CORONA PROGRAM HISTORY VOLUME I PROGRAM OVERVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00980R000500070001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 94
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 19, 1976
• Content Type: RP

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CORONA HISTORY
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CORONA PROGRAM HISTORY
PROGRAM OVERVIEW
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This volume consists of 90 pages.
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Throughout the past fourteen years, earth satellite reconnaissance, particularly imagery reconnaissance
has provided strategic intelligence at each key juncture in international affairs. This includes from exposure
of the "missile gap myth" to the current verification of the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) Agreements. It
was primarily through our reconnaissance intelligence technology that we were able to monitor and answer
these types of vital questions to our national security. Without this independent means of obtaining
continued, reliable, and hard intelligence, the course of history would likely have been quite different.
Although this series of reports entitled "CORONA Program History" was prepared and compiled by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), it received textual input, illustrations, and supportive data from the many
contractors and government agencies who combined to make the CORONA Program a success. In particular
as CORONA was the pioneer and the first of our earth satellite photographic reconnaissance systems, it is
important that the story of this program and its contributions be written and preserved for the day it can be
released to the general public.
This version of the history of CORONA has been written as a memoir of the views of the Central
Intelligence Agency and their role and interaction with the organizations involved in this program. Of special
significance was the association and knowledge between CIA and the different staff and working levels of the
Executive Branch, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Department of Defense (DoD), United States
Air Force (USAF), Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), and the main contractors which include 25X1
and Douglas Aircraft. The "CORONA Program History" has been produced in five volumes.
The first volume is a summarization of CORONA. The remaining four volumes present a more qualitative
account of the key phases outlined in Volume I. More specifically, Volume I provides an overview of the
CORONA Program based upon the recollections of key CIA people; Volume II presents greater detail regarding
governmental activities; Volume III discusses the camera systems and contractors; Volume IV addresses
recovery and recovery system contractors; and Volume V summarizes vehicle integration and the major role of
the satellite vehicle integration contractor (SVIC) .
The context of this series of reports is a consolidation of miscellaneous pieces of data, memos, letters,
and results of personal interviews which have been resurrected and, therefore, are no longer part of any
single official file within the National Reconnaissance Program.
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Several factors have been excluded from this history, as the primary purpose was to present the story of
the evolution of the different subsystems involved in CORONA operations during Its fourteen years of
development and service. Although some of these are briefly mentioned or referenced, there is no detailed
discussions on the exploitation results on a mission-by-mission basis; specialized target requirements
(color/infrared/black and white, stereo/mono, coverage frequency, etc.); independent photointerpretation
quality studies after each system modification (change in film type, use of interchangeable filters, varying
exposures on-orbit, improved optics, etc.); reproduction of material and dissemination to user community to
include equipment, personnel, volume, cost, response time, different photo-chemistry and film combination
problems, faster processing techniques, quality control through automated and manual means; logistics to
include transportation, security, funding, coordination support, vehicles, etc; and documentation through
mission evaluation reports and studies. However, much of this information is available at the facilities
tasked with the responsibility for that particular phase of the mission. The photographic reproduction of the
CORONA product was assigned to the Hawkeye (black and white) and Lincoln (color) Plants at Eastman Kodak
and at the Air Force Special Projects Production Facility, Westover Air Force Base. "Processing and
Duplication Reports of the Original Camera Record" of each mission segment were produced by Eastman Kodak.
These reports present the processing history of the original film; technical mission data; physical condition
status of original film when shipped; production data; and miscellaneous information pertinent to that specific
mission.
The exploitation responsibilities were directed to the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC),
Washington, D.C. Two CORONA achievements come immediately to mind when discussing the impact and
significance of this program. The first was the recovery of the first photo reconnaissance product from
DISCOVERER )(IV on 19 August 1960. From this film, photointerpreters were able to show that the Soviets did
not have numerous Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) emplace and pointed toward the United States.
In effect this intelligence ended the high-level concern over the conjecture of the existence of any "missile
gap. " The second was the coverage provided by CORONA which photographically confirmed the claims of
destruction to the Arabs by the Israelis in the Middle East crisis (Six-day War) of 1967. In the photo-
intelligence area, the following exploitation and mission summary information is presently available at the
NPIC Information Library: Mission Plots; Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) and Technical Evaluation
Reports (TEROs) prepared by the Program Office and the Air Force; the Exploitation Product File (EPF) which
lists the third phase intelligence reports on all targets covered by CORONA; the Installation Data File (IDF)
which lists the history of the coverage over each targeted installation; and the OAK Reports which give the
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intelligence readout data on specific priority target requirements for a given mission. Most data and documenta-
tion prior to 1970 are in hard back form, while the results of earlier missions have been transposed to a
microfiche filing system. The original negative from CORONA missions is stored in a respository located in
the Washington D.C. area.
The "CORONA Program History" is dedicated to the men and women in the Government (military and
civilian) and in private industry who made this program a success through individual and collective achievements
in design; engineering; launch, flight, and recovery operations; imagery processing and duplication; system
performance evaluation; and intelligence analysis.
Although many credits are due for compiling, organizing, and reproducing this history, the following are
deserving of special recognition for their significant contributions:
Volume I Kenneth Greer
Volume II Helen Kleyla
Volume III Harold Alpaugh/Maurice Burnett
Volume IV John Baker/Charles Leonard
Volume V William Orton/Kenneth Perryman
A special credit is due to the US Air Force Special Projects Production Facility (AFSPPF) and particularly
Colonels H. Duval and V. Stanley for assistance in the publication of this historic record.
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Page
TITLE PAGE ..................... .
FOREWORD ..............
PICTURE OF VEHICLE LAUNCH .......................................
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PUBLICATION REVIEW ............................ ...... ...... .....
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TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................
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DISTRIBUTION
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SECTION I -
BACKGROUND ...... ......... ................... ...
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SECTION II -
THE EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL PERIOD ......................
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SECTION III -
COVER AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ....................
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SECTION IV -
EARLY DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS .........................
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SECTION V -
SUMMARIES OF EARLY OPERATIONS .......................
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SECTION VI -
SUCCESS!, AN ERA BEGINS .................. .. ... .....
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SECTION VII -
THE DUAL CAMERA SYSTEM, MURAL ......................
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SECTION VIII -
THE TWO BUCKET JANUS CAMERA SYSTEM . ..... . ...........
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SECTION IX -
SUMMARY .. ... ... ..... ..... .....................
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The contribution of the CORONA reconnaissance system is best understood in the light of earlier history
of reconnaissance programs. The U-2, which began operating in the fall of 1956, was expected to have a
relatively short operational life in overflying the Soviet Union, perhaps no more than a year or two. That
expectation was based less on the likelihood of the Soviets perfecting a means of shooting it down than on
a pessimistic estimate of their ability to develop a radar surveillance network capable of reliably tracking
the U-2. With accurate tracking data in hand, the Soviets could file diplomatic protests with enough
supportive evidence to lead to political pressures to discontinue the overflights. As it turned out, the
United States had misjudged the performance characteristics and deployment pattern of the Soviet air
surveillance network. Their radar promptly acquired and continuously tracked the very first U-2 flight
over Soviet territory. The Soviets filed a formal protest within days of the incident; however, operations
were resumed after a temporary standdown.
For nearly four years, the U-2 ranged over much of the world, although only sporadically over the
Soviet Union. The effectiveness of the Soviet radar network was such that each flight risked another protest
and another standdown. Clearly, some means had to be found for accelerating the development of a less
vulnerable reconnaissance system to succeed the U-2. Fortunately, by the time Francis Gary Powers was
shot down near Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960, an alternative means of carrying out photographic reconnaissance
over the Soviet Union was approaching operational readiness. On 19 August 1960, just 110 days after the
downing of the last U-2 engaged in overflight of the Soviet Union, the first successful air catch was made
near Hawaii of a capsule of exposed film ejected from a photographic reconnaissance satellite that had
completed seven passes over denied territory and 17 orbits of the earth. The feat was the culmination of
three years of intensive effort to obtain intelligence from an imagery reconnaissance satellite.
At about the time the U-2 first began overflying the Soviet Union in 1956, the United States Air Force
was embarking on the development of strategic reconnaissance systems employing orbiting satellites in a
variety of collection configurations. The program, which was designated WS-117L, had its origins in 1946
when a requirement was placed on the RAND Corporation for a study of the technical feasibility of orbiting
artificial satellites. The first real breakthrough had come in 1953 when the USAF Scientific Advisory Board
reported to the Air Staff that it was feasible to produce relatively small and lightweight thermonuclear
warheads. As a result of that report, the ATLAS ICBM Program was accorded the highest priority in the Air
Force.
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Since the propulsion required to place a satellite in orbit is of the same general order of magnitude as
that required to launch an ICBM, the achievement of this level of propulsion made it possible to begin thinking
seriously of launching orbital satellites. General Operational Requirement No. 80 was levied in 1955 with
the stated objective of providing continuous surveillance of preselected areas of the world to determine a
potential enemy's war-making capability.
In 1956, the Air Research and Development Command, which had inherited the RAND study program
(Project Feedback) in 1953, assigned the satellite project to its Ballistic Missile Division. The development
plan for WS-117L was approved in July 1956. The program got under way in October 1956 with the awarding
of a contract to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for the development and testing of the system under their
program name PIED PIPER.
The planning for WS-117L contemplated a family of separate systems and subsystems employing
satellites for the collection of photographic, electronic, and infrared intelligence. The program, which was
scheduled to extend beyond 1965, was divided into three phases. Phase I, the THOR-boosted test series,
was to begin in November 1958 and had a primary objective of development/initial testing. Phase II, the
ATLAS-boosted test series, was scheduled to begin in June 1959 with the objective of completing the
transition from the testing phase to the operational phase and of proving the capability of the ATLAS booster
to launch heavy loads into space. Phase III, the operational series, was to begin in March 1960 and was to
consist of three progressively more sophisticated systems: the Pioneer version (photographic and electronic) ,
the Advanced version (photographic and electronic) , and the Surveillance version (photographic, electronic,
and infrared). It was expected that operational control of WS-117L would be transferred to the Strategic
Air Command with the initiation of Phase III.
It was an ambitious and complex program that was pioneering in technical fields about which little was
known. The program suffered greatly from insufficient funding, and not surprisingly, it had become
apparent by the end of 1957 that the program was running behind. It also was in trouble from the standpoint
of security. The U-2 program was carried out in secret from 1956 until May 1960, except from the Soviet
Government of course. The Soviets, however, chose to allow the program to remain a secret from the
general public (and from most of the official community) in preference to publicizing its existence and
thereby admitting that they lacked the means of defending their air space against the high flying U-2.
WS-117L was undertaken as a classified project, although its existence was not concealed. All findings
were reported to and approved by Congress. The press soon began publishing stories on the nature of the
program, correctly identifying it as involving military reconnaissance satellites, and referring to it as
"Big Brother" and "Spy in the Sky. " The publicity was of concern because the development of WS-117L was
begun in a period when the international political climate was hostile to any form of overflight reconnaissance.
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After the successful launch of SPUTNIK I on 4 October 1957, and the initiation by the Senate
Preparedness Subcommittee of an investigation into the United States "missile lag, " there was pressure
from all quarters to accelerate the United States missile and space program and also much public discussion
of civilian versus military control of the space program.
It was against this background that the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities submitted its semi-annual report to the President on 24 October 1957. The Board noted in its report
that it was aware of two advanced reconnaissance systems that were under consideration. One was a study
then in progress in the Central Intelligence Agency concerning the feasibility of a manned reconnaissance
aircraft designed for greatly increased performance and reduced radar cross-section; the other was WS-117L
which at that time included the concept, approach, and much of the technology later used in CORONA. This
had been developed from July - September 1957 at BMD by General Schriever and others. However, there
appeared to be little likelihood that either of these could produce operational systems earlier than mid-1959
unless increased funding was provided and decisive management actions were taken. The Board emphasized
the need for an interim photo reconnaissance system and recommended that an early review be made of new
developments in advanced reconnaissance systems to insure that they were given adequate consideration and
received proper funding and management in the light of pressing intelligence requirements. The Executive
Secretary of the National Security Council on 28 October notified the Secretary of Defense and the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) that the President had asked for a joint report from them on the status of the
advanced systems. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Donald Quarles responded on behalf of himself and
Mr. Allen Dulles on 5 December with a recommendation that because of the extreme sensitivity of the subject,
details on the new systems be furnished through oral briefings.
As a consequence of that proposal, there are few official records in the Project CORONA files bearing
dates between 5 December 1957 and 28 February 1958. It is clear, however, that major decisions were made
and that important actions were undertaken during the period. In brief, it was decided that those portions of
WS-117L, offering the best prospect of early success would be separated from WS-117L. This would be
designated as CORONA and placed under a joint CIA-Air Force management team, an approach that had been
so successful in covertly developing and operating the U-2. Air Force management, particularly Major
General B. A. Schriever, the Commander of the Western Development Division, and Col Fritz C. Oder, the
Program Director for WS-117L, contributed greatly to the CORONA decisions in this time frame as did Dr.
Edwin Land of Polaroid Corporation, Dr. Tames A. Killian, the Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology, and Brigadier General A. J. Goodpaster, the President's Staff Secretary at the White House.
The nucleus of a team was constituted as the Development Projects Staff under the direction of Richard
Bissell, who was Special Assistant to the DCI for Plans and Development. Bissell was designated as the
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senior CIA representative on the new venture; and his Air Force counterpart was Brigadier General Osmund
Ritland, who, as Colonel Ritland, had served as Bissell's first deputy in the early days of the Development
Projects Staff and was then Vice Commander of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division.
Bissell recalls that he first learned of the role intended for him "in an odd and informal way" from
Dr. Edwin Land, with whom he had worked on the development of the U-2 reconnaissance system and who had
come to head a panel of technical consultants informally known as the Land Panel. Bissell also recalls that
his early instructions were extremely vague: that the subsystem was to be developed out of work accomplished
under WS-117L, that it was to be placed under separate covert management, and that the pattern established
for the development of the U-2 was to be followed. Figure 1-1 shows Mr. Bissell and General Ritland, the
organizers of Project CORONA.
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Roughly concurrent with the decision to place one of the WS-117L subsystems under covert management,
the Department of Defense realigned its structure for the management of space activities. The Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was established on 8 February 1958 and was granted authority over all
military space projects. The splitting off of CORONA from WS-117L was accomplished by an ARPA directive
of 28 February 1958 assigning responsibility for the WS-117L program to the Air Force and ordering that the
proposed WS-117L interim reconnaissance system employing THOR boosters be dropped.
The ARPA directive ostensibly cancelling the THOR-boosted interim reconnaissance satellite was followed
by all of the notifications that would normally accompany the cancellation of a military program. The word
was passed officially within the Air Force, and formal contract cancellations were sent out to the prospective
suppliers. Contractors were furious over the suddenness of the action, and Air Force personnel were
thunderstruck at the abandonment of the WS-117L photographic subsystem which seemed to have the best
chance of early success. Subsequent to the cancellation, only a very limited number of individuals in the Air
Force and participating companies were cleared for Project CORONA. These people were informed of the
procedures to be followed in the covert reactivation of the cancelled program.
Although CORONA was removed from WS-117L and placed under separate management as a covert
activity, the original intent was to disguise its real purpose by concealing it as an experimental program
carrying the name, DISCOVERER. DISCOVERER was represented as a scientific program whose findings would
be of value to many related programs. This permitted overt procurement of the necessary boosters, second
stages, and hardware associated with the biomedical cover launches. It also provided an explanation for
the construction of launch and ground control facilities. Only the program components associated with the
true photographic reconnaissance mission had to be procured covertly.
After Bissell and Ritland had worked out the arrangements for the overt cancellation and covert
reactivation of the program, they began to address the technical problems associated with the design
configuration they had inherited from WS-117L. The subsystem contemplated the use of the THOR IRBM as
the first stage booster and, as a second stage, a Lockheed-modified satellite vehicle or spacecraft that had
been designed around the Bell Aircraft engine developed for the B-58 HUSTLER Bomber. It carried the
HUSTLER designation during the development phase of WS-117L but soon came to be known as the AGENA,
the name it bears today.
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Several important design decisions were implemented in this organizational period of CORONA.
Recognizing the need for resolution to meet the intelligence objectives, it was concluded that the previously
developed concept of physical film recovery did indeed offer the most promising approach for a usable
photographic return in the interim time period and should be pursued. This resulted in the design of a
recovery pod or capsule with General Electric selected as the recovery vehicle contractor. The decision
to pursue film recovery proved in retrospect to be one of the most important made in United States reconnaissance
activities. History shows that the crucial decade of the 1960's intelligence needs could not have been served
by the state-of-the-art in readout technology--the alternative concept developed under WS-117L. It should
also be noted that both the manned and unmanned United States space recovery programs which followed have
leaned very heavily on the re-entry technology developed for CORONA.
Other major decisions for the new CORONA Program resulted from a three-day conference in San Mateo,
California, among representatives of CIA, Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, Lockheed, General Electric,
and Fairchild. Discussion at the San Mateo meeting got into the need for immediate contractual arrangements
with the various suppliers. Bissell remarked that he was "faced with the problem at present of being broke"
and would need estimates from all of the suppliers as soon as possible in order to obtain the necessary
financing to get the program under way. The suppliers agreed to furnish the required estimates by the
following week. However following that meeting, the project quickly began taking formal shape. Within
a span of about three weeks, approval of the program and of its financing was obtained, and the design of the
payload configuration evolved. It was at this point in late March and early April that lengthy and serious
consideration of different camera and spacecraft configurations proposed by Fairchild Camera and Instrument
Company (FCIC) and Itek Corporation was culminated. Interest shifted toward the design submitted by the
Itek Corporation (primarily formed from resources of Boston University). Itek proposed a longer focal length
camera which would scan within an earth center stabilized pod. This concept promised substantially better
ground resolution performance. The Itek design was based on the principles of the BU HYAC High Acuity,
Panoramic Camera. Bissell recalls that he personally decided in favor of the Itek design, but only after much
agonizing evaluation. The decision was a difficult one to make because it involved moving from the
previously intended method of space vehicle stabilization to one that was technically more difficult to
accomplish. It did, however, standardize on the three-axis stabilization which was being pursued in the
WS-117L AGENA development and which has been a part of all subsequent photo reconnaissance systems.
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Bissell's first project proposal, which was completed on 9 April 1958, requested approval for concurrent
development of both the Fairchild and the Itek systems, with the Fairchild configuration becoming operational
first and the Itek configuration being developed as a follow-on system. Within two days, however, Bissell
made the final decision to abandon the Fairchild spin-stabilized configuration entirely. He rewrote the
project proposal taking note of the earlier configuration and giving his reasons for favoring the Itek approach
which principally were: the better resolution attainable, the lower overall cost, and the greater potential
for growth. The proposal was rewritten a second time, retaining the Itek configuration but raising the cost
allowance" for 12 THOR boosters and Lockheed second stage vehicles and was to be financed by ARPA
through the Air Force. The remaining $7 million was for covert procurement by CIA of the pods containing
the reconnaissance equipment and the recoverable film cassettes.
The final project proposal was forwarded to Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster, the President's
Staff Secretary, on 16 April 1958 after having been reviewed by Mr. Roy Johnson and Admiral John Clark of
ARPA; Mr. Richard Horner, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development; Brigadier
General Osmund Ritland, Vice Commander, Air Force Ballistic Missile Division; and Dr. James Killian,
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The proposal was approved, although not in
writing. The only original record of the President's approval reportedly was in the form of a handwritten
note on the back of an envelope by General Cabell, then Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
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Although it may have been the original intent that CORONA would be administered in a manner essentially
the same as that of the U-2 program, it actually began and evolved quite differently. It was a joint CIA-
ARPA-Air Force effort, much as the U-2 was a joint CIA-Air Force effort, but it lacked the central direction
that characterized the U-2 program. The project proposal described the anticipated administrative
arrangements, but it fell short of clarifying the delineation of authorities. It noted that CORONA was being
carried out under the authority of ARPA and CIA with the support and participation of the Air Force. CIA's
role was further explained In terms of participating in supervision of the technical development, especially
with regards to the actual reconnaissance equipment, handling all covert procurement, and maintenance of
cover and security. The work statement prepared for Lockheed, the prime contractor, on 25 April 1958 noted
merely that technical direction of the program was the joint responsibility of several agencies of the Government.
0
The imprecise statements of who was to do what in connection with CORONA allowed for a range of
interpretations. The vague assignments of responsibilities caused no appreciable difficulties in the early
years of CORONA when the organization was small and the joint concern was primarily with producing as
promised, but they later (1963-1965) became a source of friction between CIA and the Air Force.
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"The program was started in a marvelously informal manner. Ritland and I worked out the division
of labor between the two organizations as we went along. Decisions were made jointly. There
were so few people involved and their relations were so close that decisions could be and were
made quickly and cleanly. We did not have the problem of having to make compromises or of
endless delays awaiting agreement. After we got fully organized and the contracts had been let,
we began a system of management through monthly suppliers' meetings--as we had done with
the U-2. Ritland and I sat at the end of the table, and I acted as chairman. The group included
two or three people from each of the suppliers. We heard reports of progress and ventilated
problems--especially those involving interfaces among contractors. The program was handled
in an extraordinarily cooperative manner between the Air Force and CIA. Almost all of the people
involved on the Government side were more interested in getting the job done than in claiming
credit or gaining control. "
The schedule of the program, as it had been presented to the CORONA group at its meeting in San Mateo
in late March 1958, called for a "count-down" beginning about the first of July 1958 and extending for a
period of 19 weeks. It was anticipated that the equipment would be assembled, tested, and the first vehicle
launched during that 19-week period, which meant that the fabrication of the individual components would
have had to be completed by 1 July. By the time Bissell submitted his project proposal some three weeks
later, it had become apparent that the earlier scheduling was unrealistic. Bissell noted in his project
proposal that it was not yet possible to establish a firm schedule of delivery dates, but that it appeared
probable that the first firing could be attempted no later than June 1959.
