important customers had to say about how
well we achieve that goal?
"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political
intelligence."
Jimmy Carter, 1978
"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?"
Richard Nixon, 1970
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"CIA Director McCone...made recommendations for checking
and improving the quality of intelligence reporting. I
promptly accepted the suggestions...."
Lyndon Johnson, Memoirs
"During the rush of. . .events in the final days of 1958, the
Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a
Castro victory might not be in the interests of the United
States."
Dwight Eisenhower, Memoirs
A search of Presidential memoirs and those of principal
assistants over the past 30 years or so turns up remarkably
little discussion or perspective on the role played by
Directors of Central Intelligence (DCI) or intelligence
information in Presidential decisionmaking on foreign affairs.
What little commentary there has been, as suggested by the
introductory quotes, is nearly uniformly critical. Similarly,
in intelligence memoir literature, while one can read a great
deal about covert operations and technical achievements, there
is little on the role of intelligence in Presidential
decisionmaking. Thus, on both sides of the relationship there
is a curious, discreet silence.
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Why this dearth of first-hand reflection and evaluation in
a major area of foreign affairs and national security history?
Partly, perhaps, it is because even still there is a reluctance
to discuss what both parties perceive as sensitive
information. Partly, it may be because senior officials find
it difficult to distinguish what they learn or see in
intelligence reports from other sources of information,
ambiguities in the role of intelligence in policymaking,
confusion over what is intelligence, the inclination of senior
officials to believe they already knew what they just read in
an intelligence report, and the common predilection of senior
officials to rely on and recall personal contacts as opposed to
the written word or anonymous experts.
I believe, however, that this void in the study of
Presidents, intelligence and decisionmaking -- apart from
covert action -- is also explained by factors that continue to
dominate the relationship between Presidents and the CIA and
Intelligence Community: intelligence collection and
assessment are black arts for most Presidents and their key
advisers, neither adequately understood nor adequately
exploited. For intelligence officers, Presidential and senior
level views of the intelligence they receive and how they use
it (or not) are just as unfamiliar, giving rise among
intelligence officers to wishful thinking and even conceit. In
short, over the years, both the White House and the CIA have
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failed to take maximum advantage of the opportunity for better
intelligence support for the President and decisionmaking.*
This situation is not peculiar to any single Administration or
particular view of the CIA, but rather is a problem of personal
relationships, bureaucratic cultures, and the policy process
itself.
* This article addresses the CIA-White House relationship in
terms of intelligence assessments and substantive support to
the policy process. While CIA's involvement in operational
activities abroad, especially covert action, plainly affects
the relationship with the White House and the President, I do
not address that aspect in this article. A complex and
controversial subject warranting separate treatment, I do not
believe the operational/covert action element of the
relationship significantly affects the analysis or conclusions
of this article.
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To understand how intelligence is used and regarded at the
White House first requires an understanding of the context in
which it is received. The sheer volume of information flowing
to the President is staggering. More than 200 agencies seek to
draw his attention to programs, proposals or vital pieces of
information. An astonishing amount of their work finds its way
to the White House.
Policy agencies such as. State, Defense, the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency and others prepare and send great
quantities of paperwork to the President. Most Presidents also
get considerable information and analysis on foreign affairs
from the media. These sources of information join a river of
correspondence to the President from countless consultants,
academics, think tanks, political contacts, family and friends,
political supporters, journalists, authors, foreign leaders,
and concerned citizens. (Lest you think such correspondence
can easily be disregarded, it is my experience that most
Presidents often attach as much -- if not more -- credibility
to the views of family, friends and private contacts as they do
to those of executive agencies.) In sum, despite the mystique
of intelligence for the public, for most Presidents it is just
one of a number of sources of information. Intelligence
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reporting must compete for the President's time and attention,
and that competition is intense.
It is the responsibility of the White House Staff,
including the National Security Council (NSC) Staff, to impose
order on this avalanche of paper and to reduce it to manageable
proportions. The NSC alone processes some 10,000 "action"
papers a year -- not including intelligence analyses or other
purely "informational" papers. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski,
President Carter's National Security Adviser, once asked me to
calculate how many pages of reading he sent to President Carter
weekly; the total averaged many hundreds of pages -- and among
White House offices the NSC was among the most disciplined with
respect to the length and number of items going to the
President. These, then, are the first hurdles that
intelligence faces: a President with a heavy schedule,
inundated by paper and demands for decisions, surrounded by
senior assistants who have as a main role trying to keep that
President from being overwhelmed by paper; and a President with
vast and varied non-intelligence sources upon which he also
relies and.in which he often has considerable confidence.
WHAT INTELLIGENCE DOES THE PRESIDENT GET
The President routinely receives only one intelligence
document that is not summarized or commented upon by someone
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outside the Intelligence Community: The President's Daily
Brief -- CIA's principal vehicle for reporting and analyzing
current developments for the President. He receives this,
usually via his National Security Adviser every morning, along
with a package that has varied little from President to
President: a few (3-6) State and CIA cables of special
significance; occasionally a sensitive intelligence report from
the CIA; the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the National
Security Agency; selected wire service items; State or CIA
situation reports (rarely both) if there is a crisis abroad;
and often NSC and State morning cable summaries. Contrary to
what is commonly believed, this is the only regularly scheduled
package of current intelligence the President receives during
the day.
Through the course of the day, however, the National
Security Adviser keeps the President apprised of significant
developments overseas and may handcarry especially important
cables directly to the President. In a crisis, the flow of
information increases. More analysis and reports will be given
the President. He will receive current intelligence orally in
meetings with his senior White House, State, Defense and
Intelligence advisers, as well as from the media -- often the
first source of information. Nevertheless, on a day-to-day
basis, apart from,the PDB, successive Presidents generally have
seen only that current intelligence selected by the National
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Security Adviser, who works to make that morning package as
succinct and small as he responsibly can.
It was not always this way, even in modern times. Before
the Kennedy Administration, the President, his National
Security Adviser and the NSC Staff relied on the CIA and State
to provide incoming cables and information as soon as they were
processed. It was an approach that led to considerable
competition, redundancy and placed a President at the mercy of
the bureaucracies for information.
