THE DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1962-1970 VOLUME TWO CHAPTERS V-VI

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• Publication Date: June 1, 1972
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THE DD/S&T HISTORICAL SERIES
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THE DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
1962-1970
VOLUME Two CHAPTERS V-VI
by
June 1972
NRO review(s) completed.
Carl E. Duckett
Director
Science and Technology
HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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V. DD/S&T Relations with the National Reconnaissance
Program (NRP)
A. The NRO Concept
A proposal for the creation in Washington of a
single operational organization charged with carrying out
all peacetime overflight reconnaissance was advanced in
November 1955 by Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., as a long-
range plan whereby such activities currently being car-
ried on by various Air Force Commands and by the joint
CIA/USAF U-2 project might be brought under central con-
trol with savings in money and manpower. (This proposal
was drafted two years before the first intelligence
satellite project was initiated and so related only to
manned overflight activities in being at that time.)
Mr. Bissell's proposal* was made in a memorandum to
Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles, and
stemmed from the immediate need to decide, in coordina-
tion with the Air Force, what the future budgeting and
management arrangements for the U-2 project should be.
The future reconnaissance organization envis-
ioned by this proposal would draw its support from
existing commands of the Defense Department (principally
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Air Force) and from CIA, but all of its air crews would
be civilian and its activities would be regarded as clan-
destine intelligence-gathering operations. It would be
set up outside the framework of any of the regular mili-
tary services, although Mr. Bissell was inclined to be-
lieve that the Air Force should own a majority of the
common stock in the organization. He recommended that
Mr. Dulles propose to the Secretary of the Air Force an
examination of the organization for overflight reconnais-
sance in order to arrive at a rational and orderly
arrangement for the longer run.
B. The Initial NRO Agreement
It was more than five years later, after CIA,
with approval of highest authority, had become involved
in satellite reconnaissance and had a promising super-
sonic, manned reconnaissance vehicle coming along, that
consideration of a single organization to control the
national reconnaissance effort reached the agreement
stage. LA letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric, to Mr. Allen Dulles, dated
6 September 1961, and concurred in for CIA by the Deputy
Director, General C. P. Cabell, confirmed details of the
agreement: (1) establishment of a National Reconnaissance
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Program (NRP) covering satellite and manned overflight
reconnaissance projects, overt and covert; (2) establish-
ment of a National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to manage
the program; this would be under direction of the Under
Secretary of the Air Force (then Dr. Joseph V. Charyk),
and the Deputy Director (Plans) of CIA (then
Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr.), acting jointly, and including a
small staff drawn from DOD and CIA,0(3) the Department of
the Air Force would be the operational agency for manage-
ment and conduct of the programs; (4) the requirements,
priorities, and approved end users of the products of the
program would be established by the USIB; and (5) appro-
priate cover, security, and personnel procedures would
be established by NRO.*
Efforts to translate the terms of this first
agreement into a workable assignment of responsibilities
took the form, first, of unilateral drafting sessions by
Dr. Charyk's Air Force Staff on the one hand, and a
DPD/CIA working group on the other. On 22 November 1961
a working draft on "NRO Functions and Responsibilities"
was presented by the Air Force side which went into
detail on all aspects of the total reconnaissance pro-
gram, even to establishing responsibilities for the
*Appendix D, Tab 2.
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formatting of the collected product. The DPD working
group under Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer countered in December
1961 with a two-page "Division of Responsibilities Within
NRO" recommending the continuation of the current workable
allocation of responsibilities between the Air Force and
CIA based on existing agreements, with redefinition of
responsibilities for new developing programs as they
emerged.* Mr. Bissell, with Dr. Charyk's agreement, sent
copies of the two-page statement to General Maxwell Taylor
(then Special Assistant to President Kennedy) and to the
members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, as a basis for an NRO agreement.
On 29 November 1961 a new Director of Central
Intelligence, Mr. John A. McCone, had been sworn in.
The imminent departure of Mr. Bissell from CIA was anti-
cipated, and a reorganization of the Agency's overhead
reconnaissance activities was forecast.
Early in January 1962, Mr. McCone had several
preliminary exchanges with Messrs. Gilpatric and Charyk
concerning the NRO concept, and the form the organization
should take. On 10 January 1962 Mr. Bissell recommended
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to Mr. McCone that the best solution for setting up NRO
would be to make the organization into a truly joint pro-
ject, headed by a director responsible to both the DCI and
the Secretary of Defense. All resources required for the
conduct of national reconnaissance programs should be
assigned by the two partner agencies to the NRO and di-
rectly controlled by it. The table of organization of the
NRO should include personnel in project offices and the
operational control center on the West Coast as well as in
Washington, and its budget should cover the full costs of
all programs. It should be empowered to execute contracts
and carry out procurement under the authority of the Secre-
tary of Defense for all overt activities and under that of
the DCI where security so required. Joint control would
serve as a protection against the absorption of these
functions by the military services, and hopefully the op-
portunity for secure and technically venturesome research
and development could be maintained.*
Dr. Scoville's appointment on 19 February 1962
to the newly-created position of Deputy Director for Re-
search also gave him the responsibility for planning for
CIA's role in NRO. In a 23 February 1962 meeting with
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Dr. Charyk, Dr. Scoville reached agreement with him that
the current "phantom" NRO organization did not serve the
purpose and that a truly activated NRO was needed.
Mr. Bissell, having already severed his official
connection with CIA at the end of February, advised
Mr. McCone on 5 March that he was inclined to believe that
the present loose arrangement should remain in effect, with
possibly a few more CIA personnel moved to Charyk's staff
and, conversely, assignment of one or two of Charyk's
people to CIA's reconnaissance activities. This would en-
courage and give appropriate status to the participation
of the DD/R in certain DOD planning, and to Dr. Charyk in
certain Agency planning. Mr. Bissell warned, however
On the other hand, I believe there would be
real dangers in any effort to embody the NRO
concept in elaborate formal regulations. I
would urge that the DD/R in due time seek agree-
ment with Dr. Charyk to leave the arrangement a
loose and informal one and that the DCI seek the
support of Dr. Killian and of General Taylor for
the maintenance of this state of affairs. 85/
C. First Revision of the NRO Agreement
The "loose arrangement" recommended by
Mr. Bissell lost currency after his departure and the
"elaborate formal regulations" which he had tried to fore-
stall began to bind the NRO into a bureaucratic structure.
First of a long line of rewritings of the basic agreement
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was accomplished by Dr. Scoville, based on Mr. McCone's
expressed desires with regard to the NRO organization.
He favored a single Director, chosen from DOD or CIA,
with the senior representative of the other agency serving
as deputy. While the language of the agreement should not
mention individuals by name, Mr. MeCone was willing to
concede Dr. Charyk the directorship, with Dr. Scoville as
Deputy. Within this general arrangement, individual pro-
jects should be assigned specifically, e.g., OXCART to
CIA, and SAMOS to the Air Force. Advance planning should
be done jointly by the Director and the Deputy.
Mr. McCone specifically wished CIA to control,
all security clear-
ances for all programs within the purview of the NRP.
Dr. Scoville's draft of 20 March 1962 was pre-
sented to the DCI for his approval with the following
notation:
I have discussed this with Dr. Charyk who
generally concurs and believes that it is a
good working document on which to develop the
specific plans for the National Reconnaissance
Office. I made it clear to him that, although
the document does not specify that he will be
the Director, this is our intention. He con-
curred in the philosophy that both the Director
and the Deputy Director should be involved in
the advance planning and that one Agency or
the other should be given primary responsibility
for all approved projects. 86/
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The 20 March draft agreed on the assignment of
primary responsibility for OXCART and CORONA and future
truly covert satellite projects to CIA,
(Responsibility for the LANYARD Project was
subsequently assigned on 2 April 1962 by Dr. Charyk as
follows: Technical management of all aspects including
the payload to the Air Force, and covert contract admini-
stration of the payload and pre-mission planning and
on-orbit operational guidance to CIA.)
The agreement signed on 2 May 1962 by the DCI,
Mr. McCone, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric, was Dr. Scoville's 20 March
version as redrafted in the Pentagon.*
It provided that
the D/NRO would be designated by the Secretary of De-
fense and the Director of Central Intelligence, and would
be responsible directly to them for the management and
conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program. However,
no provision was made in the agreement for a Deputy
Director. The final paragraph stated that the Deputy
Director for Research of CIA would be responsible for
*Appendix D, Tab 5.
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seeing that the participation of CIA in the agreement was
carried out.
The Director, NRO, was held responsible for fund-
ing the NRP; DOD funds would be allocated on an individual
basis and would appear as appropriately classified line
items in the Air Force budget. CIA would be responsible
for funding covert projects for which it had management
responsibility. The D/NRO was charged with responsibility
for all NRP contracts in accordance with its technical man-
agement responsibility, and CIA, as Executive Agent of the
D/NRO, was responsible for administering procurement and
contracting for covert projects assigned to CIA, and for
covert contracting in support of overt projects, as
necessary.
On 3 May 1962, the DCI confirmed to Mr. Gilpatric
his agreement that Dr. Charyk be named D/NRO.
D. NRO Staff: Working Arrangements Initiated
Prior to scheduled meetings between Drs. Charyk
and Scoville on 22 and 23 May 1962 for the purpose of
arriving at mutually agreeable working arrangements for
the NRO, Mr. James Cunningham, Acting Chief, DPD, recom-
mended to Dr. Scoville that, in view of the Agency's con-
cession in yielding the position of D/NRO to Dr. Charyk,
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and thus to the Air Force, the Agency should seriously
consider seeking the Chief of Staff position in NRO lest
the CIA contribution be so fully subordinated to Air Force
interests that the only influence it could exert would be
through the DD/R's personal relationship with Dr. Charyk.
(This was not done.)
During the 22-23 May meetings, the discussions
ranged widely: agreement was reached that the NRO Staff
should be located in close proximity to Charyk's Pentagon
office; the name "NRO" was lowered in classification from
Top Secret to Secret, although the structure, mission,
participants, etc., of the organization would still require
the higher classification; various agencies (USAF, CIA,
NSA, Navy, etc.) were to participate in the NRO Staff
which would concern itself with over-all planning, moni-
toring, budgeting and scheduling, while day-to-day opera-
tional decisions would be made by the Program Directors;
CIA would give contracting and security support to
General Greer, head of the Air Force satellite program, in
the Los Angeles area (and Dr. Charyk assured the CIA repre-
sentatives that CIA could direct General Greer with regard
to security); finally, considerable discussion was held
concerning the position of Deputy Director, and Dr. Charyk
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expressed his view that under the present concept there
would not be enough work to keep a Deputy Director busy.
Each Program Director would carry on in the absence of the
D/NRO and if an extended absence were anticipated, the
D/NRO would appoint an Acting Director for the period. It
was left that this would be the procedure Dr. Charyk would
employ. 87/
In accordance with paragraph 3 of the 2 May 1962
agreement, that CIA would establish security policy for
the NRP, including a uniform system of security control
and appropriate delegations of security responsibility,
Dr. Scoville on 2 June 1962 requested the CIA Director of
Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, to initiate action
to establish the proposed Security Policy Unit and the
Special Security Control Center within the Office of the
Director of Security in order to carry out that portion of
the agreement. 88/
A meeting was held on 4 June 1962 between rep-
resentatives of the National Security Agency (NSA) and
NRO to settle NSA's requirements problems as they related
to the NRP. Dr. Charyk stated that only USIB could vali-
date requirements to be levied upon the NRP, either di-
rectly or through one of its committees. Since NSA was a
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member of USIB, it should present its requirements through
appropriate USIB channels. NRO would require advice and
consultation with NSA on means of satisfying requirements,
but determination of collection programs, including devices,
techniques, and schedules would rest with NRO. Dr. Charyk
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applied to all electronic
collection efforts under NRO and the TK classification
would apply to all collection products and mission reports
of NRO activities. 89/
An NRO group met on 8 June 1962 with representa-
tives of Defense Intelligence Agency, Air Force Intelli-
gence, and Eastman Kodak Company, to work out a system
whereby DOD facilities could be used in conjunction with
the Eastman processing center in order to expedite the
processing and duplicating of community reconnaissance
products. The agreement later developed by Dr. Charyk's
staff and signed by Dr. Scoville for CIA on 11 August
1962 was entitled "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding
Chemical Processing and Reproduction of Photography from
NRP Missions."* The agreement assigned management of all
covert contracts with the Eastman facilities to CIA while
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the facility at Westover Air Force Base was assigned to
the management of the Director of Special Projects, Office
of the Secretary of the Air Force (General Robert Greer).
Aim
After delays occasioned by attempts to satisfy
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the working level NRO Staff on the scope of a research and
development program for processing at Eastman, Dr. Scoville
through OSA Contracts Staff issued a contract to Eastman
for work in that area. General Greer's office negotiated
a similar contract, with Charyk's approval, and CIA was
directed to withdraw its contract with Eastman. Dr. Scoville
declined to do so, quoting the "Memorandum of Understanding"
which had assigned CIA the responsibility. The matter was
held in abeyance until Dr. Charyk's successor took over as
D/NRO on 1 March 1963 and later ordered that the CIA R&D
contract with Eastman be cancelled, and that General Greer
have technical control over all NRP processing activities
with CIA furnishing only covert contractual assistance.
Dr. Scoville still demurred, but was overruled, and CIA
then obeyed the NRO directive.*
The case for CIA acquisition of the NRO Staff Di-
rector's position was not strongly supported by Dr. Scoville
or Mr. McCone and when Dr. Charyk on 23 July 1962 issued
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his first NRO Directive* on organization and functions
for concurrence, the Director of the NRO Staff had already
been selected by Dr. Charyk in the following manner: the
cover unit for the NRO was assigned to the Office of Space
Systems in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force.
The Director, NRO Staff, was to have the overt title of
Director, Office of Space Systems. The Office of Space
Systems had previously been established and staffed for
the purpose of managing the Air Force satellite program,
and therefore its incumbent Director, Brigadier General
Richard D. Curtin, USAF, automatically became the first
Director of the NRO Staff.
The D/NRO's directive also established Program A
(the satellite effort under USAF management), Program B
(CIA assets), and a proposed Program C (Navy assets).
The directive made the D/NRO responsible for
all funding of the NRP. All covert funds were to be
budgeted by the CIA, and all covert NRP contracts were to
be let by CIA as Executive Agent for the D/NRO. All other
NRP funds were to be budgeted in appropriately classified
line items of the Air Force budget. Funds would be trans-
ferred to appropriate services and agencies on an incremental
*Appendix D, Tab 7.
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funding basis, based on specific approval of assigned NRP
activities by the D/NR?.
Dr. Scoville, in giving his general concurrence
to Dr. Charyk's directive, as a useful basis for initial
NRO operations, anticipated that there would
need to be
changes in the staffing pattern over time. In the face of
Dr. Charyk's obvious intention to operate without a deputy,
Dr. Scoville suggested the designation of himself as
Senior CIA Representative reporting directly to the D/NRO
since he held responsibility toward the DCI for NRP activi-
ties across the board. The Assistant Director for Special
Activities in CIA, who held immediate responsibility for
management of reconnaissance activities, should be named
Director, Program B. 90/
The only other point raised by Dr. Scoville re-
lated to NRO budgetary procedures. He noted to Dr. Charyk
that, in view of the Agency's position as a legally sep-
arate entity from the Defense Department, the NRO budgetary
procedures applying to CIA should be spelled out in more
detail. He appended to his memorandum to Dr. Charyk of
29 August 1962 a proposed procedure for budgeting for the
CIA portion of the NRP, the general thrust of which was a
more meaningful role for CIA in the planning and defense
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of its portion of the program before Congressional
Committees, as well as the apportionment of funds by the
BOB to CIA in the usual manner.*
Colonel Ledford and Mr. Cunningham, of OSA, as
well as others, would have preferred to make a frontal
attack on the problem at that time in an effort to secure
the post of Deputy Director, NRO, for the DD/R, and give
the Agency a voice in the NRP commensurate with the terms
of the original agreement. At a meeting held on
11 September 1962, Dr. Scoville did obtain agreement that
Dr. Charyk would reverse his position and propose to
Mr. Gilpatric that Scoville become DD/NRO. At the same
meeting the Agency lost irretrievable ground, however,
when Dr. Scoville bowed to the determination by Dr. Charyk
that the satellite operations center (SOC) was to be moved
from the OSA Control Center at Langley to the Pentagon as
soon as a new center being prepared there was ready (three
to four months hence). 91/
E. Negotiations Leading to Second Revised Agreement
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, then Special Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, on 6 July 1962
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directed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence wherein he took note of
the arrangements made to date between them with regard to
setting up the NRO (which had been reported to the Presi-
dent by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board), and in
the same memorandum Mr. Bundy had advised
We believe that the actual structure of the
documents is inadequate to support an efficient
organization when the present experienced and
distinguished group moves on to other tasks.
We therefore recommend a continuing study of a
more satisfactory, permanent, documentary basis
for the NRO with particular reference to exist-
ing NSC directives with which the present NRO
plan may be in conflict. 92/
1. Funding Problem
The question of controls over the funding
of the CIA portion of the NRP was one of the principal
areas of contention which had to be settled before further
rewriting of the Agreement could proceed.
Mr. John Bross, then CIA Comptroller, was
tasked to look into the NRO funding problem, and his
first discovery concerned a disagreement in relation to a
FY 1963 item of
appropriated by Congress to
CIA to finance covert aspects of the overhead reconnaissance
program (particularly OXCART). At the instigation of DOD
officials concerned with NRO, the BOB had been encouraged
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to withhold this amount from CIA on the theory that under
NRP the Air Force should retain the funds and release them
to the Agency from time to time in appropriate amounts to
fund covert projects as approved by NRO. The OSA officers
responsible for the management and funding of OXCART nat-
urally considered this foul play. Mr. Bross recommended
that the DCI take the line that NRO would review and approve
the over-all budget for the NRP, including covert aspects,
but that CIA should seek obligational authority from Con-
gress and adequate funds should be provided in the CIA
budget to carry out its portion of the NRP. General Carter
briefed the DCI on the matter and Mr. McCone agreed that he
would hold this line. 93/
Mr. McCone met with Secretary McNamara on
5 October 1962 to present a proposal for revising the NRO
organization once more. The principal new features of
this draft agreement* were (1) the elimination of dual re-
porting by the D/NRO to Defense and CIA; (2) the establish-
ment of the National Reconnaissance Planning Group (NRPG)
with the Secretary of Defense acting as Executive Agent
to the NRPG; and (3) a paragraph on "Financial Management"
along the lines recommended by Mr. Bross.
*Appendix D, Tab 11.
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At the 5 October 1962 meeting, the Secretary
of Defense, Mr. McNamara, stated that he had always had
reservations on the requirement for such an organization
as NRO and did not understand why, in the long run, this
kind of business could not be handled by normal intelli-
gence organization procedures. He said that he would like
to look to one organization in the Defense Department for
all intelligence matters and felt that perhaps NSA and
NRO should both be subordinated to DIA. Mr. McCone re-
butted this suggestion on grounds that the activities of
both NSA and NRO transcend strictly military intelligence
and said it would be undesirable to have this subordina-
tion. He also pointed out the difficulties which DIA
was having in establishing itself as a truly functional
organization. 94/
With regard to Mr. McCone's views on NRO
budgeting procedures, Mr. McNamara said he was interested
in preserving the integrity of NRO funds and programs and
felt it was essential that none of the agencies be allowed
to transfer funds which had been designated and defended
for NRO purposes to any non-NRO projects. Mr. McCone
agreed that such transfers would have to be approved by
both the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. The meeting
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ended on an indefinite note, and Dr. Scoville anticipated,
correctly, that Dr. Charyk would endeavor to establish in-
ternal NRO budgetary controls over the whole program, lack-
ing a firm directive to do otherwise. 95/
Dr. Charyk returned the revised draft agree-
ment to Mr. Gilpatric on 17 October 1962.* He had inter-
lined his suggested revisions, principal of which was the
crossing out of the entire CIA-drafted section on "Financial
Management" which he found completely unacceptable. He had
rewritten the section to give the NRO control over all
budget formulation, presentation, and execution. He ac-
cepted the DCI's proposal relating to the NRPG and felt it
was a good step and one which would satisfy the President's
Board and Dr. Killian. 96/
Having reached a stalemate on financing the
CIA portion of the NRP, Mr. McCone in November 1962 took his
case to the Director of the Budget, Mr. David Bell, in a
letter which outlined the procedures he believed should gov-
ern CIA's funding of projects assigned under the NRO Agree-
ment. Dr. Charyk took strong exception to the effort by
Mr. McCone to gain full funding control over the CIA portion
of NRP funds, and said in a memorandum to Mr. Gilpatric
*Appendix D, Tab 11.
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...Either the DNRO has financial control and,
hence, possesses the essential management tools
required or the NRO becomes a "paper concept."
In Mr. McCone's proposal, its financial responsi-
bilities appear to be limited to an initial justi-
fication to the Bureau of the Budget that the CIA
and DOD requests in this area are compatible and
complementary. If the NRO is to function, it must
be responsible for continuous monitoring of finan-
cial and technical status of programs, it must
control release of funds to programs, and it must
be able to reallocate funds as necessary and desir-
able between programs comprising the total NBP...
...I am advised by my Comptroller that CIA is
utilizing other funds to finance contractual docu-
ments under the responsibility of the NRO and that
at the present time they are in a deficiency posi-
tion. My Comptroller has notified the CIA Comp-
troller that if funds are not requested on Form
1080's by November 26th, the interim Joint Reso-
lution Authorization will be withdrawn. The CIA
may find itself in a highly vulnerable position
as to violations of financial procedures for
Government operations. 97/
As a result of Dr. Charyk's memorandum to
Mr. Gilpatric, the latter requested a conference with
Mr. McCone to iron out their differences. A series of di-
rect conferences between them over the next three months
finally resulted in a new version of the NRO Agreement.*
2. CIA/USAF Relations Deteriorate under NRO
Meanwhile, there was a great deal of dis-
sension in the ranks, particularly on the CIA side due to the
*See Section E-4, below, p. 212.
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circumscribed role the Agency had been given in the NRP.
Dr. Scoville, reporting to General Carter on current CIA/DOD
relations on 21 January 1963, said the only major problem
for the past six to nine months had revolved around the
organization and functioning of the NRO.* He said that
the organization had been almost entirely DOD-oriented and
that CIA had not been consulted until after decisions were
made. He said, in summary, that it was his strong convic-
tion that the Air Force had been using the NRO as a mech-
anism for reducing the CIA's role in aerial reconnaissance
with little consideration for the national need.
The principal complaints voiced by the op-
erating level of the DD/R were that the D/NRO should be a
full-time job, and the incumbent should not wear two hats
and have divided loyalty; that the NRO Staff should act as
a staff rather than involve itself in operations which were
the prerogative of the various Program Directors, and that
CIA should have a greater representation on the NRO Staff,
particularly in the form of an Agency-appointed Deputy
Director of NRO.
On the Air Force side, there was a large
body of sentiment which, from the time of planning for
*Appendix D, Tab 12.
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the U-2 project, had been opposed to CIA entering the aerial
reconnaissance business (largely SAC officers, but not ex-
clusively). The fact that this sentiment had not already
prevailed in the taking over of all reconnaissance by the
Air Force was due to decisions made by higher authority for
political reasons, and not because there had been any dimi-
nution of the anti-CIA sentiment.
The announcement early in January 1963 that
Dr. Charyk was resigning his Air Force and NRO jobs was a
signal that changes could be expected in the NRO, and each
side became active in an attempt to better its position.
On 23 January Mr. Gilpatric named Dr. Eugene G. Fubini,
Deputy Director for Defense Research and Engineering, to
fill the D/NRO slot temporarilylpending resolution of the
NRO succession.
At a meeting on 30 January 1963 between
Messrs. McCone and Gilpatric, principal points raised on
the CIA side were (1) that the present agreement did not
provide clear authority over reconnaissance operations;
(2) procedures for programming, budgeting and management
of research and development were not clear and were being
handled under compromise arrangements; (3) the DCI and
the PFIAB had not been kept advised, and were afraid that
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a sound, forward-looking program for new and improved
systems was not in the mill; (4) poor linkage existed be-
tween NRO, USIB, and DIA with regard to requirements and
targeting (the NRO Staff Director had recently refused to
brief members of COMOR on a new project on grounds of se-
curity); (5) the general attitude of the NRO Staff was not
good--as exemplified in their telling CIA representatives
that CIA was "out of the picture" and would only be in-
formed on those NRO plans which related to CIA projects. 98/
At the 30 January 1963 meeting, a copy of the
background memorandum prepared for the DCI, putting forth
the above points, was left with Mr. Gilpatric, who said
he agreed with the NRO program as proposed by Mr. McCone
and was prepared to implement it and to have the Deputy
Director of NRO, appointed by CIA, in the chain of command
on an operating basis as a true deputy. He also agreed
that the new D/NRO should spend more time at the job of
directing the NRO than had Dr. Charyk.
At the same meeting, Mr. Gilpatric presented
the name of Dr. Brockway McMillan to Mr. McCone for con-
sideration as the next D/NRO.
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3. Dr. McMillan Succeeds Dr. Charyk as D/NRO
Dr. Scoville was asked by Mr. McCone at the
end of January 1963 for his views on the proposed candidate
for D/NRO, and responded with regard to Dr. McMillan's
suitability that he was a very competent technical individual
with a rather strong systems orientation; that he might be a
little weak in the area of imagination or sparking new ideas
and was somewhat inflexible as well, not diverting easily
from a course once he had made a decision. Dr. Scoville re-
iterated to the DCI previously-expressed views that it was
asking the impossible of an individual to perform as an
Under Secretary of the Air Force and a Director of NRO at
the same time. The National Reconnaissance Program was of
such overriding importance to national security that he felt
its conduct should in no way be prejudiced through the mak-
ing of critical decisions by a manager with divided
loyalty. 99/
Mr. McCone did not raise any objection with
Mr. Gilpatric over the appointment, and on I March 1963
Dr. McMillan was designated D/NRO. On 4 March 1963,
Mr. Gilpatric informed the PFIAB of the new appointment
and of the new NRO Agreement in process of execution between
DOD and CIA. A copy was furnished the Board for comments.
