(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000300020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 3, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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10 December Congratulatory letter to James H.
Burnley, IV on being named Sec. of
Transportation.
11 December Letter to Ire his
application for employment.
11 December Note to DCI re Embassy Security.
11 December Note to DCI re IG report.
15 December Notes to Blackwell, NIO/USSR; MacEachin,
SOVA/DI attaching draft Soviet
D/SOVA;~ SOVA/DI;
speech.
15 December Memo for IG, GC, Comptroller, OCA, re the
IG be the focal point for contact between
the Agency and the new Audit and
Inspection Unit.
15 December Memo to DCI re The Second Biannual Report
on Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures.
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25X1 17
17 December
18 December
Memo for NIO/GP re Terms of
25X1 Reference/Concept Paper for
31 December Note to DCI re packaging of inspection
reports.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Support to SAFE
1. I've reviewed the compromise proposal put forward by
the Intelligence Community Staff and would like for you to
prepare correspondence to the Director, DIA and the Executive
Director, CIA. I want the orrespondence prepared as
reflecting a decision.
2. The only change in your "compromise" proposal will be
in paragraph 4. I want the correspondence to show that CIA
will provide $7.1 million in FY-88 and $3.2 million in FY-89
toward completion of remaining SAFE deliveries -- 3.2 through
3.8, Delivery 4, Set 1 and MRP rewrite. I am not prepared to
contemplate any significant fund program slippages or software
changes that would drive costs of the program in FY-89 to a
shortfall that would require a commitment of resources above
the $3.2 million for CIA. This is more than twice the
shortfall identified by CSPO. ~~
3. Correspondence should be prepared directing CIA and DIA
to organize themselves in such a way to support CSPO to ensure
that shortfalls beyond this extent do not occur. To the degree
shortfalls are anticipated, measures should be taken to keep
the program within the bounds identified. I want the
correspondence to reflect that this financial sinkhole must be
closed as we move into an extremely constrained budgetary
environment. Neither agency will be in a position to
contribute the kind of money identified as a maximum shortfall
by the Intelligence Community Staff. It is also imperative to
put a freeze on software developments to the degree necessary
to prevent expenditures from increasing beyond program levels.
It will be the responsibility of CIA, DIA and CSPO working
together to ensure that the program it dosed out at the
budgetary levels identified.
Distribution:
Orig - Ad.se (copy~so WASHFAXED)
tL. _- _DDC-I__Chrono
1 - ER _~___
C1 By Signer
DELL OADR
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DDCI Chrono Copy
(Orig. letter on DDCI
personal stationery)
Imagine my surprise to receive your invitation to the
annual meeting of the Williamsburg Chapter of the Artillery
Punch Drinking and Carol Singing Society. I remember the first
meeting vividly, probably somewhat better than Becky does --
she, of course, having been inducted into the Society with
little preparation or warning.
I very much regret that we will be in Colorado that week,
and therefore will be unable to attend. We are really sorry to
miss this chance to see old friends so long absent, but never
far from our thoughts.
Please tell everyone that we wish we could be there and
would work hard to be present at the next meeting of the
Chapter, or at least of the survivors of the upcoming session.
(You know, none of us are as young as we were at the first
meeting.)
Please pass along to Dan how very much I appreciated and
was moved by his letters last February and March. Hearing from
him after so long a time and with the thoughtfulness only an
old friend could offer really touched me. When the situation
righted itself enough that I began to try and write some notes
to people I had heard from, I simply could not lay hands on
Dan's address, and have felt guilty about it ever since.
Regrettably, neither of his letters had a return address on
them. Please ask him to send a card or something with his
address so I can get in touch with him directly.
Again, it is so good to hear from you after all these
years. Maybe early in the spring we could all get together in
Williamsburg.
/s/ Bob
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a.__ .._..~ ...
Central intelligence Agency
Brig. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF
Director for Intelligence
Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command
Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii 96861-5025
Dear Jim,
Congratulations on your selection for promotion to Major
General. I enjoyed meeting and talking with .you recently, and
am .pleased to hear this good news. It clearly recognizes your
dynamic and creative leadership -- with Pacific Command as at
U.S. Forces, Korea -- in improving the quality of intelligence
in substance, relevance, timeliness, and presentation.
This is also a welcome opportunity to let you know that I
appreciate the courtesies and confidence you show
and the spirit of cooperate u bring
to the many interests and important endeavors we share.
Sincerely,
Rober Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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ISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
or the
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'/
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C. 20505
STAT
STAT
heart attack and illness. This is a tough time
and struggle lies ahead, but I hope you will take
strength and hope from the certain knowledge that
you have many friends and we are all praying and
hoping for your quick recovery.
called to tell me about your
If there is anything I can do, please let
me know. We are thinking of-you.
Warm regards,
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
10 December 1987
The Honorable James H. Burnley, IV
The Secretary of Transportation
Washington, D.C. 20590
Dear Jim,
I am sorry to be so slow, but congratulations
on your promotion from the ranks of the Number Two's.
While being a Cabinet officer is certainly a high
honor, I think you will not find them as fun-loving
a group as your erstwhile colleagues. _
In all seriousness, your selection and confirmation
is both an honor and recognition by the President and
the Congress of your many achievements and skills.
You have my very best wishes for a successful tenure.
STAT
Warm regards,
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lp
Central Intelligence Agency
11 December 1987
recently sent me a copy of your resume and relayed your
frustration over not hearing anything official from the Agency about your
past applications. I asked our employment personnel to look into this
matter and to review your file and any related correspondence. According
to our records, letters were .sent in June 1984 and June 1986 indicating
that we were unable to offer employment. I don't know why you did not
receive these, and if the error was ours, I apologize.
Unfortunately, we do not now have a position that matches your
qualifications. Indeed, hiring limitations are among the most severe
we've had in years. I know this is small consolation; your strong desire
to work for the Agency is evident.
