SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 112
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
ackagd
Mcdazzli
&mucky.
Itonco
Febmary. R907
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Selected
National
Security
Issues
February 1987
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
This is the fourth edition of the Selected National Security
Issues Book since first assembled in September_1984. This
semi-annual publication attempts to provide a current, concise
explanation of key national security-related issues of concern to
our Government.
The Selected National Security Issues Book addresses regional,
global, defense, and arms reduction issues. The format provides
background information on key U.S. policy developments,
enunciates Administration objectives, describes the initiatives
and milestones achieved in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy goals,
and provides talking points which briefly outline the U.S.
Government position.
While not intended to be a comprehensive catalogue of all
national security issues confronting U.S. decision-making, this
publication highlights issues of the greatest importance to the
maintenance of U.S. foreign and national interests.
February 1987
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Selected National Security Issues
February 1987
Table of Contents
Page
Overview 1
Regional Issues
The Soviet Union 5
Eastern Europe 9
Western Europe 14
Japan 18
Peoples Republic of China 21
East Asia/Pacific Basin 23
South Pacific 26
Israel/Arab States/Lebanon 28
Iran-Iraq War 31
Afghanistan/South Asia 33
Southern Africa 36
Africa: Security 38
Africa: Development 41
Central America 44
Latin America/Caribbean 46
Global Issues
Foreign Assistance 49
International Economics 52
International Energy 57
Technology Security 60
Terrorism 63
Narcotics 68
Defense/Arms Reductions
Arms Reductions 71
Deterrence 82
Strategic Modernization 83
ICBM Modernization 86
Strategic Defense Initiative 88
ASAT Development and Arms Control 91
Space 94
Military Capability/Readiness 99
Nuclear Weapons Modernization in NATO 102
Conventional Modernization 104
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
February 1987
Overview
The Administration's record in the national security policy realm
over:the past six years is one of progress and accomplishment.
? America has reasserted the kind of vigorous and prudent
leadership the Free World expects and needs.
* Because of this leadership, the world has become a safer
place.
? Because of this leadership, economic recovery in the West has
been hastened, and democracy is taking root and growing in
parts of the Third World.
? Perhaps most important of all, America has regained the sense
of self-confidence that is the bedrock upon which true
national security is built.
The President has met with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on
two separate occasions. As a result of the summit meeting
between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in
Geneva in November 1985, significant progress was made in our
relationship with the Soviet Union. The second meeting was held
in Reykjavik, Iceland in October 1986. At this meeting, both
political and security issues were discussed at length. In the
area of arms reductions, significant progress was made in
resolving several important issues that had previously separated
our respective positions.
? Our policy toward the Soviets is, and will continue to be
based on the principles of realism, strength, and dialogue.
? We have the opportunity to enhance world stability by reducing
nuclear forces through mutual agreement on drastic cuts in our
arsenals, by completely eliminating ballistic missiles in ten
years, and by moving from dependence on retaliatory offensive
weapons, to reliance upon strategic defense to ensure U.S. and
Allied security.
? We must establish better communications between our two
societies, to minimize misunderstandings.
* We must defend human rights everywhere, since countries which
respect human rights are unlikely to begin wars.
- 1 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* We want countries to stop trying to expand their influence
through armed intervention and subversion, and hence, we have
proposed negotiated regional settlements, the withdrawal of
outside forces, and international assistance in building
economies and meeting basic human needs.
We have made clear and steady progress in reversing or containing
other challenges to our security interests that we found upon
assuming office in January 1981:
* Soviet military advances -- and more subtle forms of
penetration -- into other parts of the world, have been
checked: Not one square inch of free territory has fallen to
communism in the past six years.
* In Europe, together with our NATO Allies, we have improved our
nuclear deterrent and conventional forces, and have undertaken
tough negotiations on arms reductions with the Soviets; at the
35-Nation Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures on Disarmament in Europe, we and others adopted a set
of measures to reduce the risk of war.
* The leading Western industrialized nations -- and many
developing nations as well -- are increasingly standing behind
President Reagan's market-oriented approach to solving global
economic problems.
* We are continuing to encourage both Israel and the Arab states
to make serious efforts to address their differences through a
dynamic and far-reaching Middle East peace process.
* Our consistent support and encouragement has helped foster
democratic institution-building, especially in Latin America,
where 26 of 33 countries are now democratic, or in transition
toward democracy.
* In Central America, we have met the challenge of
externally-supported subversion of democracy head on, and
thanks in part to our support, have seen heartening progress
in building democracy in El Salvador.
* In Africa, we have seen several governments move away from
centrally-planned economic models, toward more market-oriented
economies, and the U.S. has led the world in providing
humanitarian aid to drought and famine-stricken millions.
* We have united the Free World against repression in Poland,
and the Soviet conquest in Afghanistan.
* We are working with all peace-loving nations to combat
terrorism effectively, and we are fighting the international
drug traffickers poisoning our young people.
- 2 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22: CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? U.S. leadership has helped to ease the threat of energy
shortages; oil supplies are now plentiful, and we have forged
effective emergency energy arrangements with our Allies; OPEC
control over energy prices has been weakened, and global oil
impact prices have fallen.
? We have continued and expanded effective steps toward stemming
the flow of militarily-senstive technology to the Soviet bloc.
Despite our achievements thus far, we know we will have to work
even harder in the coming months to protect the gains already
made, and to cope effectively with other international problems
we face as a Nation -- and we are quite determined to do so.
? Reaching broad, deep, equitable, stabilizing, and effectively
verifiable arms reduction agreements with Moscow will continue
to require patience, steadfastness, and effort. The meeting
at Reykjavik showed the need to continue our effort to gain
Soviet acceptance of the proposition that a system of
strategic deterrence based on defensive, instead of offensive
weapons, would be more stabilizing than our present system.
? The President decided in May 1986 that, given the lack of
Soviet violations of the expired SALT I and II agreements, in
the future the United States must base decisions regarding its
strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the
threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on the
standards contained in the SALT II Agreement of 1979, or the
Interim Agreement of 1972.
? President Reagan's Regional Peace Initiative which he
described at the U.N. General Assembly in October 1985,
proposing negotiations among the warring parties, followed by
bilateral U.S.-Soviet discussions, and U.S. participation in
the economic reconstruction of the affected areas, will
require a long-term commitment by all parties.
? Clearly much remains to be done to reverse the spread and
deter the perpetrators of international terrorism and drug
trafficking -- steps all nations must take if we are ever to
halt the growth of these twin scourges of mankind.
? Much remains to foster democratic and market-oriented economic
growth in those Third World countries looking to us for help.
* Helping the peoples of southern Africa to attain social and
political justice peacefully poses an especially difficult
challenge to us.
? Our efforts against economic protectionism, and against
short-sighted approaches to the international debt problem
must be maintained if the world economy is to flourish.
? 3 ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* Instabilities and conflict in many parts of the world -- the
Persian Gulf, Central America, and the Middle East to name but
a few -- will continue to flare up in new challenges to our
interests that will require our best efforts to counter
effectively.
- 4 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
REGIONAL ISSUES
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
SOVIET UNION
Issue:
How to achieve a lasting improvement in East-West relations that
advances Western political, security, and economic interests and
minimizes the chances of East-West military conflict.
Objectives:
? To deter Soviet direct and indirect aggression, thereby
reducing the possibility of U.S.-Soviet military
confrontation.
* To establish a durable and comprehensive framework to address
forthrightly the sources of mistrust and tension between East
and West in four broad areas: East-West military competition,
regional conflicts, Soviet abuse of fundamental human rights
and freedoms, and Soviet policies which inhibit the free flow
of people and ideas.
? To achieve sustained, concrete progress towards arms
reductions, observance of fundamental human rights and
freedoms, resolution of regional conflicts, and expanded
bilateral ties.
On Military Security:
? In conjunction with our Allies, to maintain an adequate
deterrent and defense, by continuing to improve and modernize
U.S. and Allied military forces.
? To seek equitable, verifiable, and effective agreements that
provide greater security and stability through deep reductions
in nuclear arsenals, lower levels of other military forces,
and improved means of preventing misunderstandings and
miscalculations that could lead to military conflict.
? To achieve strict Soviet compliance with existing and future
arms control commitments.
? To pursue research into advanced technologies that could
provide a stable system of international security which places
greater reliance on advanced defenses than on the threat of
nuclear retaliation.
On Human Rights and Freedoms:
* To impress upon the Soviet leadership that its human rights
practices perpetuate the Soviet Union's isolation from the
West and remain an important obstacle to better relations.
- 5 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* To seek full Soviet implementation of its commitments under
the Helsinki Final Act and other international agreements.
* To encourage steady progress by the Soviet government in
resolving humanitarian cases, allowing the free emigration of
those wishing to leave the Soviet Union, and in ending the
repression of Soviet citizens who speak out on behalf of human
rights.
On Regional Issues:
* To counter Soviet efforts to use armed intervention and
subversion to gain influence in other countries. Seek and
support political resolution of regional conflicts on the
basis of national reconciliation, an end to external military
intervention, and economic reconstruction.
* To establish better communication between the U.S. and Soviet
governments on regional issues to minimize the possibility of
misunderstandings that could lead to confrontation.
On Bilateral Affairs:
* To expand communication and contacts between American and
Soviet societies and peoples through an active program of
people-to-people, cultural, and other exchanges.
* To expand mutually beneficial trade and economic ties, while
denying the Soviets militarily significant Western technology.
Principles:
In pursuing both immediate and long-term objectives, U.S. policy
toward the Soviet Union is based on three guiding principles:
* Realism -- a sober recognition of the political and military
challenge posed by the Soviet system.
* Strength -- the determination and confidence which derives
from a West that is economically healthy, politically united,
and militarily strong.
* Dialogue -- the willingness to deal forthrightly with our
differences and to work creatively for practical and fair
solutions on the basis of mutual interests.
Accomplishments:
* The Soviet Union has accepted in practice that efforts to
improve relations must deal with all four areas on our broad
agenda -- arms reductions, human rights, regional issues, and
bilateral affairs.
-6
-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev in
Geneva on November 19-21, 1985, and in Reykjavik on October
11-12, 1986. These two meetings represent important steps
forward in the ongoing process of U.S.-Soviet dialogue.
* Although our differences with the Soviets over the
relationship between strategic offense and defense remain
profound, we both have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won
and must never be fought.
* On arms reductions, the U.S. and Soviet positions have moved
significantly closer together on several key issues.
* On regional issues, U.S. and Soviet experts have held
discussions on Afghanistan, Central America/Caribbean, East
Asia/Pacific, Middle East, and southern Africa.
* These discussions have provided useful opportunities for the
exchange of views. They may provide the basis for
constructive achievements aimed at supporting diplomatic
settlements to urgent regional conflicts.
* On bilateral affairs, dialogue in areas of mutual interest has
produced some of the most tangible progress toward improving
relations.
* In sum, the U.S. has engaged in a broad dialogue with the
Soviet Union, designed to develop peaceful and just solutions,
and to encourage the USSR to fulfill its international
obligations and play a responsible role in the world
community.
Talking Points:
* The U.S. seeks to build a constructive and stable relationship
with the Soviet Union founded on the principles of realism,
strength, and dialogue.
* Our objective is to deter Soviet direct and indirect
aggression and thus help create an international system
conducive to the growth of democracy, prosperity, and peace.
* Achieving these aims requires the determination to resist
Soviet expansionism, the willingness to seek agreements that
advance Western interests, and a long-term effort to encourage
internal changes in the USSR that will lead to moderation in
its international behavior.
* The President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in
Reykjavik in October 1986 achieved significant advances toward
our objectives.
- 7 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22: CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? The achievements of Reykjavik provide a solid foundation for
our efforts to make further progress in all four areas of the
U.S.-Soviet agenda: arms reductions, human rights, regional
issues, and bilateral affairs.
* The U.S. will continue to press the Soviets to negotiate
equitable, verifiable, and stabilizing agreements which deeply
reduce nuclear arms.
? We will continue our planned defense modernization program to
maintain our strength, support our Allies, and encourage the
Soviets to negotiate seriously.
? Soviet human rights performance inevitably impacts on the
broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. The U.S. will continue to
press for a significant and sustained improvement in the human
rights situation within the Soviet Union.
? Recent Soviet resolution of selected humanitarian cases is a
positive step, but must be seen in the context of overall
Soviet performance. Jewish emigration figures stand at less
than 1000 per year, compared to 50,000 in 1979. Arrests of
dissidents and religious activists continue.
? We have continued our dialogue with the Soviets on regional
issues by exchanging views among senior experts. These
exchanges have been useful and serve as a framework for
on-going consultation.
? However, little agreement has been reached on the substance of
regional issues and the Soviets show no sign of responding to
our calls for political settlement in such conflict-torn areas
as Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, or Nicaragua. The sham
"withdrawal" of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in October 1986
shows a disregard for any negotiated settlement.
? We are pleased by the progress in bilateral exchanges. The
appearances of the Kirov and Moiseyev ballets in the U.S., and
Vladimir Horowitz in the Soviet Union exemplify the benefits.
We are actively working on other exchange programs in
medicine, science, education, and sports.
? Promising measures have also been taken in the bilateral
fields of civil space cooperation, fusion research, energy,
and transportation.
? In short, we have made progress. More remains to be done. At
the same time, we are realists. The U.S.-Soviet relationship
is fundamentally adversarial and will remain so. But both
sides recognize they have a responsibility to ensure this
competition remains peaceful. Given these realities, we stand
ready, with our friends and Allies to pursue our goals of
peace and freedom over the long term.
8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
EASTERN EUROPE
Issue:
?c,)
Given the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations and Soviet
efforts to retain stringent controls on Eastern Europe, how can
we maintain and improve our relations with East European
countries?
Objectives:
? Recognize and encourage the diversity that exists among
individual East European countries, with particular reference
to domestic liberalization and more autonomous foreign
policies.
* Relate the level of activity selectively to manifestations of
foreign policy autonomy or domestic liberalization, use
international meetings, high-level visits, cultural and
scientific exchanges, and bilateral councils, as well as
traditional government-to-government contacts, to achieve
specific U.S. objectives in each country.
? Provide briefings and consultations to East European countries
on such subjects as arms reductions and international
terrorism to ensure that U.S. positions are known, and that
there is an alternative to the Soviet line.
? Help foster genuine national reconciliation in Poland that
includes dialogue among the Government, Church, and the people
(especially the Polish workforce); maintenance of amnesty;
restoration of representative trade unions; implementation of
economic reform; and an enhanced role for the Church.
? Maintain our strong support for an independent, unified,
non-aligned, economically-viable, and stable Yugoslavia.
? Further develop dialogue with Romania on political and
economic issues to encourage continuation of independent
policies; use this dialogue to express our strong concerns
about Romania's performance on emigration and other major
human rights issues, and stimulate improvements.
Accomplishments:
? In spite of U.S.-Soviet tensions and tighter Soviet controls
in Eastern Europe, we have improved bilateral relations with
several East European countries.
- 9 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? U.S.-Hungarian relations have improved significantly through
resolution of virtually all family reunification cases,
Hungary's adherence to conditions for MFN status, and our
support for Hungarian membership in the IMF in 1982. Secretary
Shultz had productive meetings in Budapest in December 1985,
and there have been several other high-level visits during the
past two years.
* In November 1986, Deputy Secretary Whitehead visited Romania,
Hungary, and Yugoslavia. This trip, once again, manifested
our strong interest in maintaining and improving relations
with Eastern Europe, without at the same time sacrificing our
objectives in the human rights area. Specifically, in
Romania, the Deputy Secretary met with President Ceausescu and
vigorously reaffirmed our interest in seeing concrete
improvements of their human rights situation.
? Romania has continued its independent foreign policy, notably
with respect to participation in the Warsaw Pact on its own
terms, and expansion of high-level political and military
contacts in Western Europe and the United States. Romanian
Defense Minister Milea's visit to the U.S. in October 1986 was
the first by a Warsaw Pact Minister of Defense. Romania also
continues to direct a higher share of its foreign trade to
Western industrialized nations than other members of the
Warsaw Pact. The Romanian Government has implemented an
agreement reached in 1985, governing emigration from Romania
to the United States, which provides for more orderly
processing under U.S. law and reduced hardships suffered by
intending emigrants prior to their departure from Romania.
Emigration to the West from Romania continues at a level far
higher than any other East European country.
? We are encouraged by the Romanian Government's release of
several religious activists from prison in May-June 1986, by
the announcement of a broad amnesty of political prisoners,
and by the Government's decision to permit the printing of
Protestant Bibles. However, we remain concerned by the
Romanian Government's limited response to numerous expressions
of strong U.S. public, Congressional, and Administration
concern about its performance in areas of human rights
generally, and on religious issues. In June 1986, the
President directed Secretary Shultz to further press our
concerns in these areas.
- 10 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* Since ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman first led a U.S.
delegation to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary in January 1985
to brief East European officials on the results of the
Shultz-Gromyko meetings in Geneva, other U.S. arms control
experts have traveled periodically to Yugoslavia, Romania,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the GDR and Poland to keep
these countries abreast of U.S. positions at the Nuclear and
Space Talks, the CDE, and MBFR. These briefings and
consultations were very successful. East European
interlocutors expressed appreciation for the information
provided. We were able to counter Soviet propaganda and
foster greater East European interest in this vital area of
East-West relations.
? In January-February 1987, Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead
traveled to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In each of
these countries, the Deputy Secretary met with high-ranking
officials to discuss a wide range of issues. He clarified
U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, detailed our human rights
concerns, and mentioned various bilateral matters. The trip
also accorded us an excellent opportunity to meet with several
opposition leaders/dissidents (in Poland -- with
Solidarity/KOR members; in Czechoslovakia -- with Charter 77
activists), and solicit their views on various East European
developments. Finally, the trip served as visible
manifestation of our continuing interest in Eastern Europe.
? We have rejected any notion that there has been a "lawful"
division of Europe. The Yalta agreement did not divide Europe
into "spheres of influence." Rather, the Soviet Union pledged
itself to grant independence to Poland and other states in
Eastern Europe, and to hold free elections. Soviet violation
of these obligations is a root cause of East-West tensions
today.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22: CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? With respect to Poland, we have maintained an effective,
step-by-step approach, under which we have eased, and in
February 1987 finally lifted our sanctions in direct response
to the appeals made by Solidarity and the Polish Catholic
Church. Specifically, during Deputy Secretary Whitehead's
visit to Poland in January 1987, both the leaders of
Solidarity and the Polish Church urged us to lift our
remaining economic sanctions so as to encourage further
movement toward genuine national reconciliation. Also, in
response to the September 1986 full political prisoner
amnesty, we have taken significant steps toward enhancing
dialogue with Poland, expanding high-level contacts, and
strengthening scientific, commercial and cultural ties. At
the same time, we are continuing to provide humanitarian aid
through non-governmental channels, which has totalled over
$300 million since 1981. However, the continuation of better
bilateral relations will be possible only if we see maintained
the spirit and principle of the September 1986 amnesty, and a
reliance on dialogue and respect for human rights. We will be
watching to see that further steps are taken toward genuine
national reconciliation in Poland, and that the progress made
is not reversed.
? With respect to Romania, we seek to encourage further
development of that country's independent foreign policy
through expansion of political and economic dialogue on
broader. issues. Emigration from Romania to the West and
Israel continues at a substantial level. Although we are
heartened by the release of several Romanian religious
activists from prison, we remain deeply concerned by the
conditions and practices that put them there. We are also
concerned about Romanian attempts to cut back on cultural and
educational exchanges, and to curb contacts between Romanian
citizens and foreign visitors. We shall continue to engage
the Romanian Government on these issues.
