WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--17 OCTOBER-6 NOVEMBER 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01330R000300480007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 31, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D,C 20505
Critical Intelligence Problems Committee
31 October 1985
DDW-137, 138, and 139
WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--17 October-6 November 1985
CIPC Organizational Activities
? As reported in DDW-136, the Chairman, WSSIC, is sponsoring a meeting of
the Chairmen and Executive Secretaries from several DCI production and
25X1 collection communities. The DDCI and the ADDI will be in attendance. The
25X1 rda?1 for this meeting has been changed to 4 November at 1400
(Attachment 1).
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The Narcotics Follow-up Report has been received from the print shop and
has been disseminated.
The Terrorism Report has been received from the print shop and is now in
the process of being disseminated.
Our followup response to memorandum on the status of the
recommendations contained in the CIPC Terrorism Study,
has been reviewe
the DCI and returned without comment (Attachment 2).
? Per your request, a copy of the CSEM-FIRF concept paper was provided to
the D/ICS. This paper was also distributed internally for ICS management
review and comment.
- Thus far the only written response to the CSEM conceit paper is from
COMIREX. Aside from a few minor suggestions, thinks the
proposal is "outstanding." Harry thinks it "may be worth a try"
(Attachment 3).
In addition, VC/HUMINT, has advised Willi he is
enthusiastic about the concept and is ready to give it a try.
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WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--17 October-6 November 1985
Once we have received specific written comments from the other
offices, we will have a better understanding on how to proceed next.
? The critical intelligence needs package for the CIPC members' review,
preparatory for the CIPC meeting, is nearing completion and should be
ready for your review by early next week--4 November.
? On 30 October, the 0/ICS requested that we review 45 issue papers prepared
by the Vice President's Terrorism Task Force and identify for him any of
the issue papers that should be brought to his immediate attention
(Attachment 4).
Two of the most significant issue papers recommend the creation of a
National Organization for Combatting Terrorism with a support staff,
and the establishment of a Terrorism Fusion Center at CIA.
2
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IUF JtUKti
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WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR THE DD/ICS--17 October-6 November 1985
25X1 ? On 22 October, attended an American Bar Association breakfast
meeting where Senator Durenberger was the keynote speaker. The subject of
Senator Durenberger's presentation was Congressional oversight of covert
action (Attachment 6).
STAT
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STAT
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SUBJECT: Weekly Activities and Status Report for the DD/ICS--(16 October-
6 November 1985)
Distribution:
1 - DD/ICS
1 - VC/CIPC
1 - ES/CIPC
1 - CIPC/Subject
1 - CIPC/Chrono
DCl/ICS/CIPC
31 Oct 1985
6
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ATTACHMENT 1
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ATTACHMENT 1
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Weapon and.Space Systems Intelligence Committee
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman, COMIREX
Chairman, DDAC
Chairman, CIPCw/
Chairman, HUMINT
Chairman, JAEIC
Chairman, STIC
Chairman, SIGINT
Chairman; TTIC
FROM: Chairman
25X1 SUBJECT: Exchange Meeting
STAT
STAT
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STAT
23 October 1985
This is to confirm the new date for the subject meeting. now
scheduled for 4 November beginning at 1400
I suggest each of the
unairmen spend about 5 minutes with introductions and brief
discussions on current activities, problem areas we have
encountered, and ideas on how we might improve communications
and support each other more effectively. The DDCI and ADDI are
planning to 'oin us. Again, I look forward to seeing you on
4 November.
CON 0 NTIAL
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ATTACHMENT 2
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DCl/ICS
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
85-3834
23 October 1985
Study Recommendations
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Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Status of Actions on CIPC Terrorism
REFERENCES: A. DCL Memorandum for the Director, Intelligence Community
Staff, et al., "The Terrorism Intelligence
Challenge," 18 August 1985
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B. DCI Executive Secretary Memorandum for the Director,
Intelligence Community Staff, et al., "CIPC Study
Entitled 'The Terrorism Intelligence
Challenge,'
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' 21 August 1985
(ER# 85-3258)
In connection
witn the results of the XI's review
of the CIPC Terrorism
Study (Reference A) and in response to the DDCI's assignment of follow-up
responsibility (Reference B), please find attached
date concerning: (a) coordination methoas for collection,
an account of actions to
and (b)
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countermeasures against electronically detonated explo9ive
devices.