I appreciate your longstanding interest in the Agency. I regret that
my response could not be .more favorable and wish you success in your
future endeavors.
obert M. (~a~es
Deputy Director of Cen al Intelligence
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Jt.l~1C~ 1
The Deputy Director entr'al Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
11 December 1987
T0: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Embassy Security
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25X1
5X1
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l/
Attached is the options paper on the Embass
Security Audit Unit as prepared by
Also enclosed is a memorandum from f
our Office of Security with his views on the
subject. I believe your decision on this can
be used to bring to a head continuing differences
with the Department of State and get this issue
resolved once and for all -- are we or are we not
to go ahead? The President and Colin Powell seem
to think we should proceed.
(Truth be told, this is probably true of all of
the options at this stage of the game.) Both
concedes that the largest option
people) is not feasible if only because
there are not enough people in the Community
with qualifications to staff such an organization.
urge yo " big". I think
that they merit in~ aPParently preferred
option of ~ people -- a unit large enough to
conduct "threat-driven" as well as event-driven
inspections but not assuming responsibility for
inspection of every single diplomatic installation
on a routine basis.
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SECRET
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
25X1
SUBJECT: Embassy Security (continued)
I recommend the following:
1. That you approve th~ person option.
2. That you meet with the directors of DIA,
FBI and NSA to review this and obtain
their support.
3. That at the next convenient lunch or
meeting with Secretary Shultz you convey
to him how you intend to proceed.
4. That you communicate your decision to the
President in response to Colin Powell's
memorandum, with the caveat that we cannot
take these resources out of our hide --
we cannot proceed without new positions and
new money as well as the training of a
substantial number of experts.
5. After all of this, that you solicit
nominations from DIA, CIA and NSA for the
head of the audit unit.
- 2 -
SECRET
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 ~~:. 7? ?_i~' ~~ .~.~ Cs ... r~ Yiti .~~a.tW: .C .~"a :K ."rh:. w:T ~~ .. .i~ .BAs+. ?.
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SECRET
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
T0: Director of Central Intelligence
Regarding the IG report my three suggestions
were:
-- Elevate the deputy Inspector General to
SIS-05 (from SIS-04) to make the IG office
parallel to the directorates.
Limit the pool of fast-rising managers
assignment to the IG to Category I
GS-15s through SIS-03 (that is, only
the very best GS-15s).
Leave open the possibility of future
growth of the Investigations and
Compliance Staff to accommodate
possibly much more aggressive use
of this unit, especially by the DCI
and DDCI.
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/3
15 December 1987
NOTE T0: Bob Blackwell, NIO/USSR
Doug MacEachin, D/BONA/DDI
SOVA DDI
SOVA/DDI
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Attached is a rather significantly revised draft of a
speech on what's going on inside the Soviet Union that I hope
to use several times in the next month or so. It is a bit long
now and any suggestions you have for trimming it would be
welcome.
Beyond this, I would like your comments on-the speech as
well as any corrections or identification of inaccuracies. In
particular, I would appreciate your updating the statistics on
personnel changes on pages 6 and 7 (including filling in the
blanks), and if you could provide me two or three additional
similar type statistics I would be grateful.
Finally, I would like to have a paragraph on economic
performance in 1987 on page 9. I think the contrast with the
description of 1986 would be useful. You will undoubtedly see
that I have cribbed shamelessly from some parts of the NIE and
from DDI publications although obviously the final assessment
is my own. I would like to work on the speech while I am on
leave and therefore would appreciate your comments and
additional text by COB Thursday, 17 December.
o er ates
Attachment:
As Stated
Administrative - Internal Use Only
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15 DECEMBER 1987
WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE OVIET UNION
INTRODUCTION
WITH THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL
SECRETARY IN THE SPRING OF 1985, THE POLITBURO SIGNALED ITS
RECOGNITION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE --
ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY
RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY
POWER AND THEIR POSITION IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW
ECONOMIC POWER AND RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR
GNP, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A
STEADILY WIDENING GAP ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE WITH THE WEST AND
JAPAN.
THE LEADERSHIP ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THE
PAST QUARTER CENTURY PRODUCED IMPORTANT CHANGES IN SOVIET
SOCIETY.
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-- THANKS TO MODERN COMMUNICATIONS, THE POPULATION HAD
BECOME LESS ISOLATED AND THUS ABLE TO REACT TO REGIME
PROPAGANDA MORE CRITICALLY AND TO COMPARE THEIR LOT
WITH THAT OF OTHER PEOPLES ENJOYING A HIGHER STANDARD
OF LIVING.
-- EXPANDED EDUCATION BROADENED THE HORIZONS OF MANY
SOVIET CITIZENS, TRANSFORMING AT LEAST A PART. OF THE
TRADITIONALLY PASSIVE AND INERT MASS INTO A PUBLIC OF
CITIZENS WITH DIVERSE INTERESTS AND INDIVIDUAL
IDENTITIES.
-- IDEOLOGY DIMINISHED AS A SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY. THERE
WAS A GENERAL INCREASE IN CYNICISM ABOUT THE REGIME AND
ITS POLICIES, AND SPREADING SOCIAL MALAISE.
-- MORE AND MORE CITIZENS BEGAN TO DROP OUT OF PUBLIC
ACTIVITIES TO PURSUE PRIVATE ACTIVITY SUCH AS
TRAFFICKING ON THE BLACK MARKET. THE UNOFFICIAL
ECONOMY BURGEONED.
-- THERE .WAS A SIGNIFICANT RISE IN THE ALIENATION OF
SOVIET YOUTH AND INCREASING NUMBERS OF YOUNG PEOPLE
BEGAN TO ENGAGE IN VARIOUS TYPES OF UNACCEPTABLE
BEHAVIOR.
