LETTER TO HENRY HYDE FROM ROBERT M. GATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 106
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
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The Honorable Henry Hyde
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Hyde:
OCA 88-1614
_0 1 JUN 1988
This is in response to your letter of 9 May 1988 which
forwarded the correspondence of your constituent,
who has asked for your assistance
in seeking employment opportunities with the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).
I have forwarded resume to the Office of
Personnel. Once our recruiters receive his resume, they will
review his qualifications to determine whether there is a
suitable position available at the Agency. They will contact
directly within 30 days if they are able to
identify a position.
Thank you for writing on behalf of
Sincerely,
/s/ Robert At Gobi
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DISTRIBUTION:
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, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001:9
-The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
The Director of Central Intelligence
ftshinganDCABOS
29 January 1987
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. President:
I herewith submit my resignation as Director
-of Central Intelligence effective this date,
January 29, 1987. It has been a great honor
serving you.
Witnessed by:
Respectfully,
William J. Casey
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.20505
3 June 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carle E. Vuono, USA
Chief of Staff, United States Army
It is my pleasure to send you the attached comments on Major General
Larry D. Budge. These cover the initial nine months of his detail to the
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
General Budge is a well-read, sophisticated officer with broad
political-military interests. The Director of Central Intelligence and I
have been pleased with his quick understanding of the national intelligence
resources and his translation of these resources into action and solutions
to problems. General Budge clearly perceives the broader strategic issues
facing his senior intelligence customers and works those issues, leaving
mundane details to the ordinary attention of the bureaucracy.
We have benefited from his service in the Office of the DCI and are
grateful to the US Army for providing such a fine officer for this important
task. We hope that you share our conviction that the US Army and the
Department of Defense derive as much from his service here as does the
Director and the Intelligence Community.
Attachment:
As stated
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
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ER 2512-88
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CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9''"`"""`""1""16""`
Washington. D. C.20505
14 June 1988
NOTE TO: Doug MacEachin
Larry Gershwin
I am giving a speech on developments in the Soviet
Union and implications for US strategy at the Naval
War College Thursday. I am using my old standby Soviet
speech but I have added something more to it on arms
control and strategic developments. I have drawn this
primarily from a recent SOVA paper on how the Soviets
might look at START.
I would appreciate your looking at these three pages
and giving me any corrections or suggestions you might
have. I would appreciate hearing back some time this
afternoon.
Robert M. Gates
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13:
ICIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO BUILD A
PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
IN MY JUDGMENT, THEA BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV,
PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE STRATEGIC
AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. WHILE HE SEEKS TO AVOID NEW,
UNANTICIPATED COSTS THAT DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS SDI MIGHT
REQUIRE, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGET, AND FEW OF THE PRODUCTION OR
RESOURCE CAPABILITIES ARE TRANSFERABLE TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES.
ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD
GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY KIND OF ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO
A VERY GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.
THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE
EVIDENT. AS THE CENTERPIECE OF A DETENTIST POLICY, AS I NOTED
114
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON
WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD,
AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET
CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM A FAR MORE
ATTRACTIVE PARTNER IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT PERMITS CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS,
DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBMS, PREVENTS THE UNITED STATES IN
DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE SPACE DEFENSE, AND PLACES CONSTRAINTS ON
AIR AND SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET
PERSPECTIVE, DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE
CONSTRAINTS, OFFER THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE RAPID GROWTH IN THE
NUMBER OF HARD?TARGET WEAPONS IN THE US ARSENAL AND TO
CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC
DEFENSES.
ABSENT SIGNIFICANT LIMITS ON US FORCE MODERNIZATION, THE
SOVIETS WOULD FACE IN THE FUTURE SEVERAL NEW US CAPABILITIES
WITH SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO DESTROY SOVIET ICBM SILOS -- THE
TRIDENT D-5 SLBM, THE RAIL MOBILE MX, AND MIDGETMAN. THE US
COULD HAVE OVER 5,000 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS CAPABLE OF
DESTROYING HARDENED TARGETS BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, AND IN
15
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
THE 1990S COULD HAVE UP TO 15,000 STRATEGIC WARHEADS. A START
AGREEMENT THAT PROTECTED SOVIET BOTTOM-LINE POSITIONS AND CUT
THE US TO 6,000 WARHEADS WOULD IN THEIR VIEW LEAVE THE US WITH
INSUFFICIENT CAPABILITY TO IMPLEMENT THE CURRENT US STRIKE PLAN
AS THEY APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND IT. HOWEVER, UNDER A START TREATY
THAT ENCOMPASSES CURRENT SOVIET POSITIONS, THE USSR'S ABILITY
riti-AAYPAE
TO leIN NORTH AMERICA AND EURASIA WOULD NOT BE
SIGNFICANTLY DIFFERENT WITH OR WITHOUT A NEW AGREEMENT ON
STRATEGIC ARMS.
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST
BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A NEW AND
DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL
EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING,
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN
PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SON/IET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID
BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED CONSISTENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL, GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE
AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO BUILD A
PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV,
PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE STRATEGIC
AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. WHILE HE SEEKS TO AVOID NEW,
UNANTICIPATED COSTS THAT DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS SDI MIGHT
REQUIRE, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGET, AND FEW OF THE PRODUCTION OR
RESOURCE CAPABILITIES ARE TRANSFERABLE TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES.
ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD
GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY KIND OF ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO
A VERY GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.
THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE
EVIDENT. AS THE CENTERPIECE OF A DETENTIST POLICY, AS I NOTED
114
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON
WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD,
AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET
CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM A FAR MORE
ATTRACTIVE PARTNER IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT PERMITS CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS,
DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBMS, PREVENTS THE UNITED STATES IN
DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE SPACE DEFENSE, AND PLACES CONSTRAINTS ON
AIR AND SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, FROM THE SOVIET
PERSPECTIVE, DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE
CONSTRAINTS, OFFER THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE RAPID GROWTH IN THE
NUMBER OF HARD?TARGET WEAPONS IN THE US ARSENAL AND TO
CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC
DEFENSES.
ABSENT SIGNIFICANT LIMITS ON US FORCE MODERNIZATION, THE
SOVIETS WOULD FACE IN THE FUTURE SEVERAL NEW US CAPABILITIES
WITH SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO DESTROY SOVIET ICBM SILOS -- THE
TRIDENT D-5 SLBM, THE RAIL MOBILE MX, AND MIDGETMAN. THE US
COULD HAVE OVER 5,000 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS CAPABLE OF
DESTROYING HARDENED TARGETS BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, AND IN
15
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
THE 1990S COULD HAVE UP TO 15,000 STRATEGIC WARHEADS. A START
AGREEMENT THAT PROTECTED SOVIET BOTTOM?LINE POSITIONS AND CUT
THE US TO 6,000 WARHEADS WOULD IN THEIR VIEW LEAVE THE US WITH
INSUFFICIENT CAPABILITY TO IMPLEMENT THE CURRENT US STRIKE PLAN
AS THEY APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND IT, HOWEVER, UNDER A START TREATY
THAT ENCOMPASSES CURRENT SOVIET POSITIONS, THE USSR'S ABILITY
TO ATTACK TARGETS IN NORTH AMERICA AND EURASIA WOULD NOT BE
SIGNFICANTLY DIFFERENT WITH OR WITHOUT A NEW AGREEMENT ON
STRATEGIC ARMS.
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST
BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A NEW AND
DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL
EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING,
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN
PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID
BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED CONSISTENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO BUILD A
PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV,
PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE STRATEGIC
AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. WHILE HE SEEKS TO AVOID NEW,
UNANTICIPATED COSTS THAT DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS SDI MIGHT
REQUIRE, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGET, AND FEW OF THE PRODUCTION OR
RESOURCE CAPABILITIES ARE TRANSFERABLE TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES.
ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD
GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY KIND OF ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO
A VERY GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.
THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE
EVIDENT. AS THE CENTERPIECE OF A DETENTIST POLICY, AS I NOTED
14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
? -
EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON
WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD,
AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET
CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM A FAR MORE
ATTRACTIVE PARTNER IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT PERMITS CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS,
DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBMS, PREVENTS THE UNITED STATES IN
DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE SPACE DEFENSE, AND PLACES CONSTRAINTS ON
AIR AND SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET
PERSPECTIVE, DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE
CONSTRAINTS, OFFER THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE RAPID GROWTH IN THE
NUMBER OF HARD?TARGET WEAPONS IN THE US ARSENAL AND TO
CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC
DEFENSES.