STAT
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ilge.-4rEettEr
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ATTACHMENT 3
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Al I ACHMEN I 3
uick Message pgl of 1
STAT
From:
:Subject: 16 October CSEM-FIRF Package
!Received: Thursday 10/24/85 at 10:35 A.M.
!Select Action - Send Quick Message Reply
* Forward to another Recipient
- Delete Message from the In Basket
!Message:
!Subject package
!which will come up to you via our copy after
!HCE says (effusively) "may be
in totality is OUTSTANDING! I have a few minor suggestions
has had a quick look. Even
worth a try." Am much interested in hearing how
!others react. If we proceed, simple examples might be next near-term task.
;
?,
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ATTACHMENT 4
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MIIMUM"1:111 4
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NOTE FOR: D/ICS
FROM: VC/CIPC
SUBJECT: Terrorism Issue Papers
30 October 1985
1. The Executive Director of the Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism has circulated 45 issue papers to the Senior Review
Group. Of these, there are 12 which we believe are of special interest to
25X1 you.
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STAT
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2. Attached please find a brief synopsis of each of these 12 issues,
including any pertinent comments; the 12 issue papers (you might want to 1
particularly at the proposal sections); and a list of all 45 issue papers.
71(7
Attachments: As stated
This memorandum may be
downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
upon removal of attachments.
TS nAie
4\ XV
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ATTACHMENT 2
3
ISSUE PAPER NO.
COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies
SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism
ISSUE: The organization tor combatting terrorism must be compatable
with the overall organizational structure of the U.S.. Government, be
capable of administering the programmatic aspects ot the national
program for combatting terrorism, be able to generate a
counterterrorist strategy, ana provide the operational capability
for oealing tactically with terrorist threats aria incidents. The
existing organization utilizes the interagency approach, ana the two
principal components are the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism
wnich rormulates policy, manages the program, and generally outlines
the counterterrorism strategy; and the Terrorist Incident Working
Group wnich generally operates in a tactical fashion to resoive
threats and incidents in an operational context.
PROPOSAL: The existing interagency approach utilizing the basic
organizations of the interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the
Terrorist Incident Working Group shoulo be retained with the
following modification.
There will be established the position of National Coordinator for
Combatting Terrorism in the National Security Council organization
at the level ot a Senior Director for National Security (Special
Assistant to the President). The coordinator will:
1. Be supported by a small, full-time, dedicated statr.
2. Serve as Chairman of the interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism.
3. Serve as Executive Director of the TIWG.
4. Be responsible for maintaining the programming documents of
tne national program for combatting terrorism.
b. Provide management coordination of the entire national
program for combatting terrorism through the programming uocuments
and the interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
6. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism
other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency
or department.
STAFF CONTACT:
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S RET
ISSUE PAPER NO. 1 1
COGN1hANT ACT1VI.LY: STATE,
DEFENSE, TREASURY, CIA, JCS. FEI
SUBJECT: Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism
ISSUE: All-source intelligence on terrorism shoula be immeaiately
accessible to all appropriate consumers to support both inciaent
management during crises anu the clay-to-clay analytical ano
predictive process. . This accessibility can best be guaranteea by
full-time colocation ot representatives of the collection and
analytical disciplines and, during times of crisis, operational
officers from the action arms ot the Government.
PROPOSAL: 1. An Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism shoulo be
establishea under the Director ot Central Intelligence.