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AS A RESULT OF THESE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS, THE
POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK
THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED
AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND VIGOROUS LEADER WHO COULD REVITALIZE
THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET
STATE OR COMMUNIST PARTY.
IN GORBACHEV THEY HAVE GOTTEN MORE THAN THEY BARGAINED
FOR. THE EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE OF HIS INITIATIVES, HIS ENERGY,
AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO BREAK WITH PAST PRACTICES, HAS PROMPTED
DEBATE NOT ONLY AT HOME BUT IN THE WEST AS TO GORBACHEV'S
ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES. WITH ALL THE SPECULATION, IT IS WORTH
TAKING A LOOK AT WHAT IS GOING ON -- WHAT HE ACTUALLY HAS DONE
AND WHERE HE INTENDS TO G0. AND THEN WE CAN ASSESS THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND WHETHER WE WANT HIM TO
SUCCEED.
STRENGTHENING THE LFAT)FRSHTP AND HI POSITION
THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR GORBACHEV
PERSONALLY AND, IN PRINCIPLE, THE NECESSITY TO MODERNIZE THE
ECONOMY. WHILE POLITBURO POLITICS ARE ALWAYS OVER SIMPLIFIED
AND OFTEN MISUNDERSTOOD IN THE WEST, FOR CLARITY AND BREVITY
ONE MAY PRESUME THREE APPROACHES TO MODERNIZATION IN THE
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POLITBURO. THE FIRST, .LED BY GORBACHEV, SEES A NEED TO
UNDERTAKE A FAR-REACHING RESTRUCTURING OF STALINIST ECONOMIC
POLICY AND ITS CENTRALIZED SLUGGISH BUREAUCRACY, AND, FURTHER,
THAT REAL MODERNIZATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE REQUIRES A
LOOSENING OF POLITICAL CONTROLS -- INCLUDING CONTROLS ON
INFORMATION.
ANOTHER APPROACH, PROBABLY BEST REPRESENTED BY LIGACHEV, IS
THAT MODERNIZATION CAN BE ACHIEVED BY REDUCING CORRUPTION, BY
IMPROVING MANAGEMENT (AND MANAGERS), BY MEASURES MAINLY
DESIGNED TO MAKE THE EXISTING SYSTEM FUNCTION MORE EFFICIENTLY
AND BY SOME CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM AT THE MARGIN. THOSE WHO
HOLD THIS GENERAL VIEW SEE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL REFORMS AS
UNNECESSARY AND DANGEROUS. THE THIRD MIDDLE APPROACH, PERHAPS
LED BY PREMIER RYZHKOV, IS MORE ATTUNED TO GORBACHEV'S VIEW OF
THE NEED FOR FAR-REACHING ECONOMIC REFORM -- THOUGH MORE
SELECTIVE, BUT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGERS OF LOOSENING
POLITICAL CONTROLS.
NONE OF THE THREE APPROACHES HAS A MAJORITY OF SUPPORT IN
THE POLITBURO AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS PROBABLY FIND THEMSELVES
TAKING DIFFERENT APPROACHES FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE WHILE THE
POLITBURO LINE UPS THUS ARE FAIRLY FLUID NONETHELESS. NEARLY
EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC
OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS A STRUGGLE, AND SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO
FOR HIS INITIATIVES SHIFTS CONSTANTLY FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE-. FOR
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EXAMPLE, HIS PROPOSALS FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE AND A PARTY
CONFERENCE WERE REJECTED IN JANUARY 1987., BUT ADOPTED IN JUNE.
AND, DESPITE SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS IN JUNE, HIS PROGRAM HAD AGAIN
RUN INTO TROUBLE BY FALL. S0, HE FACES A DAY TO DAY STRUGGLE
EVEN IN A POLITBURO WHERE A MAJORITY OF MEMBERS ARE NEW SINCE
BREZHNEV'S DEATH. AND, AS WE SAW IN NOVEMBER WITH THE
EXPULSION OF MOSCOW PARTY BOSS YELTSIN, EVEN HIS ALLIES CAN BE
A HINDRANCE IN THE DELICATE POLITICAL BALANCING AND BARGAINING
HE MUST PURSUE TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS.
BELOW THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE -- AND ESPECIALLY
FAR-REACHING CHANGE -- IS EVEN SHAKIER. OPPOSITION FROM THE
PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS IS A CRITICAL
PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV. SENIOR 'LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC
BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES TO
.DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE
UNHAPPY WITH CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF
PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED
ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN EASTERN
EUROPE CREATED BY ANY RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS. THE
SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY
HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND GO AND THEY T00 ARE
SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE LASTING
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RESULTS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT
COMES CLOSE TO GIVING WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT =- COLD COMFORT TO
THE GENERAL SECRETARY.
IN SUM, GORBACHEV HAS MADE HEADWAY IN THE POLITBURO BUT
FACES A LARGELY HOSTILE PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY AND A'
CONSERVATIVE AND APATHETIC POPULATION. IT IS A FORMIDABLE
CHALLENGE THAT HAS FACED EVERY RUSSIAN AND SOVIET LEADER
SEEKING CHANGE OR MODERNIZATION BUT, UNLIKE THEM, GORBACHEV
REALISTICALLY CANNOT RESORT TO WIDE-SCALE TERROR AND VIOLENCE
TO ELIMINATE THOSE WHO STAND IN HIS WAY. HE MUST RELY ON A
LONG-TERM, LARGELY NON-VIOLENT PURGE OF PARTY AND BUREAUCRACY
AND PLACEMENT OF HIS SUPPORTERS IF HE IS TO REMAIN IN POWER AND
TO SUCCEED AT ALL. THE CENTRAL QUESTION IS WHETHER HE WILL GET
ENOUGH TIME.