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4. Second Revised NRO Agreement, 13 March 1963
The PFIAB included its approval of the new
NRO Agreement in its 8 March 1963 memorandum* containing
recommendations to the DCI and Secretary of Defense for
the over-all improvement of intelligence collection. In
acknowledging the Board's approval, Mr. McCone said that
the new agreement was reached after due consideration of
the possibility that either Defense or CIA should take
full responsibility for the reconnaissance program. It
had been decided that such a move was unwise because on
one hand it would require relocating vast resources out
of the Defense Department, and on the other hand it would
involve the loss of CIA's experience and capabilities in
the field of overhead reconnaissance and the advantages
of security and imaginativeness it was able to provide.
Not all of the points desired by CIA were
**
included in the final text of the agreement signed by
Messrs. McCone and Gilpatric on 13 March 1963; however,
it was established that the position of Deputy Director,
NRO, would be filled by the DCI with approval of the
Secretary of Defense. CIA could include in its budget
*Appendix D, Tab 13.
**Appendix D, Tab 14.
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presentations to the Bureau of the Budget and Congressional
Committees (for informational purposes and for establishing
a true overhead base) funds for those NRP tasks assigned
to it and to be financed from NRP resources. An appendix
to the Agreement on "Program Funding" was signed two weeks
later and became a part of the Agreement.*
F. Dr. Scoville's Tour as DD/NRO
At the first meeting between Mr. McCone and
Dr. McMillan subsequent to the signing of the new Agree-
ment, Mr. McCone attributed many of the problems experi-
enced in organizing the NRO to the deficiencies of the
previous charter and said he felt the present agreement
would be a more workable document. At the same meeting
on 21 March 1963, Mr. McCone announced that he was nomi-
nating Dr. Scoville to be Deputy Director of NRO.
Agreement was reached between Mr. McCone and
war
Dr. Scoville that the latter would occupy the position
of DD/NRO while still serving in the capacity of DD/R.
Dr. Scoville proposed that an office be set up for him
near the D/NRO in the Pentagon and that he have an execu-
tive assistant and a secretary in that office full time.
-.wort
MOM
*Appendix D, Tab 14.
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Mr. James Cunningham, then Deputy Assistant
Director, OSA, recommended that Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer of
the OSA Staff be made Executive Officer to the DD/NRO to
lend strength to Dr. Scoville's day-to-day participation
in the activities of the NRO. Mr. Kiefer's technical and
professional background and his long experience with both
manned and satellite reconnaissance programs made him an
ideal choice for the position.
General Carter urged that Dr. Scoville set him-
self up in the Pentagon promptly and "infiltrate NRO at
all levels." 100/ Mr. McCone also urged, in connection
with the monitoring of Project CORONA operations and the
continuation of airtight procedures therefor, that more
Agency people be sent to the NRO Staff. 101/
In preparing his first draft of the DD/NRO terms
of reference, Dr. Scoville included the assignment of a
full-time assistant for himself and means for keeping the
DD/NRO fully informed and participating in all activities
of NRO. Dr. McMillan and Colonel John Martin, USAF (Di-
rector of NRO Staff succeeding General Curtin), vigorously
opposed Dr. Scoville's having an assistant in his NRO
office and indicated they would guarantee that the DD/NRO
would be constantly briefed and cut in on all major
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decisions of the NRO. Dr. Scoville, with misgivings,
reluctantly concurred. 102/
WOW
In the short tenure of Dr. Scoville as Deputy
Director, NRO, from 21 March to 15 June 1963, little was
accomplished in the way of establishing CIA's presence on
the NRO Staff. In line with the DCI's assuming the secur-
ity responsibility for the whole of the NRP, a senior CIA
Security Officer, was assigned to NRO 25X1
on 6 August 1962; and with the transfer of the Satellite
.m Operations Center (SOC) to the Pentagon in April 1963,
25X1
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of the OSA Operations Staff was desig-
nated CIA liaison with SOC and moved to the Pentagon,
later becoming the Chief of SOC.
1. Terms of Reference, DD/NRO
As mentioned above, Dr. Scoville's first
draft on 1 April 1963 of his terms of reference as DD/NRO*
brought objections and a redraft by the NRO Staff Director,
**
Colonel Martin. The redraft was returned to Dr. Scoville
with a memorandum from Dr. McMillan which said
...I intend that you shall be kept fully informed
of all NRO actions which I take, as well as on
*Appendix D, Tab 15.
**Appendix D, Tab 19.
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all other, aspects of NRO activities. I expect
generally to consult you on matters directly
related to your NRO duties, and on most other
NRO matters as well. I shall be the judge in
each instance as to whether consultation is
practicable or appropriate. Consultation will
not be a'pre-condition to my taking action. I
shall, of course, welcome at any time suggestions
or recommendations you may have on any NRO matter.
As you are aware, the NRO has undergone con-
siderable evolution from the Co-Director, joint
CIA-DOD organization of the 6 September 1961
agreement to the single Director, single Execu-
tive Agent organization established by the
13 March 1963 agreement. This agreement speci-
fies that the Director, NRO is directly respons-
ible to the Secretary of Defense, as Executive
Agent for the National Reconnaissance Program,
and that the NRO is an operating agency of the
Department of Defense. Except for guidance
from the USIB on intelligence collection require-
ments and priorities, all guidance to the Director
is from the Secretary of Defense, as Executive
Agent...*
The tone of this communication and the complete omission
of any reference to the DCI's NRP responsibilities (other
than through USIB's setting of requirements and priorities)
certainly gave fair warning to Dr. Scoville of troubles to
come.
The principal objection made by Dr. Scoville
to the duties and functions statement as revised by the
NRO Staff was that no provision was made for DD/NRO coordi-
nation on NRO Staff papers going to the D/NRO; in other
*Appendix D, Tab 19.
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words, there was no language to assure that he would be
truly in the "chain of command." He concurred in the
26 April draft, however, "as an initial attempt to define
methods and procedures for carrying out the duties and func-
tions of the Deputy Director, NRO" and made only one minor
change--from "full time" occupancy of his Pentagon office
when acting as D/NRO, to occupancy of that office "as
required."*
The Director, NRO Staff, Colonel Martin, then
circulated this version of the terms of reference paper
under the heading "Method of Operation for DDNRO" on
10 May 1963, addressing it to the Director, Program B,
CIA, for his
on receiving
"information and compliance."** General Carter,
a copy of the paper, expressed his disapproval
in a memorandum of 4 June to the General Counsel and to
Dr. Scoville, and said that while the duties outlined had
merit in some areas, in others they were entirely too spe-
cific and appeared to "denigrate the position of Deputy
Director of NRO far below the clear intent of the basic
vrino NRO Agreement. Furthermore, any directive assigning duties
vow.
wormed
*Appendix D, Tab 20.
**Appendix D, Tab 22.
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to the Deputy Director, NRO, should come only and directly
from Dr. McMillan and should have the prior approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone."* He
said the DCI intended to require the withdrawal of the
10 May paper and reissuance over McMillan's signature of a
proper terms of reference.
The intended action was overtaken by the
resignation of Dr. Scoville from CIA effective 14 June 1963
and in a final summarization of the NRO situation on the
eve of his departure he said that there had been no change
in the procedures practiced by the NRO Staff and that with
very few exceptions no papers had been coordinated with
the DD/NRO. He had protested to Colonel Martin who always
argued that there was not enough time, despite the fact
that the staff work coming out of the NRO was always ex-
tremely ponderous and delayed. Dr. Scoville recommended
that Colonel Martin be given a very strong directive to
improve the method of staff operations and to insure that
even the minimum terms of the Agreement were lived up to
and that CIA was no longer by-passed.**
*Appendix D, Tab 26.
**Appendix D, Tab 32.
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A new draft terms of reference produced by
the General Counsel on 20 June 1963 at General Carter's
instruction was not acceptable to Colonel Ledford who felt
it was too similar to Colonel Martin's draft and listed
only functions related to the DD/NRO's CIA activities
rather than covering the across-the-board responsibilities
he shared on behalf of the DCI for the whole NRP.
With the departure of Dr. Scoville,
Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer of the OSA Staff was accepted by
Dr. McMillan as the nominee for Deputy Director, NRO, and
was approved by the Secretary of Defense. On 2 July 1963
an announcement of Mr. Kiefer's appointment was issued,
again over the signature of Colonel Martin rather than
by the D/NRO, stating that "the Deputy D/NRO will function
in accordance with the provisions of the 13 March 1963
* *
DOD-CIA Agreement
and is to be kept fully
informed on all aspects of the NRO and all projects of
the National Reconnaissance Program."*** It further added
that the previous terms of reference (of 10 June) were
*Appendix D, Tab 33.
**Appendix D, Tab 34.
***Appendix D, Tab 35.
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rescinded. Thus, CIA now had a full-time representative
in the DD/NRO slot, but without formal, agreed terms of
reference, other than by interpretation of the 13 March
1963 Agreement.
2. Proyosed NRO/JRC Agreement on Air Operations
On 15 April 1963, Dr. McMillan and the NRO
Staff, in coordination with J-3 of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, but without prior consultation with CIA, submitted
to Mr. Gilpatric a draft paper which purported to clarify
the operational aspects of NRO in coordination with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and posed two alternatives for
accomplishing this: (1) Establish within NRO a new of-
fice having the capability to plan, evaluate, and coordi-
nate all aircraft overflights of denied areas; or (2) estab-
lish arrangements whereby the Joint Reconnaissance Center
of the JCS would serve both the NRO and the JCS, and the
Chief of the JRC (Brigadier General R. D. Steakley) would
serve as Deputy for Operations on the NRO Staff, responsible
for supervision of both the NRO Satellite Operations Center
(SOC)
and the Aircraft Operations Center (AOC). Alternative
2 was recommended as being more economical and also pro-
viding a smoother working interface between NRO and JCS.
The draft paper was forwarded to Dr. Scoville by the D/NRO
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with a note*
informing him that Dr. McMillan was planning
to establish a more formal tie-in between the NRO and JCS.
Dr. McMillan also included a copy of his memorandum* to
Mr. Gilpatric requesting that the latter discuss the pro-
posal with the JCS. Dr. Scoville was not asked for CIA's
approval or recommendations with regard to this proposal,
even though it represented a basic change in the agreed
NRO organizational set-up and procedures.
As might be expected, there was a loud outcry
in CIA when the proposal was received there, particularly
in OSA. Colonel Ledford's comments on the proposal were:
(1) that McMillan gave no evidence that present organiza-
tional arrangements were inadequate with respect to capa-
bility for operational planning and analysis, and there
had been no complaints from JCS/JRC with regard to the
currently functioning procedures; (2) the capability which
McMillan proposed to establish (or take over from the JRC)
was already in being in Program B (CIA); (3) the idea that
the suggested use of the JRC would require no increase in
manpower was naive; and (4) in general, the plan repre-
sented duplication of existing capabilities which would not
441E11
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provide any more qualified or experienced personnel but
simply add bureaucracy to a presently good, streamlined
organization. 103/
Dr. McMillan followed up his 15 April memo-
randum with a further one intended to clarify the intent
of the proposed JRC agreement;* however, Colonel Ledford
felt the second memorandum did nothing to clarify the
original proposal, and certainly did not retract or rec-
tify certain "fallacious statements" made in the original
otraNY correspondence to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He
said he thought Dr. McMillan's attention should be called
to the fact that "for seven years now we have conducted
clandestine overflights employing the highest calibre of
apia
personnel which the Air Force had to offer our joint,
.ft highest priority projects. I am not at all convinced that
Asp*
this experience...can be equalled elsewhere."
Dr. Scoville's reply to the D/NRO was
*
more
temperately expressed: it called attention to the unde-
sirable dual role which the JRC would play under the pro-
posal, and suggested that coordination of overflight
activities with the Joint Chiefs could be achieved in a
*Appendix D, Tab 17.
**Appendix D, Tab 18.
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simpler fashion without confusing command lines, possibly
by establishing as Program E all JCS-run reconnaissance
activities, with the Chief of the JRC as Director of
Program E.*
Dr. McMillan's answer to this was that the
JRC under his plan would have strictly a staff, rather
than a line, function; that he anticipated no problem with
the JCS over the dual role, and that the line elements of
NRO already satisfactorily established in DOD and CIA
would not be affected. He urged that further comment be
made quickly since the Secretary of Defense desired final
concurrence by 10 June.**
Meanwhile, Dr. Scoville had on 1 June 1963
informed the DCI of what had transpired with regard to the
insertion of the JRC into NRO operations*** and now the DCI
and General Carter took over the action in view of the an-
ticipated resignation and departure of Dr. Scoville.
Mr. McCone's first step was to set down his understanding
of his own and the USIB's responsibilities for establishing
intelligence requirements and priorities to be fulfilled
*Appendix D, Tab 21.
**Appendix D, Tab 24.
***Appendix D, Tab 23.
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by aircraft or satellite overflights over denied territory.
His premise was as follows:
It is my understanding that a decision was
made in the early days of the U-2 that the re-
sponsibility for the planning and the conduct
of overflights over denied territory was to
rest with CIA, not with Defense...Therefore be-
fore discussing any details, I want a resolution
of the question by Secretary of Defense and DCI
and if necessary, higher authority, as to whether
responsibility for intelligence in denied terri-
tories (except for active war areas) is the
responsibility of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence or the Secretary of Defense.*
On 4 June 1963 Mr. McCone met with Deputy
Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to discuss the latter's po-
sition, which had been in support of the NRO/JCS agreement.
Mr. McCone reported that during the discussion he learned
from Mr. Gilpatric that there was a strong feeling, ex-
pressed by General LeMay, then Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, and apparently supported passively by the Secretary
of Defense, Mr. McNamara, and General Maxwell Taylor, that
the time had come to move all reconnaissance operations
out of CIA to the Department of Defense.** Mr. Gilpatric
said this was not the intent of his 31 May memorandum to
the Joint Chiefs and to the D/NRO, agreeing to the proposed
*Appendix D, Tab 25.
**Appendix D, Tab 27.
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NRO/JCS agreement;* nevertheless, the sentiment existed in
the DOD.
Mr. McCone had stated that, if this was the
issue, he would like to settle the matter on the basis of
this issue, but warned that he would oppose the take-over
by Defense. Mr. Gilpatric urged him not to raise the issue,
and said he felt that the President's Board, and probably
the President himself, would be opposed to any such shift.
He feared the raising of the issue would be interpreted
as another civilian-military squabble and there were al-
ready too many of these. Mr. Gilpatric urged Mr. McCone
to amend the agreement in a way that would satisfy him
that there would be no misinterpretation of the CIA re-
sponsibility for carrying out covert overflight of denied
**
territory. Mr. McCone agreed to do as Mr. Gilpatric asked.
The General Counsel of CIA was asked to draft
a memorandum which would fulfill the DCI's agreement and
would suggest changes in the text of the proposal to pro-
tect CIA interests. The DDCI, General Carter, meanwhile
advised Mr. McCone, with regard to the dispute over the
NRO/JCS matter, as follows:
*Appendix D, Tab 24, Attachment.
**Appendix D, Tab 27.
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...you cannot place yourself in the position of
"negotiating" on the new proposals, nor can you,
as DCI, accept a caveat designed to protect CIA
interests only. Everything in the new Gilpatric
proposals is a clear downgrading of CIA activities
and responsibilities, and takes away from the
Director of Central Intelligence his prime re-
sponsibility for intelligence collection by any
and all means. As a matter of fact, the phrase-
ology is such that the Director of Central Intel-
ligence is personally downgraded, in some cases
by omission, in others by position. There is
absolutely no question in my mind that these past
and present actions indicate a direct and imme-
diate move to get you and the CIA entirely out of
the aerial reconnaissance business, and I do not
think we can stand for this for another day...*
General Carter recommended that Mr. McCone
tell Mr. Gilpatric that he would not accept the JRC into
the NRO organization, or accept policy directives from the
D/NRO, or limitations on the full Deputy responsibilities
of the CIA-appointed Deputy Director of NRO. A draft let-
ter in these terms was presented by General Carter, but
Mr. McCone preferred to draft his own more mildly-worded
reply, which, nevertheless, still firmly opposed the NRO/
JCS proposal.** After receiving concurrence on his draft
mktamod
from the General Counsel*** he dispatched the letter to
*Appendix D, Tab 28.
**Appendix D, Tab 30.
***Appendix D, Tab 29.
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Mr. Gilpatric on 11 June 1963. Mr. Gilpatric's reply*
dated 13 June was unrelenting in its insistence on the con-
clusion of an agreement with the Joint Chiefs, although he
agreed it should be possible to achieve this objective with
a simpler document and to that end he directed Fubini and
McMillan to work up a less elaborate paper.
On 26 June 1963, Mr. McCone appeared before
PFIAB and reported on CIA's views on the current organiza-
tion and management of NRO. After bringing the Board up
to date on NRO affairs
...The DCI indicated that he felt there were
two problems in the NRO. The first was the
feeling of the Air Force that it should be en-
dowed with the full responsibility for all aerial
reconnaissance, and he pointed out that the Chief
of Staff of the Air Force held this view and had
communicated it to the JCS and the Secretary of
Defense. While the view was not approved as a
Defense position, it was only natural that the
Chief of Staff's views had permeated the working
levels and had exacerbated the problems of NRO.
The second was that of personalities. The DCI
felt there had been serious differences between
Charyk and Scoville, and McMillan and Scoville.
The DCI noted that General Carter had personally
been working on the implementation of the agree-
ment and said he himself had discussed it in
greater depth with Gilpatric and McNamara than
would normally be the case at such levels...104/
The Board, particularly Dr. Edwin Land, was
perturbed to learn that the NRO staff was composed almost
*Appendix D, Tab 31.
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entirely of Air Force personnel, and Mr. McCone was
reminded of the Board's desire that the NRO should be a
partnership.
On 8 July a new version of the NRO/JCS agree-
ment was produced by Drs. Fubini and McMillan and a copy
furnished the DCI for his comments.*
Colonel Giller, then
Acting DD/R, felt the new version was merely a shortened
and generalized version of the original, to which CIA had
taken such strong exception. The purpose was still not
clear. He recommended a completely new paper be written
with a clear statement of the purpose of the agreement;
that the CIA Operations Center at Langley be designated
the NRO Operations Center; and that only in times of
.I?111
actual hostilities should there be automatic transfer to
the JRC of the NRO operational assets. 105/
Dr. Wheelon, then Assistant Director of
Scientific Intelligence, DD/I, but shortly to move into
the vacancy left by Dr. Scoville to reorganize the Direc-
torate, commented to General Carter on the NRO/JCS proposal
that, while he knew little of the background, he had been
ama.,
told that the JCS, with General LeMay in the lead, had
proposed to take over all reconnaissance aircraft, including
*Appendix D, Tab 36.
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OXCART, but that McNamara and Fubini had rejected this
concept and had told JCS not to put forward such a proposal.
The principal problem with the agreement in his view was
the option given Secretary McNamara to transfer NRO mis-
sions to the JCS in periods of war or tension; he felt
Mr. McCone should have an equal voice in any such decisions.
He said
...It seems to me that this new agreement provides
the tool for excluding the CIA from manned recon-
naissance operations on the decision of the DOD.
Of course we cannot presume that this agreement
will be so exploited. However, I do wonder what
we gain by placing such weapons in the hands of
an organization which has found it difficult to
resist using them in the past...*
Mr. James Cunningham's comments on the
8 July 1963 draft agreement with the JCS were also concerned
with the underlying purpose of the agreement, which he felt
*NW
had not been clearly stated. He said if the purpose was
to assure that NRO and DOD missions were properly coordi-
nated,there were already in being procedures and understand-
ings between the NRO (Program B) and the JRC under which the
JCS was kept fully aware of all overflight activities on a
ammo&
current basis. If the JCS concern was with high-level
policy implications, the JCS could have a representative at
*Appendix D, Tab 37.
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the Special Group meetings when these topics were discussed.
In summary, he said
...This paper can only be interpreted as a
further attempt by the JCS to absorb those
responsibilities and prerogatives relating to
operational control of reconnaissance programs
now exercised by the CIA within the framework
of the NRO.*
At the same time that the protracted argument
over the NRO/JCS agreement was going on, other confronta-
tions continued to take place on the question of budget-
ing for the CIA portion of the NBP (the CIA battle to
obtain annual versus quarterly funding of projects was lost
in August, 1963);** the arbitrary reduction of certain
items in the CIA portion of the NRP budget by the D/NRO;
and the assignment of project responsibilities by the
D/NRO (e.g., TAGBOARD was a contentious item since its
development was so closely bound to the CIA OXCART devel-
opment, but its control was given up in October 1963 to
USAF's Program D at Dr. McMillan's direction).
The next move in the NRO/JCS matter was
made by General Carter in a letter to Dr. Fubini dated
21 August 1963, bringing to bear the arguments outlined by
*Appendix D, Tab 38.
**Appendix D, Tab 39, Attachment
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Messrs. Giller, Wheelon, and Cunningham, above, and
putting forward a very simple, short, draft agreement
which he felt would answer NRO's need for coordination
with the JCS.*
Another month passed before a redraft
by Dr. Fubini was returned for CIA consideration.**
General Carter passed it to Dr. Wheelon (who had by that
time become Deputy Director for Science and Technology)
recommending that he consider the draft but not be pres-
sured into early agreement with it. Dr. Wheelon followed
this advice, and took no action on the proposal. Even-
tually the pressure for a formal agreement between NRO
and the JCS for coordinating NRO and JRC peripheral and
overflight activities was dropped in favor of coordinating
such activities at the National Security Council level.
On 3 January 1964 the NRO promulgated the
system of monthly forecasts of NRP overflight activities
to be presented to the Special Group of the National
Security Council for approval in advance. (This was a
continuation and formalization of the practice first im-
posed on CIA by the NSC under Mr. Gordon Gray in September
1960 as a result of the U-2 May Day 1960 episode, and
*Appendix D, Tab 40.
**Appendix D, Tab 42.
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continued on an ad hoc basis since then.) Procedures for
the presentation of the NRP list were published by the
Director of the NRO Staff on 16 April 1964. The missions
under the control of the JRC were also to be presented to
the Special Group on a monthly basis for approval. Thus
the combined listing included CIA manned and satellite
missions, Air Force manned, satellite, and drone missions,
and Navy satellite missions (all under the NRP); and JRC
missions, principally SAC U-2 and drone flights over Cuba
and Vietnam, and certain peripheral missions. (The fore-
cast procedure of coordination was still in effect at the
end of 1970.)
G. CIA Role in Satellite Reconnaissance
1. Pre-NRO Activities: 1958-1961
Prior to the establishment of the National
Reconnaissance Program there was no formal charter for
CIA's participation in satellite reconnaissance. Its ac-
tivities in this field resulted partly from a desire to
buy into a satellite program in order to provide some
assurance of fulfilling national intelligence requirements,
and partly because of previous achievements of the Agency
in the research and development of new and effective pho-
tographic techniques. 106/
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The Air Force had initiated studies in 1946
under a Rand Corporation contract to investigate the fea-
sibility of using an earth satellite for reconnaissance.
Early Rand proposals assumed that the satellite, once
fired into orbit would be non-recoverable, but would re-
main in orbit for perhaps a year, returning the photo-
graphic or other data collected via a data link to a
ground station. Such a proposal by Rand, called "Feed
Back," was made in 1954 and was assigned to the Ballistic
Missile Division in 1955. BMD's development plan under
Air Force Weapons System 117-L (WS 117-L) was approved
in 1956 and a contract was awarded to Lockheed for devel-
oping and testing the system. With the further advances
in missile technology during the following year, re-entry
of a space vehicle into the earth's atmosphere appeared
to be feasible, and therefore another phase was added to
WS 117-L which envisioned the launching of a two-stage
photo-reconnaissance satellite into orbit; at the com-
pletion of its planned mission, a recoverable capsule
containing the exposed film would be separated from the
second stage of the satellite for return to earth. 107, 108/
In the development of this latter phase of
WS 117-L, the Air Force plan called for a spin-stabilized
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pod containing a six-inch focal length camera, without image
motion compensation, and with very short exposure time.
This would require the use of fast film, resulting in grainy
photography, and yielding a resolution of between 40 and
60 feet on the ground. This was not good enough for intel-
ligence purposes. 109/
The decision was made that the Air Force would
drop this portion of WS 117-L and concentrate on the long-
range direct read-out system. Meanwhile, with the approval
of Dr. James R. Killian, Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology, and the cooperation of the
Director of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division,
General Bernard Schriever, an interim photo-reconnaissance
satellite system was developed quickly and secretly under
the direction of Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., and some of
the members of his U-2 project staff. Some of the residual
hardware and existing arrangements of the Air Force's can-
celled project were used, and the DCI, Mr. Allen Dulles,
approved the release of from his special reserve 25X1
to pay for the development and production of the sophisti-
cated photographic package required for the system. 110/
This interim reconnaissance program, code-
named CORONA, made use of a Douglas Thor missile as
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the first stage booster, with a Lockheed Agena as the
second stage. The payload consisted of a 24-inch focal
length camera configuration, stabilized 'after orbiting,
and giving resolution of approximately 20 feet on the
ground. The cover arrangement for the project placed
CORONA under the authority of the Advanced Research Pro-
jects Agency (ARPA) and CIA, with support and participa-
tion of the Air Force through BMD. CIA had responsibility
for development of the reconnaissance equipment and for
management of collection requirements, security, cover,
and on-orbit operations. 111/
The CORONA plan called for a one-year pro-
gram with approximately 12 shots anticipated. A press
conference held by Dr. Roy W. Johnson, Director of ARPA,
on 3 December 1958, announced the purpose of the series
of shots (designated Project DISCOVERER) as continued
development of a number of systems and techniques to be
employed in the operation of space vehicles. When a
mapping satellite project, ARGON, was set up in coopera-
.., tion with the Army Map Service in July 1959, ARPA and
CIA agreed that CIA should also exercise control over that
project in order to maintain maximum security. 112/ ARGON
shots were worked in under cover of the DISCOVERER series.