? We strongly support Yugoslavia's independence and unity, and
respect its non-aligned status. We are pleased that
Yugoslavia has reached agreement with its commercial and
official creditors on debt rescheduling, and we will continue
to provide appropriate assistance to Yugoslavia in support of
its economic stabilization program. We also believe that
Belgrade must take stronger actions to deal with its economic
problems. We continue to consult with the Yugoslav Government
to improve bilateral cooperation against international
terrorism, and believe that our meetings have been useful and
productive.
- 12 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? Bilateral relations with Yugoslavia were strengthened further
by Under Secretary Armacost's visit to Belgrade in June 1986
and Deputy Secretary Whitehead's visit to Belgrade in November
1986. U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Welch also
visited Yugoslavia in December 1986, continuing a series of
visits by high-level military officials of both countries.
Conclusion of a constructive debt rescheduling agreement in
May 1986 between Yugoslavia and its official creditors marked
the fourth consecutive year of U.S. involvement in financial
assistance to Yugoslavia in support of its economic
stabilization program. We have initiated a useful dialogue
with the Yugoslav Government on the strengthening of bilateral
cooperation against terrorism and are encouraged by recent
developments in this field.
? In 1985, the Bulgarian Government agreed to establish a
liaison unit, composed of representatives from Bulgarian
Customs and the Prosecutor General's Office, to facilitate the
exchange of seizure data and drug control investigative
information with representatives of the American Embassy and
the DEA. Drug control cooperation was further advanced by the
Bulgarian Government's decision in 1986 to provide samples of
seized drugs to the DEA for laboratory analysis and tracing.
There is room for further improvement, and the Bulgarian
Government has taken concrete steps to cooperate in a
significant way on this problem.
* Assistant Secretary Ridgway visited Sofia in November 1986. In
meeting with the Foreign Minister, Deputy Foreign Minister,
and First Deputy Prime Minister, she raised our concerns on
such matters as human rights, the persecution of ethnic Turks,
terrorism, and technology diversion. She also sought to
identify with her Bulgarian interlocutors ways to build on
recent progress in such areas of interest to the United States
as resolution of divided family cases, drug control,
non-sensitive trade, and cultural/educational exchanges.
- 13 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
WESTERN EUROPE
Issue:
How can the United States most effectively expand and strengthen
our deep, longstanding political, economic, and military ties
with Western Europe?
Objectives:
? Strengthen the NATO Alliance and our political and military
relations with Western European nations.
* Thwart Soviet efforts to decouple the U.S. from its West
European Allies.
* Work with our Allies to improve NATO conventional defense and
nuclear deterrence.
? Maintain Allied support for our arms reduction priorities.
? Counter trends in some European political parties to advocate
"defensive" or "non-provocative" defense and unilateral
nuclear disarmament.
* Work with our European Allies and friends to promote
sustainable, non-inflationary growth in our countries.
? Secure support for our opposition to protectionist tendencies,
and for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.
? Ensure that Allied dependence on the Soviet Union for energy
supplies remains at a level that does not pose a security
threat.
? Curb the flow of militarily significant technologies,
products, and resources from the West to the Soviet Union and
its allies.
? Strengthen U.S.-Allied cooperative efforts to combat
international terrorism and drug abuse.
? Expand Allied consultations and cooperation on regional issues
outside the European area, with a special focus on the
promotion of democracy.
Accomplishments:
? The Administration has put relations with our European friends
and Allies on a stronger and steadier course. This was
largely accomplished through intensive consultations with our
Allies at all levels, including frequent meetings between the
President and key European leaders, Ministerial-level
meetings, and the use of special emissaries.
- 14 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* We have secured a general consensus that free market policies,
reduced government spending, and elimination of structural
rigidities will promote non-inflationary growth; we also have
Allied agreement on a pragmatic approach to Third World debt
problems.
? We have forged a strong Allied consensus behind a realistic
approach to East-West relations, based on strength and
dialogue.
? We and our Allies remain fully committed to achieving
significant arms reductions. At the same time, NATO's unity
on INF deployment policy has helped thwart Soviet efforts to
decouple the U.S. from Europe, and has sent Moscow a strong
signal of Alliance resolve and solidarity.
? Western Europe has taken an important step with the entrance
of Spain and Portugal into the EC. The historic vote of the
Spanish people to endorse NATO membership was a solid victory
for the Alliance, and its collective defense.
? We have played a major role in developing a conventional
defense improvement program to enhance NATO's conventional
defenses. NATO is actively examining additional improvements.
We are leading complementary efforts supporting better
utilization of emerging technologies and enhanced arms
cooperation.
? The U.S. economic recovery has helped stimulate
non-inflationary economic growth in West European countries.
Real European GNP grew 2.5% in 1985, and at the same pace in
1986. The outlook for 1987 is for continued moderate growth
with inflation remaining low.
* Progress has been made toward launching a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations, including trade with and
among developing countries. Further trade liberalization will
strengthen the economic expansion in the U.S. and Western
Europe, and help spread the recovery to the LDCs.
? Our Allies have supported the U.S. initiative to address the
problems of the major debtor countries.
? We have agreed with our Allies not to subsidize the Soviet
economy or aid Soviet military expansion by offering
preferential trading terms or easy credits.
? We have agreed with our Allies to restrict the flow of
products, materials, and technology which would increase
Warsaw Pact military capabilities.
? We have helped to foster a more balanced and realistic
understanding among our Allies of the Soviet threat and the
means by which the Soviets seek to achieve their aims.
- 15 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? We have agreed with the Europeans on a strategy to reduce
European dependency on the Soviet Union as an energy supplier.
? We have reached an agreement with our Allies to explore the
possibility of a joint space station.
? We have strengthened and intensified dialogue with our Allies
on steps to combat international terrorism and drug abuse.
? We have obtained Allied support for the President's Strategic
Defense Initiative research program as a prudent hedge against
Soviet strategic defense efforts.
Talking Points:
? Our objectives in our relations with our Western European
Allies and friends have been to expand and strengthen our
political, economic, and military cooperation; to assist in
spurring their economic recovery; and to negate Soviet efforts
to sow discord among us.
? The Western Alliance system has become strong again. We have
excellent relations with all of our Allies, and President
Reagan has developed strong personal ties with many European
leaders. As President Reagan said when he met with the NATO
Foreign Ministers in May 1984, "For us, our NATO partnership
is an anchor -- a fixed point in a turbulent world."
* We continue working closely with our Allies in a number of
areas of fundamental importance to us all. These include: the
pursuit of verifiable arms reduction agreements with the
Soviet Union; planning cooperative responses to a possible oil
shortage; resolving the world debt problem; restricting the
flow of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union and its
allies; reducing European dependency on Soviet energy;
exploring the possibility of a joint space station; combatting
international terrorism and drug abuse, and promoting
democracy around the world.
? Allied solidarity in the face of Soviet intimidation and
threats succeeded in getting the USSR back to the negotiating
table. We now have an historic opportunity presented to us by
the Reykjavik meetings to pursue real and verifiable
reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, enhancing
stability and reducing the risk of war. In this regard, we
have stated clearly the concerns which we and other members of
the Alliance have about proposals for unilateral nuclear
disarmament and "defensive" defense made by political parties
in some NATO countries.
- 16 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
The Alliance is in fundamental agreement regarding the nature
of the challenge posed by the Soviet Union and its allies.
Despite Soviet threats, NATO is deploying INF missiles to
strengthen its nuclear deterrent, has reached a new consensus
on preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies
to the East, and has undertaken a program to enhance NATO's
conventional defense capability.
The U.S. economic expansion helped provide the impetus for
growth in Western Europe. Domestic demand growth in Europe is
now expected to play an increasing role in maintaining world
prosperity. The agreement in Uruguay on a new round of trade
negotiations will help eliminate protectionist tendencies,
reduce global trade barriers in the new GATT trade round, and
promote trade with less-developed, as well as industrialized,
nations.
- 17 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
JAPAN
Issue:
How should the United States manage the vital and complex
relationship with Japan?
Objectives:
? Maintain and strengthen our excellent overall bilateral
relationship.
? Continue to manage our trade relations carefully, and prevent
spillover of tension to other areas. Increase efforts to open
Japan's markets more fully to U.S. goods, especially
manufactured products, and promote the Japanese shift toward
domestic, rather than export-led growth.
? Encourage Tokyo to meet its declared self-defense commitments;
steadily expand bilateral defense cooperation.
? Enhance our ability to compete openly with the Japanese in
high technology.
? Seek a positive Japanese regional and global role in support
for our key security, foreign aid, and other policies in East
Asia, as well as around the world.
? Urge Japan to strengthen its energy security. This includes
more rapid rationalization of domestic production and markets,
and increased imports from the U.S.
Accomplishments:
? Groundwork for recent cooperation was set at the meeting of
the President and Prime Minister Nakasone in Los Angeles on
January 2, 1985. Further discussions that set the tone
occurred at the Camp David meeting in April 1986, and the
Tokyo Economic Summit in May 1986. At these meetings,
President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone strengthened
their already close personal working relationship which has
led to increased U.S.-Japanese cooperation in economic and
security areas.
? Our two governments have recently resolved bilateral trade
disputes involving textiles, tobacco, machine tools, and
aluminum. Issues currently under discussion include alcoholic
beverages, the Kansai airport project, supercomputers, and
implementation of the semiconductor agreement.
- 18 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? Intensive talks began in January 1985 on four sectors (MOSS
talks -- telecommunications, electronics forest and paper
products, pharmaceuticals) to eliminate trade barriers and
expand business opportunities for U.S. companies in Japan.
Discussions on a fifth sector, transportation machinery
(including auto parts), commenced in 1986.
* Following the rapid strengthening of the yen in late 1985 and
early 1986, the Tokyo Summit partners agreed to compare
economic data in an effort to improve the stability of
exchange rates, establish a consultative mechanism for
stronger macroeconomic coordination, and schedule regular
meetings of Ministers of Finance.
? We have begun a high level dialogue on structural economic
issues, such as the saving/investment imbalance. Structural
changes are an essential complement to exchange rate changes
and individual issue/sector discussions in reducing our two
countries' external imbalances.
? In the defense area, Japan has agreed to an expanded
self-defense role which, if properly funded, will aid global
and regional deterrence. In September 1985, the Nakasone
cabinet approved a five-year defense program to significantly
increase Japan's capability to meet its national defense
goals. The program has official Japanese Government backing,
as opposed to its two predecessors, which were only Defense
Agency estimates that had no official standing. Moreover, the
first and second years of the plan, also in contrast to past
practice, were fully funded in the 1986/1987 budget. The 1987
budget, for the first time in several years, will exceed 1% of
Japan's Gross National Product.
? We have seen increased Japanese support for U.S. military
presence and expanded U.S.-Japan defense cooperation.
? Japan has agreed to participate in Strategic Defense
Initiative research.
Talking Points:
* The U.S.-Japan relationship remains the foundation of U.S.
policy in the Pacific.
? The President's trip to Japan in May 1986, and Prime Minister
Nakasone's visit to the U.S. in April 1986 strengthened
U.S.-Japanese ties, and the partnership for peace existing
between our two countries.
? Japan has committed itself to restructure its export-oriented
economy to a demand-based economy. Prime Minister Nakasone
has given his personal backing to this policy.
- 19 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9 _
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* Consistent with its pledge to shift its economic structure to
one dependent on domestic-led growth, Japan has set as a
national goal the reduction of trade surpluses. This should
increase imports, particularly manufactured goods and
purchases of energy materials, from the U.S. over the long
term.
* Japan's decision to identify a target figure of 18.4 trillion
yen (over $110 billion) in defense spending in a five-year
defense plan is a further indication of Japan's continuing
commitment to attain its defense objectives. We favor full
implementation of this plan.
* We are pleased Japan has shown resolve to improve the defense
establishment, has committed to increase further economic aid
to the developing world, and has promised more market opening.
Japan can take on even greater responsibility in both the
self-defense and international economic areas, and has
increasingly assumed a global political stance in line with
its economic superpower status. Its decision to participate
in SDI stands as a symbol of its more active support for, and
participation in Western security.
* The U.S. and Japan share similar views on relations with the
Soviets, the Philippines, the need for Central American
stability, the importance of easing debt burdens of LDCs, and
other global issues.
- 20 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Issue:
How can the United States develop strong, stable, and enduring
relations with China?
Objectives:
* Work for continued growth in our trade, economic, military,
and cultural relations.
* Increase our dialogue with Beijing on global political issues
where we share parallel interests, as well as areas on which
we disagree.
* Assist China's modernization, encourage expansion of market
forces in its economy, and continued trade relations with the
West.
* Deepen and broaden our military-to-military defense related
areas of cooperation without posing a threat to friends and
Allies in the region.
Accomplishments:
* Our relations have been strengthened and expanded considerably
in recent years due to consistent effort and determination on
both sides.
* We have enhanced our mutually-beneficial relationship with
China without compromising our commitments to the people of
Taiwan.
* We are developing military exchanges with China to strengthen
our mutual defensive capabilities and enhance our global
dialogue, including arms reduction issues.
Talking Points:
* The successful visits in 1984-85 of President Reagan and Vice
President Bush to China, and Premier Zhao Ziyang and President
Li Xiannian to the United States broadened the dialogue and
depth of relations. High-level exchange visits continued in
1986, most recently Defense Secretary Weinberger to China, and
Vice Premier Yao Yilin to the United States.
* Our economic relations are expanding significantly. Total
trade amounted to $8.1 billion in 1985. The U.S. is China's
third-largest trading partner and second-largest foreign
investor. Actual U.S. investment is about $1 billion,
including $250 million in 142 equity joint ventures, and $750
million in offshore oil exploration.
- 21 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* A number of senior U.S. and Chinese military officers have
exchanged visits in the past year. These visits and future
ones demonstrate the limited but important cooperative
relationship which has led to several areas of agreement on
technology cooperation, artillery, F-8 avionics, range-finding
radars, and surface ship ASW torpedoes. The first U.S. Navy
ship visit to the PRC occurred in November 1986.
* In 1983, the U.S. liberalized export controls on high
technology products, such as computers and laboratory
instruments to China, and sales of these items have
skyrocketed. Improvements in COCOM procedures in the past
year have further facilitated this high-tech trade.
* The bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement was
brought into force on December 30, 1985.
* About 19,000 students from China are studying at U.S.
universities. Upon their return home, they not only will
contribute to China's modernization, but also will help
strengthen understanding of the U.S. and China's ties to the
outside world.
- 22 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
EAST ASIA/PACIFIC BASIN
Issue:
What should the United States do to facilitate the growth of
secure, prosperous, and politically stable nations, closely
associated with U.S. principles and goals, in Korea, Southeast
Asia, and the Pacific Basin?
Objectives:
? Continue developing a comprehensive Pacific Basin development
strategy that will enhance regional cooperation with the U.S.
throughout the area.
? Support the bilateral strengthening of U.S. economic,
political, and security ties with the members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
? Pursue a policy toward Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia that
firmly backs ASEAN's proposals for negotiated settlement.
? Especially maintain our close security and economic ties with
treaty ally Thailand.
? Work closely with the Government of the Philippines to improve
their economy, revitalize their political institutions, and
combat the security threat.
? Deter North Korean aggression by continuing to provide a U.S.
force presence and a close Alliance relationship with the
Republic of Korea.
? Encourage the resumption of direct talks between North and
South Korea, while discouraging efforts to involve the U.S. in
any direct negotiations with North Korea which might impinge
adversely on the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea, or
undermine the structure of the armistice.
? Resolve the Southeast Asia POW/MIA issue as a matter of the
highest national priority.
* Work with regional countries and other resettlement nations to
manage the flow of Indochinese refugees.
* Maintain our historically close ties with Australia, and
encourage New Zealand to reverse its policy with respect to
port access by ships which might be nuclear-powered or
nuclear-armed so that our traditional Alliance cooperation can
be restored.
? Encourage the development of friendly, democratic Pacific
Island nations with foreign policies supportive of U.S.
interests.
- 23 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Accomplishments:
? Numerous high-level U.S. official visits to nations in the
region affirmed our commitment to a policy of close
cooperation with the countries of the region.
? The relatively peaceful transition last year to power of a new
government in the Philippines improves the prospects for
resolution of that nation's urgent political, economic, and
security problems.
? Numerous policy-level and technical-level talks have secured a
Vietnamese pledge to resolve the POW/MIA issue within two
years: we have conducted joint crash site excavations in both
Laos and Vietnam; have seen the return of more remains in the
past two years than anytime since the end of the war; and have
established two-way dialogue on the issue of live prisoners.
Talking Points:
? The nations of the Pacific Basin represent the most dynamic
and fastest-growing economies in the Free World. As President
Reagan has said, "I see America and our Pacific neighbors as
nations of the future going forward together in a mighty
enterprise to build dynamic growth economies and a safer
world."
? We have strongly supported the ASEAN's economic and political
activities, and have simultaneously increased our security
cooperation with the individual member states. We have
encouraged the ASEAN countries to continue their
forward-looking economic policies based on free trade. We are
encouraging increased U.S. trade and investment in the region.
President Reagan met with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Bali,
Indonesia, in April 1986.
? We will continue to support ASEAN's nations' efforts to forge
a Pacific Basin development concept at a pace with which they
are comfortable.
? The U.S. strongly backs ASEAN's quest for a negotiated
settlement in Cambodia. .At the same time, we have continued
to stress that the POW/MIA matter remains the most important
bilateral issue between ourselves and Vietnam. We have made
it clear to the Vietnamese that this issue is separate and
humanitarian, but the American people would not permit us to
move forward to normalization without substantial progress.
They also know that real progress would improve the atmosphere
between our countries and preposition them for a settlement in
Cambodia, although the withdrawal of their forces remains an
essential condition.
- 24 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9 --
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
The Ray Report provides a basis for examining our efforts to
manage the Indochinese refugee problem, in conjunction with
the efforts of other resettlement countries, countries of
first asylum, and international organizations.
The United States will maintain its security commitments to
the Republic of Korea. In order to ease tension, it is
important that North Korea responds positively to the Republic
of Korea's call for a resumption of North-South bilateral
negotiations.
- 25 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
SOUTH PACIFIC
Issue:
What should the United States do in the South Pacific to
facilitate the growth of secure, stable nations supportive of
U.S. principles and goals?
Objectives:
* Encourage our friends and Allies in the region and beyond to
recognize and establish relations with the Republic of the
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia.
* Seek broad international support in the UN and other fora to
resist Soviet attacks on the legitimacy of the Compacts of
Free Association.
* Educate island leaders and populations to the need for a
respected U.S. deterrent capability and how their support of a
continued U.S. military presence in the region contributes
directly to world peace and security.
* Minimize Soviet influence in the region by providing the
island states with realistic alternatives to economic and
political relations with the Soviet Union and its surrogates.
Accomplishments:
* We have successfully concluded negotiation of the key elements
of a regional fisheries treaty that will give the U.S. tuna
fleet access to the region's rich fishery, while compensating
island states for the resource. In addition, an assistance
program associated with the treaty will bring economic benefit
to the island states.
* We have implemented the Compacts of Free Association for the
Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
Micronesia, as we have the Covenant of Commonwealth for the
Northern Mariana Islands and, in a Presidential Proclamation,
noted that these three entities are now self-governing and no
longer subject to the Trusteeship Agreement.
* We have become one of the original parties to the South
Pacific Regional Environmental Convention that establishes a
environmental regime for the entire region.
* We maintain an active ship visit program in the South Pacific,
with both conventional and nuclear-powered warships calling on
the region's ports. At the same time, U.S. Navy Seabee units
have undertaken projects in Western Samoa and, after a
devastating cyclone, the Solomon Islands.