It is pertinent to note here that there was no expectation in 1958 that CORONA would still be operating
over a decade later. The CORONA Program got under way initially as an interim, short-term, relatively low-
risk development to meet the intelligence community's requirements for area search photographic reconnaissance
pending successful development of other more sophisticated systems planned for WS-117L. The original
CORONA proposal anticipated the acquisition of only 12 vehicles, noting that at a later date it might be
desirable to consider whether the program should be extended, with or without further technological
improvement.
Having settled on the desired configuration and having received Presidential approval of the program
and its financing, the CORONA management team moved forward rapidly with the contractual arrangements.
The team of contractors for CORONA differed from the team on the WS-117L as a consequence of selecting
Itek's panoramic camera and the film recovery approach. Itek was brought in as one of the two major sub-
contractors to Lockheed (General Electric being the other) . However, to soften the financial blow to
Fairchild, Itek was made responsible for the design and development of the camera subsystem with Fairchild
producing the camera under subcontract to Itek. This contractor team continued throughout the CORONA
Program, although in 1961 the relationship was changed as a cost savings measure to the Government to that
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Associate Contractors. The contractor relationships on the CORONA Program were as friendly and
cooperative as any that could have been set up, and this team dedication to this program is one of the
primary reasons for the overall success which the program enjoyed. The locations of the Contractor and
Government facilities are shown in Figure 2-1. The final contractors were selected on 25 April, and a work
statement was issued to Lockheed on that date. The contractors began systems design on 28 April and
submitted them for first review on 14 May. The designs were frozen on 26 July 1958.
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It was decided, therefore, to separate the WS-117L photo reconnaissance program into two distinct and
ostensibly unrelated series: one identified as DISCOVERER (CORONA-THOR boost) and the other as SENTRY
(later known as SAMOS-ATLAS boost). A press release announcing the initiation of the DISCOVERER series
was issued in mid-January 1959 identifying the initial launchings as tests of the vehicle itself and later
launchings as explorations of environmental conditions in space. Biomedical specimens, including live
animals, were to be carried into space and their recovery from orbit attempted.
The new CORONA cover concept, from which the press release stemmed, called for a total of five
biomedical vehicles; and three of the five were committed to the schedule under launchings three, four, and
seven. The first two were to carry mice and the third a primate. The two uncommitted vehicles were to be
held in reserve in event of failure of the heavier primate vehicle. In further support of the cover plan, ARPA
was to develop two radiometric payload packages designed specifically to study navigation of space vehicles
and to obtain data useful in the development of an early warning system (the planned MIDAS infrared series) .
It might be noted here that only one (DISCOVERER III) of the three planned animal carrying missions was
actually attempted, and it was a failure. ARPA did develop the radiometric payload packages, and they
were launched as DISCOVERERS XIX and XXI in late 1960 and early 1961.
The photo reconnaissance mission of CORONA necessitated a near polar orbit, either by launching to
the north or to the south. There are few suitable areas in the continental United States where this can be
done without danger of debris from an early in-flight failure falling into populated areas. Cooke Air Force
Base near California's Point Arguello met the requirement for down-range safety because the trajectory of a
southward launch would be over the Santa Barbara channel and the Pacific Ocean beyond. Cooke AFB
was a natural choice because it was the site of the first Air Force operational missile training base and also
housed the 672nd Strategic Missile Squadron (THOR). Two additional factors favored this as the launch area:
(1) manufacturing facilities and skilled personnel required were in the near vicinity, and (2) a southward
launch would permit recovery in the Hawaii area by initiating the ejection/recovery sequence as the satellite
passed over the Alaskan tracking facility. The name of this base was changed from Cooke to Vandenberg AFB
in October 1958. The CORONA launch sequence is shown in Figure 3-2.
Unlike the U-2 flights, launchings of satellites from US soil simply could not be concealed from the
public. Even a booster as small as the THOR (small relative to present day space boosters) launches with a
thunderous roar that can be heard for miles; the space vehicle transmits telemetry that can be intercepted; 25X1
and the vehicle can be detected in orbit by radar skin-track. Although the fact of a launch having been made
could not be concealed, maintenance of the cover story for the DISCOVERER series required that the launchings
of the uniquely configured photographic payloads be closed to observation by uncleared personnel. Vandenberg
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was excellent as a launch site from many standpoints, but there was one feature of it that posed a severe
handicap to screening the actual launches from unwanted observation. This handicap was that the heavily
traveled Southern Pacific railroad passes through it. Operational parameters, including the requirement for
daylight recovery and for seven denied area passes during daylight with acceptable sun angles, dictated a
launch from Vandenberg in the early afternoon. Trains passing through the area broke up this afternoon launch
window into a series of successive windows, some of which were of no more than a few minutes' duration.
Even today, the space program at Vandenberg is plagued by having to time the launches to occur during one
of the intervals between passing trains.
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Recovery presented problems in the early development period and throughout the early operational period.
The planned recovery sequence involved a series of maneuvers, each of which had to be executed to near-
perfection or recovery would fail. Immediately after injection into orbit, the AGENA vehicle was yawed 1800
such that the recovery vehicle faced to the rear. This maneuver minimized the control gas which would be
required for re-entry orientation at the end of the mission and protected the heat shield from what at that time
was a deep concern for molecular heating. (Later in the J-3 design when these concerns had diminished, the
vehicle was flown forward until re-entry.) When re-entry was to take place, the AGENA would then be
pitched down through 60 degrees to position the satellite recovery vehicle (SRV) for retrofiring. Then the SRV
would be separated from the AGENA and spin-stabilized by firing the spin rockets to maintain it in the attitude
given it by the AGENA. Next, the retrorocket would be fired slowing down the SRV into a descent trajectory,
and the spin of the SRV would be cancelled by firing the despin rockets. The retrorocket thrust cone was
then separated, followed by the heat shield and the parachute cover. The drogue (or deceleration) chute
would then deploy, and finally the main chute would open to lower the capsule gently into the recovery area.
The primary recovery technique involved flying an airplane across the top of the descending parachute,
catching the chute or its shrouds in a trapeze-like hook suspended beneath the airplane, and then winching
the recovery vehicle aboard. Initially, C-119 Aircraft were used, but C-130 Aircraft replaced them later in
the program. If the air catch failed, the recovery vehicle was designed to float long enough for a water
recovery by a helicopter launched from a surface ship. Illustrations showing the recovery sequence and the
aerial recovery of the capsule are provided as Figures 4-1 thru 4-3.
While the vehicle was still in the construction stage, tests were conducted of the aerial recovery
technique by the 6593rd Test Squadron with poor results. Of 74 drops using personnel-type chutes, only 49
were recovered. Using one type of operational drop chute, only four were recovered out of 15 dropped,
and an average of 1.5 aircraft passes were required for the hookup. Eleven drops of another type of
operational chute resulted in five recoveries and an average of 2 aircraft passes for the snatch. Part of
the difficulty lay in weak chutes and rigging and crew inexperience; however, the most serious problem
was the fast drop rate of the chutes. Parachutes that were available to support the planned weight
of the recovery vehicle had a sink rate of about 33 feet per second. What was required was a sink rate
approaching 20 feet per second so that the aircraft would have time to make three or four passes, if
necessary, for hookup. Fortunately, by the time space hardware was ready for launching, a parachute had
been developed with a sink rate slow enough to offer a reasonable chance of air recovery.
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The launch facilities at Vandenberg AFB were complete, and the remote tracking and control facilities
which had been developed for WS-117L were ready for the first flight test of a THOR-AGENA combination in
January 1959. The count-down was started for a launch on 21 January; however, the attempt aborted at launch
minus 60 minutes. When power was applied to test the AGENA hydraulic system, certain events took place
that were supposed to occur only in flight. The explosive bolts connecting the AGENA to the THOR detonated,
and the ullage rockets fired. Ullage rockets are small solid propellent rockets attached to the AGENA. These
rockets are fired just prior to ignition of the AGENA engine after its separation from the THOR to insure that
the liquid AGENA propellants are pushed against the bottom of the tanks so that proper flow into the pumps
will occur. The AGENA settled into the fairing attaching it to the THOR but did not fall to the ground,
however appreciable damage was done. A program review conference was held in Palo Alto two days after
the launch failure to examine the possible causes of these events and to assess its impact on the planned
CORONA launch schedule. Fortunately, the problem was quickly identified as a timer malfunction. The
design was corrected, and the system was ready for resumption of test launches at the rate of about one per
month.
General Electric surfaced a new problem with the re-entry vehicle at the review conference having to do
with the stability of the nose cone during re-entry. The cone was designed for a film load of 40 pounds , but
the first missions would only be able to carry 20 pounds. GE reported that about three pounds of ballast
would have to be carried in the forward end of the cone to restore stability. The program officers decided to
add an instrument package as ballast for diagnostic purposes and for support of the biomedical cover story,
thus converting what could have been dead weight into an extra advantage for this test series.
The test plan contemplated arriving at full operational capability at a relatively early date through
sequential testing of the major components of the system; beginning with the THOR-AGENA combination
alone; then adding the nose cone to test the ejection/re-entry/recovery sequence; and finally installing a
camera for a full CORONA systems test. Whatever confidence the project planners had in the imminence of
success at the start, however, soon must have begun to wane. Beginning in February 1959 and extending
through June 1960, an even dozen launches were attempted with eight of these vehicles carrying cameras.
All twelve were failures, and no film capsules were recovered from orbit. Of the eight camera-carrying
vehicles, four failed to achieve orbit. Of the four vehicles that went into orbit, three experienced camera or
film failures, and the fourth was not recovered because of a malfunction of the re-entry body spin rockets.
Section V discusses problems and the solutions reached in the initial and successive launches of the
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The on-pad failure of 21 January 1959 was not assigned a number in the DISCOVERER series, thus the
second launch attempt was assigned number I. DISCOVERER I was launched on 28 February with a light
engineering payload as a test of THOR-AGENA performance. No recovery was planned. For a time there was
uncertainty as to what had happened to it because no radio signals were received. It was believed, on the
basis of exit tracking, to have attained orbit, with speculation that the protective nose cone over the
antennas was ejected just before the AGENA fired and that the AGENA then rammed into the nose cone
damaging the antennas. This was before the term "super velocity" had been invented; today most people
believe that DISCOVERER I landed somewhere near the South Pole.
The second vehicle was launched on 13 April 1959. Orbit was officially announced about two hours
later, along with a statement that the capsule carried a lightweight biomedical payload (as indeed it did) .
The Air Force reported on 15 April that plans to recover the capsule near Hawaii had been abandoned and that
the capsule might descend somewhere in the Arctic. The announcement slightly understated the known facts.
The capsule had ejected on the 17th orbit as planned, but a timing malfunction caused by a human programming
error resulted in the ejection sequence being initiated too early. The capsule was down, probably somewhere
in the near vicinity of the Spitsbergen Island north of Norway. In fact, there were later reports that the
falling capsule had actually been seen by Spitsbergen residents. The Air Force announced on the 16th that
the Norwegian government had authorized a search for the capsule, which would begin the following day.
Planes scoured the area, and helicopters joined the search on the 20th. Nothing was found, however, and
the search was abandoned on the 23rd. There was speculation at the time and some actual reconnaissance
by the Norwegian Air Force which indicated that the capsule may have been recovered by a Soviet rather than
an American recovery team.
The incident later became the subject of a book by Alistair MacLean, Ice Station Zebra, and of a 1968
movie of the same name. The fictionalized version departed rather substantially from the facts, and it is
clear that no one who was involved in the CORONA Program acted as a technical consultant to the film
producer.
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DISCOVERER III
Much publicity attended the launching of DISCOVERER III, some of it planned and some unplanned/
unwanted. This was the first and only DISCOVERER flight to carry animals, four live black mice. Black
mice were chosen in order to ascertain the possible hair-bleaching effects of cosmic rays. The mice were
members of the C-57 strain, a particularly rugged breed. They had been "trained, " along with 60 other mice,
at the Air Force Aeromedical Field Laboratory at Holloman AFB. They were seven to ten weeks old and weighed
slightly over one ounce each. A three day food supply was provided which consisted of a special formula
containing peanuts, oatmeal, gelatin, orange juice, and water. Each mouse was placed in a small individual
cage about twice its size, and each had a miniscule radio strapped to its back to monitor the effects of the
space trip on heart action, respiration, and muscular activity.
The lift-off on 3 June 1959 was uneventful, but instead of injecting approximately horizontally, the
AGENA apparently injected downward driving the vehicle into the Pacific Ocean.
The second try at launch several days later with a backup mouse "crew" was also a near abort when the
capsule life cell humidity sensor suddenly indicated 100 percent relative humidity. The panic button was
pushed and troubleshooters were sent up to check. They found that when the vehicle was in a vertical
position, the humidity sensor was directly beneath the cages and it did not distinguish between plain water
and urine. The cages were dried out and the vehicle launched; however, it again was unsuccessful falling
into the Pacific Ocean.
Also, the timing of the launch was unfortunate. Two monkeys, Able and Baker, had survived a 300 mile
flight in a JUPITER nose cone on 29 May in connection with another unrelated test program. However, Able
died during minor surgery on 3 June to remove an electrode that had been implanted under his skin. The
British Society Against Cruel Sports made a formal protest to the US Ambassador, and the press made an
issue over the fatal mice flight, comparing it unfavorably with the Russians' successful launching of the
dog, Laika, in SPUTNIK II back in November 1957 and demanding that orbit and recovery procedures be perfected
before attempting future launches of mice or monkeys.
This flight, which was launched on 25 June 1959, was the first to carry a camera and was thus the first
true CORONA mission attempt. The payload did not go into orbit because the AGENA failed to reach the
required velocity. The original cover plan had called for launches three and four to carry mice, but because
of the furor raised over the death of the mice on DISCOVERER III, no mice were included. Certain of the
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official records refer to the mission as having carried mechanical mice (vibrators to simulate mouse activity),
but this turns out to have been something that was talked about but never actually tried.
There was one amusing experiment on an early flight, and it may have been on DISCOVERER IV. A means
was needed for concealing the payload doors from inquisitive eyes while the vehicle was on the launch pad.
The scheme that was hurriedly devised was to cover the doors with fairings made of paper under which were
strung two lengths of piano wire with ping pong balls attached to the forward ends of the wires. The thought
was that as the vehicle accelerated during launch, the air flow along the vehicle skin would blow the ping
pong balls to the rear, thus tearing off the paper and exposing the payload doors. The strip-away fairing was
tested by attaching it to the side of a sports car and driving the car at high speed along the Bayshore Freeway
(US Highway 101) late one evening. The test proved two things: (1) that the fairing would tear off as intended,
and (2) that the Freeway patrolmen could easily overtake a vehicle traveling at 90 miles per hour. Since the
test indicated a "go" situation, at 2 a.m. on a foggy, chilly morning under a blaze of floodlights, a few cents
worth of paper, piano wire, and ping pong balls were affixed to a multimillion dollar space vehicle.
In parallel with the paper/ping pang ball fix, a security and environmental shroud was being designed. These
shrouds proved extremely valuable to the program in protecting the sensitive thermal surface from salt water
spray.
DISCOVERER V was launched on 13 August 1959 and attained orbit with a camera payload. The temperature
within the spacecraft was lower than planned, and the camera failed on the first orbit. The recovery capsule
was ejected at the proper time but for reasons then unknown did not show up in the recovery zone. Early in
1960 an unidentified object was discovered in space in a near polar orbit. It was finally determined to be
the recovery capsule of DISCOVERER V. Instead of deboosting it into a descent trajectory, failure of the spin
rockets had caused the retrorockets to accelerate it into a higher orbit with an apogee of 1,058 miles.
The sixth launch was on 19 August 1959. The vehicle achieved orbit, but the camera failed on the
second revolution, and the retrorocket malfunctioned on the recovery attempt.
The next launch was on 7 November 1959. The AGENA failed to go into orbit.
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DISCOVERER VIII
The vehicle was successfully launched on 20 November 1959, but the AGENA inserted into an eccentric
orbit with an apogee of 913 miles. The camera also failed again. The satellite recovery vehicle was ejected
successfully, but the parachute failed to open.
It had become plain by the end of November 1959 that many things had to be done to correct the multiple
failures that were plaguing the CORONA system. Eight THOR-AGENA combinations and five cameras had been
expended with nothing to show for the effort except accumulated knowledge of the system's weaknesses.
The project technicians knew what was going wrong but not always why. Through DISCOVERER VIII, the
system had experienced the following major failures:
A. One misfired on the launch pad.
B. Three failed to achieve orbit.
C. Two went into highly eccentric orbits.
D. One capsule ejected prematurely.
E. Two cameras operated briefly and then failed.
F. One camera failed entirely.
G. One experienced a retrorocket malfunction.
H. One had very low spacecraft temperature.
A panel of consultants reviewed the various failures and their probable causes and concluded that what was
needed most was "qualification, requalification, and multiple testing of component parts" before assembling
them and sending them aloft. This called for more money. Accordingly, Bissell submitted a project
amendment to the DDCI on 22 January 1960 asking approval of an additional to cover the costs
of the testing program. He apologized to General Cabell for submitting a request for funds to pay for work
that was already under way, "Although such a sequence is regrettable, there has been considerable
confusion in this program as to what the amount of the overruns would be and this had made it difficult to
obtain approvals in an orderly fashion in advance. "
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As of the fall of 1959, major problems remained to be solved in achieving an acceptable orbit, in camera
functioning, and in recovering the film capsule. The more serious of the specific failures were:
A. The AGENA vehicle was designed for use with both the THOR and the ATLAS boosters. The
ascent technique used by the AGENA vehicle was essentially the same in both combinations, but there were
significant differences in the method of employing the booster. In the CORONA Program, in order to conserve
weight, the THOR booster followed a programmed trajectory using only its autopilot. Also, the THOR thrust 25X1
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was not cut off by command at a predetermined velocity (as In the ATLAS); instead its fuel burned to near
exhaustion. This relatively inaccurate boosting profile, coupled with the low altitude of CORONA orbits,
imposed severe orbital injection constraints. At a typical injection altitude of 120 miles, an angular error
of plus or minus 1.1 degrees or a velocity deficit of as little as 100 feet per second would result in failure
to complete the first orbit. This had happened repeatedly. Lasting relief from this problem lay some distance
in the future; a more powerful AGENA was being developed, and the weight of instrumentation for measuring
in-flight performance on the early flights would be reduced on later operational missions. The short term
remedy lay in a drastic weight reduction program. This was carried out in part (literally, it is said) by
attacking surplus metal with tin snips and files.
B. To conserve weight the system was designed to operate without pressurization, as a result the
acetate base film was tearing or breaking in the high vacuum existing in space and causing the camera to
jam. A solution for this problem was found in substituting polyester for acetate base film. The importance
to the reconnaissance program of this change in film bases cannot be overemphasized. It ranks on a level
with the development of the film recovery capsule itself.
C. The equipment was built to work best at an even and predetermined temperature. To save
weight, only passive thermal control was provided. The spacecraft's internal temperature had varied on
previous flights, and it was much lower than desired on one flight. An interim solution for this problem was
found in varying the thermal painting of the vehicle skin. Figure 5-1 shows an example of the thermal
painting on a later CORONA system.
D. The spin/despin rockets used to stabilize the recovery vehicle during re-entry had a tendency
to explode rather than merely to fire. Several had blown up in ground tests. A solution was found in
substituting cold gas spin and despin rockets.
E. One of the most intractable problems, which was to persist for many months, was that of placing
the Satellite Recovery Vehicle (SRV) into a descent trajectory that would terminate in the recovery zone. This
required ejecting the SRV from the AGENA at precisely the right time and decelerating it by retrorocket firing
to the correct velocity and at a suitable angle. There was very little margin for error in this phase; one
second of error in ejection timing represented five miles displacement at the recovery point. A retrovelocity
vector error of more than 10 degrees would cause the capsule to miss the recovery zone completely.
A standdown was in effect from 20 November 1959 until 4 February 1960 to allow time for intensive R&D
efforts to identify and eliminate the causes of failure. During this period of problem solving, one amusing
MW
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and innovative design bears mention. A cooler was needed for the fairing interface which was heating up
during ascent. A water receptacle was installed around the leading edge of the fairing, the idea being that
the water would boil during ascent and the steam would carry away the heat. In order to contain the water
and prevent sloshing, something absorbent, soft, and easy to work with was required. After conducting a
test program on various materials, the design engineer chose "Modess because...." The reservoir was
filled using a large hypodermic needle poked through the small holes in the water receptacle. Each hole was
then sealed with wax. DISCOVERER IX was launched on 4 February but failed to achieve orbit.
The first recovery of film from a CORONA vehicle occurred from DISCOVERER X which was launched on
19 February 1960, but in a manner such that no one boasted of it as being a "first." The THOR booster
rocket began to fishtail not long after it left the launch pad and was destroyed by the range safety officer at
52 seconds after lift-off. The payload came down about a mile from Pad 5 and was located by helicopter,
which put down a team to disarm the pyrotechnics and guard the payload until it could be picked up. The
recovery was made by a crew that rode to the scene by jeep. This was one of the few failures for the
remarkable Douglas launch team which prepared the THOR boosters at Vandenberg AFB, although they did
have many exciting moments with the early launches. Several of the crew were holdovers from the German
rocket "broomlighters" who during some of the early German launches would ignite reluctant rocket engines
with kerosene soaked brooms. At Vandenberg AFB they did not have to resort to this tactic, but the "Douglas
Daredevils" were required on numerous occasions to return to the launch pad as late as T-15 seconds to
unfreeze valves.
