U-2 PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00980R000600040008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 15, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: 1.1-2 Program
July 15, 1966
The diminishing number of operationally available 1.1-2
aircraft has been a subject of continuous review for the
past two years. Although the loss of four aircraft during
the f:1 -it six months of this year has not signifiCantly
influenced the overall aircraft attrition rate (see Tab 1),
it has impacted seriously on the operational capability.
On the basis of the past ten years of experience, the
current world situation, and the expectations of world
developments over the foreseeable future, it is reasonable
to expect continuing requirements for U-2 photographic
reconnaissance in a number of different areas of the world
(see Tab 2). Our present U-2 inventory will provide a
reasonably adequate capability to accomplish the required
missions for li to 2 years. To do so, however, very close
management control of the assets to provide efficient opera-
tional utilization will be required. Beyond the two-year
time period, we do not expect, because of the anticipated
attrition rate, to have sufficient aircraft to conduct the
expected operational missions.
IDEALIST
TOP SECRET
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The present U-2 assets are:
1. Assigned to CIA 6
2. Assigned to SAC 8
3. Being Modified 2
4. Assigned to AFSC 4 (These aircraft are
?in various test configurations rather than operational
configurations. Two aircraft are of the two-seat configuration.)
Due to the limited number of operational aircraft, we
have investigatqd the feasibility and 'desirability of bringing
all aircraft under one operational management while still
maintaining both CIA and SAC programs. There are serious
constraints which militate against such a management arrange-
ment. For example, due to the difference in operational
environments, the CIA and SAC aircraft are not identical
in basic payload and defensive systems-configurations. Also,
serious problems would arise in the command and control
and security aspects of that arrangement because of the
overt and clandestine requirements.
There are, however, actions which can be taken to
optimize utilization of the operational aircraft. Some
of these actions have been taken. Thus we
modifying the SAC airplanes
(see Tab 3) to
tion (with the J-75 engine installation) to
of aircraft between CIA and SAC when their
are presently
the 1J-2C configura-
permit the exchange
respective assets
are insufficient to meet operational requirements. Additional
measures in aircraft .modifications are being accomplished
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which will provide a maximum interchangeability of these
? assets with improved flight safety.
Because our total U-2 inventory is quite low even with
a capability for maximum interchangeability of aircraft'
between CIA and SAC, it is prudent to review the opera-
tional requirements and to determine the allocation of
aircraft consistent with these requirements and available
assets. CIA has two primary missions:
overflight coverage of
COMOR targets in China and North Korea and maintaining a
dual staging capability at Edwards AFB for world-Wide
deployments as required. This dual staging capability
requirement Includes the ability to operate the U-2 from
aircraft carriers. To accomplish these missions, CIA has
six U-2s (one of which is on bailment to Lockheed for a
continuing test and product improvement program), and
14 pilots
The SAC missions include the coverage of COMOR targets in
Cuba; DIA, COMOR, and COMUSMACV targets in Southeast Asia;
alert commitments for worldwide deployment; back-up of the
Air Weather Service air sampling missions; and training of
all new pilots
being introduced
into the U-2 program. SAC has eight available aircraft and
24 to 26 pilots to fulfill these missions.
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As the result of a review of the mission requirements
and available assets, the following comments are relevant:
1. SAC now has a minimum practical number (eight)
of aircraft available for mission accomplishment. Two of
these are
for coverage of Southeast Asia in
response to both theatre and Washington Headquarters
requirements; one is maintained in operational readiness
at Barksdale AFB and is used for coverage of Cuba in
respo ,e to national requirements. The remaining five
are at Davis Monthan AFB and are employed for rotation of
aircraft in ,South Vietnam, support of Air Weather Service,
air sampling missions, and for the training of new pilots
being introduced into the program as well as for the main-
tenance of proficiency of the SAC pilots assigned to the
program.
2. CIA does not now possess an adequate aircraft
inventory to maintain the entire as well
as the dual staging capability at Edwards.
One of the
aircraft at Edwards is assigned to Lockheed for testing
which is relevant to the improvement of both the CIA and
SAC programs. There are three aircraft at Edwards which not
only must be responsive to the requirement for dual staging
capability, but also for use in continuing proficiency of
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the CIA pilots
In the past, there
.has not been a demand to exercise dual staging. To be able
to accomplish this would require a minimum of four aircraft'
at Edwards. In view of the present low inventory of U-2s,
it would seem essential to recognize history and to recon-
sider whether the requirement for a second staging capability
is valid. If such reconsideration proves the requirement
to be valid, we must recognize that the capability does not
exist with our present assets. Furthermore, consideration
The Air Force Systems Command's four U-2's are a source
for adding to the inventory for operational reconnaissance.