ABSENT SIGNIFICANT LIMITS ON US FORCE MODERNIZATION, THE
SOVIETS WOULD FACE IN THE FUTURE SEVERAL NEW US CAPABILITIES
WITH SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO DESTROY SOVIET ICBM SILOS -- THE
TRIDENT D-5 SLBM, THE RAIL MOBILE MX, AND MIDGETMAN. THE US
COULD HAVE OVER 5,000 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS CAPABLE OF
DESTROYING HARDENED TARGETS BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, AND IN
15
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
THE 1990S COULD HAVE UP TO 15,000 STRATEGIC WARHEADS. A START
AGREEMENT THAT PROTECTED SOVIET BOTTOM?LINE POSITIONS AND CUT
THE US TO 6,000 WARHEADS WOULD IN THEIR VIEW LEAVE THE US WITH
INSUFFICIENT CAPABILITY TO IMPLEMENT THE CURRENT US STRIKE PLAN
AS THEY APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND IT. HOWEVER, UNDER A START TREATY
THAT ENCOMPASSES CURRENT SOVIET POSITIONS, THE USSR'S ABILITY
TO ATTACK TARGETS IN NORTH AMERICA AND EURASIA WOULD NOT BE
SIGNFICANTLY DIFFERENT WITH OR WITHOUT A NEW AGREEMENT ON
STRATEGIC ARMS.
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST
BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A \JEW AND
DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL
EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING,
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN
PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID
BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED CONSISTENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
TO:
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ACTION
INFO
DATE
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EXDIR
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D/ICS
5
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X
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
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12
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13
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14
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Date
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
I Mir ER 2512-88
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13:
CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9 UI 1/4-C1111,11 111LCIIISUILL
WashingtonD C 20505
14 June 1988
NOTE TO: Doug MacEachin
Larry Gershwin
I am giving a speech on developments in the Soviet
Union and implications for US strategy at the Naval
War College Thursday. I am using my old standby Soviet
speech but I have added something more to it on arms
control and strategic developments. I have drawn this
primarily from a recent SOVA paper on how the Soviets
might look at START.
I would appreciate your looking at these three pages
and giving me any corrections or suggestions you might
have. I would appreciate hearing back some time this
afternoon.
Robert M. Gates
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13:
ICIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
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IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO BUILD A
PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV,
f(LOWArkA\.,/
PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE STRATEGIC
171Lof clos /1
(LE k \C;i101-9:to I,: _
d I\J 1-1-Ls? fEceivoroc
AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. WIlitE,HE/pEEKV)Y6 AVOID NEW
UNANTICIPATED COSTS THAT DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS SDI MIGH
-ikkS5? ()a r (Lot kALY 6 E S os_s-0-01-kpet._ 'r WE ct 9 r
REQUIREAE!ATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10 e
N -rg Los oc A14 '11S)11?16-5 4-t5A/P4,
PERCENT OF THE SOVIET BUDGET, FEW OF THE A-
THE PRODUCTION OR
RESOURCE CAPABILITIES ARE TRANSFERABLE TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES.) AWD
fl-5-ev E-13 kuu Arby I 1 v WE MeV c-rto oP
ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD
Miorof Fe) gc
GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE ANY Kt1109.04F ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO 7-Aritocia4
A ',4ERY GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD BE YEARS IN THE FUTURE.
74:
THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE
EVIDENT. AS THE CENTERPIECE OF A DETENTIST POLICY, AS I NOTED
14
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EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON
WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD,
AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET
CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM A FAR MORE
ATTRACTIVE PARTNER IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT PERMITS CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS,
DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBMS, PREVENTS THE UNITED STATESM)rVot/
-47069rits51t.E.,
DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE SPA5DEFENSE, AND PLACES CONSTRAINTS ON
AIR AND SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET
PERSPECTIVE, DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE
CONSTRAINTS, OFFER THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE RAPID GROWTH IN THE
NUMBER OF HARD-TARGET WEAPONS IN THE US ARSENAL AND TO
CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC
DEFENSES.
ABSENT SIGNIFICANT LIMITS ON US FORCE MODERNIZATION, THE
SOVIETS WOULD FACE IN THE FUTURE SEVERAL NEW US CAPABILITIES
?,\_fra.,os1-19 -NO co ti t4A-N.D roYts
WITH SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO DESTROY SOVIETAICBM SILOS'-- THE
/ A
TRIDENT D-5 SLBM, THE RAIL MOBILE MX, AND MIDGETMAN. THE US
COULD HAVE OVER 5,000 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS CAPABLE OF
DESTROYING HARDENED TARGETS BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, AND IN
15
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So i "en?. f 642-Pee t TIA 5ifEELfl4 IT 15 1 .0 q-Wel
Per,LEPo--TD
THE 1990S COULD HAVE UP TO 15,000 STRATEGIC WARHEADS.A/1 A START GOI1/4/c0),PE
Z. c A-tO
AGREEMENT THAT PROTECTED SOVIET BOTTOM-LINE POSITIONS AND CUT
/// A-cfLeetia<
THE OS TO 6,000 WARHEADS le/OULD IN THEIR VIEW LEAVE THE/US WITH
INSUFFICIENT CAPABILITY TO IMPLEMENT THE CURR,-,US STRIKE PLAN
,7
AS THEY APPEAR TO/UNDERSTAND IT. HOWEVER,ONDER A START TREATY
//THAT ENCOMPASSES CURRENT SOVIET POSITLONS, THE USSR'S ABILITY
TO ATTACK TARGETS IN NORTH AMERICAND EURASIA WOULD NOT BE
SIGNFJCANTLY DIFFERENT WITH OR WITHOUT ANEW AGREEMENT ON
STRATEGIC ARMS.
^ S
5"'"A-4- -1-",5A-jr-7 ?;[ 41 is
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST
BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A NEW AND
DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL
EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING,
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN
PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID
BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED CONSISTENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
16
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?
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. DC. 20505
June 17, 1988
Rear Admiral Howard Roop, USNR (Ret)
Commandant
Defense Intelligence College
Washington, D.C. 20340-5485
Dear Howard:
I want to thank you and the Defense Intelligence College
for inviting me to give the Commencement Address on June 17th.
You honored me greatly with the presentation of the Honorary
Doctorate in Strategic Intelligence. I am very proud to have
been so recognized.
Your obvious pride in the college, its faculty and students
is evident and most understandable. This is the second
commencement I have attended, and both times I have been
enormously impressed by the calibre of the students and
faculty. I know a number of people who have taught at the
college and hold them in the highest respect. While the
College has been in existence for some years now, I have a
sense of new momentum and challenge.
Again, thank you for your hospitality, your kind words and
for the honor done me by the College.
As you requested a copy of my remarks are enclosed.
Warmest regards,
Enclosure:
As Stated
DISSEM
Orig ? ADDSSF:F.
C
1 ? ER
Robert M. Gates
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COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE
17 JUNE 1988
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL PERROOTS, ADMIRAL ROOP, DOCTOR SCOTT, COLLEAGUES,
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:
I AM HONORED TO HAVE BEEN CHOSEN AS YOUR COMMENCEMENT
SPEAKER. GIVEN SOME OF YOUR PREVIOUS DISTINGUISHED SPEAKERS,
INCLUDING GENERAL HERRES LAST YEAR, THIS IS A SINGULAR HONOR
AND A DAUNTING CHALLENGE. I THOUGHT A GOOD DEAL ABOUT WHAT I
SHOULD SAY TODAY SINCE THIS IS NOT THE USUAL COMMENCEMENT
AUDIENCE. UNLIKE OTHER COMMENCEMENT SPEAKERS, IT WOULD HARDLY
BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME, NOW THAT YOU ARE GRADUATING, TO
ENCOURAGE YOU TO LEAVE THE INSTITUTION AND GO MAKE MONEY. NOR
IS IT PARTICULARLY INSPIRING TO ASK YOU TO STAY HERE AND FOREGO
THE TEMPTATIONS OF LIFE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR.
AS THIS IS A COMMENCEMENT AND AS WE ALSO CONTEMPLATE THE
CLOSE OF ONE ADMINISTRATION AND ADVENT OF ANOTHER, I THINK THE
MOST APPROPRIATE TOPIC TO ADDRESS IN THESE FEW MINUTES IS THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. NOW, SOARING FLIGHTS OF
1
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RHETORIC BACKED BY ANTIPHONAL CHOIRS OF PRAISE ARE NOT OUR
STYLE -- YOURS OR MINE. IN OUR BUSINESS WE DEAL IN HARD
REALITY. THEREFORE, LET ME SIMPLY REVIEW FOR YOU BRIEFLY THE
TRENDS THAT I BELIEVE WILL DOMINATE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE
THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THIS CENTURY, THE PERIOD WHEN YOU, AS
GRADUATES OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE, WILL ATTAIN
SENIOR GRADES AND POSITIONS AND ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF US INTELLIGENCE.