This system was revolutionized, however, when President
Kennedy created the White House Situation Room to which State,
the National Security Agency, the Defense Department, and the
CIA began to provide unevaluated or "raw" intelligence
information electronically -- an approach with its own readily
apparent shortcomings. (Many a time, an overeager white House
aide has run to a President with a dramatic but unevaluated
intelligence report, and later sheepishly had to return to
acknowledge the source was poor or there had been a mistake.)
Thus, the NSC and President began receiving intelligence and
diplomatic cables on developments abroad often as soon as, and
often before, State desk officers and intelligence analysts.
One result of the establishment of the Situation Room was a
significant diminution in the value to the White House of CIA's
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and other agencies' current intelligence reporting that-to this
day has not been fully grasped by the Intelligence Community.
Only analysis by experienced intelligence specialists lends
value to current intelligence reporting provided the White
House. Even so, because of the Situation Room, intelligence
information from abroad is sometimes in the President's hands
before reaching the DCI, other senior intelligence officials,
senior policy officials -- and the experts.
Naturally, the President receives information through
channels other than the early morning folder and the occasional
cable during the day. For example, most Presidents routinely
have received current intelligence reports in meetings and the
key judgments of important National Intelligence Estimates (and
other intelligence as well) either directly from the DCI or
through the National Security Adviser. All DCIs also have
briefed the President and his senior advisers both individually
and in formal meetings of the National Security Council.
Moreover, discussion at such meetings serves to convey
information to the President from diverse sources. The
President also receives abbreviated versions of intelligence
assessments in many policy papers.
Nevertheless, each of the four Presidents I have observed
has received a infinitesimal part of published intelligence and
only a fraction even of analysis specifically prepared for
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senior policymakers. This has placed a premium on the
President's Daily Brief, on the willingness and ability of the
DCI to give important assessments (published or oral) directly
to the President, and on the willingness of the National
Security Adviser to forward key intelligence reports to the
President. Disinterest or reluctance on the part of a DCI (or
National Security Adviser) to take an activist, even aggressive
role in this respect is a severe -- even irreparable --
handicap to ensuring that intelligence information and
assessments reach the President.
WHAT PRESIDENTS THINK OF WHAT THEY GET
Perhaps in recognition of how busy Presidents are, for
years there has been an adage at the White House that the
absence of criticism should be regarded as praise. Along these
lines, Presidential comments on intelligence assessments are so
rare that we are understandably tempted to assume satisfaction
with what is being received. Regrettably, however, this is
doubtful. Many of the infrequent comments are critical, as
illustrated at the outset of this article.
I believe the negative perceptions of Intelligence of most
Presidents and their senior advisers while in office or
afterward are due to several factors:
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-- The first and most significant is failure. Whether
Nixon's unhappiness over misestimates of planned Soviet
ICBM deployments or Carter's over failure to forecast
the Iranian revolution or untimely upward revisions of
North Korean troop strength, these Presidents and their
advisers -- with justification -- believed CIA
assessments either contributed importantly to policy
disasters or made them vulnerable to later criticism.
Moreover, Presidents expect that for what they spend on
intelligence, the end-product should be able to predict
coups, upheavals, riots, intentions, military moves and
the like with accuracy. And, in the early morning
hours when the National Security Adviser must repair to
the President's study with the (usually) bad news about
such events, the Chief Executive will not unnaturally
wonder why his billions for intelligence do not spare
him unpleasant surprises.
-- Second, Presidents do not like controversy within the
Executive Branch, and they like it even less when it
becomes public. Nor do Presidents welcome debate over
basic facts once they have made a decision. Whether
the issue is troublesome assessments on Vietnam
(Johnson), the public dispute between the CIA and
Defense on whether the SS-9 was a MRV or MIRV (Nixon),
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North Korean force levels (Carter), or the Soviet gas
pipeline (Reagan), these and other intelligence debates
over technology transfer, verification of arms control,
Soviet defense spending, Soviet weapons programs and
many more have caused controversy and weakened support
for policy. To the extent intelligence information
results (in the eyes of White House officials) in
internal government controversy, problems with the
Congress, or embarrassing publicity, it will draw
Presidential ire or at a minimum leave the President
with unflattering views of his intelligence services.
-- Third, Presidents do not welcome new intelligence
assessments undercutting policies based on earlier
assessments. As professionals, we are constantly
revisiting important subjects as better and later
information or improved analytical tools become
available. When this results in changing the
statistical basis for the US position in MBFR,
substantially elevating estimates of North Korean
forces at a time when the President is pressing to
reduce US forces in South Korea, or "discovering" a
Soviet brigade in Cuba, it is no revelation to observe
that Presidents regard us less than fondly.
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-- Fourth, successive Administrations have generally
regarded with skepticism the growing direct
relationship between Congress and US intelligence
agencies. In recent years, the provision of great
quantities of highly sensitive information and analysis
to Members of Congress and their staffs has largely
eliminated the Executive's longstanding advantage of a
near monopoly of information on foreign affairs and
defense. The flow of information to the Hill has given
the Congress a powerful tool in its search for a
greater voice in the making of foreign and defense
policy vis-a-vis the Executive -- and Presidents cannot
be indifferent to the fact that intelligence has
provided Congress with that tool and that the White
House is nearly helpless to blunt it except in very
rare cases.
-- Fifth, I believe Presidents and their national security
teams usually are ill-informed about intelligence
capabilities and therefore often have unrealistic
expectations of what intelligence can do for them,
especially when they hear about the genuinely
extraordinary capabilities of US intelligence for
collecting and processing information. When they too
soon learn of our limitations, they are inevitably
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disappointed. Policymakers usually learn the hard way
that while intelligence can tell them a great deal, it
only rarely -- and usually in crises involving military
forces -- provides the kind of unambiguous and timely
information that can make day-to-day decisionmaking
simpler and less risky. Intelligence officers
occasionally encourage such exaggerated expectations by
pretending a confidence in their judgments they cannot
reasonably justify and by failing to be candid about
the quality and reliability of their information and
the possibility of other outcomes. Once bitten by an
erroneous or misleading intelligence assessment, most
White House officials -- including Presidents -- will
be twice-shy about relying on or accepting
unquestioningly a second.