REJUVENATION OF THE ELITE
THE PURGE I~ UNDERWAY. MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO ARE
NEW SINCE GORBACHEV BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY. PERCENT
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS NEW SINCE HE ASSUMED THE REINS.
THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER LARGE SCALE PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS.
-- OF THE ELEVEN OTHER PARTY SECRETARIES, NINE ARE NEW
GORBACHEV APPOINTEES.
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-- 59 OF.1O5 MEMBERS OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ARE
NEW SINCE GORBACHEV ASSUMED POWER.
-- HE HAS APPOINTED TWELVE NEW DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OUT OF FOURTEEN.
-- 47X OF THE OFFICIALS IN THE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
HAVE BEEN REPLACED.
BEYOND A SENSE OF PERSONAL JEOPARDY, MANY WHO OPPOSE
GORBACHEV'S POLICIES BELIEVE THOSE POLICIES TO BE INHERENTLY
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MISTAKEN AND BAD FOR THE COUNTRY, THAT THEY ARE NOT
IDEOLOGICALLY SOUND, AND THAT THEY COULD THREATEN PARTY CONTROL.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ErnNC1MY
ALTHOUGH BY 1985 GORBACHEV HAD BEEN ON THE POLITBURO FOR
SIX YEARS AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER FOR 14 YEARS, HE NOW
ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY HE UNDERESTIMATED
THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFLICTING THE SOVIET
UNION, ACCORDINGLY, HE SEEMS TO BE INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE TO
MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE. -MANY OF HIS RECENT REMARKS
SHOW INCREASING FRUSTRATION OVER THE LIMITS .IMPOSED ON HIS
FREEDOM OF MANEUVER BY THE STALINIST-ERA COMMAND ECONOMY DOGMA
HE HAS INHERITED.
ESSENTIALLY, HE SEEMS TO HAVE ADOPTED A TWO STEP APPROACH
TO REVIVING THE ECONOMY. INITIALLY, GORBACHEV RELIED ON A
COMBINATION OF MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN PARTY CONTROL, IMPROVE
WORKER ATTITUDES, AND WEED OUT INCOMPETENCE -- WHAT HE REFERS
TO AS "HUMAN FACTOR" GAINS. THE MOST VISIBLE AND DRAMATIC PART
OF THESE EFFORTS HAS BEEN HIS CAMPAIGNS FOR DISCIPLINE AND
AGAINST CORRUPTION AND ALCOHOLISM. THESE MEASURES HAVE HAD A
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POSITIVE IMPACT AND ARE INTENDED ,, ONE MIGHT SAY, TO "KICK
START" THE ECONOMY -- TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY AND GNP SIMPLY
THROUGH HARDER AND MORE DISCIPLINED WORK FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS
UNTIL MOMENTUM CAN BE SUSTAINED BY THE SECOND STEP -- GENUINE
IMPROVEMENTS IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH MODERNIZATION
OF THE COUNTRY'S PLANTS AND EQUIPMENT.
IMPROVED WORKER DISCIPLINE AND PRODUCTIVITY, AS WELL AS
GOOD LUCK, MADE 1986, THE FIRST FULL YEAR OF GORBACHEV'S
STEWARDSHIP, A GOOD ONE IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE.
SOVIET GNP GREW BY MORE THAN 4%, THE HIGHEST RATE IN A DECADE.
INDUSTRY, THE FOCUS OF HIS MODERNIZATION EFFORT, ALSO RECORDED
ITS BEST GROWTH IN A DECADE. THERE WAS RECORD FARM OUTPUT,
INCLUDING THE LARGEST GRAIN HARVEST SINCE 1978.
THE JUNE 1987 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM PROVIDED THE
CLEAREST EVIDENCE SO FAR THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS A RADICAL
OVERHAUL OF THE STALINIST COMMAND ECONOMY. THE BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM ADOPTED IN JUNE IS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THOSE WHO WANT
TO DISMANTLE THE COMMAND ECONOMY NOW AND THOSE WHO WANT TO
PROCEED MORE CAUTIOUSLY. BUT IT DOES CONTAIN THE OUTLINES OF A
NEW, MORE MARKET BASED MECHANISM FOR RUNNING THE ECONOMY THAT I
BELIEVE GORBACHEV WILL PUSH. IT CALLS FOR SCALING BACK CENTRAL
PLANNING AGENCIES AND ECONOMIC MINISTRIES, RADICALLY MORE
INDEPENDENCE FOR FACTORIES IN CHOOSING SUPPLIERS AND COMPETING
FOR CUSTOMERS, AND PARTIAL DE-REGULATION OF MANY PRICES. THE
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REGIME HAS UNDERTAKEN A CAUTIOUS EXPANSION OF THE PRIVATE
SECTOR; ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF CONSUMER SERVICES.:.
GOR'BACHEV'S INITIAL FOCUS HAS BEEN ON THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR,
NOT AGRICULTURE -- PARTLY BECAUSE HE SEES INDUSTRY AS KEY TO
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL DANGERS
OF TAMPERING WITH COLLECTIVIZED AGRICULTURE.
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S TWO AND A HALF YEARS OF TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE
PACKAGE THAT IN SCOPE AND SPECIFICITY GOES WELL BEYOND THE
SO-CALLED KOSYGIN REFORMS ADOPTED IN 1965. NEVERTHELESS,. THE
REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW
CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE
PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL PLANNING: STATE OWNERSHIP, THE
FRAMEWORK OF CENTRAL PLANS, NUMEROUS OLD AND NEW ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES OVERSEEING AND PARTIALLY DIRECTING THE ACTIVITIES OF
ENTERPRISES, RATIONING OF MANY RAW MATERIALS AND INVESTMENT
GOODS, RIGID STATE-FIXED PRICES FOR KEY PRODUCTS AND DETAILED
STATE MONITORING OF ALL OTHERS, AND ENTERPRISE INCENTIVES
GEARED TO MEETING PLAN GOALS FOR OUTPUT AND ORIENTED TOWARD
DEALING WITH ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERIORS, RATHER THAN FOLLOWING
SIGNALS FROM MARKETS.
