U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP89B01354R000100170011-1
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
32
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 20, 2009
Sequence Number:
11
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 23, 1981
Content Type:
REPORT
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Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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M
DIRECTOR
OF
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
NFIB/NFIC-9.1/47
U.S. Intelligence Community
Physical Security Standards for
Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facilities
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U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICY STATEMENT
ESTABLISHING
PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES (SCIFs) '
(Effective 23 April 1981)
Physical security standards are hereby established governing the construction and protec-
tion of facilities for storing and processing Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) 2
which requires extraordinary security safeguards as prescribed in pertinent national
directives. These regulations also cover electric or electronic equipment located in SCIFs.
Compliance with these standards is mandatory for all facilities established after the effective
date above, including any renovation of existing facilities insofar as the renovation will permit
reasonable and practical upgrading. It is not intended that existing, previously approved facili-
ties be modified to conform to these standards. Facilities which meet these standards are
satisfactory for the storage of all SCI.
It is recognized that there may be instances in which circumstances constitute a threat of
such proportion that it can only be offset by the most stringent security arrangements. Con-
versely, there may arise those instances in which time, location, condition of use of the ma-
terial, or other unforeseen factors may render full compliance with these standards unreason-
able or impossible. Situations such as the foregoing are to be referred to the accreditation
authority as far in advance as possible in order that full and timely consideration may be given
to a request for deviation from the standards. When these standards are waived for an SCIF,
the accreditation authority who waives them will inform the SCIF Manager of the areas of
the SCIF that do not meet standards and what changes are necessary before the SCIF will
meet them. For contractor operated SCIFs, waivers are valid no longer than the term of the
contract. The fact of a waiver condition will be made known by the cognizant element to other
components desiring to share the facility.
All facilities must be accredited before SCI may be stored in them. The procedures
for establishment and accreditation of SCIFs are prescribed in applicable national
directives.
'This supersedes USIB-D-9.1/20 dated 30 April 1973, "Policy Statement-USIB Physical Security Standards
for Compartmented Information Facilities"
"'Sensitive Compartmented Information" (SCI) as used in this policy statement means all classified informa-
tion and materials bearing Intelligence Community special access controls formally limiting access and dissemination.
This term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
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PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES (SCIFs)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pages
Policy Statement .................................................................................. i
Section I
Definitions ............................................................................................
1
Section Il
Perimeter Construction Criteria ........................................................
4
Section Ill
Security Alarm Systems ......................................................................
8
Section IV
Telephone and Intercommunications Equipment ..............................
1 1
Section V
Miscellaneous Physical Security Requirements ................................
14
Section VI
Tactical or Combat Operations ..........................................................
15
ANNEX A
Vault Specifications ............................................................................
16
ANNEX B
Secure Area Specifications ................................................................
18
ANNEX C
Sound Attenuation Classifications ......................................................
20
ANNEX D
Specifications for Barring Windows ..................................................
22
ANNEX E
Specifications for Locally Fabricated Doors ......................................
25
ANNEX F
Technical Security ..............................................................................
29
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DEFINITIONS
I. Access Control System, Unattended-An electronic, electromechanical or mechanical sys-
tem designed to identify and/or admit personnel with properly authorized access to the
secure area. Identification may be based on any number of factors such as a sequencing of
a combination, special key, badge, fingerprints, signature, voice, etc. These systems are
for personnel access control only and are not to be used for the protection of stored
materials.
2. Acoustic Security-Those security measures designed and used to deny aural access to
classified information.
3. Administrative/Service Areas-Those identified areas within an accredited SCIF where
no storage, handling, discussion and/or processing of SCI is allowed.
4. Alarm Door Switch-A balanced magnetic switch so designed and installed that opening
the door or introducing an outside magnetic force will cause an alarm to be generated.
5. Alert Security System-A security system which has a local signalling device to alert
persons inside a facility that someone has come in through an entrance.
6. Authorized Personnel-Any person who is fully cleared and briefed for SCI and has been
granted access to the SCIF.
7. Class A Electronic Line Supervision-A system which transmits over wire a pseudo-
random generated tone or tones or digital type modulation. (This system exceeds the
previous "High Line Security" system requirement.)
8. Class B Electronic Line Supervision-A system which transmits over wire a digital or tone
type modulation. (This system is equivalent to the previous "High Line Security" system
requirement.)
9. Class C Electronic Line Supervision-A system, AC or DC, which is wire transmitted.
(This system is equivalent to the previous "Standard Line Security" system requirement.)
10. Closed Storage-The storage of SCI in properly secured GSA approved security contain-
ers within an accredited SCIF while such facility is not occupied by authorized personnel.
11. Continuous Operations-This condition exists when a facility is manned 24 hours every
day by not fewer than two appropriately cleared personnel who have the continuous
capability of detecting unauthorized entry into the SCIF. Positive identification and ac-
cess control must be maintained at all entrance points not fully secured.
12. Continuous Personnel Access Control-An access control system where access to the
building is continuously controlled by a cleared individual.
13. Controlled Area-Any area to which entry is subject to restrictions or control for security
reasons.
14. Document-Any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics,
including, without limitation, written or printed matter, data processing cards and tapes,
maps, charts, paintings, drawings, photos, engravings, sketches, working notes and papers,
reproductions of such things by any means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic or
electronic recordings in any form.
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15. Forced Entry-Unauthorized entry into an SCIF or security container in a manner in
which evidence of such entry is easily discernible.
16. Guard-A properly trained and equipped individual whose duties include the protection of
an SCIF. Guards whose duties require direct access to an SCIF, or patrol within an
SCIF, must meet the clearance criteria in Director of Central Intelligence Directive No.
1 / 14, but need not be indoctrinated for access to SCI.
17. High Line Supervision-See Class A and Class B Electronic Line Supervision.
18. Intrusion Detection System-A security alarm system consisting of various types of
alarms (vibration, capacitance, volumetric, etc.) to detect the unauthorized intrusion into
a facility.
19. Non-Discussion Area-A clearly defined area within an SCIF where classified discus-
sions are not authorized. All such areas shall be clearly marked.