-- Finally, beyond these broad factors affecting the White
House-Intelligence relationship are narrower, more
parochial bureaucratic stresses. Often, staff at the
White House do not know how to use effectively the vast
system they direct -- and, too often, an intelligence
bureaucracy that does not want "outside" direction
offers little help. There is a longstanding perception
at the White House that changing the way the
intelligence bureaucracies do business -- for example,
even the presentation of intelligence information to
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the President -- is just too hard, takes too much time
and energy, and ultimately yields little.
A useful case study illustrating the simultaneous
contribution of intelligence to Presidential policymaking and
the problems it can bring, is the ratification proceedings of
the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces. The capabilities of
US intelligence to monitor deployed Soviet INF weapons and
associated treaty provisions, made the treaty possible in the
first place. However, our uncertainties in some areas relating
to the Treaty, disagreements within the intelligence community
on the number of non-deployed INF missiles, public disclosure
of these disagreements and exploitation of them in the Senate's
ratification proceedings, all presented problems to Executive
policymakers. For the White House, on this issue -- as so many
others -- intelligence was a bittersweet player.
Presidents and other principals over the years have faulted
the CIA for lack of imagination in anticipating the needs of
the President and for insufficient aggressiveness in keeping
itself informed on policy issues under consideration. Neither
Presidents nor their Assistants for National Security Affairs
have felt it their responsibility regularly to keep senior
Agency officials well informed in this regard, to provide
day-to-day detailed tasking or to provide helpful feedback.
For guidance, the CIA thus often has had to rely on-what the
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DCI can pick up in high-level meetings and contacts -- and the
skill and interest of different DCIs in this has varied
greatly. Indeed, some DCIs have neither sought nor wanted
guidance or feedback from the White'House, or have sought it on
some issues and resisted it on others.
Irregular feedback and intelligence policy guidance --.or
the lack of any at all -- in the four Administrations that I
have observed first hand has been an obstacle to improved and
more responsive intelligence performance. The lack of
receptivity on the part of senior intelligence officials on
those infrequent occasions when guidance or advice has been
offered is equally to blame. Even.so, if Executive Branch and
especially White House officials view Congressional influence
on intelligence strategy, priorities and investment as
excessive, it is in part because senior policymakers in
successive administrations have neglected their own
responsibilities in these areas.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
A President and his national security team (the Vice
President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and National
Security Adviser) should view intelligence as an important
asset in foreign policymaking and should be prepared to devote
the time and energy to working with the DCI to provide useful
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guidance and direction to the collection and analysis efforts
of CIA and the rest of US intelligence. Contrary to the view
of those who are apprehensive over a close relationship between
policymakers and intelligence, I believe it is not close enough
-- that more interaction, feedback and direction as to
strategy, priorities and requirements is critical to better
performance, and that this can be accomplished without
jeopardizing the independence and integrity of intelligence
assessments and judgments.
There has been progress in the last ten years, though much
more can be done. The Carter and Reagan administrations have
worked constructively at a high level to inform CIA of the
analytical needs of the President and to advise the Agency of
perceived shortcomings in collection and analysis.
In 1978, Dr. Brzezinski sent a memorandum to then DCI
Turner that made the following points:
-- Greater attention needs to be paid to clandestine
collection targeted on the thinking and planning of key
leaders or groups in important advanced and secondary
countries, how they make policy decisions and how they
will react to US decisions and those of other powers.
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-- Political analyses should be focused more on problems
of particular concern to the US government. Too many
papers are on subjects peripheral to US interests or
offer broad overviews not directly linked to particular
problems, events or developments of concern to the US
government.
-- There needs to be greater attention to the future.
More papers are needed that briefly set forth facts and
evidence and then conclude with a well-informed
speculative essay on the implications for the future:
"We expect and hope for thought-provoking, reasonable
views of the future based on what you know about the
past and present.... Analysts should not be timorous
or bound by convention."
After the Iranian Revolution, the Carter White House took
other steps to ensure better communication of intelligence
needs. A Political Intelligence Working Group (the Deputy
National Security Adviser, the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
and later the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), was
established at the White House to organize remedial action in
response to the President's November 1978 note. The group
interpreted its charter broadly and worked to improve and
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better focus field reporting by State, CIA and Attaches; to
resolve bureaucratic impediments to good reporting; and to
tackle other problems in order to improve collection and
analysis and make intelligence more responsive. As part of the
work of this informal group, senior staff representatives of
Dr. Brzezinski met weekly with representatives of the Secretary
of State and the DCI to review foreign developments or issues
of current concern to the President and to provide feedback on
intelligence coverage. These efforts had a salutary effect in
improving communication between the Intelligence Community and
the White House and improved intelligence support to the
President.
A major innovation of the Reagan Administration in this
regard was the President's decision in 1981 that his
President's Daily Brief should be provided each day also to the
Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the
National Security Adviser and later the-Chairman of the Joint'
Chiefs of Staff. They all were to have the same information as
the President. Most significantly, primarily for security
reasons, the PDB was to be delivered to these principals in
person by a senior analytical officer of the CIA, who would sit
with the principal and then carry the document back to the
CIA. These arrangements provided an opportunity unique in US
intelligence history for intelligence professionals to get
immediate, informed feedback from principals -- their follow-up
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questions, tasking for further collection and analysis, and a
sense of the priorities and concerns of the top officials in
the government. Intelligence support was thereby improved as
was the understanding of intelligence officers of policy
dynamics and reality of the decisionmaking arena which they
were supporting.
The day to day dialogue between intelligence officers and
policymakers at all levels has increased significantly in
recent years. Intelligence officers have been more aggressive
in this regard and policymakers more receptive. Routine weekly
meetings between the DCI and, separately, the Secretaries of
State and Defense and the National Security Adviser have
contributed to improved relevance and timeliness of
intelligence support. The NSC Staff and several Reagan NSC
advisers worked with intelligence managers to improve
responsiveness to Presidential intelligence needs and to remedy
shortcomings in intelligence support. With the encouragement
of the President, his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
studied substantive and bureaucratic problems in the
Intelligence Community and offered recommendations for
improvement.
In sum, the dialogue essential to better intelligence
support has improved, but such progress is highly perishable
with frequent turnover in senior policy officials. Moreover,
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this improved dialogue until recently focused primarily on
current intelligence or crisis-related subjects. Much remains
to be done in institutionalizing improved White House
intelligence guidance policy, attention to requirements,
investment, and dialogue on strategy and longer-range issues.
