INTELLIGENCE AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER--MEETING WITH MG STEVEN NICHOLS, NIO/GPF, 19 MARCH 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01330R000400750026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 19, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750026-4
T` C_' I - J
19 March 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--Meeting with MG Steven Nichols,
NIO/GPF, 19 March 1986
1. I visited with General Nichols in his office at CIA Headquarters. I
gave him some background on the project, including selection of the topic by
Mr. Casey, and said I wanted to get his views about the content and approach
for its study.
2. Nichols said that, for starters, it would be good to cite historical
examples of the force multiplier effect. Beyond this, new technologies for
intelligence collection would be relevant and fruitful area for
investigation. He commented that in this area, however, Mr. Casey had been
oversold by George Keyworth who claimed that certain applications--e.g., using
synthetic aperture radars, lasers, and microwave technology--were "on the
shelf" whereas they really hadn't gotten out of the laboratories. Nichols
said that on this issue he had gone "round and round" with the DCI who was
said to be always very eager to exploit advanced technologies.
3. In terms of ground forces, Nichols said that the CINCEUR, General
Rogers, was a leading advocate of the "force multiplier" in the main battle
area. His concept for "Follow-On Forces Attack" (or "FOFA") require the use
of intelligence systems for the location, disruption, and destruction of
expanded the enemy's rear echelons. The relevant issue in the naval area was
how to best keep abreast of the enemy submarine force in order "to permit more
of the army to get to Europe." Nichols said he didn't have any insights about
air or strategic warfare.
4. Nichols said that tactical commanders are, at best, skeptical that
they will get the wartime intelligence support that they need. For years
they've been told that they just have to ask for whatever battlefield imagery
or Elint they want--but they never get it. If they do, it's too old. The
Army has its own battlefield capability for voice intercept and DF
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750026-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750026-4
SECRET
5. Nichols concluded that the study would be "very good", especially
given the DCI's interest. He said he would be willing to informally review
its TOR. In any case, he said that a visit with Army ACSI, General Weinstein,
is a must. Weinstein is a vast resource for ideas about the relationship of
intelligence to military doctrine, roles, and missions. He didn't think that
General Perroots would be very informative beyond broad conceptual notions
about the topic. Nichols also recommended that I contact his predecesser, Ted
Atkeson, now with the General Research Corporation.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750026-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750026-4
,)Lk ,ML I
SUBJECT: Meeting with MG Steven Nichols, NIO/GPF, 19 March 1986
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - VC/CIPC
1 - ES/CIPC
1-
1
1-
1 - CIPC/Chrono
DCI/ICS/CIP(
(19 Mar 86)
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750026-4