20. Open Storage-The storage of SCI in other than GSA approved security containers
within an SCIF when it is not occupied by authorized personnel.
21. Optical Security-Those security measures designed and used to deny visual access to
classified objects, documents, rooms, etc.
22. SCI Facility (SCIF)-An accredited area, room, group of rooms, or installations where
SCI may be stored, used, discussed and/or electronically processed.
23. SCI Security Control System-A system which provides for the security control of special
access program information within the category of National Security Information (NSI)
called National Foreign Intelligence (NFI).
24. Secure Area-An accredited facility which is used for storing, handling, discussing,
and/or processing of SCI.
25. Secure Working Area-An accredited facility which is used for handling, discussing
and/or processing of SCI but where SCI shall not be stored.
26. Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO)-Those senior principals and observers on the National
Foreign Intelligence Board who head intelligence organizations or intelligence producing
agencies within the Intelligence Community.
27. Sound Groups-Sound transmission attenuation groups (ratings measured in decibels-db)
established to satisfy the acoustical security requirements of SCIFs.
28. Sound Transmission Class (STC)-The rating used in architectural considerations of
sound transmission loss such as those involving walls, ceilings, and/or floors.
29. Standard Line Supervision-See Class C Electronic Line Supervision.
30. Surreptitious Entry-The unauthorized entry into an SCIF or security container in a
manner in which evidence of such entry is not readily discernible.
31. Tactical or Combat Operations-Operations which are conducted under combat or simu-
lated combat conditions and which must provide for a mobile or semi-permanent
environment.
32. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Surveys and Inspections-A thorough
physical, electronic, and visual examination to detect technical surveillance devices, tech-
nical security hazards, and related physical security weaknesses.
33. Temporary Secure Area (TSA) -A temporarily accredited facility which is used for stor-
ing, handling, discussing, and/or processing of SCI.
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34. Temporary Secure Working Area (TSWA)-A temporarily accredited facility which is
used for handling, discussing, and/or processing of SCI, but where SCI shall not be
stored.
35. Two-Person Rule-As a matter of policy, SCI Control Facilities (SCIFs) should be
staffed with sufficient people to deter unauthorized copying or illegal removal of SCI.
SCIF designated communication centers, document control centers (registries), and like
facilities that handle or store quantities of SCI must be manned while in operation by at
least two appropriately indoctrinated persons in such proximity to one another as to
provide mutual support in maintaining the integrity of the facility and the material stored
therein. The granting by an SIO of exceptions to this policy will be made a matter of
record and should involve consideration of the proven reliability and maturity of the
persons involved; the volume, variety and sensitivity of the holdings in the facility; and
whether or not the persons involved are subject to periodic polygraph examinations as a
condition of access. Exceptions for communications centers, document control centers,
and the like, should be granted in only extraordinary circumstances. Routine work by a
lone individual in any SCIF is to be avoided. Contractors will provide two person occu-
pancy in all SCIFs not specifically exempted by the SIO of the Government sponsor.
36. Vault-A maximum protection accredited facility which is used for storing, handling,
discussing, and/or processing of SCI.
37. Volumetric Detection System-An alarm system which detects movement or human
presence within a protected area.
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SECTION II
PERIMETER CONSTRUCTION CRITERIA FOR
SCI FACILITIES
I. GENERAL-The construction of and the physical security protection for an SCI Facility
(SCIF) must prevent the visual, acoustic, technical and physical access to or compromise
of classified information. It must also permit detection of forced or surreptitious entry of
the facility. The criteria for the construction of perimeters are governed by whether the
facility is in the United States or not, and whether it is located at, above or below ground
level according to the following situations: Open Storage, Closed Storage, Continuous
Operations, Secure Working Areas, and Non-Discussion Areas.
2. COMMON CRITERIA-Certain criteria, however, are common to every facility and ap-
ply to all locations and situations. These are set forth as follows:
A. AIR VENTS AND DUCTS-All air vents, ducts, and similar openings that pass
through a facility's perimeter will be protected and equipped as prescribed below:
(1) Sound protection-All openings will be sound baffled where appropriate to meet the
requirements of Sound Transmission Class (STC) 45 or better (not required for
Non-Discussion Areas).
(2) Nonconductive Section-All ducts must have a nonconductive section installed at
the perimeter of the SCIF.
(3) Physical protection-All openings larger than 90 square inches will be protected at
the perimeter with the following installed in the order listed, progressing inward
from the outer face of the perimeter:
(a) Hardened steel bars one-half inch in diameter, mounted five inches on center
vertically and horizontally and welded at all the intersections.
(b) An alarm device (not required for Non-Discussion Areas).
(c) Access ports to facilitate the inspection of any installed security devices and to
permit examination of the interior of the vent and duct runs for the presence of
unauthorized objects. These access ports will be within the secure perimeter of
the SCIF.
B. SOUND ATTENUATION-Except for Non-Discussion Areas, all SCIFs, regardless of
location or situation, must meet the specifications for sound attenuation as set forth in
Annex C.
C. ALARM REQUIREMENTS-All SCIFs, as defined in Section 1, must meet the
requirements for security alarms as set forth in Section Ill.
D. DOORS
(1) Normally there will be a single controlled entrance to an SCIF. When safety or
other considerations require more than one door, only one of the doors will be used
as the entrance access control point. The other door(s) will be secondary and se-
cured from the inside with either bars and brackets, or sliding dead bolts, and/or
dead bolt panic hardware.
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(2) Door requirements for Vaults and Secure Areas will be as stated in Annex A and
Annex B, respectively.
(3) The entrance door will be equipped with a permanently mounted approved Group I
combination lock and have an inside escape mechanism. The access door will also
be equipped with a door closer and may be equipped with an access control device
for use as a convenience during working hours. Secondary exit door(s), if required,
will be of equal construction as the entrance door and locked as described in D(1)
above. Door hinges located on the door exterior will be the nonremovable type with
hinge pins peened or otherwise secured to preclude removal.
E. WINDOWS-Windows should be permanently sealed. All windows in an SCIF which
might reasonably afford optical surveillance of personnel, documents, materials, hard-
ware or activities within the SCIF shall be made opaque or equipped with blinds,
drapes, or other suitable coverings which will preclude such surveillance.