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During the period from 1958 until the NRP
was established at the end of 1961, Mr. Bissell, as CORONA
Project Director, representing CIA, and Major General
Osmond J. Ritland, representing the Air Force Ballistic
Missile Division, had developed a loosely defined set of
procedures whereby the CORONA camera payload procured by
CIA was installed in the vehicle, which was furnished by
the Air Force, launching took place, orbiting was guided,
and recovery at sea was effected, with the aid of the
Air Force and Navy. A control center operated by BMD at
Palo Alto, California, had responsibility for launchings
from Vandenberg Air Force Base and coordination of activi-
ties during countdown and orbit, and for triggering all
facets of recovery. Lockheed Missile Division (later
renamed Lockheed Missile and Space Company) was contracted
by CIA to provide the services of its Systems Engineering
and Test Division in pulling together all parts of the
system being furnished by various contractors, and in
successfully testing the completed system. This was ac-
complished at a secure facility in Palo Alto.*
As a prac-
tical matter, the contractors' technicians were in almost
*Appendix E, Tab 5.
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complete control of the operational aspects of CORONA
with BMD and CIA personnel overseeing their activities.
In the earliest days of CORONA, the day-to-
day liaison between CORONA Project Headquarters (the fifth
floor of the Matomic Building, 1717 H Street) and the Palo
Alto center at the operating level was the responsibility
of the same Operations Staff, under
and which controlled the activities
of the U-2 and other CIA manned overflight programs. On
the BMD side, Colonel William J. Sheppard was the prin-
cipal liaison officer at Headquarters, and
was in charge of the MD Palo Alto
center. After CORONA became operational a liaison offi-
cer from CIA, Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Murphy (an
Air Force detailee), was sent to Palo Alto to serve as
an on-site monitor and as CIA member of the Configuration
Control Board (established in February 1961).
In September 1958, Mr. Bissell requested
then Chief of the Contracts Staff,
to serve as coordinating point for all CORONA activities
being carried on by other units. With
de-
parture from the Agency in June 1959, coordination of
CORONA activities was reassigned to
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then Director of the DPD Development Branch, and his Deputy,
Mr. John Parangosky; Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer, Technical Adviser
on the A-12 program, was also technical adviser on CORONA
from its inception. Under this management, with the
Bissell/Ritland overview, CORONA arrived at operational
status, and after thirteen non-productive firings, finally
began to produce useful intelligence with the successful
retrieval of a payload on 19 August 1960.
In December 1959, the DOD reorganized the
military space program to give the Air Force the prime
role, returning to the services most of the projects ARPA
had taken over when it was set up in 1958. The Air Force
then took over the supervision of space vehicle develop-
ment for joint CIA/USAF projects which had formerly been
under ARPA's administration.
The prolongation through 1960-61 of CORONA
after the system's capabilities were proven, and the
introduction of a higher resolution stereo camera into
the system, gave CIA a continuing stake in satellite re-
connaissance, since the Air Force program had not yet
begun to produce intelligence. (The last unsuccessful
attempt to orbit a direct read-out satellite under the
original Air Force reconnaissance satellite program,
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known publicly as Samos, occurred on 9 September 1961 and
subsequently that program was phased out. It had involved
the expenditure of many millions of dollars and had pro-
duced no usable photography.)
2. CIA Role Limited Under NRO
With the establishment of NRO all resources
of the Space Systems Division of the Air Force Systems Com-
mand* which were involved in full or part-time work for NRO
were placed under the management of the Director of Program
A, NRP, Major General Robert Greer, whose overt duty assign-
ment was Director of Special Projects, Office of the Secre-
tary of the Air Force (SAFSP), with duty station at the
field extension office of the Secretary at El Segundo.
When General Greer took over the Air Force
satellite reconnaissance programs and support of CORONA in
1962, the old leadership on the CIA side had fallen away.
25X4.-Mr. Bissell
and had resigned
from the Agency;
25X1
had been transferred
25X1
25X1'
and Mr.
John Parangosky was
almost completely
4.4111.0
occupied with the crisis situation in the development of
the A-12 engine. The Development Projects Division staff
(then responsible for CORONA's direction on the CIA side)
*ARDC was reorganized in March 1961 and became Air Force
Systems Command; General Ritland was named Director, SSD.
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was in a state of disorganization for most of the year 1962,
during which time it was being reconstituted under the DD/R
as the Office of Special Activities. Its reorganization
was effective as of 30 July 1962, and on 4 September 1962
Colonel Jack C. Ledford, USAF, was named to direct it. He
immediately became deeply involved in CIA's manned recon-
naissance projects--the development problems of the A-12
and the U-2's coverage of the Cuban missile build-up.
Between 1958 and 1961 CORONA had established
an operational pattern under the working level direction of
contractor technicians, DPS/DPD personnel, and the SSD's
Special Project Office 162 under Colonel Lee Battle. The
latter office became a part of General Greer's over-all
management responsibility as SAFSP Director. Late in 1962
General Greer began to move into the CORONA leadership
and take over the technical direction of contracts for
CORONA MURAL (stereo) and "J" (dual payload) projects,
with D/NRO and NRO Staff encouragement.
By agreement between Drs. Scoville and
Charyk in May 1962 (approved for CIA by General Carter
void
the
on
1 September 1962), authorization was given for OSA's Con-
tracts Staff to do covert procurement in furtherance of
the objectives of the NRP. Pursuant to that agreement,
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la the Office of Logistics was assigned
las the Agency's resident con-
tracting officer with General
Greer at SAFSP.
A CIA Indus-
trial Security Officer,
assigned to SAFSP under
was also
3 of the
25X1
the terms of paragraph
NRO Agreement then in force.*
.1111111111
When General Greer's staff began to take
over technical direction of contracts which had been ne-
AMMO
gotiated by CIA contracting officers,
25X1
UMW
+101101,
were placed in an anomalous position vis-a-vis
both General Greer and the contractors, since they were
outside the Air Force line of command and yet had been
given responsibilities with regard to those contracts
which cut across departmental
contract fulfillment problems
went by.
boundaries. Security and
began to develop as time
The OSA Contracts Staff had, throughout
the U-2 and follow-on programs between 1955 and 1961,
built up good relationships with the Air Force echelons
muril
with whom they had dealt;
however, in January
1963 the
OSA Contracts Chief, then
reported
25X1
wool
to Dr. Scoville that for the
previous three or four
*Appendix D, Tab 9.
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months there had been a lessening of the "team" spirit
in relations with both Air Force and contractor personnel,
particularly in relation to the satellite programs. Now
OSA was often hearing first from contractor representa-
tives of new development or of requirements being levied
upon the contractors by visiting NRO staff from the Pen-
tagon or from General Greer's office. 113/
After many requests for resolution of these
problems, the situation resulted in a visit to the West
Coast contractors and to General Greer by the CIA Direc-
tor of Security, then Mr. Robert Bannerman, in July 1963.
It developed that approximately contracts worth about 25X1
had been issued by CIA contracting officers
in support of satellite projects.*
All of these contracts
were at that time under the technical direction of
General Greer, either having been assigned to him
origi-
nally by NRO, or assumed by him with NRO consent.
Mr. Bannerman advised the DD/S&T that to
make available the authorities of the Confidential Funds
Contracting Officer and the CIA Security Officer to
SAFSP to be directed and utilized as General Greer saw
fit represented the delegation of those authorities by
*Appendix D, Tab 10 (List of NRP satellite projects).
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the DCI to another agency. The DCI had previously expressed
his position that he would not so delegate his authorities.
Mr. Bannerman felt the concept of separating technical di-
rection from the normal source of authority for contract-
ing and security was unsound and that every effort should
be made to correct the situation. General Greer was aware
of the possible illegalities involved and had considered
the solution of turning over all "black" contracts for
satellite systems to CIA.* At a meeting in August 1963,
however, the decision was made that CIA procurement and
security officers should not be given responsibility for
"black" contracts under the Air Force's satellite program.
was called to Headquarters for
consultation in December 1963 and, at the request of the
DD/S&T, he set down his views on the situation currently
existing at General Greer's SAFSP office particularly in
regard to contracting.** He outlined for the DD/S&T the
continuing trend towards Air Force consolidation of man-
..
agement control over the CORONA M and J programs and esti-
mated that, unless immediate action was instituted by the
Agency, the take-over by the Air Force would be complete
in a matter of months.
wool
*Appendix D, Tab 39
**Appendix D, Tab 48.
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Early in March 1964 the DD/S&T received copies
of cables sent by General Greer to Headquarters to the ef-
fect that SPO-162 (the SSD group of personnel assigned to
support CORONA launches and retrievals) was being dissolved
and its functions and personnel transferred to SPO-241
under Colonel Paul Heran, within General Greer's immediate
SAFSP organization. The significance of this action was
that control of the CORONA program would be automatically
transferred to General Greer and USAF's Program A, without
the formality of CIA concurrence. At this point, the
CORONA management question became a part of the larger issue
of the viability of the NRP as a whole and the CIA role
therein. In the spring of 1964, the PFIAB conducted an
extensive inquiry into this issue, about which more will
be written below.
3. Dr. Wheelon Enters the Fray
The steadily eroding CIA role in satellite
reconnaissance prompted Mr. McCone at his morning staff
meeting on 1 August 1963 to make a strong statement to the
effect that CIA must get back into the satellite business,
including the development of proposals for new and better
systems beyond present capabilities. Colonel Giller (then
Acting DD/R) immediately passed this directive to the D/SA,
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Colonel Ledford, who was nominally responsible for CORONA
within Program B (CIA's NRP-assigned projects). He ad-
vised Colonel Ledford to work closely with Dr. Wheelon, who
had just agreed to take on the job of organizing the Direc-
torate for Science and Technology. 114/
To review the situation prevailing at that
moment, we find that most of the frustrations which had
caused the resignation of Dr. Scoville were still waiting
to be faced by his successor. Dr. Wheelon had already
faced up to the basic frustration, i.e., the failure of
the DD/R to develop into the all-encompassing scientific
and technological base which had been anticipated. He
had laid out his conditions for accepting the assignment
and had been assured of the transfer of OSI and the Agency's
computer assets, and the promise of a missile and space
analysis center. He failed to acquire control of all
Agency research and development, which had to be fore-
gone in view of the position of other Directorates. The
principal remaining problems were in the area of the rela-
tions between the Agency and the NRO. Current operating
arrangements established by the NRO Staff had curtailed
CIA's freedom of action in its overhead reconnaissance
projects: the control of funds to support these projects
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had been taken out of CIA hands and transferred to NRO;
the Satellite Operations Center, which had been operating
effectively in CIA's Langley Headquarters Building, was
transferred (albeit with Dr. Scoville's acquiescence) to
the Pentagon under the NRO Staff; the management of CORONA
(which was beginning to pay off, even though still having
technical problems), was about to be assumed completely by
the Air Force with the D/NRO's encouragement; and research
and development looking ahead to advanced reconnaissance
satellite systems was not showing promise of meeting future
requirements. The latter deficiency was of great concern
to Mr. McCone and it was in that area that Dr. Wheelon
waged one of his strongest battles for the next few years.
a. Wheelon Views on CIA/NRO Problems
Dr. Wheelon assumed the post of DD/S&T
on 5 August 1963, and Mr. McCone placed on him the re-
sponsibility previously carried by General Carter and
Dr. Scoville for NRO matters. On 19 August 1963 a meet-
ing was scheduled between the DCI and Messrs. Gilpatric
and McMillan to go over all NRO problems, and in prepar-
ation for that meeting Dr. Wheelon asked his staff and
office chiefs to "let their hair down" and address them-
selves to the total relationship problem. The scheduled
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meeting was called off, but the papers prepared for it,
which were quite revealing of the problem areas in manage-
ment, funding, and security, were preserved in a single
bundle for the DCI's background information.*
Dr. Wheelon then attempted to put the NRO
problem into proper perspective by drafting a background
memorandum for the DCI containing recommendations for steps
which might be taken to restore and preserve the original
intent of the NRP.** Under the heading "Reference Points"
he listed all the factors in the problem, giving each a
value of "self evident," "matter of record," or "personal
conviction based on reliable secondhand reporting." Added
together, these points showed (1) the deterioration of
CIA's initial role in the NRP as a strong partner with the
capability to develop and operate new advanced reconnaissance
programs, and (2) the ascendancy of the Air Force role
through the various appointments and decisions made since
the NRP was established. Dr. Wheelon recommended certain
sm.
drastic actions for the DCI's consideration: (1) that the
responsibility for all reconnaissance operations (satellite
.11.1M11
*Appendix D, Tab 39.
**Appendix D, Tab 41.
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and aircraft) should be transferred to CIA as Executive
Agent; (2) the D/NRO should drop his claim to line authority
over elements contributing to NRP; i.e., Colonel Ledford
as Director of Program B would work for the DD/S&T, who
would be responsible for carrying out the CIA portion of
the NRP; (3) a CIA/USAF partnership should make a joint ap-
proach to conception and design of new systems after which
each project would be assigned to a specific NRP contribut-
ing agency which would be responsible for contracting for
and carrying on the technical management including security;
(4) the Agency should cease to carry out contracting and
security responsibilities for Air Force programs over which
CIA had no cognizance in widely dispersed industrial plants
throughout the nation; and (5) CIA should fund in its own
mm budget all of the activities undertaken on behalf of the
mast
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NRP because program control and financial control were in-
dissolubly linked.
In summary, Dr. Wheelon's recommendations,
if carried out, would entail in almost every instance going
back to fight over ground which had already been fought
over and either lost or compromised under the current NRO
set-up. Dr. Wheelon was quite prepared to make the fight
and felt that CIA had right and reason on its side and a
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capability which should not be allowed to go unused in
support of the national intelligence effort. The opposi-
tion was well entrenched, however, and every inch of ground
gained demanded a continuous, concerted effort on the part
of those in CIA who believed that the Agency must maintain
a strong role in the NRP. Such an effort was not always
forthcoming in a timely and forceful manner.
b. Purcell Panel and Drell Working Group
Recommendations
In the spring of 1963, Mr. McCone asked
a panel of experts headed by Dr. Edward Purcell, Harvard
physicist, to investigate and make recommendations on the
future course for the NRP's satellite programs. The Panel
met in June and July 1963 after which they presented their
recommendations to the DCI.
CORONA should be improved to
In
summary, they said that
its utmost capabilities.*
General Greer's staff on the West Coast
and Dr. Wheelon's staff in DD/S&T undertook separate
studies looking toward such an improvement program. The
proposal of the Greer group did not solve the problem for
it proposed to increase peak performance but did nothing
to spread the probability of obtaining peak performance
*Appendix F, Tab 6.
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for the greater percentage of the time. The CIA group, on
the other hand, did an analysis of the resolution distribu-
tion of CORONA photography and found that the quality spread
was much broader than anyone had expected, and was not to
be accounted for by error analysis of known effects. The
results of the latter study were briefed to the members of
the Purcell Panel, who completely concurred in its con-
clusions. There was still much to be learned about the
basic limitations on quality of satellite photography, par-
ticularly of the search system type.*
Messrs. McCone and Gilpatric, at a meet-
ing on 22 October 1963, agreed that the Greer improvement
proposal for CORONA should be held up and that Dr. Wheelon
should meanwhile convene a research group comprised of the
nation's best talent to explore the problem. 115/ The
"Satellite Photography Working Group" was established with
Dr. Sidney Drell, Stanford University physicist, as chair-
man. It met first on 13 November 1963 at NPIC where most
of its work was accomplished.
newly appointed
Deputy Assistant Director of ORD, was assigned by the DD/S&T
*Appendix D, Tab 43.
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as full-time assistant to the working group, and as he and
Dr. Drell and their technical experts progressed with their
investigation it became clear that this complicated, inter-
related scientific problem would not be solved in a short
study without the benefit of experimental results. In spite
of the great effort devoted to aerial reconnaissance to date
this was the first time the physics of image quality had
been studied in a meaningful way. In its report, rendered
8 February 1964, the group isolated the vital factors in-
volved and indicated the necessary further experiments which
were required to reach maximum resolution continuously with
avail
the CORONA/MURAL system. 116/ Their conclusions, briefly,
were (1) work should continue toward construction of an
objective and quantitative measure of image quality; (2) an
inflight and ground measurement program should be imple-
mented to obtain engineering data to check on system per-
..
formance in the operational environment; and (3) more
emphasis should be placed on engineering passes of opera-
tional systems over properly designed domestic, ground-
based targets.*
asmil0
.1111110?10
*An appendix to the ORD History contains a full account
of the work of the Drell committee.
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(page 250),
c. CIA Participation in the NRO Staff
At the 22 October meeting mentioned above
Mr. McCone indicated his very strong belief that
NRO must be so constituted, directed, managed, and staffed
as to continue to be responsive to intelligence require-
ments, and said he wanted more CIA personnel assigned to
the NRO Staff in order to make it a truly joint organiza-
tion. 117/
A meeting was called for the specific pur-
pose of discussing NRO staffing on 7 November 1963 with
Dr. Wheelon, General Carter, and Mr. Bross attending for
CIA, and Dr. McMillan and his Aide, Colonel Strand, for
NRO. After a briefing on NRO organization, Dr. McMillan
offered only three specific suggestions for slots to which
CIA nominees might be appointed. In answer to a query by
Dr. Wheelon as to how Mr. Eugene Kiefer, the DD/NRO, fit
into the NRO structure, according to Dr. Wheelon's report
McMillan was quite candid in saying that NRO
decisions were made between himself and General
Martin, and readily agreed that this left
Kiefer between two "do-it-yourselfers." I sug-
gested that perhaps Kiefer ought to become the
Chief of Staff when Martin leaves (summer '64),
but McMillan rejected this promptly...McMillan
then tabled an open preference for Air Force
officers who have served with CIA as the only
workable way to inject CIA thinking into NRO
affairs. Carter pointed out that such officers
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serve tours at CIA so as to bring flying talents
to CIA and seldom develop the deep appreciation
for intelligence needs that a career CIA officer
would bring to the staff...
judged this meeting to represent an all
time low in NRO/CIA relations, and this view was
amplified considerably by Carter and Bross. It
was made abundantly clear then and later (through
Kiefer) that McMillan has no intention of estab-
lishing a truly joint staff. Under the circum-
stances, I am most reluctant to send additional
people to join Kiefer in their sterile role until
a satisfactory understanding is reached on the
over-all NRO problem. I am convinced that it is
quite unrealistic to expect Kiefer and widely
distributed and subordinated CIA staff members
to create a peaceful reorientation in the face
of clearly expressed Air Force intentions to
dominate this field and McMillan's desire to
rely on Air Force staffing.*
In early March 1964, Dr. McMillan queried
Dr. Wheelon concerning Agency nominees for the three posi-
tions he had mentioned the previous November, particularly
a candidate for an advanced development slot on the West
Coast with General Greer. Dr. Wheelon reported that he
"made little response to this except to agree that the
issue had been hanging for some time."**
Dr. Wheelon later made a formal written
reply concerning the filling of the three positions.
*Appendix D, Tab 45.
**Appendix D, Tab 51.
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Noting that the conversation held on 7 November 1963 on
this subject had envisioned a much more broadly-based joint
staffing of NRO than was represented by the three positions
offered by Dr. McMillan, Dr. Wheelon added
The entire question of the NRO and its
functioning is now being looked into by the
PFIAB. I propose that we postpone incremental
solutions to partial staffing problems until
broader guidelines are supplied by the DCI and
SecDef. I am sure that you are aware of our
intense interest in creating a truly joint
CIA/military NRO Staff and our desire to reach
an early framework within which this action can
be taken.*
The fashioning of the "framework" referred
to by Dr. Wheelon was not achieved until August 1965 when
a revised NRO agreement was signed. The assigning of CIA
staff to the NRO in any significant numbers still did not
result, even with the new agreement (which, incidentally,
Dr. Wheelon advised the DCI not to sign since he believed
it to be unworkable). It was not until late in 1966, and
.m
after Dr. Wheelon's departure from the Agency that any
further nominees to the NRO Staff moved to the Pentagon,
and even then only a small number?a maximum of eight or
ten.
woos*
*Appendix D, Tab 52.
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At the same 22 October 1963 meeting
referred to above, which ranged widely over the areas of
dissatisfaction on the CIA side, an agreement was reached
that regularly scheduled meetings of senior officials on
both sides would aid in improving policy guidance to NRO
by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. Mr. McCone made
known his intention to participate personally in such
meetings. A further agreement was the designation of
Dr. Wheelon by the DCI, and Dr. Fubini by Secretary Gil-
patric, to examine and monitor activities of NRO on behalf
of their two principals. 118/
Dr. McMillan then drew up his own plans
for the participation of the monitors and in a letter to
Dr. Wheelon of 4 December 1963 he indicated certain re-
strictions he intended to place on the CIA representative's
freedom of investigation.
...I recognize that there may be occasions when
you may find it desirable to have NRO personnel
provide you with information, briefings, or at-
tendance at meetings. On these occasions, upon
my receipt of your needs, I will take the neces-
sary steps to insure that they are met by the
appropriate NRO personnel. However, as a matter
of policy, I do not expect direct tasking upon
any personnel assigned to the NRO on an individ-
ual basis.*
*Appendix D, Tab 46.
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Dr. Wheelon's reaction to this letter, and
to the terms of reference of a proposed "NRP Review Commit-
tee" suggested to the DCI by Mr. Gilpatric, was expressed to
Mr. McCone in a memorandum wherein Dr. Wheelon outlined
what he believed to have been agreed
at the 22 October 1963
meeting: namely, that Messrs. McCone and Gilpatric would
meet regularly to provide policy guidance to McMillan as
D/NRO, and to review the over-all NRP as stock-owning direc-
tors; and Fubini and Wheelon would work with NRO more fre-
quently at the technical level. Dr. Wheelon said the new
committee proposal would subordinate Fubini and Wheelon
to McMillan, when in fact the purpose of their monitor-
ship was to provide constructive inquiry and criticism of
McMillan's own programs. The new proposal also gave a very
circumscribed charter to the reviewing function and did not
include such things as management change procedures or in-
vestigation into the health of ongoing programs, such as
CORONA, for which Dr. Wheelon felt he should be responsible
to the DCI. He noted to Mr. McCone
...I believe that these deficiencies have not
escaped McMillan. Being the kind of autocratic
manager he is, it is understandable that he is
not anxious to have a pair of overseers. How-
ever, his record to date shows that this is just
what he needs and you will only negate that by
signing this directive in hand. I suggest that
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you call Gilpatric back indicating that the
meetings already seem to be well started and that
no structuring or chartering is needed or desir-
able.*
Mr. McCone agreed that no further commit-
tee structuring was needed, placing confidence in the
Executive Committee's capability to steer the NRO in the
right direction. The proposed NRP Review Committee was
not pressed further by Messrs. Gilpatric and McMillan and
the whole idea of formalizing such monitoring of NRO's
programs was dropped in favor of informal, ad hoc arrange-
ments.
The fact that many meetings were held
between NRO and Agency officials without agreed minutes
being written, and attended by the DCI or DDCI without
back-up staff present and without prior briefing on what
the opposition might bring up for decision, led to much
confusion and misinterpretation as to just what the DCI
and/or the Secretary of Defense had agreed to. In many
instances the D/NRO took action on the strength of his
own interpretation of what was said at a meeting without
further reference to the DCI for concurrence.
*Appendix D, Tab 47.
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4. CIA Efforts to Keep NRP Role
a. CORONA Management in Contention
wow During the spring and summer of 1963 the
CORONA program suffered a disproportionate number of fail-
ures over successful missions due to a variety of malfunc-
tions, some explainable and some not fully understood. In
mid-November, Dr. McMillan requested Mr. McCone's approval
to "clean up the mess" by transferring complete control of
the CORONA program to General Greer under the Air Force's
Program A. Dr. Wheelon advised strongly against relinquish-
ing the program to the Air Force since such action, he said,
gave no promise of solving the recurring problems. The
program had enjoyed remarkable successes as well as fail-
ures and he believed that only a few of the total 26 mis-
sion failures suffered to date could be laid to the CIA-
supervised payload. He had been disappointed in the Air
Force's technical stewardship over CORONA, particularly
since Colonel Worthington replaced Colonel Battle at
SPO 162 in July 1963, and he was concerned over the cur-
rent technical difficulties and the possibility of the
cancellation of the CORONA "J" double recovery system
by the D/NRO.*
+MOO
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Dr. Wheelon felt that more vigorous CIA
participation on the technical and programmatic front was
required, and a return to a genuine partnership between
CIA and the Air Force such as first characterized the
CORONA program. CIA should establish a strong project
office which would direct the camera, recovery vehicle,
and payload integration contractors, and ensure that Air
Force and CIA components worked closely together on a
daily basis in all aspects of joint satellite programs.*
While Mr. McCone turned aside the D/NRO's
attempt to remove CORONA completely from CIA control, he
encouraged his staff in moving into the forward-planning
areas of the NRP rather than concentrating their efforts
in the fight for operational control of programs. He ad-
vised the DDCI, General Carter
With respect to CIA's activities, I think it
is more important for us to exercise the forward-
looking, imaginative approach to the future than
to concern ourselves too much with operations.
Quite naturally we do not wish to lose control
of operations but the Executive Board which was
set up and met last week seems to be a good step
in the right direction in this regard.
What worries me is the fact that we are not
moving aggressively enough on a new system that
will provide a resolution approaching U-2
*Appendix D, Tab 44.
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resolution in a search system. I know that we
have the study of the CORONA system under way
but I believe we should be developing some con-
crete ideas on the next forward step. I think
this is CIA's most important role in satellite
photography. 119/
Dr. McMillan continued to press for
General Greer to take over full control of CORONA, and
Dr. Wheelon continued to counsel seeking an alternative
menfai
more favorable to CIA participation.