AFSC has four U-2's engaged in high altitude test and research
programs (see Tab 4). While it is recognized that these
research programs play a significant role in the long range
development of future systems, the need to augment the
operational forces to the minimal acceptable level must be
given priority. To provide AFSC the opportunity for program
planning and maximum utilization of the test vehicles, trans-
fer of the U-2's should be done on a scheduled basis rather
than acquired at random to compensate for operational losses.
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One of the four aircraft from AFSC should be turned over
for modifications immediately. A second aircraft may be
required at the end of the current modification line if
attrition losses so dictate. It is anticipated that these
aircraft can be replaced in two to three years with the
.U-2C's,if a U-2R is built. The U-2C will provide improved
performance characteristics over the
increase the test capability at that
U-2A's and, hence,
time.
3. The present low inventory of. U-2's, the antici-
pated need for the use of this aircraft, a continuation of
present requirements, the possibility of new requirements
in various parts of the world, and the increased hostility
of certain operational environments strongly
need for additional procurement now. Growth
air defense suggests that any newly procured
indicate the
in the enemy's
aircraft must
have abetter performance and better survival potential.
The Lockheed U-2R proposal offers the desired product
improvement design and probably reaches the maximum per-
formance envelope we can hope to obtain in a subsonic
vehicle. If a decision is made to go ahead with the buy,
the amount and the rate of procurement will have to be
determined by a careful examination of available funds.
This is the subject of a separate paper to be developed
PFR1R
in coordination with CIA and Alet0106. The
determination of how to use the U-2R's as they come out
of production and also how to employ the remaining inventory
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of U-2C's are questions which need not be addressed at
this time and can, in fact, be better addressed some
months hence.
Conclusions.
The diminishing inventory of operationally available
U-2 aircraft requires the following re-adjustments and
procedures:
? 1. The assignment of an additional airplane to CIA
to bring the complement
2. A reconsideration of the requirement for dual
staging capability by CIA at Edwards. History suggests
that this requirement may be excessive, or if it is not,
the present inventory cannot support it.
4. CIA and AFIC10=-8 are already making every effort
to insure the interchangeability of SAC and CIA aircraft
through close consultation prior to making modifications
designed to improve safety and survivability. This is
important and should be continued.
5. One (perhaps two) of the 13-2's assigned to AFSC
will be required in the operational units within the next
year.
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6. A new tr-2 buy should be initiated immediately.
Recommendation.
That the foregoing conclusions be approved.
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U-2 ATTRITION
ATTRITION RATE
YEAR
AIRCRAFT LOST
1955
0
0.00
1956
4
2.83
1957
5
..3.73
1958
4
3.81
1959
0
2.94
1960
2
2.87
1961
2
2.65
1962
4
2.83
1963
2
2.73
1964
5
2.97
1965
3
2.98
1966 (thru 30 June)
4
3.21
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TAB 2
e, Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP89130098061000600040008-7
Extract from, NRO Paper to the President's Foreign Intelligenqg
Advisory Board Submitted on February 4, 1966.
On the basis of the past nine years of experience, the
current world situation, and the expectations of world develop-
ments over the foreseeable future (two-to-three years), it is
reasonable to expect continuing requirements for U-2 photo-
graphic reconnaissance under a number of different areas of
the world. These requirements can be grouped into three general
categories:
(a) Strategic covert reconnaissance of areas not
heavily defended by surface-to-air missiles. Included in this
category are certain areas of Communitit China, the Sino-Indian
border,
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(b) Prompt coverage of criSis situations where de-
fenses permit. Included in this category are situations previously
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experienced in areas such as Cyprus, India-Pakistan, and
Cuba. Included in the crisis management program is the
capability to monitor the course of developments on a fre-
quent basis with rapid exploitation of the collected photo-
graphic intelligence.
(c) In support of tactical reconnaissance in situa-
tions such as Laos and North Vietnam where the 13-2 can be used
to get the basic photographic coverage, keep abreast of develop-
1'72.
itiAM2007.
ments, and provide intelligence support a;14,44.Q.maa;-a.a.gvreconnais-
samce conducted by friendly forces actually engaged in tactical
operations.
Through long experience, the 13-2 has proven to be an
economical means to obtain high resolution photographic re-
connaissance on a prompt basis. Because of the aircraft alti-
tude and range performance capabilities, it can, in certain
situations, permit sufficient flexibility in flight planning
to accommodate U.S. political restraints while still achieving
the objective. In addition, the range of the aircraft and the
flexibility of the ground support system, make it possible to
conduct orderly reconnaissance on relatively short notice and
with a minimum of political difficulties.
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11-2 MODIFICATION SCHEDULE
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