FIRST, OUR MARGIN FOR ERROR WILL STEADILY SHRINK. WHETHER
ESTIMATING SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES, WARNING OF TERRORISM,
HELPING TO GUIDE ANTI?NARCOTICS CRUSADES, OR ADDRESSING A
MULTITUDE OF OTHER PROBLEMS, A HIGHER DEGREE OF ACCURACY AND
TIMELINESS WILL BE EXPECTED OF US AND WILL BE CRITICAL TO THE
SUCCESS OF US POLICY IF NOT OUR NATIONAL SURVIVAL. AN ERROR
MARGIN OF 15-20% IN ESTIMATING SOVIET STRATEGIC WARHEADS MAY BE
TOLERABLE IN AN ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THERE ARE MORE THAN 10,000
OR 12,000 WARHEADS, BUT IN AN ARMS CONTROL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH
THAT NUMBER IS RADICALLY REDUCED, SUCH MARGINS OF ERROR ARE NOT
ACCEPTABLE AND PUT THE NATION IN PERIL. A WARNING OF A
TERRORIST ATTACK RECEIVED TOO LATE IS USELESS. TRACKING
INFORMATION ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS OR TERRORISTS, REACHING
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER AUTHORITIES TOO SLOWLY, SPELLS
FAILURE. OUR ACCURACY AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH WE DELIVER
INFORMATION MUST DRAMATICALLY IMPROVE IN THE YEARS AHEAD.
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SECOND, AND RELATEDLY, WE MUST REVOLUTIONIZE THE
DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. WE SPEND BILLIONS
ON NEAR REAL TIME COLLECTION SYSTEMS, COMPUTERS, WORD
PROCESSORS SO THAT WE RECEIVE IN WASHINGTON INFORMATION FROM
THE FARTHEST CORNERS OF THE WORLD IN SECONDS. AND WHAT DO WE
DO WITH IT? WE WAIT UNTIL THE NEXT MORNING AND DELIVER IT BY
AUTOMOBILE OR TRUCK TO THE RECIPIENT. WE MUST BEGIN MOVING
TOWARD THE ELECTRONIC DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS
DIRECTLY TO THE POLICYMAKERS' DESK, PROVIDING NOT ONLY
GENUINELY NEAR REAL TIME INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT BUT ALSO
PROVIDING FOR AN INTERACTION BETWEEN THE RECIPIENT OF THE
INFORMATION AND THE PROVIDERS AT THE OTHER END OF THE WIRE.
SPACE AGE COLLECTION AND HORSE AND BUGGY DISSEMINATION CAN NO
LONGER BE TOLERATED.
THIRD, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE GROWING DIFFICULTY OBTAINING
NECESSARY INFORMATION. THE SOVIETS ARE DEVOTING EVER MORE
EFFORT TO DENYING US INFORMATION ON WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS,
TESTING AND DEPLOYMENTS. THEY ARE RELYING INCREASINGLY ON
CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION. WE CONFRONT THE PARADOX
THAT AT A TIME WHEN MORE AND MORE DATA IS EMERGING BECAUSE OF
CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, TRADITIONAL
FORMS OF INFORMATION, FOR EXAMPLE ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY, ARE
BECOMING EITHER LESS RELIABLE OR LESS AVAILABLE. WE ARE
SPENDING MORE JUST TO STAY AT THE SAME LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE WE
HAVE HAD IN RECENT YEARS -- AND IN SOME CASES, WE ARE FALLING
3
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BEHIND. THIS PROBLEM IS WORST IN THE SOVIET UNION BUT,
UNHAPPILY, THE LESSONS ALSO ARE BEING LEARNED BY A GROWING
NUMBER OF NATIONS ON HOW TO AVOID OUR LEARNING OF THEIR
ACTIVITIES,
FOURTH, IN THE FUTURE, AS IN RECENT YEARS, WE CONFRONT A
GROWING DIVERSITY OF SUBJECTS WE ARE ASKED TO ADDRESS AND A
GROWING DIVERSITY OF USERS. FROM SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, FROM TERRORISM
TO NARCOTICS, FROM PORTENTS OF INSTABILITY IN THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND LITERALLY SCORES OF OTHER
ISSUES, POLICYMAKERS AND CONGRESS INCREASINGLY ARE TURNING TO
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR INFORMATION AND ANSWERS. AND
WHERE WE ONCE SUPPORTED JUST THE PENTAGON OR STATE DEPARTMENT
OR THE WHITE HOUSE, WE NOW COUNT AMONG OUR USERS THE
DEPARTMENTS OF AGRICULTURE, COMMERCE, TREASURY AND MANY
OTHERS. MANY OF THEM HAVE NEITHER A REALISTIC APPRECIATION FOR
WHAT WE CAN AND CANNOT DO OR FOR THE SENSITIVITY AND FRAGILITY
OF OUR INFORMATION.
FIFTH, WE ARE CONFRONTING INCREASINGLY THE USE OF OUR
INTELLIGENCE BY ADMINISTRATIONS BOTH TO PROVE TO OUR ALLIES AND
FRIENDS THE RECTITUDE OR EFFICACY OF US POLICY AND TO INFORM
AND PERSUADE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. AND NO MATTER HOW MUCH
INFORMATION WE PROVIDE ON ANY GIVEN SUBJECT, IT ONLY WHETS THE
APPETITE. WE FACE THE TWIN RISKS OF POLITICAL ABUSE OF OUR
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INFORMATION AND COMPROMISE OF SENSITIVE SOURCES AS WE BECOME A
UNIQUELY RELIABLE AND TRUSTWORTHY SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR
AUDIENCES FAR BEYOND OUR POLICY LEADERS.
SIXTH, WE FACE A PRESENT AND A FUTURE IN WHICH INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION IS INCREASINGLY CENTRAL TO THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY. AS THE RECENT RATIFICATION DEBATE OVER THE INF
TREATY DEMONSTRATED, WITHOUT ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE FOR
MONITORING SOVIET COMPLIANCE, ARMS CONTROL IS POLITICALLY
UNATTAINABLE. WITHOUT BOTH STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE, SUCCESS IN IMPEDING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE
SOVIET UNION BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE. WITHOUT OUR INFORMATION AND
ANALYSIS, WARNING OF TERRORIST ACTS AND THE INFORMATION
REQUIRED TO DISRUPT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IS NOT TO BE
FOUND. THIS GROWING DEPENDENCE ON INTELLIGENCE IS TRUE IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST DRUG DEALERS AND A HOST OF OTHER
NON?TRADITIONAL THREATS TO THIS COUNTRY AND ITS WELL BEING.
MORE AND MORE, THE POLICY COMMUNITY AND THE CONGRESS ARE FORCED
TO TURN, EARLY OR LATE, TO INTELLIGENCE AS CRITICAL FOR THE
FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY. AND I AM CONFIDENT
THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE TRUE REGARDLESS WHO IS ELECTED IN
NOVEMBER.
SEVENTH, AFTER A PERIOD OF LARGE SCALE GROWTH THAT
BASICALLY RETURNED US TO WHERE WE WERE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
1970S IN TERMS OF RESOURCES, WE NOW FACE A CRISIS PRODUCED BY
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AN EXPLOSIVELY EXPANDING NUMBER OF REQUIREMENTS IN A PERIOD OF
SHRINKING DOLLARS. SOME IN CONGRESS -- AS A DECADE AGO -- ARE
TAKING A LEADING ROLE IN TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO BE HELPFUL IN
OVERCOMING THIS CRISIS. BUT ABSENT NEW RESOURCES, AT SOME
POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE SENIOR MANAGERS OF US
INTELLIGENCE WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH THE CHOICE OF EITHER
REDUCING QUALITY OR TELLING THE POLICY COMMUNITY THERE SIMPLY
ARE ISSUES WE NO LONGER HAVE THE RESOURCES TO TACKLE. WE
CANNOT REPEAT THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1970S IN CRIPPLING OUR
CAPABILITIES OR THE QUALITY OF OUR WORK ACROSS THE BOARD.