In mid-January 1964, Dr. Fubini, playing
the role of intermediary during the transition period be-
tween the resignation of Mr. Gilpatric and the appointment
of Mr. Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of the Army, to the
.4^Ner
position of Deputy Secretary of Defense, put forward a
specific plan for CIA participation in the satellite recon-
naissance program in the following terms: that CIA be
given responsibility for the development of a completely
new follow-on search system to CORONA; the Air Force to
get the CORONA improvement program, and all other systems;
the new system which CIA developed, if successful, would
later be turned over to the Air Force for operation after
aoro.N
a few successful shots had been made.*
Dr. Wheelon felt
the Fubini proposal was acceptable only as a gesture of
*Appendix D, Tab 50.
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good intentions; otherwise he found it unacceptable since
he felt CIA's participation should not stand or fall on
the Agency's ability to identify, sell, and develop a dis-
tinct, second-generation, broad-coverage system. He pre-
ferred that the central problem, that of how to partition
the satellite program, be solved by assigning responsi-
bility for all broad-coverage (search) satellite payloads
to CIA, and all high-resolution spotting systems to the
Air Force, with other specialized satellite systems being
the subject of negotiation as they might come along.
A working proposal for the partition of
satellite development and operations was prepared at
Mr. McCone's request in line with Dr. Wheelon's philosophy,
above, but the study concluded by saying that no partition
of responsibilities could work effectively under the pre-
sent environment in which the D/NRO had absolute budgetary
control and continued to hold the view that CIA should not
be in the reconnaissance business.**
(A division of responsibilities as put
forward by Dr. Wheelon did eventually come about; but it
*Appendix D, Tab 50.
**Appendix D, Tab 53.
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was a year and a half before the matter could be settled
by the redrafting and signing of a new NRO Agreement in
August 1965. Meanwhile, at Mr. McCone's urging, Dr. Wheelon
and his staff began exploratory work, outside of NRO and
using CIA funds to begin with, on new systems. These uni-
lateral CIA efforts resulted in the initiation of studies
on
IEncouragement of
these activities by USIB, and subsequent initial outlay of
funds by NRO--after extensive justification by DD/S&T--gave
CIA reentry into the NRP with a strong research and devel-
opment role. However, it was not as easily done as said,
and the effort to get CIA out of the overhead reconnais-
sance business did not diminish appreciably while the
above-described activities were going forward.)
b. PFIAB Inquiry Into NRO Workings
During the spring of 1964 a special panel
of the PFIAB headed by Dr. William Baker, of the Bell
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Telephone Laboratories, made an intensive investigation of
the organization, management, and operation of the National
Reconnaissance Program in view of the surfacing to the
PFIAB of the controversy between CIA and the NRO. The
MEW
anti
reemmi
Panel heard first from Dr. McMillan and the NRO Staff
their justification for the removal of CIA from the satel-
lite reconnaissance field. On 1 and 2 April 1964, the
DD/S&T, Dr. Wheelon, appeared before the Panel and then
before the PFIAB, then chaired by Mr. Clark Clifford,
and his testimony as reported in his own memoranda is con-
tained in Appendix D, Tab 54. That testimony reiterated
strongly the views held by Dr. Wheelon as previously de-
scribed in the foregoing pages.
Recommendations resulting from the
PFIAB's review of the Panel findings were transmitted by
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President,
to the DCI and Secretary of Defense on 22 May 1964 with
a request for comments. The Panel had recommended that
the NRP be conducted as a national effort, maintained
through joint endeavor of the DOD and CIA, with clearly
established delineation of the roles and responsibilities
of each; that fuller use be made of the potential of CIA
for advanced planning and research; but that full control
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over satellite reconnaissance operations be assigned to
DOD (USAF). Mr. McCone replied, via Mr. Clark Clifford,
on 11 June 1964, that certain of the recommendations were
unacceptable to him, and he set forth his two principles
for reaching agreement on the management of the National
Reconnaissance Program; (1) a clear recognition of the
DCI's joint responsibility with the Secretary of Defense
for the development of the reconnaissance program, and
(2) assurance that the capabilities of CIA, in both the
operational and the research and development fields were
fully utilized. He believed that the establishment of
these principles was an essential prerequisite to an ef-
fective national reconnaissance program and therefore
recommended that they be accepted for incorporation in a
revised agreement, and that instructions be issued ac-
cordingly. 120/
Another period of stalemate ensued; the
D/NRO took the opportunity meanwhile to press for the
turn-over of systems engineering on CORONA to Aerospace,
the Air Force's non-profit engineering organization,
having taken it for granted that CORONA would be turned
over fully to the Air Force. During this period, on the
other hand, USIB, foreseeing urgent continuing requirements
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for coverage of critical targets,
c. Contingency Plan for Satellite Incidents
During this period the first international
incident in the CORONA program developed two days after
Mis-
sion 1005 was launched on 27 April 1964, when a malfunction
occurred and after unsuccessfully attempting to command the
vehicle through 20 May 1964, no further attempts were made.
On 5 August 1964, a satellite capsule was reported found
411=11
near the Venezuela-Colombia border in the Andes Mountains.
Due to NRO's failure to agree to CIA's request to convene
the Interdepartmental Contingency Planning Committee (ICPC),
which had been set up to take care of just such emergencies,
a period of confusion, conflicting instructions, and delays
resulted during the attempt to recover the capsule from its
discoverers, and it was seen and even photographed by a
AIN/
good number of local citizens and officials of Venezuela.
That incident led to the drafting of a
comprehensive contingency plan for the ICPC which spelled
out action to be taken by all concerned in case of an inci-
dent caused either by equipment malfunction, or of an inci-
dent arising through the deliberate act of another country
*NOV
fiwomW
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to destroy, capture, or otherwise interfere with the
operation of a U.S. satellite reconnaissance vehicle.*
d. Mr. Kiefer's Resignation as DD/NRO
On 20 July 1964, after having served for
a full, frustrating year as Deputy Director of NRO,
Mr. Eugene Kiefer asked for relief from his assignment,
after having testified as to his experience before the
Baker Panel of the PFIAB. In a memorandum addressed to
General Carter, the DDCI, he said that he had not been
drawn into the workings of the NRO and had been unable to
make a contribution to the improvement of relations within
the organization. He had appended to his request for relief
a summary of his views, with copies for the information of
the DCI and the D/NRO.**
In his summary, Mr. Kiefer questioned
the wisdom of perpetuating the NRO as currently organized
unless all concerned were willing to begin to demonstrate,
in deeds as well as words, a unified understanding of why
*The text of the Contingency Plan, dated 31 March 1965,
and related instructions, can be found at Tab 80 of
Appendix D.
**Appendix D, Tab 56.
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there was an NRO, what it should be, and how it should
work. He recommended, in the national interest, a re-
examination by appropriate officials of the fundamental
principles behind NRO so that present inter-agency rela-
tions could be reaffirmed or modified as appropriate for
current circumstances.
Mr. Kiefer's request to be relieved
came as no surprise to Dr. Wheelon and others concerned
with NRO affairs, some of whom had by this time come to
the conclusion that the NRO concept was unworkable. Nev-
ertheless, pressure was exerted on Mr. Kiefer by both the
DDCI, General Carter, and by Dr. Fubini, to stay on and
keep the Agency's franchise on the DD/NRO slot. The lev-
erage used to persuade him was the promise that both the
PFIAB and the Executive Committee of the NRP would concern
themselves with upholding the joint nature of the Program.
During the next six months of Mr. Kiefer's
tour as DD/NRO the main development, in his view, was a
worsening of the previous situation. The antagonism between
Dr. McMillan and Dr. Wheelon did not lessen and Mr. Kiefer's
own utilization by Dr. McMillan remained low. In addition,
he was then excluded from DD/S&T councils as well. The
most useful thing he could do was to try to keep up the
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an Aerospace Corporation contract for systems engineering
was pushed aggressively in July and August 1964. At an
Executive Committee (NRP) meeting on 11 August, at which
no recording secretary was present and for which no agreed
minutes were provided, the matter was urged upon the DCI,
Mr. McCone. He registered strong dissent, while recog-
nizing that "the majority view should prevail." Since the
ExCom at that point was an ad hoc body with no established
voting procedures, the constitution of a "majority view"
was a moot question. Dr. McMillan, however, with no fur-
ther consultation, directed the Program B Contracting
Officer to cable the three CORONA payload contractors
(LMSC, Itek, and GE) and to inform them that Aerospace
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morale of the few CIA people assigned to the NRO Staff. He
eventually gave up the struggle and resigned effective
18 February 1965, taking a position with United Aircraft
Corporation. The position of DD/NRO remained vacant after
his departure until September 1965 (see page 284, below).
e. Agency Control of CORONA Payload
The effort by Dr. McMillan to nail down
control of the CORONA program by SAFSP through inserting
rood
am**
amnia
*From conversation with Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer, August 1970.
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would be responsible for general systems engineering and
corresponding technical direction of the efforts under
their contracts for CORONA. Although General Carter made
a strong denial in writing to Mr. Vance saying that the DCI
had not agreed to any such contractual changes, General Greer,
as instructed by the D/NRO, went ahead and relieved LMSC of
their SETD contract while attempting to get Lockheed to sign
an agreement with the Air Force for systems integration sup-
port, subject to the insertion of Aerospace into the over-
all systems engineering for CORONA. Being aware of the
conflict between CIA and the Air Force, Lockheed would sign
with neither until the dispute over the basic management of
the program was settled, although they continued to furnish
required support.*
The volume of contracting activity by
the OSA assignee to SAFSP
had steadily dimin- 25X1
ished with the closing out of the LANYARD (USAF) and the
ARGON (Army Map Service)satellite contracting, and in
August 1964 the DD/S&T took the occasion of
nomination to another position by the Director of Logistics
to advise the D/NRO that it was not intended to replace
*Appendix D, Tab 67, pp. 3-5.
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on his departure from SAFSP, which was set for
October 1964.*
Mr. McCone, almost immediately thereafter,
having obtained agreement from the Secretary of Defense to
begin discussions looking toward a realignment of the
over-all NRO structure, gave directions that a plan of
action be prepared to give the Agency the capability to
exercise technical direction and contract management of
the CORONA program,
Therefore the
Office of Logistics was asked to extend
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current assignment and he was thus put into a holding pat-
tern at SAFSP pending the outcome of the negotiations to
regain technical direction of CORONA. 121/
Secretary Vance suggested that CIA might
insert several CORONA technical people into General Greer's
facility and this was considered by the DD/S&T staff in
relationship to the delegation of the CORONA contracting
and security responsibilities from Washington
Dr. Wheelon said that if the plan
*Appendix D, Tab 57.
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meant placing CIA technical people under the command of
Colonel Heran in the Project 241 office at SAFSP, the
DD/S&T was opposed because (1) past experience showed that
the CIA people would not be allowed to participate in a
meaningful way; (2) they would be assuming partial respons-
ibility for the program while having no real influence over
it; and (3) this would set a disastrous precedent for on-
coming programs He felt it 25X1
would be preferable to bow out of CORONA altogether rather
than follow this path. He recommended the alternative of
putting a very senior CIA man with Greer's group who would
be responsible for the entire CIA contribution to CORONA,
including contracting for the payload, security of the pay-
load, technical direction, the AP Facility at
(payload assembly and testing installation), and interface
with the Air Force. The CIA group would be responsive to
General Greer but would retain its line of command back to
the DD/S&T in Washington. Success of this alternative
would depend largely on the ability to give the senior CIA
man a strong equity in the program and well-defined terms
of reference vis-a-vis General Greer. 122/
The interpretation placed on the DCI's
remarks at the 11 August 1964 ExCom meeting by the D/NRO
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regarding the insertion of Aerospace into CORONA management
was brought to General Carter's attention at an ExCom
meeting on 26 August 1964, and after checking with his staff,
the DDCI informed Deputy Secretary Vance by letter of
28 August that the DCI had not agreed to any change in
CORONA payload contracting. That letter crossed with one
from Mr. Vance to General Carter of the same date express-
ing the former's belief that the CORONA payload contracting
should be turned over to General Greer. However, at the
ExCom meeting on 1 September 1964, attended by Mr. McCone,
Mr. Vance said that he was prepared to continue CORONA
contracting as presently established if that was the DCI's
desire. Mr. McCone said that it was.*
On 10 September 1964, Mr. McCone briefed
the ExCom on his plans to augment the West Coast component
of CIA and take over responsibility for all CIA contracting
and other functions related to CORONA. There was no dis-
sent by anyone present to continuing CIA contracting for
**
CORONA. However, at the ExCom meeting of 29 September
1964, attended by General Carter as sole CIA representative,
*Appendix D, Tab 66, pp. 1-2.
**Appendix D, Tab 66, p. 2.
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CORONA contracting was again raised in a stormy session in
which the Aerospace/LMSC issue was dwelt on and CIA was ac-
cused of bad faith in that and other matters. Strong ex-
ception was taken to the accusations by General Carter,
who made no commitments other than to say he would look
into the problems raised. 123/
Dr. McMillan on 1 October 1964 reiterated
to General Carter that he wished the systems integration
contract now written between LMSC and CIA to be transferred
to the Air Force, and in a conversation on the same subject
on 2 October 1964, General Carter told Mr. Vance that the
DCI's position was that contracts previously and presently
held by CIA should remain with CIA, who would augment the
West Coast staff to administer the contracts. On 6 October
1964, Mr. McCone handed to Mr. Vance a firm proposal by
which he planned to carry out that undertaking. It antici-
pated the assignment of Mr. John J. Crowley to the SAFSP
office of General Greer where he would be specifically re-
sponsible for CIA activities and provide a single point of
contact. Mr. Vance, acknowledging the DCI's plan on
15 October 1964, underlined the roles of General Greer,
Aerospace, and the CORONA Project Director at SAFSP,
Colonel Heran. There was still not a clear-cut agreement
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as to the CIA and Air Force roles, but Mr. Vance urged that
the DCI proceed with his plan to put a CIA CORONA group at
General Greer's office without delay.
Efforts to arrive at a CORONA management
agreement for the next two months were centered at the
working levels of DD/S&T and the NRO Staff. A draft agree-
ment which had the concurrence of the Director of the NRO
Staff, General Stewart, and which gave CIA the technical
direction for the CORONA payload, was tabled by General
Carter at the ExCom meeting of 13 January 1965. The only
reaction of Dr.
General Stewart
agreed with the
some ambiguity,
McMillan to the draft, as reported by
a week or so later, was that, although he
intent of the paper, the
and he felt the document
to allow any ambiguity.**
language contained
was
too
important
The D/NRO was informed on 15 January 1965
and again on 18 January 1965 that in view of his acceptance
in principle of the CORONA management proposal, all imple-
mentation and conduct of work on CORONA payloads would be
solely authorized by the CIA Contracting Officer or his
representative. Dr. McMillan took no further action on the
*Appendix D, Tab 66, pp. 3-4.
**Appendix D, Tab 58.
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as to the CIA and Air Force roles, but Mr. Vance urged that
the DCI proceed with his plan to put a CIA CORONA group at
General Greer's office without delay.
Efforts to arrive at a CORONA management
agreement for the next two months were centered at the
working levels of DD/S&T and the NRO Staff. A draft agree-
ment which had the concurrence of the Director of the NRO
Staff, General Stewart, and which gave CIA the technical
direction for the CORONA payload, was tabled by General
Carter at the ExCom meeting of 13 January 1965. The only
reaction of Dr.
General Stewart
agreed with the
some ambiguity,
McMillan to the draft, as reported by
a week or so later, was that, although he
intent of the paper, the
and he felt the document
to allow any ambiguity.**
language contained
was
too
important
The D/NRO was informed on 15 January 1965
and again on 18 January 1965 that in view of his acceptance
in principle of the CORONA management proposal, all imple-
mentation and conduct of work on CORONA payloads would be
solely authorized by the CIA Contracting Officer or his
representative. Dr. McMillan took no further action on the
*Appendix D, Tab 66, pp. 3-4.
**Appendix D, Tab 58.
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CORONA program, including the basis for CIA's claim to a
proper and valid role, and examples of NRO efforts to sub-
jugate CIA's role, was prepared by the Special Projects
Staff of DD/S&T on 29 March 1965, and approved by the
Acting DD/S&T,
On 20 April 1965, the President of Itek,
Mr. Frank Lindsay, met with the DCI to discuss CORONA
management from the camera manufacturer's viewpoint. He
was told specifically by Mr. McCone that unless advised
to the contrary by either himself or Mr. Vance, CIA alone
would be responsible for the CORONA payload. Mr. Lindsay
noted that the enabling language had not been written into
the contract with Itek, and Mr. McCone directed the DD/S&T
to have the contracts relating to CORONA brought into con-
formity with the guidance he had just given.**
Mr. McCone's resignation was effective
eight days later on 28 April 1965. When briefing the new
DCI, Admiral Raborn, on CORONA in June 1965, Dr. Wheelon
said
In authorizing the language now incorporated
in the new contracts which establishes CIA as
*Appendix D, Tab 63.
**Appendix D, Tab 67, p. 6.
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the U.S. Government agent for the CORONA payload,
I have reflected the original authorization of
1958 given to this Agency, have acted in conform-
ity with direction given to me on 20 April 1965
by the previous DCI and have attempted to protect
the statutory authorities of the DCI by maintain-
ing both technical direction as well as contract
management on those contracts which are financed
by his certification on the expenditure of un-
vouchered funds.*
H. Third Revised Agreement, 13 August 1965
1. Mr. McCone Pushes for New Agreement
The effort of Mr. McCone to obtain a realign-
ment of the National Reconnaissance Program in order to
reassert CIA's role therein was initiated coincident with
the PFIAB's inquiry in the spring of 1964 and continued,
in the background, while the fight to maintain CIA's con-
trol over the CORONA payload was being waged. In
January 1965, Mr. McCone drafted his "Principles to Guide
the Preparation of a New NRO Agreement" which, as re-
drafted by Dr. Wheelon on 2 February 1965, can be found
at Tab 60 of Appendix D. The DCI's initial premise was
that the acquisition of intelligence by overhead recon-
naissance was a responsibility of the Director of Central
Intelligence and the DCI in discharging his statutory
duties must direct this intelligence-gathering facility
*Appendix D, Tab 67, p. 6.
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toward the collection of information which he considered
essential to the national security. To carry out his
duties he also needed to have control and direction of
the Satellite Operations Center. The DOD was the proper
authority to coordinate all satellite missions, but in
cases where major components of a system were assigned
another agency of the Government, the DOD must recognize
that procurement and technical direction of such compo-
nents would be the undivided responsibility of the agency
which was assigned to develop them. Lastly, the DCI
together with USIB must establish the criteria for new
systems on the basis of national requirements, and the
DCI and the Secretary of Defense should make final judg-
ment on what systems to pursue and which agencies should
be made responsible for them.*
The case for a single agency taking
over the franchise for the National Reconnaissance Pro-
gram was reconsidered during this period and again elimi-
nated in favor of some form of partnership between CIA
and DOD. The form of organization had not been agreed to
when Mr. McCone resigned from CIA in April 1965, and it
*Appendix D, Tab 60.
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was left for his successor, Admiral Raborn, to pursue the
matter, with a large part of the negotiations falling upon
the Deputy to the Director for National Intelligence Pro-
grams Evaluation, Mr. John Bross.
2. PSAC Initiates the Land Panel
The antipathy between Dr. Wheelon and
Dr. McMillan had, as reported by Mr. Kiefer above, in-
creased noticeably by the end of 1964. An added point of
contention resulted when the DD/S&T's research and devel-
opment efforts in the field of new satellite systems came
into competition with those of the Air Force and the lat-
ter were funded in a disproportionately generous manner
by the D/NRO.
Early in 1965 it was proposed by the Presi-
dent's Special Assistant for Science and Technology,
Dr. Hornig, that the President's Scientific Advisory Com-
mittee (PSAC) set up a panel under the chairmanship of
Dr. Edwin H. Land with the charter to maintain an over-
view of the National Reconnaissance Program, with partic-
ular interest in technical characteristics of intelligence
requirements, the status of existing projects, and the ade-
quacy of research and development programs.
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At a meeting to discuss the make-up of his
panel, Dr. Land confronted Drs. Wheelon and McMillan with
the dire consequences which might be expected to result
unless they both turned their talents to seeking a solution
to the NRP problem. He said that neither the Air Force nor
CIA could hope to control all of the program--the Government
would not allow it--but the present situation wherein all
operating decisions were referred upward to the DCI and the
Secretary of Defense because they could not be settled at
*Mad lower levels was one which could not continue. He made a
plea for a return to the harmonious relations of former
times under Bissell and Charyk. It was pointed out by
Dr. Wheelon that he, unlike Mr. Bissell, did not have his
own budget and program,
At the end of the meeting, according to
Dr. Wheelon's record, Dr. Land repeated his plea and asked
the two men to work out a solution to the over-all problem
*Appendix D, Tab 61.
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through the settlement of
25X1
Dr. Wheelon reported of his own and Dr. McMillan's reaction
...I agreed with alacrity; McMillan maintained a
relative silence while agreeing briefly to do so.
In all of this I had the feeling that McMillan's
participation in this affair was a directed and
reluctant one; one in which he saw no advantage...*
The above-described confrontation took place
in February 1965, and despite Dr. Land's efforts there was
little change for the better in the relationship. The Land
Panel, furthermore, did not become active until July, and
despite the agreement between Admiral Raborn and
Secretary Vance to await a decision by the Panel on a
specific search and surveillance system, Dr. McMillan was
preparing to make a unilateral choice and move ahead on
the basis of his own NRO Steering Group and Task Force
findings when the DCI, in a note to Mr. Vance of 20 July,
asked that the choice await the Panel's deliberations.**
An inconclusive meeting of the Panel on 21 July recom-
mended an additional three months extension of efforts
to define and substantiate performance claims by the three
camera contractors engaged in studies
*Appendix D, Tab 61.
**Appendix D, Tab 68.
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3. Agreement Signed by Vance and Raborn
The drafting of a new NRO Agreement had
meanwhile reached its final stages and, through the efforts
of Mr. John Bross, was agreed to in draft the first week of
August 1965 by both sides and signed in its final form on
13 August 1965 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Mr. Cyrus Vance, and the DCI, Admiral Raborn.*
The new agreement formalized the NRP Execu-
tive Committee (ExCom) and gave it specific responsibilities
with regard to the allocation of projects and supporting
funds (formerly exercised almost exclusively by the D/NRO).
Admiral Raborn succeeded in limiting the membership of the
ExCom to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and the
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technol-
ogy. The D/NRO was to sit with the ExCom but as a non-
voting member. It was also agreed that design requirements
of the sensor payloads would be given priority in their
integration into the spacecraft and reentry vehicles.
Annex A to the new agreement assigned to CIA
(1) the development of the CORONA improvement program, and
(2) development of the optical sensor subsystem for the
new advanced general search system (once the concept and
*Appendix D, Tab 69.
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the contractors were selected). To USAF went the
The D/NRO was given responsibility for managing over-all
systems development.
CIA did not succeed in getting the Satellite
Operations Center returned to the DCI's management; and
there was no relief from the budgetary stringencies, which
the DD/S&T had to accept as a way of life.
Organizational charts on the two following
pages (figures 4 and 5) show the NRO's make-up and its
management personnel, as well as its relationships within
the Executive Branch of the Government, as of October 1965.
a. Personnel and Organizational Changes
With the rewriting of the NRO Agreement
in a form which he had testified to the PFIAB was unwork-
able, Dr. McMillan stepped down from the position of D/NRO
effective 30 September 1965. Dr. Wheelon had advised
Admiral Raborn not to sign the Agreement for the same
reason, but had agreed wholeheartedly, according to his
own statement, to support it if the DCI did accept it.*
*Appendix D, Tab 70, p. 1.
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Dr. McMillan was replaced by
Dr. Alexander Flax, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Research and Development, effective 1 October 1965.
Meanwhile, the DCI had on 1 September 1965
Deputy Director of NRO.
named a new
then Chair-
slot vacated by
man of COMOR, was named to fill the
Mr. Kiefer in February 1965, and not filled in the interim.
Admiral Raborn, having been informed of the manner in which
Mr. Kiefer had been bypassed by the NRO Staff, advised
Mr. Reber that, whereas he should not be officious, none-
theless if he at any time detected that he was being by-
passed by the staff to Dr. Flax, he should put a stop to
it. Dr. Flax, on the other hand, was specifically advised
by higher authority in the Pentagon that he was to make
the NRO work, that higher authority was not content to
have the NRP as an exclusively military exercise, and that
was not to be made a matter of contention
within the NRO.*
In realigning CIA's organizational
structure to support the NRP, it was decided by the DCI
that all CIA reconnaissance activities would come to a
management focus in the person of a Director of Reconnaissance,
*Appendix D, Tab 78.
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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
NRO
Director Dr. Flax
Deputy Director Mr. Reber
Staff
Brig. Gen. Stewart
PROGRAM A
Brig. Gen. Martin
Satellites
PROGRAM C
Rear Adm. Taylor, USN
Sigint Satellite Payloads
Aircraft
PROGRAM 'D
Brig. Gen. Geary
Figure 4
(October 1965)
CIA RECCE PROGRAMS
Director
OSP
Mr. Crowley
Satellites
OSA
Brig. Gen. Ledford
Aircraft
ELINT
Mr. Miller
A/B Electronics
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r-re
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TOP SECRET
THE PRESIDENT
October 1965
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
USIB
Adm Raborn, DCI
Mr. Belmont, FBI
Mr. Brown, AEC
Lt.Gen.Carroll, DIA
lt.Gen.Carter, NSA
Mr. Hughes, Slate
303 COMMITTEE
Mr. Bundy, WH
Adm. Raborn, DCI
Mr. Johnson, State
Mr. Vance, DOD
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
Mr. Clifford, Chairman
Dr. Wm. Baker
Mr. Gordon Gray
Dr. Land
Dr. Langer
Dr. Long
Mr. Murphy
Mr. Pace
Adm. Sides
Gen. Taylor
Mr. Coyne,Exec Sec
DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
p s Ac
(Panel-on NRP Matters)
Dr. Land, Chairman
Dr. Baker
Dr. Drell
Dr. Garwin
Dr. Ling
Dr. Puckett
Dr. Purcell
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. McNamara
DEP. SEC. OF DEFENSE
25X1
Adm. Raborn
NRP
Mr. Vance
TOP SECRET
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
FIGURE 5
Mr. Vance, Dep.Sec.Def.