2. This Terrorism Fusion Center shoula be created by the physical_
colocation of the counterterrorism intelligence collection ana
analytical units of the CIA, and providing them with all of the
communications and computer support necessary to link them with all
other appropriate units in the intelligence and policy community.
3. The Center snould be closely connectea to the 24-hour CIA
operations center ana itself have a small rouna-the-clock staff.
4. Positions and support should be proviaed for the rotational
assignment to this Center of other agencies' intelligence personnel,
such as DIA, JSOC, FBI, NSA, ano STATE.
5. In times of crisis, the Center should be capable of accepting
and supporting surge manning from aftectea agencies.
6. In times of crisis or during terrorist inciaents, it will serve
as the intelligence support staft ot the TIWG, CPPG, or other crisis
management groups.
7. When a capability for secure video is available, this tusion
center should be linkea to the operational ana policy centers such
as the MCC ano the WHSR through this system.
STAFF CONTACT:
switch)
*40). RV,RccIkk
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ISSUE PAPE( NO. I 9
COGNILANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, JUSTICE, NSC, CIA
SUBJECT: Congressional Oversight of Counterterrorist Operations
ISSUE: Current legislation (the War Powers Resolution ana the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment) were well-intenoea, but written before the
recent increase in international terrorist acts against Americans
abroad. Sensitive, time-compresseo counterterrorist operations are
difficult enough to plan and execute within the Executive Branch or
government -- with several agencies involved, particularly State,
DoD, and the CIA -- without attempting to become too involveo in an
elaborate, complex consulting ano reporting function to the
Congress. The current Congressional reporting mechanisms are:
1. War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148 of 1973) -- to
consult "in every possible instance" ano to report within 48 hours
in writing, the introduction of US Armeo Forces into actual or
imminent hostilities.
2. National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 413), Sec. 501 -- to
"keep the ... intelligence committees fully and currently informeo"
of "significant anticipated intelligence activities." (The
Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1961 requires a Presidential "finding" in
each case.)
The applicability of these two overlapping, complex reporting
mechanisms to US military and intelligence community responses to
terrorism is not at all clear. For example: Should a small
military counterterrorist team -- in effect, a military "SWAT" team
-- that "takes down" a hijackeo aircraft overseas be consioereo
"equipped for combat" or involveo in "hostilities" in the sense of
the war Powers Resolution? In other words, does the Executive
Branch have to consult ano/or report on such a counterterrorist
operation?
Could new legislation simplify ano reduce the consulting ana
reporting requirements for counterterrorist operations?. For
example, in the case of TWA 847 an appropriate threshhold for
requirement to report to the Congress might nave been when the
olannea CT operation involveo the possibility of refusal 25X1
rather than execution of such a CT operation
itself. In other woros the possibility of significant diplomatic25X1
repercussions of a CT operation might be a suitaole reporting
"tripwire" -- not the CT operation itself.
PROPOSAL: The National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (Issue
Paper 3) snould convene a working group of State, DOD, CIA, ano DOJ
personnel from within the IG/T which he chairs, to develop
legislative proposals for simpiitieo consulting and reporting
requirements to Congressional Oversight Committee for
Counterterrorist Operations.
STAFF CONTACT:
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ATTACHMENT 4
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
October 16, 1985
MR. NOEL KOCH, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAT
VADM ARTHUR S. MOREAU, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADM J. L. HOLLOWAY, III (USN-RET)
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM
SUBJECT: Issue Papers
Issue Papers have been distributed to all of the members of the
Senior Review Group. As you noticed Issue Paper No. 23 was not
included in order to avoid the entire book being classified Top
Secret. Attached is our Issue Paper No. 23 which being distributed
separately to the cogizant activities.
As you can see it contains sensitive information that should be
given special handling. You should feel free to contact either the
staff contact, or me directly if you have
substantive comments to make on the subject. STAT
Inasmuch we are working on a tight schedule I would ask your
assistance in expediting the responses to all of the Issue Papers by
October 30.