EIGHTH, WE WILL FACE A GROWING PROBLEM IN RECRUITING AND
RETAINING THE SKILLED CADRE OF ENGINEERS, ANALYSTS AND
OPERATORS THAT WE REQUIRE TO MEET OUR NEEDS. IT IS A SAD
REFLECTION THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF APPLICANTS FAIL TO
MEET EITHER OUR INTELLECTUAL OR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS
CONNECTION, WE ALL FACE A CRISIS IN THE DEARTH OF PEOPLE
TRAINED IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES. ALSO, IT IS A SAD FACT THAT
WORKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT IS STEADILY BECOMING A LESS
ATTRACTIVE CAREER NOT JUST BECAUSE WE ARE BECOMING LESS
COMPETITIVE IN PAY AND BENEFITS BUT BECAUSE OF DIMINISHING
REGARD ON THE OUTSIDE FOR PEOPLE IN PUBLIC SERVICE. THESE
TRENDS, TAKEN TOGETHER, WILL MAKE RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION A
PROBLEM.
6
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NINTH, WE ARE SEEING A CONTINUING REVOLUTION IN THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE CONGRESS. I BELIEVE
THIS IS HEALTHY. DESPITE CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM OF US
INTELLIGENCE FROM THE CONGRESS, THE LEGISLATURE HAS BEEN
ENORMOUSLY SUPPORTIVE OF ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR INTELLIGENCE
OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS. AS I NOTED A MOMENT AGO, THE
INITIATIVE TO TRY TO REMEDY OUR CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IS COMING
FROM THE CONGRESS. FOR THE FIRST TIME, DUE TO THE NUMBER OF
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO HAVE SERVED ON OUR INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEES AND UNDERSTAND OUR WORK, INTELLIGENCE QUIETLY HAS
ACQUIRED A POWERFUL CONSTITUENCY THAT WHILE CRITICAL ON
SPECIFICS IS GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE AND TRIES TO BE HELPFUL IN
IMPROVING WHAT WE DO AND THE TOOLS WE HAVE. NOW, THE PASSAGE
OF ENORMOUS QUANTITIES OF INFORMATION BY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
TO THE CONGRESS HAS CREATED TREMENDOUS AWKWARDNESS IN OUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICY DEPARTMENTS. THE RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE CONGRESS FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS OFTEN IS FRACTIOUS.
BUT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT IS HERE TO STAY AND, IN MY
JUDGMENT, BRINGS WITH IT A HERETOFORE ABSENT LEGITIMACY AND
BROAD BASE OF SUPPORT FOR OUR WORK THAT WE MUST HOPE WILL GIVE
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE VALUE OF WHAT WE DO.
TENTH, AND FINALLY, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TRENDS I SEE
BOTH NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE IS THE UNIQUE ROLE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES ARE PLAYING IN LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, IN LOOKING OUT
7
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FIVE OR TEN YEARS OR EVEN INTO THE 21ST CENTURY, IN TRYING TO
IDENTIFY PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES THAT WILL PRESENT
THEMSELVES TO THE UNITED STATES AND HOPEFULLY IN TIME THAT
ACTION CAN BE TAKEN BEFORE CRISIS OCCURS. WHETHER ECONOMIC
TRENDS, THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD OR ENERGY, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
SOVIET UNION, THE AIDS PANDEMIC OR A HOST OF OTHER ISSUES, OR
SIMPLY IN GATHERING AND STORING TACTICALLY USEFUL INFORMATION,
WE INCREASINGLY FIND THAT INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS ARE THE
ONLY ONES IN GOVERNMENT "SCOUTING THE FUTURE." IT IS BY SUCH
WORK THAT WE CAN DIMINISH FEARS AND MISCALCULATIONS BORN OF AN
OTHERWISE UNFATHOMABLE FUTURE. WHILE THE WORK IS REMARKABLE,
THE REAL CHALLENGE IS IN GETTING POLICYMAKERS DRIVEN BY DAY TO
DAY CONCERNS TO PAY ATTENTION.
AS WE LOOK TO THE FUTURE AND THE ROLE OF AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE IN IT, I CANNOT HELP BUT REFLECT THAT THOSE OF US
IN THIS BUSINESS, IN MANY RESPECTS, HAVE JOINED A PRIESTHOOD;
APART FROM VOWS OF POVERTY AND SILENCE, LIKE PRIESTS, YOU HAVE
DEDICATED YOURSELVES TO A LIFE OF SERVICE AND SACRIFICE FOR A
HIGHER CALLING -- A CALLING DEDICATED ABOVE ALL TO KNOWLEDGE
AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH. AS CHURCHILL SAID IN 1915, IN WORDS
THAT GO TO THE HEART OF OUR WORK, "THE TRUTH IS
INCONTROVERTIBLE. PANIC MAY RESENT IT; IGNORANCE MAY DERIDE
IT; MALICE MAY DESTROY IT; BUT THERE IT IS." INDEED, THERE IT
IS -- WITHOUT TRUTH, WITHOUT INTEGRITY OUR WORK IS FATALLY
FLAWED. THESE VALUES ARE THE FOUNDATION FOR ALL WE DO.
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LET ME CLOSE BY ASKING YOU TO PONDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
INTELLIGENCE WORK.
-- MANY SERVE IN INHOSPITABLE CLIMATES AND DANGEROUS
PLACES, SOME OF THEM OUTSIDE OF WASHINGTON.
-- ALL WORK EXTRAORDINARY HOURS UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURE
AND STRESS WHETHER IN WASHINGTON, AT MILITARY BASES OR
OVERSEAS.
THERE ARE MANY DIFFICULTIES FOR OUR OFFICERS AND THEIR
FAMILIES. OUR PEOPLE MAKE MANY SACRIFICES. MANY
HOLIDAYS, FAMILY GATHERINGS, AND ANNIVERSARIES FIND OUR
PEOPLE IN THE OFFICE, IN DISTANT PLACES, OR, TOO OFTEN,
GONE FOREVER. AND, PERHAPS HARDEST OF ALL, WE ALMOST
NEVER ARE ABLE TO EXPLAIN WHY.
THE NEEDS OF THE SERVICE ALWAYS COME FIRST.
YOUR SUCCESSES ARE UNHERALDED AND WE ARE SUBJECT TO
CONSTANT AND PUBLIC CRITICISM. FOR THE MONDAY MORNING
QUARTERBACKS, WE WILL ALWAYS HAVE DONE TOO LITTLE OR
TOO MUCH, TOO SOON OR TOO LATE.
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AND TOO MANY AMERICANS WILL NEVER KNOW OF OR BELIEVE
THE EXTRAORDINARY TALENT, INTEGRITY, DEDICATION AND
FIDELITY TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW OF AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS.
BUT THERE ARE COMPENSATIONS.
IN YOUR ROLE AS AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER YOU PLAY A KEY
ROLE IN PRESERVING AND PROTECTING THE NATION. INDEED,
I BELIEVE THAT THE NATION IS AT PEACE IN SUBSTANTIAL
MEASURE BECAUSE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IS UNCEASINGLY AT
WAR.
YOU ARE TRUSTED AS NO OTHERS ON EARTH WITH
EXTRAORDINARY RESPONSIBILITY, FROM THOSE OF YOU WHO
HOLD THE LIVES OF AGENTS AND OTHERS IN YOUR HANDS,
THOSE WHO MANAGE MULTI?BILLION DOLLAR PROGRAMS AND
SERVICES, TO THOSE WHO MUST TELL PRESIDENTS, MILITARY
LEADERS AND CONGRESS UNPOPULAR THINGS OR UNWELCOME NEWS.
-- YOU HAVE THE SPECIAL SATISFACTION AND INNER CONFIDENCE
THAT FLOWS FROM EXERCISING INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT AND
HAVING A UNIQUE BLEND OF THOUGHT AND ACTION.
-- YOU HAVE THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE THAT WHAT YOU DO MAKES A
DIFFERENCE.
10
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YOUR INTEGRITY, DEDICATION, LOYALTY AND COMPETENCE ARE
REPAID MANY TIMES OVER WITH THE FRIENDSHIPS OF A
LIFETIME, PRIDE IN WHAT YOU DO, UNIQUE EXPERIENCES ALL
OVER THE WORLD, AND THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE AT THE END OF
YOUR CAREER THAT YOU HAVE SERVED YOUR COUNTRY WELL.
SHORTLY YOU WILL REENTER THE FRONT LINE OF THIS COUNTRY'S
DEFENSE. YOU WILL BE THE NATION'S EYES, ITS EARS, AT TIMES ITS
HIDDEN HAND, AND, IN TURBULENT TIMES, ALWAYS ITS COMPASS --
RELIABLY POINTING TO THE FUTURE WHILE INFORMED BY THE PAST.
YOU WHO TODAY GRADUATE FROM THIS COLLEGE, AND THE OFFICERS WHO
WILL FOLLOW YOU, REPRESENT THE STRONGEST AND MOST RELIABLE
ASSURANCE OF THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND ITS
CENTRAL ROLE IN PROTECTING THE NATION AND ITS WELL?BEING. I
CONGRATULATE YOU AND WISH YOU THE BEST. THANK YOU.