Adm. Raborn, DCI
Dr. Hornig, WH
NRO
Director
Dr. Flax
Deputy Director
Re ber
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reporting to the DD/S&T, and providing a single authoritative
point of contact within the CIA for all reconnaissance pro-
grams. At the same time, the concept of a Program B manager
was to be discontinued; General Ledford of OSA would then
have the responsibility only for OSA's reconnaissance pro-
jects, was designated on 15 Sep-
tember 1965 to serve as Director of Reconnaissance on an
interim basis.*
He was later confirmed in this position
and his terms of reference were spelled out in the DCI's
memorandum to him of 12 January 1966.**
He was to be re-
sponsible for formulating, with appropriate coordination,
the CIA views and positions on all matters relating to
? the NRO, and to prepare Agency responses to NRO memoranda,
including those relating to fiscal and budgetary matters.
In support of the latter duty, on 11 March 1966 the posi-
tion of Assistant for Financial Management to the Director
of Reconnaissance was established, and
was selected to fill the slot.
The assignment of a positive role in
reconnaissance program to CIA by the new
the satellite
* * *
*Appendix D, Tab 71.
**Appendix D, Tab 73.
***Appendix D, Tab 74.
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agreement was the signal for the formal establishment of
the satellite group which had been operating under the title
of "Special Projects Staff, DD/S&T" as the Office of Special
Projects, adding also the members of the OSA staff who had
been involved in satellite operations. Headquarters No-
tice 1-59 of 6 October 1965 announced the establishment of
OSP, effective 15 September 1965, and named as its Director
Mr. John J. Crowley, and as its Deputy Director, Mr. John N.
McMahon. OSP was to be responsible for CORONA,
and other projects as might be assigned.*
b. Partitioning of Projects
The award to CIA of the CORONA improve-
ment program, centered about the camera modification which
would provide a 20% to 30% gain in ground resolution and
lower operating altitudes, required the working out of
implementation procedures suggested by the OSP and NRO
Staffs. Because of Dr. McMillan's opposition to the pro-
posals being considered, Dr. Wheelon concluded that a
working agreement on the continuation of CORONA should
await the arrival on duty of the new D/NRO. Other
*See ChapterIII-B-5, above, pp. 76-77, for additional
details concerning the establishment of OSP.
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priority decisions awaiting Dr. Flax's attention were an
agreement on funding the general search satellite systems
under study until the Land Panel could make a final selec-
tion; the staffing of the NRO according to the new agree-
ment;
The long struggle to reach accord on
the management of the CORONA program finally succeeded
when the CORONA organization and management plan was
agreed on 22 June 1966, largely through the constructive
efforts of Mr. John Crowley. As of 30 June 1966, all the
remaining work under CORONA was contracted for by OSP,
including the LMSC systems integration work at the AP
Facility. OSP had taken over from OSA the contracts re-
lating to satellite activities and two Contracting Offi-
cers, Messrs. James H. McDonald and
were transferred to OSP and authorization was delegated
to them in October and November 1965, respectively.
The management plan proposed for the
called for CIA
to develop the sensor subsystem, while the Director of
SAFSP, as System Project Director, was assigned over-all
responsibility for the integrated engineering system,
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including interface specifications. An attempt by OSP and
the Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, was initiated in the
spring of 1966 to obtain full responsibility for the sensor
from development to full operation. This led to extended
discussions; CIA did not succeed in defeating the split
management concept, and the program suffered more than a
year's delay as a result.
With regard to staffing of the NRO,
there were still problems; however, if ten men had drawn
up an organizational and staffing chart of NRO, there
would no doubt have been ten different approaches to the
problem. Mr. James Q. Reber, in a summary of his tour
as DD/NRO, made this point and in explanation of the
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small CIA representation on the NRO Staff (which varied
from three or four, to eight or ten, at any given time),
he said that Dr. Flax did not consider the strength of
the NRO Staff related to a one-for-one CIA/Military rep-
resentation, and, on the other hand, the DD/S&T did not
wish to send any of his highly capable staff members to
NRO when their services were required in his own pro-
grams.*
The Director of OSP was assigned the
responsibility in April 1966 for nominating Agency employ-
ees to fulfill assignments on the NRO Staff. While he was
to provide administrative support including Career Service
actions, the individuals would not be in his chain of
**
command, but would take their directions from the D/NRO.
The signing of the new agreement and
the departure of Dr. McMillan did not wash away all the
troubles between CIA/DD/S&T and the NRO, since the NRO
Staff was still largely made up of the same Air Force
officers who were opposed to CIA's participation in the
NRP in a leading role. There continued to be instances
*Appendix D, Tab 78.
**Appendix D, Tab 79.
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of undercutting of CIA by the NRO Staff, and reaction,
sometimes overreaction, by the CIA Staff. However, a
gradual smoothing out of points of difference began to
take place, and Mr. John Crowley noted with regard to
this improvement
I am happy to find that we are reaching the
stage of maturity where we can discuss these
matters and negotiate our points of difference.
I would like to add that the concept of negotia-
tion implies an objective look at the total pro-
gram. We cannot negotiate with those who say
"What's mine is mine, and what's yours is
negotiable." 124/
Admiral Raborn's annual report to the
PFIAB rendered in January 1966 also painted a brighter
picture of CIA/NRO relations, while at the same time
cautioning as follows:
I do not wish to leave with you the impres-
sion that the NRO skies are completely cloudless.
There is still a legacy of distrust and suspicion
which cannot be completely dispelled in the short
time span since the inception of the new agreement.
I can, however, report my firm conviction that the
present parties to the agreement are making a sin-
cere effort to make it work...Certain pending de-
cisions of great importance to the future of the
NRP will soon put the efficacy of the new agree-
ment to a severe test. These decisions relate to
and to a lesser degree to the CORONA improvement
program. These will be hard decisions. I be-
lieve, nevertheless, that a climate now exists
within the NRO which greatly enhances the prospect
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that the decisions will be made in the national
interest. 125/*
I. Mr. Duckett Assumes NRP Role
1. NRO Participation Revamped
NRO matters, by the time Mr. Duckett took
over as Acting DD/S&T in August 1966, had, as indicated
above, moved into a phase of relative calm as a result of
several influences: the signing of the new NRO Agreement
in August 1965 had defined more clearly the responsibilities
under the NRP between CIA and the Air Force; the appointment
of Mr. Sheldon as Director of Reconnaissance in September
1965, his confirmation in that position 12 January 1966,
and his administrative transfer in May 1966 to the immedi-
ate Office of the Director, relieving the DD/S&T, then
Dr. Wheelon, of a task which had become onerous to him;
the eventual departure of Dr. McMillan from the position
of D/NRO and his replacement on 1 October 1965 by
Dr. Alexander Flax, a more open-minded and less autocratic
arbiter of NRP affairs; the appointment of Mr. Reber as
DD/NRO to keep CIA's franchise on that slot, and to exert
*For a substantive history of the development of the
reconnaissance satellite projects assigned to OSP, consult
the OSP History.
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a calming influence on relations between CIA and the Air
Force within the NRO Staff; and the control which the
Executive Committee of NRP was beginning to wield, with
the added influence of White House participation therein.
On 13 January 1967, the DCI, Mr. Helms, re-
assigned
fairs by relieving
Director
responsibilities relating to reconnaissance af-
of his activities as
of Reconnaissance, CIA, and abolishing that
position, but assigning him the task of supporting the
DCI in his role as a member of the NRP ExCom. Mr. Duckett
as Acting DD/S&T was designated also Director of CIA Re-
connaissance Programs, and was instructed to deal with
the D/NRO on the DCI's behalf in the management of CIA
programs under the NRP, reporting directly to the DCI on
such matters.*
Later, in November 1967, Mr. Sheldon was
relieved of responsibility for supporting the DCI in NRP
ExCom matters, and Mr. Duckett (having meanwhile been
confirmed as DD/S&T) was assigned the duty of supporting
the DCI in all matters of overhead reconnaissance policy:
(a) in his role as member of the NRP ExCom; (b) in matters
*Appendix D, Tab 75.
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related to space policy; and (c) in other overhead
reconnaissance matters not assigned to other Agency com-
ponents, coordinating his actions and recommendations as
necessary with the Agency Sigint Officer, the Deputy for
National Intelligence Programs Evaluation and other Dep-
uty Directors as appropriate.
Even though, as indicated above, relation-
ships between Agency and DOD officers involved in the
National Reconnaissance Program had improved somewhat,
CIA continued to be under pressure from various quarters
to relinquish its operational role in overhead reconnais-
sance. Events in this sphere of activities subsequent to
Mr. Duckett's designation as Director, CIA Reconnaissance
Programs, are recorded in the Office Histories of OSA, OSP.
and OEL. The two most outstanding developments have been
(1) on the negative side, the losing fight of CIA to re-
tain the A-12 supersonic photo reconnaissance capability,
carried all the way to highest authority for a decision,
which resulted in the mothballing of the A-12 aircraft in
favor of the Air Force's SR-71 capability, residing with
the Strategic Air Command; and (2)
*Appendix D, Tab 76.
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2. Manned Reconnaissance Programs of DD/S&T
a. Continuation of U-2 Program
The U-2 program inherited by the DD/R,
and subsequently the DD/S&T,had been consolidated into two
principal operations by 1962: a domestic test, training,
and holding base at Edwards Air Force Base, California,
from which staging operations were conducted as required
Yeoman work was done in coverage of Cuba during the Soviet
missile build-up by the Agency's TJ-2's through the summer
of 1962 up to the discovery in October of MRBM's in Cuba,
after which SAC took over the U-2 coverage of Cuba on
the decision of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara.
From the time of the blanketing of the
CIA U-2 assets under the NRP, the principal events related
to maintaining a contingency capability to meet all re-
quirements levied by USIB or higher authority for over-
head reconnaissance of denied territory, and included:
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retrofitting and modernizing the existing U-2 fleet,
including SAC's aircraft, of approximately twenty U-2's
in 1965-1966; the eventual decision by the ExCom of NRP,
in the face of the high attrition rate and the vulnerability
of the current U-2 model, to purchase a new model TJ-2R
late 1966 decision) ;1
b. The A-12 Program (OXCART)
The Lockheed A-12 aircraft was designed
as the follow-on to replace the U-2 when the latter became
vulnerable to the improved Communist air defense. The air-
craft design represented new departures in configuration
and materials, and in the reduction of its radar cross
*For a detailed account of the U-2 program, consult the
OSA History,
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section. Its superiority over the U-2 was in its supersonic
speed (3.2 Mach), and its altitude (85,000 feet and better).
In addition the A-12 carried photographic systems of ad-
vanced design, giving better resolution than the U-2's,
The program, code-named OXCART, was ini-
tiated, with Presidential approval, in 1958 by Mr. Bissell's
U-2 Project Staff, augmented with additional technical per-
sonnel. It was managed by CIA with Air Force support, and
with supplementary financing by the Department of Defense,
until Fiscal Year 1963 when it was blanketed under the
National Reconnaissance Program budget, with CIA paying for
salaries, travel and per diem of personnel assigned to the
program.
The first official flight of the proto-
type A-12 took place on 30 April 1962, just as the NRO
was beginning to operate. The total number of aircraft
purchased for the program was fifteen, one of which was
a trainer, and two of which were configured for launching
an experimental drone (TAGBOARD), initiated under the
A-12 program management, but later transferred to the Air
Force.
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When the Office of Special Activities
evolved, by way of the Development Projects Division, out
of the original U-2 Staff in mid-1962, it continued to
manage the OXCART program. Flight testing of the A-12
was delayed at the start due to non-delivery of the
Pratt & Whitney J-58 engine (the first three aircraft de-
livered by Lockheed had to be fitted with an older model
J-75 engine for initial flights). The first J-58 engines
delivered gave poor performance, and in the spring of 1963
the test program was plagued with a rash of ingestions of
foreign objects into engines. The first A-12 crash also
occurred at that time.
The Air Force meanwhile decided to buy
about 30 of the aircraft, to be configured to Air Force
standards for pre-hostility and post-strike reconnaissance.
Air Force versions were the YF-12A, a two-seated inter-
ceptor, and the SR-71, a two-seated strategic reconnaissance
version.
The successful development of the aircraft
was announced by President Johnson at a press conference
on 24 February 1964--a unilateral decision by the President,
after several months of discussion between CIA and Defense
on whether, when, and how the disclosure should be made.
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Only the Air Force version was referred to in the public
statement, and the CIA's A-12 version and its special con-
figuration remained secret.
The continuing need to keep Cuba under
surveillance in order to detect the introduction of offen-
sive missiles there brought about discussions of whether
the A-12 should be used for that job. The majority of
opinion was against risking the OXCART capability before
it reached its altitude and speed specifications,
Some preliminary planning was done in
early 1964, however, and in August 1964 the decision was
made by the DDCI, General Carter, that an operational
capability against Cuba should be achieved by 5 November
1964 of Mach 2.8 and 80,000 feet altitude. With an all-out
effort a limited capability was achieved by 5 November, to
the extent that with two weeks notice, the A-12 could over-
fly Cuba; within three weeks after that date there were
five aircraft and five pilots operationally ready for such
a mission. This contingency plan (SKYLARK) was never put
into operation.
The effort under OXCART then turned
toward achieving the original specifications of the A-12
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of Mach 3.2 and maximum altitude. In 1965 contingency
planning was done looking toward the A-12's use in the Far
East. The maximum range had not yet been achieved and the
plan was therefore to stage to an overseas base from which
the A-12 would operate. The staging plan was called BLACK
SHIELD and the validation flights to ready the group for
such a deployment were completed
in November 1965.
At the same time, the Bureau of the Budget
began to question the high cost of the A-12 and SR-71 pro-
grams and recommended first that the A-12 be phased out
and no more SR-71's be purchased. The Secretary of Defense
declined to act on this recommendation and meanwhile the
303 Committee was approached for approval of an A-12 Far
East deployment. The Committee endorsed the plan on
2 December 1965, but said plans should only include prepa-
rations for deployment, but that actual movement must await
further approval sometime after 1 January 1966.
The requirement for coverage of possible
Chinese Communist build-up and involvement in North Vietnam
was posed by the DCI in February 1966, and the JCS supported
the proposal that the A-12 stage to the Far East to cover
the area photographically. Secretaries McNamara and Vance
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opposed this move at the time. The matter was argued pro
and con until August 1966, at which time the President was
approached, but he decided that the operation should be
postponed for the time being.
In September 1966 a proposal for coverage
of Cuba by the A-12 received a negative response from the
303 Committee (particularly the State Department). The
Bureau of the Budget had meanwhile returned to the question
of phasing out the expensive and thus far unused A-12 capa-
bility as an economy measure. This time the proposal was
supported by Secretary Vance and Dr. Hornig of the White
House Staff, as well as the Budget Director. The DCI,
Mr. Helms, took a strong position for retaining the A-12
capability under civilian sponsorship; however the
President accepted the majority recommendation and on
28 December 1966 directed the termination of the OXCART
program by January 1968.
In May 1967, a requirement developed
to check on the possible introduction into North Vietnam
of surface-to-surface missiles, and it was proposed that
a BLACK SHIELD detachment of A-12's be deployed to Kadena
Air Force Base on Okinawa, from which the coverage of
North Vietnam would be obtained. Presidential approval
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was given on 16 May 1967, and the detachment was airlifted
to Okinawa between 17 and 19 May 1967, with
personnel
and three A-12 aircraft. The decision had been made that
the SAC SR-71's would relieve the A-12 unit and take over
its mission by January 1968, but the SR-71 operational read-
iness date slipped twice, and the A-12 group was extended at
Kadena awaiting the SAC group until March 1968, with an
additional three months of overlap and back-up.
Because of the extension of the A-12's
deployment to the Far East and the successful accomplish-
ment of its mission, the DD/S&T staff felt there might be
hope for a reversal of the decision to cancel the program.
Efforts in that direction by the OXCART supporters did
not succeed, and the decision to cancel was reaffirmed
by the Secretary of Defense on 16 May 1968, and by the
President on 21 May 1968.
The last BLACK SHIELD mission was flown
over North Korea on 8 May 1968, and the group returned to
the States in June 1968. One A-12 disappeared on an over-
water test flight east of the Philippines just prior to
the return of the detachment. A total of six A-12's were
lost during the program, which lasted nine years and cost
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At the end of the OXCART program, nine
A-12 aircraft were placed in storage at the Lockheed facil-
ity at Palmdale, California, including one launcher and one
trainer. A rough estimate by Lockheed is that it would re-
quire the work of 30 men for 30 days to put one of the
stored aircraft back into flying condition, with a second
being readied by the end of 45 working days. None of the
aircraft had been brought out of storage as of the end of
1970.*
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thumbnail sketch; a definitive history, prepared by
can be found in the OSA History
t Chapter XX.
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VI. SUMMARY
A. Organizational Goals of the Directorate
In proposing the establishment of a scientific
directorate for CIA, Mr. McCone indicated that his purpose
was to pull all the scientific and technical talent of the
'Agency together in one office so as to provide more com-
plete intelligence and cross-fertilization among the var-
ious scientific disciplines, while creating an environment
which would draw new, highly-trained scientific personnel
into the Agency to make a career, and in turn contribute
their talents and training to accomplishing the Agency's
mission. We have seen, in the foregoing pages, that under
Dr. Wheelon's leadership the Directorate of Science and
Technology was pulled together from existing and newly-
constituted entities, infused with new talent, and given
further responsibilities especially in the satellite re-
connaissance and guided missile and space intelligence
fields.
A few of the Agency's enclaves of scientific
activity remain outside of the Directorate of Science
and Technology, notably the Technical Services Division
of the Plans Directorate, which continues to support the
Clandestine Services with research, development, and
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production of equipment for use by covert agents; the
National Photo Interpretation Center, and the Offices of
Communications and Security have their own research and
development activities oriented toward the production of
equipment peculiar to their individual operations. These
four offices, together with the DD/S&T, are represented
on the RD&E Review Board, the mechanism under which all
Agency research, development and engineering is coordi-
nated by the DD/S&T.
The DD/S&T's assignment of functions was com-
pleted with the establishment of the Foreign Missile and
Space Analysis Center early in 1964. Dr. Wheelon at
that time in reporting the Directorate's progress to the
DCI, depicted the principal function of the Directorate?
the production of scientific and technological intelligence
on a worldwide scale--as a continuous process wherein,
AM!
beginning with clearly stated requirements, new collec-
tion systems were researched, developed, built, and put
into operation; data were collected, processed, and ana-
lyzed; and results were published to the Intelligence
MEW
Community. An additional factor, vitally necessary to
the successful completion of this process, was the
assurance of a share of the Community's resources, and
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establishment of priorities, sufficient to do the job
assigned.
B. Mission of the Directorate
The mission of the Deputy Director for Science
and Technology was first published, along with those of
the Office of Elint and the Office of Special Activities
on 27 March 1964. It was later revised to include his
responsibilities with regard to RD&E, in October 1969.
His responsibilities besides coordination of RD&E are
(1) advising the DCI on S&T intelligence matters;
(2) producing scientific intelligence; (3) conducting
liaison with the entire scientific community on matters
of science and technology relating to intelligence;
and (4) managing the "R" Career Service. The most re-
cent Mission and Functions statement for the Deputy
Director and for the Offices which he is responsible
for directing can be found at Tab 63 of Appendix A.*
1. Requirements
The requirements levied on the Directorate
are based on National Security Council Intelligence
*OSP's Mission and Functions statement is not published
for security reasons; ORD's appears in Tab 63 of Ap-
pendix A in its draft version, not having been published
at the end of 1970.
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....d
Directives (NSCID's), appearing initially as a list of
amai
broad objectives, approved by USIB. From these objectives
are derived all other requirement lists, whether broad in
scope or of infinite detail, most of which are prepared by
ammo the special committees of USIB such as the Committee on
Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX). The
.w
trend in recent years has been away from long "shopping
lists" of requirements, which have tended toward waste-
fulness and diffusion of effort. Within the over-all re-
quirements framework there are also ad hoc requirements,
originating, for example, with the OSI or FMSAC analyst
who has a question which must be channeled to the appro-
priate collection asset for an answer.
Until 1963, most of the intelligence-producing
offices of DD/I had their own collection staffs which pro-
cessed, controlled and set priorities for all requirements
levied. Late in 1963, the DD/I, Dr. Cline, after the OSI
had been transferred to the DD/S&T, decided to consolidate
all DD/I collection staffs into one "Collection Guidance
Staff" (CGS), which he anticipated would seek to be a
useful management mechanism in assisting intelligence pro-
duction and information collection activities in meeting
the needs of the Agency and the Community. Dr. Wheelon
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was opposed to the broad charter proposed for the CGS and
wished to ensure that it would concern itself only with
certain requirement matters, as opposed to management
matters properly the responsibility of other Directorates.
He also felt the CGS should be recognized as a DD/I unit,
not as an Agency-wide or national-level intelligence mech-
anism. The understanding reached with the DD/I was that the
CGS should in no way interfere with analyst-collector con-
tacts on the technical level or interpose a channel or serv-
ice where none was needed on any given problem. 128/
The services of the CGS were not used to a
significant extent by the DD/S&T during the three years
in which it functioned within the DD/I.
A DD/S&T Collection Requirements Study Group
was set up in November 1965 to review the procedures and
practices employed within DD/S&T in generating, validating,
placing, and following up on collection requirements. The
group also developed an estimate of the quality and quan-
tity of these requirements. The procedures employed ap-
peared generally adequate except for DD/S&T monitoring for
compatibility with DD/S&T goals. It was recommended that
periodic reviews be conducted to ensure better understand-
ing by the analyst, who generated requirements in most
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instances, of the relationship of his work to the collection
effort. DD/S&T requirements originate almost entirely from
OSI and FMSAC. The initiating analyst ascertains that a
gap exists in the information which he must have, forwards
the requirement through the Branch Chief and the Division
Chief to the Collection Guidance Staff, where all require-
ments are consolidated. There was agreement by the Study
Group that CGS does perform a useful function
requirements on the Intelligence Community.
In the spring of 1967, following a study of
in placing
the requirements process by
on behalf 25X1
of the IG, the DDCI directed the DD/I to disband the CGS,
and to set up an Information Requirements Staff (IRS) to
service the needs of the intelligence-producing offices
of the DD/I and the DD/S&T. The IRS is a service unit,
acting as a broker of requirements between the customer
for intelligence and the office which controls the collec-
tion asset. The DD/S&T has made much greater use of the
services of IRS than of its predecessor, due in part to
the development of better relations between the two Di-
rectorates in the latter '60s.
During the life of the DD/S&T, budgetary
constraints and rising costs of technical collection
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systems have caused continuous evaluation to be made of
the various systems and programs with a view to reduction
or elimination of less productive ones. Increased coopera-
tion between the collector and the producer of intelligence
throughout the stages of a given project, from planning to
operations, has been necessary so as to improve the effec-
tiveness and responsiveness of the system to the production
requirements. In the cases where the collector and the
producer of intelligence are both within the S&T Directorate,
such cooperative action is facilitated.
2. Directorate Tasks by Functional Category
Specific tasks assigned to DD/S&T under the
over-all Combined Agency Program fall under the categories
of "Collection of Intelligence," "Production of Intelli-
gence," "Information Processing and Exploitation," and
"Research, Development, and Engineering."
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In the production of intelligence by DD/S&T
both OSI and FMSAC have responsibilities, their roles
being complementary, in that FMSAC covers offensive bal-
listic missiles and most aspects of space, whereas OSI
covers all other fields of scientific and technological
intelligence, including defensive and cruise missile sys-
tems and the biomedical and scientific aspects of space.
Both FMSAC and OSI lend support to USIB committees, in-
cluding administrative and secretariat support.
In-depth analysis and reporting by OSI
normally represents the principal contribution to DD/S&T's
production activities, although considerable effort must
also be expended on current reporting of, for instance,
new Soviet weapons, or the Middle East conflict. Import-
ant contributions are made to the National Estimates from
time to time, including those on Soviet offensive and de-
fensive forces, Soviet and Chinese nuclear and other ad-
vanced weapons programs.
Under the category of information processing
and exploitation, there is OEL's signal processing and
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analysis activity, which assesses product quality of ongoing
operations, determines hostile reaction to reconnaissance
flights, and reduces data for use in intelligence analysis
and reporting; and there is the central automatic data pro-
cessing activity of OCS, which maintains the computer hard-
ware and skilled personnel necessary to support the programs
of the various analytical and support components not only of
DD/S&T, but of the whole of CIA.
Finally, the Directorate's research, devel-
opment, and engineering is conducted principally by ORD,
but with participation in their own special fields by
OEL, OSA, and OSP. Principal RD&E activities are in the
areas of technical collection systems of all types, the
processing, analysis and production of information, and
in the various areas of covert action and operational sup-
port. ORD's principal responsibility is in basic and ap-
plied research plans and programs to support the intelligence
process, in coordination with other RD&E offices of the
Agency. Since the early days of ORD, its emphasis has been
largely on collection systems; however, as of 1970 the plan
was to lessen this emphasis and to increase activities in
the other areas of RD&E. The Directorate's RD&E program
accounts for a little more than 50% of all CIA RD&E.
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C. Status Report by Offices
The following summaries of developments within
the Directorate's subordinate offices set forth a little
of the philosophy behind the operations of each Office and
something of the contributions of each toward fulfilling
the Directorate's mission during the 1963-1970 period.
1. Office of Special Activities (OSA)
OSA was the principal operational unit of
the Directorate between 1963 and September 1965 (when OSP
took over management of satellite reconnaissance) and main-
tained the Agency's capabilities for overhead reconnaissance
of all types. Subsequent to September 1965, OSA has con-
tinued to have responsibility for manned and other aero-
dynamic aircraft projects, most of which now fall under
the National Reconnaissance Program.