OVERCOMING WHITE HOUSE SUSPICION AND CIA ISOLATION
Presidents expect their intelligence service to provide
timely, accurate and farseeing information and analysis. Thus,
nearly all Presidential comments on the quality of intelligence
are critical -- prompted by our failure to meet expectations.
Indeed, all but one quote at the outset of this article was in
response to a specific situation where intelligence was
perceived to have failed to measure up. In short, Presidents
often consider intelligence as much another problem bureaucracy
as a source of helpful information, insight and support.
This point is perhaps most graphically illustrated by a
story involving President Johnson. Former DCI Richard Helms
recounts a private dinner in the White House family quarters
during which President Johnson engaged John J. McCloy in a
discussion about intelligence. He told McCloy things were
going well in intelligence, but then continued: "Let me tell
you about these intelligence guys. When I was growing up in
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Texas, we had a cow named Bessie. I'd go out early and milk
her. I'd get her in the stanchion, seat myself and squeeze out
a pail of fresh milk. One day I'd worked hard and gotten a
full pail of milk, but I wasn't paying attention, and old
Bessie swept her shit-smeared tail through that bucket of
milk. Now, you know, that's what these intelligence guys do.
You work hard and get.a good program or policy going, and they
sweep a shit-smeared tail through it."
The dynamics of the relationship between the White House
and CIA and the lack of understanding of each other's
perspective and motives are usually difficult for the players
themselves to discern. They are even less clear to outside
observers. While most journalists and academicians focus on
alleged distortions of intelligence to support policy, the
players know that the relationship actually is often
characterized by disagreement on substance and suspicion of
motives. To the extent intelligence professionals are isolated
(or isolate themselves) from White House/NSC officials and are
unresponsive to White House informational requirements or
suggestions on strategy, this adversarial nature of the
relationship will be emphasized.
Although the routine order of business and internal
organization may vary from Administration to Administration,
there are ways to improve this relationship and intelligence
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support to the President. None is new. Efforts have been made
to carry out most of the suggestions but they have been
haphazard, transitory or obstructed by bureaucratic, cultural
or attitudinal problems. This must change.
The DCI and his senior managers and the President and
his staff must both promote and maintain close personal
ties at all levels. Both must aggressively seek new
ways to let intelligence officers in on policy
initiatives under consideration or underway to figure
out how intelligence can make a contribution, and how
best to get intelligence information and assessments
before the President. There should be closer contact
on questions of long term intelligence strategy,
investment and performance.
The role of the DCI is central to understanding the
President's needs and conveying analysis-to him. DCI
aggressiveness in getting substantive matters before
the President (and DCI access to the President) has
varied greatly, though. The DCI should work closely
with the National Security Adviser -- perhaps the best
source of information on issues of topical interest to
the President and the foreign affairs and defense
agenda. Finally, the importance of feedback from the
President and his national security team is critical.
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Contrary to the views of some, we cannot properly do
our work in splendid isolation -- and should not.
Timeliness, relevance and objectivity are not
incompatible.
The responsibility for making intelligence more
relevant, timely and helpful is not that of the DCI and
senior officials of the Intelligence Community alone.
The President and his senior national security team
must take seriously their responsibility for the
quality of intelligence support they get. They must be
willing to make time for regular dialogue as to their
intelligence requirements; for understanding
intelligence capabilities, the impact of competing
priorities for collection and analysis, and major
investment decisions. They must be willing to play an
active role in guiding intelligence strategy and
determining priorities.
The above "suggestions" apply to improving the quality and
usefulness of intelligence to the President. They will not
resolve the several causes of Presidential displeasure --
intelligence support to Congress, revised assessments that have
policy implications, surprises, and politically disagreeable
assessments. Even here mitigating steps can and have been
taken. More can be done. For example:
24
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-- Intelligence professionals should take the initiative
to let the Security Adviser, the NSC Staff, or a
Cabinet officer know when an estimate or other form of
analysis will revise earlier assessments and have a
significant impact on the President's policies. This
would include, in particular, advance warning of new
and important conclusions in military estimates. There
is, of course, a risk that someone will try to change
or stop publication of an unwelcome or embarrassing
estimate. Here the DCI must and, I am confident, will,
stand his ground to protect the integrity of the
assessment and the process.
-- Intelligence needs to develop a mechanism for better
informing the White House about support provided to the
Congress. The intelligence agencies are part of the
Executive Branch; the DCI is appointed by and reports
to the President. It is not improper or inappropriate
for the Intelligence Community to keep the President's
foreign affairs and Congressional affairs staff more
completely and regularly advised of papers provided to
the Congress, as well as possibly controversial
testimony or briefings. Keeping the Executive informed
about CIA dealings with Congress is an important aspect
of building Presidential confidence that we are not
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trying to undercut him or his policies when responding
to legitimate Congressional requests.
Finally, ground rules should be developed for the
disclosure of declassified intelligence. The current
lack of a systematic approach contributes to leaks; to
White House suspicion of obstructionism, bureaucratic
games or pursuit of a contrary policy agenda by
intelligence professionals; and concern on the part of
intelligence officers over the appearance (and
sometimes the reality) of politicization of
intelligence by White House or other
policymaker-directed declassification of information.
This is not a new problem, but it has worsened over the
years. Many in the Executive Branch and Congress agree
that intelligence information undergirding major policy
decisions must often be made available for public
education or to gain support for national security
decisions. There is widespread demand for unclassified
publication of intelligence assessments or research on
issues of moment to the country. But who should make
these decisions? This is not the place to propose
solutions, but the problem exists and it seriously
affects the relationship between the President and the
intelligence agencies on the one hand and the Executive
and Legislative Branches on the other.
26
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515
DICK CHENEY
WYOMING
September 16, 1988
Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Thank you for your get-well wishes, which meant
a lot to me and my family. I am feeling better
each day, and look forward to getting back into
the swing of things in the near future.
It helps a lot to have good friends like you.
Your thoughtfulness was most appreciated.
Thanks again.
. Best regards,
ck Cheney
Member of Congress
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515 a-, Qd'EVNII
Ef, rro n
Mr. Robe
Deputy D
Central
Washingta
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Ccntnl Intclligcncc Agcncy
29 August 1988
The Honorable Dick Cheney
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
I have been following at a distance your travails in recent
weeks. Please know that our thoughts and prayers are with you
for a quick recovery.
