INTERAGENCY GROUP MEETING ON POLAND 1700-1830 HOURS, FRIDAY, 23 JANUARY 81

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000100030023-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: January 26, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECR
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
FROM
NFAC #335-81
26 January 1981
? Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment
? ? Robert M. Gates
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT Interagency Group Meeting on Poland
1700-1830 hours, Friday, 23 January 81
1. Under Secretary of State David Newsom chaired an Interagency
Meeting on 23 January to review contingency planning on Poland,
receive a current intelligence report, and coordinate several outgoing
cables from the Secretary to his Allied counterparts and Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko. A tasking memo from State based on the meeting is
at Tab A.
2. Newsom updated those new to the government on the contingencies
that are the basis of current planning, specifically:
-- The Polish government itself takes repressive measures.
- Kania is replaced by a hardliner, and repressive
measures follow.
-- The Soviets undertake maneuvers without direct confrontation
but in ways that give them effective leverage or control
over events.
-- The Poles invite the Soviets to send troops into the country.
-- The Soviets invade, resulting in resistance and bloodshed.
Newsom reported that all contingency planning has been based on the
fifth, or worst case, scenario in the belief that the list of retaliatory
measures could then be adapted to less dramatic scenarios. He acknowledged
there has been virtually no planning for the first two contingencies --
repressive measures by a Polish regime.
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON JAN87
Derived from Multiple
SECRET
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NFAC #335-81
26 January 1981
SUBJECT: Interagency Group Meeting on Poland
1700-1830 hours, Friday, 23 January 81
25X1
4. There was considerable discussion of the political and economic
contingencies that had been considered in recent weeks, as well as the
status of consultations with the Allies. Rick Burt (Director-designate,
Bureau of Political Military Affairs, State) pressed the desirability of
pursuing measures that were not only punitive but also would take advantage
of a Soviet invasion to obtain long-range restructuring of mechanisms such
as COCOM to US advantage. After some back and forth among Newsom, Burt
and Paul Wolfowitz (Director-designate, Policy Planning Staff), Newsom
instructed the State representatives to prepare two papers for the Secretary:
1) a summary of economic contingency measures considered to date and the
status of discussions with the Allies; and 2) a proposed list of broader
objectives the US might pursue in the event of a "Polish crisis". At least
the first paper is to be shared with other agencies.
5. The Interagency Group then reviewed a series of cables on Poland
from the Secretary to his counterparts in Bonn, Paris, London, Tokyo, Rome,
Ottawa, Canberra, and Wellington (Tab 8); a message to Gromyko (Tab C); and
public affairs guidance on Poland (Tab D). The cables to the Allies were
to be dispatched Friday night; no time was mentioned on the message to Gromyko.
(There was some byplay among the State Department representatives whether to
coordinate the cables with the NSC Staff; at adjournment, sentiment was running
strongly against.) CIA clearance was neither requested nor appropriate.
6. Newsom then met with State, JCS and DoD representatives (excusing the
other agencies present, including State/INR)for a discussion of military contingencies.
The State tasking memo at Tab A indicates that Defense is to do a status report
of defense measures for Secretary Haig.
7. No subsequent meeting was scheduled, but I expect this group will
meet regularly for the foreseeable future.
[All portions of this
memorandum are classified
SECRET]
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JtLKLI
NFAC #335-81
26 January 1981
SUBJECT: Interagency Group Meeting on Poland
1700-1830 hours, Friday, 23 January 81
DISTRIBUTION
0 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DD/NFA
1 - D/OER
1 - D/OSR
1 - Ch/OPA/USSR-EE
1 - NIO/USSR-EE
1 - NFAC Reg.
NIO/USSR-EE/RMGates/de
(26Jan81)
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S/S 4
DIST:
ITIT/81
EUR
S/P
PM
INR
EB
JCS
Treasury
CIA
NSC
DOD
S/S
SECRET/EXDIS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
w*smovt.n. D.C. NSW
January 24, 1981
TO: See Distribution
FROM: 1,14 - L. Paul Bremer III, Acting Executive Secrete]
SUBJECT: Inter Agency Group on Poland
January 23 Meeting
The following papers were tasked at the January 23 meeting of
the Inter Agency Group on Poland.