OSA's mission is the technical collection of
intelligence (principally photographic and Elint) with a
small amount of supporting research and development. As
of 1970 its NRP-supported projects had been cut to only
the 13-2, using the new model U-2R which was approved by
the NRP Executive Committee in 1966 and phased into the
program in 1969-70. It has since been used peripherally
along the China Coast and over the Middle East war zone.
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The supersonic, Mach 3, A-12 reconnaissance
system intended to follow the U-2 was shelved after one suc-
cessful deployment, for the sake of economy, in mid-1968.*
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Funds were not made available for any new air-
craft research and development efforts in FY 1971 and indi-
cations were that OSA R&D programs would cease to exist.
OSA's principal liaison within DD/S&T is with
OEL
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furnishes continuous updating of its assessment of enemy
threat against OSA's mission aircraft. ORD has cooperated
in several joint projects and provided RD&E support when re-
quired. Day-to-day coordination of support and common use
of facilities between OSA and the Air Force has been a way
of life since the beginning of the joint U-2 program. This
latter coordination has had its ups and downs, but on the
whole has functioned exceedingly well. Air Force materiel
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support to OSA might be singled out as one of the best
areas of cooperation over the years.
The only technical collection system in opera-
tion in OSA, the U-2R, was under review during 1969-70 by
Defense, Budget, and CIA, who have all examined the need
for its continuation. Approval of the budget request for
the program for FY 1971 by highest authority indicated a
reluctance to effect an economy at the expense of this
only existing contingency capability to back up satellite
reconnaissance by covert overflight (except over the USSR).
The question has been raised in recent budg-
eting exercises whether the CIA should continue to operate
its part of the U-2R program covertly, or whether the en-
tire U-2R fleet should be consolidated under Air Force
management. The same question was raised first in 1956
when the Air Force, led by Generals LeMay and Twining, and
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others, first attempted to freeze CIA out of the U-2
program in favor of SAC. At that time, and since, when the
issue was raised, State and the White House have historic-
ally favored control of peacetime overflight reconnaissance
by a civilian arm of the government. No doubt the issue
will continue to be raised.
2. Office of Special Projects (OSP)
OSP was formally established within the Di-
rectorate in September 1965 to assume control of the satel-
lite reconnaissance operations assigned to CIA, and to
conduct advanced research looking toward improved new sys-
tems for the future, under the over-all authority of the
NRP. CIA's efforts to maintain a strong role in this most
productive program for technical collection of intelligence
had at that time begun to achieve results through the medium
of a new agreement with Defense on the division of program
responsibilities.
The pioneer CORONA photographic satellite
project, inherited from the former Development Projects
Division (now OSA), and carried through a continuous im-
provement program by OSP, has continued to be the most
productive asset for the technical collection program
against denied areas (particularly Soviet Russia and Com-
munist China) available to the Community. Examples of
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intelligence collection to the credit of CORONA in the
late 1960's are the identification of most of the Soviet
SS-9 and SS-11 missile sites, and coverage of the Soviet
Northern Fleet Bases, and ballistic missile submarines.
OSP was given responsibility in late 1965
for developing, processing, assembling and integrating the
payload (camera system) for the follow-on search and sur-
veillance reconnaissance system to replace CORONA. It is
a larger and more sophisticated system and delays have
been encountered in its development which have put the
first launch almost two years behind the original schedule.
At the end of 1970 several panels of technical experts found
its current progress to be satisfactory. Meanwhile CORONA
has been stretched out with launches programmed to provide
a safe overlap.
The advanced research activities of OSP are
the province of its Design and Analysis Division, which
has conducted intelligence requirements analyses, program
definition studies, photographic satellite vulnerability
analyses, and advanced technology programs in support of
satellite systems development. Two of the Division's fields
of exploration which have offered promise are (1) the de-
velopment of a high resolution photographic satellite
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3. Office of Elint (OEL)
In a real sense the success achieved in the
CIA Elint Program has been made possible by the close co-
operation of the various offices of the Directorate. One
of the initial purposes in bringing together all Elint
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activities under a scientific directorate was to provide
electronic protection for airborne photographic collection
systems--first the U-2 and then the A-12--which were oper-
ated by the Office of Special Activities. Later with the
addition to the Directorate of the Office of Scientific
Intelligence, there was added the third dimension of in-
depth intelligence analysis and vulnerability prediction.
Thus the close relationship between OSI and OEL resulted
not only in decreased vulnerability of the aircraft but
also provided excellent Elint collection as a by-product
of the photographic collection activities. In the same
vein the addition of the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis
Center to the DD/S&T resulted in the defining of require-
ments and feedback to OEL which made possible critical
collection in missile and space Elint.
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OEL and OCS also work very closely together
in data reduction and analysis aspects of the Elint opera-
tion and much mutual benefit results from this cooperation.
While the day-to-day relationships with ORD are somewhat
less than with other offices of the DD/S&T, numerous bene-
fits result from research carried out by ORD. Particular
mention could be made of
OEL has its own research and
development program, but its activities in this area are
principally of an engineering nature and are carried out
under contracts with various electronic industries.
The Office of Elint maintains contact with
many elements of the Intelligence Community including
Army, Navy, Air Force, DIA, SAC, and the NSA. The Elint
activities of CIA are,I
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Mr. George C. Miller, who has headed the
Office of Elint since its establishment, believes that
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the close working relationships between the Agency's
scientific, technical and operational units and the quality
of Agency personnel involved are largely responsible for
the success achieved by the Agency's Elint program. Of
particular importance has been the support given by
other substantive offices of the DD/S&T.
4. Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI)
The transfer of OSI out of the DD/I complex
to the DD/S&T in August 1963 was a part of the DCI's plan
to gather under one roof all of the Agency's scientific
activities; it was considered vital that OSI, the prin-
cipal producer of scientific intelligence, should be
under the same roof. Due to the DD/I's steadfast oppo-
sition, the transfer might not have been made but for
the secondary motivation; i.e., the transfer was a part
of the price for getting Dr. Wheelon to agree to org-
anize the Directorate for Science and Technology.
As to the trauma among OSI personnel re-
sulting from their separation from the DD/I, it was not
so severe nor so lasting as statements by the DD/I at
the time, and the IG report of a year later, would indi-
cate. It was principally the older OSI employees who
were most affected by the break in their routine pattern
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the close working relationships between the Agency's
scientific, technical and operational units and the quality
of Agency personnel involved are largely responsible for
the success achieved by the Agency's Elint program. Of
particular importance has been the support given by
other substantive offices of the DD/S&T.
4. Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI)
The transfer of OSI out of the DD/I complex
to the DD/S&T in August 1963 was a part of the DCI's plan
to gather under one roof all of the Agency's scientific
activities; it was considered vital that OSI, the prin-
cipal producer of scientific intelligence, should be
under the same roof. Due to the DD/I's steadfast oppo-
sition, the transfer might not have been made but for
the secondary motivation; i.e., the transfer was a part
of the price for getting Dr. Wheelon to agree to org-
anize the Directorate for Science and Technology.
As to the trauma among OSI personnel re-
sulting from their separation from the DD/I, it was not
so severe nor so lasting as statements by the DD/I at
the time, and the IG report of a year later, would indi-
cate. It was principally the older OSI employees who
were most affected by the break in their routine pattern
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has impinged to some extent on OSI. For example, OSR's
responsibilities lead them, in the course of making judg-
ments, to look back at research and development, whereas
OSI investigates research and development up to initial
production. There tends to be a slight area of overlap
which requires careful coordination. OSR's failure to
analyze information and produce intelligence on certain
areas, for example, biological and chemical warfare,
necessitates the expenditure of some OSI effort to com-
plete estimates in those fields.
Within the DD/S&T, OSI has close cooperation
with OEL
with OSA particularly on the question
of threat assessment against manned overflight (recently
reduced since OSA's China operation has been limited to
peripheral flights); and with FMSAC in constant liaison
on space activities. OSI follows meteorological and
navigational satellites, Soviet anti-satellite capabili-
ties, assessment of Soviet capability in space, fuels,
guidance systems, life support, and all Soviet research
and development which applies to space.
The fulfillment of OSI's mission has been
aided by working within the S&T complex, as noted above
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in the case of dealing directly with FMSAC on space matters
and with OEL in acquiring certain desired signal intelli-
gence, rather than having to go through the less respons-
ive mechanism of USIB subcommittees. An additional
example of inter-Directorate cooperation is in the field
of biological and chemical warfare intelligence,
'The DD/S&T has taken the ini-
tiative and set up an informal group under ORD leadership
with OSI and DD/P representation to look for new ways of
acquiring BW/CW intelligence.
Since OSI's transfer to the DD/S&T, most
of the changes in emphasis in the areas of reporting have
resulted from increased attention to the principal threats
to U.S. national security. About 75% of the total effort
of both internal and external research and analysis is
focused on the USSR--anti-ballistic missiles, air defense,
and anti-satellite activities; about 17% is toward Com-
munist China; and the balance of about 8% is on the rest
of the world. Several areas are covered worldwide,
including nuclear proliferation, BW/CW, some medical
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\Formerly worldwide science and technology were
covered, but more recently only in specialized fields;
in the case of Soviet scientific research, for instance,
concentration is on those areas of the greatest strategic
significance.
As to the question of whether collection of
data is exceeding OSI's ability to analyze and report,
OSI's Director feels that his Office is able to provide
analytical support commensurate with the amount of intel-
ligence made available to its analysts in all priority
areas. NPIC, for example, has a data explosion problem
with the massive photographic collection generated by
the satellite programs, and in some cases has only been
able to identify signatures after evidence from other
sources has caused a re-examination of film on hand. This
kind of a situation of course inhibits OSI from timely
analysis and reporting of existing coverage since it has
not yet been reported to OSI.
There are, of course, areas from which
little or no information is forthcoming, and there is not
enough data for OSI to make reasonable judgments. Some
of these are in
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Satellite reconnaissance, whether photographic or elec-
tronic, can only give us knowledge of the results of re-
search and development conducted years earlier.
OSI's ability to monitor its own perform-
ance in the production of scientific intelligence is aided
by regular meetings with the USIB scientific committees,
and by OSI participation in the preparation of the semi-
monthly briefings for the President's Science Adviser.
The Director of OSI, Dr. Chamberlain, feels that the con-
tributions of his Office
to the National Estimates under
the new system of estimating established in 1970 are hav-
ing more of an impact than in previous years, and, in
general, the Estimates are being well received at the
White House level, specifically by Dr. Kissinger.*
01011110
*See pp. 184-186, above, regarding the new system of
estimating.
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5. Office of Computer Services (OCS)
On 5 August 1963, coincident with the
establishment of the Directorate for Science and Technology,
the Automatic Data Processing Staff was changed to the Off-
ice of Computer Services and transferred from the Director-
ate of Support to the DD/S&T. At that
an authorized strength of
on board. Three IBM computer systems*
time the Office had
personnel actually
had been installed
within the year. The principal projects in development in
the Office of Computer Services at that time were:
a. The design of a document/information
retrieval system for the DD/I (Project CHIVE).
b. The design and implementation of special
applications, e.g., trajectory analysis, Soviet defensive
systems capabilities, Soviet military expenditures,
c. A review of existent RCA 501 computer
and punched card applications in the Automatic Data
Processing Division/Comptroller, with the objective of
optimizing these applications.
*IBM 1401, IBM 1410, IBM 7090.
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d. Analysis, design, and implementation
of computer systems in the Support Directorate for Secur-
ity Records Index and Name Checking, mechanization of
typesetting operations in the Printing Services Division,
Qualifications System for Office of Personnel,/
about\
from the DD/I.
'coming from the DD/S and the balance
On 18 November 1963, shortly after the
establishment of OCS, the Automatic Data Processing Divi-
sion was transferred from the Comptroller's Office to
the Office of Computer Services. This included
RCA computer equipment, a considerable amount of
punched card equipment, and responsibility for on-going
computer applications concerned with the "business appli-
cations" of the Agency: finance, logistics, personnel,
training, security, payroll, and others.
By 1970, OCS had passed through seven years
of extensive growth. Hardware and software had been con-
verted to third generation systems* which were operating
*3 IBM 360/65's, an IBM 360/67, an RCA 70/45 and 70/35,
a CDC Page Reader, and other miscellaneous equipment.
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around the clock. Eighty computer terminals were installed
in various user locations within the Headquarters building.
Employees had grown to
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Some 250 computer projects were in-
volved in OCS support to Agency customers for such functions
as:
a. Scientific data processing for trajectory
and orbital analysis, signal analysis, mathematical compu-
tations, modeling, simulation, statistical analysis, map
projections, etc.
b. Intelligence file management and exploi-
tation in substantive areas such as foreign missile and
space events, ship movements, strategic research, economic
research, scientific data, etc.
c. Management and administrative data pro-
cessing for finance records, personnel, logistics, pay-
roll, training, security, etc.
Top management's concern over the continued
growth of ADP was evidenced by the Executive Director-
Comptroller's institution of more stringent procedures
for the approval of acquisitions of computer equipment
and software; by studies, recommendations and procedures
aimed at costing and, perhaps, charging computer users for
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the computer services they receive; and by the application
of ceilings on OCS personnel and financial resources. A
more modest rate of growth in OCS can probably be ex-
pected for the immediate future.
6. Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
(FMSAC)
CIA's initiative in establishing FMSAC
resulted from general dissatisfaction with the efforts of
the various Community components concerned with the anal-
ysis and interpretation of data in the missile and space
field. This dissatisfaction was sharply pointed up on
the CIA side on at least one occasion when Mr. McCone
learned first of a Soviet space event, not from his own
intelligence sources, but after the fact, through a
Tass announcement picked up from the news ticker.
The first CIA plan for a "Missile and Space
Technical Intelligence Center (MISTIC)" was drawn up
early in 1963 before the DD/S&T came into being, and pro-
posed to provide coordinated tasking of U.S. assets for
collection and reduction of data on foreign missile and
space events, as well as analysis of the data and pro-
duction of intelligence on these events for GMAIC, USIB,
and the Community generally. The initial plan was
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dropped in August 1963 in favor of a CIA-financed, all-source,
national analysis capability to handle raw data on missile
and space activities. Since such a facility did not then
exist, there was no problem of duplication in furnishing
this service to the Community.
Mr. McCone's directive to the DDCI instruct-
ing him to establish such a center was justified under the
DCI's statutory obligation to correlate and evaluate intel-
ligence relating to the national security under the National
Security Act of 1947. Mr. McCone further noted that in his
view, CIA through its Office of Scientific Intelligence,
and USIB through the Guided Missile and Astronautics Com-
mittee, were not satisfactorily organized for the task,
despite the face that a considerable number of very valu-
able analyses and reports on Soviet missile and space
activities had been produced through the years. 129/
The Department of Defense at the same time
was reviewing its own activities in the missile and space
intelligence area with a view to centralizing control
over DOD collection and production facilities. The Direc-
tor of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. Eugene Fubini,
urged that the new CIA center not duplicate current efforts
being carried on elsewhere in the Community.
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FMSAC was established under the DD/S&T,
pursuant to Mr. McCone's 21 October
1963 directive,
and
was authorized an initial T/O of
and an op-
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of the Bur-
officials
When
eau of the Budget
were approached
with a request
for CIA
award
funding of FMSAC for FY 1965
in the amount
of
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and a personnel allowance of
they were prepared
25X1
to accept the proposition that
the DCI
needed this capa-
amml
woad
riment
WS*
Aurrt
awl
bility for independent substantive assessment of a most
important area of national security, but underlined the
priority responsibility of the DOD in the matter of foreign
missile capabilities and urged CIA to work closely with
the DOD in seeking to keep duplicative analysis, particu-
larly that under external contract, to a minimum. 130/
When the DOD, in April 1964, established
its own "Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center
(D/SMAC)" the Secretary of Defense suggested to the DCI,
Mr. McCone, that they form a DOD/CIA management coordi-
nation group in the missile and space field. Mr. McCone,
while welcoming the establishment of a central point in
DOD where FMSAC could conduct liaison, turned down the
idea of another joint committee, preferring that FMSAC
make its reports to USIB through the established GMAIC.
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Dr. Wheelon was fortunate in obtaining the
services of Mr. Carl E. Duckett, then Director of Army
Missile Intelligence Activities at Redstone Arsenal, who
was recruited principally to chair the GMAIC, but was
given the additional job of laying plans for organizing
FMSAC, and upon the formal establishment of the Center on
7 November 1963, became its first Director.
Since the inception of FMSAC, it has contin-
ued to provide current analysis on a 24-hour basis, and
to produce finished intelligence on foreign strategic
weapon and space systems (except defensive weapons) and
in-depth analyses on significant missile and space events.
In addition it provides all-source collection support,
including evaluation in terms of effectiveness of various
collection systems and sensors of Agency and other Com-
munity programs tasked to collect missile and space data.
Principal intra-Directorate relations of
FMSAC are with OSI, OEL, and OCS. Finished intelligence
production is coordinated by FMSAC with other components
of DD/S&T (principally OSI) and with DD/I. Joint plan-
ning is carried on with OCS on a continuing basis re-
garding ADP equipment requirements of FMSAC.
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In its efforts to provide accurate assessments
FMSAC faces the problem of collection deficiencies in cert-
ain areas, e.g., new developing weapons systems, particu-
larly in the non-Soviet area. This means that the analysts
have an insufficient base of information on which to make
firm judgments in those areas. Also the analytical re-
sources of FMSAC are spread quite thinly in the non-Soviet
areas, with cases where one analyst covers one or more
countries. Since the Soviet Union is no longer the sole
threat in the missile and space field, FMSAC and the
DD/S&T must increasingly give consideration to the pro-
vision of sufficient analytical resources to cover the
entire field.
7. Office of Research and Development (ORD)
In establishing an Office of Research and
Development on paper in 1962, the desire of Mr. McCone
and Dr. Scoville was to bring all CIA research and de-
velopment activities under the DD/R, and from this nucleus
build a capability to support all Agency R&D requirements
in the scientific field. Recommendations of the PFIAB
in March 1963 underlined the necessity for making the
greatest use possible of all available industrial and
academic advances in science for intelligence purposes,
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at the same time realizing great savings by contracting
for the solution of problems with research institutes and
laboratories who had the facilities and expert manpower
available.
The initial organization of ORD was delayed
by several factors; (1) the DD/P was reluctant to give
over to the DD/R all of TSD's R&D responsibilities and a
compromise had to be negotiated; (2) Colonel Giller,
former Deputy Chief of TSD, at first wore two hats, act-
ing as Assistant DD/R and as Acting Assistant Director
for Research and Development, thus not being able to
give full time to either job; and (3) after a Deputy
Assistant Director for R&D, Mr. Robert M. Chapman, was
recruited in September 1963, he was given special addi-
tional duties by Dr. Wheelon, such as full-time assist-
ance to the Drell Satellite Photography Working Group,
and thus he was unable to devote his immediate, full
attention to the organization of the Office of Research
and Development.
There was
since the ORD budget of
not a problem of money at first,
had been approved,
but it was necessary to develop a program under which
available funds could be put into contracts for viable
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and worthwhile projects. The Kinzel Scientific Advisory
Board had been organized in July 1963, and its recom-
mendations on areas of research which would be fruitful
in supporting the Agency's mission were given cognizance
in ORD's programming. An organizational concept was
approved by Dr. Wheelon in November 1963 under which the
areas of research were first established as Optics,
Physics/Chemistry, Radio Physics, and Life Sciences Di-
vision.
Not too much difficulty was encountered
in recruiting scientists to man ORD, once those with the
kinds of skills and background required were located,
although the recruiting process was necessarily slow, in
the CIA pattern, with the usual thorough security investi-
gations and coordinated personnel actions. ORD offered
an inviting new field of work to most of those approached
and there were sufficient slots and opportunities for pro-
motion. Under Mr. Chapman's basic philosophy for recruit-
ing ORD staff, his division chiefs were advised to recruit
young, bright, and versatile Ph.D.'s, and all other things
being equal, to pick those-who were willing to tangle with
the real world, not those who would wind up as back-room
theoreticians.
.alsom#
armed
al?m?S,
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Dr. Scoville's theory of "cross fertilization"
of ideas among the various scientific disciplines encom-
passed in the Directorate has worked well within ORD. Since
approximately 80% of ORD's annual budget normally goes into
external research contracts, the Director of ORD, Mr. Chapman,
maintains pressure on his scientists to keep their activities
from lapsing into merely the letting and monitoring of
external research contracts. This is accomplished by means
of constant liaison with the industrial and academic com-
munities in scientific fields related to ORD's work, and
through working closely with scientific advisory panels
made up of leading American scientists. One such body,
the IDA/JASON Panel, draws on the capabilities of the In-
stitute for Defense Analyses for conducting seminars de-
voted to presentations and discussions of technical problems,
and to deliberations, formulations of conclusions, and recom-
mendations which are reported back to the Director of ORD.
As a result of ORD's growth since 1963 and
its entry into new fields of research, its organizational
set-up has been broadened to include eight divisions:
Analysis, Applied Physics, Biological Sciences, Medical and
Behavioral Science, Optics, Physics-Chemistry, Radio Physics,
and a Special Projects Group.
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Among the research projects being conducted in
the various disciplines, some noteworthy examples of achieve-
ments to date would include:I
The initial plan to bring all Agency R&D
together under the ORD did not come to pass, as previously
noted. There was continued resistance within the DD/P to
giving up any activities which were agent-related, and so
TSD has retained the final authority over the application
of science and technology to the operations of the Clandes-
tine Services. Some few other pockets of highly specialized
R&D also remain outside of DD/S&T, but ORD continues to
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control more than 50% of the Agency's total R&D budget,
coordination of which is now carried out under terms set
forth by under the authority of
the DD/S&T, acting in a staff capacity for the DCI.**
As a result of the time taken to settle the
division of responsibility and to coordinate overlapping
activities in the research and development area, the Mis-
sion and Functions statement of ORD had still not been
published in Agency Headquarters Regulations at the end of
1970, but a final draft had been agreed to by the DD/P and
the DD/I, as well as the DD/S&T, in December l970.***
There has been, and probably will continue
to be, an area of indecision in R&D programming Agencywide;
i.e., how much R&D should be completely tuned to satisfying
immediate requirements, and how much should be devoted to
innovation, looking to the future? Since it requires on
the average about five years to bring a sophisticated new
piece of equipment or system from research and development
through production and into operation, some hard current
*Appendix A, Tab 57.
**See Chapter IV-E, pp. 145-155, above.
***Appendix A, Tab 63. (Finally published
on 8 March 1971.)
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decisions have to be made from time to time, looking five
years ahead in order to preserve some equity against the
future course of events.
The Office of Research and Development, in
arranging its priorities, must continue to select those
areas of greatest relevance to its task, which in the
final analysis must be to help the Director of Central
Intelligence to avoid any "scientific and technological
Pearl Harbors" which might occur as a result of scien-
tific breakthroughs by our opposition, for example, in
the field of weather control. One burning priority in
the R&D of Technical Collection, is to develop alter-
natives to our far from invulnerable satellite capability.
ORD must therefore continue to give priority to its ef-
forts in the research and development relating to sensors
which will lend themselves to a distant emplacement, or
stand-off, collection capability.
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??
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SOURCE REFERENCES
25k11-,
1.
Deputy Director of Scientific Intelligence,
25X1
History of 061, 1949-68, pp. 1-4, TS.
ammo
2.
Ibid., pp. 4-8, 16, 50-52.
25X1
3.
Elint Staff Officer, Memo to DCI,
trganization
semi
9 Jul 57, sub: for Exploitation of Advanced
Technology in Support of Critical Intelligence Problems,
TS-164263.
4.
John A. McCone, DCI, Memo for his own use, 24 Jul 63,
sub: Organization of DD/R, p. 1, ER-63-6326, S.
-mama
5.
Richard M. Bissell, Jr., DD/P, Memo to DCI, 10 Jan 62,
sub: Technical Intelligence Collection, S.
6.
Headquarters Notice 1-8, 14 Feb 62, C. (Appendix A,
MOW
Tab 1).
7.
Headquarters Notice 1-9, 16 Feb 62, C. (Appendix A,
Tab 2).
8.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., AD/SI, Draft Memo, Feb 62,
sub: Activities of DD/R, ER-62-3399/A, S.
9.
Richard Helms, DD/P, Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick,
6 Mar 62, sub: Location of TSD/R&D in the Agency,
DD/P-2-0968, S.
10.
Robert Amory, Jr., DD/I, Memo to DCI, 19 Mar 62,
sub: Objections to OSI Inclusion in the DD/R, S.
lyriff4
11.
L. B. Kirkpatrick, ExDir, Memo to DCI, 6 Apr 62,
sub: Final Report of Working Group on Organization
and Activities, ER-62-2169, S.
12.
Ibid.
13.
L. B. Kirkpatrick, ExDir, Memo to the DCI, 17 May 62,
sub: Organization of the Office of the Deputy Director
(Research), ER-62-3399, S.
25X1
14.
'Memo to DD/R,
5 Jul 62, sub: Mission ana rUULLIou bf DD/R, S.
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25X1
??
.ormol
Approved
For Release 2005/Q3 8qftgliolD89B00980R000500010001-8
SOURCE REFERENCES
25k11-,
1.
Deputy Director of Scientific Intelligence,
25X1
History of 061, 1949-68, pp. 1-4, TS.
ammo
2.
Ibid., pp. 4-8, 16, 50-52.
25X1
3.
Elint Staff Officer, Memo to DCI,
trganization
semi
9 Jul 57, sub: for Exploitation of Advanced
Technology in Support of Critical Intelligence Problems,
TS-164263.
4.
John A. McCone, DCI, Memo for his own use, 24 Jul 63,
sub: Organization of DD/R, p. 1, ER-63-6326, S.
-mama
5.
Richard M. Bissell, Jr., DD/P, Memo to DCI, 10 Jan 62,
sub: Technical Intelligence Collection, S.
6.
Headquarters Notice 1-8, 14 Feb 62, C. (Appendix A,
MOW
Tab 1).
7.
Headquarters Notice 1-9, 16 Feb 62, C. (Appendix A,
Tab 2).