DISCOVERERS VII through X carried only a quarter of a load of film (10 pounds) to permit the carrying of
additional instrumentation for testing vehicle performance. DISCOVERER XI was launched on 15 April 1960
carrying a camera and 16 pounds of film. A reasonably good orbit was achieved (380 miles at apogee and
109.5 miles at perigee), and the camera operated satisfactorily. All of the film was exposed and transferred
into the recovery capsule. Unfortunately, the problem of the exploding spin rockets, which had been
observed in ground tests, occurred during the recovery sequence and the payload was lost. It might be noted
that this was the first mission on which the camera operated successfully throughout the mission, primarily
because of the change from acetate base to polyester base film.
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Another standdown, this one a major one, was imposed following the failure of DISCOVERER XI. As of
mid April 1960, there had been 11 launches and two aborts on the pad. Seven of the launches achieved orbit,
but no capsules had been recovered. DISCOVERER XII was planned as a diagnostic flight, without camera
payload, heavily instrumented to determine precisely why recovery of capsules had failed previously. The
vehicle was launched on 29 June 1960, but the AGENA failed to go into orbit.
The next flight, on 10 August 1960, was launched as a repeat of the DISCOVERER XII diagnostic flight,
without camera and film. The vehicle was launched and successfully inserted into orbit. The recovery
package was ejected on the 17th orbit, and retrofiring and descent were normal, except that the capsule came
down well away from the planned impact point. The nominal impact area was approximately 250 miles south
of Honolulu where C-119 and C-130 aircraft circled awaiting the capsule's descent. The splash-down
occurred about 330 miles northwest of Hawaii. The airplanes were backed up by surface ships deployed in
a recovery zone with a north-south axis of some 250 miles and an east-west axis extending about 550 miles
to either side of the predicted impact point. Although beyond the range of the airborne recovery aircraft, the
DISCOVERER XIII capsule descended near enough to the staked out zone to permit an attempt at water
recovery. A ship reached the scene before the capsule sank and fished it out of the ocean. Much of the
credit for this achievement was attributed to the successful use of the cold gas spin and despin system.
This type system was initially flown on DISCOVERER XII.
For the first time ever, man had orbited an object in space and recovered it according to plan. This
American space "first" beat the Russians by just nine days. The Soviets had tried to recover SPUTNIK IV
the previous May, but failed when the recovery capsule ejected into a higher orbit. They did succeed in
deorbiting and recovering SPUTNIK V carrying the dogs, Belka and Strelka, on 20 August 1960.
We have all watched television coverage of the US manned spaceflight programs with the recovery of
astronauts and capsules after splash-down in the ocean. A helicopter flies from the recovery ship to the
floating capsule and drops swimmers to attach a line to the capsule. After the astronauts are removed, the
helicopter hoists the capsule from the water and carries it to the recovery ship. What few know is this
recovery technique was developed for and perfected by the CORONA Program as a backup in event of failure
of the air catch.
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photos were released of the lift-off from Vandenberg, of the capsule floating in the ocean, and of the recovery
ship, Haiti Victory. President Eisenhower displayed the capsule to the press, and it was later placed on
exhibit in the Smithsonian Institution for public viewing. The Illustrated London News covered the story as
shown in Figure 5-2.
In ancitipation of the first recovery being a reconnaissance mission, a cover plan had been developed
under which the actual capsule would be switched in transit through Sunnyvale. Since DISCOVERER )(III was
a diagnostic flight, the project office was spared the necessity of executing a clandestine switch of capsules
prior to shipment to Washington; and the President and Smithsonian received the actual hardware from the
first recovery including a flag which President Eisenhower displays in Figure 5-3.
CORONA development had been persistently and energetically pursued in the face of adversity because
of the overwhelming intelligence needs of the period. The initial planning of CORONA began at a time when
we did not know how many BEAR and BISON aircraft the Soviets had, whether they were introducing a new and
far more advanced long-range bomber than the BISON, or whether they had largely skipped the buildup of a
manned bomber force in favor of missiles. There had been major changes in intelligence estimates of Soviet
nuclear capabilities and of the scope of the Soviet missile program on the basis of the results of the relatively
small number of U-2 missions approved for the summer of 1957. However, by 1959, the great "missile gap"
controversy was very much in the forefront. The Soviets had tested ICBMs at ranges of 5, 000 miles proving
they had the capability of building and operating them. What was not known was where they were deploying
them operationally and in what numbers. In the preparation of the National Intelligence Estimate for Guided
Missiles in the fall of 1959, the various intelligence agencies held widely diverse views on Soviet missile
strength. Nineteen Sixty ushered in an election year in which the missile gap had become a grave political
issue, and the President was scheduled to meet with Soviet leaders that spring without the benefit of hard
intelligence data. The U-2 had improved our knowledge of the Soviet Union, but it could not provide area
coverage and the answers to the critical questions; and it was increasingly becoming more of a political
liability than an intelligence asset. Most experts felt that it was only a matter of time until one was shot
down as occurred in May 1960. This incident resulted in ending the U-2 reconnaissance of USSR.
The successful recovery of a CORONA SRV, even though it contained no film, was the first assurance of
imminent success for a photographic reconnaissance satellite capability.
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First Recovery from Space
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SECTION VI
SUCCESS!, AN ERA BEGINS
Success! DISCOVERER XIV was launched on 18 August 1960, one week after the successful water
recovery of the DISCOVERER )GII capsule. The vehicle carried a camera and a 20 pound load of film. The
camera operated satisfactorily, and the full load of film was exposed and transferred to the recovery capsule.
The AGENA did not initially position itself in orbit so as to permit the recovery sequence to occur. It was on
the verge of tumbling during the first few orbits, and an excessive quantity of gas had to be used in correcting
this condition. Fortunately, vehicle attitude became stabilized about midway through the scheduled flight
period, thus relieving the earlier fear that recovery would be impossible. The satellite recovery vehicle was
ejected on the 17th pass, and the film capsule was recovered by air snatch.
Captain Harold E. Mitchell of the 6593rd Test Squadron piloting a C-119 (flying boxcar) called Pelican 9
and crew successfully hooked the descending capsule on his third pass. Upon arrival at Hickam Air Force
Base, Hawaii, Captain Mitchell was decorated with the Distinguished Flying Cross and members of his crew
were awarded the Air Medal for their accomplishments. Ironically, Captain Mitchell and the Pelican 9 had
been one of the primary recovery aircraft for DISCOVERER XIII; however, failure to make an aerial recovery
on this mission relegated them to a backup position for DISCOVERER XIV. Figure 6-1 is a photograph of
Captain Mitchell, another crew member, and the Pelican 9. A photograph of then Senator Kennedy viewing
the DISCOVERER XIV capsule on display at Vandenberg AFB is presented as Figure 6-2.
The film was flown to the Eastman Kodak Processing Facility in Rochester, New York, for processing and
duplication. The EK Facility accomplished all processing and duplication of CORONA missions until 1962,
after which the task was shared between EK and the Air Force Special Projects Production Facility (AFSPPF)
at Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts. The photography was delivered to the Photographic Intelligence
Center, now known as the National Photographic Intelligence Center (NPIC), and other intelligence centers.
This one CORONA mission yielded more photographic area coverage than the total of all U-2 missions
that had been flown over the Soviet Union. Aside from the expected lower resolution, the only major
deficiencies in the photography were plus and minus-density bars running diagonally across the format. Some
were due to minor light leaks, and some were the result of electrostatic discharge known as corona. There
are two types of corona markings: (1) a glow which caused the most difficulty, and (2) a dendritic discharge
which is more spectacular in appearance. Figure 6-3 shows examples of corona discharge marks made by the
CORONA cameras.
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A press release announced the success of the mission but naturally made no mention of the real success;
the delivery of photographic intelligence. The announcement noted that the satellite had been placed into an
orbit with a 77.6 degree inclination, an apogee of 502 miles, a perigee of 116 miles, and an orbital period of
94.5 minutes. A retrorocket had slowed the capsule to re-entry velocity, and a parachute had been released
at 60,000 feet. The capsule, which weighed 84 pounds at recovery, was caught at 8,500 feet by a C-119
Aircraft on its third pass.
The program officers did not take the success of DISCOVERER XIV to mean that their problems with the
system were at an end, even though many of the earlier difficulties had been surmounted. The orbital
injection technique had improved to a point where vehicles were repeatedly put into orbit with injection
angle errors of less than four-tenths of a degree. The timing of the initiation of the recovery sequence had
been so refined that ejection of the DISCOVERER XI SRV occurred within five seconds of the planned time.
Parachute deceleration and air catch of the capsule had been accomplished repeatedly with capsules dropped
from high altitude balloons. The last two cameras placed in orbit had operated well. However, there were
other critical problems that remained to be solved. Foremost among them was that of consistently achieving
the correct retrovelocity and angle of re-entry of the recovery vehicle. Even though the DISCOVERER XIV
capsule was successfully recovered aerially, the overall subject of recovery received major attention during
the next few months.
Four more cameras were launched within the next four months with one success and three failures.
DISCOVERER XV was sent aloft on 13 September. The vehicle was successfully inserted into orbit, and the
camera functioned properly. However, the recovery vehicle re-entered at the wrong pitch attitude causing
the capsule to come down outside the recovery zone, again demonstrating that the concern over the retrofiring
sequence was well founded. The capsule was located, but it sank before a recovery ship could reach it.
DISCOVERER XVI was launched on 26 October, but the AGENA failed to go into orbit because of a malfunction
of a timing device.
The first ten camera-equipped vehicles carried what was known as the C camera, which was a single,
vertical-looking, reciprocating, panoramic camera that exposed the film by scanning at a right angle to the
line-of-flight. DISCOVERER XVI carried the first of a new series of cameras known as the C Prime (C'). The
C' differed only slightly from the original configuration and was essentially little more than a follow-on
procurement of the C camera.
through the camera. It was the first of the two day missions and the capsule was recovered on the 31st orbit.
The DISCOVERER XVII mission was launched on 12 November and travelled the entire cycle including a
successful air catch, except for one mishap. The film broke after 1.7 feet of the acetate base leader had fed 25X1
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Success again! DISCOVERER XVIII was launched on 10 December 1960 carrying 39 pounds of film. Orbit
was achieved, and the camera worked well exposing the entire film load. The recovery vehicle was ejected
on revolution 48 after three days in orbit, and the capsule was retrieved by air snatch. This was the first
successful mission employing the C' camera and the AGENA B second stage. There was fogging on the
first, second, and last frame of each photo pass due to minor light leaks, but image quality was otherwise
as good as the best from DISCOVERER XIV.
On the next ten launches, extending from December 1960 thru 3 August 1961, only four were CORONA
missions. DISCOVERERS XIX and XXI carried radiometric payloads in support of the CORONA cover story, and
were not intended to be recovered. DISCOVERER XXI included an experiment that was to be of major
significance in the later development of CORONA and other space programs. The result of this experiment
was the successful restart of the AGENA engine in space.
DISCOVERER XX was the first of a dozen launches extending over a period of three years carrying mapping
cameras, a program sponsored by the US Army which the President had approved for inclusion within the
CORONA project. The purpose of the mapping program, which was known as ARGON, was to obtain precise
geodetic fixes and an extension of existing datum planes within the Soviet Union. ARGON accomplished its
intended goal and was considered a successful program in spite of resolution and focal length limitations of
the mapping camera and the many flight difficulties which were encountered.
DISCOVERER XX was in itself a failure because: (1) the camera failed, (2) there were no shutter
firings, and (3) the orbital programmer malfunctioned. This latter failure led to an important change in control
procedures for CORONA. On this and all prior flights the recovery sequence was initiated automatically by
an ejection command cut into the program tape. The program timer failed temporarily on orbit 31 of this
mission causing the entire sequence to be about one-half cycle out-of-phase. The automatic initiation of the
recovery sequence was eliminated from the program tape on subsequent missions. Thereafter, the positive
issuance of an ejection command was required.
Of the four CORONA missions attempted between December 1960 and August 1961, two did not go into
orbit as a consequence of AGENA failures, and two were qualified successes. DISCOVERER XXV was launched
on 16 June and exposed its full load of film. The air catch failed, but the back-up water recovery was
successful. The camera failed on revolution 22 of DISCOVERER XXVI, which was launched on 7 July, but
three-quarters of the film was exposed and recovered by air catch.
As of August 1961, a total of 17 camera-carrying CORONA missions had been attempted, with usable 25X1
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to photograph large areas of the earth's surface can be obtained from the fact that these four successful
missions had yielded plottable coverage of some 13 million square miles which represented nearly one-half
of the total area of interest. Part of this coverage was redundant as a consequence of multiple photographic
passes over the same target areas. This situation continued as long as the mission life remained at two days.
The first substantial upgrading of the CORONA camera system came with the introduction in August 1961
of the C Triple Prime (C"') camera. The original C camera was a scanning panoramic camera in which the
cycling rate and the velocity-over-height (V/h) ratio were constant and selected before launching. Image
motion compensation (IMC) was fixed mechanically to the V/h ratio. A brief explanation of these terms follows:
A. A means must be provided for matching the number of film exposures in a given period of time
(camera cycling rate) with the varying ratio between vehicle altitude and velocity on-orbit (velocity-over-
height) so that the ground area is photographed in a series of swaths with neither gaps nor excessive
overlapping in the coverage.
B. If the subject moves just as a snapshot is taken with a hand held camera, and if the camera
shutter speed is not fast enough to "stop" the motion, the photographic image will be smeared. To a camera
peering down from an orbiting CORONA space vehicle, the earth's surface appears to be passing beneath the
camera at a speed of roughly five miles per second. A camera photographing the earth's surface from a satellite
moving at that speed would yield smeared photography if some means were not provided for stopping the
relative motion. The technique used in accomplishing this is known as image motion compensation.
The C"' was the first camera built totally by Itek Corp. The C"' was also a reciprocating camera with
a rotating lens cell which exposed the film during a segment of its rotation. The new camera had a larger
aperture lens, an improved film transport mechanism, and a greater flexibility in command of camera and
vehicle operations, especially with regard to control of the V/h factor. The larger aperture lens permitted use
of slower film emulsions which, combined with the improved resolving power of the lens itself, offered the
prospect of yielding photography with a ground resolution approximately twice as good as with the C and C'
cameras.
The first C"' camera system with a 39 pound film load was launched on 30 August 1961. The mission
was a success, with the full film load being transferred and with ejection and recovery occurring on the 32nd
revolution. However, all frames of the photography were out-of-focus. The cause was identified and
corrected by redesigning the scan head. Seven more missions were launched during the last four months of
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1961, three with the C' camera and four with the CI " . Six of them attained orbit and the cameras operated
satisfactorily on all six. Film was recovered from four of the missions. The last of the four, DISCOVERER
XXXVI which carried a C"' camera system, was rated the best mission to date. It also had a cover assignment
which was the injection of a secondary satellite, dubbed OSCAR (Orbital Satellite Carrying Amateur Radio),
into a separate orbit. OSCAR was a small radio satellite broadcasting a signal on 145 megacycles for pickup
by amateurs as an aid in the study of radio propagation phenomena. Figure 6-4 provides a photograph of
DISCOVERER XXXVI on the launch pad.
Slowly but surely the bugs were being worked out, but it always seemed that just as one was laid to rest
another arose to take its place. Perhaps what was actually happening was that various sets of problems
existed simultaneously, but some of them were masked by others. The elimination of a particular problem
made it possible to recognize the significance of another. The recent success had resulted largely from
correcting weaknesses in the payload portion of the system. At the same time, difficulties in the AGENA
vehicle began to surface. Of the last seven missions in 1961, four experienced on-orbit difficulties with
the AGENA power supply or control gas system.
Power system components for general use in satellite systems were designed, developed, and tested in
the CORONA Program. Foremost among those components were the static electronic inverters used to convert
direct current battery energy into the various alternating current voltages required by the other subsystems.
Static inverters, which were first flown aboard CORONA vehicles, were considered essential because they
had half the weight and double the efficiency of their rotary counterparts. Unfortunately, they are rather
temperamental instruments. The history of inverter development had been marked by high failure rates in system
checkouts on the ground. Despite the lessons that had been learned and the improvements in circuit design
that resulted from them, the recent on-orbit power failures demonstrated a need for further research and
development.
The AGENA failed on DISCOVERER XXXVII, launched on 13 January 1962, and the payload did not go into
orbit. It was the last mission to carry the C"' camera system, and with it the DISCOVERER series came to
an end. After 37 launches or launch attempts, the cover story for DISCOVERER had simply worn out. With
the improved record of success and the near certainty of an even better record in the future, it seemed likely
that there would be as many as a dozen and a half to two dozen launches per year for perhaps years to come.
The cover story that DISCOVERER was an experimental series had ceased to be tenable, and no other cover
story was available to account for the number of launches and their unique mission profiles. So, beginning
with the 38th launch, CORONA missions were announced merely as being Air Force satellite launches.
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On 18 April 1962, the Air Force announced the issuance of a new directive classifying all information
pertaining to military satellites and eliminating the DISCOVERER, SAMOS, and MIDAS series designations.
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SECTION VII
THE DUAL CAMERA SYSTEM, MURAL
The 1961 development effort was not confined to improving the performance of the existing system. A
major development program was concurrently underway on an improved camera subsystem. A contract was
awarded on 19 August 1961, retroactively effective to 20 March, for a new camera configuration to be known
as MURAL. The MURAL camera system (M) consisted essentially of two C"' cameras mounted with one
pointing slightly forward and the other slightly aft. Two 40 pound rolls of film were carried in a double
spool film supply cassette. The two film webs were fed separately to the two cameras where they were
panoramically exposed during segments of the lens cells' rotations and then were fed to a double spool
takeup cassette in the satellite recovery vehicle. The system was designed for a mission duration of up
to four days.
The vertical-looking C, C', and C"' cameras had photographed the target area by sweeping across it in
successive overlapping swaths. The MURAL concept involved photographing each swath area twice. The
Forward-looking camera first photographed the swath at an angle 15 degrees from the vertical; approximately
six frames later, the Aft-looking camera photographed the same swath at an angle also 15 degrees from the
vertical. When the two resulting photographs of the same area or object were properly aligned in a stereo-
microscope, the photography would appear to be three-dimensional. Simultaneous operation of both
instruments was required for stereo photography. If either camera failed, photography of that area could
still be obtained with the exception that it could be viewed in only two dimensions.
The first MURAL camera system was launched as program flight number 38 on 27 February 1962. An
anomaly occurred during re-entry of this mission. The Re-entry Vehicle (RV) heat shield failed to separate
and was recovered by the aircraft along with the capsule. This anomaly provided valuable diagnostic data
on the re-entry effects. This turned out out to be especially significant when program extensions caused the
shelf life of the heat shields to be a major concern. The 26th, and last in the series, was launched on 21
December 1963. Twenty of the SRVs were recovered, 19 of them by air snatch. The one water recovery was of
a capsule that splashed down a thousand miles from the nominal impact point. An interesting aspect of this
recovery was that the capsule turned upside down in the water causing loss of the beacon signals. It was
located during the search by an alert observer who spotted the sun reflecting off the gold capsule. Of the six
vehicles that failed, two malfunctioned in the launch sequence, one SRV failed to eject properly, and three
capsules came down in the ocean and sank before they could be recovered. Twenty successes out of 26 tries
were a remarkable record when viewed against the difficulties experienced only two years earlier. 25X1
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The three capsules that sank came down in or near the recovery zone indicating that the problems
previously encountered in the re-entry sequence had been solved. However, they were not supposed to sink
so quickly; one of them floated for less than three minutes. To minimize the chance of a capsule being
retrieved by persons other than the American recovery crew, the capsules were designed to float for a
period ranging originally from one to three days and then to sink. The duration of the floatation period was
controlled by a capsule sink valve containing compressed salt which would dissolve in sea water at a rate
that could be predicted within rather broad limits. When the salt plug had dissolved, water entered the
capsule and it sank, simple but ingenious.
Other significant improvements in the CORONA Program were inaugurated during the lifetime of the MURAL
system. One of them was an aid to photointerpretation. In order to read out the photography, there are
certain collateral facts that the photointerpreter must be told or be able to determine about each frame of the
photography. He must be able to ascertain the portion of the earth's surface that is imaged, the scale of the
photography, and its geometry. In simplest terms, he must know where the vehicle was and how it was
oriented in space at the precise time the picture was taken. Until 1962, the ground area covered by a
particular frame of photography was identified by combining data provided on the orbital path of the vehicle
with the time of camera firing. The orientation or attitude of the vehicle on-orbit was determined from horizon
photographs recorded at each end of every other frame from a pair of Horizon cameras that were included in
the CORONA camera system.
Beginning with the first of the MURAL flights, an Index camera was incorporated into the photographic
system, and a Stellar camera was added a few missions later. The short focal length Index camera took a
small scale photograph of the area being covered on a much larger scale by successive sweeps of the pan
cameras. The small scale photograph, used in conjunction with orbital data, simplified the problem of
matching the pan photographs with the terrain. Photographs taken of stars by the Stellar camera, in
combination with those taken of the horizons by the Horizon cameras, provided a more precise means of
determining vehicle attitude on-orbit.