11
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The Deputy l--7-cirector of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
1 7 JUN 1988
Mr. Benjamin Huberman
Chairman, Technical Advisory Committee to
US Space Command
1616 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20506
Dear Ben:
I'm pleased to hear of your work as Chairman of the
Technical Advisory Committee to the US Space Command, and in
particular of the Committee's interest in the question of the
threat to the ground-based segments of our space assets. While
it is true that we have not put together in a single publication
a comprehensive Intelligence Community assessment of the threat,
we have addressed the issue in some detail in a variety of
related contexts. Specifically, I believe you will find some
very useful material in a number of publications put out by the
National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency, and
Defense Intelligence Agency over the last two years.
I would suggest that you get in touch again with Larry
Gershwin, who will make this material available to you at your
earliest convenience. Once you have reviewed it, please feel
free to discuss with Larry any additional intelligence needs you
and the Committee ma cr have beyond what already exists. Although
I would be somewhat reluctant to direct a completely new
assessment on the subject at this point, I feel certain we can
meet your needs through some combination of existing
publications, briefings, and meetings with principal analysts.
Sincerely,
110
Robert M. Gates
All portions classified CONFIDENTIAL
CONE' ENT I AL
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- CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Benjamin Huberman
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 DDCI
1 Executive Registry
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - DDI
1 - DDS&T
1 - NIO/S&T
1 - NIO/GPF
1 - NIO/FDIA
1 - D/OSWR
3 - NIO/SP
DCl/NIC/NIO/SP
(16 Jun 88) 25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington D C 20505
June 17, 1988
Lt.Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, USAF
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 3E258, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
Dear Lenny:
I just want to send a note of special thanks for the very
kind things you said in your introduction at the Defense
Intelligence College Commencement. One of the most important
legacies Bill Casey left was a degree of harmony in the
Intelligence Community unparalleled in its history. You were
instrumental in helping Bill create that harmony and have had a
critical role in helping Bill Webster to sustain it. I am a
beneficiary of that legacy.
Perhaps the most important lesson I learned from my years
at the NSC -- and there were many lessons -- was the damage to
our national interest from parochial turf fights and the lack
of cooperation among the agencies of government in supporting
the President. So many in Washington fail to remember that we
all work for the same man and through him the country at
large. Casey and I used to discuss whether the harmony in the
Community would survive a shrinking budgetary pie. He would be
enormously pleased at the way we have all been able to work
together, with your and Bill Webster's leadership, to keep that
harmony intact. The irony is that because the personal
relationships are so good -- thanks in no small measure to your
example -- the competition of ideas and candid presentation of
differences to policymakers is better than ever before. This
is as it should be.
I don't know how your conversations with Carlucci will end
up today but, I hope, as you suggested, you can stay through
the transition. I had hoped for your extension for another
year. Your integrity and leadership at DIA have been
unparalleled, certainly in my career. You are a very special
friend and every day longer we can keep you is a day to the
good.
My best to Mickey.
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig ?
Warmest regards,
Robert M. Gates
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP 14 June 1988
TO:
DDCI
ROOM NO.
7D60
BUILDING
HQS
REMARKS:
FROM: D/OSWR
ROOM NO.
5F46
BUILDING
HQS
'STAT
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 36-8
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
mailed 20June88
Mr. R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.
Editor-in-Chief
The American Spectator
1101 N. Highland
P.O. Box 10448
Arlington, VA 22210
MD
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! Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
16 JUNE 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNITY PARTY.
1
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P_,U ET ER 2557-88
20 June 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Administration
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: SIS Promotions
1. While I have approved your recommendations for
promotion in the SIS ranks for this cycle, the DCI and I are
troubled by the total absence of minority nominations from the
DI out of ten eligible, and the fact that only one member of a
minority group (out of 13 eligible) has been recommended for
promotion in the DA.
2. Such small numbers of both eligible and recommended
officers make any generalization questionable, but if there are
no recommendations for the promotion of blacks or other
minorities in the winter promotion cycle, your recommendations
should be accom anied by a memorandum explaining the
circumstances.
Robe M. Gates
CL By Signer
DECL OADR
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SE
ER 2556-88
20 June 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligente
SUBJECT: SIS Promotions
1. I have approved your recommended promotions for this
cycle. However, I note that your recommendation is not
responsive to my memorandum of 15 April 1988 asking that you
devote one-third of your additional FY-88 ceiling to the
promotion of experts or specialists I
but there are none.
2. I know that you are establishing a supergrade
specialist program for senior case officers -- and I believe
these positions should be for case officers. Accordingly, I
hope that the program will have been implemented by the time of
thlerle:CE:wmAjwd_c_v_c_La_aimi_e_x_ne_c_t_t_ht_i_nn_m,0-0,mhpr I will
Robe M. Gates
cc: EXDIR
D/Pers
j>2?f7r CL By Signer
DECL OADR
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
MsilinguipCM505'
20 June 1988
The Honorable James C. Miller, III
Director
Office of Management and Budget
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Jim:
Bill and I thoroughly enjoyed your company at lunch last
week. Were glad you could come over.
Apropos of our conversation about future-oriented
assessments, I am enclosing a daunting packet -- as requested
-- of ten papers that I think you would find of interest.
Several of them are particularly sensitive and perhaps the best
way to handle this is for you simply to read or scan them and
then return them to me when you are finished. To each his own,
but I was especially impressed with the papers on Africa in the
1990s (very depressing), the national estimate on the AIDS
pandemic, and the paper on East Asia in the 1990s.
Enjoy!
Enclosures:
As Listed
ORIG -j4;25see
11 - C
1 - ER File
Robert M. Gates
SE ET Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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INFO
DATE
INITIAL
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CDDDCI
X
3
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4
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5
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6
DDA
7
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21
22
SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
3637
(1041)
Executive Secretary
21 Jun 88
Date
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1-1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
21 June 1988
f
txerllike eeutu
2577/2-88
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Craig Alderman, Jr.
Chairman
Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Policy)
FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelligence and
Countermeasures Posture
1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has
approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third
biannual report for the President on the President's Report to
the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was
pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it
reflects toward implementation of measures to improve our
counterintelligence and countermeasures posture.
2. While the report is an accurate one, Judge Webster and
I believe that its very positive tone may obscure some real
problems in addressing the unfinished agenda for strengthening
CI and CM. In fact, there is very little indication in the
submitted reports of problems and obstacles to further
progress.
3. Accordingly, the Chairman of the SIG(I) would value a
personal report from you on outstanding problems in the area of
responsibility of your interagency group. For example, in what
areas specifically have parochial or turf problems inhibited
faster or better progress? In what areas is there a genuine
resources problem? Are there elements of the bureaucracy
simply going through the motions? If, as memo
indicates, an estimated 70% of the assigned_ tasks have been
completed or programmed, to what degree are the really tough
problems in the other 30%?
4. In short, the DCI would appreciate having from you, a
personal, uhcoordinated memorandum outlining problem areas
within the purview of your interagency group. While there is
no question that significant progress has been made over the
RET Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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?
past year or so, we are concerned that important problems are
either being set aside or haggled to death in the bureaucracy.
If there were no such problems, this undertaking would be
unique in the history of government. To be able to address
these problems in a sensible and effective way we need more
specific information and solicit your help in that regard. We
hope you will be candid; your replies will be held tightly. We
would appreciate your report by 15 July 1988.I ?
Robert M. ates
cc: Director, Community Counterinte ligence and
Security Countermeasures Office,
Intelligence Community Staff
2
SECRET
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ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
IDDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
X
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
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SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
Executive Secretary
21 Jun 88
Date
3637 (1041)
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. ILA C.20505 '
21 June 1988
, ,JeCbtIVE tieciStri
-/ _
.2577/1-88
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Charles A. Hawkins, Jr.
Chairman
Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Technical)
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Improving Our Counterintelligence and
Countermeasures Posture
1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has
approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third
biannual report for the President on the President's Report to
the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was
pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it
reflects toward implementation of measures to improve our
counterintelligence and countermeasures posture.
2. While the report is an accurate one, Judge Webster and
I believe that its very positive tone may obscure some real
problems in addressing the unfinished agenda for strengthening
CI and CM. In fact, there is very little indication in the
submitted reports of problems and obstacles to further
progress.
3. Accordingly, the Chairman of the SIG(I) would value a
personal report from you on outstanding problems in the area of
responsibility of your interagency group. For example, in what
areas specifically have parochial or turf problems inhibited
faster or better progress? In what areas is there a genuine
resources' problem? Are there elements of the bureaucracy
simply going through the motions? If, as memo
indicates, an estimated 70% of the assigned tasks have been
completed or programmed, to what dParee a-e the really tough
problems in the other 30%?