- 26 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Talking Points:
? With the signing of the Regional Environmental Convention in
November, and the signing of the Regional Fisheries Agreement
in January 1987, the Administration has successfully resolved
two of the major issues it faced in the South Pacific.
? The Administration is committed to seeing that the Republic of
the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia
are welcomed onto the international stage by our friends and
Allies.
? The Administration is equally committed to working with the
people of Palau on their future political status and to
implementing that status and terminating the Trusteeship
Agreement as quickly as possible.
? We continue to be pleased with the contribution to regional
security made by the states of the South Pacific that warmly
welcome the visits of U.S. warships.
? Our biggest problem in countering
the region has been our inability
assistance to the South Pacific.
economies remain our best defense
we have been extremely limited in
region's economies grow.
- 27 -
Soviet efforts to penetrate
to provide more economic
Strong, free enterprise
against Soviet influence and
our ability to help the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
ISRAEL/ARAB STATES/LEBANON
Issue:
How can the United States effectively improve prospects for a
lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and assist
Lebanon in attaining unity and stability?
Objectives:
* Support efforts to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict through
direct negotiations among the involved parties, including the
Palestinians.
* Encourage the improvement of relations between Egypt and
Israel in accordance with their peace treaty.
* Ensure the security of Israel within defensible and recognized
international borders.
* Expand U.S. relations with Arab states, and continue to
demonstrate U.S. resolve to maintain our security assistance
relationships.
* Continue to support Jordanian-Israeli efforts toward West Bank
development.
Accomplishments:
* The United States took the lead in setting up the
Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. The success
of this venture made it possible to return the Sinai to Egypt.
* The President's peace initiative of September 1982 set forth a
balanced set of positions which the parties to the
Arab-Israeli conflict know the U.S. will stand by as soon as
negotiations are resumed.
* Because of our extensive engagement, Egypt and Israel reached
agreement on arbitration procedures for the disputed Taba area
in September 1986. We will continue to help the parties
resolve such issues affecting their bilateral relationship.
In 1984, at the request of the Government of Egypt and in
cooperation with other nations, we assisted in mine-clearing
operations in the Gulf of Suez following the mining of this
vital waterway by an unknown party. We also assisted the
Saudi Government in like manner in their waters near Jidda and
Yanbu.
* We have instituted routine political-military and
military-military talks with a number of Arab states.
- 28 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89601356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? We reached agreement with Israel in late 1983 to set up a
Joint Political Military Group to plan and coordinate
strategic cooperation, and the group now meets on a regular
basis, making steady progress in several areas of military
cooperation.
? The U.S. Navy, in conjunction with the Governments of Israel
and Egypt, helped Israel search for its missing submarine
"Dakar," lost off the coast of Egypt in 1968. While the
submarine was not found, the search proved that Israel and
Egypt can cooperate, and earned the U.S. Navy the gratitude of
both countries.
* On the economic side, we have concluded a free trade area
agreement which went into effect on September 1, 1985.
Negotiations are currently underway for the establishment of a
VOA/RFE/RL transmitter in Israel.
Talking Points:
? A formal state of war has existed between Israel and its Arab
neighbors since the State of Israel was founded in 1948. Ever
since that time, it has been our policy both to help Israel
survive and defend itself, and to work with all states in the
region to help them resolve their differences peacefully. This
Administration has reaffirmed and reemphasized these two key
aspects of our overall Middle East policy while attempting to
enhance our security cooperation with all parties as an
essential element in achieving our mutual goal of peace in the
region.
? We have invested a great deal in working for peace in the
Middle East. Although not all these investments have yet paid
tangible dividends, they serve to demonstrate our deep
interest in helping bring peace, freedom, and prosperity to
all the peoples of the region.
* American-Israeli relations, always close, are at an especially
high level. JPMG and the FTA are examples of our deepening
relationship.
? U.S.-Arab state relations also have improved steadily, with
more, quiet cooperation achieved in political, military, and
economic areas.
? Israel faces serious economic problems that only it, through
serious efforts of economic discipline, can solve, but we back
those efforts. In this regard, we strongly support the
economic measures that have been introduced by the government,
and we look forward to their continued and effective
implementation.
- 29 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* We support the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.
We favor agreed-on arrangements in South Lebanon as the best
means of assuring stability in the South, continuation of a
reinvigorated UNIFIL force, and security for Northern Israel.
* Recognizing that Lebanon's political problems cannot be solved
by force, we support efforts to end fighting and reestablish a
dialogue that could lead to political reform.
- 30 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
IRAN-IRAQ WAR
Issue:
How can the United States contribute to international efforts to
improve the security of the Persian Gulf region and find a
solution to end the six-year old Iran-Iraq war?
Objectives:
* Support diplomatic efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war and
prevent its spread to the Persian Gulf and other countries.
* Assist our friends in the Gulf to meet their legitimate
self-defense needs in the event that the Iran-Iraq conflict
expands.
* Reduce Soviet opportunities to exploit the conflict and
further destabilize the region.
* Ensure that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to international
shipping.
* Within the framework of U.S. neutrality, continue to develop
our political and economic relationship with Iraq in support
of its nonaligned status.
* Maintain our current state of military readiness to deter, and
if necessary, defend against possible escalation of the
conflict, thereby reducing the threat to non-belligerent oil
and shipping interests.
* Continue to urge our Allies and regional states to cooperate
in the event of a crisis to avoid panic oil-buying and
subsequent oil price increases and shortages.
Accomplishments:
* By providing U.S. AWACS and surface-to-air missile systems to
Saudi Arabia on an emergency basis, we have demonstrated to
our friends in the Gulf that we are committed to helping them
meet their legitimate self-defense needs.
* In response to instability in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. led a
process within the International Energy Agency to improve
international energy emergency preparedness. An IEA decision
(July 1984) calls for a coordinated stock draw in the event of
a crisis, coupled with other measures (demand restraint,
increases in indigenous production) to avoid a rush to the
spot market. In addition, all nations which do not have
adequate stocks have agreed to make best efforts to increase
them.
- 31 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* Despite establishing relations with a few GCC countries, the
Soviets have not yet improved markedly their position in this
important region.
* In November 1984, we reestablished normal diplomatic relations
with Iraq after a 17-year break.
Talking Points:
* The United States is and has been concerned about this
six-year old conflict because it threatens the security of the
other states in the Persian Gulf and the flow of Gulf oil to
the West, and may create opportunities for Soviet meddling.
* We have continued our efforts to prevent a widening of the
Gulf War and to bring about a prompt negotiated settlement,
working closely with our Allies in efforts to contain the
conflict and to prepare for any temporary disruption of the
flow of oil from the region. We also have been working with
the U.N. to try to develop a formula for restraint leading to
a comprehensive settlement.
* We are committed to helping our friends in the Gulf meet their
legitimate self-defense needs and to help keep the Gulf open
to the shipping of non-belligerents, as attacks on shipping
and Iranian visit-and-search efforts have increased.
* We are attempting -- so far successfully -- to avoid direct
Soviet or other external involvement that would further
destabilize the region.
* We have made it absolutely clear that we abhor use of chemical
weapons in the conflict.
- 32 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
AFGHANISTAN/SOUTH ASIA
Issue:
What should the United States do to help end the Soviet military
occupation of Afghanistan, enhance Pakistani security against
external aggression, and encourage peaceful relations among all
South Asian nations?
Objectives:
? Support U.N. resolutions calling for Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan.
? Assist in obtaining the restoration of Afghanistan's neutral
and non-aligned status, self-determination for the Afghan
people, and the opportunity for Afghan refugees to return home
in peace, freedom, and honor.
? Help project the international image of the Afghan resistance
as a national liberation movement.
? Improve bilateral relations with all South Asian countries.
? Promote regional stability by supporting regional dialogue and
cooperation, particularly in matters of commerce, trade,
narcotics control and anti-terrorism. Support dialogue
between India and Pakistan to reduce potential for nuclear
proliferation in the region.
? Assist Pakistan to remain free and secure, despite the threats
posed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
? Strengthen relations with the potential world power in the
region -- India -- building on positive dialogue begun with
Rajiv Gandhi in June 1985.
? Maintain good relations with Nepal and Sri Lanka; encourage a
peaceful settlement of the communal conflict in Sri Lanka.
Accomplishments:
? We have helped keep the issue of Soviet aggression in
Afghanistan before world public opinion; there remains
overwhelming international condemnation of Soviet behavior
there.
? The United States has contributed heavily to the support of
the 3.4 million Afghan refugees who have fled their homeland;
we are the largest contributor to the refugee relief effort in
Pakistan.
- 33 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? We have also participated in a program of cross-border
assistance designed to help the Afghan civilian population
better sustain itself inside Afghanistan.
? We have been in the forefront of those nations encouraging a
political settlement that would allow the Soviets to withdraw
from Afghanistan.
? We exposed a major Soviet hoax concerning alleged withdrawal
of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in the Fall of 1986, thereby
increasing skepticism about true Soviet intentions toward the
Geneva proximity talks.
* Thanks largely to the provision of $3.2 billion in American
aid, Pakistan's security has been enhanced.
* Pakistan's confidence to defend itself has been furthered by a
follow-on six-year aid program of $4.02 billion in 1988.
* We have responded to India's desire for increased access to
advanced technology, and are working toward broadening
cooperation in several other areas, including anti-terrorism,
narcotics control, and trade.
* We have continued high-level discussions with the Indian
government to increase understanding of U.S. policies.
* The U.S. has encouraged sustained dialogue between India and
Pakistan to reduce regional tensions, including the nuclear
issue.
Talking Points:
? U.S. policy on South Asia has focused on seeking an end to the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, strengthening Pakistan's
security against potential Soviet aggression, improving
relations with India, strengthening democratic institutions,
and promoting regional South Asian peace and understanding.
? President Reagan has made clear our support for the Afghan
freedom fighters -- it is clear where we stand.
? The Afghan national liberation movement, like others which
struggle against regimes imposed by Soviet imperialism, cannot
be defeated by force of arms. Like the colonial powers
earlier in this century, the Soviet Union must recognize that
the tide of history is against them in Afghanistan.
? Our position on Afghanistan has been shared by 121 other
nations that voted for last November's U.N. General Assembly
resolution on Afghanistan. This was the largest number (in
six years of strong votes) ever to call for Soviet withdrawal.
- 34 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? We have also helped to promote the search for peace by
supporting Pakistan's efforts to seek a political solution to
the Afghan dilemma through the offices of the U.N. Secretary
General.
? We have underscored our strong commitment to help Pakistan
protect itself by negotiating a new multi-year program of
economic and security assistance valued at $4.02 billion as a
follow-on to the $3.2 billion program which runs out in 1987.
? We have conducted a dialogue at the Head of State and Head of
Government levels with India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and
Bangladesh in the last four years. Our contacts have also
continued at other levels.
? The United States has encouraged sustained bilateral
discussions between the Governments of Pakistan and India to
narrow their longstanding differences.
? We have worked to reduce chances of nuclear weapons
proliferation in the area, and have also encouraged India and
Pakistan to include this issue in their bilateral discussions.
? We have improved relations with India through a continued
high-level dialogue -- resulting in stronger ties in the areas
of trade and technology transfer, broader cooperation against
terrorism and illicit narcotics traffic, and better
consultation on international issues.
? We have supported Prime Minister Gandhi's efforts to promote a
political resolution of the communal conflict in Sri Lanka.
? Recognizing that South Asian stability requires stronger
regional cooperation, we have also supported efforts to
develop the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation as
an effective forum for promoting stronger ties among South
Asian nations.
* We have strongly encouraged the efforts of Pakistan and
Bangladesh to develop enduring democratic institutions.
- 35 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Issues:
How can the United States best use its influence to help end
apartheid and establish truly representative government in South
Africa and bring about regional peace and economic development in
southern Africa?
Objectives:
Our policy approach is regional and has the following goals:
? Eliminate apartheid.
? Promote the need for dialogue and negotiations between the
South African government and representative black leaders.
? Lessen regional violence, promote diplomatic resolution of
regional conflicts and support economic development.
* Achieve Namibian independence and withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Angola.
* Enhance U.S. influence and reduce Soviet and Soviet-proxy
influence in southern Africa.
Accomplishments:
? Despite the recent backsliding by South Africa, a framework
has been established for the reduction of cross-border
violence in the region. The Nkomati Accord between Mozambique
and South Africa, and the Lusaka Agreement between Angola and
South Africa -- both reached with facilitative efforts by the
U.S. -- provide the basis for contact among the parties aimed
at lessening cross-border tension. Renewed efforts by all the
parties are, of course, necessary to make the agreements work.
? Limited, and now apparently stalled progress has been made on
Namibian independence, including all parties' commitment to
U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 as the basis of
settlement, and Angolan acceptance in principle of the need
for Cuban troop withdrawal. The South African Government
agreed to a certain date for withdrawal of South African
forces from Namibia in return for Cuban troop withdrawal from
Angola; this offer has not been accepted by the Angolan
Government.
- 36 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP891301356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? The passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
puts in place strong sanctions against South Africa and sets
conditions for their removal. The Act also expresses support
for the Administration's goals in South Africa. The
Administration is implementing these sanctions faithfully and
pursuing an active diplomacy aimed at fostering negotiations
to solve South Africa's conflict. Secretary Shultz's speech
of December 4, 1986, expresses U.S. resolve to remain engaged
in southern Africa.
Talking Points:
? On July 22, 1986, President Reagan delivered a major policy
address on South Africa, urging the Pretoria government to end
apartheid, and outlined components of progress toward a
political settlement. These components included setting a
timetable for the end of apartheid, releasing all political
prisoners, unbanning black political movements, and releasing
Nelson Mandela. The President warned that time is running out
in South Africa, and that the government must act now to
prevent further deterioration of the political and social
climate.
? The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 is being implemented. The
debate over sanctions was over means, not ends. Sanctions are
not a policy by themselves. Even as sanctions are applied,
the U.S. must continue to use diplomacy to bring the
contending parties together.
? We remain ready and willing to assist in bringing about
meaningful negotiations, which offer the best hope for
democracy in South Africa, and the best alternative to
continued upheaval.
? Our diplomatic efforts to foster change were bolstered by an
FY 1986 $33.5 million assistance program directed exclusively
at the South African black community. It aimed at furthering
education and training, promoting human rights, and assisting
the black private sector. The President will also be
proposing a new AID program for southern Africa early in 1987.
? We continue to work closely with the business community in
encouraging adherence to the Sullivan Principles of fair
employment practice, and these principles (or more stringent
ones) are applied to South African employees of all U.S.
Government agencies. Further, the President's Executive Order
of September 9, 1985, and the Anti-Apartheid Act' require U.S.
firms in South Africa employing at least 25 persons to
implement these principles, or face loss of U.S. export
assistance.
- 37 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
AFRICA: SECURITY
Issue:
How can the United States respond most effectively to requests
from friendly African states for help in resisting outside
aggression, and promoting peaceful solutions to local conflicts?
Objectives:
? Provide security assistance on a selective basis to countries
under threat of external aggression.
? Promote the peaceful resolution of local and regional
conflicts through diplomatic means.
? Attack the root causes of instability through economic
development assistance, and help the private sector to create
growth and jobs.
* Continue working for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from
the southern African region as part of our multifaceted
initiative to create a security framework under which all
states of the region can live in peace.
Accomplishments:
* We have blunted the Soviet projection of power in Africa and
no sizeable new influx of Soviet or surrogate forces has
occurred. Many African governments allied with the Soviets in
the 1970s have begun dialogues with us, and are moving away
from Soviet influence toward non-alignment. Despite the
sudden death of Mozambican President Machel last October, the
new leadership appears to favor his policy of improving
relations with the West.
? We continue to act as a catalyst for peaceful resolution of
local disputes. Although regional accords in southern Africa
are subject to serious strains, we have facilitated an
improvement in relations between Kenya and Somalia, and the
maintenance of the March 1984 non-aggression pact between
South Africa and Mozambique, and the February 1984 Lusaka
agreement providing for disengagement and withdrawal of South
African forces from Angola.
? Faced with deteriorating economies, a number of African
governments have signaled their displeasure with
Marxist/socialist economic models, and their willingness to
move toward more privately-oriented economies.
- 38 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? Timely U.S. security assistance helped counter Libyan
aggression in Sudan and Chad in 1983, in Sudan in 1984, and
again in 1986. U.S. equipment, such as C-130 transport
aircraft, permitted Zaire to quell rebel attacks in Eastern
Zaire in late 1984. The defection of Libyan-backed rebels in
1986 to the Chadian Government weakened Libya's position in
the North, and strengthened President Habre's position.
? We have obtained agreement by all parties on implementing the
U.N. plan for Namibia, pending only Angolan agreement on Cuban
troop withdrawal.
Talking Points:
? The late 1970s saw Africa increasingly exploited by the Soviet
Union and its allies. Violence in southern Africa and the
Horn of Africa was escalating, insurgencies were growing in
eight African countries, and cross-border armed raids by
opposition groups were occurring elsewhere on the continent.
Feeding on these conflicts, the Soviet Union poured almost $5
billion in arms into Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, and
fielded almost 5,000 military "advisors" in Africa. Two Cuban
expeditionary forces totalling almost 40,000 combat troops
were garrisoned in Ethiopia and Angola. Libyan-sponsored
subversion against neighboring African states was on the
increase, and in 1980-81, a Libyan military force of 8,000
occupied Chad.
? Thanks in large part to U.S. policies and efforts in the area,
the Soviets have added no new national converts in Africa
since 1983, nor have they dispatched new surrogate troop
contingents to Africa. Several African governments which were
counted as Soviet allies in 1980 have moved closer to
non-alignment.
? U.S. military assistance to Africa has been converted to grant
aid in recognition of the difficult economic situations of the
recipients. We have maintained a 5:1 ratio of economic
assistance to security assistance in Africa in recognition of
the fundamental security role economic stability and progress
plays. This ratio favors non-military assistance even more
when emergency fund aid is taken into account.
? With the U.S. acting as a catalyst, a non-aggression pact
between South Africa and Mozambique was signed in March 1984,
and a landmark force disengagement agreement between South
Africa and Angola was formalized in Lusaka in February 1984.
- 39 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? We have undertaken a special regional security initiative for
southern Africa. Specific components include a complex
diplomatic initiative to lead to an internationally recognized
settlement of the Namibia problem and Namibian independence;
support for regional economic development; withdrawal of
foreign forces from the area; and support for peaceful
progress in ending apartheid in South Africa.
? There is growing pressure for change in South Africa, and the
last few years have seen limited, but important, fundamental
changes: official status accorded to black trade unions,
legitimization of black residence in urban areas, the
enfranchisement of so-called "coloreds" and Asians, a major
increase in expenditures for black education, and the
beginning of black municipal and local self-government. But
many fundamental concerns remain, including the overriding
need to address the question of political power-sharing among
all South Africans.
? We are concerned about recent increased Soviet military
assistance to Angola and the violence this fuels in Angola and
the region. Our policy is to continue efforts to promote
national reconciliation in Angola, and to provide support to
UNITA's efforts to resist Soviet designs in Angola.
- 40 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
AFRICA: DEVELOPMENT
Issue:
What should the United States do to help the African countries
most severely affected by economic crisis and famine, and how can
we assist in coming to grips with their critical economic and
developmental problems?
Objectives:
? Work with other nations and organizations to combat famine by
providing food relief assistance and follow-on recovery and
rehabilitation programs.
? Induce African governments to make serious and sustained
substantial structural reforms which provide incentives to the
indigenous private sector, so that broad-based, equitable
growth can be attained.
? Persuade African governments that economic development goals
can best be pursued through mechanisms and incentives which
incorporate the principles of private enterprise and free
trade.
? Support the IMF's successful use of the Structural Adjustment
Facility.