1. Memorandum to the Secretary: A short briefing
memorandum reviewing the status of allied agree-
ment on contingency economic measures and possible
additions (EB, clearing with EUR, S/P, and E; due
in S/S-S by close of business Tuesday, January 27).
2. Memorandum to the Secretary: A summary review of
discussion with the allies on additional defense
measures MOD, due to the Executive Secretariat
close of business Tuesday, January 27).
3. Paper for Circulation to the Inter Agency Group:
A review of the status and possible new measures on
the question of technology transfer to the Soviets,
to include a definition of general purpose computers
(DOD, due prior to next meeting of the Interagency
Group or COB Wednesday, January 28).
4. Paper for Circulation to the Interagency Group;
A brief review of what "key allies" have already
agreed,for use at the next meeting (EUR, clearing
with EB, by close of business, Tuesday, January 27).
5. Circulation of Copies of the "British List" with
brief explanatory summary (ES, by close of business
Monday, January 26).
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DRAFT
Nopis/Oliftmmier
Bonn Immediate, London Immediate, Paris Immediate'
Info: Moscow Immediate, USNATO Immediate
Subject: Poland :Views of U.S. Administration
1. Secret Entire Text.
2. Please see that the message in Para 3 from Secretary Haig
is brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister as soon as
possible.
3. Dear
As I take up my duties as Secretary of State I wanted you to
know that I have begun to review the agenda of international
issues about which we share common concerns and interests. I
have paid special attention to the good work that has been done
by our nations on the most important and sensitive issues
facing the Western world. I intend to continue working with
SECRET
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- ?
you and our other key Allies so that together we can contribute
to agreement on consistent and coherent positions by the
members of the NATO alliance and other important non-NATO
nations on the challenges we face as Western democracies.
I look forward to our early meeting. There is one issue,
however, where immediacy does not permit the luxury of the
passage of time. The situation in Poland remains a cause for
deep concern. You should know that I have sent a personal
message to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stressing that
Soviet intervention in Poland
adverse consequences for U.S.
emphasized President Reagan's
would have the most profound
-Soviet relations.
support for
of December 12, 1980. The Soviets should
this Administration fully shares the view
benefits gained in the past decade in the
I also
and
the NATO Communique
now understand that
that the appreciable
field of East-West
cooperation have been seriously damaged by Soviet actions;
that Poland should be free to decide its own future; and, that
detente could not survive if the Soviets were again to violate
the basic rights of any state to territorial integrity and
independence.
SECRET
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rasa
S1
This expression of Allied resolve in December surely had an
impact and I am hopeful that my message to Gromyko will too.
However, it is even more important that we continue to use our
time wisely to consult together so that we, should we have to
meet in an emergency as NATO Foreign Ministers, would have
available the best possible list of feasible measures from
which to choose. Moreover, in recognition of the importance of
finding ways to help stabilize the situation in Poland, we are
giving high priority to the question of additional economic
assistance for Poland.
Therefore, I believe that the dialogue presently under way
among our senior officials should continue so that we can reach
a consensus on these measures as soon as possible, and then use
these to build a broad consensus within the Alliance and with
our Pacific friends, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
In this spirit, I writing to you and to the Foreign Ministers
who participate in the Economic Summit group, and to Australia
and New Zealand. My goal is to encourage each of us to
consider carefully the measures they could take as part of a
broad Western effort. I am also reaffirming to NATO Secretary
SECRE
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? , ? ,111
r-ula
*t?
General Luns the continuing American commitment to work in
concert with Allies on the challenges we face.
In closing, I look forward to working closely with you in the
period ahead. We have great opportunities and great strengths
in our nations and in the Western World collectively. With
combined wisdom and effort, the values and goals we share will
prevail.
Sincerely Alexander Haig
end text
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Draft: EUR/RPM- RFHopper
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Clearances: EUR- GSVESTr
EUR- RLBarryr
C-RRidgway r.
EUR/RPM-CHThomas
...