4. In short, the DCI would appreciate having from you, a
personal, uncoordinated memorandum outlining problem areas
within the purview of your interagency group. While there is
no question that significant progress has been made over the
Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
SECRET
?
past year or so, we are concerned that important problems are
either being set aside or haggled to death in the bureaucracy.
If there were no such problems, this undertaking would be
unique in the history of government. To be able to address
these problems in a sensible and effective way we need more
specific information and solicit your help in that regard. We
hope you will be candid; your replies will be held tightly. We
would appreciate your report by 15 July 1988.
obert M Gates
cc: Director, Community Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Office,
Intelligence Community Staff
2
SECRET
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CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
ECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
(D)CI
X
c
DCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
X
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
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12
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13
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14
D/PAO
15
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16
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17
D/CCISCMO
X
18
19
20
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22
SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
Executive Secretary
21 Jun 8R
I 3637 (10-81) Date
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C.20505,
21 June 1988
ixecutive Re ist
2577-88
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William S. Sessions
Chairman
Interagency Group/Counterintelligence
FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Improving Our Counterintelli ence and
Countermeasures Posture
1. The Chairman of the SIG(I), Director Webster, has
approved and signed to the National Security Advisor the third
biannual report for the President on the President's Report to
the Congress on the Nation's Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Plans, Programs, and Capabilities. He was
pleased with the report, especially the continuing progress it
reflects toward implementation of measures to im rove our
counterintelligence and countermeasures posture.
2. While the report is an accurate one, Judge Webster and
I believe that its very positive tone may obscure some real
problems in addressing the unfinished agenda for strengthening
CI and CM. In fact, there is very little indication in the
submitted reports of problems and obstacles to further
progress.
3. Accordingly, the Chairman of the SIG(I) would value a
personal report from you on outstanding problems in the area of
responsibility of your interagency group. For example, in what"
areas specifically have parochial or turf problems inhibited
faster or better progress? In what areas is there a genuine
resources problem? Are there elements of the bureaucracy
simply going through the motions? If, as memo
indicates, an estimated 70% of the assigned tasks have been
completed or programmed, to what degree are the really tough
problems in the other 30%?
4. In short, the DCI would appreciate having from you, a
personal, uncoordinated memorandum outlining problem areas
within the purview of your interagency group. While there is
no question that significant progress has been made over the
Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
past year or so, we are concerned that important problems are
either being set aside or haggled to death in the bureaucracy.
If there were no such problems, this undertaking would be
unique in the history of government. To be able to address
these problems in a sensible and effective way we need more
specific information and solicit your help in that regard. We
hope you will be candid; your replies will be held ti htl . We
would appreciate your report by 15 July 1988.
CC:
R bert M. ates
Director, Community Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Office,
Intelligence Community Staff
2
SECRET
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TO:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
'
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DATE
INITIAL
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cl)
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Date
Remarks
STAT
Executive Secretary
22 JUN 88
Date
3637 (1"1)
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
June 22, 1988
Mr. Brad Roberts
Executive Editor
The Washington Quarterly
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Mr. Roberts:
Thank you for your kind letter of June 7 inviting me to
contribute an essay to the winter issue of The Washington
Quarterly on intelligence policy issues. I regret that I do
not see how I could find sufficient time in the next weeks to
write an article of the quality that would satisfy you or me.
I find your invitation most tempting and even considered
updating an earlier, formerly classified article I did on the
use of intelligence at the White House, but I am not convinced
this would be adequate. The article has never appeared in
public.
If you have some interest in a revised and updated article
on my perceptions of the use of intelligence at the White House
over four administrations, I would be happy to talk further
with you. If not, thanks again for the invitation to
contribute to The Washington Quarterly and I hope I will some
day have the opportunity to make a contribution to the journal.
Regards,
ORIG - Addressee
PAO
-&Q
Robert M. Gates
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WHINGTON
UARTERLY
June 7, 1988
Offire of the Editor
Mr. Robert Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Gates:
Anne Armstrong suggested that I write you about a project of
possible mutual interest.
She and I have been working together to develop a cluster of
essays for the winter issue of The Washington Quarterly on
intelligence policy issues. She is authoring an essay analyzing
the way in which the executive branch "consumes" intelligence and
offering some lessons based on her years at PFIAB. Roy Godson is
authoring a complementary piece drawing together conclusions from
his three-year research project on intelligence and the 1990s.
Mrs. Armstrong suggested that you might consider
contributing an essay of your own to this cluster. As someone
with a strong practical sense of the intelligence business as
well as a broader perspective on the role of the intelligence
community in the nation's business you could make an important
contribution to the policy community's understanding of the
issues we face in the years ahead.
I understand that there are many demands upon your time.
But I hope that you might look upon this as an opportunity to
distil some lessons from your experience for an important
community. The Washington Quarterly is well read in senior
policy circles in the executive and legislative branches; we
also have subscribers in over 50 other countries. A copy of the
most recent issue is enclosed for your reference.
I look forward to an opportunity to discuss this proposal
with you or a member of your staff some time e next week or
so. Thank you for giving this your 'on-ider
cc:Armstrong
Brad Roberts
Executive Editor
The Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20006, Telephone: [phone]
Cable Address: CENSTRAT Telex: 7108229583
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:?;":4
4 IVA
Still(tIV 111,111,1;1110 .-;tV11(111 of 1 he ropikj 1411
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
24 June 1988
TO: Mr. Eli S. Jacobs
E.S. Jacobs & Company
Kathy --
As promised to Mr. Jacobs by
Mr. Gates.
Thank you
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CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
16 JUNE 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THF SPRINn nF lcIRR CmmAlpn
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
24 June 1988
The Honorable James A. Courter
United States Representative
Attn: Lesa
TI-IPDr
Per your phone request attached is
a copy of the speech the Deputy
Director gave at the Naval War College
on the 16th of this month.
TTBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
-- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
!ECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
POWER AND THEIR POSITION
.0NOMIC POWER AND
'EAR GNP, THE SOVIET
1 A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
LIFE.
9LITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
ROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
F THE SOVIET STATE OR
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC. 20505
June 24, 1988
Mr. Anthony R. Dolan
Deputy Assistant to the President
(Director of Speechwriting)
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Tony,
As an amateur, I think twice about sending a professional a
speech text, but you might find the enclosed of some interest.
I wrote this speech with a view to explaining to layman what is
going on in the Soviet Union. I have delivered it to audiences
in a variety of places with one or another titles but the text
has remained essentially the same. I think you will find it is
not exactly the prevailing view in Washington today. I would
welcome any comments you might have.
In exchange, I would like to impose upon you to send me a
copy of the text of the President's Guildhall speech in
London.. I saw a tape of it and found it deeply moving. You
guys did yourselves proud on his trip generally but Guildhall
was surely the high point.
We are overdue for lunch again. Give me a call.
Robert M. Gates
Enclosure:
As Stated
DDCl/RMGatesi
Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - ER
1 -'DDCI Chrono
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CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
16 JUNE 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNITY PARTY.
1
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u v ar.:CRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
DCI
X
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
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DDO
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DDS&T
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Chm/NIC
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GC
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D/OCA
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Nb/CT
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w
c/cTC/DO
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L
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Date
Remarks
STAT
Exbcutive Secretary
24 Jun 88
Date
3637 (10-81)
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`.?
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
24 June 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Intelligence Information
Handling Committee
SUBJECT: Multilateral Counterterrorist Data System
(MCDS)
1. I believe that it is premature to spend time and
resources on MCDS until we resolve the fundamental issue of who
will have access and what information will be provided. I
believe the first step must be to reach agreement with the
agencies that control the data, most particularly CIA and NSA,
on exactly what data will be provided and the groundrules
governing who will have access to it.
2. I understand that data sharing has been a continuing
problem with the existing DESIST system and has led to user
complaints about the inadequacies of the system and the
difficulty of using it. I suspect that neither NSA or CIA will
be willing to make a substantially larger body of information
available to the wide variety of agencies represented in the
counterterrorism community. If that is the case, then I do not
see how the present proposal is a significant advance beyond
the DESIST system.