BECAUSE OF SUCH INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION
OF SO MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, THE REFORMS, EVEN IF
FULLY IN PLACE IN 1991 AS INTENDED, WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC
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ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE
OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST AND SPELL TROUBLE
FOR HiS ECONOMIC PROGRAM GENERALLY. INDEED, ITS AGGRESSIVE
IMPLEMENTATION IS CAUSING SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN
THE ECONOMY AND WILL CAUSE MORE AS THE BUREAUCRATIC FACTIONS
ATTEMPT TO ADJUST TO THE MANY CHANGES BEING IMPOSED FROM
ABOVE. SPECIFICALLY:
GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM IS DISRUPTING
PRODUCTION AND THE SUPPLY NETWORK AS POOR-QUALITY GOODS
ARE REJECTED. A HIGH GROWTH RATE AND IMPROVED QUALITY
ARE NOT READILY COMPATIBLE OBJECTIVES. INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION GOALS, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE T00 HIGH TO ALLOW
FOR A SLOW DOWN IN PRODUCTION TO INSTALL NEW MORE
TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED EQUIPMENT.
-- NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION, AND BUREAUCRATIC
FOOT-DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE IN OTHERS.
-- THE RAPID PACE OF THE REFORM PROGRAM IMPOSES A
STAGGERING SET OF TASKS ON THE CENTRAL BUREAUCRACIES
AND ON THE PRODUCING UNITS, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY
DEMANDING FULFILLMENT OF THE 12TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN
(1986-90).
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-- DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, NONE OF THE PROPOSALS SO
FAR GREATLY CHANGES THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE.
-- A SHARP DECLINE IN SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNING (THE
RESULT OF FALLING OIL PRICES AND THE DEPRECIATION OF
THE DOLLAR) WILL LIMIT MUCH NEEDED SPECIALIZED IMPORTS
FROM THE WEST.
-- FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN
SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW
REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK.. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS
REFLECTED IN CONTINUING LONG LINES IN STATE STORES AND
RISING PRICES IN THE COLLECTIVE FARM MARKETS.
BEYOND THE SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES FACING GORBACHEV'S
ECONOMIC PROGRAM, THERE ARE BROADER REASONS FOR THE SHARP
CONTRAST BETWEEN GORBACHEV'S RADICAL RHETORIC AND HIS MORE
MODEST RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT TO DATE:
-- IT IS IN PART A MATTER OF TIMING. GORBACHEV, WHO
HIMSELF CHARACTERIZED PROGRESS ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT SO
FAR AS "INSIGNIFICANT" AT THE JUNE 1987 PLENUM,
APPRECIATES THAT IMPLEMENTING HIS VISION WILL TAKE
YEARS, IF NOT DECADES.
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A SERIES OF OBSTACLES --..FROM POLITICAL RESISTANCE TO
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS -- HAVE SLOWED GORBACHEV'S
MOMENTUM AND FORCED HIM TO COMPROMISE.
BUT DESIGN FLAWS IN THE NEW LEADERSHIP'S APPROACH, IN
MY VIEW, REMAIN PART OF THE PROBLEM. AS IT COMES FACE
TO FACE OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS WITH THE GAPS AND
CONTRADICTIONS IN THE LEGISLATION APPROVED SO FAR --
AND THE CONFUSION AND PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS THAT WILL
RESULT -- THE REGIME WILL HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN STEPS
WHICH EXPAND ON THE MORE RADICAL ELEMENTS OF THE VISION
GORBACHEV HAS ARTICULATED OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, STEPS
THAT DILUTE THE THRUST OF THE REFORMS AND REASSERT
CENTRAL PLANNING AS THE MAIN FEATURE OF THE ECONOMY.
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE STALINIST
ECONOMIC SYSTEM, THE WAR MUST STILL BE FOUGHT AND WON. AND, AS
GORBACHEV PERCEIVES THAT THE CAUTIOUS CHANGE THUS FAR
ACCOMPLISHED IS INADEQUATE TO ACHIEVE HIS GOALS, HE IS LIKELY
TO TAKE MORE AND MORE RADICAL MEASURES AND DISRUPTIVE REFORMS
IN ORDER TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS. THIS, IN TURN, WILL
GENERATE FURTHER OPPOSITION AND CONTROVERSY.
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POLITICAL REFORM
GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS
WELL-DEFINED THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT HE AND HIS ALLIES
HAVE SHOWN A GROWING CONVICTION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT
CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL. THE REGIME APPEARS TO
BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO CREATE THE POLITICAL
CLIMATE IT SEEKS. \
THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH THE
STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS OF CHANGE
HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. GORBACHEV TOLD THE JANUARY 1987
CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, THAT "THE THEORETICAL CONCEPTS OF
SOCIALISM REMAINED AT THE LEVEL OF THE 1930S AND 1940S." HE
SEEKS TO EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN
ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS OWN
PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S ORIGINAL INTENT.
THE SECOND FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT CENTRAL
CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION LIE AT THE
HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY GORBACHEV, AND HIS KEY
ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS
APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL-EDUCATED
SOCIETY, COMPLEX ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT.
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I SEE SEVERAL MOTIVES BEHIND GLASNOST.
-- IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND OTHER
UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN AND
THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY, GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT
IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON
-- GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO PILLORY OFFICIALS GORBACHEV
HAS TARGETED AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO GET WITH THE
PROGRAM.
-- IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT SOCIAL PROBLEMS HE WANTS
TO ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
-- BY ALLOWING UNORTHODOX CULTURAL WORKS TO APPEAR,
GORBACHEV IS HOPING TO REDUCE THE INCENTIVE TO BYPASS
OFFICIAL ORGANS AND PUBLISH MATERIALS IN THE
UNDERGROUND PRESS.
-- HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS TO
COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS AND
SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT TO
MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR CYNICISM.
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-- FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER DISCUSSION OF
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN PERMITTED
HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF DOMESTIC
RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR MANEUVER AT HOME.
FURTHER, HE SEES THE EXPANSION OF POLITICAL DEBATE AS A
NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE HIS LONGER RANGE GOALS.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO OBSERVE
THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO DIRECT CRITICISM OF GORBACHEV PERSONALLY
OR HIS LEADERSHIP. SIMULTANEOUSLY, UNDER HIS AUTHORITY, THERE
HAS BEEN INTENSIFIED REPRESSION OF UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS OF
INFORMATION. WITH RARE EXCEPTIONS, ONLY THOSE IN AGREEMENT
WITH THE CENTRAL THRUST OF GORBACHEV'S POLICIES ARE ALLOWED TO
VOICE THEIR VIEWS. NONETHELESS, THE PUBLICATION OF DIVERSE AND
CRITICAL INFORMATION, AS WELL AS OF SOME WESTERN COMMENTARY AT
VARIANCE WITH OFFICIAL SOVIET VIEWS, HAS BEEN REMARKABLE AND
HAS LED TO CONTROVERSY OVER THE POLICY ITSELF. INDEED,
GORBACHEV HAS SET LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT
AND PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS MUST HAPPEN AT SOME POINT.
THE THIRD FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S CAMPAIGN
FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. GORBACHEV WANTS TO SANCTION MULTIPLE
CANDIDATES FOR LOCAL AND REGIONAL ELECTIONS IN THE PARTY AND
STATE APPARATUS BOTH TO HELP DISLODGE CONSERVATIVE OFFICIALS
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WHO ARE RESISTING HIS REFORMS BUT ALSO TO SANCTION A MEASURE OF
DIVERSITY AND DEBATE IN ORDER TO GIVE SOVIET CITIZENS AND THE
PARTY RANK-AND-FILE A SENSE OF GREATER PARTICIPATION IN AND
COMMITMENT TO THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.
THE EXPANSION OF THE BOUNDARIES OF POLITICAL DEBATE IS
GORBACHEV'S MOST SUBSTANTIAL ACCOMPLISHMENT SO FAR. YET,
GLASNOST ASIDE, GORBACHEV'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS ON THE POLITICAL
FRONT ARE MODEST.
WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL RHETORIC
HAVE THOROUGHLY SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET
CHANGED IT. THE REGIME'S ACTUAL REFORM INITIATIVES HAVE SO FAR
BEEN CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED TO INSURE THAT THEY DO NOT DEPART
T00 BOLDLY FROM EXISTING APPROACHES. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS
VISION OF REFORM WILL DEPEND ON HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING.
AHEAD WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION OVER THE NEXT DECADE IN THE FACE
OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC DISRUPTION, AND TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION
AND, WORSE, APATHY. AND BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL AS POPULAR
HOSTILITY IS LIKELY TO GROW AS DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION
BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND, IN ALL
LIKELIHOOD, A WORSENING SITUATION FOR THE CONSUMER. WHAT
GORBACHEV ~ SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE PARTY AND STATE
.BUREAUCRACY. ONCE AGAIN, THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR
CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS FOR
IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A BENIGN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY THAT SPRING FROM
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF NEW INITIATIVES AND
LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV WANTS TO ESTABLISH A
NEW AND FAR-REACHING DETENTE IN THE LATE 1980S TO OBTAIN
TECHNOLOGY, INVESTMENT, TRADE AND, ABOVE ALL, TO AVOID MAJOR
NEW MILITARY EXPENDITURES WHILE THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED.
GORBACHEV MUST SLOW OR STOP AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION,
ESPECIALLY SDI, THAT THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET STRATEGIC GAINS
OF THE LAST GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF CONTINUED, WILL FORCE
THE USSR TO DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY IN A HIGH
TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY ARE ILL-EQUIPPED. THE
SOVIETS KNOW THAT DETENTE IN THE EARLY 1970S CONTRIBUTED
SIGNIFICANTLY TO DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS,
SLOWED MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKENED RESOLVE TO COUNTER
SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPENED TO THE USSR NEW
OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
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AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. DESPITE SOVIET RHETORIC,
WE STILL SEE I~1Q LESSENING OF THEIR WEAPONS PRODUCTION. AND,
FURTHER, SOVIET RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS-SUCH AS LASERS
AND THEIR OWN VERSION OF SDI CONTINUES APACE. VIRTUALLY ALL OF
THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE REPLACED WITH NEW,
MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-1990S, AND A NEW BOMBER
IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES.
THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS ARE BEING STEADILY IMPROVED,
AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR WAR-FIGHTING. AS OUR DEFENSE
BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN, THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT
SLOWLY. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE -- AND, I THINK,
REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT PAST PRACTICE
SUGGESTS THE SOVIETS WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT PROTECT EXISTING
ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE AVENUES OF WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL GAINS, OR TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS
OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO BUILD A LIMITED ABM AS
PERMITTED BY THE TREATY).
THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD.
UNDER GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE NOW PROVIDING MORE
THAN A BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA; MORE THAN A BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF
MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN
THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THIS YEAR; MORE THAN FOUR BILLION
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DOLLARS IN MLILTARY EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN SENT TO ANGOLA SINCE
1984. AND, OF COURSE, CUBA GETS ABOUT FIVE BILLION DOLLARS IN
SOVIET SUPPORT EACH YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT
HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS SPEAK VOLUMES ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.
THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE; AND TO SUGGEST MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS
TO AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT NEW AND
BOLDER INITIATIVES INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS --
POSSIBLY UNILATERAL -- THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE
COHESION. SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA AND JAPAN WILL
BE ATTEMPTED TO OVERCOME BILATERAL OBSTACLES TO .IMPROVED
RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM AND THE US.
AND, IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEY WILL SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
ANY RELAXATION OF US VIGILANCE OR CONSTANCY.
CONCLUSIONS
THERE CLEARLY ARE GREAT CHANGES UNDERWAY INSIDE THE SOVIET
UNION AND IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY. WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE
ECONOMY OR POLITICAL LIFE OF THE SOVIET UNION SO FAR HAVE BEEN
MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A
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POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. ONE CANNOT, IT SEEMS TO ME, .DISMISS WHAT
-HE IS .SAYING OR ATTEMPTING AS SIMPLY NOISE OR MORE OF THE SAME,
BETTER PACKAGED. HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN
A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE --
AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE
FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND
INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A
TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE -- A PURGE -- NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR
THE ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.
THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS GlUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND
GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER
AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM
TO LENINISM. AS THE SOVIETS SAY, IT IS NOT BY ACCIDENT THAT
GORBACHEV CONSTANTLY REFERS TO LENIN OR THAT OTHERS SPEAK OF
THE OSSIFIED IDEOLOGY OF THE 1930S AND 1940S. GORBACHEV SEEKS
TO RESTORE IN THE USSR A SYSTEM IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH
CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED THUS OPENING THE WAY
TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND THEREBY TO
MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE. IT ALSO MEANS A
MASSIVE PURGE OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, NOW
UNDERWAY.
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IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, GORBACHEV'S LENINISM MEANS THE
CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ITS ROLE
AS SOLE ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE
LEVERS OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. GORBACHEV'S OWN BOOK MAKES
CLEAR THAT "DEMOCRATIZATION" SOVIET-STYLE DOES NOT MEAN MOVING
THE USSR AWAY FROM MARXISM-LENINISM AND ITS ESSENTIALLY
TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE. I, FOR ONE, DO NOT FIND A RETURN TO
LENINISM COMFORTING.
GORBACHEV'S PROGRAM IS SHOT THROUGH WITH PARADOX. AS
OTHERS HAVE POINTED OUT, IN ORDER TO WIELD THE POWER NEEDED TO
DECENTRALIZE THE ECONOMY, HE MUST FIRST CENTRALIZE EVEN MORE TO
WEAKEN THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY AND REGIONAL PARTY
ORGANIZATIONS. TO DE-STALINIZE THE ECONOMY, HE WILL FOCUS ON
MODERNIZING INDUSTRY AND USE COLLECTIVIZED AGRICULTURE TO HELP
PAY THE WAY -- JUST AS STALIN DID. TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, HE WILL FIRST CREATE DISRUPTION AND WORSENED
PERFORMANCE. TO GIVE THE PEOPLE MORE INCENTIVES TO WORK
HARDER, HE WILL PURSUE POLICIES THAT REDUCE THE AVAILABILITY OF
CONSUMER GOODS. TO WEAKEN THE SO-CALLED SECOND ECONOMY, HE
WILL SELECTIVELY LEGITIMIZE IT. AND, FINALLY, ONE OF THE
GREATEST PARADOXES IS THAT THE EFFORT TO MODERNIZE THE CIVILIAN
SIDE OF THE ECONOMY WILL LIKELY BENEFIT THE MILITARY MORE
BECAUSE THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES ARE IN A BETTER POSITION TO
ASSIMILATE MODERNIZATION THAN THEIR CIVILIAN COUNTERPARTS.
22
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WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE-HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION
-- SIGNALED AN END TO DESPOTISM AND THE BEGINNING OF
WESTERNIZATION. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE WEST HAS HOPED THAT
DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO CHANGES IN COMMUNIST
COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS ABROAD. THESE HOPES,
DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED BY GORBACHEY'S
DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.
YET ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME
AND POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES
UNDERWAY-OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A
RELAXATION OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND
MORE DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WE MUST NOT MISLEAD
OURSELVES OR ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE MISLED -INTO BELIEVING
OTHERWISE.
HOW THEN DO I ANSWER WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR
GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR FAIL? I BELIEVE THAT TO THE DEGREE HE
IS EVEN MODESTLY SUCCESSFUL -- AND HE IS HAVING SOME SUCCESS --
THE UNITED STATES WILL FACE A FAR MORE DYNAMIC AND DANGEROUS
ADVERSARY IN THE 199OS AND BEYOND: A MILITARILY MORE POWERFUL,
DOMESTICALLY MORE VITAL AND POLITICALLY MORE ADROIT SOVIET
23
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UNION WHOSE AGGRESSIVE OBJECTIVES ABROAD AND ESSENTIAL
TOTALITARIANISM AT HOME REMAIN LARGELY UNCHANGED. A STICL LONG
COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE LIE BEFORE US. SEEING REALITY CLEARLY
-- _THE.OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS THE DANGERS -- WILL BE AN
EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE
YEARS AHEAD.
24
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~.vi~r iL~ty t 1LiL
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
General Counsel
Comptroller- -
Director of Congressional Affairs
FROM: The Deputy Director
SUBJECT: Audit and Investigat`Yon Unit
The Director has decided that the Inspector General should
become the focal point for contact between the Agency and the
new audit-and ,investigations unit of the Senate Intelligence
Committee. He has also asked the Inspector General to meet with
Dave Doherty, Dan Childs and Dave Gries to draw up guidelines
for this activity. As the relationship develops, these officers
should consult as needed to make sure that the unit obtains the
necessary access and the Agency protects sources and methods.