Just to show my confidence that you will,be "back in
battery" soon, I hear all kinds of rumors about possible
changes in your status in the House. Speaking personally, I
hope that whatever changes occur, it will be possible for you
to remain a member of the House Intelligence Committee. You
are a highly constructive and well-informed member, and I very
much enjoy working with you.
Again, we look forward to seeing you back on your feet just
as soon as possible.
Regards,
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DISSEM:
0- Addressee
Cl - DDCh
1 - ER
1 - OCA
DCB
EXEC
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The usefulness of the CIA to Presidents in that area for
which the CIA was primarily established -- collection,
reporting, analysis and production of information -- at times
has suffered because of self-imposed isolation by CIA and the
lack of sustained interest, understanding and involvement by a
President and his national security team. Lack of White House
involvement at times has left intelligence professionals adrift
amid conflicting priorities and requirements, with the
inevitable price in relevance and timeliness.
CIA and the other US intelligence agencies represent an
extraordinary national asset. The rebuilding of the
Intelligence Community over the past decade has vastly
augmented our collection and analysis capabilities and
sharpened our skills. Congress has greatly enhanced its
understanding of intelligence and shown a willingness -- even
determination -- to provide guidance and direction, as well as
funding. I believe the White House should assert more
aggressively its proper intelligence policy direction and
guidance role, and that CIA should welcome this role. Only
thus can we seize the opportunity further to improve
intelligence support to the President and, concomitantly,
better serve the policymaking process.
27
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 C-
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Central Intelligence Agcncy-
29 August 1988
Maj Gen Stanley H. Hyman
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff
Army Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-1001
I have just been informed that it is now official that you
will be the new Commander of U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command, replacing Ed Soyster. They could not have
chosen a better man for the job, and I wish you every success.
I look forward to continuing to work with you in the
Intelligence Community.
STAT
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Dissem:
0- Addressee
1- C/PCS/DO
1 - ER
DC!
EXEC
REG
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QTAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
New Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
FROM:
E
EXTENSION
NO.
Chief, Policy and Coordination Staff
DATE
25 August 1988
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1. O/DDO
Ran. 7E26, OHB
2.
MG Stan Hyman informed me
this morning that it is now
official that he will be the
3.
new Commander of the U.S. Army
Intelligence and Security
Command (INSCOM) replacing
4.
MG Harry "Ed" Soyster, who is
moving to be Director of DIA.
The change of command ceremony
5?
for INSCOM is scheduled for
22 November 1988.
6.
7?
CC: ( .O/DDCI
DI/CPAS
O/DDA
8
D/DA/OS
D/DA/OL
ADDO/CI
C/m0
C/DO/CCS
AC/DO/SE
10.
DO/
C/DO/PC
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
I-,79 EDITIONS
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
11IShin lon.D.C.2OSOS
STAT
30 August 1988
Adm. Bobby R. Inman, USN (Ret.)
Dear Bob,
It was good to talk to you after too long
a time since our last conversation. I am glad
you and Nancy were able to get away on the cruise
despite the incredible undertaking in the business
world in which you were engaged.
Enclosed is the article that I agreed to do
for The Washington Quarterly. It will be published
at the end of November.
STAT
Regards,
Robert M. Gates
Enclosure
As Stated
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1
An Opportunity Unfulfilled
The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the white House
"Collection, processing and analysis all are directed at
one goal -- producing accurate reliable intelligence.... Who
are the customers who get this finished product? At the very
top, of the list is the President. He is, of course, the
Central Intelligence Agency's most important customer."
(CIA Information Pamphlet)
What have our most important customers had to say about how
well we achieve that goal?
"I am not satisfied with the quality of our political
intelligence."
Jimmy Carter, 1978
"What the hell do those clowns do out there =n Langley?"
Richard Nixon, 1970
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rAE%-uiivr.3r,%.icLiA c1AT
ROUTING SLIP
TO: ACTION INFO DATE
1 DCI
2 DDCI x
INITIAL
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10,
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
18
19
20
21
22
STAT
ER 88-3374/1
Execdtive -Secretary
30 AUG 88
Date
1 31437 (10.81)
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 ER 88-3374/1 ~-)
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30 August 1988
Mr. William J. Lavery
Professor
History Department
Furman University
Greenville, South Carolina 29613
was good to hear from you after so long a time. You
must be something of an institution by now. Whoever thought
any us would settle down for so long in one place. I didn't
dreg.:: of a career here; it just sort of happened. In any
ever." you must be enjoying it there.
:f at some point you find that you are going to be in
Washington with some advance notice, please send me a note. I
would very much like to have a sandwich with you and catch up
on the last twenty years.
Regards,
Robert ates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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 STAT
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J..ra
}
FURMAN UNIVERSITY ? `-- , , ' 8,212745
''a n 3
7~~
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
296t3
Dr. Robert Gates
Deputy Di,fector
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
IIIIA IIII1111111111111111111111
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I L' ALLU I IV C. JLI..KL' 1 AKIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
D CI
X
EXDIR
4
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D OSWR
I
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22
STAT
Executive Secretary
30 Au-88
3637 (10-81)
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- . Lcnrn II11Cpl},chic \yY-:,, -- - 0
30 August 1988
Lt Gen James A. Abrahamson, USAF
Director
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-7100
Just a you for your completion of tour
comments or. There have been few instances in my
experience in which a DCI detailee to a military organization
has made as area- ontribution -- and been as favorably
regarded -- has in the SDIO. I think that his
substantive knowledge and personal approach to dealing with
both SDIO and the Intelligence Community have made his tour an
exceptionally successful one, as you so clearly describe in
your memo.
He could not have had such success, however, had it not
been for your continued support and cooperation. I want to
thank you for that. His replacement has a big pair of shoes to
fill, but I have no doubt he will build on the strong
foundation put in place
Again, thanks for your comments. You may rest assured they
will be included in his personnel file.
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
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1
DCI
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
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X
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DDA
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DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
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14
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16
D/Ex Staff
17
D OSWR D
X
18
19
20
21
22
65
Remarks
I To #17: Ple t a copy of the att memo
STAT is placed in ersonnel file.