Roberl 1. Gates
Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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STAT
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA:
FROM:
ICS 4227-88
1 June 1988
Deputy Di rector of Central Intelligence
Acting Director, Intelligence Community Staff,'
Chairman, DCI Intelligence Information Handling Committee
SUBJECT: Multilateral Counterterrorist Data System (MCDS)
1. This is to amplify the recent memorandum to you on this subject
(Reference) by Fritz Ermarth and Andre LeGallo. The IHG-proposed MCDS design
and operations concept referred to therein is outlined in Attachment A
hereto. Attachment B is a draft Terms of Reference for a follow-on, fast
track system definition effort to examine: (a) the technical and operational
implications of implementing the concept; (b) the projected cost of doing so;
and (c) the willingness of the Community and other governmental agencies
involved in counterterrorism to actively participate in development and
support of MCDS. Favorable determinations in these areas would be logical
prerequisites to any system implementation action. The proposed study would
-require fundi ng for contractor
technical and administrative support.
2. I am prepared to further discuss this initiative with you at your
convenience.
Attachments:
As stated
cc: C/NIC
NIO/CT
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25X1
25X1
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ISSue.
The priority given by the National Security Council and by. Agency
management to the establIshaent of a computer data base for use by the.
of progress toward this goal.
counterterrorist intelligence community is not reflected in the current rate
b:1110CDS
1-Cis.gLpund
-,
7. -Vesponding to the Congress and to NSOD 30 caliinirfor better interagency
fondling of counterterrorist-related information.Director Casey committed the :---:
to develop o community-wide data-base which was implemented through the
.1preation of the Decision Support and Information System for Terrorism (DESIST) '
..In 1984.- DESIST was .absorbed by the Counterterrorismarnter (CTC) upon itS -
treatIon in 1986. The following year. the Deputy Director for ?orations "
(DDO) requested the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS). which coneurred to
take the lead on questions related to systems interface and shared funding
while CTC continued to run DESIST. ICS then began to develop a more
comprehensive Intelligence Community program. not necessarily including
DESIST, envisioning a possibly new community data base that would be more
"user-friendly" than DESIST and promote community funding support. In
November 1987, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DOC) notified.
National Foreign Intelligence Board principals that he had designated the ICS
to coordinate the effort within the Community to ensure compatibility of
systems and data structures. In December 1987. the Chairman of the
Information Handling Committee (IHC) of the ICS forwarded a proposed concept -
of design and operations to the office of Information Technology (OITY, CTC___:
and to the National Intelligence Officer/Counterterrorism .(Nb/CT) offering
suggestions on solving the operational efficiency against security dilemma; The NICVCT held a meeting of interested CIA representatives, which surfaced
divergent views, and subsequently sent the INC concept paper to the members-of
the Counterterrorism Community. Responses were supportive. Exceptions
included the National Security Agency, which wanted more details before
committing itself, and from Information Management Staff (IMS) of the DO
which, while stating the proposal was "on-track", proposOd additional, and
problematic security constraints (e.g. recipients of.MCDS inforMation to be
polygraphed)._L
Problems
There is no agreement between INC and CIA on the concept for a
Community-wide database system.
There is not a designated hitter for CIA, i.e. one voice.
The role of the INC as the coordinator and of CIA as the executive agent
is unclear.
There Is a chicken and egg problem; that is, whether-to decide first on
thesystem or ensure that the policies of the various players will allow
their information to be included on the system.
Funds are necessary to better define the concept.
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SE T
Attachment A
MCDS: Concept of Design and Operations
Principal Operational Objective
To facilitate counterterrorist operations and intelligence analysis by
providing improved communications, information handling and data base access
in a secure operating environment.
Basic System Design Concept
MCDS would be designed to function as a community-specific system, meaning
that it would be technically and functionally structured to support a limited,
pre-defined-body of users, i.e., the counterterrorism community. This
approach would permit adoption of technical and procedural security controls
needed to maximize protection of intelligence sources ana methods while
facilitating a relatively uninhibited interchange of information within the
community the system supports. It would also aia in tailoring system
capacities and capdbilities to maximize responsiveness.
MCDS would be a closed system without interactive connection to any other
system. Data could be entered into the system online, but could not be
-transferred out of the system electronically. Outputs would be limited to
system controlled peripherals (display terminals, printers, etc) that could
not further transfer the data without human intervention. Additional security
features would include:
o centrally monitored terminal access control (personal identification
verification)
o automatic collection of audit trail data: user activity, internal data
transfers, outputs, interstation communications, etc.
o automated monitoring of audit data (intrusion detection expert system)
o superencryption of data transmitted via multiuser networks, e.g. DuUI1S.
o operate as a compartmenteo mode system per DCII) 1/16.
Operationally, MCDS would view its subscribers as members of the defined
counterterrorism community rather than of a spectrum of separate agencies ana
commands. Dissemination of reports and access to data bases within MCDS
would, therefore, be determined on a functional rather than organizational
basis. An authorized MCDS subscriber would have access to all data within tne
system that corresponded to an established need-to-know profile reflecting the
scope of his or her assigned counterterrorism operations or analysis duties.
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MCDS would be established as an addressable entity for communications
purposes, and would be made a direct addressee of terrorist-related message
reporting and other traffic its subscriber community found operationally
useful. The system would automatically route incoming traffic and provide for
specific alerting. It would also accumulate daily acquisitions and make them
available for retrospective search in-accordance with established user
profiles.
The basic system development objective would be to provide the MCUS user a
fully integrated suite of facilities, data bases, and information handling
services needed to support counterterrorist operations and analysis.
The underlying operational objective would be to establish channels for
effective interaction among the people and organizations conducting
counterterrorist analysis and operations. The episodic nature of terrorist
activity and its intelligence manifestations create situations that are not
readily predictable and, therefore, require ad hoc interpretations, decisions,
and actions. Given the involvement of numerous, pnysically separated
organizations with differing perspectives, knowledge bases, and operational
imperatives, such situations generate discontinuities that can degrade the
efficacy and timeliness of counterterrorist action. While MCUS would not of
itself resolve such difficulties, it can provide a critical medium for
enhancing the interaction of the people who could. Uperational experience
with even the limited capabilities of FLASHBDARD attests to the value of such
facilities.
2
SEGREI
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Attachment 6
DRAFT
5/19/88
TERMS OF REFERENCE
COMMUNITY MULTILATERAL COUNTERTERRORIST DATA SYSTEM DEFINITION
Introduction
Intelligence support to counterterrorist (and antiterrorist) activities is
characterized by operating circumstances and conditions that require
significant premium be placed on effective coordination among participating
organizations and the concomitant timely and appropriate dissemination of
relevant data. A high level of uncertainty or ambiguity is created, in part,
by the relatively unstructured nature of the terrorist intelligence target,
the fragmentary nature of the insights it reveals, and the consequent
difficulty in determining the probability and imminence of events against
which counteraction or precautions should be taken. Compounding factors are
the large number of organizations and media involved in acquiring, processing
and using terrorist intelligence; differences in their missions and operating
methods; geographical dispersion; and the absence of a common command and
control infrastructure. The use of sensitive intelligence sources and methods
in acquiring terrorist-related intelligence necessitates compartmentation and
?restricted dissemination of reporting. However unavoidable, such measures do
increase uncertainty, particularly where their implementation is uneven.
Since uncertainty is a deterrent to timely decisions and appropriate
action, reducing and controlling it (elimination cannot realistically be
expected) must be a major management objective. The role of an automated
information handling system in this context is 0 facilitate interactivity and
coordination among the functionally disparate and geographically dispersed
organizational elements and support capabilities of the counterterrorist
intelligence community. To be effective, such a system must, at a minimum,
provide for:
- a relatively uninhibited, predictable flow of relevant data among
members of the counterterrorist community;
- security protection and monitoring sufficient to safely permit
implementation of the foregoing;
- secure intercommunication among Community elements to facilitate
exchanges of data and expertise, as well as coordination to reduce
uncertainty; and
- access to useful data bases and related services.
kE?
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Task Objective
To define a projected Multilateral Counter Terrorist Data System (mCOS) to
a level of specificity and with sufficient detail to:
- provide senior Community management, a description of projected system
capabilities and concept of operations necessary to support an implementation
decision;
- serve as the basis of a contingent agreement among participating
_organizations to support development and operation of the MCDS as defined;
- assure that the proposed concept of operations and associated
capabilities are functionally and technically achievable at an acceptable
level of cost and risk;
- establish the basis for technical and functional system security design
acceptable to Community accrediting authorities;
and
- support reliable estimation of the cost to build and operate the system;
- serve as the point of departure for a system development program,
following a DCl/DDCI decision to implement.