The photography from program flight number 47, a MURAL mission launched on 27 July 1962, was marred
by heavy corona The corona problem was a persistent one, disappearing for a time
only to reappear later, and had become even more severe with the advent of the complicated film transport
mechanisms of the MURAL camera. Corona marking was caused by discharge of static electricity generated
by friction between moving parts of the system, especially between the film and the film rollers. The
problem was eventually solved by modifications of the parts themselves and by rigid qualification testing
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SECTION VIII
THE TWO BUCKET JANUS CAMERA SYSTEM
The boosting capacity of the first-stage THOR was substantially increased in early 1963 by strapping to
the THOR a cluster of small solid propellant rockets which were jettisoned after firing. This thrust
augmented THOR (TAT), was first used for the launching of the heavier LANYARD camera system. LANYARD
was developed within the CORONA Program as a film recovery modification of one of the cameras designed
for the SAMOS system and, with its longer focal length, was expected to yield better resolution than the
CORONA cameras. It had a single lens cell capable of stereoscopic coverage by swinging a mirror through a
30 degree angle. Three flights were attempted, only one of which was partially successful. The camera had
a serious lens focus problem which was later identified as being caused by thermal effects. The problem
was then corrected. The LANYARD Program was initiated as an interim system pending the completion of a
high resolution spotting system then under development by the Air Force. It was cancelled shortly thereafter
because of the success of the spotting system. The TAT booster itself was a significant success permitting
the launch of heavier, more versatile CORONA systems.
Program flight number 69, launched on 24 August 1963, introduced the next major upgrading of the
CORONA system, the first two bucket configuration. The film recovery capsule is commonly referred to as a
bucket. The new modification, which was known as the JANUS system, or CORONA-J, retained the MURAL
stereoscopic camera concept but added a second film capsule and recovery vehicle. With two satellite
recovery vehicles in the system, film capacity was increased to 160 pounds. The two bucket system was
designed to be deactivated or stored on-orbit in a passive (Zombie) mode for up to 21 days. This permitted
the recovery of the first bucket after half of the film supply was exposed. The second bucket could begin
filling immediately thereafter, or its start could be delayed for a few days. A major redesign of the command
and control mechanisms was required to accommodate the more complicated mission profile of the two bucket
system.
As with each of the early modifications of CORONA, the CORONA-J system had a few bugs. On the first
mission, the shutter on the Master Horizon camera remained open approximately 1, 000 times seriously fogging
the adjacent panoramic photography, and the AGENA current inverter failed in mid-flight making it impossible to
recover the second bucket. Also, this system initially experienced a rather severe heat problem, which was
solved by reducing the thermal sensitivity of the camera and by better control of vehicle skin temperature
through shielding and varying the paint pattern.
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Back in 1960 and 1961, the successful recovery of a CORONA film bucket was an "event. " Two years
later when the system was referred to as J-1, success had become routine, and a failure was an "event.
By the end of 1966, 37 J-1 systems had been launched, 35 of them put into orbit, and 64 buckets of film
recovered. There were no failures at recovery in the three years following 1966, when 28 buckets were
launched and 28 buckets recovered. Also, mission duration was greatly expanded during the lifetime
of the J-1 system. A mission in June 1964 yielded four full days over target on each of the two buckets.
Five full days of operation on each bucket was attained in January 1965. In April 1966, the first bucket was
recovered after seven days in orbit. A 13 day mission life was achieved in August 1966, and this was
increased to 15 days in June 1967.
The increased mission life and excellent recovery record resulted from a number of successive
improvements that were incorporated into the J-1 time period. Among them was a subsystem known as
LIFEBOAT, a completely redundant and self-contained apparatus built into the AGENA that could be activated
for recovering the SRV in event of an AGENA power failure. Another improvement was the introduction of the
new and more powerful THORAD booster. A third was the addition of a rocket orbit adjust system. At times,
the CORONA vehicles were flown into quite a low perigee over the target areas in order to increase the scale
wr of the photography; however, the low perigee resulted in a relatively rapid decay of the orbit. The orbit
adjust system compensated for the decay. It consisted of a cluster of small rockets, known as drag makeup
units, which were fired individually and at selected intervals. Each firing accelerated the vehicle slightly,
boosting it back into approximately its original orbital altitude.
The following is a summary of the most mysterious CORONA J-1, two bucket mission ever flown. Program
flight number 78 (Mission 1005) was launched on 27 April 1964. The launch and insertion into orbit were
uneventful. The Master Panoramic camera operated satisfactorily through the first bucket, but the Slave
Panoramic camera failed after 350 cycles when the film broke. Then the AGENA power supply failed.
Vandenberg transmitted a normal recovery enable command on southbound revolution 47 on 30 April.
The vehicle verified receipt of the command, but nothing happened. The recovery command was repeated
from various control stations, in both the normal and backup LIFEBOAT recovery modes, on 26 subsequent
passes extending through 20 May. The space vehicle repeatedly verified that it had received the commands,
but the ejection sequence did not occur. No further recovery commanding was attempted after the 20th since
the vehicle had ceased on the 19th to acknowledge receipt. It was felt by the systems control technicians
that Mission 1005 space hardware was doomed to incineration. The vehicle would gradually sink into a
progressively lower orbit until it finally entered the atmosphere and exploded.
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However, it didn't happen quite that way. A commercial photographer named Leonardo Davila telephoned
the American Embassy in Caracas on 1 August 1964 to report that he had photographed a space satellite that
had fallen in Venezuela. The report started a series of inquiries that discovered, after the fact, what had
happened to Mission 1005.
At six minutes past midnight on the morning of 26 May, coinciding with northbound revolution 452
of Mission 1005, observers in Maracaibo, Venezuela, saw five incendiary objects in the sky. Seven minutes
later, the Moorestown, New Jersey, SPADATS station made radar sightings of small residual objects in the
atmosphere. The DEW line made three radar hits on objects of unknown size. Theca acking station
did not detect the Mission 1005 vehicle on revolution 452. u
On 7 July, 14 year old Eladio Becerra and 40 year old Gabino Mora stumbled upon a battered, glimmering
gold object lying on nearly deserted mountainous terrain within a couple of miles of the Colombian border and
near the village of La Fria in Tachira State in southwestern Venezuela. The object was on Farm No. 35 owned
by Pablo Garcia, but Becerra and Mora worked for Facundo Albarracin, the owner of neighboring Farm No. 36.
They reported their find to their employer. He had the object moved about 1,000 yards onto his own property
and then sent out word of the find in an attempt to sell the object. However, it being an unknown object
in terms of value, Albarracin could not even get a worthwhile offer to have it smuggled into nearby Colombia.
So Albarracin and his employees commenced to dismantle the bucket. By hacking and prying, they managed
to remove the radio transmitter and various pieces of the takeup assembly using them as household utensils
and as toys for the children.
Before long, word of the find reached the city of Cristobal, and people began visiting La Fria to examine
the curious object from space. It was the first bucket from Mission 1005 with one full spool of well charred
film clearly visible. One of the visitors was the photographer, Davila, who passed the word to the American
Embassy. Military attachees were called in and a team of CORONA Program officers flew to Caracas to direct
the recovery operation and to ship the capsule and any other fragments that could be found back to the United
States for detailed examination. The capsule was carried out part way by campesinos on foot and then was
taken over by the Venezuelan Defense Ministry and flown to Caracas. The USAF bought the crumpled specimen
from the Venezuelan Government and quietly dismissed the event as an unimportant NASA space experiment
that had gone astray.
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The story rated only a dozen lines in the New York Times of August fifth, but the local Venezuelan press
had a field day. Diario Catolico, of San Cristobal, along with a lengthy report, published three pictures of
the capsule showing the charred roll of film on the takeup spool. The photographs are reproduced in Figure
8-1. The Daily journal handled the story in lighter vein with this parody of Longfellow:
I shot an arrow into the air.
It fell to earth I know not where.
Cape Kennedy signalled: "Where is it at, you are?
Responded the rocket: "La Fria, Tachira. "
Many of the bits and pieces that appeared in the first on-the-scene photographs, as well as other items
that were known to be in the capsule, were kept by those who had handled it.
The CORONA technicians who examined the capsule after its arrival back in the U. S. concluded that the
re-entry of the SRV came as a result of normal orbit degeneration with separation from the instrument fairing
being caused by re-entry forces. The thrust cone was sheared during separation but was retained by its
harness long enough to act as a drogue chute, thus preventing the capsule from burning up during re-entry
and stabilizing it for a hard, nose-down landing.
The final major modification of the CORONA system got under way in the spring of 1965 at a time when
about a dozen and a half of the two bucket J-1 systems had been flown. The J-1 was performing superbly,
but had little potential for future system growth. The new CORONA improvement program was begun with a
series of meetings among representatives of Lockheed, General Electric, Itek, and the various CORONA
Program offices to examine ways of bettering the performance of the panoramic and Stellar/Index cameras and
of providing a more versatile command system. These were the resulting design goals established for a new
panoramic camera:
A. Improved photographic performance by removal of camera system oscillating members and
reduction of vibration from other moving components.
B. Improvement of the velocity-over-height match to reduce image smear.
C. Improved photographic scale by accommodation of proper camera cycling rates at altitudes down
to 80 nm (the minimum J-1 operating altitude was 100 nm).
D. Elimination of camera failures caused by film pulling out of the guide rails (an occasional
problem with the J-1 system).
E. Improved exposure control through variable slit selection (the J-1 system had a single exposure
throughout the orbit resulting in poor performance at low sun angles).
F. Capability of handling alternate film types and split film loads (an in-flight changeable filter and
film change detector were added for this purpose).
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NEW YORK TIMES PHOTOS OF MISSION 1005
MISSICN 1005
I sluit ill arrovA into the air, it fell to earth- I know not where.....
Cape Kennedy signalled: "Where is it at, you are?" -
Responded the Rocket: "La Fria, Tachira. "
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G. Capability of handling ultra thin base (UTB) film (yielding a 50% increase in coverage with no
increase in weight).
The panoramic camera that was developed to meet those design goals was known as the "constant rotator.
The predecessor C"' camera employed a combination of rotating lens cell and reciprocating camera members.
In the constant rotator, the lens cell and the balance of the camera's optical system are mounted in a drum.
The entire drum assembly is continuously rotated, thus eliminating the reciprocating elements from the
camera system. The film is exposed during a 70 degree angular segment of the drum's circular sweep. The
capability of using UTB was one of the design goals, but the camera design was not to be constrained by
requirements to accommodate the thinner film. UTB was successfully flown on several other missions, but
ground test results showed a loss of reliability and attempts to use it in the constant rotator were eventually
abandoned. In all other respects, however, the constant rotator was a resounding success. It yielded
substantially better ground resolution in the photography, the best resolution being approximately 4.5 feet.
It also permitted versatility in operation far exceeding that available in the earlier cameras.
The Stellar/Index camera in use was a delicate instrument with a short 1.5 inch focal length and a history
of erratic performance. The efforts at upgrading the performance of the Stellar/Index camera resulted in an
instrument with a 3 inch focal length (like ARGON) and a dual-looking stellar element. The new camera had the
designation of Dual Improved Stellar Index Camera, commonly referred to by its acronym DISIC.
The new payload system, which was designated the J-3, consisted of a pair of constant rotator Panoramic
cameras, a pair of Horizon cameras, and a DISIC. During the study phases, an interim configuration between
J-1 and J-3 was included which consisted of a combination of the J-1 Panoramic camera and the DISIC mapping
camera on an improved THORAD booster. This interim system, designated J-2, was never implemented.
However, the J-3 designers continued to label their work as J-3, even after the J-2 configuration was
dropped. Hence, there was no operational J-2 program as the series jumped from J-1 to J-3. The J-3 system
retained the stereo capability begun with the MURAL cameras and the two bucket recovery concept
of the J-1. Apart from the improved photographic capability of the hardware itself, the most significant
advance represented by the J-3 was in the flexibility it allowed in command and control of camera operations.
Any conventional area search photographic reconnaissance system is film limited. Consequently, the
ultimate goal of all of the CORONA improvement efforts was to fly the maximum load of the best quality film
at optimum acquisition parameters. The built-in flexibility of the J-3 system greatly increased the variety
and degree of controls that could be applied to camera operations, thus substantially boosting the potential
intelligence content of the photography.
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The first J-3 system was launched on 15 September 1967. This mission yielded even better photographic
intelligence and higher operational reliability than its successful predecessor, the J-1 system. Figure 8-2
shows the succession of CORONA developments with profiles of all of the various CORONA payloads. Figure
8-3 provides a photograph of the camera systems.
A series of important tests were run in conjunction with the primary mission of the first five J-3 system
flights. These secondary objectives were the culmination of efforts requested by the United States Intelligence
Board (U SIB) , which in February 1966 directed CIA to develop techniques that would enable estimates of crop
yields to be made from satellite photography. To accomplish this requirement, the payloads of these five 1-3
systems were specially instrumented and contained, in some cases, tag-on lengths of special camouflage
detection color film or high speed, high resolution black and white film. The test series demonstrated the
J-3 camera's capability to handle new photographic techniques due to the added flexibility of having two
changeable filters and four changeable exposure slits on each camera. This allowed the use of mixed film
loads and/or different filters. These tests were conducted without degrading the main intelligence collection
mission in any way.
These tests drew such interest throughout the intelligence community that a CORONA J-3 Ad Hoc
Committee was formally convened by the Director National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO) on 4 December 1967
and formally constituted in February 1968. Its purpose was to analyze and evaluate the experiments conducted
on these five test flights. Specific findings of the Committee included the recommendations that: (1) further
testing of color films and techniques should be conducted against specific intelligence requirements; (2) a
special subcommittee of the Committee on Imagery Reconnaissance and Exploitation (COMIREX) should be
constituted to evaluate the utility of satellite color photography; and (3) a well planned color collection
program be worked out with the close cooperation of the system program offices, the Satellite Operations
Center (SOC), the intelligence analysts, and the photointerpreters.
apparent mineralization. Figure 8-5 is a photogeologic evaluation map produced from CORONA imagery.
While the primary objective of the CORONA Program was the search and surveillance of denied territories,
the high quality of the photography permitted even further exploitation of the film. For example, an effort at
Itek was undertaken by the Government and private agencies to achieve photogeological mapping from the
satellite photography. Through stereoscopic viewing of the high definition black and white and color films,
these studies at Itek did lead to successful geological mapping. In March 1971, Itek published W. V.
Trollinger's final report, Appraisal of Geologic Value for Mineral Resources Exploitation, which concluded
that CORONA system image quality was sufficient for most photogeologic mapping projects, and that the film
could be used in determining the geological, economical, and political potential of a photographed area.
Figure 8-4 provides a stereo pair (one black and white record and one color record) from a mission showing 25X1
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There were many officers and technicians in the Air Force and CIA responsible for the success of the
CORONA Program. As noted earlier Captain Mitchell and his crew were decorated for their part in the aerial
recovery of DISCOVERER XIV. Other key Air Force personnel received service recognition, but because of
security considerations it was not possible for the awards to be made directly for contributions to the CORONA
Program. The CIA had a provision within its honors and merit program to present classified awards to its
employees. They did not present any medals for their work in the early CORONA development. CIA did,
however, award recognition to their members on the CORONA design team who had been significant contributors
in making the J-1 and J-3 systems a success. Kenneth M. Tebo, A. Roy Burks, and Vernard Webb were
recipients of the Intelligence Medal of Merit; and Louis A. Snyder, Donald Grass, and Donald Cochran were
awarded the Certificate of Merit.
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Looking back on CORONA, it is not always easy to keep in mind that it was merely an assemblage of
inanimate objects designed and put together to perform a mechanical task. The program began as a short term
interim system, suffered through adversity in its formative years, and then survived in glory throughout a
decade. Those who were associated with CORONA or came to depend upon its product developed a personal
affection for this program. They suffered with it in failure and revelled in its successes.
The technological improvements engineered under CORONA advanced the system in eight years from a
single panoramic camera system having a design goal of 20 to 25 feet ground resolution and an orbital life of
one day, to a twin camera panoramic system producing stereophotography at the same ground resolution. From
this point, it became a dual recovery system with an improvement in ground resolution to approximately 7 to
10 feet with twice the film load, to finally the J-3 system with a constant rotator camera, selectable exposure
and filter controls, planned orbital life of 18 to 20 days, and yielding nadir resolution of 5 to 7 feet.
The totality of CORONA's contributions to US intelligence holdings on denied areas and to the US space
program in general is virtually immeasurable. Its progress was marked by a series of notable firsts: (1) the
first to recover objects from orbit; (2) the first to deliver intelligence information from a satellite; (3) the
first to produce stereoscopic satellite photography; (4) the first to employ multiple re-entry vehicles; and (5)
the first satellite reconnaissance program to pass the 100+ mission mark. By March 1964, CORONA had
photographed 23 of the 25 Soviet ICBM complexes then in existence; three months later it had photographed
all of them. The value of the CORONA derived intelligence effort is given dimension by this statement in a
1968 intelligence report: "No new ICBM complexes have been established in the USSR during the past year. "
This statement was made because of the confidence held by the analysts that if an ICBM was there, then
CORONA photography would have disclosed them.
CORONA coverage of the Middle East during the June 1967 war was of great value in estimating the
relative military strengths of the opposing sides. Evidence was produced of the extensive damage inflicted
by the Israeli air attacks by actual count of aircraft destroyed on the ground in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
The claims of the Israelis might otherwise have been discounted as exaggerations but for this timely photo-
graphic proof.
Again in 1970, CORONA was called on to provide proof of Israeli-Egyptian claims with regard to ceasefire 25X1
compliance or violation. CORONA Mission 1111 , launched on 23 July 1970, successfully carried out the
of the CORONA Program history reflecting the number of launches and developmental and operational milestones NRO
is given in Figure 9-2, and a detailed history of each of the 145 CORONA vehicles is recorded in Table 9-1 on
pages 9-8 thru 9-16.
NRO
the Air Force, and CIA over the 16 year period wasI IA graphical synopsis 25X1
to our allies, would doubtless have been increased by billions. The cost for all CORONA activities of ARPA,
The CORONA Program had to be extended because of delays in the follow-on system; hence even
qualification models were refurbished and flown. As a result, there was little hardware available at the
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NR
0
? Last CORONA Series Flight
? First Single/Solar Array -
? First 3/4 Speed Programmer
? First -3 Payload
? First THORAD Booster
? First OAS Flight
? 8 Day Lead Time
y Explicit Guidance Equation
25X1 b ? First Dual Recovery
NR y
0-40 M First Thrust Augmente T
M ? First Engr Restart on Orbit
? First Air Recovery
? Stabilized Flight &
Attitude Change 7
? First Polar Orbit
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375 - 1850 lbs
Active Life Increase -
1 - 20 days
160
140
U)
100
8
11
17
22
17
15
14
9
9
8
6
4
3
2
0
4
7
16
12
23
25
16
18
16
12
8
4
4
o O
0
O
m
1350 - 4895 lbs
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CORONA HISTORY
Volume I
termination of the program when it was suggested that a museum display be set up to illustrate and to
preserve the CORONA Program. Using recovered hardware from the last flight, development models from
the J-3 program, and photographic records from the memorable flights, a classified museum display was set
up in Washington, DC. Figures 9-3 and 9-4 provide photos of the museum display and photos of some of
those who attended and participated in the dedication. In his speech dedicating the Museum, Mr. Richard
Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, said:
"It has been confidence in the intelligence estimates that has allowed
President Nixon to enter into the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and to
sign the Arms Limitation Treaty this month. There can be no doubt that
the photo reconnaissance satellite represents the primary means of
verification for SALT, or that CORONA, the program which pioneered
the way in satellite reconnaissance, deserves the place in history
which we are preserving through this small Museum display.
"A Decade of Glo as the display is entitled, must for the present
remain classiified. However, as the world grows to accept satellite
reconnaissance, we hope it can be transferred to the Smithsonian
Institute where the American public can view the work and the men
of CORONA, and like the Wright Brothers, can be recognized for the
role they played in the shaping of history. "
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CORONA HISTORY
Volume I
CORONA PROGRAM PERFORMANCE
FROG DD
FLT VEH THOR 250 MSN
4 1023 179 002
5 1029 192 004
6 1028 200 003
7 1051 206 006
8 1050 212 007
9 1052 213 008
10 1054 223 009
11 1055 234 010
14 1056 237 011
15 1058 246 013
16 1061 253 015
17 1062 297 016
18 1103 296 017
TOP SECRET TOP SECRET
TOTAL POUNDS POUNDS
Si MAIN INSTR SHIP WEEKS PAYLOAD PAYLOAD NO.
INSTR SRV TM SI TU SUPPLY TU DRCG RECD TO WKS-DYS UNTIL WEIGHT FLIGHT WEIGHT OF RECOVERY
NO. NO. NO. NO. CASS'T CASS'T CASS'T NO. AT AP BASE AT AP FLIGHT FLOWN DATE TRANS ORBITS DATE
2/28/59
4/13/59
6/3/59
9001
C
4
102
5/5/59
5/29/59
3 - 3
7
- 2
16
6/25/59
0
9003
C
7
111
6/5/59
7/23/59
6 - 6
9
- 6
20
8/13/59
0.405
9002
C
6
105
5/18/59
6/3/59
2 - 2
13
- 2
16
8/19/59
0.108
9004
C
10
109
6/24/59
7/23/59
4 - 1
19
- 3
10
11/7/59
0
9005
C
9
107
7/25/59
11/7/59
15 - 0
16
- 6
10
11/20/59
0
9006
C
8
113
6/28/59
1/10/60
28 - 0
31
- 4
10
2/4/60
0
9007
C
13
110
12/7/59
2/4/60
8 - 3
10
- 4
10
2/19/60
0
9008
C
14
103
1/11/60
2/24/60
6 - 2
13
- 3
16
4/15/60
16
6/29/60
0
8/10/60
0
9009
C
3
101
1/28/60
3/28/60
8 - 4
29
- 0
20
8/18/60
20
9010
C
11
106
2/22/60
8/25/60
26 - 3
29
- 1
20
9/13/60
20
9011
C
15
506
6/6/60
9/17/60
14 - 5
20
- 2
20
10/26/60
0
9012
C.