STAT
Executive S retary
29 Aug '88
Date
3637 (10.81)
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ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
DCI
DCI
X
3
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4
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X
5
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D/CCISC
0 X
18
19
20
21
22
Remarks To # 17: Please Note suspense
date of COB, 9 Sep 88.
STAT
30 Aug 88
3637 (10.81)
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 STAT
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30 August 1988
Director, Community Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Staff
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and
Countermeasures Posture
1. As you know, on the Director's behalf on 21 June I
asked the Chairmen of the IG-CI, IG-CM(P) and the IG-CM(T) for
their candid views on outstanding problems in the areas of
their responsibility.
2. We now have the submissions from the three Chairmen.
They are, as we had hoped, substantive and forthright. Both
the DCI and I have read them. We believe there is considerable
food for thought. There are also items for action in the
submissions.
3. We would appreciate your examining the three reports
and identifying for us those areas in which the IG Chairmen
identify significant resource problems, those in which
bureaucratic difficulties pose problems, specific tasks that
have proven impractical, and other possible areas where
concrete recommendations can be assembled from the
submissions. Where there are
appreciate your working with to
rank these in importance both for our information and for
consideration for the DCI's investment wedge.
4. We would appreciate your views along the lines
addressed above by COB 9 September.
Attachments:
As Stated
cc: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
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SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP (INTELLIGENCE)
INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
CHAIRMAN
SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP/INTELLIGENCE
William S. Sessions
Chairman
--~~ Interagency Group/Counterintelligence
SUBJECT: IMPROVING OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERMEASURES POSTURE
entirety.
This communication is classified "Secret" in its
This communication responds to a memorandum from Acting
Director of Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates, dated June 21,
1988, captioned "Improving Our Counterintelligence (CI) and
Countermeasures (CM) Posture." Mr. Gates requested that I
outline the problem areas within the purview of the Interagency
Group/Counterintelligence (IG/CI) as they relate to the
"President's Report to the Congress on the Nation's
Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Plans, Programs,
and Capabilities."
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SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP (INTELLIGENCE)
INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES (POLICY)
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
ICS 0884-88
20 July 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Craig Alderman, Jr.
Chairman
SUBJECT: Obstacles to Task Implementation
REFERENCE: Acting Director of Central Intelligence memorandum,
21 June 1988; subject: Improving our Counterintelligence
and Countermeasures Posture
1. This correspondence responds to cited reference, which requested my
personal, uncoordinated assessment of problems impacting those outstanding
tasks currently assigned to the IG/CM(P). The principal focus of this request
was on the unfinished agenda accrued from issues detailed in the September
1986 President's Report to Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. However, M(P)
deliberations have also included several recommendations contained in the
related SSCI report. The comments in this memorandum therefore pertain to
issues assigned and accepted from both reports.-.
2. From the outset, let me say that comparing the number of actions
completed with the number remaining to be accomplished is not a valid measure
of progress in any but the grossest sense. Admittedly, there is no agreed
measure of intrinsic worth of individual tasks in the security arena.
Nevertheless, much has been accomplished that is meaningful and of significant
benefit to our overall security posture. Many of the tasks or problems that
remain before us are, however, intractable, impractical, or both.
3. I find it revealing that, to date, none of the more traditional
problems of. interagency work have played a significant role in efforts to
resolve tasks assumed by the IG/CM(P). Parochial and turf considerations have
been minimal, the bureaucracy has been largely cooperative, and difficult
issues are receiving adequate attention as appropriate. The SIG-I system has
proven to be , but I have also found that it must be led
aggressively.
Downgrade to CONFIDENTIAL when separated
from SECRET attachments
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SUBJECT: Obstacles to Task Implementation
4. 1 see the dominant obstacles inhibiting faster or more thorough
completion of my assigned tasks as falling into four generic, but often
overlapping, categories. The impact of each category of obstacle varies.
These categories are outlined below without regard to what would necessarily
be a subjective judgment as to priority of importance. The discussion of each
category also identifies an attachment that contains examples of tasks
25X1 impacted by the cited obstacle(s).I
Pending Decisions and Authorities
Action on several outstanding issues is in large part directly
dependent on pending National Security Council and White House decisions
regarding a proposed personnel security executive order and the Information
Security Oversight Office's initiatives. At this point, additional
contingency planning on the potential outcnm decisions would be
nonproductive. Please see Attachment 1.
Time to Implement
This category is directly affected by general perceptions as well as
by interpretation of the wotrd "resolution." Both factors have the potential
to generate criticism. In several instances we have initiated the mechanisms
that can cause ultimate resolution of tasks assigned. Completion of these
tasks, in some cases, will take time, and some are even open ended. Immediate
results, therefore, may be difficult to define. Without immediate results
there may be a tendency by some to perceive either non or slow accomplishment
since no move to closure of the task may be apparent. On the other hand,
"resolution" by development of a task-facilitating mechanism is only a first
step. It will be important to guard against a dusting of the hands and a walk
away attitude of "look what I did"' We must take exceptional care, therefore
25X1 to ensure effective follow up on those tasks that fall into this category.
Many tasks in this category are also impacted by the obstacle of
pending decisions and authorities outside the purview of the SIG-I. Please
25X1 see Attachments 1 and 2.
25X1
Desirable but Impractical
The atmosphere surrounding the period of development of the
Presidential and SSCI reports promoted a super-conscientious review of our
counterintelligence and security countermeasures needs and desires. In that
environment it was perhaps inevitable that, despite careful review, a number
of noble, but ultimately impractical, tasks were sanctioned or accepted as
policy intentions.
SECRET
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25X1
25X1
25X1
SUBJECT: Obstacles to Task Implementation
It was in making the subsequent detailed examination of how these
.tasks might reasonably be implemented that we ascertained their true
parameters. As a result, attempts are being made to salvage the intent of the
tasks where possible by tailoring the scope. In a few instances, it may be
that we will have forged a consensus among member departments and agencies
that certain tasks are not "doable." There are a limited number of other
tasks that may have to be left undone because of the dubious value in return
versus the resources required to carry out the tasks. Please see Attachment
3.