Attachment
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ISSUE PAPER NO. 24
COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, DCI, FBI
SUBJECT: Increased Coordination with Law Enforcement
Elements Domestically and Overseas
ISSUE: A terrorist act is by definition a crime. In combatting
terrorism (tnat is anticipating, preempting, managing, resolving,
punishing), classic intelligence disciplines and liaison
relationships must be supplemented by close relations with local_
police and law enforcement elements. CIA officers are selaom
trained or experienced in police matters, ana tend to feel more
comfortable with intelligence counterparts. FBI legal attaches tend
to deal primarily with the highest echelons of police in their areas
of responsibility, and seldom deal on a continuing basis with
working level officers with counterterrorist responsibilities. The
State Department's Regional Security Officers deal primarily in
areas of physical security and personnel and consular matters (eg.
U.S. citizens arrested or victimized.) There needs to be more
specific attention given to overseas police relations, and in the
United States the broad network of law enforcement professionals
should be exposed to the plans ana requirements of the national
counterterrorism program.
PROPOSAL: Counterterrorism specialists, trained in both
intelligence and police techniques, should be accredited to the
national and local police and law enforcement elements in each
country in which terrorism poses a threat to U.S interests. These
officers, whether they be from CIA, FBI, State or the military,
should have the highest level of training possible, linguistic ana
professional, and should be assigned for tours long enough to
provide considerable continuity. In the U.S., law enforcement
officers shoulo be briefed by counterterrorism specialists, ana
their help solicited.
The DCI snould establish a formal, extensive "exchange tour" program
between analysts, case officers, and CT specialists or the
intelligence community witn analysts ana special agents of the FBI
and with the State Department's Bureaus of Intelligence and Researcn
and Diplomatic Security. Successful completion of a one or two year
tour in this program should be made a prerequisite to selectea
overseas assignment as a CIA CT specialist, FBI Legal Attache in
posts where terrorism is a major threat) or Regional Security
Officer.
The DCI snoula be airectea to take the /eao in torming tnis caure c:
counterterrorism specialists, with officers detailed to it trom
otner agencies and aepartments as appropriate.
The FBI, in consultation with tne intelligence Community, should
develop a program of briefings and instruction on the national
program for combatting terrorism, ano mate this available to
professional law enforcement officers wno attend tne National
Academy at Quantico.
STAFF CONTACT:
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ISSUE PAPER NO. 30
COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: DC1, Fbi
SUBJECT: Terrorism intelligence Analysts
ISSUE: As the tocus on terrorism intensities and 24-hour
anti-terrorist alert centers and watch oesks are created,
collection requirements expanu and the oemano for timely anu
accurate analysis grows proportionately. Yet analysts specializing
in terrorism remain relatively row. They rotate in and out of this
specialty, and tend to limit their view to their own organization's
perspective of the terrorist problem. There is a distinct need to
increase the number ana the qualifications ot terrorism analysts.
PROPOSAL: The National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism should
establish and oversee an interdepartmental career development
program that will encourage a core of intelligence analysts to
devote themselves to addressing terrorism as a specialty. Training,
plans and resources, interagency rotations, exchanges with triendly
governments, and participation in various agency and CINc gaming
evolutions should be included in the program.
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SE IT
31
ISSUE NO.
COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, CIA, NSC, OMB
SUBJECT: Research and Development for Combatting Terrorism
ISSUE: In some cases R&D for combatting terrorism has tended to
fall, betweenagencies. Each agency tends to fund R&D projects of
principal value to itself. Because of lower relative priority, some
proposed terrorism related projects have fallen below the "funded"
threshold. Others that have been funded, tend to duplicate projects
funded by other agencies. In an attempt to coordinate government
R&D for combatting terrorism, two different interagency committees
have emerged: the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) of the
Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and the IR&DC
(Intelligence Research and Development Council), a DCI committee
working with the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism
(IICT). The latter group completed a study in October 1985 of R&D
requirements for intelligence collection and support for
counterterrorism. Coordination between these two interagency groups
has not been complete, altnougn cooperation is steadily improving.