Task Execution Methodology
Definition of the MCDS will be based on: (1) the concept of operations
outlined by the Intelligence Information Handling Committee (attached) and
reviewed by the Interagency Committee on Counterterrorism, and (2) the MOS
Follow-On Study Report of 25 March 1988 (to be provided separately) prepared
under the auspices of the CIA Counterterrorism Center. The projected system
will supplant the current Decision Support and Information System for
Terrorism (DESIST) and FLASHBOARD as either a lineal improvement or a
substantial replacement, the determination to refle0t, inter alia, the
findings of this system definition effort. Commensurate with MCOS operating
and security requirements, as much of the current DESIST information handling
system as possible should be utilized. Its associated International Terrorist
Profile and CENTIPEDE data bases will, in any event, be continued in MUM,
regardless of its configuration.
The MCDS definition will be developed in three segments, the first to
address functional and performance requirements, the second to explore the
system design and capabilities implications of those requirements, and the
third to assess the cost of implementation and operation. While it is logical
to address the segments consecutively, aspects of all three will need to be
considered in parallel if the effort is to result in a pragmatic development
program. A follow-on fourth segment will seek to structure a multi-year
implementation strategy based on the findings of .segments two and three.
2
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To facilitate rapid development of the MCDS system definition, its major
components, will be addressed separately, but simultaneously, by working
groups comprised of appropriate personnel from participating agencies. The
working groups will have technical and administrative contractor support.
They will identify first the functional and performance requirements within
their respective components and then their system design implications in terms
of information handling capabilities and capacities. The latter will then be
integrated to form a composite system description. The IHC Staff will
coordinate the overall effort to insure necessary interaction among the
working groups and completeness of the integrated product.
Upon completion of the system description, the technical support
contractor will prepare an estimate of system implementation costs, taking
into account, as appropriate, the prospective use of existing assets and
capabilities, such as DESIST, FLASHBOARD, DoDIIS, etc. Finally, a phased
implementation strategy seeking to achieve an initial operating capability as
rapidly as possible, commensurate with available funding, will be prepared.
All of the foregoing will be coordinated with participating Community
organizations prior to submission to the DCl/DUCI.
Level of Detail
The key to the foregoing methodology is the specificity and detail to
which the MCUS system definition is developed. Too little will preclude
useful estimation of system development and operating costs; too much will bog
down the working groups and obscure the functional and economic questions most
relevant to senior management.
The system definition should be limited to establishing significant
functional requirements and their technical design implications, the latter
being necessary to implementation cost estimation. No extensive detail
regarding how the requirements are to be met will be documented; however, the
working groups, in translating requirements into the system definition, will
include only those which are technically and operationally achievable, as well
as cost effective. Technical design implications will be elaborated only to
the extent needed to derive cost estimations. An example of the foregoing is
the functional requirement that MCDS subscribers be able to informally
communicate with one another through the system. Provision of this
capability, in turn, implies a system architecture featuring a central
processing or switching facility through which all terminals are
interconnected. A related requirement that a record be made of such
communications for security auditing purposes yields additional implications
regarding configuration of the central facility, etc.
Working Group Organization
The following is the proposed working group structure and major system
elements that should be addressed by each. The working groups will operate
simultaneously, with the system architecture group lagging, insofar as its
findings must reflect the output of the other groups.
3
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System Architecture and Communications Working Group
- Central processor specifications and capacities
- Operating system
- Data base management system
- Intermediate processors, switches etc.
- System redundancy/survivability
- Access terminal specifications
- Central processor-terminal connectivity
- Common user network utilization
- Transmission capacity requirements (photos, grapnics, etc.)
- Message traffic direct input
.71
Security Working Group
- Access control
- Auditing
- User profiling rn
- Internal compartmentation -4
- Physical security requirements
- Electronic security requirements
- Network Security Requirements
User Services Working Group
- User terminal facilities
- Query and retrieval ; data integration
- Report generation
- Interstation communications
- Graphics
- Analytical aids
- Alerts
- Message traffic dissemination
- Retrospective query and retrieval
- System databases and maintenance procedures
- Data handling and storage capacities
Concept of Operations Working Group
(See below)
Concept of Operations Definition
In parallel with the system definition effort outlined above, the concept
of MCDS operations must be developed to the level of specificity needed to
serve as the basis of a formal Community understanding concerning MCDS
operations, support responsibilities, and security. MCDS design will be
substantially influenced by the dual goals of providing less inhibited
intelligence support to counterterrorist operations and analysis while
adequately safeguarding the intelligence sources and methods involved.
Achieving them will require functional, procedural, and technical trade-offs
in system configuration and operation that will, in turn, reflect policy and
management decisions by the Community agencies sponsoring MCDS. Tnose
decisions will be a prerequisite to MCDS implementation.
4
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The Concept of Operations Working Group will serve as the medial for
development of the above. It will comprise representatives of the agencies
principally affected by MCDS requirements and operations; however, all
agencies participating in MCDS support and utilization will review and
contribute to the working group's findings. The formalized understanding
reached will be included in the MUDS implementation proposal submitted to the
DCl/DDC I .
Questions to be addressed in the MCDS Concept of Operations
will include:
- Access terminal deployment
- Access control and monitoring responsibility
- Need-to-know determination and administration
- Dynamic data input contributions
- Reference database contributions and maintenance responsibilities
- Interstation communications policy and procedures
- System security administration
- System configuration control management
- System operational management
- System operating and maintenance cost underwriting
5
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SUBJECT: Multilateral Counterterrorist Data System (MCDS)
Distribution: ICS 45227-88
Orig - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - AD/ICS
1 - D/ICS Chrono
1 - INC Subj
1 - INC Chrono
1 - ICS Reg
ICS/INC
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TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
0
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
X
8
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,
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22
SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
Ltr w/Attachment to Amb Adams,
1600 hrs, 28 Jun 88.
STAT
txecumeecmmry
28 Jun 88
Date
/A/7 004?
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EA L341/4-60
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D C.20505
28 June 1988
NOTE TO: Ambassador Alvin Adams
Office of the Secretary of State
Deputy Director for Counter-Terrorism
Al --
Attached is the Memcon I read to you over the
telephone. I hope I am now out of the loop.
Attachment:
As Stated
Robert M. Gates
Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
28 June 1988
1. I received another call today.
He said that he has more details on the initiative to try to
free the hostages.
Ambassador Adams at State. I told him there was nothing that
we could do with this information but ourselves pass it along
to State.
2. I told him that even though I suspected that people
would be skeptical about this proposal, he should still deal
through regular channels to avoid getting cross-threaded with
the government. He responded that he sensed hostility when he
had talked to Ambassador Adams and that there was a "not
invented here" attitude toward his information. He said it was
his impression that Adams regarded him as an amateur who was
meddling and had nothing to contribute.
3. I said he might try to speak to Ambassador Bremer this
time, but that whatever reaction he got, he needed to work
through that channel. I told him that his calls to me were not
moving the problem along and that I had become nothing more
than an intermediary since I simply would refer him to State.
He said he understood what I was saying and that he would not
Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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bother me again with this but would contact State. He also
understood my concerns about him getting at cross-purposes with
the government and avowed his desire to work within the
system. He indicated he would call Bremer this afternoon and I
urged him to give me a little time to alert that office to his
call.
Robert (JY. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DISTRIBUTION:
IG
CK;C
DDO
Ambassador Alvin Adams
Office of the Secretary of State
Deputy Director for Counter-Terrorism
(Ambassador requested the Deputy Director read contents
of Memcon over phone and that a copy be sent to him.)
2
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13:
CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
TO:
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
Pi/
pp ?
X
2
DDCI
3
EXDIR
A
D/ICS
15
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
X
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
X
11
IG
X
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17,
19_
20:
ty
21i
22'
...,___
SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
STAT
Executive Secretary
22 Jun 88
Date
3637 (104"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13:
CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
22 June 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
The Deputy Director
spoke
Retired)
Director
come to
advised
25X1
25X1
25X1
with General Perroots about
(BGen USAF
and his purported hostage ransom
wanted to alert Perroots that
DIA for assistance or
he could not vouch for
or plans, but believed he is
efforts. The Deputy
Pettyjohn might try to
information. Mr. Gates
present intentions
free-lancing in a dangerous
and trouble prone arena -- and had
so warned
Mr. Gates suggested that any DIA official
25X1
contacted should refer
o Ambassador Bremer at the
25X1
"a
State Department, whos
shot across the bow."
LbAl
25X1
eady has given
25X1
0/DDCI
Distribution:
OGC
OIG
DDO
Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
---S46eiter7-
ER 2541X/2-88
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP89G00720R000300080001-9
22 June 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: More on
Further to my earlier memorandum concerning
based on my reflections on comments to
me as well as what and Ambassador Adams have told me
about other activities, I have serious reservations
about any CIA dealings with him. While it may be worth having
your people talk to him about his contacts on the foreign
materiel side or I believe we should
discourage him from pursuing these activities and then we
should have no further contact with him.
(