Dollar Resources
This obstacle cuts across every assigned issue. There are no real
surprises here. As recognized in your budget guidance letter, resource
constraints and mounting requirements demand that we continually reassess our
programs to reduce the resources we devote to activities that are "nice to do"
or even "important to do." We are now entering a period when the criterion
should be "must do." As previously suggested, our enthusiasm, as well as that
of the Congress and the executive, to do the "right things" regarding national
security has put on our plate many issues which, on reflection, do not fall
under the "must do" heading. Sustaining Congressional interest in funding
important security initiatives appears to become proportionally more difficult
as time elapses between significant security incidents. A variety of issues
is affected by these circumstances. Please see Attachment 4.
5. In specific regard to the President's report only, the IG/CM(P) was
assigned 45 tasks. To date, 25 have been completed and the completion of
another 12 is imminent, bringing the total to 37. Of the remaining eight
tasks, three relate to the authorities obstacle, two are impacted by time, one
is impractical, and two are affected by availab lar resources. These
tasks are further discussed in the attachments.
6. The IG/CM(P) will continue to pursue resolution of all assigned
issues. As mentioned, a prominent role for the IG will be that of following
up on the solutions that have been put into place. Obtaining expeditious
national authority decisions, structured followup on the implementation of
in-place policy decisions, and sustaining an adequate dollar flow into both
necessary security initiatives and ongoing security programs are the keys to
continued effective progress. We can manage the followup requirements; I view
that as a prominent role for the IG. We will need assistance, however, with
the first and last requirements.
SECRET
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25X1 SUBJECT: Obstacles to Task Implementation
7. My next input to the President's status report will diminish the
emphasis on percentages of tasks accomplished and will rpflpc more on the
approach presented in this memorandum report to you.
Attachments:
1. Discussion Paper -- Pending Decisions and Authorities
2. Discussion Paper -- Time to Implement
3. Discussion Paper -- Desirable but Impractical
4. Discussion Paper -- Dollar Resources
cc:
Chairman, IG/CI
Chairman, IG/CM(T)
Director, ICS
4
SECRET
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SUBJECT: Obstacles to Task Implementation
CCISCMO/ICS
Distribution of ICS 0884-88
Original - Addressee (DCI) (w/atts)
1 - DDCI (w/atts)
1 - William Sessions, Director, FBI (Chairman, IG/CI) (w/atts)
1 Charles Hawkins, Dep Asst Sec Def (Intelligence)
(Chairman, IG/CM(T) (w/atts)
1 - Director, Intelligence Community Staff (w/atts)
1 - Cr i Al an, DUSD(P) (w/atts)
1 - D/OS/CIA (Chairman, Personnel Security Committee)
(w/atts)
1 - Marvin Doig, State (Chairman, Physical Security Committee (w/atts)
1 - Ray Pollari, OSD (Chairman, National OPSEC Advisory Committee
(w/atts)
1 - Maynard Anderson, OSD (Chairman, Information Security Committee
(w/atts)
1 - IG/CM(P) subject (w/atts)
1 - IG/CM(P) chrono (wo/atts)
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Iq
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional) Improving cur Counterintellitence and Countermeasures
Posture `(U)
FROM: Charles A. Hawkins `
l
EXTENSION
NO.
ER 88-2577X/3
Dep Asst Secretary of
Defense
.
,
(Intelligence)
DATE
15 Jul 88
TO: (Officer designation. room number, and
building)
DATE
OFNCER-S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
REFINED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
her
ES to DDCI: Haven't receive
DDCj
Sessions or Alderman's
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.
2.
, as yet...,
3.
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4.
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9.
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Diane
Have made no dissem = at some point
T cy to ICS?
DCI
EXEC
A
ST
A
ST
FOR
1-79M 610 USEEDITI PREVONSIOUS
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505,
21 June 1988
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Executive Registry
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William S. Sessions
Chairman
Interagency Group/Counterintelligence
FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and
Countermeasures Posture
1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has
approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third
biannual report for the President on the President's Report to
the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was
pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it
reflects toward implementation of measures to improve our
counterintelligence and countermeasures posture.
2. While the report is an accurate one, Judge Webster and
I believe that its very positive tone may obscure some real
problems in addressing the unfinished agenda for strengthening
CI and CM. In fact, there is very little indication in the
submitted re r s of problems and obstacles to further
3. Accordingly, the Chairman of the SIG(I) would value a
personal report from you on outstanding problems in the area of
responsibility of your interagency group. For example, in what
areas specifically have parochial or turf problems inhibited
faster or better progress? In what areas is there a genuine
resources problem? Are there elements of cy
simply going through the motions? If, as memo
indicates, an estimated 70% of the assigned tasks have been
completed or programmed, to what degree are the really tough
4. In short, the DCI would appreciate having from you, a
personal, uncoordinated memorandum outlining problem areas
within the purview of your interagency group. While there is
no question that significant progress has been made over the
i~ (cCTI~
25X1
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past year or so, we are concerned that important problems are
either being set aside or haggled to death in the bureaucracy.
If there were no such problems, this undertaking would be
unique in the history of government. To be able to address
these problems in a sensible and effective way we need more
specific information and solicit your help in that regard. We
hope you will be candid; your replies will be held tightly. We
would appreciate your report by 15 July 1988.
R bert M.
cc: Director, Community Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Office,
Intelligence Community Staff
2
SECRET
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~Kl, iCL. 1
The Director of Central Intelligence
t L
L 2577/1-88
-----------------
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Charles A. Hawkins, Jr.
Chairman
Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Technical)
FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Countermeasures Posture
SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and
counterintelligence and countermeasures posture.
1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has
approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third
biannual report for the President on the President's Report to
the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was
pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it
reflects toward implementation of measures to improve ur
progress.
2. While the report is an accurate one, Judge Webster and
I believe that its-very positive tone may obscure some real
problems in addressing the unfinished agenda for strengthening
CI and CM. In fact, there is very little indication in the
submitted reports of problems and obstacles to further
problems in the other 30%?
3. Accordingly, the Chairman of the SIG(I) would value a
personal report from you on outstanding problems in the area of
responsibility of your interagency group. For example, in what
areas specifically have parochial or turf problems inhibited
faster or better progress? In what areas is there a genuine
resources problem? Are there elements of the bureaucracy
simply.going through the motions? If, as Dick Beyea's memo
indicates, an estimated 70% of the assigned tasks have been
completed or programmed, to whegree are the really tough
4. In short, the DCI would appreciate having from you, a
personal, uncoordinated memorandum outlining problem areas
within the purview of your interagency group. While there is
no question that significant progress has been made over the
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SECRET
25X1
25X1
past year or so, we are concerned that important problems are
either being set aside or haggled to death in the bureaucracy.