Accomplishments:
* We have provided over $540 million worth of food aid in
regular and emergency programs in 1986.
? We remain the primary donor of humanitarian aid to African
refugees.
? Our regular non-food economic assistance leveled off at $579
million last year, of which over half supported economic
reform, particularly in agriculture.
? We are a member of the African Development Bank and support
the African Development Fund.
? Both the African Economic Policy Reform Program (AEPRP)
Initiative and the Food for Progress program support efforts
by African governments to make the transition from
centrally-controlled economies, to ones based on freer markets
and private initiative.
? Our AEPRP program was a precursor and stimulated the creation
of the IBRD's Special Facility for Africa, which we have now
joined.
- 41 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* African leaders have learned from their bitter experience, and
are now adopting economic policy changes which should lay a
more solid basis for sustained economic growth.
* Major economic reforms have been successfully implemented in
several African countries in the recent past. Ghana, Guinea,
Madagascar, Zambia, and Senegal have shifted their priorities
to emphasize their respective agricultural sectors.
* Zimbabwe and Malawi have undertaken successful, substantial
pricing reforms, which have resulted in national grain
surpluses.
* At the OAU Heads of African State meeting in Addis Ababa in
July of 1985, African leaders approved a program of action
entitled "Africa's Priority Program for Economic Recovery,
1986-1990," (APPER). In this document, they pledged to take
measures to strengthen incentive schemes, review public
investment policies, discipline and efficiency in the use of
resources, and encourage domestic resource mobilization.
* At the initiative of the OAU, a UN Special Session on the
Critical Economic Situation in Africa was held in May-June
1986. At this Session, despite opposition from the
non-African G-77 countries, the African states and the
international community committed themselves in a "spirit of
genuine and equal partnership" to a "United Nations Program of
Action for African Economic Recovery and Development,
1986-90." The framework of that understanding required that
the African states undertake necessary reform, encourage the
private sector, and ensure the productive use of scarce
resources. For its part, the international community agreed
to improve its quality of external assistance, to make every
effort to provide sufficient resources to support and
supplement the African development effort, to shift the
emphasis from project to program support, to increase the
concessionality of development assistance, to improve donor
coordination methods, and to urge the speedy replenishment of
IDA.
* The U.S. Government spearheaded a successful international
control effort last year to eradicate the worst
grasshopper/locust infestation to hit Africa in sixty years.
Talking Points:
* Virtually all 46 nations of Sub-Saharan Africa, with a
combined population of over 400 million, continue to face an
economic crisis of stark proportions. Per capita food
production has fallen twenty percent in the last twenty years;
six percent in the last ten years. For the poorest of the
countries, per capita income has fallen over the last twenty
years. Refugees number over two million. The recovery from
the 1981 recession has yet to reach Africa.
- 42 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89601356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* While the rain of 1985 broke the drought and related famine in
most of Africa, recovery and rehabilitation will require years
of effort, reform, and international assistance. Pockets of
famine remain, requiring continued vigilance by all donors.
Early warning systems are being devised which will allow us to
detect at much earlier stages the decline into nutritional
emergencies and famines and the corresponding increased need
for emergency interventions.
* The economic crisis has many causes: drought, the
flow-through effect of recession in the developed world, the
impact of the 1979 oil price increase, and civil wars. But
virtually all observers -- including the Africans themselves
agree that a major cause has been government economic
mismanagement. Many African governments have held too long to
failed policies which stifle domestic production, with the
chief among them being the rigid hewing to central planning
and control precepts and practices.
* The unprecedented economic crisis in Africa threatens U.S.
interests. Economic malaise breeds political instability that
opens opportunities for Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan meddling.
The African debt problem, though small compared to other
areas, adds to the strain on the international financial
system and thwarts African recovery and development. Unchecked
crisis could lead to greater famine and civil strife. The
U.S. is working with the IMF and the World Bank to ease
Africa's debt situation and to stimulate economic growth.
* We remain committed to indigenous private sector development
in Africa, and Western private investment and trade, as the
long-term answer to the continent's development needs. We see
agricultural self-reliance as the first order of economic
recovery and development there. We fully support the
international financial organizations in requiring structural
reforms in return for renewed financial assistance.
* The efficiency and success of our efforts so far may be
measured by the fact that nearly all the centrally-planned
economies in Africa have undertaken positive change in the
direction of providing incentives to the private sector.
* We view the UN Special Session on the Critical Economic
Situation in Africa as a vindication of our policy thrust. At
that Session, the Africans committed themselves to undertake
major structural adjustment reforms, to provide increased
emphasis to the agricultural sector, and to encourage private
sector activity.
- 43 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
CENTRAL AMERICA
Issue:
What should the United States do to eliminate Nicaraguan,
Cuban, and Soviet-assisted subversion and military adventurism
in the region and promote democratic and economic development
efforts?
Objectives:
* Encourage consolidation of new democracies in Central America
and cooperation among them to promote democratic values
throughout the region.
* Improve the economic well-being of the free peoples of the
area.
* Help friendly Central American countries to defend themselves
against Nicaraguan, Cuban, and other sources of aggression and
subversion, both internal and external.
* Support diplomatic efforts to achieve comprehensive, fully
verifiable regional political solutions.
Accomplishments:
* The United States has worked diligently through regular and
special diplomatic channels to pursue realistic solutions to
Central America's problems. Our efforts have included several
trips to the region by the President, Vice President, and
Secretary of State, and the consecutive appointments of three
Special Envoys to Central America. We have also consistently
supported the goals of the peace-seeking process initiated by
the Contadora countries (Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and
Venezuela) and reinforced by the Contadora support group
(Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay).
* The Administration took the lead in formulating a major,
comprehensive regional assistance and development plan for
the area in January 1984. Called the President's Central
America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative, the
program implemented the January 1984 recommendations of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. We are
continuing these efforts and are seeking to obtain the
resources needed to attain the objectives of the Commission.
* Central America is a major recipient of U.S. economic
assistance, which comprises 74 percent of all U.S. assistance
to this region. We have worked closely with the Central
American democracies to use these resources to help implement
comprehensive stabilization programs.
- 44 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? Our defense assistance to El Salvador has been modest, ($669.4
million for FY 80-86), but crucial in helping that country
turn the tide against the anti-democratic guerrilla
insurgency. Democracy in El Salvador has continued to grow,
and our defense assistance is vital in helping protect it.
? U.S. military exercises in Honduras and provision of U.S.
military training and assistance to Honduran forces have
helped them meet aggression by Nicaraguan forces, which number
120,000 troops -- including reserves and militia -- and which
possess much more sophisticated equipment than the Honduran
border forces. We have also provided emergency assistance to
the Government of Honduras in response to two Sandinista
incursions in 1986.
Talking Points:
? Nicaraguan, Cuban, and Soviet-assisted subversion and
aggression have created a crisis in Central America,
particularly within Nicaragua and in El Salvador. We are
countering the threat this subversion and aggression have
caused by helping the people of Central America to defend
themselves.
? In addition to our modest military assistance to the region,
our contribution in economic and developmental assistance has
been substantial. Through the President's Central America
Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative, our commitment
to help the free peoples of the area to recover economically
has already achieved considerable results.
? Our support for the democratic resistance in Nicaragua is
crucial to the future of democracy in Central America.
Nicaraguan freedom fighters provide the military pressure
necessary to convince the Communist Sandinista regime to make
democratic reforms and to negotiate seriously with its
neighbors and its own opposition.
? We have consistently supported the efforts of the Contadora
countries (Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela) to arrange
a comprehensive, verifiable and peaceful solution to Central
America's security problems. National reconciliation and
democratization are key objectives of the Contadora
negotiators, and are essential for any lasting peace.
? 45 ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
LATIN AMERICA/ CARIBBEAN
Issue:
How can the United States most effectively assist Latin
American and Caribbean democracy, economic improvement, and
ability to resist outside aggression and subversion?
Objectives:
? Support democratic governments where they already exist and
encourage the few non-democratic governments remaining to make
the transition to democracy.
? Help improve the economic well-being of the free peoples of
Latin America and the Caribbean.
? Encourage the adoption of sound, market-led economic policies
in order to establish the basis for long-term growth.
? Assist friendly, democratic governments and governments making
the transition to democracy in the region to defend themselves
against externally-supported communist subversion and
aggression.
? Support democracy by encouraging respect for human rights and
improvement in the administration of justice.
? Encourage cooperation among the democracies.
? Ensure that the historically close and friendly U.S.-Latin
American relationship continues.
Accomplishments:
? We have provided consistent support and encouragement for
democratic institution building: today 28 of 33 countries
with over 90% of the Latin American population are democratic.
Since November 1980, there have been over 45 free national
elections in 27 countries, virtually all with very high voter
participation, including El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala,
Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic,
Grenada, Dominica, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Peru. The
Administration has provided tangible support for democratic
labor unions and democratic institution-building through
programs, such as the new National Endowment for Democracy
proposed by President Reagan in 1982, and passed by the
Congress in 1983.
? We have been working with the area's public and private
sectors and the International Monetary Fund to encourage
involved parties to work effectively to resolve the $380
billion Latin American debt problem.
- 46 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22: CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? We have also worked actively with our hemispheric neighbors to
address a growing and pervasive threat: production and
trafficking in illegal narcotics. Our efforts are beginning
to show positive results. Recent successful actions by the
Governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Jamaica, Mexico, and
others in eradicating crops, disrupting shipments and
destroying processing facilities show that the region is
actively involved in the effort. A U.S. military task force
supported a four-month drug interdiction operation by the
Government of Bolivia.
? Under the leadership of this Administration, U.S. economic
assistance to the Latin America-Caribbean region has more than
doubled. In addition to our major Central American
development program, we devised and have implemented another
innovative regional assistance and development plan, the
Caribbean Basin Initiative, which offers participating
countries increased access to the U.S. market for 12 years,
creating many jobs and new sources of income.
? Our most dramatic Caribbean accomplishment was to join, in
October 1983, with the East Caribbean democracies at their
request, to rescue their and our citizens in Grenada, remove
the Soviet bloc/Cuban presence from Grenada, and facilitate
the restoration of democratic institutions in that island
nation. Free elections were held in December 1984, and the
last troops from the U.S. and other regional countries helping
Grenada to build its own security forces withdrew. Grenada
has since joined the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security
System which, with our support, provides for cooperation in a
number of areas, including search and rescue, customs, and
national emergencies.
? In South America, we have consistently supported democratic
governments politically and economically, as they have worked
to strengthen their constitutions and generate economic
growth. Our assistance has helped ensure that no country that
was democratic six years ago has lost its freedom.
? We are supporting an orderly transition to democracy in Chile
through such means as endorsing reasonable proposals put
forward by responsible civilian groups, and by urging its
present military regime to accommodate popular demands for
reinstitution of democratic processes.
Talking Points:
? The United States is linked by history, proximity, and special
ties of friendship with the 33 independent countries and 380
million people of Latin America and the Caribbean. Objectives
of this Administration have been to encourage democracy,
support economic improvement, use active diplomacy to solve
- 47 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
disputes, and provide security assistance so that governments
threatened by Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Nicaraguan subversion
can defend themselves.
? For the region as a whole, a highly encouraging recent trend
has been the return of a number of countries to democratic
government -- today, 27 of 33 countries. These account for
90% of the area's population. The Administration has
consistently encouraged the process of democratic
institution-building in the area.
? Actions by the United States played a key role in ending the
28-year Duvalier family rule in Haiti. We are encouraged by
and support the Council of National Government's efforts to
establish an elected democratic government. We have provided
a small amount of economic and developmental assistance
designed to improve the quality of life in Haiti and support
the continuing transition to democracy.
? In addition to our modest military assistance to the region,
our contribution in economic and developmental help has been
substantial. Through the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the
President's Central American Democracy, Peace, and Development
Initiative, our commitment to help speed the process of
economic recovery in those areas is self-evident.
? We are continuing to work with friendly governments in the
region to help them cope with their severe debt problems.
? We are also working with friendly governments to bring drug
traffickers to justice and destroy their production facilities
and transport networks.
? In Grenada, the United States and Caribbean democracies
rescued a nation from Soviet bloc and Cuban control and
internal repression and helped it return to a democratic
course. Free elections were held there in December 1984, and
the last troops from the U.S. and other regional countries
helping Grenada to rebuild its own security forces were able
to leave.
? In South America, we are helping governments strengthen their
democratic institutions and generate economic growth. The
result -- no country that was democratic six years ago has
lost its freedom.
- 48 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
OBAL ISSUES
Declassified and Approved For Release 2'013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Issue:
What is the United States doing to promote economic development;
assist nations in meeting the basic needs of their citizens; and
build the level of security necessary to deter aggression and
ensure stability and development?
Objectives:
? To assist the people of developing countries in their efforts
to improve the economic, political, and social conditions of
their societies.
? To alleviate the causes of economic and political disruption
that threaten security and independence by fostering
meaningful economic reform and development.
* To foster improved relations with all nations, especially in
strategic areas of the world.
* To strengthen and develop defensive Alliances and other
cooperative military arrangements.
? To enable countries to defend themselves against external
threats, maintain internal order, strengthen democratic
institutions, and improve judicial systems.
Accomplishments:
? Overall funding for security assistance grew by 84 percent
from FY 1981 to FY 1984 in response to real worldwide needs.
? This trend reversed in the last two years, however. We now
face a foreign assistance crisis because of low congressional
funding.
? Budget authority for Economic Support Funds and direct
assistance has increased in step with military assistance to
maintain a 60:40 ratio in favor of economic aid. This is in
recognition of the importance of economic development to
regional and global stability, and of the necessity to meet
human needs.
? We have increased the level of concessionality in our foreign
assistance programs to better respond to global economic
conditions.
- 49 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22: CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? We have made significant progress in addressing the debt
problems that resulted from earlier assistance programs.
? We have increased the number of countries receiving
assistance. This has improved bilateral relations, helped
solve pressing economic problems, and contributed to world
peace through deterring aggression and promoting stability.
Talking Points:
? It is incumbent upon the United States to conduct a vigorous
foreign assistance program to relieve the suffering of
millions of less fortunate people around the world, and assist
them in their efforts to develop their economies and eliminate
hunger, disease, and poverty.
? U.S. foreign assistance programs reflect the humanitarian
ideals of the American people and their commitment to help
those in need. We can be proud, for example, that we have
helped Africa turn the corner in fighting one of its worst
famines in history. Because of our child survival programs,
many more children will survive to adulthood than once would
have been the case.
? In the Third World today, popular demand for more open
political systems is on the rise. Through our assistance
programs, we promote democratic values. We support programs
which promote participatory development, the protection of
human rights, and the strengthening of political and legal
institutions.
* We have an admirable record in this regard. From the days of
the Marshall Plan to the ongoing famine relief efforts in
Africa, the United States has been a global leader in the
fight against hunger and deprivation.
? Maintaining our national security is a global task. We must
assist our friends as they seek to defend themselves, and help
them obtain capabilities to contribute to the defense of
mutual interests. Our security assistance programs reduce the
chance of regional conflict and make it less likely that U.S.
forces will have to be committed to defend our interests --
all at a fraction of the cost of sending American men and
equipment overseas.
? Encouraging development and ensuring security and stability
directly benefits the U.S. economy. Forty percent of our
exports of goods and services are purchased by developing
nations. Developing nations represent the single greatest
source of expansion in overseas markets for American
enterprise.
- 50 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? Eighty percent of foreign assistance dollars are spent within
the United States to purchase goods and services. Two billion
dollars in foreign assistance funds are spent each year on
American agricultural goods and services alone. Security
assistance programs support the purchase of $4 billion worth
of products from American manufacturers annually, while other
foreign assistance programs contribute another billion dollars
in sales.
? Despite the many benefits, we are facing a crisis in the
ability of the United States to maintain its leadership role
in the international community. The root of this crisis is
the minimal funding by the Congress for foreign assistance
programs.
? Each of the tools the United States uses to advance its
peacetime interests around the world is being drastically cut
back and restricted. The disparity between the national
interest being served and the resources we are seeking is
clear when we note that only 2% of the Federal budget is
devoted to these programs.
? The Administration is committed to obtaining adequate funding
for our foreign assistance programs. We will continue to work
with the Congress to ensure that our goals are met.
? In addition, we are committed to using the foreign assistance
resources we have as effectively as possible. We are working
with our friends and Allies to ensure that assistance money is
going to fill the most pressing development and security
needs.
- 51 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Issue:
What should the United States do to help sustain and extend world
economic recovery; better coordinate international economic
policy; help debtor nations help themselves; assist developing
countries to realize substantial, lasting, economic growth, and
promote free and fair trade?
Objectives:
? Formulate and implement balanced economic policies at home
aimed at promoting growth, holding down inflation, and
reducing the federal budget deficit by controlling
government spending.
? Develop a Free World consensus on policies designed to achieve
enduring, non-inflationary economic recovery, financial
stability and liberalized trade.
? Encourage an effective economic adjustment process for debtor
nations, including sufficient private and public financing,
selective reschedulings to ease the debt service burden on
LDC's and create conditions for sustainable economic growth.
? Heighten Allied attention to the security dimensions of
East-West economic relations, including the forging of common
objectives in NATO, OECD, IEA and COCOM.
? Obtain global progress toward free trade, including reversing
protectionist pressures here and abroad, eliminating unfair
trade practices, and implementing the new GATT trade round to
reduce global trade barriers.
Accomplishments:
? This Administration has succeeded in rebuilding a strong
domestic economy that has led the world out of recession and
into recovery: U.S. GNP has grown at a 3.9 percent average
annual rate over the last three years; average consumer price
inflation of 13.5 percent in 1980 was cut to 2.0 percent this
year.
? Our approach to LDC debt management has been successful in
broad terms. We have averted threats to the integrity of the
international financial system. Many LDC's have improved
their external positions and rekindled economic growth.
Successive Economic Summits have voiced support for this
approach.
- 52 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* The Program for Sustained Growth, proposed by Secretary Baker
in Seoul in October 1985, builds on this approach. The
Program is already showing results in terms of economic policy
reforms in various LDC's and new, higher-quality World Bank
lending.
* In September 1986, the U.S. successfully led the effort to
launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in the
GATT; agenda included such issues as services, agriculture,
intellectual property rights, and a comprehensive new round of
multilateral negotiations.
* Administration leadership on the trade agenda has included:
Presidential vetoes against protectionist legislation, as well
as warnings of veto actions against proposed legislation;
self-initiation of several Section 301 cases against the
unfair trade practices of foreign governments; and our
participation in the September 1985 meeting of Allied finance
ministers, in which a substantial realignment of exchange
rates occurred; thus, better affecting trade balances and
better reflecting fundamental economic conditions.
* Substantial progress has been made in domestic and
international energy emergency preparedness through the
accelerated buildup of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve
(SPR), and an agreement among IEA members for early use of
petroleum stocks and demand restraint to avoid unnecessary
volatility in the spot market.
* Falling oil prices, which owe much to the President's decision
to decontrol U.S. oil prices, and to the cooperative energy
policies pursued by the industrial countries over the past
decade, have resulted in large net economic benefits in
growth, employment and inflation.
* An historic Allied consensus on East-West economic relations
has been achieved which has led to elimination of preferential
credit terms for the USSR; reduction of the risk of Western
European dependence on Soviet energy resources; and
strengthened measures in COCOM to reduce Soviet access to
strategically important Western technology.
Talking Points:
* The President inherited a fractious and deteriorating
international economic order characterized by record
inflation, high unemployment and severe recession.