3. SCI FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AT GROUND LEVEL-SCIFs at ground
level must meet the construction criteria set forth herein as they apply to the following
situations:
A. OPEN STORAGE-Open storage of SCI shall be avoided if possible. When open
storage is required, the SCIF must meet either the specifications for vaults set forth in
Annex A, or be located in a building that has:
(1) Continuous personnel access control;
(2) A 24-hour guard force capable of responding to an alarm within five minutes or
less;
(3) A reserve guard force available to assist the responding guard in an emergency,
and
The area is alarmed in accordance with Section III, and the SCIF is constructed as
a secure area according to Annex B, paragraph IA.
B. CLOSED STORAGE
(1) The SCIF must meet the specifications of a Secure Area specified in Annex B.
(2) SCI must be stored in GSA approved security containers having a resistance to
surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that of a Class 6 container.
C. CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS
(1) The floors, walls, and ceilings in such part of the facility must be constructed of
substantial material that provides protection against forced entry.
(2) An adequate security force must be available to respond to the SCIF within five
minutes in an emergency.
(3) In an emergency, all SCI must be stored in lockable containers. If the bulk of the
material precludes this, then there must be an adequate, tested plan to protect,
evacuate, or destroy the material.
D. SECURE WORKING AREAS-Perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings may be con-
structed without regard to the thickness or type of material so long as they will show
evidence of attempted forced or surreptitious entry.
4. SCI FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES ABOVE OR COMPLETELY BELOW
GROUND LEVEL-Facilities above or completely below ground level with no ready ac-
cess to exterior openings must meet the construction specifications set forth herein as they
apply to the following situations:
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A. OPEN STORAGE-Open storage of SCI shall be avoided if possible. When open
storage is required, the SCIF must meet either the specifications for secure areas set
forth in Annex B, paragraph I B, or be located in a building that has:
(I) Continuous personnel access control;
(2) A 24-hour guard force capable of responding to an alarm within five minutes or
less;
(3) A reserve guard force available to assist the responding guard in an emergency,
and
The area is alarmed in accordance with Section III, and the SCIF meets construction
specifications in Annex B, paragraph IA.
B. CLOSED STORAGE
(1) SCI must be stored in GSA approved security containers having a resistance to
surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that of a Class 6 container.
(2) The floors, walls, and ceilings must be constructed of substantial, permanent ma-
terial which provides protection against forced or surreptitious entry and which will
offer visual evidence of surreptitious entry. Walls will be attached to floors and true
ceilings solidly and permanently.
C. CONTINUOUS OPERATION
(1) No alarm or special construction is required other than to meet sound attenuation
requirements set forth in Annex C. If there is the possibility of surreptitious entry,
however, then alarms and/or barriers as discussed in Section 11, paragraph 2, must
be used to guard against such penetration.
(2) In an emergency, all SCI must be stored in lockable containers. If the bulk of the
material precludes this, then there must be an adequate, tested plan to protect,
evacuate or destroy the material.
D. SECURE WORKING AREAS-The construction of, and the physical security protec-
tion for, a secure working area must provide for the detection of both forced or sur-
reptitious entry of the SCIF, including those areas above false ceilings or below false
floors. Perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings may be constructed without regard to the
thickness or type of material so long as they will show evidence of attempted forced
entry.
5. SCI FACILITIES LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES-The criteria for
SCIFs outside the United States are the same as those for SCIFs within the United States
except as follows:
A. OPEN STORAGE
(1) No waiver shall be granted for the vault construction of an SCI F approved for open
storage.
(2) No waiver shall be granted for the secure area construction requirement of an
SC IF approved for open storage.
(3) Open storage of SCI will be permitted only for material which is of a size or
configuration that precludes its being stored in the largest GSA approved security
container available. All other SCI must be stored in GSA approved security
containers having a rating for both forced and surreptitious entry equal to or
exceeding that afforded by Class 5 containers.
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(1) The SCIF must meet secure area construction specifications as listed in Annex B,
paragraph 113.
(2) All SCI controlled material shall be stored in GSA approved security containers
having a rating for both forced and surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that
afforded by Class 5 containers.
(1) The SCI F must meet secure area construction specifications as listed in Annex B,
paragraph I B.
(2) In an emergency, all SCI must be stored in GSA approved security containers, or
the SCIF must have an adequate, tested plan to protect, evacuate or destroy the
information.
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SECTION III
SECURITY ALARM SYSTEMS
1. PURPOSE-The purpose of an alarm system is to detect an intrusion or attempted intru-
sion into an SCIF and to notify appropriate personnel. Whenever these requirements state
a class of alarm system, they are referring to the method of transmitting an alarm signal.
2. CLASSES OF ELECTRONIC LINE SUPERVISION
A. CLASS A-Pseudo-random digital and tone-wire transmitted preferred. (Exceeds pre-
vious "High Line Security" requirement.)
(1) These systems will transmit over wire a pseudo-random generated tone or tones or
digital type modulation. These systems will use either an interrogation and reply
scheme or a synchronization scheme. The signal between the protected premises
and the monitor location shall not repeat itself within a six month period. A line
supervision alarm signal shall cause a lock-in condition which shall be transmitted
to the monitor location in not more than 30 seconds. If the above conditions cannot
be met, then a UL approved system with commercial Grade A service and Grade
AA transmission will be acceptable.
(2) It shall not be possible to compromise Class A systems by the use of resistance,
voltage or current substitution techniques.
B. CLASS B-Digital and tone-wire transmitted preferred. (Formerly described as High
Line Security.)
(1) The systems using digital or tone type modulation over transmission lines shall use
an interrogation and reply scheme. The signal technique used for the interrogation
shall be different than that of the reply. Each line supervision alarm signal shall
cause a lock-in condition which shall be transmitted to the annunciator in not more
than 90 seconds. If the above conditions cannot be met, then a UL approved system
with Grade B commercial service and Grade A transmission will be acceptable.