17
507
9/12/60
10/17/60
5 - 0
9
- 6
39
11/12/60
1.7 leader
9013
C
19
508
10/9/60
10/29/60
2 - 6
8
- 3
39
12/7/60
39
12/20/60
0
10/18/60
10/21/60
9 - 1
17
- 3
39
2/17/61
39
2/18/61
0
2/21/61
3/28/61
5- 0
5
- 2
39
3/30/61
0
11/30/60
3/16/61
15 - 1
18
- 3
39
4/8/61
39
4/3/61
5/25/61
7 - 3
9
- 3
39
6/8/61
0
3/7/61
4/17/61
5 - 6
14
- 3
39
6/16/61
39
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No capsule flown.
Capsule ejected over Spitzenbergen 4/13/59.
AGENA failed to orbit.
AGENA failed to orbit.
Low temperatures. Not recovered.
Instrument failed on Rev 1.
Retrorocket malfunction. Not recovered.
Instrument failed on Rev 2.
Eccentric orbit. Wrong altitude.
Instrument failure. Not recovered.
AGENA failed to orbit.
AGENA failed to orbit.
Spin rocket failure. Not recovered.
Instrument operation OK.
AGENA failed to orbit.
Diagnostic.
8/11/60 Successful water pickup.
Diagnostic.
8/19/60 Successful air catch.
Instrument operation OK.
Vehicle pitch attitude improper at re-entry.
Capsule sunk before recovery. Instrument operation OK.
"D" timer malfunction AGENA failed
to orbit.
11/14/60 Successful air catch. Payload broke.
TM No. 34.
12/10/60 Successful air catch. Instrument
operation OK. TM No. 37.
Orbital programmer failed at Rev 31. Instrument
failed. Still in space. No shutter firings.
No SRV installed (RM-2 payload).
AGENA failure. No orbit. TM No. 39.
Recovery was attempted on Rev 31 due to loss of
control gas. Still in space. Instrument operation OK.
No orbit AGENA failure, power failure, and guidance
problem causing ocean impact.
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TABLE 9-1 (CONT'D)
FROG
DD
FLT
VEH
THOR
250
MSN
INSTR
INSTR
SRV
NO.
NO.
NO.
NO.
NO.
TYPE
NO.
NO.
26
1109
308
023
9019
C.
20
511
27
1110
322
024
9020A
A
7
524
28
1111
309
025
9021
C.
21
512
29
1112
323
027
9023
C.I.
54
554
30
1113
310
026
9022
C"'
53
551
31
1114
324
029
9024
C"'
55
552
32
1115
328
032
9025
C."
56
555
33
1116
329
028
9026
C.
22
513
34
1117
330
033
9027
C'
24
553
35
1118
326
037
9028
C.
25
523
36
1119
325
039
9029
C'"
52
525
3
7
1120
327
040
9030
C"'
57
. 571
38
1123
241
041
9031
Cm-1
70-71
581
39
1124
331
042
9032
Cm-2
72-73
584
40
1125
333
043
9033
Cm-3
74-75
586
41
1126
334
044
9034
A-5
A
582
42
1128
336
045
9035
Cm-4
76-77
585
43
-1127
335
046
9036
Cm-5
78-79
583
44
1129
339
047
9037
Cm-6
80-81
591
45
1151
340
048
9038
Cm-7
84-85
592
46
1130
342
049
9039
Cm-8
90-91
593
47
1131
347
050
9040
Cm-9
82-83
594
48
1152
344
051
9041
Cm-10
88-89
595
Cm-11
92-93
596
TOTAL POUNDS POUNDS
SI MAIN INSTR SHIP WEEKS PAYLOAD PAYLOAD NO.
TM SI TU SUPPLY TU DRCG REC'D TO WKS-DYS UNTIL WEIGHT FLIGHT WEIGHT of RECOVERY
NO. NO. CASS'T CASS'T CASS'T NO. AT AP BASE AT AP FLIGHT FLOWN DATE TRANS ORBITS DATE
10/18/60
5/15/61
29
- 6
37
- 3
39
7/7/61
28.78
7/9/61
4/4/61
6/24/61
11
- 3
15
- 3
39
7/21/61
0
11/13/60
5/20/61
26
- 6
37
- 3
39
8/3/61
0
No orbit
6/23/61
8/17/61
7
- 6
9
- 5
39
8/30/61
39
9/1/61
5/29/61
7/17/61
7
- 0
15
- 1
39
9/12/61
39
9/14/61
5/22/61
8/23/61
13
- 2
16
- 5
39
9/17/61
20
No
Separation
8/9/61
9/14/61
5
- 1
9
- 2
39
10/13/61
12.4
10/14/61
3/16/61
7/20/61
18
- 0
31
- 4
39.5
10/23/61
0
No orbit
5/22/61
9/26/61
18
- 1
23
- 6
39
11/5/61
39
8/30/61
10/18/61
7
- 0
11
- 0
39
11/15/61
13
11/16/61
11/10/61
11/27/61
2
- 3
4
- 4
38.2
12/12/61
38.2
12/16/61
11/16/61
12/19/61
4
- 5
8
- 2
38.6
1/13/62
0
Successful air catch. Instrument failed
on Rev 22 .
No orbit. THOR guidance destruct.
AGENA guidance failure.
Recovery on Rev 32 . Instrument OK.
Successful air catch. Recovery OK
Rev 33.
Successful orbit. Power failure before recovery precluded
the event. Instrument OK (Instr quit at 400 cycle failure).
Successful air catch. Suspect AGENA power problems
had to attempt recovery on Rev 18.
Second stage AGENA failed. Went into
SFA after take-off.
Successful orbit. Due to gas valve failure, no
recovery made. Still in space. Instrument operation OK.
One day operation due to shortage of control gas.
Instrument operation OK. Recovery bucket re-used.
Successful orbit recovered on Rev 64 . Successful
water pick-up. Instrument operation OK.
AGENA failure. No orbit.
57
74
N/A
N/A 70-71
7
65
3/3/62
Successful orbit. Ablative shield recovered intact.
Air snatched. Instr OK. F/C failed full spools of payload.
/A
N/A 72-73
1
33
4/20/62
Successful orbit air catch. Instrument operation OK.
53
NONE
N
Guidance system operation OK.
52
70
N/A
N/A 74-75
6
1/26/62
4/11/62
10
- 5
13
- 1
39.1-39.1
4/28/62
68.8
64
Successful orbit. Oper malfunction on orbital timer
failed to eject chute. Chute ejector squibs failed. Sunk.
58
N/A
N/A
N/A N/A
13
5/26/61
4/25/62
47
- 4
50
- 3
39.4
5/15/62
39.4
63
5/19/62
Successful air recovery. Bellows missing H-timer and shutter
timer malfunction. Instr oper OK except this.
55
82
N/A
N/A 76-77
9
2/16/62
5/13/62
12
- 2
14
- 4
39.7-39.5
5/29/62
79.2
49
6/1/62
Successful air recovery. No F/C oper. Chute strap burned off
200 miles off location due to comm'd dump sequence.
44
76
N/A
N/A 78-79
8
3/1/62
5/21/62
11
- 4
13
- 1
40.6-40,5
6/1/62
81.1
0
Successful orbit. Chute tore loose SRV went Into ocean,
floated for 3 minutes then sank. Instr oper OK.
48
88
N/A
N/A 84-85
10
3/21/62
5/30/62
10
- 0
13
- 2
40.1-40.2
6/22/62
60.3
50
6/25/62
Successful air recovery. Chute cords intact. Air snatch at
12,000 ft on first pass. No known malfunctions.
96
97
/
3
3/20/62
6/13/62
12
- 1
14
- 2
40
1-39.9
6/27/62
80.0
63
7/1/62
Successful air recovery. First AGENA "D" burned too long
50
80
N/A
-
N
A
.
causing 3 minutes high on period. Instr oper OK. F/C bad.
59
90
N/A
N/A 88-89
13
4/11/62
6/20/62
10
- 0
14
- 2
40.2-40.2
7/20/62
19.7
33
7/22/62
Successful air recovery thru normal sequence. F/C full.
H-timer malfunction. Instr oper only 14%.
86
/A
N/A 86-87
16
4/19/62
7/3/62
10
- 5
14
- 1
39.4-39.3
7/27/62
78.7
65
7/31/62
Successful air recovery. Instrumentation OK. F/C failed
56
N
due possibly to metering switch and solenoid quitting.
60
94
N/A
N/A 94-95
5
4/30/62
7/17/62
11
- 1
13
- 2
39.5-39.4
8/1/62
78,9
65
8/5/62
Successful air recovery through normal sequence.
Instr oper OK. F/C full.
58
84
N/A
N/A 102-10
3
19
5/19/62
8/24/62
13
- 6
14
- 3
39.4-39.3
8/28/62
78.7
65
9/1/62
Successful air recovery through normal sequence.
Instr oper OK. F/C didn't function properly.
Successful Instr oper planned to recover after 65th
Rev but chute tore from SRV during air P/U. No F/C flown.
25X1
25X1
~ ! I II iillfi I 1 1 I '11 I P ',p ill~f)f Iilf II Ike. nil.' Ipi s lp fllI'l
Approved For Release 2005106109 : CIATRDP8~BOO 80R 0~00500070001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000500070001-2
CORONA HISTORY
Volume I
TABLE 9-1 (CONT'D)
TOTAL
POUNDS
POUNDS
PROG
DD
Si
MAIN
INSTR
SHIP
WEEKS
PAYLOAD
PAYLOAD
NO.
FLT
VEH
THOR
250
MSN
INSTR
INSTR
SRV
TM
SI
TU
SUPPLY
Tu-
DRCG
RECD
TO
WKS-DYS
UNTIL
WEIGHT
FLIGHT
WEIGHT
OF
RECOVERY
NO.
NO.
NO.
NO.
NO.
TYPE
NO.
NO.
NO.
NO.
CASS'T
CASS'T
CASS'T
NO.
AT AP
BASE
AT AP
FLIGHT
FLOWN
DATE
TRANS
ORBITS
DATE
51 1133 350 055 9043 Cm-12 94-95 597 65 100 N/A N/A 98-99 4 5/16/62 9/1/62 15 - 3 17 - 5 40.2-40.2 9/17/62 44.2 17 9/18/62
52 1154 351 056 9045 Cm-13 96-97 598 64 D-3 N/A N/A 104-105 11 6/20/62 9/13/62 12 - 1 14 - 3 39.6-39.5 9/29/62 66.0 49 10/2/62
53 1134 352 057 9046 A-9 A 603 66 N/A N/A N/A N/A 10 3/31/62 9/30/62 26 - 1 27 - 3 38.3 10/9/62 38.3 65 10/13/62 Successful air recovery. Veb was 70 miles out of apogee.
Intended for 170, went 242 miles. Shutter timer malfunct.
54 1401 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 10/26/62 N/A
55 1136 367 058 9047 Cm-14 98-99 599 54 D-5 N/A N/A 106-107 24 6/25/62 10/23/62 17 - 1 19 - 0 39.8-39.6 11/5/62 79.4 65 11/9/62 Successful air recovery. F1C full. Instrument
operation perfect.
56 1135 3S3 059 9048 Cm-15 100-101 601 62 D-7 N/A N/A 100-101 23 7/10/62 11/12/62 17 - 6 19 - 4 39.4-39.4 11/24/62 78.8 81 11/29/62 Successful air recovery. F/C failed. Instr open OK.
Picked up capsule 32 miles from Honolulu.
58 1156 368 061 9050 Cm-17 102-103 607 70 D-4 N/A N/A 114-115 18 8/13/62 12/7/62 16 - 4 17 - 4 39.7-39.6 12/14/62 79.3
60 1159 370 064 9052 ~Cm-20 108-109 610 67 D-6 N/A N/A 120-121 12 12/8/62 2/13/63 9 - 3 12 - 1 39.3-39.5 2/28/63 0
61 1164 360 065 8001 L-1 03 612 70 S-2 T/L-1 N/A 6 303 11/27/62 3/5/63 14 - 0 15 - 6 72.2 3/18/63 0 0 Second TAT worked perfectly. No orbit due to
failure of pneumatic guidance on Agena booster.
63 1411 372 067 9055 A-12 A 605 54 N/A N/A N/A N/A 205 1/10/63 4/10/63 12 - 6 15 - 1 38.3 4/26/63 0
64 1165 364 069 8002 L-2 05 613 58 S-3 T/L-2 N/A 4 302 2/26/63 4/14/63 6 - 5 11 - 4 72.9 5/18/63 0
65 1161 362 068 9054 M-21 112-113 616 68 D-9 N/A N/A 110-111 26 12/7/62 4/13/63 18 - 1 26 - 5 39.5-39.2 6/12/63 78.7
66 1166 381 070 9056 M-22 110-111 611 62 D-11 N/A N/A 130-131 20 4/15/63 6/1/63 6 - 5 10 - 2 39.5-39.4 6/26/63 78.9
67 1412 388 071 9057 M-23 120-121 624 55 D-12 T/U-12 N/A 128-129 14 5/1/63 6/16/63 6 - 4 11 - 2 39.1-39.1 7/18/63 78.2
1162 377 073 1001 J-1B 114-115 617 - 01 D-16 T/U-10 S/C-3 T-4 402 4/1/63 8/3/63 17 - 5 20 - 5 81.5 8/24/63 0 0 Tried recovery after 12 days. 400 cycle inverter on AGENA
failed. S/I Intermittent. Temp gen showed veh hot.
70 1169 394 074 9058 A-11 A 604 64 . N/A N/A N/A N/A 203 9/3/62 8/2/63 47 - 5 51 - 4 38.9 8/29/63 38.9 65 9/2/63 Successful air recovers. instrument operation
perfect.
71 1163 383 075 1002 J-2A 116-117 619 69 D-18 T/J-4 S/C-4 T-3 404 4/24/63 8/27/63 17 - 6 21 - 5 81.7 9/23/63 81.0 49 9/26/63 Successful air recovery. Master unit on cassette failed.
Misadjustment on puck arm. Consistent light leaks.
72 1601 386 079 9059 A-6 A 602 50 N/A N/A N/A N/A 204 2/21/61 10/8/63 136 - 6 139 - 6 40.1 10/29/63 40.1 65 11/3/63 Successful air recovery. Perfect instr oper. Best "A" system
flown to date. Discontinuities three times on DRCG.
1163 383 075 1002 J-2B 116-117 620 60 D-13 T/J-13 S/C-4 T-6 404 4/24/63 8/27/63 17 - 6 21 - 5 82.5 .9/23/63 0 165
0
33 5/20/63
65 6/16/63
65 6/30/63
64 7/22/63
32 8/1/63 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation only
through Rev 23. Instrument malfunction.
64 8/28/63 Successful air recovery. S/I failure. First I' system
flown. Main instrument operation OK.
Successful air recovery. No P/L on F/C 100 mile
perigee and radiation factor Involved. Instr oper OK.
Successful air recovery. F/C full. Water seal on main
instr side failed to close. P/L not cut. Part of P/L in W/S/
Successful orbit during air snatch. Skyhook tore part of
chute causing SRV to sink. 2 day orbit due to 80 ml perigee.
Successful air recovery. S/I unit full. Instrument
operation OK.
First TAT. Third TAT booster failed to separate.
Destruct 100 seconds after launch.
Successful air recovery. Had to recover after 4z9 revs.
AGENA pwr supply prob. 400 cycle inverter failed. Instr OR.
No orbit acheived. Attitude sensors misaligned.
Perfect launch.
25X1
Decoder 103 no activate. Signal erratic. Orbit AGENA boos4 y O
too strong. D-timer 4 sec slow. Recovery after 33 revs.
Successful air recovery. Lost center format closure on
slave unit. Temperature in orbit was in mid BOs.
Tried to recover on Rev 165 but commands
failed. Decoder failure in vehicle.
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2005106109' : CIA-RDP89~00980R000500070001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000500070001-2
CORONA HISTORY
Volume I
TABLE 9-1 (CONT'D)
PROG
DD
SI
MAIN
INSTR
'
SHIP
TOTAL
WEEKS
POUNDS
PAYLOAD
FLIGHT
FLT
VE14
THOR
250
MSN
INSTR
INSTR
SRV
TM
SI
TU
SUPPLY
TU
DRCG
REC
D
TO
WKS-DYE
UNTIL
WEIGHT
DATE
NO
NO
NO.
NO.
NO.
TYPE
NO.
NO.
NO.
NO.
CASS'T
CASS'T
CASS'T
NO.
AT AP
BASE
AT AP
FLIGHT
FLOWN
.
.
74
1172
406
080
9061
M-25
134-135
637
75
D-26
T/J-21
N/A
T-29
25
9/27/63
11/18/63
7
- 4
8
- 5
37.9-37.8
11/27/63
75
1168
398
081
9062
M-26
130-131
642
61
D-34
T/J-10
N/A
T-24
306
10/24/63
11/27/63
4
- 6
8
- 2
38.4-38.6
12/21/63
76
1174
389
084
1004
J-5A
124-125
629
64
D-29
T/U-20
S/C-7
T-39
505
6/25/63
2/1/64
31
- 4
33
- 4
79.0
2/15/64
1174
389
084
1004
J-SB
124-125
628
65
D-42
T/J-6
S/C-7
T-10
505
6/25/63
2/1/64
31
- 4
33
- 4
79.2
2/15/64
77
1175
396
088
1003
J-6A
126-143
631
105
D-36
T/J-17
S/C-8
T-17
506
7/26/63
3/6/64
32
- 0
34
- 4
78.7
3/24/64
1175
396
088
1003
J-6B
126-143
630
103
D-31
T/J-18
S/C-8
T-18
506
7/26/63
3/6/64
32
- 0
34
- 4
78.9
3/24/64
78
1604
395
093
1005
J-8A
146-147
618
120
D-28
T/1-24
S/C-10
T-15
513
1/16/64
4/10/64
12
- 0
14
- 3
78.4
4/27/64
3
4
4
78
4/27/64
4/2 7/64
1604
395
093
1005
J-8B
146-147
635
121
D-40
T/J-26
S/C-10
T-26
513
1/16/64
4/10/64
12
- 0
14
-
.
,
79
1176
403
094
1006
J-9A
148-149
638
107
D-45
T/J-14
S/C-11
T-21
508
1/27/64
4/26/64
12
- 5
18
- 2
78.5
6/4/64
1176
403
094
1006
J-9B
148-149
639
104
D-49
T/J-30
S/C-11
T-30
509
1/27/64
4/26/64
12
- 5
18
- 2
78.5
6/4/64
80
1606
408
096
9065
A-21
21
661
61
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
525
3/5/64
6/2/64
- 12
- 5
14
- 2
39.6
6/13/64
81
1609
410
095
1007
J-7A
144-145
634
102
D-43
T/J-11
S/C-9
T-11
509
12/30/63
5/13/64
19
- 1
24
- 3
80.1
6/19/64
1609
410
095
1007
J-7B
144-145
633
110
D-54
T/J-16
S/C-9
T-16
509
12/30/63
5/13/64
19
- 1
24
- 3
78.9
6/19/64
82
1177
404
097
1008
3-10A
150-151
640
109
D-48
T/J-15
S/C-12
T-31
514
2/27/64
5/19/64
11
- 4
19
- 0
80.1
7/10/64
1177
404
097
1008
3-1ee
150-151
641
112
D-33
T/J-9
SIC-12
T-14
514
2/27/64
5/19/64
11
- 4
19
- 0
80.2
7/10/64
83
1605
413
098
1009
1-12A
154-155
646
136
D-56
T/U-23
S/C-15
T-37
517
3/30/64
6/26/64
12
- 4
18
- 2
79.2
8/5/64
1605
413
098
1009
J-12B
154-155
647
116
D-38
T/J-34
S/C-15
T-34
517
3/30/64
6/26/64
12
- 4
18
- 2
79.4
8/5/64
84
1603
412
099
9066A
A-22
22
667
71
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
526
4/9/64
8/4/64
18
- 0
20
- 3
39.4
8/21/64
85
1178
405
100
1010
3-11A
152-153
644
113
D-41
T/J-27
S/C-26
T-27
510
3/12/64
7/14/64
17
- 5
26
- 3
80.5
9/14/64
1178
405
100
1010
1-11B
152-153
652
118
D-44
T/1-39
S/C-26
T-44
510
3/12/64
7/14/64
17
5
26
- 3
81.5
9/14/64
86
1170
421
105
1011
J-03A
160-161
653
119
D-30
T/U-22
S/C-16
T-49
518
5/25/64
8/21/64
12
- 1
18
- 2
78.9
10/5/64
1170
421
105
1011
J-03B
160-161
654
131
D-57
T/J-8
S/C-16
T-20
518
5/25/64
8/21/64
12
- 1
18
- 2
78.7
10/5/64
87
1179
418
107
1012
J-13A
156-157
651
117
D-51
T/U-20
8/C-5
T-43
507
3/30/64
7/30/64
17
- 3
28
- 5
79.7
10/17/64
1179
418
107
1012
J-13B
156-157
645
114
D-46
T/J-32
S/C-5
T-32
507
3/30/64
7/30/64
17
- 3
28
- 5
79.7
10/17/64
88
1173
420
108
1013
J-15A
158-159
656
127
D-52
T/U-27
S/C-20
T-55
519
4/17/64
9/16/64
21
- 5
28
- 3
79.2
11/2/64
1173
420
108
1013
J-15B
158-159
657
133
D-47
T/J-36
S/C-20
T-40
519
4/17/64
9/16/64
21
- 5
28
- 3
79.1
11/2/64
POUNDS
PAYLOAD NO.
WEIGHT OF RECOVERY
TRANS ORBITS DATE
75.7 81 Tried to recover after 81 revolutions (4 days) but
capsule did not eject properly.