8.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., AD/SI, Draft Memo, Feb 62,
sub: Activities of DD/R, ER-62-3399/A, S.
9.
Richard Helms, DD/P, Memo to L. B. Kirkpatrick,
6 Mar 62, sub: Location of TSD/R&D in the Agency,
DD/P-2-0968, S.
10.
Robert Amory, Jr., DD/I, Memo to DCI, 19 Mar 62,
sub: Objections to OSI Inclusion in the DD/R, S.
lyriff4
11.
L. B. Kirkpatrick, ExDir, Memo to DCI, 6 Apr 62,
sub: Final Report of Working Group on Organization
and Activities, ER-62-2169, S.
12.
Ibid.
13.
L. B. Kirkpatrick, ExDir, Memo to the DCI, 17 May 62,
sub: Organization of the Office of the Deputy Director
(Research), ER-62-3399, S.
25X1
14.
'Memo to DD/R,
5 Jul 62, sub: Mission ana rUULLIou bf DD/R, S.
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29. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to DDCI, 12 Aug 63,
sub: Requirements for SPS Positions, DD/S&T-1030-63,
S.
30. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, ExDir, Memo for the Record,
1 Oct 62, sub: Discussion with DCI on Deputy Director
(Research), S.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, ExDir, Memo for the Record,
5 Oct 62, sub: Luncheon with Dr. Wheelon, S.
34. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, ExDir, Action Memo A-263,
2 Jul 63, to DD/R, with 2 att.; excerpt quoted is
from Att. 1, Recommendations to Intelligence Com-
munity by PFIAB, TS/SC-04276-63/1.
35. Ibid., Att. 2.
36. Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R, Letter to Mr. McCone,
25 Apr 63, sub: Resignation, CIA/IUO.
37. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, ExDir, Memo for DDCI, 30 Jul 63,
sub: Organization of DD/R, ER-63-6326/1, S.
38. Albert D. Wheelon, AD/SI, Memo to DCI, 17 Jul 63,
sub: Organization of DD/R, ER-63-6325, S.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ray S. Cline, DD/I, Memo for DCI, 16 Jul 63, sub:
Science Organization in CIA, ER-63-5712, S.
42. Ibid.
43. John A. McCone, DCI, loc. cit. (4, above, pp. 2-3).
44. Ray S. Cline, DD/I, Memo for DDCI, 27 Jul 63, sub:
Agency Functions and Organization, S.
45. Marshall S. Carter, DDCI, Note to DCI (handwritten),
transmitting 44, above, undated, S.
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46. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, ExDir/Compt, op. cit.
(37, above).
47. Ray S. Cline, DD/I, Memo for A/DCI, 6 Aug 63, sub:
Transfer of OSI from Directorate of Intelligence,
DD/I-4082-63, S.
48. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, ExDir/Compt, op. cit.
(33, above).
49. Ibid.
50. John A. McCone, DCI, Memo for Special Assistant to
the President, 10 Sep 63, sub: CIA Organization for
Scientific and Technical Intelligence, ER-63-6786, S.
25X1 51.
25X4.
am*
Chief, ABCD/SI, Memo to AD/SI,
19 Feb 62, sub: DD/R Organization and Responsibili-
ties, S.
52. Inspector General's Survey of OSI, August 1964, p. 145.
53. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Letter to Chairman,
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 12 Apr 66, sub: Functions of
DD/S&T, DD/S&T-2024-66, S.
54. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo for Record, 13 Aug 63,
sub: Meeting with Fubini re DD/S&T-1112-63, S.
25X1
55. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo for DD/R&E, 23 Aug 63,
sub: Preliminary Planning for DD/S&T-1216-63, 25X1
S.
56.
Jack C. Ledford/John J. Crowley, Memo for DD/S&T,
1 Oct 65. sub: Management Relations: OSA/OSP,
S.
57. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to ExDir/Compt,
26 Dec 64, sub: Cataloging of R&D Projects,
DD/S&T-3205-64, CIA Internal Use Only.
58. John A. MeCone, DCI, Memo to Special Assistant to
..000 the President, 13 Dec 63, sub: Further Report to
PFIAB on 8 Mar 63 Recommendations, S. 25X1
59. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to DCI, 2 Dec 62,
sub: Interlocking Advisory Boards, DD/S&T-2243-63, S.
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60. Ibid.
61. John F. Blake, EXO/DD/S&T, Memo for Record, 19 Jul 65,
sub: Meeting with DD/S&T on Restructuring Boards and
Panels, S.
62. John A. McCone, DCI, op. cit. (57, above).
63.
Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to ExDir, 4 Feb 64,
sub: DD/S&T Assumptions for FY 1966-69,
DD/S&T-0406-64, S.
NM.
64.
Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to DCI, 4 Mar 64,
sub: Organization and Functional Chart of DD/S&T,
DD/S&T-0802-64, CIA Internal Use Only.
65.
Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo for ExDir/Compt,
23 Feb 66, sub: Management, DD/S&T-873-66, S.
66.
Ibid.
67.
David E. Bell, Director of Budget, Memo to DCI,
8 Apr 62, sub: FY
1963-67 Budget Projections, S.
25X1
68.
PPS/DD/S&T, Memo to
DD/S&T, 30 Oct 63,
63, S.
sub: Budget Hearings 21-25 Oct
69.
John F. Blake, EO/DD/S&T, Memo to D/OBPAM, 8 Jan 65,
70.
sub: Quarterly Economy
Albert D. Wheelon,
sub: BOB Exercise,
Report,
DD/S&T, Memo
DD/S&T-085-65, S.
to D/BPAM, 7 Jun 65,
S.
25X1
71.
PPS/DD/S&T,
Functions,
Memo to EO/DD/S&T,
S.
Chief,
20 May 66, sub: PPS
25X1
72.
Comptroller,
DD/S&T, Memo to
25X1
DD/S&T, 28 Jul 66,
sub: Response
to BOB Request,
TS.
73.
John F. Blake, EO/DD/S&T,
Memo to DD/S, 18 Dec 63,
sub: Space Requirements for Office of DD/S&T,
DD/S&T-2465-63, S.
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74. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Informal note to DDCI,
transmitting case of a resigned employee, undated,
unnumbered.
75. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to AD/SI, 31 Oct 63,
sub: Coordination with DD/I, DD/S&T-1913-63, S.
76. Ibid.
77. Donald F. Chamberlain, AD/SI, Memo to AD/RR, 11 Mar 64,
sub: ORR/OSI Coordination, S; Otto E. Guthe, AD/RR,
Memo to AD/SI, 24 Mar 64, sub: ORR/OSI Coordination, S.
78.
I"A Study of the
Procurement System of Ih Central Intelligence Agency,"
Chapter VI, July 1966, TS. 25X1
79. Carl E. Duckett, DD/S&T, Memo to DD/S&T Offices,
11 Mar 68, sub: Initiation of Contract Team for
DD/S&T, DD/S&T-933-68, CIA Internal Use Only.
80. Carl E. Duckett, DD/S&T, Memo to D/ORD, 20 Feb 69,
sub: DD/S&T Contracting Teams, DD/S&T-391-69, S.
81. Carl E. Duckett, DD/S&T, Memo to ExDir/Compt, 3 Oct
68, sub: Contract Management, Attachment B, "Coordi-
nation of R&A and R&D in the Directorate for Science
and Technology," TS.
82. Carl E. Duckett, DD/S&T, Memo to ExDir/Compt, 3 Feb
69, sub: IG's Survey of FMSAC, DD/S&T-437-69, S.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. R. M. Bissell, Jr., Memo to DCI, 5 Mar 62, sub:
Reorganization of DPD, OXC-3135, S.
86. Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R, Memo for DCI, 20 Mar 62,
sub: Draft NRO Agreement, TS-155848.
87.
Chief, Security, DPD, Memo for
the Record, 28 May 62, sub: Meetings, Scoville and
Charyk, Unnumbered, S.
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111111
25Xr
88.
89.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R, Memo to D/Security,
2 Jun 62, sub: Security Agreement, NBP, Unnumbered, S.
Lt. Col. Edwin J. Istvan, USAF, NRO Staff, Memo for
Record, 4 Jun 62, sub: NRO/NSA Relationship,
S.
90.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R, Memo to D/NRO, 29 Aug 62,
sub: Comments on Organization and Functions of NRO,
25X1
91.
Edward B. Giller, A/DDR, Memo for Record, 12 Sep 62,
Arai
DD/R-549-62, S.
92.
McGeorge Bundy, Assistant to the President, Memo to
AMMO
DCI and SecDef, 6 Jul 62,
25X1
93.
John A. Bross, Comptroller, Memo for Record, 21 Sep
25X1
62, sub: Financing Programs Assigned CIA under NRO,
S.
94.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R, Memo for DCI, 5 Oct 62,
sub: Meeting with Secretary McNamara, TS.
25X1
95.
Ibid.
96.
Joseph V. Charyk, D/NRO, Memo to Deputy Secretary of
Defense, lf Oct 62. sub. Proposed Revision to NRO
25X.1.,
97.
Agreement, TS.
Joseph V. Charyk, D/NRO, Memo for Deputy Secretary
of Defense, 23 Nov 62, Unnumbered, TS.
MOW
98.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R. Memo to DCI, 24 Jan 63,
sub: NRO Organization, TS.
' 25X1
IMISO
99.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R, Memo to DCI, 1 Feb 63,
sub: Dr. Brockway McMillan,' S.
25X1
25X1
100.
Minutes of DCI Morning Staff Meeting, 2 Apr 63,
S.
25X1
101.
Minutes of DCI Morning Staff Meeting, 9 Apr 63,
S.
41.E1/0
room,
mmoil
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102.
Herbert Scrville. Jr., "Summary
of NRO Activities,"
25X1
14 Jun 63, TS.
103.
Jack C. Ledford D/SA. handwritten
notes on thermo-
25X1
fax copy ofl Series
B, Copy 1, 15 Apr 63,
TS.
104.
L. B. Kirkpatrir rvnir/rnmnt,
Note of PFIAB Meet-
ing, 25 Jun 63,
TS.
25X1
105
'Edward B. Giller, A/DDR, Memo to DDCI, 15 Jul 63,
25X1
S.
106.
Lawrence R. Houston,
1 Nov 63. sub
General Counsel, Memo for DCI,
Authorization for CIA Functions,
25X4ft.
107.
A. H. Katz, "The
Reconnaissance Satellite," U.S.
Air Force Project Rand, S-81, 24 Feb 58, pp. 49-51,
S.
108.
T. M. Anderson, Cover Officer, DPS/DCI, Memo to
SA/PD/DCI, 8 Aug 58, sub: Request to Brief
Gen. Luehman, COR-0094, TS, w/att. WS 117-L Pub-
licity Plan, COR-0104, S.
109.
Project Outline for CORONA, 15 Apr 58, COR-0013, TS.
110.
Allen W. Dulles, DCI, Memo to the Comptroller,
25 Apr 58, sub: Project CORONA, DPS-0025, S.
111.
Loc.cit. (Number 109, above).
112.
Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, Memo to DCI,
3 Jun 63, sub: Basic Authority
for CIA Conduct of
+=NI
Overflight Reconnaissance Operations,
25X1
S.
113.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R,
Memq tn 'Dm. 28 63,
In
TS.
sub: Contract Status and Funding,'
25X1
114.
Edward B. Giller,
A/DDR, Memo
for AD/OSA, 1 Aug 63,
25X1
Mai
115.
John A. Bross,
Comptroller,
Note of Meeting on NRO,
25X1
22 Oct 63, S.
25X1
viii
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ars,
116.
A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo
to DCI, 28 Mar 64,
sub: Letter of Commendation,
S.
25X1
117.
John A. Bross, Comptroller,
loc. cit. (115, above).
IIIIM
118.
Ibid.
119.
John A. McCone, DCI, Memo for General Carter, DDCI,
AMMO
9 Dec 63, sub: CIA Role in NRP, ER-63-9086, C.
120.
John A. McCone, DCI, Letter
to Mr. Clark Clifford,
Ammeol
Chairman, PFIAB, 11 Jun
TS.
64,. sub: NRP,I I
25X1
121.
J. F. Blake, EXO/DD/q&T.
Memo to DD/S. 10 Sep 64.
sub: Availability
ofl
25X1
25X1
S.
122.
A. D. Wheelon,
DD/S&T, Memo to DDCI, 2 Sep 64, sub:
CIA Participation
in CORONA in Los Angeles,
25X1
S.
123.
Marshall S. Carter,
DDCI, Memo for Record,
29 Sep 64, sub:
NRO ExCom Meeting, 29 Sep 64,
25X1
25X4.
124.
John J. Crowley,
7 Jan 66, sub:
organization,
D/OSP, Memo to D/Recon, CIA,
Comments on Proposed NRO Staff
Re-
TS.
25X1
125.
CIA, Memo for
DCI,
I ID/Recon,
25X7-
20 Jan 66, sub: Brief in
of PFIAB on Progress
in
S.
25X1
the NRP,
with att.
aim(
126.
A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T,
sub: Satellite Vulnerability,
Memo to DCI, 12 Mar 64,
25X1
1 S.
127.
A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T,
Memo to DCT 16 Set) 65.
sub: Vulnerability of Satellites,
S.
25X1
128.
A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T,
Memo to DDCI, 7 Mar 64,
am*
sub: Comments on CGS, DD/S&T-0729-64, S.
129.
John A. McCone, DCI, Memo to DDCI, 21 Oct 63,
sub: Establishment of FMSAC, TS-188398.
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FMSAC, DD/S&T-3080-64, S.
131. A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to ExDir/Compt, 4 Sep 64,
sub: New Management Relationship with
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INDEX
A
A-12 manned reconnaissance program
cancellation of, 301-302
design of aircraft, 295-296
disclosure to public of USAF version of, 297-298
first flight of, 296
operational planning for, 298-301
test and training base, App. E, Tab 1
USAF versions YF-12A, SR-71, 297
Action Staff, 0/DDS&T
establishment of, 73-74
mission and functions of, App. A, Tab 30
Adey, Dr. Ross W., Chairman, Brain Research Institute,
Univ. of California
Life Sciences Panel, Chairman, App. F, Tab 8
Science and Technology Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 12
Agency Retirement Program in DDS&T, 140
25X1 'Deputy Director, ORD
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 1
Life Sciences Panel supported by, App. F, Tab 8
mum
Amory, Robert, Deputy Director for Intelligence
25X1 transfer of OSI to DD/R opposed by, 11-12
lims0
Bacalis, Brig. Gen. Paul N., USAF
appointed Director of Special Activities, App. A, Tab 46
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 2
Baker, Dr. James G., Research Assoc., Harvard Observatory
Purcell Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 6
Bannerman, Robert S., Director of Security, CIA
views on use of CIA Contract and Security Officers by
USAF, 242-243
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Batzel, Dr. Roger E., Lawrence Radiation Laboratories
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
Becker, Joseph
appointed Asst. Director for Computer Services, App. A,
Tab 13
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 3
change of title, App. A, Tab 33
reassigned, App. A, Tab 45
Beckman, Dr. Arnold O., Pres., Beckman Instruments Inc.
Scientific Advisory Board, Member, App. F, Tab 1
Beerli, Col. Stanley W., USAF, Chief, DPD/DDP, 23
Bethe, Dr. Hans, Cornell University
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
Betts, Maj. Gen. Austin W., USA, Off. of R&D
Strategic Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
Strategic Wpns. Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 9
Biographic profiles, listing of, App. B, Tabs 1-32
Bisplinghoff, Dr. Raymond L., NASA
Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
Bissell, Richard M., Jr.
Deputy Director for Plans, 7
NRO proposal made by, 187, 190-191, 192
NRO role of, 189
quoted:
assignment of air activities to DD/R and DD/P, 20
project versus functional organization, 21
NRO concept, 192
recommendations on DPD reorganization, 9, 19-21
scientific directorate opposed by, 5, 7-8
resignation, App. A, Tab 1
U-2 project manager, 5
Blake, John F.
appointed Executive Off., DD/S&T, 116, 135, App. A, Tab 11
budget economies in DD/S&T discussed by, 103
reassigned, App. A, Tab 40
Blasingame, Dr. Benjamin P., General Motors Corp.
Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
Bode, Dr. Hendrik W., Bell Telephone Laboratories
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Brandwein, David S
appointed Director, FMSAC, 88, App. A, Tab 44
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 4
GMAIC Chairman, 88
Brewer, Prof. Leo, Dept. of Chemistry, Univ. of Calif.
Scientific Advisory Board, Member, App. F, Tab 1
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Briggs, Charles A.
appointed Director of Computer Services, App. A, Tab 45
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 5
Bross, John, Comptroller; D/NIPE
role in drafting NRO Agreements, 203-204, 282
appoin tea uompuuer
App. A, Tab 24
Bundy, McGeorge, Special Asst. to the President
quoted:
NRO documentary basis, 202-203
Chief, Security Management Staff,
0/DDS&T, App. A, Tab 58
Burnett, Dr. James, TRW
Science and Technology Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 12
ocience Adviser to OCS, 113,
Cabell, Lt. Gen. C. P., USAF, DDCI, 188
Career Development Course, DDS&T, 140-143
Career Management Staff, 0/DDS&T
mission and functions, App. A, Tab 30
Career Service. See "R" Career Service.
Carter, Maj. Gen. Marshall S., USA, DDCI, 21
CORONA contracting discussed by in NRP ExCom, 272-273
quoted:
guidelines for DDS&T relations with USIB, 87
JRC/NRO agreement, 226
role in transfer of OSI to DD/R, 53-54
transfer of DPD projects to DD/R announced by, 21
Central Intelligence group established, 1
Chamberlain, Dr. Donald F.
appointed Asst. Director for Scientific Intelligence,
DDS&T, 63, App. A, Tab 28
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 7
Chief, Atomic, Biological and Chemical Division, OSI,
DDI, 63
JAEIC Chairman, 88
quoted:
transfer of OSI to DD/R favored, 63
R Career Service Board Chairman, 111
title changed, App. A, Tab 33
CORONA. See listing under National Reconnaissance Program,
CIA role in.
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appointed Acting Asst. Director for Research and Develop-
ment, DDS&T, App. A, Tab 22
appointed Asst. Director for Research and Development,
DDS&T, App. A, Tab 32
appointed Dep. Asst. Director for Research and Develop-
ment, DDS&T, App. A, Tab 12
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 8
title changed, App. A, Tab 33
Charyk, Dr. Joseph V., Under Secretary of the Air Force
NRO role of, 189-190, 192, 195
quoted:
financial control of NRP, views on, 207
resignation, 209
Strategic Intellizence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
appointed Dep. Director of Computer Services, App. A,
Tab 45
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 9
Cline, Dr. Ray S.
appointed DD/I, 14
opposes transfer of OSI to DDR, 14-15, 50-51, 53-54, 57
quoted:
basis for a scientific directorate outlined by, 51
Collection Guidance Staff, DDI, 308-310
Collection of scientific intelligence by DDS&T, 95-96,
100, 173-175
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
(COMIREX), 89-90
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), 72, 89-90
Computer Services, Office of (OCS)
Automatic Data Processing Division acquired by, App. A,
Tab 20
Becker, Joseph, appointed Asst. Director of, App. A,
Tab 13
Briggs, Charles A., appointed Director of, App. A, Tab 45
establishment of under DDS&T, 65-68, App. A, Tab 10
mission of, App. A, Tab 63
outlook for increased computer use, 67-68
status report on, 1963-70, 332-335
Contingency plan for satellite incidents, 265-266
Contract Information System, 163, 173
Contracting in support of NRP, 200, 240-244, 269-270,
271-275. ADD. D, Tabs 9, 10, 57, 66, 67
Secty, PFIAB
Working Group on Organization, CIA, Member, 6
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Crowley, John J.
appointed Director, Office of Special Projects, 286,
App. A, Tab 37
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 10
proposed assignment of to SAFSP, 273-274
quoted:
CIA/USAF relations in NRO, 290
Culler, Floyd L., Jr., Director, Chemical Technology Div.
Oak Ridge Natl. Laboratory
Roddis Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 4
Cunningham, James A., Jr.
appointed Asst. Director of Special Activities, 23-24
appointed Special Asst. to DDS&T, App. A, Tab 46
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 11
quoted:
JCS/JRC-NRO Agreement, 229-230
Curtin, Brig. Gen. Richard D., USAF, Director NRO Staff,
200
David, Dr. Edward E., Science Adviser to the President, 180
Davis, Maj. Gen. Waymond A., USAF, Cdr., Ballistic Missiles
and Space Division, Air Force Systems Command
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 9
Defense, Department of
agreements with CIA on NRP, 188-189, 194-195, 204-207,
212-213, 254, 277-279, 282-283, App. D, Tabs 2, 3, 5,
11, 14, 69
DDS&T relations with, 125-127, 208. See also National
Reconnaissance Program subheadings.
DeFlores, RAdm. Luis, USN, Ret.
Chairman, CIA Research Advisory Board, App. F, Tab 1
Deputy Director for Research. See also Directorate for
Research.
appointment of Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., as, 8-9
Office of DD/R T/0 approved, 15-16, fig. 1
resignation of Dr. Scoville, 46-47
Deputy Director for Science and Technology. See also
Directorate for Science and Technology.
Duckett, Carl E., confirmation as, 132-133
mission of, App. A, Tab 63
organization, office of, 71-75, App. A, Tab 17
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Deputy Director for Science and Technology (contid)
staff reorganization, 0/DDS&T, 133-138
Wheelon, Dr. Albert D., appointed, 60-61
Deputy for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation,
165, 293
Development Projects Division, DD/P
CORONA operations under, 239-240
elements transferred to DD/R, 9, 10, 13, 19-23, App. A,
Tab 3
NRO Agreement drafting role, 189-190
Chief, DD/R Registry, 16
Director ot Reconnalbsance, CIA
appointment of, 285
appointment of Asst. for Financial Management under, 285,
App. A, Tab 42
role redefined, 292-293
Directorate for Research (DD/R)
establishment of, 6-9, App. A, Tab 2
mission outlined, 17-19, App. A, Tab 4
office space, 29-31
organization, 10-37
organization reviewed by DCI, 38-40
organizational structure, Wheelon/Kirkpatrick views on, 41
personnel recruitment for, 31-32
R Career Service established by, 33-35
reorganization plans for proposed by McCone, 52-53
Scientific Pay Schedule approved for, 35-36
transfer of DPD activities to, 21-23, App. A, Tab 3
Directorate for Science and Technology (DD/S&T)
budgeting for, 101-107
contract management under, 156-165
comptroller system introduced in, 105
computerization in, 105
Duckett, Carl E., appointed Asst. Deputy Director of,
131-132, App. A, Tab 44; Actg. Deputy Director of, 132,
App. A, Tab 48; Deputy Director of, 132-133, App. A, Tab 49
establishment of, 56, App. A, Tab 10
facilities and properties acquired by, 78-80, 143-144,
App. E, Tabs 1-17
functional organization of, 93-96, 305-307
guidelines for relations with DDI, 63-64, App. A, Tab 15
interdepartmental relations of, 125-127
intra-Agency relations of, 117-123
Management Information System initiated by, 158
mission and functions of, 307, 311-313, App. A, Tab 63
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Directorate for Science and Technology (DD/S&T) (cont'd)
office space occupied by, 107-109
organizational development chart of, App. C, Tab 1
personnel:
Career Development Course, 140-143
graduate degree holders, 113-115, App. C, Tab 3
manpower growth, 139-140, App. C, Tab 2
overseas assignees, 74
R Career Service, 32-35, 109-111, App. A, Tabs 5, 14,
19, 29
recruiting, 112-115
retirement program, 140
Scientific Pay Schedule (SPS), 31-32, 35-37, 111, 115,
App. A, Tabs 7, 26, 41, 59
supergrades, 36-37, 112
table of organization, fig. 3, fol. p. 94
training, 140-143
Procurement Division, Office of Logistics, relations
with, 156-157
procurement team concept introduced in, 159-161
production and publication responsibilities of, 63-65
reorganization of Deputy Director's staff, 1966, 133-138
requirements and priorities for, 307-311
research, development and analysis contracts of, 161-165
research, development and engineering role of, 148-155,
App. A, Tab 62
scientific advisory bodies of, 80-87, App. F, Tabs 1-13
scientific community relations of, 128-129
USIB committee responsibilities of, 62-63, 87-90
Wheelon, Dr. Albert D. See separate listing under "W"
White House relations of, 90-92, 124-125
Domestic Operations Division, DD/P
air proprietary activities transferred to, 19-20
Donnelly, Lt. Gen. H. C., USAF, Ret., Defense Atomic
Support Agency (moved to AEC in 1969)
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
Donovan, Dr. Allan F., Sr. Vice Pres., Aerospace Corp.
Purcell Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 6
Space Intelligence Panel, App. F, Tab 10
Stern Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 5
Doolittle, General James, Space Technology Laboratories,
Board of Directors, 59
Draper, Dr. Charles Stark, Head, Dept. of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, M.I.T.
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 9
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Drell, Dr. Sidney, Stanford University
Chairman, Photographic Working Panel, 249-251
Duckett, Carl E.
appointed Acting DD/S&T, 132, App. A, Tab 48
appointed Asst. DD/S&T, 131-132, App. A, Tab 44
appointed Chairman of GMAIC, 88
appointed Director of FMSAC, 70-71, 88, App. A, Tab 16
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 12
confirmed as DD/S&T, 132-133, App. A, Tab 49
management philosophy as DD/S&T, 170-173
NRP role of, 291-293, App. D, Tabs 76, 77
priorities established by, 173-176
production of intelligence under, 176-178
relations with DCI, 132-133
research, development and engineering role of, 148-155,
App. A, Tab 62
support to policymakers, 182-186
Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence, 2, 4-6
Duntley, Dr. Seibert Q., Scripps Institution of Ocean-
ography, San Diego
Optics Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 7
25X11".