(2) It shall not be possible to compromise Class B system by the use of resistance,
voltage, or current substitution techniques. The circuits and methods employed
shall be highly immune to transmission line noise, such as crosstalk, hum,
transients, and the like.
C. CLASS C-AC and DC-Wire Transmitted. (Standard Line Security.) The Class C
circuit supervisor units shall provide an alarm response in the annunciator in not more
than one second as a result of the following changes in normal transmission line
current:
(1) Five percent or more in normal line signal when it consists of direct current from
0.5 milliamperes through 30 milliamperes.
(2) Ten percent or more in normal line signal when it consists of direct current from 10
microamperes to 0.5 milliamperes.
(3) Five percent or more of any component or components in a complex signal upon
which the security integrity of the system is dependent. This tolerance will be
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applied for frequencies up to 100Hz. Component as used in this specification
means AC or DC voltage or current, AC phase, or frequency duration.
(4) Fifteen percent or more of any component or components in a complex signal upon
which the security integrity of the system is dependent. This tolerance will be
applicable for all frequencies above 100Hz. Component as used in this specifica-
tion means an AC or DC voltage or current, AC phase, or frequency duration.
3. FACTORS-The factors that determine whether or not an SCIF shall have an alarm or
alert system are:
A. LOCATION
(1) Within the United States.
(2) Outside the United States.
B. TYPE OF OPERATION
(1) Continuous.
(2) Noncontinuous.
ALARM REQUIREMENTS
Continuous Operation SCIFs are not required to have an alarm system unless there
exists a possibility of surreptitious entry. This determination shall be made by the
SID.
(2) Noncontinuous Operation SCIFs shall be alarmed and have a Class A line super-
vision system if the transmission signal leaves the SCIF and traverses an un-
controlled area.
(3)
Noncontinuous Operation SCIFs shall be alarmed and have a Class A or Class B
line supervision system if the transmission signal does not leave the controlled area
containing the SCIF.
(4) If an SCIF cannot meet the requirements of (1), (2), or (3) above due to un-
availability of transmission and/or monitoring facilities, then the SCIF must be
protected by an alarm system utilizing a Class C line supervision system and which
has an external UL approved bank vault type bell. Approval for the substitution of
a Class A or Class B line supervision system by the above mentioned Class C line
supervision system can only be granted by the SIO.
B. SCIFs located outside the United States-All SCIFs located outside the United States,
regardless of the type of operation, shall have an alarm system or alert system. Either
system must be monitored by U.S. citizens.
(1)
Continuous Operation SCIFs shall have, as a minimum, an alert system. If there
exists a possibility of surreptitious entry, appropriate alarms will be installed. This
determination will be made by the SIO.
(2) Noncontinuous Operation SCIFs shall be alarmed and have a Class A line super-
vision system.
(3) SCIFs for which the two-person rule has been waived should have, in addition to an
alarm or alert system, a panic system for emergency notification to an outside
cognizant individual or other facility to provide immediate response.
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5. ALARM SYSTEM
A. Equipment shall be UL approved (or equivalent).
B. Areas of the SCIF between the floor and ceiling shall be protected by volumetric
C. If an SCIF has a false ceiling or floor which provides a means for surreptitious entry,
then one of the below listed methods must be used to protect that area:
(1) A separate alarm system covering the area between the false and true ceiling or
false and true floor.
(2) Expanded metal (9-11 gauge).
D. Perimeter doors will be protected by balanced magnetic switches.
E. All windows will be protected by an alarm system.
F. Emergency exits and secondary doors shall be on a separate zone from the volumetric
and main entrance sensors within the same SCIF.
G. Every SCIF shall be on a separate zone.
H. If an SC IF consists of more than 6 rooms, or more than 5,000 square feet, then it shall
be protected by two or more alarm zones as determined by the cognizant security
authority.
1. All control units will be located within the protected area.
J. All alarm systems will be tested monthly, i.e., doors opened and volumetric sensors walk
tested. Detailed test procedures will be prepared which outline the required tests by the
SCIF Manager.
K. All components shall be installed in a manner to prevent access or removal from a
location external to the protected zone.
L. All alarm systems shall be capable of operating from commercial AC power. In the
event of commercial power failure, provisions will be made for automatic switchover to
emergency power, and back to commercial power without causing an alarm. A signal
will be presented to the monitor location indicating when the system has lost all power.
When batteries are used for emergency power, they will be maintained at full charge by
automatic charging circuits. Emergency power must be capable of operating the system
for a minimum of four hours.
M. Volumetric sensors employed in the alarm system must be placed so that the most likely
intruder motions are detected.
N. All perimeter sensors and control units will be equipped with tamper detection.
6. ALERT SYSTEM-An alert system shall consist of balanced magnetic switches or other
appropriate sensors on all entrances. These sensors shall be connected to a signaling device
through a closed loop to a latching relay. Neither the signaling device, relay or wire
connecting the switches shall leave the SCIF.
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SECTION IV
TELEPHONE AND INTERCOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
I. CONCEPT-Unsecure telephones installed in areas where SCI is discussed and/or pro-
cessed, present an unacceptable threat unless particular attention is paid to applying effec-
tive countermeasures. The most effective countermeasure is the exclusion of telephones and
associated wire runs and equipment from SCIFs. Telephones and associated wire runs and
equipment are therefore prohibited in SCIFs except where operationally justified.
2. PROTECTIVE MEASURES-If telephones are permitted within an SCIF, the protective
measures outlined below must be applied:
A. Cable/wire control.
(I) All telephone wires must enter the SCIF through one opening. Each conductor will
be accurately accounted for from the point of entry. The accountability will iden-
tify, through labeling or log/journal entries, the current precise use of every
conductor. This accountability applies to excess conductors which must also be
terminated at the point of entry and connected to appropriate connector blocks and
grounded.
(2) When SCIFs employ dedicated key telephone or computerized systems, the system
shall be installed within the secure perimeter of the SCIF and restricted to such
use.