If there were no'such problems, this undertaking would be
unique in the history of government. To be able to address
these problems in a sensible and effective way we need more
specific information and solicit your help in that regard. We
hope you will be candid; your replies will be held tightly. We
would appreciate your report by 15 July 1988
cc: Director, Community Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Office,
Intelligence Community Staff .
2
SECRET
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P SZORST
The ni er ctor of Central Intelligence it ?Pecutl're Re izti
Washington,D.C.20505
2577/2-88
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Craig Alderman, Jr.
Chairman
Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Policy)
FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and
Countermeasures Posture
1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has
approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third
biannual report for the President on the President's Report to
the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was
pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it
reflects toward implementation of measures to improve our
2. While the report is an accurate-one, Judge Webster and
I believe that its very positive tone may obscure some real
problems in addressing the unfinished agenda for strengthening
CI and CM. In fact, there is very little indication in the
submitted reports of problems and obstacles to further
counterintelligence and countermeasures posture.
progress.
3. Accordingly, the Chairman of the SIG(I) would value a
personal report from you on outstanding problems in the area of
responsibility of your interagency group. For example, in what
areas specifically have parochial or turf problems inhibited
faster or,better progress? In what areas is there a genuine
resources problem? Are there elements of the bureaucracy
simply going through the motions?. If, as Dick Beyea's memo
indicates, an estimated 70% of the assigned tasks have been
completed or programmed, to what degree are the really tough
problems in the other 30%?
4. In short, the DCI would appreciate having from you, a
personal, uncoordinated memorandum outlining problem areas
within the purview of your interagency group. While there is
no question that significant progress has been made over the
Q6oa 12
Y
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IF . - 0r, . r, r- t
25X1
25X1
past year or so, we are concerned that important problems are
either being set aside or haggled to death in the bureaucracy.
If there were no"such problems, this undertaking would be
unique in the history of government. To be able to address
these problems in a sensible and effective way we need more
specific information and solicit your help in that regard. We
hope you will be candid; your replies will be held tightly. We
would appreciate your report by 15 July 1988.
cc: Director, Community Counterint igence and
e
,
Security Countermeasures Office,
Intelligence Community Staff
V
2
SECRET
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PAO 88-0298
31 August 1988
RE: Speaking Invitation
Institute for Risk Research
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
22 September 1988
STAT
Associate Director of the Institute for Risk Research at Waterloo
University, John H. Shortreed, has invited you or a senior representative to
participate in a short course in strategic decisionmaking, on Thursday, 22
September 1988 in Toronto. The one-day course, Conflicts: Managing,
Resolving, Winning, is being sponsored by the Institute for Risk Research and
its purpose is to teach formal techniques for solving complex management
problems in conflict situations. The course will involve workshops in which
several real case studies are analyzed, based on attendees' personal
experiences or their current concerns.
While this appears to be an excellent issue to address, a foreign
university is not an appropriate forum. Therefore I recommend that you
decline this invitation. If you agree, a letter of regret is attached for
your signature.
STAT DC I /PAO/W1l8
STATDistribu
Orig.
1
STAT 1
1
tion:
- Addresse
1 - D/PAO
1 - PAO Registry
1 - PAO Ames
1 - MED(Subject)
ADMINISTRAJI-Hf-INTERNAL USE ONLY
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Central Intelligence Agency
'1i ?9FP FRB
Mr. John H. Shortreed
Associate Director
Institute for Risk Research
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1
Thank you for your invitation to participate in Conflicts: Managing,
Resolving, Winning in Toronto on September 22nd. I am sure that it will be a
most interesting course. However, my schedule is such that I cannot make a
commitment for that date, and unfortunately, our other senior Agency officers'
time is also heavily committed so that they are not able to attend.
I wish you all a very successful day.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/31 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000300100001-6 ?
University of Waterloo
Institute for Risk Research [phone]
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1 Telex 069-55-259
August 12, 1988
Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
U.S.A.
An important function of an organization's leadership is the skillful
management of conflict situations. Decision making under conditions
of uncertainty and conflict, whether external or internal to the firm,
is the essence of the executive's task. In the long run, the vitality
and even the viability of the organization are governed by the sound
management of conflict.
During the past few years, conflict analysis has been developed into
a fully operational set of procedures that can be applied to virtually
any conflict arising over the spectrum of human activities. Leaders of
well-managed institutions can greatly benefit from a knowledge of this
valuable set of tools. A short course on strategic decision making,
Conflicts: Managing, Resolving, Winning is being sponsored by the
Institute for Risk Research and will be held in Toronto on September
22, 1988. We invite you to take part.
This course is aimed at executives and their advisors in industry and
government. Its purpose is to provide understanding of and experience
with the techniques of conflict analysis. The subject comprises a set
of general methodologies, implemented in easy-to-use computer programs.
Strategic problems are modelled by placing the information into a struc-
tured framework to predict the possible outcomes that are feasible
socially, politically and technically. 'A participant in a dispute can
behave optimally by selecting a course of action leading to the most
preferred joint position.
The course presents the analytic procedures and includes extensive work-
shops as a forum where several real case studies are examined. The case
studies are based on the attendees' personal experiences or reflect their
current concerns. The sessions are small and off-the-record, and you
should be prepared to be active in the discussion so that a realistic
study can be made of conflicts of current interest.
[Yutive Registy
88-3183X
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The Course Leaders are internationally recognized for their development
of the modern discipline of conflict analysis:
Dr. Niall M. Fraser, P.Eng.
Department of Management Sciences, University of Waterloo
Dr. Keith W. Hipel, P.Eng.
Department of Systems Design Engineering, University of Waterloo
Dr. D. Marc Kilgour
Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University
I enclose a detailed announcement and a registration form. Telephone
registration will be regarded as firm and should be made to Jean Webster
at this institute (Telephone: [phone], ext. 3355; Telex: 069-55-259).
I hope that you or a senior representative will take the time to join us
for the course.
Yours sincerely,
John H. Shortreed
Associate Director
/am
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