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DRAFT
N0DIS/411101111OP
- * g
Rome Immediate, Ottawa Immediate, Tokyo Immediate
Info: Moscow Immediate, USNATO Immediate Paris Immediate,
London Immediate, Bonn Immediate
Subject: Poland--Views of U.S. Administration
1. Secret Entire Text.
2. Please see that the message in Para 3 from Secretary Haig
is brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister as soon as
possible.
3. Dear
It is been of great importance for our nations to consult and
work together on a wide range of important issues. It will be
even more so in the months ahead. As Secretary of State I look
forward to the closest continuing cooperation between our two
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nations in order to promote agreement on consistent and
coherent positions by [the members of the NATO Alliance and]
key Western industrial democracies on the challenges we face.
In tnis regard the situation in Poland remains a cause for deep
concern. You should know that I have sent a personal message
to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stressing that Soviet
intervention in Poland would have the most profound and adverse
consequences for U.S. -Soviet relations. [I also emphasized
President Reagan's support for the NATO Communique of December
12, 1980.] The Soviets should now understand that this
Administration fully shares the view that the appreciable
benefits gained in the past decade in the field of East-West
cooperation have been seriously damaged by Soviet actions;
that Poland should be free to decide its own future; and, that
detente could not survive if the Soviets were again to violate
the basic rights of any state to territorial integrity and
independence.
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I am hopeful that my message to Gromyko will have the proper
impact. However, it is even more important that we continue to
use our time wisely to consult together so that should
emergency decisions be required, our governments will have
available the best possible list of feasible and compatible
measures from which to choose. Moreover, in recognition of the
importance of finding ways to help stabilize the situation in
Poland, we are giving high priority to the question of
additional economic assistance for Poland.
Therefore, I believe that the consultations presently under way
with the Western European Allies and with Japan should continue
so that we can reach a broad consensus within the Western
family of nations.
In this spirit, I am writing to the Foreign Ministers of all
the nations who take part in the Economic summit, as well as to
those of Australia and New Zealand, with the goal of
encouraging them to consider carefully the measures they could
take as part of a broad Western effort. [I am also reaffirming
to NATO Secretary General Luns the continuing American
commitment to work in concert with Allies on the challenges we
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face.]
In closing, I look forward to working closely and consulting
with you in the period ahead. We have great opportunities and
great strengths in our nations and in the Western World
collectively. With combined wisdom and effort, the values and
goals we share will prevail.
Sincerely Alexander Haig
end text
4. The letter to the Japanese Foreign miniister should delete
the portions in brackets which make reference to NATO.
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RLBar ry
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C-Amb Ridgway(draft)
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DRAFT
Nopis/wwwww
Canberra Immediate, Wellington Immediate,
Info: Moscow Immediate, USNATO Immediate Paris Immediate,
London Immediate, Bonn Immediate Tokyo Immediate
Subject: Poland--Views of U.S. Administration
1. Secret Entire Text.
2. Please see that the message in Para 3 from Secretary Haig
is brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister as soon as
possible.
3. Dear
As I take up my duties as Secretary of State I wanted you to
know that I have begun to review the agenda of international
issues about which we share a concern and interest. In these
areas of mutual concern which offer opportunites for
cooperation, I look forward to extensive consultations with you
and your government so that together we can promote the
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broadest possible agreement on consistent and coherent
positions on the challenges we face as Western democracies.
There is one issue, however, where immediacy requires that we
share views without delay. Poland remains a cause for deep
concern. You should know that I have sent a personal message
to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stressing that Soviet
intervention in Poland would have the most profound and adverse
consequences for U.S. -Soviet relations. The Soviets should
now understand that this Administration fully shares the view
that the appreciable benefits gained in the past decade in the
field of East-West cooperation have been seriously damaged by
Soviet actions; that Poland should be free to decide its own
future; and, that detente could not survive if the Soviets were
again to violate the basic rights of any state to territorial
integrity and independence.
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I am hopeful that my message to Gromyko will have the proper
impact. However, it is even more important that we continue to
use our time wisely to consult together so that should
emergency decisions be required, our governments will have
available the best possible list of feasible and compatable
measures from which to choose. Moreover, in recognition of the
importance of finding ways to help stabilize the situation in
Poland, we are giving high priority to the question of
additional economic assistance for Poland.