B. Isolation. The telephone instrument must be effectively isolated from all incoming lines
when the telephone is not in use, i.e., in the "on-hook" condition. The two approved
methods of achieving isolation are listed below:
(I) Manual disconnect. Each instrument must be fitted with a plug and jack arrange-
ment so that the telephone can be manually disconnected at all times when not in
use. This method requires the incorporation of an audible alarm in the "on-hook"
condition to warn users to remove the plug upon completion of calls. (Attachment
I, Section IV, is a diagram of an approved installation method.)
(2) Automatic disconnect. Any Telephone Security Panel (TSP) approved automatic
disconnect system may be used.
C. Handsets. All telephones will be equipped with a TSP approved handset.
D. Ringers. Signalling of incoming calls will be accomplished by one of the following
procedures:
(1) In SCIFs where the Key Service Unit (KSU) is installed, no special signalling
apparatus is required if the KSU includes a local ring generator and is wired for
common audible signalling. Any ringer or buzzer may be used.
(2) In SCIFs where KSU is not used, a TSP approved signalling device will be used.
3. SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT-The installation of specialized telephone equipment, such
as telephone answering devices or speaker phones, within an SCIF is prohibited.
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4. INTERCOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT-The installation of intercommunications
systems within SCIFs is prohibited except where operationally justified and installed
according to the guidance below:
A. If a dial-type intercommunications system capability is engineered into the approved
telephone system, no further action is required provided that the system is installed
according to paragraphs one through three above.
B. If a separate telephone, dial type system is installed, no station or wiring will be located
outside the SCIF and all wiring will be installed in a manner that permits visual
observation of the complete wire run, or installed within electromagnetic tubing
(EMT).
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POS
RING
i
I
-
2.7M
-0 KTS SI
GNAL GROUND
RING-2
2.7M
RING
3
-
2.7M
RING-4
2.7M
2.7M
M
TIP-3
2.7M
22K
TIP-4
470K
RING
IC
-
(INTERCOM RING -24VDC)
KTS SI
GNAL POWER
(-20VDC)
SINGLE-LINE TELEPHONE, ANY TYPE
Plug-and-Jack connections
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MISCELLANEOUS PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
I. GENERAL: With the increased handling of SCI in facilities which do not have strictly
enforced personnel access programs, which do not have a controlled area surrounding the
SCIF, and/or which house non-government personnel, efforts shall be made to ensure that
all security safeguards are strictly employed.
2. ACCESS CONTROLS: SCIFs shall be afforded personnel access controls to preclude entry
by unauthorized personnel. Non-SCI indoctrinated personnel entering an SCIF shall be
continuously escorted by an SCI indoctrinated employee who is familiar with the security
procedures of that SCIF.
3. TEMPORARY SECURE AREA (TSA)-A TSA shall be equipped with GSA approved
security containers and SCI shall be stored therein. The entrance(s) to this facility shall be
alarmed with balanced magnetic switches and an approved volumetric alarm system. If
such a facility must also be used for the discussion of SCI, a TSCM shall be conducted
periodically on a random basis during the operation of this temporary facility and person-
nel access shall be limited to those employees who possess the appropriate SCI access(es).
Such a facility shall be accredited on a temporary basis by the Intelligence Community
agency/department SIO for a non-renewable period of 6 months or less. A shipboard
facility may be accredited on a temporary basis for a nonrenewable period not to exceed
the duration of the mission. No special construction is required other than to meet sound
attenuation requirements.
4. TEMPORARY SECURE WORKING AREA (TSWA)-The entrance will be controlled,
and access limited to persons having the clearance for which the area has been approved
during the entire period the TSWA is in use. Approval for using such areas must be
obtained from the SIO of the next higher level within appropriate SCI channels, setting
forth room number(s), building, location, specific security measures employed during us-
age as well as during other periods, and purpose of such usage. These areas will not be used
for periods exceeding an average total of 40 hours per month. No special construction is
required other than to meet sound attenuation requirements. If such a facility must also be
used for the discussion of SCI, a TSCM shall be conducted periodically on a random basis
during the operation of this temporary facility.
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SECTION VI
TACTICAL OR COMBAT OPERATIONS AND PORTABLE/MOBILE
SCIFs
1. Security standards for tactical or combat operations can only prescribe the minimum
requirements, since each situation differs. Situation and time permitting, the minimum
standards below will be improved upon, using the security considerations and requirements
for permanent secure facilities as an ultimate goal. When available, permanent type facili-
ties shall be used.
2. For tactical or combat conditions, a continuous 24 hours a day operation is mandatory.
Every effort must be made to obtain all necessary support from the headquarters served
(e.g., security containers, vehicles, generators, fencing, automatic weapons, etc.)
3. Recognizing that tactical/combat operations, as opposed to operations within a fixed in-
stallation, are of the type which may be considered least secure, the following minimum
physical security requirements must be met:
a. The SCIF shall be physically located well within the supported headquarters area pref-
erably adjacent to the Command/Tactical Operations Center.
b. The SCIF shall be located within a controlled area with the perimeter of the controlled
area clearly marked.
c. The perimeter of the controlled area shall be guarded continuously (24 hours) by walk-
ing or fixed guards to provide observation of the entire controlled area. Guards shall be
armed with weapons and ammunition prescribed by the supporting officer in charge.
d. Access into the area will be restricted to a single point of entry.
e. The entrance to the controlled area will be guarded on a continuous basis.
f. A minimum of two appropriately indoctrinated personnel shall be within the facility at
all times.
g. Emergency destruction and evacuation plans will be kept current and tested
periodically.
h. When not in use, SCI shall be stored in lockable containers.