* From the outset, the President emphasized the importance
of sensible, market-oriented economic policies. These
policies were designed to promote non-inflationary growth and
stem the tide of visionary leadership in advancing a common
? 53 ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Allied approach to key economic, trade, financial and security
objectives through bilateral discussions in Washington and
abroad, annual Economic Summit meetings, and multilateral
organizations such as OECD, IEA, NATO and COCOM, GATT, IMF,
and World Bank.
? The President first put forward his economic policies at
the Ottawa Economic Summit in 1981. By the time President
Reagan hosted the Williamsburg Summit two years later, it was
clear that his policies were moving the U.S. and the Free
World down the path to full economic recovery. Under the
President's leadership, the Summit leaders agreed to
coordinate policies to promote sustainable, non-inflationary
growth, and to forge a consensus on the security dimensions of
East-West economic relations which had proved elusive in the
past.
? Later Summits reemphasized the importance of pursuing
non-inflationary, growth-stimulating fiscal and monetary
policies, free and fair trade, and comprehensive,
growth-oriented strategies for managing the debt problem.
? At the 1986 Tokyo Summit, the participants noted the need to
maintain appropriate medium-term fiscal and monetary policies,
but also stressed the need to implement effective structural
adjustment policies across the whole range of economic
activities to promote long-term growth, employment, and the
integration of domestic economies into the world economy. They
also agreed to consider additional measures to further
strengthen procedures for effective coordination of
international economic policy.
? Working with our NATO Allies and Japan, we have made major
gains in correcting past imbalances between the advantages of
trading with the USSR, and our common security requirements.
We have reached agreement with the Allies on eliminating
preferential credit terms to the USSR and reducing the
substantial risk of West European dependence on Soviet energy.
In cooperation with the COCOM countries, we have met head-on
the challenge of stopping the flow of Western military
technology to the USSR through the upgrading of the COCOM
review process, the harmonization and tightening of national
licensing and enforcement procedures, and the monitoring of
the potential military application of emerging technologies.
? The President has taken significant steps to ensure that we
can manage the impact of any temporary energy disruption. Our
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) continues to grow, and IEA
member countries have agreed to coordinate the use of their
stocks in an energy emergency.
- 54 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? Our case-by-case approach to managing LDC external debt and
other economic problems has been successful in averting
threats to the international financial system, more reliance
on private investment, and closer cooperation between the
World Bank and IMF.
? The Program for Sustained Growth, first proposed by Secretary
Baker at Seoul in October 1985, and endorsed during the Tokyo
Economic Summit, strengthens this approach. It encourages
LDC's to adopt comprehensive, growth-oriented macroeconomic
and structural adjustment policies. It also calls upon the
international community to support and encourage such economic
reforms by providing new net private and official lending. We
are already seeing an increase in World Bank lending tied to
policy reform.
? The President has initiated a major effort to meet the urgent
problem of world hunger by providing help to build a new
infrastructure where needed, and by taking other steps to
speed up the impact of relief measures.
? Through the leadership of President Reagan in the Summit
process, the Allies have dedicated themselves to the expansion
of international trade by the reduction of trade barriers.
? The Administration is conducting a vigorous trade policy based
on four principles: free trade and fair trade are in the best
interest of the citizens of the U.S.; the U.S. plays a
critical role in ensuring and promoting an open trading
system; our trading partners have an important stake in
efforts to improve the trading system which has benefited us
all; and the U.S. will fight unfair trade practices and
supports the new GATT round of multilateral negotiations to
reduce trade barriers.
? Stemming the tide of protectionist actions is of paramount
importance. Rising protectionism threatens the effectiveness
of the multilateral trading system, fosters retaliatory
measures which will reduce global growth and welfare, and
stymies LDC efforts to service their debts with increased
export earnings.
? The improvement in the world economy and Allied agreement to
resist protectionist trade policies have begun to restore
economic and financial stability to a number of Third World
countries. We are encouraging the developing country debtors
to help themselves by adopting economic adjustment policies,
which promote private sector financing and investment.
? The President has given new emphasis to U.S. economic ties
with the economically dynamic nations of the Pacific Basin.
The result has been significant improvement in our bilateral
relations with China, South Korea and other countries of this
vital region.
- 55 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
In our own hemisphere, the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the
Central American Peace Initiative have helped open up markets
for the exports of our closest neighbors. Our efforts to help
Grenada rebuild its economy, and our active support of U.S.
private sector initiatives to expand Grenadian investment and
trading potential are demonstrating the benefits of a return
to democracy.
- 56 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
Issue:
How can the United States best guarantee a reliable and adequate
supply of the energy resources needed for national and
international security and economic well-being?
Objectives:
* Reduce government intervention in the energy sector, and in
energy trade through deregulation and increased reliance on
market mechanisms.
? Improve the energy security of the U.S. and its Allies by
action to reduce both the probability of future disruptions
and the impact such supply interruptions might have on our
economies.
? Urge Allies to hold adequate strategic oil stocks and be
prepared to participate in an early coordinated stock draw in
the event of an oil supply disruption.
* Promote free energy markets in response to lower oil prices.
* Urge key Allies to diversify their energy resources, so that
they are not dependent on single supplier nations,
particularly in the case of gas imports from the Soviet Union.
? Promote a balanced and mixed energy resource system that
avoids undue dependence on any single energy source.
Accomplishments:
? The Administration's decision to deregulate oil prices has
stimulated domestic production and reduced oil imports to less
than one-third of oil needs in 1986.
? The partial decontrol of natural gas prices on January 1, 1985
has helped maintain gas production without causing a price
increase. More than one-half of U.S. gas production is now
sold at market prices.
? The Strategic Petroleum Reserve contained 510 million barrels
a year in 1986, equivalent to 98 days of net oil imports.
? The U.S. has led initiatives within the International Energy
Agency (IEA) to limit Western European reliance in Soviet
natural gas, including Ministerial decisions in 1983 and 1985
to avoid undue dependence on any one source of gas imports,
and to emphasize indigenous OECD sources.
- 57 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? In June 1986, Norway announced the conclusion of a contract
for the development of the Troll and Sleipner gas fields,
thereby limiting the prospects of increased Soviet gas sales
for the foreseeable future.
? President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone agreed in
November 1983 to a program to increase energy trade between
the United States and Japan. Over the long run, this effort
can create thousands of new jobs for Americans and greater
efficiency for both our nations.
? In March 1985, President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney of
Canada signed the Quebec Summit Declaration, directing both
governments to take steps to strengthen a market approach to
energy trade by reducing regulatory barriers and extending
open access to each other's energy markets. Volume and price
controls were subsequently removed on crude oil trade, and
both governments are actively working to deregulate their
natural gas sectors. Thanks to cooperative efforts,
U.S.-Canadian bilateral energy trade is now characterized by
higher volumes, less regulation, and lower prices.
? Ministers at the July 1985 IEA Ministerial agreed to "pursue
expeditiously a common approach whereby they would maintain or
create conditions such that imported refined products could go
to the markets of different IEA countries and regions on the
basis of supply and demand as determined by market forces
without distortions." As a consequence of this agreement,
Japan began to import gasoline and other light petroleum
products in 1986.
? In response to a steady loss in market share, the OPEC cartel
in late 1985 gave up its goal of trying to maintain oil prices
at artificially high levels, and moved toward a more
market-oriented approach, which resulted in a significant, and
beneficial, drop in world oil prices. In 1986, in the face of
falling oil prices, OPEC made repeated efforts to put a floor
under oil prices with limited success, and attempted to agree
on a program to raise oil prices to $18 a barrel, later in
1986.
Talking Points:
? U.S. Administrations since the 1973-74 oil embargo had seen
energy supply as a constraint on economic systems. The
present Administration sees energy supply as an opportunity to
promote economic growth and prosperity.
* Action to deregulate oil and gas prices has encouraged
domestic production and conservation, and the increased use of
coal and nuclear energy have reduced oil consumption.
- 58 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* With the maintenance of oil and gas production as well as
nuclear power, we now produce about 87 percent of the energy
we use.
? We have urged our Allies in Europe and the Pacific to consider
buying more U.S. coal, thereby reducing their dependency on
more uncertain supplies of energy. Prime Minister Nakasone
and President Reagan have endorsed increased energy trade
between the United States and Japan, which can mean jobs for
citizens and greater security for both nations.
? In addition, we have led a process in the IEA to improve
cooperation in more efficient use and supply of energy, and in
special arrangements for emergency sharing among key
industrialized countries, to ensure that we can minimize the
effects of any future oil shortage. We will continue to press
for improvements in the IEA emergency preparedness system.
? The SPR would be our first line of defense in an oil supply
disruption, and we are committed to its early use in large
quantities in coordination with other IEA members, whom we
expect to take complementary actions.
? IEA members at the May 1983 Ministerial agreed that member
countries should avoid undue dependence on any one source of
gas imports, and obtain future gas supplies from secure
sources, with emphasis on indigenous OECD sources. This
emphasis on natural gas security was reaffirmed at the July
1985 IEA Ministerial and contributed to the 1986 agreement to
develop the Norwegian Troll and Sleipner gas fields.
? As a result of cooperative efforts between the United States
and Canada to reduce regulatory barriers and extend open
access to bilateral energy trade, the value of two-way trade
in energy products in 1985 was over $15 billion -- higher than
our total bilateral trade with most countries of the world.
? At the July 1985 IEA Ministerial, member states agreed to
pursue a common approach to maintain or create conditions so
that refined products go to markets on the basis of supply and
demand as determined by market forces, without distortions.
? At the April 1986 IEA Governing Board, member governments
reaffirmed the validity of existing energy policies despite
falling oil prices. The Governing Board also stressed the
importance of maintaining adequate stock levels, and noted
that the current oil market situation affords an advantageous
opportunity to increase stock levels.
? The U.S. is working actively in the IEA to encourage adherence
to the spirit as well as the letter of the stockholding
obligation. We are urging all members to maintain
government-controlled stocks equal to 90 days of imports.
? 59 ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
Issue:
Illicit trade in high technology is a threat to Western security.
This was confirmed in the 1982 Inman report that documented a
systematic, well-organized Soviet program for obtaining
sophisticated manufacturing, computer, and other sensitive
technologies. How can the United States and its Allies resolve
their own disparate views and devise a comprehensive means of
limiting the Soviet Union and their allies in their acquisition
of militarily critical technology?
Objectives:
? Reach agreement with our Allies and other friendly nations on
the nature of the threat posed by the uncontrolled transfer of
militarily critical technologies to the Warsaw Pact.
* Introduce new countermeasures and constraints on a
multilateral basis, whenever possible, to impede, if not
prevent, such losses.
? Continue to improve our intelligence on technology transfer
matters.
? Curb the loss of militarily-sensitive technology, without
slowing down the development of new technologies in the West,
and without bringing undue hardship to U.S. and Allied
economic interests.
Accomplishments:
? Since the publication of the 1982 Inman report, our efforts to
prevent Soviet theft and purchases of advanced technology have
paid off. We now have in place an export control process
which renders it very difficult for the Soviets to buy or
steal our technology.
? The President has directed the Cabinet to provide
recommendations, both to maintain the strength of America's
high-tech industries, and to ensure that our control system
encourages exports without sacrificing national security.
? Domestic U.S. procedures in both intelligence-gathering and
export control have been strengthened and made more effective.
? Through a government-wide outreach plan, U.S. industry has
been made more aware of the threat, and has been encouraged to
institute its own technology security measures.
- 60 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? Under U.S. initiatives, COCOM procedures have been made more
effective, and the list of multilaterally-controlled items has
been expanded to include sensitive, militarily critical
technologies.
* Bilateral arrangements are in place, or being negotiated with
a number of non-COCOM countries for the protection of U.S. and
other COCOM members' indigenous technologies.
* The effectiveness of our technology security program has
improved. The results are being seen in court cases and
convictions for diversion and espionage.
? Both U.S. Customs and the Commerce Department have
significantly increased their enforcement work, and since
1980, technology security has become an area of priority in
our intelligence effort. Good relationships with Customs'
counterparts abroad have resulted in the foiling of an
increasing number of diversion attempts.
? The security services of our Allies have uncovered and
expelled many Soviet intelligence collectors of militarily
sensitive technology, a result partially attributable to U.S.
efforts to highlight this issue. Also, the U.S. has closed
down many means previously used by the Soviets to acquire
technical information.
? This achieved, we now intend to consolidate our efforts with
initiatives at home and abroad to regulate strategic trade in
a way that defends our security, reduces administrative
burdens, promotes real competitiveness in free world trade,
and strengthens enforcement of international export controls.
Talking Points:
? The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact Allies, using espionage as
well as legal and illegal trade channels, have sustained a
large-scale effort for some time to obtain Western technical
information and hardware to improve their weapons and their
military's supporting industrial base. The Soviets are well
behind the U.S. in many technologies having military use --
advanced computers and advanced and sophisticated
microprocessor technology -- and thus require Western, and
especially U.S., information to meet technologically advanced
weapons requirements.
- 61 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? Europe and Japan are, like ourselves, innovative and
scientifically advanced. Our Allies have a vested common
concern in stemming technology loss, as this loss leads to
higher defense budgets for all, while concurrently weakening
deterrence. On the other hand, each Ally has its own view of
its economic relationship with bloc countries; there is,
therefore, a tension of competing interests among our Allies
over economic gain versus the provision of technology to the
bloc. How to resolve these disparate views remains a
challenge to us and to our Allies.
? Resolution of the competing military, political, economic and
commercial interests is an on-going effort. Acquisition of
technical information has been a long-standing campaign, with
numerous avenues of collection. Awareness of Soviet methods
and their effects is the cornerstone of our response to their
campaign.
? The U.S. is an open society with a heritage of free
expression. This freedom of expression is exploited by the
Soviets in their collection program; the U.S. Government must
ensure proper protection of militarily sensitive information,
while not impeding the rights and traditions of free
expression, nor of open research and development upon which
the dynamism of our society depends.
? The effort to slow or stop the loss of strategic technology
must be a persistent, long-term undertaking. It is essential
both for ourselves and our Allies that the threat continues to
be highlighted and exposed for the danger that it poses, and
that unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral countermeasures
be kept in place and supported by the highest levels in the
Administration. A great deal of progress has been made, and
this progress must be sustained and enhanced by
organizational, legal, and technical means.
? In pursuing this important national security objective, we
endeavor to protect technology with as little economic cost as
possible to the U.S. entrepreneur. At the same time that we
have been working to slow or stop technology losses, we have
been working to reduce the delays imposed on the private
sector when export licenses are reviewed as part of our
control efforts.
- 62 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
TERRORISM
Issue:
How can the United States improve its ability to deter, protect
against, and respond to terrorist attacks?
Objectives:
? Improve international cooperation to detect, deter, and combat
terrorism bilaterally with Allies, and multilaterally in
groupings of like-minded states and other international fora.
? Enhance operational capabilities and inter-governmental
coordinating mechanisms to prevent and respond to terrorist
attacks.
? Continue refinement of legal instruments and agreements to
counter terrorism, including steps for the extradition and
prosecution of persons involved in terrorism.
Accomplishments:
? The Tokyo Economic Summit in May 1986 promulgated an important
statement condemning international terrorism and pledging
maximum Allied cooperation to combat it.
? The United States responded militarily to Libyan-sponsored
terrorism by striking terrorist-related targets in Libya after
the West Berlin disco bombing, and reports of other ongoing
Libyan-directed terrorist acts.
* The EC and the Summit Nations agreed to ban arms shipments to
Libya, and to discourage their nationals from filling in
behind the American firms and workers who left Libya.
? The Tokyo Summit also accepted the American-originated
proposals for restricting Libyan diplomat missions and
tightening up visa requirements.
? Western European countries expelled more than 100 Libyan
"diplomats" and "businessmen" since the bombing of the Berlin
disco in April, and the subsequent U.S. military operations
against Libya, throwing off balance the Libyan terrorist
network.
? Many potential terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens or
facilities abroad were identified and thwarted by the end of
1986 by improved intelligence and stronger security and
cooperation with other governments.
- 63 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? Quick and decisive action to intercept the Egyptian airliner
carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers resulted in their capture
and trial. The hijackers have been convicted and sentenced to
prison by Italian courts.
* The UK broke diplomatic relations with Syria because of their
involvement in the attempted bombing of an El Al airliner at
London's Heathrow airport. At British request, members of the
EC (excluding Greece) halted new arms sales to Syria,
suspended high-level diplomatic contacts with Damascus and
made unilateral demarches against Syrian support for
terrorism.
? West Germany, in protest of Syrian complicity in the bombing
of the German-Arab Friendship Union in West Berlin in March
1986, asked three Syrian diplomats to leave, and postponed
sending a new Ambassador to Damascus.
? Some 2700 officials from 33 countries have been brought to the
United States for specialized counter-terrorism training under
the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program.
? U.S. initiatives and/or support at the U.N. obtained passage
of a Security Council resolution condemning the taking of
hostages; Security Council Presidential statements condemning
specific attacks, and a broad U.S. General Assembly resolution
condemning terrorism as a criminal act.
? At U.S. initiative, two U.N. specialized agencies, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), are drafting
improved security guidelines.
? The Public Diplomacy Working Group established under the joint
sponsorship of the IG/T and the International Information
Committee, has helped coordinate public affairs activities
related to Libya, including "white papers" and media
appearances.
? A major program to enhance the physical and operational
security at diplomatic posts abroad has been initiated; a
follow-up to implement the program is being acted on by
Congress this year.
? A protocol to the UK extradition treaty which narrows the
political offense exceptions has been ratified by the Senate.
Similar treaty modifications are being negotiated with other
countries.
? As authorized under 1984 legislation, rewards of up to
$250,000 have been offered for Abu Abbas for the Achille Lauro
hijacking, the TWA 847 and Kuwait 221 hijackings, and the
murders of six Americans in El Salvador.
- 64 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? We have established a system of coordinated threat alerts and
advisories by all members of the U.S. intelligence community
to provide more timely and accurate information on terrorist
threats to our overseas missions, reducing the problem of
duplicate warnings and reporting.
? Implementation has begun of a number of important
anti-terrorism provisions in the Foreign Aid Authorization
bill for 1986 and 1987, which Congress passed and the
President signed into law in August of 1984. These provide
for additional sanctions against countries supporting
terrorism or maintaining unsafe airports and authorize
additional funds for the ATA program and research and
development on equipment to detect explosives.
Talking Points:
? Terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon which is becoming
increasingly frequent, indiscriminate, and state-supported.
Terrorism is likely to be a prominent factor on the
international political landscape for the rest of the century.
It directly attacks our democratic values and interests and
our diplomatic efforts for peaceful solutions to conflict.
? The nature of the international terrorist threat is evolving.
Recent developments include the rise of state-supported
terrorism through the use of surrogates, and collaboration
with insurgent and narco-trafficking.
*
The number of terrorist attacks has been increasing. There
were almost 800 terrorist incidents in 1985, with the same
number of incidents carried out in 1986. During recent
months, we have seen the hijacking of a Pan Am airliner in
Karachi, and the bombing of a synagogue in Turkey. Terrorist
attacks such as these are becoming increasingly violent -- the
number of casualties and fatalities generally has grown with
the number of incidents.
? A broader spectrum of citizens is likely to fall victim to
terrorism, as exemplified in the bombing of the La Belle disco
in April, the hijacking of a Pan Am jet in Karachi, and the
September bombings in Paris.
? This is not solely an American problem; terrorism has been
directed against a broad range of countries. Nonetheless, the
U.S. is a prime target of terrorist acts overseas due to our
extensive official and commercial global presence. Our
citizens and facilities are readily accessible, our democracy
and freedoms are directly opposed to the interests of many
terrorist groups.
- 65 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* In countering terrorism, we are prepared to act unilaterally
or in conjunction with other nations in a wide range of
options appropriate to the situation at hand.