(For Canberra only) I want you to know that I am aware of your
offer to make your-self available to participate in
consultations with members of NATO on the types of measures
that would be required should the Soviets intervene in Poland.
I greatly appreciate your commitment to join in a firm response
and you should know that we are currently consulting with our
NATO Allies on effective arrangements for broad consultations
with important countries such as yours both before and should
there be an intervention. We will keep your government well
informed as these NATO consultations evolve.
(for both)
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It is more important than ever before that we find concrete
ways to cooperate together on such matters. It is in this
spirit that I am writing to our two Allies in ANZUS, as well as
to other major Western democracies. My goal is to encourage
each of us to consider carefully the measures they could take,
in the event of a Soviet military intervention in Poland, as
part of a broad Western effort.
In closing, I look forward to working closely with you in the
period ahead. We have great opportunities and strengths in our
nations and in the Western World collectively. With combined
wisdom and effort, the values and goals we share will prevail.
Sincerely, Alexander Haig
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
Dear Mr. Minister:
oRAFT HAIG-GROMYKO MESSAGE
I would like to thank you for your message of congratulations
on my appointment as Secretary of State. I can assure you that
I share your hopes for strengthening the peace and that as
Secretary I will work for the development of relations between
our two countries on the basis of restraint and reciprocity.
If these goals are to be realized, I believe it is essential
from the start that our two government fully comprehend each
other's concerns and intentions. For this reason I would like
in this initial correspondence to address two issues which I
consider of immediate importance.
The first deeply affects American opinion and thus the entire
climate of our relations. I refer to the treatment by the
official Soviet media of events surrounding the release by
Iran of the 52 American diplomatic personnel illegally held
captive in Tehran for over a year. The attitude of the USSR
throughout our efforts to deal with the hostage crisis has
already contributed to strains in our relations. Continued dis-
tortion of the facts concerning the hostages and of our policy
toward Iran can only raise further doubts in this country
concerning Soviet intentions.
The second is a matter of utmost potential seriousness--
the situation in Poland. I wish to make clear at the outset
that there will be no change in the US position of noninterference
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c.
in Poland's internal affairs. We are prepared to do what we
can to help Poland resolve its serious economic difficulties.
Andwe are convinced that, if left to themselves, the Poles are
fully capable of solving their problems themselves.
Nor do I wish to leave any doubt as to the seriousness
with which the US would view efforts by the Soviet Union to
influence developments in Poland through military pressure or
direct intervention. This Administration fully supports
the conclusions of the December 12 North Atlantic Council
Communique. Any intervention in Poland would fundamentally
alter the entire international situation, and the US with its
Allies would be compelled to act in a manner which the gravity
of the situation would require.
Mx. Minister, I cannot in this initial letter address all
of the issues between us. At an appropriate time I would
hope it would be possible to exchange views on a wider range
of subjects, particularly the problem of Afghanistan, and the
need for an early and complete Soviet withdrawal from that
country. The points I have raised are those which I believe
deserve immediate attention.
I would hope you would be prepared to address them in
that spirit.
Sincerely,
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ON POLAND
-- The American people have a deep and lasting in-
terest in events in Poland, a country with which so many
Americans have personal ties. All Americans are following
events in Poland with sympathy and concern.
-- We look forward to a constructive political and
economic relationship with the Polish government and
encourage continued cultural, economic, and financial
ties between American institutions and Poland.
-- We are examining Poland's request to the previous
Administration for additional economic assistance on
a priority basis.
We believe the Poles can solve their problems
without outside interference and should be left to do
so. We realize that these problems will take time to
resolve.
-- There should be no doubt as to the seriousness
of the consequences of any Soviet intervention in Poland.
The US stands behind the December 12 NATO communique
which stated in part:
Any intervention tin Poland) would fundamentally
alter the entire international situation. The
Allies would be compelled to react in the manner
which the gravity of the development would require.
-- We do not believe that Soviet intervention
is inevitable but there should be no doubt that any
such action would have the most severe adverse conse-
quences for US-Soviet relations.
EUR:RLBarry:mr
1/23/81:x21752
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