4. The major concern in the use of portable/mobile SCIFs in a semipermanent configuration
is that the material stored therein or the facility itself does not receive a lesser degree of
protection than that afforded in a strictly tactical operations environment or a permanent
facility.
a. When portable type vans and shelters are operated in a semipermanent environment,
they must be operated and protected according to this Section or Sections 11 and III of
this publication. In some instances it may be necessary to combine some security
requirements of this Section and some in Sections 11 and III in order to meet operational
requirements and still maintain minimum physical security standards.
b. Due to the numerous variables in use, configuration, guard response, location, construc-
tion, and type of storage, portable SCIFs under this paragraph will be evaluated and
accredited on a case-by-case basis. -
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ANNEX A
VAULT SPECIFICATIONS
1. CONSTRUCTION CRITERIA:
Walls, floor, and ceiling shall be a minimum thickness of 8 inches of reinforced con-
crete. The concrete mixture shall have a compressive strength rating of at least 3,000
PSI. Reinforcing will be accomplished with steel reinforcing rods, a minimum of 5/K"
diameter, positioned centrally in the concrete pour and spaced horizontally and verti-
cally 6 inches on center; the rods will be tied or welded at the intersections. The
reinforcing is to be anchored into the ceiling and floor to a minimum depth of one-half
the thickness of the adjoining member.
Where unique structural circumstances do not permit concrete construction of a Vault,
construction will be of steel alloy plate, a minimum of 1/,," thick. The steel selected will
be a low carbon alloy type, such as U.S. Steel T-1, having characteristics of high yield
and tensile strength. (If alloy-type steel is not available, normal structural steel may be
used, but in a minimum thickness of '/a"). The metal plates are to be continuously
welded to load-bearing steel members of a thickness equal to that of the plates. If the
load-bearing steel members are being placed in a contiguous floor and ceiling of re-
inforced concrete, they muse be firmly affixed for a depth of one-half the thickness of
the floor and ceiling. If the floor and/or ceiling construction is less than 6 inches of
reinforced concrete, then a steel liner is to be constructed the same as the walls to form
the floor and ceiling of the Vault. Seams where the steel plates meet horizontally and
vertically are to be continuously welded together.
A. All Vaults shall be equipped with a GSA approved Class 5 vault door. Normally, a
Vault shall have only one door which serves as both entrance and exit from the SC IF. If
the "travel distance" from the most remote point in the SCIF to the door exceeds 50
feet, a second door, equal to the original door, must be installed for life safety purposes.
Travel distance shall be measured on the floor along the natural path of travel, starting
I foot from the most remote point, curving around any corners or obstructions, and
ending at the entrance doorway. When an SCIF has more than one door, only one
should be used for normal business.
B. Utility openings required for air-conditioning ducts, exhaust fans, and the like, nor-
mally shall not exceed 90 square inches and need not be barred or alarmed. (See
Section 11, paragraph 2A). Utility openings which must exceed 90 square inches shall
be justified by the requestor and approved in writing by the SIO. Approved openings
which exceed 90 square inches shall be barred with 'h" diameter steel rods, placed 5
inches on center vertically and horizontally, welded at the intersections and either
securely imbedded into the SCIF wall to a minimum depth of 3 inches or be welded to
adjacent steel plates. If excessive moisture is present in the vent opening, stainless steel
bars '/z" in diameter may be used instead of the normal steel bars; the stainless steel
bars must be affixed in the same manner as normal steel bars.
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C. Where building codes require that a Vault entrance meet a specified fire rating, a
vestibule should be formed on the outside of the entrance and a fire door of the required
rating should be installed in addition to the approved vault door. There shall be no
windows in a Vault.
3. MINIMUMS:
These are minimum specifications; use of materials having thickness or diameters larger
than those specified is permissible. The terms "anchored to and/or imbedded into the floor
and ceiling" may apply to the affixing of supporting members and reinforcing to the true
slab or to the most solid surfaces; subfloors and false ceilings are not to be used for this
purpose.
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ANNEX B
SECURE AREA SPECIFICATIONS
1. CONSTRUCTION CRITERIA:
A. Secure Area Located Within the United States: Walls will be reinforced slab to slab
with 9-11 gauge expanded steel affixed to supporting members of equal or greater
thickness. No other special construction of the SCIF is required so long as the floors,
walls and ceilings are constructed of subs-antial, permanent material which provides
protection from surreptitious entry and will offer visual evidence of forced entry. Ex-
terior walls will be attached to floors and true ceilings solidly and permanently.
B. Secure Areas Located Outside the United States:
(1) Secure Area walls shall be reinforced concrete at least 4 inches thick, or of solid
masonry (stone or brick) at least 8 inches thick. Any wall not meeting the above
specifications shall be reinforced on the inside with steel plate not less than '/x"
thick. The plates at every vertical joint are to be affixed to vertical steel members
of a thickness not less than that of the plate. The vertical plates shall be spot
welded to the vertical members by applying a 1 inch long weld every 12 inches;
meeting of the plates in the horizontal plane shall be continuously welded. Walls of
hollow masonry (blocks and tiles) are not considered adequate and must be
reinforced.
(2) The floor and ceiling of the room shall be of at least 4 inches of reinforced concrete.
Floors and ceilings not meeting this criterion must be reinforced with steel plating
I/x" thick. Floor and ceiling reinforcement must be securely affixed to the walls
with steel angles welded or bolted in place.
A. All Secure Areas within the United States shall be equipped with approved Class 6
vault doors, or with locally fabricated doors as indicated in Annex E. Secure Areas
overseas shall be equipped with a Class 5 or 6 vault door or an equally strong steel
reinforced door and frame. Normally, a Secure Area shall have only one door which
serves as both entrance and exit from the SCIF. If the "travel distance" from the most
remote point in the SCIF to the door exceeds 50 feet, a second door, equal to the
original door, must be installed for life safety purposes. "Travel distance" shall be
measured on the floor along the natural path of travel, starting 1 foot from the most
remote point, curving around any corners or obstructions, and ending at the entrance
doorway. When an SCIF has more than one door, only one should be used for normal
business.
B. Utility openings required for air-conditioning ducts, exhaust fans, and the like, nor-
mally shall not exceed 90 square inches and need not be barred or alarmed. (See
Section 11, paragraph 2A) Utility openings which must exceed 90 square inches shall be
justified by the requestor and approved in writing by the SIO. Approved openings'which
exceed 90 square inches shall be barred with 1h" diameter steel rods, placed 5 inches on
center vertically and horizontally, and either securely imbedded into the SC IF wall to a
minimum depth of 3 inches or be welded to adjacent steel plates. If excessive moisture is
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present in the vent opening, stainless steel bars 1/2" in diameter may be used instead of
the normal steel bars; the stainless steel bars must be affixed in the same manner as
normal steel bars.