* The preemption of terrorist attacks on American targets in
France and Turkey, and the decisive action against Libya after
their sponsorship of the terrorist bombing of the West Berlin
discotheque demonstrated the increasing effectiveness of the
current U.S. policy on terrorism.
* The Department of State is assigned the lead interagency role
in combatting terrorism outside the United States. The State
Department's Office for Counter-Terrorism deals with the
problems of international terrorism on two levels: in its
coordinating role within the Department of State, and in its
similar role as head of the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism.
* In February 1986, the Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism published its public report endorsing
U.S. policy against terrorism and recommending additional
measures to improve the national program. A Presidential
directive was signed to implement all of the recommendations.
* Efforts to counter international terrorism include a major
effort within the U.S. Government and with friendly
governments to improve our intelligence on the identity,
objectives, plans, capabilities, and locations of terrorist
organizations. We have increased efforts to inform the
public, both here and abroad, about the international
terrorist threat, and the need to be alert in helping to
combat it.
* Additional unilateral efforts to counter terrorism include
continuing to improve the security of U.S. installations
overseas, stepped-up training for U.S employees, and
improvements in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence information. Laws passed in recent years, such
as the International Security and Development Cooperation Act
of 1985, (which provides for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program, the Air Marshall program, and Foreign Airport
Security procedures), have also strengthened the
anti-terrorism effort.
* Multilateral steps include the Tokyo Summit declaration
against terrorism; U.N. conventions against attacks on
diplomats and the taking of hostages, and the Summit Seven's
Bonn Declaration, which provides for concentrated action
against states that fail to take appropriate legal action
against hijackers.
? 66 ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* International cooperation in countering terrorism is
imperative. We cannot succeed alone when the threat
originates, and is carried out abroad where other governments
have the principal responsibility for security and law
enforcement.
* We continue to encourage other countries to take an active
stand -- through diplomatic, legal, and economic means --
against terrorism. They are, after all, frequently as much
the victims of such attacks as we: citizens or installations
of over 80 countries were hit by terrorist attacks in 1986.
- 67 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
NARCOTICS
Issue:
How can the United States reduce the flow of illicit narcotics
from foreign drug-producing and transit countries?
Objectives:
* Increase the awareness of our young people and others of the
dangers of drug use.
* Continue to promote and fund crop eradication and interdiction
operations in source countries.
* Foster economic alternatives to the drug economy.
* Promote and improve international and regional cooperation in
combatting drug trafficking.
* Enhance the enforcement and operational capabilities of drug
law enforcement agencies to counter the growing sophistication
of the drug industry.
Accomplishments:
* Successful crop eradication programs have been carried out in
several producing countries, and aerial surveys -- a necessary
first step toward future eradication programs -- have been
completed in others.
* Carefully targeted and U.S.-supported interdiction operations
in Latin America have resulted in unprecedented seizures of
cocaine and destruction of processing laboratories.
* President Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD), announced by Vice President Bush in June 1986, which
states that the narcotics issue is a threat to our national
security, and which directs additional Administration-wide
efforts, including greater involvement of our Defense
Department in battling the flow of narcotics into the United
States.
* The President's establishment of the National Narcotics Border
Interdiction System has greatly improved the collection,
assessment, and sharing of narcotics information, and has
resulted in improved interdiction operations in the Caribbean.
? 68 ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? The Congress significantly strengthened U.S. narcotics
enforcement efforts when it enacted the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act. Among its important drug-related provisions, the
law establishes a Cabinet-level board to develop
Government-wide drug enforcement programs and coordinate the
efforts of the various Federal agencies; increases the
penalties for drug offenses to include up to 20 years of
imprisonment and fines of $250,000 for offenses involving even
small amounts of heroin, cocaine, and certain hallucinogens;
revises criminal and civil forfeiture laws to permit
forfeiture in all felony drug cases and allows the Government
to seize more property; and strengthens the Government's
efforts to detect and deter drug money-laundering.
? Two First Ladies' Conferences here on drug abuse in April and
October 1985 have helped to raise awareness of the growing
internationalization of the drug trade, and have resulted in
many first ladies becoming actively involved in promoting drug
control and awareness in their own countries.
? A number of countries have become actively involved in the
United Nations effort to call attention to the global
dimensions of the drug abuse and trafficking issue; a World
Conference on Narcotics has been scheduled for June 1987 in
Vienna.
? Narcotics activities across national borders are stimulating
bilateral and regional cooperation against it. Several Latin
American countries have already dealt setbacks to growers and
traffickers by staging joint operations against them.
? President Reagan hosted a conference in 1986 for Ambassadors
from key drug producing areas, resulting in a comprehensive
set of recommendations for enhancing international narcotics
control programs.
? Cooperation on drug trafficking was an item which was
discussed and agreed upon at the Economic Summit in Tokyo in
1986.
Talking Points:
? Despite more successful U.S. and foreign drug interdiction
efforts, the amount of drugs entering the United States
continues to rise. The criminal trafficking organizations
behind this increase are using the wealth acquired through
narcotics to subvert drug control and economic, political, and
security institutions in many countries.
* Drug crop production is expanding in several countries and is
spreading to others not equipped to halt it. Growers are
developing more scientific techniques and obtaining higher
yields than ever before.
- 69 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* Several countries have initiated successful crop control and
eradication programs that have substantially reduced harvests.
In some cases, these gains have been offset by resurgent
narcotics activities in countries whose once successful
control programs were subverted by graft, violence, and other
countermeasures, and in countries whose governments have
little or no control over the countryside.
* The immense profits realized by the drug trade have prompted
criminal trafficking organizations to resort to violence to
protect their industry. These organizations strike at U.S.
and foreign symbols of law and order at all levels to
intimidate governments and thwart control programs.
* Governments also face threats to their security from terrorist
and insurgent involvement in drug trafficking. These groups
use narcotics as a lucrative and usually non-traceable method
of obtaining funds to further their anti-government goals.
* Rising drug abuse has now affected many Western and other
consuming countries, prompting them to seek international
solutions. Although an effective and coordinated worldwide
strategy is still several years away, the increased attention
devoted to the narcotics issue has already led to tougher laws
and more effective enforcement in many countries.
* Two First Ladies' Conferences on drug abuse hosted by Mrs-
Reagan during 1985 helped to raise awareness at home and
abroad of the growing internationalization of the drug trade,
and the dangers it poses to the world's young people. Mrs.
Reagan also travelled to Southeast Asia in late 1985, and
Malaysia and Thailand in April 1986, focusing attention on the
international parents movement which has expanded dramatically
during the past few years.
* Effective drug control will require patience and a long-term
commitment, and its goals will sometimes be affected by
competing foreign policy objectives. Because those who
traffic in drugs are so adept at exploiting weaknesses and
vulnerabilities, gains in one country will frequently be
offset by setbacks in others. Unless we persevere despite the
inevitable setbacks, the international drug trade will have
the potential to undermine our society, and that of other
friendly governments.
- 70 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
DEFENSE/ARMS REDUCTIONS
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
ARMS REDUCTIONS
Issue:
The shift in strategic doctrine from Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD), to survivable defense, has complicated the Soviet Union's
strategic decision making, and has forced Moscow to consider
major cuts in nuclear arsenals and the de-linking of SDI from
INF. Successful conclusion of a reduction agreement will be
predicated on mutual verification measures.
Objectives:
* Reduce the risks of war between East and West, particularly
nuclear war, while maintaining our freedom and that of our
Allies.
* Negotiate arms reduction agreements which, in the President's
words, provide for "deep cuts, no first-strike advantages,
defensive research -- because defense is much safer than
offense..."
* Ensure that arms control remains an integral component of a
comprehensive, coherent security policy that includes the
maintenance of credible deterrent forces.
* Ensure verification of and promote compliance with existing
arms control accords.
* Ensure that the panoply of arms control efforts deals with the
relationship between strategic offensive and defensive
systems.
* Support expanded membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to
additional countries.
Accomplishments:
This Administration has the most far-reaching arms control agenda
in history. Arms control issues were extensively discussed when
President Reagan met with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva
in November 1985, and Reykjavik in October 1986.
Even though our two nations still profoundly disagree over the
relationship between strategic offense and defense, we have made
progress on many arms control issues. At the Geneva Summit both
sides agreed in principle on 50 percent reductions in U.S. and
Soviet strategic offensive forces, on accelerating our work at
the Geneva Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, and on seeking an
interim agreement on limiting Intermediate Range Nuclear Force
(INF) missile systems.
- 71 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
The U.S. went to Iceland in October 1986 in order to narrow
differences, where possible, between U.S. and Soviet positions,
and to lay the groundwork for more productive negotiations. By
that measure, the meeting was a success. It achieved movement on
START, INF, nuclear testing, and aspects of defense and space
issues.
We are realistic about our differences with the Soviet Union.
There will be many tough issues to resolve, and the negotiating
process will require patience and persistence, but the U.S.
stands ready to proceed, as a matter of highest priority, to
reach agreements along the lines discussed at Reykjavik. Our
immediate arms control priorities are: a START agreement cutting
each side's strategic offensive forces by 50 percent, an INF
agreement reducing INF warheads globally to 100 on each side,
with none in Europe, and a global ban on chemical weapons. In
all three areas, effective verification is essential.
When, after a year-long boycott, the Soviet Union agreed in
January 1985 to resume arms reduction negotiations in Geneva, the
Administration developed a three-phased strategic concept as the
heart of its approach to the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks: (1)
near-term significant reductions in nuclear arms and the
stabilization of the offense-defense relationship; (2) a period
of transition to a more stable world, with a reduced reliance on
nuclear arms and greater reliance on non-nuclear defenses against
nuclear arms; and (3) the eventual complete elimination of
nuclear arms.
START: The immediate U.S. priority remains to strengthen
stability through broad, deep, equitable, and verifiable
reductions in strategic forces, focusing on the most
destabilizing elements (ballistic missiles and their warheads).
The U.S. position calls for 50% reductions to 6000 weapons and
1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. To ensure that
reductions to these levels are stabilizing, the U.S. is also
seeking sublimits on certain types of ballistic missile warheads
as well as throw-weight limits 50% below the current Soviet
level. We are now engaged in serious efforts to resolve
differences and move closer to a START agreement. U.S. proposals
reflect carefully considered objectives for a stable relationship
with the Soviet Union, and U.S. negotiators keep these objectives
in mind in evaluating any Soviet counter-proposals. U.S.
negotiators have the authority to explore alternative methods of
reductions, to explore tradeoffs which would not dictate Soviet
or U.S. force structure, and to discuss Soviet proposals in areas
where differences exist.
? 72 ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
INF: In November 1981, we proposed far-reaching accords calling
for the global elimination of land-based Longer-range
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (LRINF). After the Soviets
returned to the negotiations from their 16-month walkout in March
1985, we reiterated this proposal. In February 1986, the U.S.
proposed a concrete and phased plan for elimination of LRINF. Our
latest proposal, agreed to in principle by the Soviets at
Reykjavik, calls for a global limit of 100 LRINF warheads for
each side, with none in Europe, along with constraints and
follow-on negotiations on shorter-range systems. At Reykjavik,
the Soviets held completion of this agreement hostage to their
demands that would kill SDI. Recently, however, General
Secretary Gorbachev expressed willingness to pursue the
commitment he made at the Geneva Summit to a separate INF accord,
along the lines of the Reykjavik agreement.
Defense and Space: In the Defense and Space negotiations, we are
examining ways to strengthen deterrence by moving away from sole
reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation, and toward greater
reliance on defenses which will threaten no one. We also have
been discussing our view of the offense-defense relationship,
Soviet actions which are eroding the ABM Treaty, and Soviet
non-compliance with this and other existing agreements with
respect to both offensive and defensive forces. We will continue
to press for Soviet compliance and corrective action in cases
where there is non-compliance. While some issues posed by SDI
are for the future, we are nonetheless prepared now to discuss
defense and space arms and the broader question of strategic
defense, including existing Soviet defenses and systems based in
space, as well as systems based on earth which can reach space.
We have proposed, as a confidence-building measure, reciprocal
site visits by U.S. and Soviet governmental experts to facilities
in both countries where strategic defense research is being
conducted.
In response to a Soviet proposal for a ten-year period of
non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, we have said we could agree
to such a ten-year commitment if either side would be free to
deploy strategic defenses thereafter unless otherwise mutually
agreed. This would be conditioned on full compliance with the
Treaty during the ten years, agreement to 50% strategic offensive
force reductions to equal levels by 1991, and total elimination
of U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. A
previous U.S. proposal still stands: non-withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty for five years, to be followed, should either side wish to
deploy advanced strategic defenses, by two years of negotiation
on sharing the benefits of defenses and elimination of ballistic
missiles; sides would be free to deploy thereafter on six months
notice.
- 73 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
MBFR: In December 1985, NATO tabled a major new proposal aimed
at breaking the 13-year deadlock in the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction (MBFR) Talks in Vienna. The Western proposal accepted
the basic framework proposed by the East in February 1985 for a
time-limited, first stage agreement on initial U.S.-Soviet ground
troop reductions followed by a no-increase commitment on
remaining forces on each side. NATO also set aside its
longstanding requirement for data agreement on Eastern troop
levels before treaty signature, which the Soviets had insisted
was the main obstacle to reaching an agreement. NATO also tabled
a package of fair and reciprocal verification measures. The East
has so far failed to respond constructively to this Western
initiative or to make good on Gorbachev's endorsement on January
15, 1986, of "reasonable" verification in MBFR. Instead, the
East's February 20 draft agreement merely recycled previous
provisions on the key verification issues and even backtracked on
some aspects. In April, General Secretary Gorbachev accepted in
principle the Western concept of conventional arms control in an
expanded zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. The May 1986
Halifax statement by NATO Ministers, calling for the
establishment of a stable balance of conventional forces at lower
levels, was promptly followed by a June 11 Warsaw Pact "appeal"
to reduce conventional forces in the whole of Europe. A detailed
NATO review of conventional arms control issues culminated with
the December 11 "Brussels Declaration" in which NATO Ministers
expressed their readiness to open East/West discussions on a new
mandate for conventional arms control covering the larger zone.
CDE: The 35-Nation Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)
adjourned in Stockholm on September 19, 1986, with the adoption
of a set of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs)
designed to reduce the risk of war arising from miscalculation or
misunderstanding of military activities taking place in Europe.
The measures, which mark a significant advance over those
contained in the Helsinki Final Act, include prior notification
of military activities in Europe above the level of 13,000
troops, mandatory observation above a level of 17,000, exchange
of annual forecasts of notifiable military activities, and
on-site inspection without right of refusal as the means of
verifying compliance. If fully implemented by all parties, these
measures can contribute to a more stable and secure Europe and to
an improved East-West relationship. The Stockholm Document,
however, did not exhaust the potential for further work on CSBMs,
and the future of the CDE will be determined by the Vienna CSCE
Follow-up Meeting in light of the need for balanced progress
across the full CSCE agenda, particularly in the area of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
- 74 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
CW: At the November 1985 Geneva Summit, President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to intensify bilateral
discussions on all aspects of the comprehensive chemical weapons
ban being negotiated at the forty-nation Geneva Conference on
Disarmament. In 1986 we had four rounds of bilateral CW treaty
talks, and a fifth round took place in February 1987.
The bilateral treaty discussions have been frank and serious.
They have given an impetus to the multilateral negotiations in
the CD, where differences have narrowed on the elimination of CW
production facilities, on chemicals to be covered by the eventual
CW treaty, and on monitoring of the chemical industry to ensure
against activities forbidden by the convention. Soviet
acceptance of the tough, but necessary U.S. challenge inspection
proposal would contribute much to attaining the long-sought goal
of an effectively verifiable CW convention.
Nuclear Testing: The security of the U.S. and its Allies today
depends on nuclear deterrence. For the foreseeable future,
nuclear weapons will remain a key element of our deterrent.
Nuclear testing is required to ensure both the credibility and
effectiveness of our deterrence and the safety, reliability, and
survivability of our nuclear weapons. Practical steps can be
taken now which would strengthen existing nuclear testing
limitations and lead, under appropriate conditions, to further
limitations, and eventually the elimination of nuclear testing.
Determining what these limitations may entail must be worked out
in future negotiations.
The U.S. places its highest priority in the nuclear testing area
on finding ways to improve the verification provisions of the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear
Explosions Treaty (PNET) so that we can move forward on their
ratification. The U.S. has made numerous offers to the Soviet
Union in this regard:
In September 1984, we proposed direct on-site yield
measurements of one another's nuclear weapon tests.
In July 1985, we invited Soviet experts -- without
preconditions -- to come to the U.S. test site to measure
the yield of a U.S. test, bringing with them any
instrumentation devices the USSR deemed necessary for this
purpose.
In December 1985, we proposed a meeting of technical
experts to discuss U.S. and Soviet approaches to
verification.
- 75 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
In March 1986, we described a method of direct, on-site
hydrodynamic yield measurement (CORRTEX) to the Soviets and
invited Soviet experts to come to Nevada to examine CORRTEX
fully, to observe U.S. experts using CORRTEX to measure the
yield of a U.S. test, and to discuss verification methods.
In July, September, and November 1986, U.S. and Soviet
technical experts met, without preconditions, in Geneva for
discussions on a broad range of issues related to nuclear
testing -- a direct result of suggestions by the President.
In September 1986, the President stated in an address to
the United Nations General Assembly that upon ratification
of the TTBT and PNET, and in association with a program to
reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons, the
U.S. is prepared to discuss ways to implement a
step-by-step parallel program of limiting and ultimately
ending nuclear testing. He asked the Soviets to join us
immediately in taking practical steps toward limiting
testing by making the necessary verification improvements
to the TTBT and PNET.
During the October 1986 meetings in Iceland with General
Secretary Gorbachev, the President indicated that if the
Soviets were to agree to essential verification
improvements to these treaties, he would, when the 100th
Congress convenes, request the advice and consent of the
Senate to their ratification. If the Soviets failed to
agree to the needed verification improvements prior to the
convening of the 100th Congress, the President would still
seek the advice and consent of the Senate, but with an
appropriate reservation to the treaties that would ensure
that they not take effect until they are effectively
verifiable.
At Reykjavik the U.S. proposed that the U.S. and Soviet
Union begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda
for these negotiations would first be to resolve remaining
verification issues associated with existing treaties. Once
these verification concerns have been satisfied and the
treaties ratified, the U.S. and USSR would immediately
engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step
parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce
and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting
and ultimately ending nuclear testing.
While the Soviets claim they wish to address our concerns, there
has yet been no agreement on priorities in negotiations. At the
expert level discussions on nuclear testing, the Soviet
delegation rejected a step-by-step approach to negotiations.
- 76 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
The U.S. has also participated in discussions at the Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva, of verification and compliance issues
related to a comprehensive test ban (CTB). A CTB remains a
long-term objective of the United States, but cannot be achieved
under existing international conditions. Such a ban must be
viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on
nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability
and when we have achieved broad, deep and verifiable arms
reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities,
expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in
conventional forces.
Non-Proliferation: We continue to seek strengthened
international safeguards to prevent further proliferation. The
NPT review conference that met in Geneva in September 1985
produced a consensus document strongly endorsing the Treaty, an
action that serves to strengthen U.S. non-proliferation efforts.
President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed both
countries' commitment to the Treaty at the Geneva Summit in
November 1985. They also agreed to additional measures to
enhance the Treaty's effectiveness, including enlarging its
membership and strengthening the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). In December 1986, the U.S. and the Soviet Union
met in Washington for the eighth round in an on-going series of
consultations covering a wide range of issues including prospects
for strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,
support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the mutual
desire to strengthen the IAEA.