The TSWG has identified an unfunded deficiency of pe25X1
year over the next five years. No agency will assume funding
responsibility, yet each agency agrees that "somebody" should fund
the proposed R&D projects I
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.
The TSWG has proposed supplemental funding for tri
projects, but OMB rejects such a proposal and suggests that 25X1
reprogramming of existing or budgetted funds is required. The
bottom line is that R&D to combat terrorism is inefficiently funded
-- multiple-agency funding of some projects and underfunding of
others.
PROPOSAL: The National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (see
Issue Paper No. 3) should be assigned coordination authority and
responsibility for R&D related to terrorism. His coordination
function would reduce the incidence of duplication in the funding of
terrorism R&D projects and the likehood that worthwhile R&D projects
to combat terrorism go unfunded because of interagency bickering
over funding responsibility.
STAFF CONTACT:
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NOTE FOR: D/ICS
FROM: VC/CIPC
SUBJECT: NSW) on Narcotics
28 October 1985
25X1 1. Attached please find an MFR byL concerning the development
of an NSDD on narcotics and the implica iO f?t?ational security. The DDCI
is aware of the substance of the attached MFR; the topic might be raised by
him in your weekly meeting.
2. The catalyst for this NSDD appears to be a set of DoD-endorsed
recommendations which discuss an expansion of the US military's effort 4gainst
the narcotics traffickers. Among other things, the DoD calls for the
establishment of an all-source drug intelligence fusion center.
25X1 3. the A/NIO/Narcotics, appears concerned that the NSC
drafter may be listening too closely to advocates of a more intensified US
drug interdiction effort, i.e., the Office of the Vice President and the
National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), and may not have
focused on the extant body of Community-endorsed recommendations to improve
na ? ics intelligence contained in the several CIPC narcotics studies.
25X1 will be attending the next MOD meeting this Friday (1 November).
25X1
Attachment: As stated
25X1
?4E-eRET-
25X1
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ATTACHMENT 6
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22 October 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Senator Durenberger Remarks at ABA Breakfast Meeting,
22 October 1985
1. The Chairman, SSCI, was tne guest speaker at tne monthly breakfast of
the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Law and National
Security. I was a guest of one of the committee's members.
2. Durenberger's subject was Congressional oversight of covert action.
He said that both the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Oversight Act
are not designed for, but might be applicable to, terrorist situations.
Although it is absolutely crucial that planning be done quickly for the
application of the most appropriate military forces or intelligence assets in
such situations, there is still great value in incorporating secure
consultations with the Congress in the planning process. In particular, the
opportunity that such consultations present for gauging public and
Congressional support after an action becomes public. Durenberger
acknowledged that a source of some cdnfusion is tne absence of provisions in
the laws covering whom the President should consult--i.e., how to handle
Congressional notification. He concluded that, as sucn, the laws actually
inhibit, rather than encourage, executive-legislative consultations.
3. Durenberger seemed to be most concerned about large-scale paramilitary
activities with overt US involvement. He said US activity in Nicaragua--a
phenomenon he described as "overt-covert action"--crowds out just about
everything else the oversight committees do. He said the committees can't
engage in open debate of the Administration's policies because, despite their
public scrutiny, they constitute covert action.
4. Durenberger's closing comments: The SSCI hasn't yet received a
detailed briefing on the Achille Lauro incident. He fears that the
Administration will continue to "slignt" the oversignt committees on
counterterrorist actions. This, in turn, is likely to result in legislation
containing certain parameters for the Administration's policies--he sees a
need for a formalized notification process. The SSCI is sponsoring a series
of seminars to consider tnese issues.
UNCLASSIFIED
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STAT
SUBJECT: Senator Durenberger Remarks at ABA Breakfast Meeting,
22 October 1985
2
UNCLASSIFIED
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