C. Windows:
(1) Within the United States: Windows readily accessible will be protected against
forced entry and alarmed as described in Section 111. If the facility is located in a
high crime or risk area, or in one that is subject to civil disorders, steel bars as
described in Annex D will be used on the accessible windows in addition to the
alarms.
(2) Outside the United States: All windows will be protected against forced entry as
described in Annex D.
3. ACCESS:
Access will be monitored or prevented by any one of those means described in Section V.
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SOUND ATTENUATION CLASSIFICATIONS
1. This Annex provides information to be used as acoustic isolation criteria (voice range only)
for construction of SCIFs.
2. The term "Sound Transmission Class" (STC) is used in architectural acoustics to describe
the transmission attenuation afforded by various wall materials and other building compo-
nents expressed in decibels (db). The following transmission attenuation groups have been
set up to satisfy the normal security requirements of facilities used for SCI activities.
A. Sound Group I ................................
B. Sound Group 2 ................................
C. Sound Group 3 ................................
D. Sound Group 4 ................................
30 or Better STC. Loud speech can be understood
fairly well. Normal speech cannot be easily
understood with the unaided human ear.
40 or better STC. Loud speech can be heard, but
is hardly intelligible. Normal speech can be heard
only faintly if at all with the unaided human ear.
45 or better STC. Loud speech can be faintly
heard but not understood. Normal speech is
inaudible with the unaided human ear.
50 or better STC. Very loud sounds, such as loud
singing, brass music or a radio at full volume, can
be heard only faintly or not at all with the un-
aided human ear.
Building Areas Sound
and Functions Group
Office Space
Executive suite .......................................................... 3
Private Offices .......................................................... 3
Open Workspace ........................................................ 3
"Lab" ........................................................................ 2
Conference Rooms
Briefing or Conference Rooms .................................. 3
Training-Plans Room .............................................. 3
Conference rooms with movable partition (includ-
ing movable partition) .............................................. 3
Auditoriums
Auditorium with sound reinforcement (No speakers
on common wall) ........................................................ 4
Auditorium without sound reinforcement ................ 3
Projection Rooms .......................................................... 3
4. Because of the variety of ways that sound can be transmitted through a solid or semi-solid
surface, it is impractical to attempt to provide construction standards that will guarantee
satisfactory sound attenuation in all situations. If a problem exists or if new construction is
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planned, the professional guidance of a qualified architect or sound engineer should be
sought. If general background information is desired, it can be found in the sixth edition
of Architectural Graphic Standards, published by John Wiley & Co., on pages 502
through 516.
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1. TYPE A
r-A I ~ II
LIZ
The steel frame must be a minimum of 3/8" thick by 3 inches wide. The steel bars must be
a minimum of 'h" in diameter and placed not more than 5 inches apart vertically. The
horizontal steel supports must be a minimum of 1/a" thick by 11/2 inches wide and placed not
more than 18 inches apart. The horizontal supports are to be drilled so that the vertical bars
can be passed through them and be spot welded in place prior to installation. All joinings of
frame, bars and supports, at top bottom or sides must be by welding. Frame must be held in
masonry opening by using masonry anchors and steel screws that are not less than 3/8" in
diameter by 3 inches long, with screw heads welded to frame. Screws and expanding anchors
are to be located in the center of the frame width and placed every 12 inches around the entire
frame; top, sides, and bottom.
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~-l
Steel bars must be a minimum of 1/2" diameter and placed not more than 5 inches apart,
vertically. Horizontal steel supports must be a minimum of '/a" thick by 1'h inches wide and
placed not more than 18 inches apart. The horizontal supports are to be drilled so that the
vertical bars can be passed through them and be spot welded in place prior to installation. The
ends of each vertical bar will be embedded in the masonry a minimum depth of 3 inches. The
entire bar work will be located back in the masonry opening at least 4 inches.
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TYPE C iI
I
,
1 ,
One-half inch diameter steel bars are used to form a grill work that is to be imbedded
into the masonry wall around the window opening. Vertically the bars must be no more than 5
inches apart; horizontally, no more than 18 inches apart. Horizontally, bars must be welded to
each vertical bar. The point where bar ends, both vertical and horizontal, enter the masonry
must be a minimum of-4 inches from the edge of the opening. The angled bar ends should
extend into the masonry a minimum of 4` inches, with the bent end being a minimum of 3
inches.
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MINIMUM SPECIFICATIONS FOR LOCALLY
FABRICATED OR LOCALLY AVAILABLE
MAIN ENTRANCE AND EMERGENCY EXIT DOORS
1. Locally Available or Locally Fabricated Main-Entrance Doors:
a. Metal-clad type, minimum 16 gauge face, or
b. Solid-wood door with a minimum thickness of 13/4 inches, and
c. Both doors above shall be equipped with a pneumatic door closer and the following or
equal: An approved Group I combination lock with an extension 50 and backed with
appropriate drill-resistant '/a" thick hard plate. Install the hard plate between the body
of the lock and the interior side of the door. Weld all hinge pins, top and bottom, to their
respective hinges when doors are installed with hinge pins located on the exterior face of
the door. Otherwise, each hinge pin must be secured by a setscrew threaded through one
point of the hinge pin proper. Position the setscrew to prevent access (or removal) of it
when the door is closed.
2. Flat-sill fire doors having a half hour to one hour rating are authorized provided that the
appropriate hard plate exists around the lock and that the door has an emergency escape
device shield or a round door knob.
3. Doors for Secure Working Areas and Continuous Operation Facilities:
a. Install a perimeter door having enough strength to prevent its being forcefully entered
without leaving evidence of such entry.
b. These doors above must be equipped with a pneumatic door closer and the following or
equal: An approved Group 1 combination lock with an extension 50 and backed with
appropriate drill-resistant '/s" thick hard plate. Install the hard plate between the body
of the lock and the interior side of the door. Weld all hinge pins, top and bottom, to their
respective hinges when doors are installed with hinge pins located on the exterior face of
the door. Otherwise, each hinge pin must be secured by a setscrew threaded through one
point of the hinge pin proper. Position the setscrew to prevent access (or removal) of it
when the door is closed.