Other Confidence-Building Measures: In June 1984, the U.S.
renewed the U.S. agreement to prevent incidents at sea. In July
1984, a new agreement was signed with the Soviet Union to improve
the Direct Communications Link, or "Hot Line," by adding a
facsimile capability; an agreement on the transfer of U.S.
upgrade equipment to the Soviets was signed in September 1985. In
June 1985, the U.S. and Soviet Union signed a "Common
Understanding" to the 1971 "Accidents Measures" Agreement
clarifying their obligations to consult in the event of a nuclear
incident involving unknown or unauthorized parties, including
terrorists. President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev agreed at
the Geneva Summit in November 1985 to study the concept of
establishing nuclear risk reduction centers to further reduce the
chances of conflict between us. Subsequently, expert-level talks
were held with the Soviet Union in May 1986, and again in August
1986. An initial negotiating session was held in Geneva in
January 1987.
- 77 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
General Talking Points:
Nuclear War: The President and his Administration have no higher
priority than reducing the risks of war, nuclear war in
particular. As both he and General Secretary Gorbachev
explicitly agreed to in Geneva, "nuclear war cannot be won and
must never be fought." We seek arms control agreements that
truly enhance stability and security.
Arms Reductions: Although we and the Soviets still profoundly
disagree over the relationship between strategic offense and
defense, we did make some progress at the 1985 Geneva Summit and
the 1986 meeting in Reykjavik on arms control issues. The
Administration has a broad arms control agenda involving
far-reaching proposals for arms reductions, constraints, and
confidence-building measures. We are seeking agreements that are
militarily significant, equitable, and effectively verifiable.
In each of our efforts, including a number of major negotiations,
the U.S. and our Western Allies have made forthcoming new
proposals in an effort to achieve progress.
Geneva Negotiations: Both sides agreed at the Geneva Summit to
accelerate work at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, and
substantial movement toward agreements was achieved during the
Iceland meeting in October 1986. We still have a long road and
tough issues ahead. Patient and persistent dialogue will
continue to be required.
In addition to our proposals already on the table, our
negotiators -- at the President's direction -- tabled new U.S.
proposals based on agreements in Reykjavik, including:
Fifty percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, to
be implemented by reductions to 1600 strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles and 6000 strategic weapons on those
delivery vehicles, with sublimits to constrain the most
destabilizing categories of such weapons;
A global limit of 100 longer-range INF missile warheads
for each side, with none in Europe; and constraints on
shorter-range INF missiles accompanied by follow on
negotiations at Geneva for their reduction;
A proposal that, in conjunction with agreement through
1996 not to deploy advanced strategic defenses, with each
side conducting strategic defense research, development
and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, the
two sides would reduce offensive strategic arms by 50%
through 1991 and eliminate all remaining U.S. and Soviet
ballistic missiles by the end of 1996. We further made
clear that at the end of 1996, either side could deploy
advanced defenses if it so chose, unless the parties
agreed otherwise.
- 78 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? On November 7, the Soviet Union took some new steps as well,
by tabling proposals that partially reflect the headway made
at Reykjavik. Areas of agreement at Reykjavik can serve as
the starting point from which United States and Soviet
negotiators can hammer out significant arms reduction
treaties.
? In the negotiations, the U.S. and Soviet Union agree that
there is a relationship among the different types of arms to
be addressed. Offensive and defensive systems are closely
related and cannot be considered in isolation from each other.
However, progress in any of the three Geneva forums should not
be held hostage to progress in another. A vital task before
us is to strengthen stability by moving over time to a
different kind of strategic relationship, one less dependent
on the threat of nuclear devastation, and more dependent on
defensive systems that threaten no one.
? Other Negotiations: In addition, we are actively
involved in a number of other serious arms control
efforts. These include the Vienna negotiations on Mutual
and Balanced Forced Reductions (MBFR), and the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) negotiations in Geneva on a
comprehensive chemical weapons ban, as well as
discussions at the CD on limits on nuclear testing, on
outer space, and in other areas of bilateral and
multilateral concern. Both sides agreed at the 1985
Geneva Summit to increase their efforts to reach
effective agreements in these areas. At Stockholm, the
Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) reached a successful
conclusion, which, if fully implemented, should reduce
the risk of war and the possibility of using force for
political intimidation.
? VERIFICATION: Verification and compliance are vital
elements of arms reduction agreements. The primary
systems of verification are the National Technical Means
of each side. U.S. verification capabilities have ?
improved since the late 1970s. In the future, arms
control accords will continue relying on National
Technical Means as an essential verification tool, but
they will also require an extensive exchange of data and
on-site inspection.
? COMPLIANCE: The United States is seriously concerned
about Soviet noncompliance with existing agreements. The
key strategic arms violation is the Krasnoyarsk radar
system outside Moscow (ABM Treaty). Two previous key
violations involved the SALT II Agreement: the SS-25 and
telemetry encryption. The President's December 1985
Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms
- 79 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Control Agreements stated that U.S. Government studies
supported its conclusion that there was a pattern of
Soviet noncompliance. In addition to violating the
former SALT I Interim Agreement (use of "remaining
facilities" at former SS-7 sites) and the former SALT II
Treaty (SS-25, telemetry encryption, strategic nuclear
delivery vehicle limits, concealment of missile/launcher
association), the Limited Test Ban Treaty (nuclear test
venting); the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and
the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons (offensive BWC
program and use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan); and
the Helsinki Final Act (exercise notification
provisions).
In addition, the USSR has likely violated provisions of
the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (150 kiloton limit). In
addition, the aggregate of Soviet ABM and ABM-related
activity leads the U.S. to conclude that the Soviets may
be preparing a base for a prohibited territorial ABM
defense. We must insist that the Soviets rectify those
areas where they are in violation of existing obligations
or political commitments, as their failure to do so has
serious consequences for the arms control process. For
our part, we are continuing to carry out our own
obligations, and will continue to seek effective
verification and compliance measures in all arms control
efforts we undertake.
U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY: The U.S. will continue to
exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic
deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary
atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic
arsenals of both sides. Had the SALT II agreement ever
been ratified, it would have expired in December 1985.
SALT I had also expired. In May 1986, the President
determined that the policy of unilateral U.S. observance
of the SALT I and SALT II agreements could not be
continued in the face of continuing Soviet
non-compliance. After the U.S. dismantled two Poseidon
SSBNs in May 1986, it remained in technical observance of
SALT until November 28, 1986, when the 131st heavy bomber
equipped for ALCMs completed its conversion process. No
compensating dismantlements were made at that time.
Future judgments on U.S. strategic forces will be based
on an assessment of the nature and magnitude of the
Soviet threat, and not on the basis of the SALT
agreements. If there is no significant change in the
threat we face as we implement the strategic
modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic
ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.
? 80 ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: In July 1984, the Soviet
Union signed what we hope will be the first of several
agreements designed to ensure war does not erupt because
of accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding: an
agreement to upgrade the U.S.-Soviet hotline. At the
1985 Geneva Summit, both sides agreed to study the
concept of establishing nuclear risk reduction centers to
further reduce the possibility of conflict between us.
Since then, there have been two U.S.-Soviet meetings at
the expert level to explore the concept further. We hope
that, over time, the Soviets will work with us to improve
the framework for ensuring against accidental nuclear
war.
- 81 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
DETERRENCE
Issue:
How can we maintain our ability to deter attack on the U.S. and
our Allies, while moving toward a more stable world with lower
levels of nuclear forces?
Objectives:
? Maintain our ability to deter war today, and to reduce the
risk of war or coercion by the threat to use force.
? Move away from deterrence based exclusively on the threat of
nuclear retaliation, to an enhanced deterrence based on the
increasing contribution of defensive systems; primarily
non-nuclear systems, that threaten no one.
Accomplishments:
? Through our strategic, intermediate-range, nuclear and
conventional forces modernization programs, we have begun to
remedy the significant vulnerabilities in those forces --
which were inherited in 1981. This will permit us to maintain
deterrence today and into the near future.
? The Strategic Defense Initiative, a broad-based research
program, will provide future options for moving away from
deterrence based on nuclear retaliation and toward a safer,
more secure and more stable deterrent.
Talking Points:
? Deterrence is the cornerstone of U.S. national security
policy. We deter by ensuring that the leadership of all
potential aggressors is aware of our policy to maintain forces
adequate to deny an aggressor his basic war aims and, through
retaliation, make the costs of aggression far outweigh any
potential benefits.
? The President has emphasized that a nuclear war "cannot be won
and must never be fought." Our recognition of this fact is
not sufficient to prevent nuclear war; we must be certain that
the Soviet leadership understands it as well.
? Deterrence based on nuclear retaliation has worked for over 30
years. However, Soviet improvements in both their offensive
forces and their own strategic defenses, if unanswered, will
erode deterrence.
? Our strategic modernization program is designed to ensure our
ability to deter today. The SDI program seeks to create a
better basis for deterrence in the future.
- 82 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION
Issue:
How can the United States close the gap between its strategic
capabilities and those of the Soviet Union?
Objectives:
* Redress the most serious weaknesses in our current strategic
posture.
* Provide incentive to the Soviets to negotiate meaningful arms
reductions that promote strategic stability.
Accomplishments:
* In 1981, the President recognized the need for strategic
modernization, and as a result, proposed a five-part,
mutually-reinforcing program to restore the strategic balance.
* The five-point program directed the Department of Defense to:
Improve U.S. strategic defenses; design and deploy
improvements to our command-and-control system to ensure
positive control to further reduce the risk of war; design and
produce a cost-effective Peacekeeper intercontinental
ballistic missile; refine and improve the basic design of the
B-1 strategic bomber and place it into series production;
select a design and develop an Advanced Technology Bomber
(ATB), and an advanced cruise missile (ACM), to complete the
basic modernization requirements of the strategic bomber force
of the 1990s and beyond; deploy the Trident submarine, and
develop an improved Trident II/D-5 submarine-launched
ballistic missile system; and deploy nuclear-armed cruise
missiles (SLCM) aboard naval vessels.
* A major change to the President's program was incorporated
after its initiation: at the recommendation of the Scowcroft
Commission, work was initiated on a small ICBM for deployment
in the 1990s in addition to the Peacekeeper.
* Significant progress has been made on all five of the
Strategic Initiatives.
* Improvements to the Strategic Command-and-Control system are
being implemented.
* The B-1 is now being deployed to operational bases months
ahead of schedule and below cost. Research on the AT is on or
ahead of schedule. The advanced cruise missile has been
placed into production.
- 83 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? The first 42 Peacekeeper missiles are in production, and the
Peacekeeper missile has completed its pre-operational series
of test launches. Ten missiles were deployed as of December
1986.
* Research on the D-5 missile is on schedule and the
nuclear-armed SLCM has been deployed.
? Improvements to our strategic air defenses are being
implemented.
Talking Points:
? Strategic modernization is required to redress the serious
weaknesses in our strategic posture caused by the massive
Soviet build-up of strategic forces over the past 10 to 15
years -- a period of U.S. restraint in deployment of strategic
systems. It is also needed to restore our deterrent strength,
and to provide strong incentives to the Soviets to negotiate
genuine arms reductions.
? Under President Reagan's leadership, a five-part, mutually
reinforcing strategic modernization program has been
initiated. Significant progress has already been made in a
number of areas.
? Strategic communications-and-control systems are being
improved to ensure that we could employ our nuclear forces
effectively, which is essential to a credible deterrent.
? Bomber modernization is underway to reduce the risks
associated with the aging and potentially vulnerable B-52
force.
? Sea-based forces, currently the most survivable leg of our
strategic Triad, are being modernized and a new Trident II/D-S
missile is being developed on schedule.
? Our land-based missile force is being modernized to remedy an
important part of the strategic imbalance. This modernization
is critical because of the important contributions of the ICBM
which include: prompt hard target capability; secure
command-control-and-communications; rapid re-targeting; high
alert rate; and low operations and support costs (only 12
percent of the total cost for the entire Triad). The
President's decision to develop a Rail Garrison Basing mode
for the Peacekeeper missile, and to start full-scale
development of the mobile small ICBM has greatly increased the
survivability of the future ICBM force through mobility.
- 84 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* The President's strategic modernization program is an
essential element in helping us meet our arms control
objectives. We have stated that we are willing to negotiate
trade-offs in each side's advantages and a build-down of
strategic systems leading to significantly lower and more
stable strategic forces. We seek to reach an equitable and
verifiable arms control agreement in the talks under way in
Geneva.
- 85 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
ICBM MODERNIZATION
Issue:
How can the United States maximize the effectiveness of the
ground-based portion of the strategic Triad in support of
credible deterrence?
Objectives:
* Modernize the aging U.S. ICBM force through the deployment of
100 Peacekeeper missiles and the development of a new small
mobile ICBM.
Accomplishments:
? The Peacekeeper test program has been an outstanding success:
All test objectives have been met or exceeded, and
accuracy/reliability results have been excellent.
? Fifty Peacekeeper missiles have been approved for silo
deployment in Minuteman silos. In December 1986, the
President approved the initiation of full-scale development of
a new mobile basing mode for the Peacekeeper, known as
Garrison Rail Basing. This new mode will be available for the
initiation of a production of additional Peacekeeper missiles,
if appropriate, in December 1988.
? Production has been approved and initiated on the first 50
Peacekeeper missiles, and work in connection with the
deployment of the first 50 missiles in existing Minuteman
silos at F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, is progressing
on schedule. The first squadron of missiles is now on alert
status.
? Development of the small ICBM has begun, and is on schedule
for a possible deployment in the early 1990s.
Talking Points:
? ICBM modernization is essential to the viability of the
strategic Triad of bombers, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and ICBMs that has kept the peace for well over two
decades.
? The President has endorsed the recommendations of the
Bipartisan Scowcroft Commission to deploy the Peacekeeper
missile as soon as possible and develop a small ICBM, while
vigorously pursuing arms control.
? Peacekeeper is the only near-term ICBM that can help restore
the strategic imbalance that developed as the Soviets
modernized during a period of U.S. restraint.
- 86 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* The President's December 1986 decision to move forward with
development of Garrison Rail Basing for Peacekeeper, and the
initiation of full-scale development of the SICBM insures that
the U.S. will have a full-range of options to deploy a new
generation of survivable mobile ICBMs in the future, if
appropriate. Thus, we will be able to achieve our future
national security interests through more survivable offensive
forces, deployment of defensive systems, through arms control,
or combinations of all three, if appropriate.
- 87 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22: CIA-RDP89601356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
Issue:
How can the United States attain its long-range goal of a stable,
secure deterrence, making ballistic missiles impotent and
obsolete?
Objective:
? Continue intensive research into the potential of advanced
defensive technologies to support a future U.S. decision on
whether to develop and deploy an effective defense against
ballistic missiles.
Accomplishments:
? On March 23, 1983, the President directed that research within
the limits prescribed by the ABM Treaty go forward on
neutralizing all ballistic missile threats.
? Early feasibility studies determined that advanced
technologies showed promise for providing an effective
anti-ballistic missile defense which would enhance deterrence,
stability, and prospects for offensive nuclear arms
reductions. The studies recognized that uncertainties could
only be resolved through further research. As a result,
defense experts recommended a vigorous research program
designed to answer the remaining questions as to whether an
effective defense is feasible.
? After consulting with key military and civilian advisors, the
President directed that an accelerated research effort be
conducted. The objective is to provide answers that will
permit us to make an informed decision in the early 1990s on
whether to proceed with developing and ultimately deploying
such defensive systems. All research is fully compliant with
our treaty obligations.
? In recognition of the importance of SDI both to the United
States and our Allies, the U.S. extended an offer to our
Allies to participate in SDI research. Agreements to
facilitate such participation has been reached with the UK,
West Germany, Italy, Israel, and Japan, and may be reached
with additional Allies as well.
Talking Points:
? The President's Strategic Defense Initiative seeks to explore
the potential of emerging defensive technologies to enhance
deterrence and improve stability by significantly reducing the
military effectiveness of ballistic missiles.
- 88 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* The pace of Soviet offensive and defensive strategic military
programs has upset the balance in the areas of greatest
importance during crises. Their modernization of offensive
nuclear forces and investment in strategic defenses of all
types has been particularly striking.
* When the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, it was agreed that a
comprehensive treaty reducing offensive nuclear forces should
parallel it. It was hoped that such a treaty could be
concluded in two years, and certainly within five years. Those
hopes were not realized.
* SALT I and SALT II codified major arms buildups, and allowed
inequalities and ambiguities with respect to verification.
They counted launchers, and limited weapons only indirectly.
Since SALT I was signed in 1972, the Soviets have nearly
doubled their strategic ballistic missile warheads from about
5000 to about 9000. The SALT structure did not reduce the
Soviet buildup.
* The Soviet Union's relentless improvement of its strategic
ballistic missile forces has steadily eroded the survivability
of our land-based retaliatory forces.
* The President's Strategic Defense Initiative addresses his
deep conviction that "certainly, there should be a better way
to strengthen peace and stability, a way to move away from a
future that relies so heavily on the prospect of rapid and
massive retaliation and toward greater reliance on defensive
systems which threaten no one."
* On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced his decision to
take an important first step toward this goal by directing the
establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative research
program.
* The Soviets have long been engaged in an intense strategic
defense research program, including the world's only existing
ABM system -- deployed around Moscow -- and the construction
of a ballistic missile detecting and tracking radar near
Krasnoyarsk, which violates the ABM treaty.
* The Soviet offensive and defensive build up has eroded the
foundation on which deterrence has long rested. In concert
with their massive and newly modernized offensive forces and
already impressive air and passive defense capabilities, the
possibility of a Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty -- which
the Soviet Union is already violating -- poses a serious new
threat to U.S. and Allied security.
- 89 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22: CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? In addition, the Soviet Union has been engaged in extensive
research and development of advanced technologies for
ballistic missile defense since the 1960s. That program
covers the same technologies being examined under the SDI, but
represents a much greater investment of capital and manpower.
? At a minimum, the SDI program is a prudent response to the
very active Soviet research and development activities in this
field, and it provides insurance against Soviet efforts to
develop and deploy unilaterally an advanced defensive system.
? The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative research program is
fully consistent with the ABM treaty, emphasizes advanced,
non-nuclear defensive technologies with the aim of finding
better ways of deterring aggression, strengthening stability,
and increasing the security of the United States and its
Allies.
? SDI offers us, our Allies, and the world in general the
possibility of radically altering today's dangerous trends by
moving to a better, more stable basis of deterrence. It would
allow us to move away from reliance on the threat of nuclear
retaliation to deter aggression, and towards an enhanced
deterrence based upon defensive capability that threatens no
one.
- 90 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
ANTI-SATELLITE (ASAT) DEVELOPMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
Issue:
How can the United States best protect its interests in space and
strengthen deterrence?
Objectives:
* Ensure that we have a full range of options for protecting the
military and civil systems of the United States and our Allies
deployed in space.
? Deploy a U.S. anti-satellite capability (the MV - Miniature
Vehicle System), and develop other ASAT-related systems and
capabilities, as well as endeavor in good faith to negotiate
agreements that maintain and strengthen deterrence in these
areas.
Accomplishments:
? U.S. National Space Policy, announced by the President on July
4, 1982, states that the United States will consider
verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban
or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons
systems, should those measures be compatible with U.S.
national security.
? With U.S. support, a specialized ad hoc committee to consider
issues relevant to space arms control, without a negotiating
mandate, was formed in the forty-nation Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva. The mandate for this Committee is
largely that proposed by the U.S. and its Allies over a year
ago, and focuses on legal and verification issues.
? In March 1984, the Administration submitted a comprehensive
report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control,
which pointed out factors that impede identification of
effective ASAT arms control measures. These include
verification difficulties, the potential for breakout, the
risks of disclosing sensitive information, diverse sources of
threats to U.S. and Allied satellites, and threats posed by
Soviet targeting and reconnaissance satellites. The report
also indicated that the U.S. would continue to study selected
limits on specific types of systems or activities.