77.0 81 12/26/63 Successful air recovery. Perfect instrument
operation.
79.0 49 2/18/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
very good.
79.2 112 2/22/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
0 0 No orbit due to AGENA failure (regulated power
failure).
0 0 Did not achieve orbit.
0 0 Successful launch & orbit. No power from AGENA
due to Afro buss failure. Slave instr failed due
to film breakage.
0 0 d
78.5 65 6/8/64 S
0 air v ry. ope ondn oors?uck
orbits.
78.5 128 6/12/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
39.6 96 6/19/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good. Cloud coverage 60-70%.
80.1 65 6/23/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good. Resolution good.
78.9. 128 6/27/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
80.1 49 7/13/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
80.2 112 7/17/64 Successful air recovery. instrument operation
good.
recovery. Ins
air
69.5 49 8/8/64 S ssENA beacon yrobletrment operation
good. AG -
79.4 128 8/13/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
39.4 96 8/27/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good. Cloud coverage 60%.
80.5 65 9/18/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
81.5 144 9/23/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
80.0 65 10/9/64 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good. Drogue chute (ailed,
69, 3 Veh battery dropped to 18.5 volts. Attempted recovery
on Rev 112. No separation from AGENA.
S/I operation good.
69.3 49 10/20/64 Successful
problem. air ocovery. Instr
38.5 81 10/22/64 Guidance problem on AGENA requiring Lifeboat recovery.
48% payload retrieved. Water impact due to weather.
59.4 65 11/ 6/64 4Sucssful air 16 cycles unprogrammed ed on Rev failed . S/I oper normal.
0 81 11/7/64 SSuucc ssfulair reccov ry. Mission terminated on Pass
TOP SECRET
9-11
25X1 25X1
Approved For Release 2005106109 : Cl -RDP89D009801 000500070001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000500070001-2
CORONA HISTORY
Volume I
TABLE 9-1 (CA NT'D)
TOTAL POUNDS
PROG DD Si MAIN INSTR SHIP WEEKS PAYLOAD
FLT VEH THOR 250 MSN INSTR INSTR SRV TM Si TU SUPPLY TU DRCG REC'D TO WKS-DYS UNTIL WEIGHT
NO. NO. NO. NO. NO. TYPE NO. NO. NO. NO. CASS'T CASS'T CASS'T NO. AT AP BASE AT AP FLIGHT FLOWN
89 1180 416 110 1014 1-16A 162
1180 416 110 1014 J-165 139
90 1607 424 111 1015 J-17A 138
1607 424 111 1015 1-17B 141
91 1608 414 112 1016 J-18A 132
1608 414 112 1016 1-18B 133
92 1611 432 119 1017 J-14A 140
1611 432 119 1017 J-14B 165
93 1612 429 115 1018 J-19A 122
1612 429 115 1018 J-19B 123
94 1614 437 118 1019 1-04A 118
1614 437 118 1019 1-048 119
95 1615 438 121 1021 J-21A 166
1615 438 121 1021 J-21B 167
96 1613 444 132 1020 J-20A 136
1613 444 132 1020 J-20B 137
97 1617 446 133 1022 J-22A 168-
1617 446 133 1022 J-22B 169
98 1618 449 134 1023 J-23A 170
1618 449 134 1023 J-23B 171
99 1602 401 N/A N/A N/A N/A
100 -1619 458 136 1024 J-24A 172
1619 458 136 1024 J-248 173
101 1616 433 138 1025 TX-28A 142
1616 433 138 1025 JX-28B 127
659 128 D-53 T/J-2 S/C-21 T-7 520 6/4/64 10/26/64 20 - 4 23 - 6 79.1
660 132 D-50 T/J-33 S/C-21 T-12 520 8/14/64 11/4/64 11 - 5 13 - 5 79.4
662 129 D-61 T/J-25 S/C-22 T-33 524 9/30/63 11/16/64 59 - 0 63 - 6 78.9
663 140 D-58, T/J-38 S/C-22 T-38 524 11/15/63 11/16/64 52 - 1 57 - 0 79.0
665 135 D-55 T/U-21 S/C-23 T-47 523 9/6/63 11/24/64 63 - 3 70 - 6 78.7
666 106 D-59 T/J-28 S/C-23 T-28 523 9/6/63 11/24/64 63 - 3 70 - 6 78.5
623 109 D-21 T/J-23 S/C-24 T-25 531 11/15/63 12/21/64 57 - 2 66 - 5 79.6
625 112 D-60 T/1-25 S/C-24 T-52 531 6/17/64 12/21/64 57 - 2 66 - 5 78.7
668 136 D-20 SP-1 S/C-27 T-51 530 5/20/63 1/13/65 35 - 0 45 - 1 79.0
669 108 D-22 T/1-44 S/C-27 T-54C 530 5/20/6-3 1/13/65 35 - 0 45 - 1 78.7
626 138 D-39 T/U-26 S/C-6 T-53 512 5/8/63 1/28/65 90 - 1 103 - 1 78.1
627 139 D-19 T/J-50 S/C-6 T-60C 512 5/8/63 1/28/65 90 - 1 103 - 1 78.1
674 134 D-63 T/J-45 S/C-32 T-59C 529 11/18/64 4/29/65 23 - 1 25 - 6 77.9
670 111 D-25 T/J-48 S/C-32 T-58C 529 11/18/64 4/29/65 23 - 1 25 - 6 78.5
672 1011 D-67 T/J-13 S/C-28 T-13 501 11/13/64 3/15/65 17 - 3 29 - 5 78.3
673 107 D-62 T/J-40 S/C-28 T-48 501 11/13/64 3/15/65 17 - 3 29 - 5 78.2
664 119 D-65 T/J-47 8/0-03 T-61C 516 12/28/64 5/17/65 20 - 0 29 - 0 78.9
658 129 D-24 T/J-46 S/C-33 T-56C 516 12/28/64 5/17/65 20 - 0 29 - 0 78.3
621 113 D-17 T/J-43 S/C-31 T-57C 522 1/28/65 6/9/65 18 - 5 28 - 5 78.9
649 114 D-66 T/J-37 S/C-31 T-42 522 1/28/65 6/9/65 18 - 5 28 - 5 78.3
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
622 1005 D-69 T/U-19 S/C-34 T-41 515 3/2/65 8/10/65 23 - 0 29 - 1 80.1
643 118 D-64 T/U-24 S/C-34 T-50 515 3/2/65 8/10/65 23 - 0 20 - 1 80.2
650 115 D-73 TU-18 S/C-30 T-45 521 12/11/63 9/16/65 92 - 1 94 - 6 78.9
636 130 D-70 TI-42 S/C-30 T-36 521 7/26/63 9/16/65 114 - 5 117 - 3 78.9
25X1
2~ Il,
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA 1
-RDP8iB00980~00~05000700 01 -2
POUNDS
PAYLOAD NO.
FLIGHT WEIGHT OF
DATE TRANS ORBITS
11/18/64 80.0 81
11/18/64 78.0 145
12/19/64 76.0 81
12/19/64 68.7 175
1/15/65 77.7 81
1/15/65 78.5 159
2/25/65 81.2 81
2/25/65 75.7 145
3/25/65 80.5 66
3/25/65 77.2 99
4/29/65 76.6 80
4/29/65 79.6 143
5/18/65 75.4 81
5/18/65 51.9 161
6/9/65 77.9 97
6/9/65 28.0 113
7/19/65 81.2 65
7/19/65 76.7 144
8/17/65 79.9 81
8/17/65 57.7 144
9/1/65 N/A N/A
9/22/65 81.5 81
9/22/65 79.8 161
10/5/65 78.8 81
10/5/65 78.6 161
25X1
RECOVERY
DATE
11/23/64
11 /27/64
12/24/64
12/30/64
1/20/65
1/25/65
3/2/65
3/6/65
3/29/65
3/31/65
5/4/65
5/23/65
5/28/65
6/15/65
6/16/65
7/2 3/65
7/28/65
8/22/65
8/26/65
N/A
9/27/65
10/2/65
10/10!65
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal. No failures in system.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal. No failures in system.
Successful air recovery. instrument operation normal
after 5 day mission (Drogue chute failed on B).
Successful air recovery. Deactivated for 3 days (1st time).
Early recovery due to pyro battery problem on AGENA.
Successful air recovery aprx 40 miles from estimated
point of impact. Instr operation normal.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal. Zero defects on this mission.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good. Zero defects.
Successful air recovery. S/I failure (metering).
Yaw programmer failure on Rev 88, capping shutter.
Successful air recovery. Instr operation good.
S/I programmer failure, affecting both instrs.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal.
No recovery due to malfunction of vehicle.
Recovery command system programming.-
Successful air recovery. S/1 failed on 79th rev.
Pan instrument operation normal.
Successful air recovery. Payload in No I instr came
out of rails because of torn film causing inst failure.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal.
Type 9 regulator failed on AGENA causing
complete loss of guidance. Recovered by Lifeboat.
Successful air recovery. Zero defects for A/P
facility.
Successful air recovery. Cycle counter on No. 2
instrument intermittent.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal.
Successful air recovery. Instr No. 1 intermittent.
Relay in A/P command box probable cause.
Complete RP veh. No A/P range safety.
Destructed THOR at T + 57 seconds.
Successful air recovery. Low period orbit due
to booster. Instrument operation good.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
10/15 /65 Successful air recovery. Anomolous
deployment of main chute.
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000500070001-2
CORONA HISTORY
Volume I
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
TABLE 9-1 (CONT'D)
PROG
FLT
H
DD
SI
MAIN
INSTR
S
TOTAL POUNDS
POUNDS
VE
NO
NO
THOR
NO
250
NO
MSN
10 STR
INSTR
SRv
TM
SI
TU
SUPPLY
TU
DRCG
REC'D
HIP
TO
WEEKS PAYLOAD
PAYLOAD
NO
.
.
.
.
NO.
TYPE
NO.
NO.
NO.
NO.
GASS'T
CASS'T
CASS'T
NO.
AT AP
BASE
W
KS-DYS
UNTIL WEIGHT
FLIGHT
WEIGHT
.
OF
AT
AP
FLIGHT FLOWN
DATE
TR
102
162
ANS
ORBITS
DATE
0
439
139
1026
J-25A
174
701
1001
D-75
TJ-78
S/C-35
T-65C
502
4/30/65
10/1/65
22
- 1
26 - 0 78.6
10/28/65
78.6
81
11/2/65
1620
439
139
1026
J-25B
175
702
1002
D-72
TT-62
S/C-35
T-62C
502
4/30/65
10/1/65
22
- 1
26 - 0 78.5
10/28/65
77.8
160
11/7/65
103
1621
448
140
1027
JX-27A
163
648
140
D-71
TJ-19
S/C-29
T-19
532
6/4/64
10/25/65
57
- 6
64 - 5 78.8
12/9/65
55.0
17
12/10/65
1621
448
140
1027
JX-27B
164
655
141
D-68
TT-41
S/C-29
T-22
532
6/17/64
10/25/65
56
- 0
66 - 4 78.8
12/9/65
0
33
12/11/65
104
1610
451
141
1028
J-26A
176
703
1003
D-77
TT-7
S/C-37
T-67C
535
5/26/65
12/2/65
29
- 1
30 - 2 78.6
12/24/65
80.3
81
12/29/65
1610
451
141
1028
J-26B
177
704
1004
D-74
TJ-64
S/C-37
T-64C
535
5/26/65
12/2/65
29
- 1
30 - 2 79.3
12/24/65
77.6
144
1,/2/66
105
1623
450
142
1029
1-27A
178
705
1010
D-79
TT-35
S/C-36
T-690
540
5/28/65
12/16/65
28
- 6
31 - 2 79.9
2/2/66
79.9
81
2/7/66
1623
450
142
1029
J-27B
179
706
1006
D-76
TJ-66
S/C-36
T-66C
540
5/28/65
12/16/65
28
- 6
31 - 2 79.8
2/2/66
79.8
160
2/12/66
106
1622
452
143
1030
J-29A
182
709
1009
D-94
TJ-73
S/C-39
T-71C
533
7/2/65
1/24/66
29
- 3
35 - 5 79.1
3/9/66
80.2
81
3/14/66
1622
452
143
1030
J-29B
183
710
1012
D-82
TT-70
S/C-39
T-68C
533
7/2/65
1/24/66
29
- 3
35 - 5 79.9
3/9/66
78.8
159
3/19/66
107
1627
474
146
1031
J-30A
184
711
102
D-83
TJ-81D
S/C-42
T-81D
537
9/21/65
3/2/66
23
- 1
28 - 2 79.7
4/7/66
81.0
113
4/14/66
1627
474
146
1031
J-30B
185
712
130
D-86
TJ-65
S/C-42
T-78C
537
9/21/65
3/2/66
23
- 1
28 - 2 79.9
4/7/66
39.8
177
108
1625
465
149
1032
J-28A
180
707
1007
D-81
TJ-67
S/C-38
T-73C
534
7/9/65
4/5/66
38
- 4
42 = 4 80.0
5/3/66
0
1625
465
149
1032
J-288
181
708
1008
D-80
TJ-5
S/C-38
T-70C
534
7/9/65
4/5/66
38
- 4
42 - 4 79.5
5/3/66
0
0
109
1630
469
150
1033
J-33A
194
717
1017
D-91
TJ-87D
S/C-45
T-87D
543
11/9/65
5/5/66 2
5
- 2
27 - 6 79.6
5/23/66
82.0
82
5/28/66
1630
469
150.
1033
J-33B
195
718
107
D-84
TJ-84
S/C-45
T-84C
543
11/9/65
5/5/66 2
5
- 2
27 - 6 79.7
5/23/66
77.s
176
6/3/66
110
1626
466
153
1034
J-31A
186
713
1013
D-85
TJ-77B
S/C-41
T-77D
538
10/6/65
5/18/66 2
7
- 4
32 - 3 79.7
6/21/66
79.6
81
6/26/66
1626
466
153
1034
J-31B
187
714
1014
D-87
TJ-74
S/C-41
T-74C
538
10/6/65
5/18/66 2
7 -
4
32 - 3 79.7
6/21/66
79.3
161
7/1/66
111
1631
506
154
1036
J-32A
190
715
1015
D-89
TJ-83D
S/C-43
T-83D
511
10/27/65
8/1/66 3
9 -
4
40 - 6 79.5
8/9/66
80.1
115
8/16/66
1631
506
154
1036
J-32B
191
716
1016
D-88
TJ-80
S/C-43
T-80C
511
10/27/65
8/1/66 3
9 -
4
40 - 6 79.3
8/9/66
78.2
212
8/22/66
112
1628
477
164
1035
J-36A
188
723
118
D-95
TJ-7513
S/C-40
T-75D
607
1/26/66
6/21/66 2
0 -
6
33 - 6 79.8
9/20/66
78.9
81
9/25/66
1628
477
164
1035
J-36B
189
724
127
D-96
TJ-72
S/C-40
T-72C
607
1/26/66
6/21/66 2
0 -
6
33 - 6 79.8
9/20/66
80.6
160
9/30/66
113
1632
507
178
1037
J-38A
198
727
102
D-101
TJ-101D
S/C-46
T-99E
544
6/30/66
10/13/66 1
7 -
4
18 - 5 79.7
11/8/66
79.4
66
11/12/66
1632
507
178
1037
J-388'
199
728
135
D-106
TJ-89
S/C-46
T-96F
544
6/30/66
10/13/66 1
7 -
4
18 - 5 78.4
11/8/66
78.2
19S
11/20/66
114
1629
495
184
1038
J-34A
192
719
115
D-93
TJ-85D
S/C-44
T-85D
542
12/3/65
1/10/67 5
7 -
4
58 - 1 81.0
1/14/67
80.3
81
1/19/67
1629
495
184
1038
J-34B
193
720
134
D-90
TJ-82
S/C-44
T-82C
542
12/3/65
1/10/67 57
-
4
58 - 1 80.8
1/14/67
81.5
193
1/26/67
TOP SECRET
25X1
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000500070
Successful air recovery. Intermittent C F
switch operation.
Successful air recovery. H 0 had sticky
shutter.
Successful air recovery. Instr operation normal.
Veh 'D' timer SW failure. Lifeboat recovery.
Successful air recovery. No Instr operation.
Lifeboat recovery.
Successful air recovery. Instr operation perfect.
Zero defects.
Successful air recovery. Instr 200pps timing
intermittent, otherwise zero defects.
Successful air recovery. Zero defects.
Successful air recovery. S/I non-operational
between Revs 81 thru 133.
Successful air recovery. Stepper switch problem.
Instrument operation normal.
Successful air recovery. Same stepper problem.
Instrument operation normal.
Successful air recovery. Slave camera
failed during C&W.
Failed to achieve orbit.
Failed to achieve orbit.
Successful air recovery. Instr operation normal.
Successful air recovery. Instr operation normal.
Successful air recovery. V/H programmer failure.
PMU gas leak out by Rev 30.
Successful air recovery. Flashing light
failure.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
good.
Successful air catch. Instr operation normal.
New OPS selection capability and 0 S F G.
Successful air catch. V/H programmer failed
on Rev 157.
Successful air recovery, 3rd interim phase ill, second
PC, 6 second THORAD launch.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal. High system temp, MIP an.
Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal. NIP 90. Temp normal. 1st full + 3 system.
. 25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000500070001-2
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CORONA HISTORY
Volume I
TABLE 9-1 (CONT'D)
TOTAL POUNDS POUNDS
PROG DD SI MAIN INSTR SHIP WEEKS PAYLOAD PAYLOAD NO.
FLT VEH THOR 250 MSN INSTR INSTR SRV TM SI TU SUPPLY TU DRCG RECD TO WKS-DYS UNTIL WEIGHT FLIGHT WEIGHT OF RECOVERY
NO. NO. NO. NO. NO. TYPE NO. NO. NO. NO. CASS'T CASS'T CASS'T NO. AT AP BASE AT AP FLIGHT FLOWN DATE TRANS ORBITS DATE
115 163S 493 196 1039 J-39A 206 729 1001 D-103 TT-79D S/C-51 T-79D 602 4'8/66 2/16/67 44 - 5 44 - 11 80.3 2/22/67 80.76 81 2/27/67 Successful air recovery. instrument operation
normal. High system temp, SLIP 85.
1635 493 196 1039 J-393 207 730 1010 D-100 TT-76 S/C-51 T-76C 602 4/8/66 2/16/67 44 - 5 44 - 11 79.9 2/22/67 79.44 177 3/5/67 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal. Normal system temp. hIIP 85.
116 1636 501 200 1040 J-35A 196 721 136 D-78 TJ-89D S/C-47 T-89D 539 12/17/65 3/26/67 66 - 2 66 - 6 79.3 3/30/67 76.28 81 4/4/67 SAR S-band link inoperative. B,/'U employed.
MIP 85, temp normal.
1636 501 200 1040 J-358 197 722 113 D-92 TT-86 S/C-47 T-86C 539 12/17/65 3/26/67 66 - 2 66 - 6 79.1 3/30/67 82.12 145 4/8/67 SAR S-band link inoperative. 6,/U employed.
MIP 85. temp normal.
117 1634 508 209 1041 J-40A 208 731 1003 D-105 TJ-99D S/C-52 T-101E 536 5/20/66 5/4/67 50 - 0 50 - 5 88.5 5/9/67 80.14 93 5/15/67 Successful air recovery.
1634 508 209 1041 J-40B 209 732 138 D-102 TJ-96 S/C-52 T-98F 536 5/20/66 5/4/67 50 - 0 50 - 5 88.2 5/9/67 78.95 215 5/23/67 SAR pickup 225 nm down range due to abnormal
orbit (AGENA velocity meter failure).
118 1633 509 213 1042 J-37A 204 725 129 D-97 TT-95D S/C-49 T-95D 528 3/22/65 6/8/67 115 - 3 116 - 4 80.5 6/16/67 78.4 97 6/22/67 Successful air recovery. Instrument operation
normal.
1633 509 213 1042 J-37B 205 726 1005 D-98 TJ-88 S/C-49 T-88C 528 3/22/65 6/8/67 115 - 3 116 - 4 78.1 6/16/67 80.2 143 7/1/67 Water pickup. Instrument operation normal.
Chute events late.
119 1637 510 216 1043 1-42A 200 735 127R3 D-107 TJ-91D S/C-48 T-91D 527 8/4/66 7/27/67 51 - 0 52 - 4 79.9 8/7/67 79.9 113 8/14/67 Successful air recovery. Master scan rate
erratic after Rev 68.
1637 510 216 1043 J-426 201 736 112 D-112 TJ-92 S/C-48 T-92C 527 8/4/66 7/27/67 51 - 0 52 - 4 80.2 8/7/67 73.2 127 8/22/67 Successful air recovery. Master instrument
DISIC failed on Rev 228.
120 1641 512 217 1101 CR-lA 302 803 1029 3 3 302 T-305 616 2/14/67 9/10/67 29 - 6 30 - 4 79.5 9/15/67 79.5 97 9/21/67 SAR pan &e DISIC insrrument operation normal. Some
early timeouts on exposure control delay.
1641 512 217 1101 CR-1B 303 804 1028 3 6 302 T-302 616 2/14/67 9/10/67 29 - 6 30 - 4 79.8 9/15/67 79.8 208 9/28/67 Pan &DISIC instrument operation normal.
121 1639 513 221 1044 J-41A 202 733 1004 D-99 TJ-97D 5/0-50 T-97E 606 7/6/66 10/27/67 68 - 1 68 - 6 79.75 11/1/67 79.75 97 11/8/67 SAR instrument operation normal. Impact aprx
60 nm south.