4. Access-Control Doors: The use of a vault door for controlling access to a facility is not
authorized as this type of continued use will create undue wear on the door and will
eventually weaken the locking mechanism, cause malfunctioning of the emergency-escape
device, and become a security and safety hazard. To preclude this install a second door for
access during duty hours. Use the doors listed in la and lb above for this purpose. Equip
access-control doors with pneumatic door closers.
5. Emergency Exits: An emergency-exit door must provide protection equivalent to the door
prescribed for the entrance of the facility. However, when a prescribed door cannot be
obtained, a door constructed according to the specifications outlined in paragraph 6, this
Annex, is acceptable as an emergency exit. Emergency exit doors may be modified as
follows:
a. "Panic hardware" may be substituted for the approved Group I combination lock
providing that the door is equipped with metal brackets and a center-door-mounted,
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removable metal bar which can be secured to the wall. The metal bar must be in place
and appropriately secured during nonduty hours.
b. Approved emergency-exit control locks may be used instead of the "panic hardware"
and metal bars or the Group I combination lock.
c. When an emergency-exit control lock is used to secure double emergency doors, the
unused leaf must be deadbolted top and bottom from the inside. The movable leaf shall
also be equipped with an astragal strip.
d. Vault doors, equipped with escape devices, do not require the modifications stated in
paragraph 5a and 5b above.
6. Locally Fabricated Steel Secondary or Emergency Exit Doors for Vaults and Secure Areas:
a. The door will be a single steel panel not exceeding 4 feet in width or 8 feet in height.
The minimum panel thickness should be '/a" for secure areas and 1/2" for vault areas.
b. The door frame is to be constructed of steel at least 1/s" thick for secure areas and 1/a"
thick for vault areas. The door stop must be continuously welded to the frame. It may be
a solid block of metal (Detail B) or a "U" channel (Detail A); however the stop must
extend out from the frame sufficiently to allow at least a one inch contact with the door
panel at sides and top. The frame should extend over the wall, sides and top, a minimum
of 4 inches.
c. Normally doors of this type must open outward for safety reasons and, therefore, the
hinges are on the outside. Heavy duty steel hinges will be used, at least three per door
panel. These hinges should be welded to the panel and frame, and the hinge pins welded
to the butts.
d. Four steel bar holding brackets, at least 4 inches wide and '/a" thick, will be welded to
the inside of the door in the approximate location shown on the attached drawing. The
top two brackets are to be positioned approximately one third of the distance from the
top to the bottom of the door, the bottom brackets two thirds of the same distance.
e. Two steel bars are to be made (Detail C) for placement in the brackets. The bars can be
constructed of two steel angles or "U" channels welded together and, when completed,
should be approximately 3 inches to 4 inches square. The length of the bars will be such
that, when in place, they provide a close fit in the door jamb, overlapping the door
stop/mullion by 1 inch or more.
f. The bars and brackets are to be drilled at a downward angle to accommodate '/a" steel
pins. The pins are to be sufficiently long to bottom out in the inside of the bars and are
to be secured with chains welded or otherwise attached to the door jamb; attachment is
to keep the pins from being lost. The fit of the pins must permit ready removal by hand.
g. Spacer blocks are to be provided with each of the bar and bracket units. These blocks
serve to cause a proper, snug fit of the bars when in place. The blocks may be of either
steel or wood. If steel, they may be welded to the bars; if wood, they may be drilled and
attached with bolts.
h. Detail A depicts a means of securing a door frame to a light secure area type wall, such
as wood studs and dry wall reinforced with steel or expanded metal. A "U" channel or
two angles are adjusted and welded together to form the frame around the wall opening.
It is then bolted in place by the use of carriage bolts having their rivet-like heads on the
outside and the nut on the inside. The bolts at the nut end will be peened over or spot
welded to preclude tampering. The bolts should be at least 3/s" in diameter and installed
so that their heads fit tight and flush against the outside of the frame. Bolts will be
installed in both sides and top of the frame and spaced approximately 18 inches apart.
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i. Detail B depicts a suggested method for installing a frame in a masonry wall. Pieces of
steel 11h inches to 2 inches wide by '/s" thick are formed as shown and grouted into the
masonry of the door opening every 12 inches to 18 inches at both sides and top. The hole
in the end, kept flush with the opening, will be drilled and tapped to receive the screw
selected. This screw should be of steel, 3/8" or more in diameter, and will be long enough
to extend through all three pieces of metal. Two angles, as shown in the detail, are then
put in place and screwed together. The door stop, be it a solid block or "U" channel, is
then continuously welded in place on both sides and top of the frame. This method of
installing a steel door frame is extremely effective from the standpoint of strength. If
the steel piece is not used, a 3/s" diameter steel lag bolt, shaped in an L, may be grouted
into the masonry with its threaded end out. The two angles are then installed with holes
to permit the threaded end to protrude through them and a nut is used to bolt the frame
in place. This method is as effective, but is more unsightly and personnel passing
through the door are apt to catch clothing on the protruding bolt ends.
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Side View View of inside Door
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TECHNICAL SECURITY
1. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES: TSCM inspections and sur-
veys will be conducted as specified by cognizant SIOs for the SCIFs involved.
2. COMPUTER SECURITY: All automatic data-processing equipment used to handle or
store SCI will be operated in compliance with DCID 1/16 (Security of Foreign Intel-
ligence in Automated Data Processing Systems and Networks).
3. COMPROMISING EMANATIONS CONTROL: All equipment used to transmit or proc-
ess SCI electronically, including communications, word-processing, and automatic data-
processing systems and equipment, must satisfy the requirements of USCSB 4-11 (Na-
tional Policy on Control of Compromising Emanations). (See appendix D.) All
compromising emanations must be contained within boundaries specified by the TEM-
PEST accreditation authority.
4. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT: Personally owned electronic equipment shall not be in-
troduced into an SCIF.
29
For Official Use Only
Approved For Release 2009/02/20: CIA-RDP89B01354R000100170011-1