? The U.S. ASAT Program under development has made significant
technical progress: the miniature vehicle anti-satellite
(MVASAT) system has been tested in space; and a successful
test was made against a satellite target in space in 1985, and
two highly successful phenomenology tests against the
radiation of a star were conducted in August and September
1986.
- 91 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? Research continues on technologies with potential for ASAT
use, including directed energy weapons and space tracking
technology.
* Survivability of U.S. space assets is being upgraded through
the development of measures which reduce or eliminate the
effectiveness of Soviet ASAT systems.
? On March 12, 1985 the United States and the Soviet Union began
talks on space and nuclear arms with the objective of
preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth,
at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening
strategic stability.
? In February 1987, the President decided to restructure the
ASAT program in light of Congressional bans on testing the
MVASAT system against a target in space. The President's new
program continues work on the F-15 launched MVASAT, provides
for development of a ground-launch capability and for the
development of ground-based laser systems for potential ASAT
use.
Talking Points:
? The Soviets introduced their ASAT system over a decade ago.
Today it is the world's only operational ASAT system.
? Current Soviet ASAT capabilities include an operational
orbital interceptor system; ground-based test lasers with
probable ASAT capabilities; possibly the nuclear-armed Galosh
ABM interceptors (if modified); and the technological
capability for electronic warfare (jamming) against space
systems.
? The operational Soviet ASAT system threatens U.S. low-altitude
satellites.
? The 1978-1979 ASAT arms control talks revealed major
U.S.-Soviet differences, and subsequent study has brought
space arms control issues into sharper focus. Problems in
space arms control include: verification difficulties;
existing Soviet advantages in ASAT capabilities and research;
difficulties in defining space weapons, since many
ground-based systems have space capability and manned space
systems have extreme flexibility; and the fact that the
Soviets have deployed ASAT systems, whereas we have not.
- 92 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22: CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? The Soviets' proposal in the 1983 UNGA for an ASAT arms
control treaty lacked provisions for effective verification,
was unclear with regard to Soviet targeting satellites, and
did not deal with residual ASAT capabilities. This moratorium
proposal seemed clearly designed to block tests of the U.S.
ASAT, while allowing the USSR to maintain its monopoly with
the world's only operational ASAT interceptor system. The
Soviets essentially reiterated these same proposals in June
1984, in connection with their proposal for talks in Vienna in
September 1984, and again in March 1986, at the U.N.
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
? The U.S. is prepared in the Defense and Space Negotiations
Group in the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks to consider Soviet
proposals, and to present ideas of its own on this complex
subject. So far the Soviet proposal for a ban on ASAT testing
and deployment suffers from the same defects as their earlier
proposal.
? The U.S. Congress has again imposed a unilateral ban on
testing the U.S. ASAT against a target in space during FY
1987. The President has requested that this ban be lifted as
soon as possible.
? Continuing progress on an ASAT capability is vital if we are
to deter threats to our own space systems and to deny any
adversary the use of space-based systems against the United
States and our Allies in support of hostile military forces.
- 93 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
SPACE
Issue:
How can the United States capitalize on the full potential of the
medium of space in satisfying overall national interests?
Objectives:
* Strengthen the security of the United States.
* Maintain U.S. space leadership.
* Benefit economically, politically and scientifically by
exploiting space.
* Expand U.S. private sector investment and involvement in civil
and commercial space-related activities.
* Promote international cooperative activities in space that are
in the national interest.
* Work with other nations to preserve the freedom of space for
all activities that enhance the security and welfare of
mankind.
In pursuing these objectives, our approach is based on a set of
principles:
* We are committed to the exploration and use of space by all
nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind.
* We reject any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer
space, celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and reject
any limitations on the fundamental right to acquire data from
space.
* We consider the space systems of any nation to be national
property, with the right of passage through, and operations in
space without interference.
* We encourage domestic commercial exploitation of space
capabilities, technology, and systems for national economic
benefit.
* Promote U.S. economic interests and enhance the overly U.S.
competitive position in space technology.
* Ensure a reasonable return on U.S. Government investment in
space technology, and seek to create an appropriate
opportunity for U.S. private sector investment in space.
* Foster international cooperation in basic scientific research.
- 94 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? We will conduct international cooperative space-related
activities that achieve sufficient scientific, political,
economic, or national security benefits for the Nation.
? Our space program will be comprised of two separate, distinct,
and strongly interacting programs -- national security and
civil security.
? Ensure consistency with U.S. policy objectives regarding U.S.
Government launch programs and U.S. private sector
commercialization of space transportation services.
* The Space Transportation System (STS) is a major space launch
system for both national security and civil government
missions.
* We will pursue activities in space in support of our right of
self-defense, but will continue to study space arms control
options.
Accomplishments:
? On July 4, 1982, President Reagan signed the National Space
Policy to guide the conduct of our space program. The policy
confirms that our space program will be conducted according to
principles outlined above.
* Our Space Assistance and Cooperation Policy, which was issued
on August 6, 1982, promulgates broad U.S. objectives in
international space cooperation, and provides policy on space
launch and technology assistance.
? In May 1983, the President established a policy to facilitate
the commercialization of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). A
Senior (Space) Interdepartmental Group study subsequently led
to establishing procedures for licensing commercial space
launches and giving lead agency responsibility to the
Department of Transportation.
* In his State of the Union Address on January 25, 1984, the
President announced that the U.S. will develop a
permanently-manned Space Station and place it in orbit within
a decade; our friends and Allies were invited to join us, and
in May 1985, we received positive responses from the European
Space Agency, Canada, and Japan to participate in the
U.S.-Manned Space Station program.
* On July 20, 1984, the President announced 13 initiatives to
encourage commercial activity in space.
- 95 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? On August 15, 1984 the President approved a National Space
Strategy. The Strategy implements the National Space Policy
by providing 17 priorities for the U.S. Space Program in the
STS, Civil Space, Commercial Space, and National Security
Space areas. Seven follow-on efforts to further implement the
policy are directed.
? On February 25, 1985, the National Security Launch Strategy
was issued. It authorizes the Department of Defense to
procure a limited number of ELVs in order to maintain assured
access to space. It also directs a joint Defense-NASA study
on the development of a second-generation space transportation
system that would be a follow-on to the Shuttle.
? On July 30, 1985, the President approved a plan for
implementing full cost recovery of foreign and commercial
Shuttle flights occurring after October 1, 1988. In approving
this plan, the President directed that the price charged to
DOD for Shuttle flights would be negotiated separately from
that charged under the foreign and commercial policy, and
would include appropriate compensation for DOD services
rendered in connection with Shuttle flights.
? On January 28, 1986, the Shuttle orbiter Challenger was
destroyed shortly after lift-off, killing all seven astronauts
on board. On February 3, 1986 the President established an
accident investigation commission to determine the cause of
the Challenger loss. On February 5, 1986, the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs directed a study
to determine what measures to take to reconstitute the U.S.
space launch capability. On June 13, the President instructed
the Administrator of NASA to report back in 30 days as to how
he would implement commission findings. On June 20, the
Congress passed an FY 86 urgent supplemental funding bill
which provided DOD and NASA sufficient funds to begin
reestablishing the U.S. space launch capability.
? On August 15, 1986, the President issued a decision that the
Space Shuttle would not be used for foreign and commercial
payloads unless they were Shuttle-unique or involved important
national security or foreign policy interests.
? On October 3, 1986, the President decided on a plan for
meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev which included
establishment and approval of a work plan that would allow
drafting and finalizing a U.S.-Soviet agreement on cooperation
in space.
- 96 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22: CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? On December 27, 1986, the President established a U.S.
National policy for restoration of the capability to launch
satellites and missions into space to support U.S. national
security, civil, and commercial goals using space. The policy
provides a balanced, robust, flexible space launch capability
which can function independently of failures in any single
launch vehicle system.
* On February 3, 1987, the President determined that a set of
principles and guidelines were required in order to achieve
the maximum, mutually-beneficial participation in the
development of the U.S. Space Station. These principles and
guidelines support the national security, scientific,
economic, foreign policy and commercialization interests of
the U.S. in maximizing the potentials of space.
Talking Points:
? A vigorous and forward-looking space program is one of the
most highly visible and tangible demonstrations of world
leadership and gives us an effective means of influence in
foreign relations.
? Few other national endeavors have equaled the potential of the
U.S. Space Program to: perform functions in the national
security, domestic and private sectors that either cannot be
performed any other way or cannot be performed as economically
or as well; advance the state-of-the-art in high technology;
elevate the human spirit, capture our imaginations,
demonstrate our pioneering initiative, and hold out hope for a
progressive future for our Nation and all mankind.
? Since announcement of his National Space Policy in July 1982,
President Reagan has issued approximately ten directives and
made numerous decisions that will help implement this broad
policy. The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) for Space
was established to coordinate the implementation.
? Much remains to be done to set the U.S. Space Program on a
course that ensures U.S. leadership in the decades ahead. By
the President's direction, a National Space Strategy has been
completed, which establishes broad priorities for the U.S.
Space Program and identifies potential issues to be resolved
through follow-on studies.
- 97 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* Several actions are underway to reestablish the U.S. space
launch capability. They include: procuring a fourth
replacement orbiter, additional medium expendable launch
vehicles (MELVs), and larger complementary expendable launch
vehicles (CELVs), conducting studies and research into
development of a heavy-lift launch vehicle (HLLV), requiring
satellites to be dually compatible with either the Shuttle or
ELVs, repairing faulty NASA shuttle launch systems to preclude
future failures similar to the Challenger accident, and
preparation of a transition plan that integrates U.S.
commercial launch systems into the U.S. space launch
capability, pursuing advanced technology programs into new
launch systems, such as the National Aerospace Plane (NASP),
and seeking development and deployment of a permanently-manned
U.S. Space Station using international participation.
? 98 ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
MILITARY CAPABILITY/READINESS
Issue:
Are our armed forces more "ready" than in 1980?
Objectives:
? Continue to improve training and skill levels of U.S. forces.
? Reduce longstanding shortages in combat sustainability,
including stock levels of critical consumables.
? Provide modern equipment to enhance combat effectiveness and
survivability.
* Provide better capability to deploy and support forces over
long distances.
* Blend equipment, sustainability, logistics, and manpower
improvements into more combat-capable armed forces.
Accomplishments:
? In force readiness (the ability of forces, weapons systems, to
deliver outputs -- without unacceptable delay -- for which
they were designed), substantial progress has been made in the
past six years, and steady improvement is projected for the
future.
? Since FY 1980, there has been an almost 21 percent increase in
the number of enlisted personnel with four or more years of
service, and the percentage of recruits with high school
diplomas has increased from 68 percent to 92 percent.
? While trends in average training hours/flying days/steaming
days have been steady, or have improved slightly since 1980,
the quality of training has improved considerably.
? Trends in the material condition (mission-capable rates) of
most major weapons categories have been steady or slightly
improving since FY 1980. Now, however, we are supporting
larger numbers of more sophisticated and complex weapons,
operating them for longer periods, and still realizing
readiness improvements in some areas.
? In force sustainability, (the staying power of our forces in
combat), because of the long lead times involved in
procurement, our increased funding from FY 1982-87 for
sustainability has not yet been fully translated into
inventories. However, we have increased the budget allocation
by 100 percent over the 1980 level, which will result in
increased sustainability.
- 99 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? In force structure, (the number, size, and composition of our
forces), we have provided for significant increases in the
numbers of some units (divisions, battalions, tactical fighter
wings, Navy aircraft squadrons, and ship battle groups) over
the past six years. The need to provide balance among the
components of military capability within finite resources has
required, however, that revisions in force structure receive a
somewhat lower priority than modernization, readiness, and
sustainability.
? In strategic mobility we can deliver 25 percent more tonnage
to Europe by air than we could in 1980. We have done more to
improve sealift since 1981 than in all the years since WW II.
? In force modernization, we have obtained appropriations of
over $76 billion for shipbuilding, including the construction
of 64 new major combat ships. We have funded a substantial
increase for procurement of modern weapons systems for the
Army and Marine Corps: 5,359 M-1 Abrams tanks; 4,251 Bradley
Fighting Vehicles; 526 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters; 722
Light Armored Amphibious Vehicles; and 22,135 Stinger
missiles. We can provide 62 percent more air sorties in
Europe -- sorties whose individual effectiveness is improved
because they are flown by newer aircraft carrying more
accurate weapons.
? The Bottom Line: In the professional judgment of each U.S.
Unified and Specified Commander-in-Chief, his command is
indeed far more ready "by every measure of common sense" than
it was six years ago.
Talking Points:
* This Administration inherited several acute defense problems
which required immediate attention: There was no
comprehensive plan for strategic modernization; production
rates for many important procurement programs were grossly
inefficient; war reserves were extremely low; and there was a
shortage of skilled manpower.
? This Administration's primary objectives have thus been to
improve near-term training, readiness, and manpower problems;
integrate the modernization of strategic forces; increase
conventional force modernization; and make inroads in the
longstanding deficiencies in combat sustainability.
? Overall, substantial progress has been made in many aspects of
these problems in the past six years, and gradual but steady
improvement is projected in the future. We have more and
better people, they are better trained, and our men and
materiel are better supported.
- 100 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
* We have shown that it is possible to set defense priorities
and to make balanced progress in improving overall military
capabilities.
* The President is now requesting three percent real growth in
the Defense -- the minimum considered necessary to consolidate
the gains made earlier in this Administration in rebuilding
our defense capabilities.
- 101 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION IN NATO
Issue:
How can the United States best provide an effective and credible
nuclear deterrent which supports NATO?
Objectives:
* Maintain an effective and credible nuclear deterrent in NATO
which supports NATO strategy and objectives at the lowest
possible level of arms.
* Continue, in the absence of an arms control agreement, to
deploy longer-range intermediate nuclear weapons (LRINF) in
accord with the 1979 NATO Decision.
* Enhance the utility, survivability, and safety of nuclear
weapons in NATO.
Accomplishments:
* The NATO nuclear weapons inventory is being reduced to its
lowest level in twenty years. Following a withdrawal of 1,000
warheads in 1980 as part of the 1979 Dual-Track Decision, NATO
reached further agreement in 1983 to withdraw 1,400 additional
weapons by 1988. That reduction and restructuring is well
along toward completion. In addition, theater nuclear weapons
are being withdrawn on a one-for-one basis as LRINF deployment
proceeds.
* Alliance unity has been maintained through extensive
consultations throughout INF negotiations. We agree on
negotiating positions and on adherence to measured deployment
of 572 LRINF weapons in the absence of a verifiable, equitable
arms control agreement. Deployment has proceeded on schedule
in the UK, the FRG, Belgium, and Italy.
* In November 1985, the Dutch Government reconfirmed its
commitment to deploy 48 cruise missiles in the Netherlands.
The Government announced that deployment would occur in 1988,
and construction of the cruise missile base in the Netherlands
has begun.
* We continue to explore ways to reach the lowest inventory
level and weapons mix consistent with a credible and effective
nuclear deterrent.
* We have obtained Allied recognition of and support for
improvements in conventional defense capabilities to permit
less reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. U.S.
defense improvements have led the way in reducing the need for
early resort to nuclear weapons.
- 102 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22: CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
? A limited but effective modernization program for
shorter-range systems has been developed, to provide needed
capabilities at reduced inventory levels. Modernization also
enhances the accuracy, flexibility, and security of stock-pile
warheads.
Talking Points:
? Over the last four years, progress in NATO nuclear weapons
modernization has been substantial. We are reducing the
overall weapons inventory to the lowest level in twenty years.
? We have maintained Alliance unity in pursuit of both tracks of
the 1979 Dual-Track Decision. We have negotiated
constructively and flexibly on INF, with full Alliance accord
on our position; we have adhered to a limited and gradual
deployment of Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles
in the absence of an equitable and verifiable INF arms control
agreement.
? We have pursued a limited modernization program for other
short-range nuclear weapons, which will allow us and NATO to
maintain a credible, effective theater nuclear deterrent at
the lowest possible inventory level.
? We have led the way in conventional defense improvements in
NATO, and there is Allied agreement on the wisdom of improving
conventional forces and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons
if deterrence fails.
* The United States has undertaken a sustained, expanded, and in
some cases unprecedented, level of consultations with its NATO
Allies.
? The NATO Special Consultative Group (SCG), chaired by the
United States, meets regularly and often to review and
coordinate our INF negotiating efforts.
? The NATO High-Level Group (HLG), also chaired by the United
States, also meets frequently to examine critical nuclear
issues facing the Alliance, providing the analysis on which
NATO decisions on these issues have been based.
? The Ministerial-level Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), of which
the United States is a participant, meets semi-annually to
discuss nuclear issues in the Alliance.
? The United States also has participated in a series of
bilateral High Level Defense Group meetings with various NATO
partners which have resulted in improved understanding of
defense matters.
- 103 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
CONVENTIONAL MODERNIZATION
Issue:
How can the U.S. best utilize its technological strength to
modernize its conventional forces, better deter conventional
conflicts, and reduce reliance on tactical nuclear weapons.
Objectives:
* To move technology into the force structure at a more rapid
pace.
* To help offset Soviet superiority in numbers of troops and
conventional weapons systems.
Accomplishments:
? In January 1987, the President published a new National
Security Strategy that emphasizes the importance of a
well-structured conventional modernization program.
? Key elements include:
The Army's modernization program, which is based on the
new Air Land Battle doctrine, and provides a
combined-arms capability that will enable our divisions
to maintain a qualitative edge over the much larger
Soviet forces.
Ongoing modernization programs for our tactical air
forces supplement these ground force programs. The
ability of our tactical air forces to maintain local air
superiority and support ground forces requires continuing
improvement.
The program to revitalize our special operations forces
is being fully implemented as one of our highest
priorities. This program will ensure that we have highly
trained forces immediately available to respond to a
broad range of crises and Low Intensity Conflict
situations, when our interests so require.
Improvements in C3I are of continuing high priority in
order to strengthen the ability to employ our
conventional forces to their full capability.
New short- and long-range mobility forces are improving
our capability to transport and support our forward
units, and to deploy forces in contingencies. The
ability to build up military power rapidly in
strategically important areas on the Eurasian periphery
is essential for deterrence, and for neutralizing the
geographical advantages of the Soviet Union.
- 104 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9
The warfighting capability of our naval forces is
improving markedly with the increase in the quantity and
quality of ships and aircraft, as we proceed to a
balanced 600 ship, 15 carrier battle group Navy. This
long-term program to assure our ability to use the
world's oceans in peace and war requires continuing
support.
Talking Points
* As we continue to improve out strategic deterrent forces, we
must be mindful of the fact that our conventional forces are
the first line of deterrence, and an essential means of
supporting U.S. interests in crises short of general war. With
the emergence of rough nuclear parity between the United
States and the Soviet Union, conventional forces have become
even more important to maintaining a secure deterrent. Our
current conventional force modernization program contributes
to a strong forward defense posture.
* The full impact of our major conventional modernization
programs will be felt over the decade ahead. Accomplishment
of our objectives will greatly increase our conventional
deterrent capability. The net improvement in our defense
posture will not be marginal; it will be fundamental.
* Full support of these programs is essential to avoid
deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet conventional force balance,
and assure that we have conventional forces capable of
conducting forward defense of our interests without recourse
to nuclear weapons.
* Ongoing implementation of the recommendations of the
President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,
chaired by David Packard, includes a number of actions to
shorten acquisition cycles and move advanced technology into
the force structure at a faster pace.
- 105 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B01356R000100150004-9