1639 513 221 1044 1-41B 202 734 13082 D-104 TJ-94 S/C-50 T-94F 606 7/6/66 10/26/67 68 - 1 68 - 6 78.56 11/1/67 78.56 144 11/11/67 SAR instrument operation normal. Anomaly in
Lifeboat timer dictated early recovery.
DISIC
122 1642 514 223 1102 CR-2A 304 805 1025 4 1 303 T-303 626 5/2/67 12/2/67 30 - 5 31 - 5 80.0 12/9/67 80.0 83 112/15/67 SAR, MIP 100. Second J-3 flight.
1642 S14 223 1102 CR-2B 305 806 1026 4 8 303 T-304 626 5/2/67 12/2/67 30 - 5 31 - 5 84.1 12/9/67 84.1 129 12/22/67 SAR, MIP 100. Best of CORONA missions to date.
123 1640 516 226 1045 J-45A 214 741 1022 D-109 TJ-107D 55 T-107E 612 12/9/67 1/19/68 58 - 0 58 - 5 80.5 1/24/68 74.0 112 1/31/68 SAR, MIP 90. 14 day mission despite loss.
1640 516 226 1045 1-45B 215 742 1023 D-108 TT-102 55 T-102F 612 12/9/67 1/19/68 58 - 0 58 - 5 80.5 1/24/68 81.5 223 2/7/68 SAR, MIP 90.
124 1638 518 228 1046 J-48A 220 747 1015R2 119 TJ-1130 58 113F 608 6/30/67 3/10/68 35 - 6 36 - 3 81.4 3/14/68 81.4 113 3/21/68 First full load of SO-230. System
exhibited a decrease In performance from
Rev to end
R 9MI 85 of mission. SAR, MIP 90.
1638 518 228 1046 1-488 221 748 101482 120 TJ-110 58 110E 608 6/30/67 3/10/68 35 - 6 36 - 3 81.4 3/14/68 81.4 240 3/29/68 SA
DISIC
125 1643 511 233 1103 CR-3A 306 807 1035 5 9 304 T-307 621 8/23/67 4/25/68 34 - 4 35 - 3 77.6 5/1/68 77.6 115 5/8/68 Out-of-focus probably caused by film
flatness in platen area. Partial
load of UTB. BAR, MIP 95.
1643 511 233 1103 CR-3B 307 808 1036 5 11 304 T-306 621 8/23/67 4/25/68 34 - 4 35 - 3 78.0 5/1/68 78.0 228 5/15/68 BAR, MIP 95.
126 1645 517 235 1047 J-47A 218 745 1017R2 117 TJ-109D S/C-57 T-109E 604 6/18/67 6/13/68 56 - 12 57 - 2 81.2 6/20/68 81.2 129 6/28/68 Cold booster caused ground track mismatch.
AGENA/PL incompatibility caused concern.
SAR, MIP 85.
1645 517 235 1047 J-47B. 219 746 1016R2 118 TJ-106 S/C-57 T-106E 604 6/18/67 6/13/68 56 - 12 57 - 2 81.3 6/20/68 81.3 240 7/5/68 SAR, MIP 85.
DISIC
127 1644 522 238 1104 CR-4A 308 809 1030 7 14 305 T-309 618 11/14/67 8/2/68 37 - 0 37 - S 81.1 8/7/68 81.3 115 8/14/68 PMU failure. T/R failure in "B"
bucket. Highest MIP rating for
to (115).
CORONA date
1644 522 238 1104 CR-4B 309 810 1031. 7 15 305 T-308 618 11/14/67 8/2/68 37 - 0 37 - 5 81,2
8/7/68 81.0 244 8/22/68 SAR SAR, MI P 115.
5.
25X1
:CIA-~bP89"bQ~0b80Rdb~500070bd1"-?2
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 ? 6 ~r ,
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000500070001-2
r
r
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CORONA HISTORY
Volume I
TOP SECRET
TABLE 9-1 (CONT'D)
PAOG DD TOTAL POUNDS POUNDS
SI MAIN INSTR SHIP WEEKS PAYLOAD PAYLOAD NO.
FLT VEH THOR 250 MSN INSTR INSTR SRV TM SI TU SUPPLY TU DRCG REC'D TO WKS-DYS UNTIL WEIGHT FLIGHT WEIGHT
NO. NO. NO. NO. NO. TYPE NO. NO. NO. NO. CASS'T CASS'T CASS'T NO. AT AP BASE AT AP FLIGHT FLOWN DATE OF RECOVERY
TRANS
ORBITS DATE REMARKS
128 1647 524 240 1048 J-49A 222 749 1010R3 121 TJ-I1ID 59 T-I1IE 605 10/23/67 9/13/68 46 - 2 47 - 0 81.4 9/18/68 81.4 145 9/27/68 SAR,MIP 85. P/L tear in "B" mission
and instrument failure.
1647 524 240 1048 J-496 223 750 13583 116 TJ-108 59 T-108F 605 10/23/67 9/13/68 46 - 2 47 - 0 81.1 9/18/68 56.6 224 10/2/68 SAR, MIP 85. Instrument failure.
129 1646 515 242 1105 CR-5A 310 811 1032 NONE NONE 301 T-311 601 2/2/68 10/24/68 37 - 5 39 - 1 79.4 _ 11/3/68 79.4 1131 11/11/68 OAR, MIP 100. Both instruments failed
at end of mission.
1646 515 242 1105 CRSB 311 812 1033 NONE NONE 301 T-312 601 2/2/68 10/24/68 37 - 5 39 - 1 76.9 11/3/68 76.9 292 11/21/68 SAR, MIP 100.
130 1648 527 243 1049 J-50A 224 751 134R3 D-123 TT-115E 60 T-11SE 609 1/22/68 12/5/68 45 - 0 46 - 0 80.6- 12/12/68 80.6 99 12/18 /68 SAR, MIP 85. Out-of-focus, only fair
quality. Heavy rail scratching.
1648 527 243 1049 J-50B 225 752 11583 D-124 TJ-112F 60 T-112F 609 1/22/68 12/5/68 45 - 0 46 - 0 79.9 12/12/66 79.9 179 12 /18/68 SAR, MIP 85.
DISIC
131 1650 519 244 1106 CR-6A 312 801R 1027 6 18. 307 T-313 627 3/26/68 1/30/69 44 - 2 45 1 81.5 2/5/69 81,2 66 2/9/69 SAR, MIP 105. First DSR command system
flown. Degraded by haze.
1650 519 244 1106 CR-6B 313 6028 1024 6 22 307 T-314 627 3/26/68 1/30/69 44 - 2 45 - 1 80.2 2/5/69 74.0 147 2/14/69 SAR, MIP 105. All quality good to fair,
132 1651 541 245 1050 J-43A 210 737 1023 109 TJ-93D 53 T-93D 611 10/17/68 3/14/69 125 - 1 125 - 6 81.3 3/19/69 46.2 34 3/21/69 SAR, MIP 85. Problems on vehicle guidance
requiring early recovery on both "A" and "B. "
Both 1651 541 245 1050 J-43B 211 738 137 110 TJ-9D 53 T-90C 611 10/17/68 3/14/69 125 - 1 125 - 6 81.0 3/19/69 80.6 50 3/22/69 SAR, MI85QMS out-of-focus cond.
133 1649 544 246 1051 J-44A 212 739 1020 115 TJ-105D 54 T-105E 617 11/17/68 3/24/69 126 - 4 127 - 4 80.5 5/1/69 80.1 113 5/8/69 SAR, MIP 80.
1649 544 246 1051 J-44B 213 740 1012 116 TJ-100 54 T-100F 617 11/17/68 3/24/69 126 - 4 127 - 4 80.5 5/1/69 80.1 256 5/17/69 SAR, MIP 80. "B" recovery was the 50th
DISK consecutive recovery.
134 1652 038 247 1107 CR-7A 314 813 1034 11 12 306 T-317 630 4/20/68 7/17/69 64 - 5 65 - 4 80.7 7/23/69 50.7. 147 8/1/69 MIP 95. Water pickup.
2nd flight utilizing DSR cmnd system.
1652 038 247 1107 CR-7B 315 814 1041 11 17 306 T-310 630 4/20/68 7/17/69 64 - 5 65 - 4 81.5 7/23/69 48.0 308 8/11/69 SAR, MIP 95. No. 2lnstrfailed on 1st day.
DISIC failed on 18th day.
135 1653 300 248 1052 1-46A 216 743R 118R2 D111 T-93D 56 T-93D 614 2/10/67 9/11/69 134 - 6 136 - 2 79.1 9/22/69 79.1 115 9/29/69 SAR, MIP 85.
1653 300 248 1052 J-46B 217 744R 101381 D110 T-90C 56 T-90C 614 2/10/67 9/11/69 134 - 6 136 - 2 80.2 9/22/69 80.2 244 10/7/69 SAR, MIP 85. Last of the 1-1 series payloads.
136 1655 039 249 1108. CR-9A 316 817 1037 12 10 314 T-331 633 10/16/68 11/21/69 57 - 2 59 - 3 80.6 12/4/69 80.6 115 1/10/69 SAR, MIP 105. These MIPs are the highest achieved
by a CORONA system for a launch near the winter
solice.
1655 039 249 1108 CR-9B 317 818 1039 12 13 314 T-330 633 10/16/68 11/21/69 57 - 2 59 - 3 81.5 12/4/69 - 81.5 276 12/21/69 SARtMIP 100.
137 1657 041 251 1109 CR-10A 320 819 1040 9 23 308 T-319 628 5/15/69 2/26/70 40 - 6 41 - 5 81.2 3/4/70 81.2 115 P/11/70 SAR, MIP 110.
1657 041 251 1109 CR-10B 321 820 1044 9 28 308 T-318 628 5/15/69 2/26/70 40 - 6 41 - 5 78.6 3/4/70 78.6 309 /23/70 SAR, MIP 100.
138 1656 045 252 1110 CR-IIA 322 821 1042 10 25 309 T-325 624 6/16/69 5/14/70 47 - 5 48 - 4 80.0 5/20/70 80.0 179 6/31/70 SAR, MIP 90,
1656.045 252 1110 CR-11B 323 822 1043 10 26 309 T-324 624 6/16/69 5/14/70 47 - 5 48 - 4 80.1 5/20/70 80.1 308 6/6,'70 SAR, MIP 95.
139 1654 556 253 1111 CR-12A 324 823 1025 02R 16 310 T-323 625 9/25/69 7/15/70 41 - 5 42 - 5 80.3 7/22/70 80.3 112 LL
y/29/70 SAR, MIP 105. Imagery produced by the aft-looking
instrument Is considered the best in CORONA
1654 556 253 1111 CR-126 325 824 1026 028 20 310 T-316 625 9/25/69 7/15/70 41 - 5 42 - 5 77.5 7/22/70 77.5 301 /10/70 program for 2nd generation lens.
SAR, MIP 105.
140 1658 552 254 1112 QR-2A 300 827 1038 08 4R 299 T-333 613 1/4/70 11/11/70 200 - 3 201 - 3 80.6 11/18/70 78.1 147 /27/70
SAR, MIP 115. DISK failed 5 hours after C/5.
6
552 2
1
58
54 1112 QR-2t1 dui 828 1039 . U8 21 299 T-322 613 1/4/70 11/11/70 200 - 3 201 - 3 80.9 11/18/70 40.3 309 12/7,/70 SAR, MIP 115.
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r
CORONA HISTORY
Volume I
DD
SI
TU
SUPPLY
MAIN
TU
DRCG
INSTR
REC'D
SHIP
TO
TOTAL
WEEKS
WKS-DYS UNTIL
AT AP FLIGHT
POUNDS
PAYLOAD
WEIGHT
FLOWN
FLIGHT
DATE
PAYLOAD NO.
WEIGHT OF
TRANS ORBITS
RECOVERY
DATE
PROG
V EH
INSTR
INSTR
SRV
TM
SI
NO
CASS'T
CASS'T
CASS'T
NO.
AT AP
BASE
FLT
NO 0
N NOO
TYPE
NO.
NO.
NO.
.
Destruct 35 seconds after
ilure
f
NO 0.
NOO. NO.
.
NO N0. .
.
. .
/71
69 - 3
70
- 3
80.8
2/17/71
0
0
.
a
THOR booster
h
141
1659
537
255
1113
CR-13A
326
825
1031R2
13
19
312
T-327 6
20
10/11/69
2/10
0
.
launc
37
255
1113
CR-13B
327
826
1032
13
29
312
T-326 6
20
10/11/69
2/10/'1
69 - 3
70
- 3
80.0
2/17/71.
tem exhibited the highest
Thi
1659
5
5
7
58
- 5
80.5
3/24/71
80.0
115
3/31/71
s sys
SAR, MIP 120.
the CORONA Program.
i
i
1660
538
256
1114
CR-14A
328
829
1029R
1R
24
315
T-321 6
29
2/6/70
3/17/71
-
5
ng
n
MOP rat
P 125
142
1660
538
256
1114
CR-14B
329
830
1037
1R
2R
315
T-328
629
2/6/70
3/17/71
57 - 5
58
- 5
78.5
3/24/71
73.0
260
4/9/71
.
SAR, MI
0
1662
567
257
1115
CR-iSA
330
831
1041
14
7
313
T-329
623
8/19/70
9/5/71
76 - 3
77
- 1
79.0
9/10/71
79.0
115
9/17/71
.
SAR, MIP 12
110
143
1662
567
257
1115
CR-15B
331
832
1040
14
27
313
T-320
623
8/19/70
9/5/71
76- 3
77
- 1
78.5
9/10/71
78.5
309
9/29/71
.
SAR, MIP
4
1661
569
250
1116
CR-16A
332
833
1045
N/A
N/A
316
T-315
619
8/5/70
4/14/72
80 - 6
80
- 11
80.8
4/19/72
80.8
180
4/30/72
SAR, MIP 115.
115
14
569'
2S8
1116
00-168
333
834
1044
N/A
N/A
316
T-300
619
8/5/70
4/14/72
80 - 6
80
- 11
80.8
4/19/72
80.8
309
5/8/72
.
SAR, MIP
failed to deploy. Also
l
1661
311
T-301
615
8/27/68
5/16/72
184 - 11
184
- 20
80.0
5/25/72
80.0
34
5/27/72
ar array
SAR, MIP 115. So
leak in control gas system on vehicle reduced
5
1663
571
259
1117
CR-8A
318
815R
1038
N/A
N/A
mission life to 6 days.
MIP 115
14
1663
-
571
259
1117
CR-8B
319
816R
1046
N/A
N/A
311
T-332
615
8/27/68
5/16/72
184 - 11
184
- 20
80.1
5/25/72
80.1
98
5/31/72
.
SAR,
I
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TABLE 9-1 (CONT'D)
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
',the Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Under Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Science and Technology
Policy
The National Reconnaissance Officer
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
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NSC--U SM-157A September 29, 1976
SUBJECT: Policy on Remote Earth. Imagery
Attached for your comment and/or concurrence
are a draft Memorandum for the President and a
report prepared by the Standing Committee on Space
Policy. Clearances and minor editorial comments
may be provided to Mr. Michael Michaud, Department
of State, 632-8018; substantive comments should be
addressed to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries
Committee in writing. Your response is requested
by c.o.b. Tuesday, October 12, 1976.
Acting Staff Director
cc: AID
ACDA
USGS
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' NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
Subject:. Policy on Remote Earth Imagery
. The Standing Committee on Space Policy of the Under
Secretaries Committee, which was established by your direction
in 1975, has undertaken as its first task a review of policy
on remote earth imagery..
I am transmitting herewith a report on remote earth
imagery policy, prepared by the Standing Committee. This report
represents the first interagency review of USG policy governing
remote earth imagery since 1966. The Standing Committee has
identified one issue as central to updating our policy
and
provides a detailed analysis and options
for your consideration. Certain other issues on which there
is a consensus are presented in the form of recommendations.
US Remote Earth Imagery Programs
The US currently operates two wholly separate satellite
programs which acquire images of the earth. On the one hand,
intelligence programs are classified and compartmented, and
are used principally (although not solely) to acquire foreign
military information that is essential to US defense planning
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2 -
and arms control verification. intelligence programs stress
high spatial resolution. On the other hand,, civil imagery
programs have been open, unclassified and used to acquire
global information on a routine, repetitive basis. Civil
programs have tended to utilize a variety of sensors, rely
heavily on digital processing techniques for data extraction
and stress precise spectral resolution (which permits fine
discrimination between wave lengths of recorded energy) rather
than high spatial resolution.
To date most of the federal civil users who have access
to high resolution imagery have found it useful. High reso-
lution imagery (for the purpose of this study defined as
resolution better than 20 meters) is produced only by the
intelligence program at present, and is not contemplated in
the US open civil programs until the shuttle is flying in the
1980's.
Objectives
The Standing Committee has postulated the following
objectives for US remote earth imaging programs:.
-- to continue to protect the US intelligence program
from direct challenge, external regulation, or
interference;
--- to avoid compromising technology which reveals
the precise characteristics of US equipment used
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in the intelligence program or which reveals US
intelligence capabilities and methods;
--- to avoid providing outside of protected channels
imagery which compromises classified information
on US military operations or defense installations;
-- to promote complete freedom in the acquisition
of imagery in both civil and intelligence programs,
and in the distribution of unclassified imagery
and data in any-eventual internati"nal legal regime
for remote earth imagery;
--- to maintain the civil character and control of the
US civil program for remote earth imagery while
taking pertinent security considerations into account,
including provisions for dedication of such programs
to national security purposes when directed by the
President in time of national emergency;
-- to continue to use cooperation with other countries
in remote earth imagery and other space applications
as an important element in our foreign relations,
with particular emphasis on sharing the products of
such technology to assist developing countries;
--- to provide federal civil users the best imagery
available at the lowest classification possible
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within national security constraints in order
that the requirements of federal civil users can
be met to the extent feasible and that the maximum
utility may be extracted from satellite photography
produced by the intelligence program;
-- to make publicly available the most useful unclas-
sified imagery and unclassified data derived from
classified imagery both of the US and of the world
for scientific research, economic development, com-
mercial applications, and other appropriate purposes.
Classification
The present US policy is to refuse to confirm in any
unclassified official statement the fact that the US conducts
photo-reconnaissance from satellites, and the "fact of" the
intelligence program is classified SECRET. In effect this
policy also precludes the release outside classified channels
of any imagery or derived information with attribution to a
classified imagery satellite source. Thus the use of intel-
ligence imagery for civil purposes is severely constrained.
On the one hand, it is argued that the uncertain risks to
.the intelligence program associated with official acknowledgment
at this time outweigh the potential benefits of opening the
way for greater civil use of intelligence data. On the other
hand, it is argued that the intelligence program is such an
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open secret that there is little risk in making intelligence
imagery which reveals no classified information available
for broader civil use.
Members of the Under Secretaries Committee who favor
maintaining classification of "fact of" include State, DOD,
NASA, JCS, CIA, and NRO. ACDA shares this view. Members
who favor declassifying "fact of" without'revealing classi-
fied information on the program itself include Commerce and OMB.
Interior and AID share this view.
OMB, in commenting on the attached report, has expressed
the judgment that the report gives. insufficient emphasis to
the programmatic and budgetary implications of a decision not
to seek declassification of "fact of".. Other agencies be-
lieve that they have given appropriate consideration to'
programmatic and budgetary alternatives in arriving at
their positions.
Recommendations
The Under Secretaries Committee reached consensus on
the following recommendations and recommends that you approve
them:
1. That there be limited expansion of federal civil
.use of high-resolution imagery acquired by the intelligence
programs.
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2. That civil programs be permitted to utilize
acquisition resolution of no better than 10 meters on an
open worldwide basis with better resolution being considered
on a case-by-case basis.
3. That the USG continue its efforts to ensure that any
international legal regime governing remote sensing acti-
vities does not restrict our freedom to acquire and dis-
seminate remote earth imagery.
classified
4. That the President reaffirm, as/internal USG policy,
that programs devoted to military or intelligence purposes
will not be constrained by any international regime govern-
ing?civil remote sensing activities.
5. That NRO and NASA should continue their efforts
to utilize common techniques and services when appropriate
and otherwise continue to coordinate their programs through
the recently established Program Review Board. Periodically
the Program Review Board should report to the Standing
Committee on the results of these coordination actions.
6-. That the objectives postulated for US remote earth
imaging programs be endorsed, and, together with the above
options and recommendations that are approved, be incorporated
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into new policy guidelines governing the civil and intel-
ligence remote sensing programs and the relationship
.between the two.
Charles W. Robinson
Chairman
Attachment:
Report - Remote Earth Imagery Policy
Drafted: PM/ISP:ARTurrentine/MAGMichaud:jan
9/27/76 x 28018
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NSC Under Secretaries Committee
Standing Committee on Space Policy
Report
Subject: Remote Earth Imagery: Policy Issues,
Options, and Recommendations
The Problem: Present USG policy governing remote earth
imagery is based on guidance issued in 1960 and revised
most recently in 1966. Is this policy still valid, or
are certain chances permissible and desirable in the cur-
rent international environment? The Standing Committee
on Space Policy has addressed this question in a review
of remote sensing issues in general, and the relationship
between the civil and intelligence programs in particular.
An analysis of the issues together With policy options
and recommendations are contained in the following report.
Conclusions: After reviewing the problem, the Standing
Committee finds little to be gained from merging or radi-
.cally restructuring the relationship between the civil.
and intelligence imagery programs at this time. However,
it was agreed that there is merit in updating our remote
earth imagery guidelines with a view toward facilitating
the use of classified imagery from space for appropriate
civil purposes. This report explains how these conclu-
sions were reached and offers specific recommendations
for implementing them.