CONFIDENTIAL CL By Signer
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/S
ER 4865-87
~. 15 December 1987
i
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: The Second Biannual Report on
Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures
Attached is the Second Biannual Report for your submission
to the ;President and, in turn, for his report to the Congress
on counterintelligence and security countermeasures.
I hesitate to send-you this note because if you agree with
me, it will mean a fair amount of further work and some delay.
I think the proposed report lacks integration, analysis and
polish. It is simply a collection of Interagency Group
Chairmens' reports to you as Chairman of, the Senior Interagency
-Group/Intelligence (SIG-I), with a brief {6 1/2 page)
memorandum to Colin Powell summarizing the highlights of
actions taken and underway. There is really no overall
assessment in the report whether progress has been outstanding,
poor or mixed -- and why. There is no distillation of what
this pile of paper means in terms of whether we are making real
progress.
One rather straightforward improvement would be to expand
your memorandum to Powell by two or three pages to provide just
the above kind of analysis. In addition, I was struck by the
absence in the draft summary report of any specific reference
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~~x~
to the ongoing effort to improve counterintelligence in our
embassies abroad or new counterintelligence problems
A couple of paragraphs
wrapping up the last year -- both progress and problems --
would seem to be in order.
SECRET C1 By Signer
DECL OADR
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All in all, I found even the proposed summary pretty
bureaucratic and not very impressive. I think the problem is
mainly in the packaging, but in my opinion the summary memo
-- - -
Rober M. Gates
Attachment:
As Stated
2
SECRET
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NOTE TO: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
As requested by the Director, please arrange for
promulgation of the attached
I also would like to have copies of the printed regulation
issued to every senior manager in the Agency with a covering
memorandum to be prepared for the Director's signature on the
importance of reading and being familiar with the contents. It
is in many respects our "bible."
Further, more people in the Agency generally need to be
aware of0 Henceforth, I believe a copy of the
regulation should be issued to every CT, everyone going through
management training, every participant in the mid-career course
and everyone going through the new supergrade course. Please
develop other proposals for keeping this regulation at the
forefront of our officers' minds as they go about their daily
business.
Attachment:
As Stated
SECRET Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
T0: James Geer
Assistant Director, Intelligence Division
~ Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attached is my draft of the memcon for
your information. As I indicated, if you
want to share it with Buck, Judge Sessions
or John Otto, feel free but I would ask that
it not be circulated beyond them. Obviously
I ha e f used on the conversation between
STAT and me and probably did not capture
some of the summit business talk between Powell
STATndO Anyhow, enjoy! (By the way,
where were you Friday night? The waiter looked
eery familiar.)
STAT
Attachment:
As Stated
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The Deputy Dire'cfor of Central Intellinence
STATTO ;
ationa ecurity Council Staff
Per our conversation here is my draft. I
would appreciate getting the finished version
back from you as early as possible next week.
I have tried to include both the substantive
discussions and as much of the banter as I
could remember. If you have a different
recollection of any of the substantive
conversations, give me a call.
STAT
Attachment:
As Stated
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 --
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
TO:~ Acting, DDO
~' DDS&T
~DDI
Acting, C/NIC
~" NIO/USSR ~, may
DDO/SE
DDI/USSR
Attached is my draft memcon of the dinner
STAT last Frida ni h
STAT
an o in Powe wi be supplementing it with
their own recollections and I will circulate the
final version of the memcon to you.. At least
until the Summit is over, I think we should be
quite discreet about this (even though Powell
told his entire staff meeting about it).
STAT
Ro er Gates
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 -~
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HUU'1'IiVG SLIY
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
DD
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DD58~T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
D/SOVA
X
1s
C/SE/DO
X ~~ ~
^ _ ~
---
19
C CI DO
X ~,
20
21
22
Remarks Copy provided to Mr. Ermarth, NSC
Staff.
(NO FURTHER REPRODUCTION OR DISSEMINATION
STAT'~ITHOUT DDCI APPROVAL)
cecutive Secretary
18 Dec 87
3637 ~10-81~
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i yr ~C~.Kt i
UNCLASSIFIED when blank -TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document -When detached from document regrade
cover sheet as appropriate. Attach to each CIA and Non-CIA collateral Top Secret document maintained by CIA.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT (COLLATERAL)
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ATTENTION: Access to the attached document is restricted to only authorized recipients or Top Secret control
ersonnel. For accountability purposes, all designated individuals are to sign and date this form.
REFERRED TO
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OFFICE
SIGNATURE
DATE
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SIGNATURE
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Remove this sheet upon completion of any action noted below, classify form, and forward to the ClA
Top Secret Control Officer.
DOWNGRADED
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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
WashinYton, D.C. 20505
v
STAT
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: OTS IG Report
I am unfamiliar with much of the organizational and
cultural history of OTS as well as its relationship with the
DO. However, there is one element of the report that sounds
very familiar, I am sure, to both you and me -- the problem of
communication between the producer and the consumer and the
dangers of parochialism and insularity. I strongly encourage
you and Joe to take steps to encourage (or force) greater
communication between OTS personnel and the DO, and also
looking to outside sources for both ideas and equipment. A
"not invented here" syndrome strikes me as even more
unacceptable and counterproductive in OTS as we knew it to be
in the DI. I know you are instinctively inclined in this
direction and I urge you and Joe to take special steps to move
Robert M. Gates
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~" ~ ~ SECRET
REPORT BY THE
Inspection Team/Career Service
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SI S-2 _
S&T, GS-15
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DO ,~ GS-13
SI S-2
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DS&T,
GS-15
i
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All portions of his document
are -classified S CRET
_ SECRET
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