Background: The legitimacy of one nation photographing.
the territory of another from space had not been estab-
lished when US policy on remote earth imagery was first
formulated in 1960. In the wake of the U-2 incident
(1960), there was considerable uncertainty as to how the
Soviet Union might respond to our satellite reconnais-
sance program. We sought to avoid posing a direct
political challenge to the Soviet Union on this issue
by carrying out our intelligence program in total secrecy,
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even to the point of prohibiting officials from acknowl-
edging its existence in public. At the same time we
sought to gain broad international acceptance of remote
earth sensing as a legitimate activity through open civil
programs. We have avoided, however, acquiring and re-
leasing unclassified imagery that might be unduly provo-
cative and we have not incorporated technology in civil
systems that would disclose the technical capabilities
of US intelligence systems. The spatial resolution per-
mitted in the civil program has been limited to no better
than 20 meters photographic ground resolution from earth
orbit, in part to avoid arousing international political
sensitivities.
Thus, the USG currently operates two wholly separate
satellite programs which acquire images of the earth. On
the one hand, intelligence programs are classified and
compartmented, and are used principally (although not
solely) to acquire foreign military information that is
essential to US defense planning and arms control verifi-
cation. Intelligence programs stress high spatial reso-
lution (which reveals minute details), are directed against
specific targets, and have relied heavily on film return
systems and on Photo-interpretation techniques for data
extraction.
On the of er an , civi imagery programs been open, unclassified and used to acquire global infor-
mation on a routine, repetitive basis about such things
as the earth's resources and natural phenomena for use by
a wide variety of consumers, including government agencies,
commercial interests, and scientists in the US and abroad.
Civil programs have tended to utilize a variety of sensors,
rely heavily on digital processing techniques for data
extraction and stress precise spectral resolution (which
permits fine discrimination between wave lengths of re-
corded energy) rather than high spatial resolution.
In sum, the civil and intelligence remote earth
imagery programs have been developed separately in re-
sponse to different requirements and as a matter of policy.
They are under separate management, stress different
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technical approaches, have entirely different program
objectives and different data distribution policies. For
the past decade the US civil programs have been coordinated
closely with the military and intelligence communities to
mitigate any actual or potential impact on the interests
of the intelligence program. At the same time, the US civil
programs have been coordinated closely with the foreign
affairs agencies to serve US foreign policy interests, pro-
mote international acceptance of remote earth sensing for
peaceful purposes, and avoid generating undue international
concerns. In general, this dual approach -- separate but
closely coordinated - has served US policy interests well
over the years.
The New Environment: Since the last major review of re-
mote earth imagery policy in 1966, .there have been a number
of pertinent developments including the following:
-- broad international awareness and tacit accept-
ance of intelligence satellites in general, and
implicit acceptance by the Soviet Union of in-
telligence reconnaissance satellites under the
euphemism "national technical means of verifi-
cation" as used in the US-Soviet SALT arrange-
ments;
the steady growth and general international
acceptance of the operational US environmental
satellite programs (ITOS, DMSP, TIROS-N) which
routinely acquire global data openly available
to the public;
the initiation and continuation of the experi-
mental civil US earth resources satellite pro-
gram (Landsat) routinely acquiring global data
which is openly available to the public;
growing utilization of data from the US civil
programs by domestic and foreign users who
are increasing their investment in training,
ground stations, etc., and thus have a concomi-
tant interest in assured program continuity and
improved data;
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-- the development by the US of the Space Shuttle
and by the Europeans of its companion, the
Spacelab, which in the near future may provide
repetitive access to space by any participant
for any peaceful purpose, including remote
sensing;
--- utilization by some civil USG agencies of'se-
lected high resolution intelligence satellite
imagery on a classified basis;
-- 68 countries, including the US and the Soviet
Union, have ratified or acceded to the outer
Space Treaty of 1967, which states in Article I
that "...outer space-shall be free for explor-
ation and use by all States without discrimina-
tion of any kind...in accordance with. inter--
national law...";
-- continuing interest in remote sensing issues
at the United Nations directed toward the de-
velopment of an international legal regime
governing remote sensing activities. (At present
some countries are calling for controls on the
dissemination of data pertaining to natural
resources);
-- recent indications of interest by the Soviet
Union in establishing a resolution limit by
international agreement beyond which data
would not be disseminated to third countries
without the consent of the sensed state. (This
proposal applies only to dissemination and not
to acquisition.);
-- indications that commercial interests may wish
to invest in a private earth sensing program
(a consortium of oil companies has been men-
tioned as well as a venture along the lines
of COMSAT/INTELSAT);
-- resumed testing by the Soviet Union of anti-
satellite systems;
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- 5 --
growing US dependence on intelligence collec-
tion from space, including imaging satellites,
in support of national security and defense,
as other sources decline in productivity for
a variety of reasons;
-- improvements in resolution of intelligence
satellites with corresponding increase in the
potential psychological, hence political, im-
pact should our best capability be disclosed.
US Objectives: In considering this new environment we
have postulated the following policy objectives for US
remote earth'imaging programs:
-- to continue to-"protect the US intelligence
program from direct challenge, external regu-
lation, or interference;
-- to avoid compromising technology which re-
veals the precise characteristics of US equip-
ment used in the intelligence program or which
reveals US intelligence capabilities and methods;
--- to avoid providing outside of protected channels
imagery which compromises classified informa-
tion on US military operations or defense in-
stallations;
to promote complete freedom in the acquisition
of imagery in both civil and intelligence pro-
grams, and in the distribution of unclassified
imagery and data in any eventual international
legal regime for remote earth imagery;
to maintain the civil character and control of
the US civil program for remote earth imagery
while taking pertinent security considerations
into account, including provisions for dedica-
tion of such programs to national security pur-
poses when directed by the President in time
of national emergency;
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-- to continue to use cooperation with other
countries in remote earth imagery and other
space applications as an important element in
our foreign relations, with particular em-
phasis on sharing the products of such technology
to assist developing countries;
--- to provide federal civil users the best imagery
available at the lowest classification possible
within national security constraints in order
that the requirements of federal civil users
can be met to the extent feasible and that the
maximum utility may be extracted from satellite
photography produced by the intelligence program;
-- to make publicly available the most useful un-
classified imagery and unclassified data derived
from classified imagery both of the US and of
the world for scientific research, economic
development, commercial applications, and other
appropriate purposes.
Issues and Options: The Standing Committee has identified
one issue as central to updating our remote earth imagery
policy. This issue is discussed and analyzed in terms of
pros and cons. Policy options are offered for the
President's consideration.
Issue #1 -- Should the existence of the US intelligence
remote earth imaging dram be declassified
in order to permit greater civil use of data
which would otherwise qualify as unclassified?
Discussion: The present US policy is to refuse to confirm
in any unclassified official statement the fact that the
US conducts photo-reconnaissance from satellites, and the
"fact of" the intelligence program is classified SECRET.
In effect this policy also precludes the release outside
classified channels of any imagery or derived information
with attribution to a classified imagery satellite source.
We have refused confirmation of the intelligence recon-
naissance satellites in order to avoid putting other
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nations in a position where they might feel compelled to
protest formally such intelligence sensing of their
countries. Even though the intelligence program has
been discussed in the press and is implicitly acknow-
ledged in the SALT arrangements under the euphemism
"national technical means of verification", it is
argued that lack of official confirmation has permitted
other governments to ignore the issue. It should be
noted that, on occasion and very early in the intelli-
gence program, the "fact of" reconnaissance satellite
programs was acknowledged. On one occasion over ten
years ago the President mentioned the value of the intel-
ligence reconnaissance program in an off-the-record public
statement which was nevertheless reported in the press.
Also, various senior government officials have used infor-
mation in public hearings before the Congress which clearly
could have only come from very high resolution satellite
or aircraft imagery.
There. is a growing sentiment in some quarters of the
USG for declassifying the "fact of" the US intelligence
reconnaissance satellite program in a low-key, carefully
controlled manner without discussing or disclosing de-
tails. It is argued that this would put the USG in a
more credible position with Congress and the public, and
would also permit wider civil use of sanitized imagery
or unclassified derived information from the intelligence
program. At present we are caught in a "Catch 22" situ-
ation of being inhibited in the use of imagery from the
intelligence program if such use might be attributed to
or confirm the existence of the intelligence imagery
satellite system. Declassification of the "fact of" the
intelligence program would not of itself result in the
declassification of any intelligence system or_product.
Thus it need not affect the continued classification of
sensitive technical details nor lead inevitably to dis-
semination of imagery in forms which would reveal our
most sensitive capabilities. it would permit the avail-
ability and level of classification of intelligence
product for civil.use to be based on a case-by-case de-
termination of the degree of risk to national security
associated with the particular product. For example,
information derived from intelligence imagery, but other-
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wise unclassified, could be presented "legally" to the
public and the Congress when this was deemed to be in the
national interest. Declassifying "fact of" would also
make it possible to use derivative information that was
otherwise unclassified in support of foreign aid pro-
grams and disaster relief, since in both cases there is
a need for information that can be obtained only from
high resolution imagery which the current civil space
program is unable to provide.
Issue #1 - Declassification of "fact of"
-- would facilitate wider use of intelligence satel-
lite imagery and derived information in support
of US political and military policy;
-- would permit wider use of high resolution intel-
ligence imagery and unclassified derived infor-
mation among federal civil agencies and possibly
other civil users;
-- the fact that the US has an intelligence photo-
graphic satellite program is widely known and
probably cannot be considered to be a "SECRET"
in the meaning of Executive: Order 11652;
-- would permit the USG to take a. more credible
position on this issue;
---- could facilitate excluding national security
systems explicitly from any definition in the
UN of remote sensing that might be used. in a
future international legal regime;
--- declassification of "fact of" could facilitate
employment of high-resolution imagery technology
in support of foreign aid and disaster relief
programs. . -
Issue #1 - Declassification of "fact
-- courts risk of unfavorable international
political reaction, particularly when the
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change in US policy is detected by the press
(some members of the press, particularly those
who follow technical issues, are aware of the
US policy regarding "fact of" in spite of the
fact that it is classified);
-- might lead to relaxation within the USG in the
attitude of those who have knowledge of the
intelligence program and lead to increased
leaks or disclosure of genuinely sensitive in-
formation;
-- once we acknowledge officially the existence
of the US intelligence. satellite program we
cannot reverse our position if reactions are
adverse;
-- acknowledgment could stimulate greater interest
in the program with demands for sensitive clas-
sified details by the public, the media, and
the Congress;
- public acknowledgment of the US intelligence
imagery satellite program may excite debate
which could lead some nations to press for a
restrictive international legal regime governing
remote sensing. It could also lead to explicit
inclusion of intelligence programs in such a
restrictive legal regime, which the US would be
unable to accept.
Agency Views - Although there were dissenting views, the
majority of the Standing Committee members believe that the
uncertain risks to the intelligence program associated with
official acknowledgment at this time outweigh the potential
benefits of opening the way for greater civil use of intel-
ligence data. Members who favor maintaining classification
of "fact of" include NASA, JCS, CIA, NRO, State, and DOD.
ACDA shares this view. Members who favor declassifying
"fact of" without revealing classified information on the
program itself include NOAA and OMB. Interior and AID share
this view.
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Issue #l Option A - Maintain classification of "fact of"
US satellite reconnaissance intel-
li.gence program.
ALTERNATIVELY
Option B Permit declassification of the existence
of the US satellite reconnaissance pro-
gram in a controlled, low-key manner,
without revealing classified details
about the program itself.
Recommendations: During the course of its review, the
Standing Committee reached a consensus on certain other
issues which follow in the form of recommendations.
Recommendation 1 - That there be limited expansion of
federal civil use of high.-resolution
imagery acquired by the intelligence
program.
Discussion: There are essentially two categories of domestic
civil users, whose requirements are quite different: a) se-
lected personnel in a few US civil government agencies who
'have.security,clearances for access to imagery of the US
acquired from intelligence programs; and b) other federal
and non-federal US users who do not have access to intel-
ligence data and most of whom will not have access to any
classified information.
To date most of the federal civil users who have
access to high resolution imagery have found it useful.
(For.the purposes of this study high resolution is defined
as resolution better than 20 meters.) High resolution
imagery is produced only by the intelligence program at
present, and not contemplated in the US open civil programs
until the Shuttle is flying in the 1980's. If a decision
is made to declassify some of the intelligence product
(which would necessitate declassifying "fact of" as dis-
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cussed in Issue #1 above) both categories of users
might benefit from access to additional high resolution
imagery. However, there are limits on the amount of
high resolution data the federal civil users can handle
and the costs they could bear to acquire such imagery.
The Director of Central Intelligence is currently
exploring the possibilities for sanitization df selected
high resolution imagery of the US from the intelligence
program and, if found to be feasible, will promulgate
guidelines and procedures for such sanitization. It is
anticipated that such sanitization would obscure the
satellite source and not compromise high resolution in-
telligence capabilities.
Regardless of whether or not the "fact of" the exist-
ence of the intelligence program is declassified, there is
a need for better mechanisms for coordination and consid-
eration of all civil requirements. At the present time,
the Committee for Civil Applications of Classified Overhead
Photography of the US, an interagency committee chaired by
the Department of Interior, establishes consolidated re-
quirements only for selected federal civil agencies for
high resolution imagery of the US. The intelligence pro-
~grams are requested to meet these imagery requirements to
the extent possible. This committee does not consider the
requirements of non--federal users. While the federal civil
users can request decornpartmentation of intelligence data
to facilitate its use, existing procedures are cumbersome
and,the amount of data acquired by the intelligence pro-
grams in response to the requirements of federal civil
users is limited owing to higher priority needs for
foreign intelligence collection. One way in which federal
civil user needs might be better taken into account would
be to expand the membership and mandate of the Committee
for Civil Applications of Classified Overhead Photography
of the US.
Expanded use of data from the intelligence program
would make it feasible to satisfy most important require-
ments of federal civil users for high resolution domestic
imagery with existing systems. It would allow more federal
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- 12 -
civil users to gain experience in using high resolution .
imagery and determine its value relative to other products.
It also would permit intelligence satellite imagery ac-
quired at considerable cost to be used more readily as a
national resource while taking security factors into
account.
On the other hand, the idea of "expanding the role"
of the intelligence community into the civil sector might
be politically unacceptable to a significant part of US
society, although the Committee for Civil Applications
decouples direct involvement of the foreign intelligence
program in domestic affairs. Also, security control over
classified intelligence imagery might be degraded by
expanded federal civil use. Some countries might be stimu-
lated to call for international restrictions on intelli-
gence satellite systems if it were suspected that the US
intelligence program is being used to provide data on their
national resources (even if in fact such data were limited
to the US, restricted to the US federal civil agencies, and
remained classified).
There also are legal problems of using data
for certain federal civil purposes, such as law enforcement,
if such data is produced by programs funded through defense
or intelligence budgets, and there is a risk of compromising
classified information if data from intelligence programs
becomes involved in civil litigation. The members of the
Standing Committee have weighed these arguments and have
concluded that there should be a limited expansion of
federal civil use of high resolution imagery acquired by
the intelligence program.
The Space Policy Committee intends to examine options
under this recommendation. One would be to extend the
charter of the Interior chaired Commission to cover domestic
requirements for high resolution imagery of all federal
civil users. Another would be to explore the possibility
of expanding the_1 _j making a por-
tion of the capability available for domestic requirements
of federal civil users.
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Recommendation # 2 That civil programs be permitted to
utilize acquisition resolution of no
better than 10 meters on an open world-
wide basis with better resolution being
considered on a case-by-case basis.
Discussion: In 1966 a ground resolution criterion of "no
better than 20 meters" was set as the assumed level of in-
ternational acceptance which would also not compromise US
technology and reveal US capabilities. Civil space programs
did not approach this level of quality until 1973, when
Skylab imagery of 10 meter resolution was authorized as an
exception (in part as a test of international reactions, in
part as a test of the civil. utility of this higher resolu-
tion imagery). All Skylab imagery, including imagery with
1-0 meter resolution, was released for public use, after a
careful security screening of photography that was considered
potentially sensitive, and no negative international reac-
tions have been recorded. On the contrary, domestic and
foreign users have indicated much interest in using imagery
of this quality or better were it routinely and repetitively
acquired. Landsat, by contrast, is currently providing use-
ful repetitive multispectral coverage of the world's land
masses but at a ground resolution of some 200 meters.
Landsat-C will be providing some data at 100 meters resolu-
tion by 1977; the next generation of automated satellites
,in the early 1980's will be operating at about 75 meters
resolution. The advent of the Space Shuttle, however, brings
the use of high quality film cameras for earth observation
within the'reach of many nations. The European Space Agency,
for example, is planning to use a 60-cm focal length camera
on the first Spacelab mission which will be launched by
Space Shuttle around 1980 to return selected, non-repetitive
worldwide imagery in the 10 meter resolution class. Wide'-
spread international recognition of the utility of remote
sensing over the past decade has apparently been success-
fully fostered by the US in accord with the 1966 policy
guidelines. In terms of ground resolution without regard
to imagery content it appears that the threshold of poli-
tical sensitivity has dropped at least to the 10 meter
range and on a selective basis could be tested at an even
lower level.
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It should be recognized, however, that defense con-
cerns with regard to satellite imagery are not limited to
the revelation of high resolution capabilities. There may
be considerable intelligence of military significance ex-
tracted from imagery having a resolution in the 75 meter
range, particularly if coverage is repetitive and frequent.
Such programs will be capable of acquiring classified in-
formation on US defense forces and facilities that might
be of value to other nations. The Soviet Union and others
are likely also to be sensitive to the open availability
of such imagery. This concern will pertain as well to
commercial and foreign civil satellite systems (e.g. Euro-
pean) for which the US may be asked to provide launch
services. This paper does not address these issues since
the capabilities are still some years in the future, but
the problem needs to be kept under. review by the Standing
Committee.
Recommendation #3 - That we continue our efforts to ensure
that any international legal regime
governing remote sensing activities
does not restrict our freedom to ac--
quire and disseminate remote earth
imagery.
ery
Discussion: The threat of international restrictions on
remote sensing from space is ambiguous. On the'one hand,
there has been growing support for the experimental Land-
sat program from a considerable number of foreign nations,
many of which are building an interest in this and future
programs as they invest in ground stations and technical
training, and establish programs dependent on a continued
flow of data and imagery. A number of countries have now
signed bilateral agreements with the US that require open
distribution of Landsat data. On the other hand, a number
of countries -- including some of those who have committed
themselves in bilateral agreements to open distribution of
Landsat data -- have espoused positions that would restrict
in future operational systems the sensing and distribution
of space acquired imagery concerning natural resources
without the approval of the sensed country. Clearly the
threat of restriction has not disappeared.
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In general, the US would like to postpone adoption of
principles by the UN until adequate experience has been
gained with experimental systems such as Landsat. The more
experience each country gains with an open remote sensing
program with unrestricted distribution, the less severe
pressures for future constraints and procedures are likely
to be on an operational system. Practicably we would like
to see the development of principles on remote sensing
which are permissive enough to be acceptable to both civil
and intelligence programs.
It is not clear, however, how long it will be possible
for the US to forestall UN resolutions that call for re-
striction of remote earth sensing and particularly distri-
bution of imagery data acquired from space. Thus, the
Standing Committee should keep this problem under close
review.
Recommendation #4 That the President reaffirm, as internal
USG policy, that rograms devoted to
mili.tar or intelJ.igence~tarposes w~.ll
not be constrained by anv international
mime governing civil remote sens:iinu
activi_ties. (It is not envisaged-that statement would be made _public
at this time.)
Discussion: As we work in the UN toward the eventual estab-
lishment of agreed principles governing the acquisition,
distribution, or utilization of civil remote earth imagery,
we should continue to resist any restrictions on our freedom
to acquire and disseminate data. However, should our best
efforts fail to prevent the development of an international
consensus that some controls or restrictions should be
adopted, even if only on a voluntary basis, then we should
ensure that our programs devoted to national security pur-
poses are excluded from any such provisions. It should be
noted that this objective could be achieved by explicitly
defining civil programs, or including a "military" exclu-
sion clause. We would be confirming, at least tacitly,
the existence of the intelligence program and acknowledging
the "fact of" by attempting to negotiate a "military" ex-
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CV4
clusion clause which could reopen the issue of defining
"peaceful purposes" in the context of the Outer Space
Treaty. At present no distinction is made between military
activities that are not specifically prohibited and other
"peaceful purposes" (i.e., placing nuclear weapons or other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction in orbit is prohibited).
For use only within the Executive Branch at this time, it
would be desirable to have a clear statement of policy by
the President that we will not permit our vital intelligence
satellite programs to be subjected to international controls
or restraints.
Recommendation 45 - That NRO and NASA should continue
their efforts to utilize common -tech-
ni ug es and services when appropriate
and otherwise continue to coordinate
their programs through the recently
established Program Review Board.
Periodically the Program Review Board
should report to the Standing Committee
on the results of these coordination
actions.
Discussion: While the techniques used by the civil and
intelligence programs have been different, they now seem
to be cnnvp_ra~ nrTL_F_
T us,
close and continuing coordination. between NRO and NASA will
be of increasing importance in the years ahead. In addition,
as the capabilities of the civil systems improve, close
technical and policy coordination will be required, in par-
ticular when the civil programs approach the threshold of
political and technical sensitivities.
Recommendation 46 -- That the objectives postulated for US
remote earthitagery enumerated on
Fades 5 and 6) be endorsed, and together
with the above options and recommenda-
tions that are approved be incorporated
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into new policy guidelines governinc
the civil. and intelligence remote
sensing programs and the relation sli
between the two.
Discussion: Rather than amend the 1966 guidelines to bring
them up to date, it would be more clear cut to rescind them
entirely and issue a new set of classified guidelines based
on those recommendations and options that are approved, the
US policy objectives proposed by the Standing Committee,
and those portions of the 1966 guidelines which remain
applicable.
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