Elint, Office of
Clandestine Services joint role with, 7, App. E, Tabs 7, 13
establishment of under DD/R, 25-27, App. A, Tab 4
Headquarters Elint Processing Center of, 78, App. E, Tab 9
mission of defined, 25-26, App. A, Tab 63
.rn
Estes, Lt. Gen. Howell W., USAF, Dep. Cdr., Aerospace
rn.
Systems
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Evans, Brig. Gen. Harry Lee, Vice Director, MOL Program, USAF
Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
External advisory groups, 82-87, 166-167, App. F, Tabs 1-13
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Eyer, Dr. James A., Asst. Director Institute of Optics,
University of Rochester
Chairman, Optics Panel, App. F, Tab 7
Scientific Advisory Board, Member, App. F, Tab 1
Eyster, Dr. Eugene H., Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
Tab 28
Finger, Dr. Harold B., Manager, Space Nuclear Propulsion
Office, AEC
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
, Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
'China Coordinator, 174-175
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC)
Ballistic Missiles and Space Division, OSI, transferred
to, 71, App. A, Tab 39
Brandwein, Davis S., second Director of, and Chairman of
GMAIC, 88, App. A, Tab 44
Duckett, Carl E., first Director of, 70-71
establishment of, under DD/S&T, 68-71, App. A, Tab 16
Inspector General's Survey of, 161-165, 168-170
mission of, App. A, Tab 63
status report on, 1963-1970, 335-339
Foster, Dr. John S., Jr., Lawrence Radiation Laboratories,
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 9
Froelich, Dr. Joseph E., Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Fubini, Dr. Eugene G., Deputy Director, Defense Research
and Engineering
CIA/Air Force roles in satellite reconnaissance, views
on, 260-261
Purcell Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 6
Stern Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 5
Fhief, Action Staff, 0/DDS&T, 73-74, App. A,
Garrett, Dr. George A., Lockheed Missile and Space Division
Roddis Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 4
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Garwin, Dr. Richard, Watson Laboratories; Member, PSAC
Purcell Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 6
Gewertz, Harry, Systems and Instruments Division, Bulova
Watch Company
Optics Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 7
Giller, Colonel Edward B., USAF
appointed Assistant DD/R, 16
appointed Assistant DD/S&T, 115
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 13
designated Actg. Asst. Director for R&D, 28-29
views on NRO/JRC relations, 228
Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense
NRP Review Committee proposed by, App. D, Tab 47
resignation from DOD, 260
signer, letter agreement establishing NRP, 188
signer, NRO Agreement of 2 May 1962, 194
supporter of NRO/JRC agreement, 221, 224-225, 227
Gordon, Dr. Kermit, Brookings Institution
Strategic Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
Gottlieb, Dr. Sidney, Chief, Technical Services Division,
DD/P, 148, 151-152
Grabowski, Edward J., Chief, Isotope Separation Branch,
Atomic Energy Commission
Roddis Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 4
Action Staff, 0/DDS&T, 74
Greer, Maj. Gen. Robert, USAF, Director, SAFSP
directs Air Force satellite reconnaissance programs, 239
takes over CORONA responsibilities, 240-243
use of CIA Contract and Security Officers by, 240-243
Hafstad, Dr. Lawrence R., Vice Pres. for Research,
General Motors Corp.
Webster Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 3
Haussman, Dr. Carl, Lawrence Radiation Laboratories,
Strategic Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 9
Chief, Plans and Programs Staff, 0/DDS&T,
App. A, Tab 35
Helms, Richard M.
appointed DD/P, 8, App. A, Tab 1
opposes transfer of TSD to DD/R, 10-11
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Helms, Richard M, (contid)
relations with DD/S&T, 132-133, 182-184
relieves Director of Reconnaissance and abolishes
position, 292
remarks on presenting Intelligence Medal to Dr. Wheelon,
183
Executive Officer, DD/S&T, 135, 137,
ADD. A, Tab 40
Director, Career Development
Course V, 143
Hoover Commission, Task Force on National Security Organi-
zation, 2
Hyland, Dr. Lawrence A., Vice Pres. and Gen. Mgr., Hughes
Aircraft
Chairman, Hyland Panel, App. F, Tab 2
Chairman, Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, App. F,
Tab 9
Hyland Panel, App. F, Tab 2
appointed Deputy Director of Elint, DD/S&T, App. A, Tab 45
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 14
Information Processing Research and Development Center, ORD,
App. E, Tab 15
Irvine, Charles R., ARPA
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
appointed Executive ui icer, DD/S&T, 138
Member R Career Service Board, 111
Chief, General Sciences Division, OSI, assigned as
Spec. Asst. to Actg. Asst. Director for R&D, App. A,
Tab 27
Johnson, Clarence L., Vice Pres., Lockheed Aircraft Co.
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 9
Joint Research and Development Board, 1-2
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Chief, Intelligence Liaison Support
Staff, 0/DDS&T, 137, App. A, Tab 47
Director, Career Development Course III, 142
Kiefer, Eugene P.
Deputy Director, NRO, 219-220, App. D, Tab 35
recommended as Executive to DDNRO, 214
resignation, 266-268, App. D, Tab 56
Special Asst. for Technical Analysis, DPD, 189-190
Support to Purcell Panel, App. F, Tab 6
Killam, Dr. Keith F., Asst. Prof. of Pharmacology,
Stanford University
Life Sciences Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 8
Killian, Dr. James R., Jr., Pres., M.I.T.
Boston Dinner co-sponsor, 128
Chairman, PFIAB, 8
Chairman, Surprise Attack Committee, 3-4
Special Asst. to the President for S&T, 234
lAsst. for Admin., DD/R
role in organizing DD/R, 16-17
Kinzel, August B.
Chairman, Scientific Advisory Board, 82-86, App. F, Tab 1
Kirchner, Dr. Werner, Aerojet General Corp.
Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 9
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B.
appointed Executive Director, CIA, 14
approves enlargement of DD/R, 55
Inspector General, CIA, 6
publishes mission and responsibilities of DD/R, 17-18
quoted:
evolution of DD/R, 15
Working Group on Organization, Chairman of, 6, 13
Kirkpatrick-Coyne-Schuyler Committee. See Working Group
on Organization.
Kissinger, Dr. Henry A., Special Asst. to the President
approves revised estimating procedures, 184-186
Kistiakowsky, Dr. George, Prof. of Chemistry, Harvard Univ.
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 9
Klein, Milton, Atomic Energy Commission
Atomic Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
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Kohler, Foy D., Director, Center for Advanced International
Studies, University of Miami, Florida
Strategic Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
Chief, Security Management Staff, 0/DDS&T,
136
DC/TSD, 149-150
Chief, Budget Branch, 0/DDS&T, 135, App. A,
Tab 4(
Land, Dr. Edwin H., President, Polaroid Corp.
Boston Dinners attendee, 128
Chairman, PSAC Reconnaissance Panel, 279
NRO Staff composition, interest in, 227-228
plea for harmony in NRO by, 280-281, App. D, Tab 61
Purcell Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 6
LaPierre, Cramer W., Exec. Vice Pres., General Electric Co.
Webster Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 3
Larsen, Dr. Finn, Dep. Director, Defense Research & Engineering
Science and Technology Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 12
appointed Asst. DD/bsri, 171-172, App. A, Tab 50
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 15
resignation, 139
Science and Technology Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 12
Lawrence Radiation Laboratories
contract for external research facility, App. E, Tab 12
Contracting Officer
assigned to bAkbP, 240-244
Chief, Procurement Management Staff, 0/DDS&T, 160-161
delegation of authority, App. D, Tabs 9, 10
reports on CIA/AF relations at SAFSP, App. D, Tab 48
withdrawn from SAFSP, 269-270, App. D, Tab 57
Ledford, Col. Jack C., USAF (Later Brig. Gen.)
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 16
named Asst. Director for Special Activities, 24, App. A,
Tab 28
opposes JRC/NRO agreement, 221-222
title changed, App. A, Tab 33
Lehan, Frank, Asst. Secty. for Research and Technology,
Department of Transportation
Science and Technology Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 12
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Libby, Dr. Willard F., Univ. of California at Los Angeles,
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
Webster Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 3
Lindsay, Frank, President of Itek
camera contract terms discussed by with DCI, 276
Ling, Dr. Donald P., Bell Telephone Laboratories
Purcell Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 6
Stern Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 5
Lovelace, Dr. William Randolph, Lovelace Foundation
Life Sciences Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 8
Lundahl, Dr. Arthur C., Director, NPIC
Purcell Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 6
appointed Assistant for Financial Management to Director
of Reconnaissance, 134, App. A, Tabs 42, 74
appointed Comptroller, DD/S&T, 134-135, App. A, Tab 47
appointed Executive Officer in addition to Comptroller,
App. A, Tab 53
appointed Chief, Amin. Staff, 0/DDS&T, App. A, Tab 28
appointed Chief, Procurement Management Staff, 135-136
ranazement Information System, DD/S&T, 173
Contracting Officer
delegation of autnority re NRP procurement, 240-244,
App. D, Tabs 9 and 10
Martin, Col. John, USAF, Director, NRO Staff
terms of reference for DD/NRO stated by, 215-220
Mathews, Dr. Charles W., NASA
Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
appointed uniei, krstems Analysis Staff, 0/DDS&T, 73, 113
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 17
CORONA Short History by, App. D, Tab 63
May, Dr. Michael, Lawrence Radiation Laboratories
Science and Technology Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 12
McCone, John A.
appointed DCI, 6, 190
critical of CIA's scientific effort, 39-41
Directorate of Research established by, 6-9
principles established for new NRO Agreement by, 277-278,
App. D, Tab 60
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McCone, John A. (cont'd)
quoted:
CIA role in satellite reconnaissance, 259-260
opposition faced by in establishing DD/R, 17, 46
planned expansion of DD/R, 46
plans for reorganizing DD/R, 52-53
purpose in establishing DD/R, 7
report to PFIAB on Scientific Advisory Board, 83-84
responsibility of DCI for overflight of denied
territory, 224
report to PFIAB on development of CIA's S&T capabilities,
45-46
report to PFIAB on NRO problems, 227
resignation, 276, 278-279
urges strong CIA effort in satellite program, 244-245,
259-260
McMahon, John N.
appointed DD/OSP, 286, App. A, Tab 37
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 18
support to Purcell Panel, App. F, Tab 6
McMillan, Dr. Brockway, Under Secretary of the Air Force
appointed DNRO, 210-211
proposed formal tie of NRO with JCS/JRC, 220-223
quoted:
opposed to monitoring by DD/S&T, 255
terms of reference, DDNRO, 215-216
suitability for DNRO job, 211
urges transfer of CORONA to Air Force control, 258-260
Wheelon confrontation, 280-281
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense
views on NRO organization, 204-206
McRae, Dr. James Wilson, Vice Pres., A.T.& T.
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Medaris, Maj. Gen. John B., C/G, U.S. Army Ordnance
Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Meinel, Dr. Aden B., Professor of Astronomy, University
of Arizona
Optics Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 7
Mettler, Dr. Ruben, President, TRW
Chairman, Strategic Intelligence Panel, App. F, Tab 13
encourages Wheelon service in CIA, 58-59
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Miller, George C.
appointed Asst. Director of Elint, 25-26, App. A, Tab 28
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Miller, George C. (cont'd)
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 19
title changed, App. A, Tab 33
Chief, Action Staff, 0/DDS&T, App. A.,
Pah 21
Comptroller, DD/S&T, 138-139, App. A, Tab 57
N
;Naka. F. Robert, Deuty Director, NRO, 179
I
appointea uniei, irbneral Sciences Division, OSI,
25X1 vice App. A, Tab 27
National Estimates, 178, 184-186, 331
National Intelligence Authority, 1
National Photo Interpretation Center, 13, 145-146
National Reconnaissance Office. See National Reconnaissance
Program.
National Reconnaissance Program
agreements, 188-189, 194-195, 204-207, 212-213, 254,
277-279, 282-283, App. D, Tabs 2, 3, 5, 11, 14, 69
budgeting, 101-107, 179-180, 195, 200-202, 203-204,
205-207, 213, 230, 280, App. D, Tab 8
CIA programs blanketed under, 79
CIA role in:
Air Force opposition to, 208-210, 224-225, 227, 228-229,
245-246, 271-277, 289-290, 293, App. D, Tabs 12, 32,
65, 66, 67
CORONA/ARGON Series, 235
CORONA cover arrangements, 235
CORONA development program, 234-238
CORONA improvement program, 238, 249-251, App. D, Tab 43
CORONA incident, Mission 1005, 265-266
CORONA management by CIA, 258-262, 270-277, 286-287, 318,
'mord
App. D, Tabs 44, 49, 55, 58, 66, 67
covert contracting, 200, 240-244, 269-270, 271-275,
App. D, Tabs 9, 10, 57, 66, 67
DCI responsibility for overhead reconnaissance, 277-278,
App. D, Tab 25
DDCI (Gen. Carter) support for, 226
DD/S&T assumes responsibility for, 246
Development Projects Division role in developing NRO
Agreement, 189-190
stimed
rood
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National Reconnaissance Program (cont'd)
CIA role in: (cont'd)
Director/Reconnaissance, CIA, appointed, 284-285,
App. D, Tab 71
IDISCOVERER cover series, 235
280-281
'assigned WA, 282, 287-288
joint versus single agency control of NRP, 278, 280, 284
P set up to support NRP, 285-286
direction assigned CIA, 288, 320, 321, 323
responsibilities under August 1965 agreement, 282-283
security responsibility of CIA, 197, 215, App. D, Tab 72
Contingency Plan for satellite incidents, App. D, Tab 80
Deputy Director, NRO:
Charyk opposes naming of, 196-197
CIA nominee for, 195-196, 202
DD/R Scoville's appointment as, 38, 47, 201, 213
DD/R's NRO role recommended by Wheelon, 48
Gilpatric agrees to CIA nominee for, 210
Kiefer replaces Scoville as, App. D, Tab 35
Kiefer resigns as, App. D, Tab 56
Reber succeeds Kiefer as, 284
sterile role of, under McMillan, 252-253
terms of reference of:
DDCI (Gen. Carter) views on, 217-218, App. D, Tab 26
DNRO McMillan's views on, App. D, Tabs 19, 22, 215-220
General Counsel's views on, App. D, Tabs 33, 34
Scoville's views on, 214-217, App. D, Tabs 15, 20
Director, NRO:
Charyk, Dr. Joseph V., appointed as, 195
Flax, Dr. Alexander, appointed as, 284
funding responsibility of, 195
McMillan, Dr. Brockway, appointed as, 210-211
McMillan opposes monitoring of by DD/S&T, 255-257,
App. D, Tab 46
McMillan resignation as, 283
McMillan unilateral action as, 256-257, App. D, Tab 68
McMillan favors Air Force take-over of CORONA, 258-261
Executive Committee of, 257, 268-269, 271-272, 282
initial proposal for, 1966, 187-188, App. D, Tab 1
joint direction proposal for, 189-193, App. D, Tab 4
Joint Reconnaissance Center, JCS, relations with, 220-232,
App. D, Tabs 16-18, 21, 23-24, 27-31, 36-38, 40, 42
manned reconnaissance projects under, 293, 294-302. See
also listings under A-12 and U-2.
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National Reconnaissance Program (cont'd)
National Security Agency requirements for, 197-198
organization and functions, NRO, App. D, Tab 7
organizational charts, figs. 4 and 5, fol. p. 283
photo-processing agreement under, 198-199, App. D, Tab 6
staff organization, NRO, 195-197, 199-200, 252-254,
288-289, App. D, Tabs 45, 51, 52, 79
USAF role in:
Aerospace Corp. use in systems engineering, 264, 268,
271-273
CORONA management responsibilities assumed by Air
Force, 240-243, 258-261
joint USAF/CIA program proposed, 189-191
prime role in military space program assigned Air
Force, 238
WS-117L Program, 233-234
vulnerability of satellites under NRP, 302-304, App. F,
Tab 2
National Security Countil
Intelligence Survey Group, 2
memoranda, 91-92
Special Group, 92
appointed Dep. ASBL. Director for Elint, 26
, App. B, Tab 20
Director,
Nitze, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Stratperin Tntellizence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
Officer to SAFSP, 240-241
, Career Development Course I,
0
Oder, Dr. Frederick C., Lockheed Space Systems Division
Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
Ogle, Dr. William E., Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
25X1
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(cont' d)
Chief, Systems Analysis Staff, 137-138, App. A, Tab 31
transfer of to NIPE Staff, 138
Chief, Career Management Staff, 0/DDS&T,
App. A, Tab 11
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 22
Deputy Director, FMSAC, App. A, Tab 56
O'Neill, Lt. Gen. John W., USAF, Vice Cdr, Air Force Sys-
tems Command
Strategic Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
Organizational charts, DD/S&T, Frontispiece, fig. 1, fol.
p. 16, figs. 2 and 3, fol. p. 94
Overflight of denied territory
CIA responsibility for, 224-225
coordination procedures, 231-232
Panofsky, Dr. Wolfgang, btanforU-University
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F,
Tab 9
Parangosky, John
appointed Deputy Director, Special Activities, App. A,
Tab 46
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 23
appointea oecreltary to DD/R, 16
Perry, Dr. William, President, Electromagnetic Systems
Laboratory
Chairman, Science and Technology Panel, 166, App. F,
Tab 12
conflict of interest implications, 161-165, 168-170
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Personnel. See sublisting under DD/R and DD/S&T.
I Chief, Security Staff, 0/DDS&T,
App. A, Taus 11, 28
Pickering, Dr. W. H., Jet Propulsion Lab.
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
Pierce, Dr. John Robinson, Exec. Director, Communications
Systems Div., Bell Telephone Labs.
Scientific Advisory Board, Member, App. F, Tab 1
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Plans and Programs Staff, 0/DDS&T, 72-73, App. A, Tabs 17,
30
am.
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
Baker Panel of, hearings on NRO, App. D, Tab 54
Chairman Killian encourages CIA scientific approach, 8
DCI report to on NRO organization, App. D, Tab 13
DCI report to on S&T reorganization in CIA, 61-62
influence of in DD/S&T affairs, 90
informed of DNRO McMillan appointment, 211
inquiry by into NRO, spring 1964, 262-264, 277
recommendations on NRO organization, App. D, Tab 13
recommendations to Intelligence Community on technical
capabilities, 42-46
Wheelon testimony before on NRP, App. D, Tab 70
President's Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC)
DD/S&T liaison with, 124-125
establishes Reconnaissance Panel, 279-281
Production of scientific intelligence, 98-99, 176-178
Project organization versus functional organization,
...a
R. M. Bissell quoted on, 21
Purcell, Dr. Edward, Professor of Physics, Harvard Univ.
Chairman, Purcell Panel, 249-250, App. F, Tab 6
amm,
???????
Quality Elint Program, OEL, 27
R Career Service
DD/S&T Career Service Board, App. A, Tabs 14, 19, 29
DD/S&T Career Service management, 109-115
established by DD/R, 32-35, App. A, Tab 5
S&T Personnel Advisory Committee, App. A, Tab 6
Scientific Pay Scale, 31-32, 35-37, 111-115
Raborn, RAdm. William F., USN
appointed DCI, 276, 278-279
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
quoted:
Report to PFIAB on CIA/NRO relations, 290-291
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Ramo, Dr. Simon, President, TRW
Chairman, Space Intelligence Panel, App. F, Tab 10
Raymond, Dr. Arthur E., Vice Pres., Rand Inc.
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
biographic prolle, App. B, Tab 24
Chairman, COMOR, 72, 89
Chairman, Sigint Committee, 89, App. A, Tab 60
DD/NRO, experience as, App. D, Tab 78
Special Asst. (COMOR) to DD/S&T, 72, 89, App. A, Tab 21
Rechtin, Dr. Eberhard, Director, ARPA
Science and Technology Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 12
Regulatory Issuances, DD/S&T, App. A, Tabs 1-63
Research and development:
budgeting for, 152-155
coordination of RD&E, 145-155, App. A, Tab 52
division of responsibilities for between DD/P and DD/R:
Bissell recommendations, 20-21
Kirkpatrick recommendations, 17-18
Wheelon recommendations, 50
Research and Development, Office of
I appointed AD/RD, App. A, Tab 32
computer center (IPRD) established under, App. E, Tab 15
establishment of, 28-29, App. A, Tab 4
mission of, App. A, Tab 63
projects acquired from TSD by, 29
relations with TSD, 145, 148, 149-150
status report on, 1962-1970, 339-345
Retirement Program, CIA, 140
See listing under National Reconnaissance Pro-
lyrnm CT) role in.
Executive Asst. to DD/R
role in organizing DD/R, 16-17
S&T Career Service Committee proposal by, 34
Ritland, Brig. Gen. Osmond J., Vice Commander, Western
Development Division, ARDC, USAF
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
role in development of Project CORONA, 236
Roddis, Dr. Louis H., President, Pennsylvania Electric Co.
Chairman, Nuclear Intelligence Panel, App. F, Tab 11
Chairman, Roddis Panel, App. F, Tab 4
Webster Panel. Member, App. F, Tab 3
USAF (later Brig. Gen.)
assigned as Director of Special Activities, App. A, Tab 55
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 25
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Sabin, Dr. Albert, Children's Hospital Research Foundation,
Cincinnati, Ohio
Life Sciences Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 8
Schuyler, Cortlandt V. R., Maj. Gen., USA, Ret.
Working Group on Organization, Member, 6
Science and Technology Panel, App. F, Tab 12
Scientific Advisory Board
DeFlores Committee replaced by, 39-40
formation announced, 82-83, App. A, Tab 9
terms of reference, App. F, Tab 1
Wheelon recommends dissolution of, 84-87
Scientific and Technical Personnel Advisory Committee, 34-35,
App. A, Tab 6
Scientific Branch, CIG, 1-2
25X1
bcientitic intelligence, urxice or
establishment of, 2
Future Threats Branch of, 177
I.G. survey of, 1964, 64-65
integration into DD/S&T, 61-65, App. A, Tab 10
mission of, App. A, Tab 63
production of intelligence by, 98-99, 176-178
status report on, 1963-1970, 326-331
transfer to DD/R favored by Wheelon, 49
transfer to DD/R opposed by:
Amory, 11-12
Bissell, 7
Cline, 14, 50-51, 53-54, 57
Working Group on Organization, 13
Scientific Pay Schedule
establishment of, 35-36
regulations regarding, 111-112, App. A, Tabs 7, 26, 41, 59
request for establishment of, 31-32
slots for assigned to DD/R, 36-37
Scoville, Dr. Herbert, Jr.
appointed DD/R, 8-9, App. A, Tab 2
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 26
delegation of contracting authority by, App. D, Tab 9
difficulties in organizing DD/R, 10-17, 38-42, 46-47
favors establishment of scientific directorate in
CIA, 6-7
named DD/NRO by DCI McCone, 213
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Scoville, Dr. Herbert, Jr. (cont'd)
NRO relations of, 38, 191-202, 208, 211-218, 221-223,
App. D, Tabs 12, 32
quoted:
DD/R Career Service, 34
division of DPD air activities between DD/R and
DD/P, 22
draft of NRO Agreement, 193
reasons for resignation, 46
TSD research and development, 15
resignation from CIA, 46-47, 218
Seamans, Dr. Robert, Jr.
Strategic Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
Security Staff, 0/DDS&T, mission and functions, App. A, Tab 30
Chief, Plans and Programs Branch, 0/DDS&T,
13, App. A, Tab 47
Shea, Dr. Joseph F., Program Manager, Apollo Spacecraft
Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
Stern Panel. Member, Arp. F, Tab 5
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 27
Chairman, Sigint Committee, 89
Chairman, USIB Watch Committee, App. A, Tab 18
Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, 131-132, 135, 291-293,
App. D, Tabs 73, 75, 76
retirement announced, App. A, Tab 60
Special Asst. to DCI, App. A, Tab 43
Special Asst. to DD/S&Ti 75, 116, App. A, Tab 18
biographic profile, App B, Tab 28
Chairman, RD&E Review Board, 150-151
prepares Project Officers' Manual, 147-148
Special Asst. to DD/S&T for R&D, 115-116, 138, App. A, Tab 36
Siegmund, Dr. Walter, American Optical Co.
Optics Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 7
143, App. E, Tab 16
Executive Otticer, OhL, app. A, Tab 28
named Deputy Director, OSA, vice Mr. Parangosky, App. A,
Tab 60
Smith, Abbott, Chairman, Board of National Estimates, views
on DD/S&T intelligence production, 99
Smith, Rear Adm. Levering, USN, Technical Director,
Special Projects Office
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
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Smith, Rear Adm. Levering, USN (contid)
Strategic Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 9
Chief, Plans and Programs Staff,
0/DDS&T, 72-73
Space Intelligence Panel, App. F, Tab 10
Special Activities, Office of
CORONA operations under, 240-244
covert procurement for NRP projects by, 240-244, 269-270,
271-275, App. D, Tabs 9, 10
Director of named, 240
establishment under DD/R, 19-24, 240, App. A, Tab 4
mission, App. A, Tab 63
qualifications for Director of, 24
status report on. 1963-1970. 314-318
Special Projects, Office of
Director and Deputy Director named, 76, 286
establishment of announced, 76-77, 285-286, App. A, Tab 37
projects assigned to, 286
relationship to NRO, 77, 285-291
status report on, 1965-1970, 318-320
West Coast A/P Facility of, App. E, Tab 5
Special Projects Staff, 0/DDS&T
Crowley named Chief, App. A, Tab 34
mission of, App. A, Tab 30
Spint Staff, 0/DDS&T, 75, App. A, Tab 23
disestablished, App. A, Tab 61
Staebler, Ulysses, Senior Assoc. Director, AEC Division of
Reactor Development
Roddis Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 4
Steininger, Donald H.
appointed Asst. DD/S&T, App. A, Tab 60
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 30
member R Career Service Board, 111
support to S&T Panel, App. F, Tab 12
support to Strategic Intelligence Panel, App. F, Tab 13
Stern, Dr. Marvin, Vice Pres. for Research, North American
Aviation
Chairman, Stern Panel, App. F, Tab 5
Stever, Prof. H. Guyford, Chairman, Mechanical Engineering
and Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering Dept.,
M.I.T.
Science Advisory Board, Member, App. F, Tab 1
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Stever, Prof. H. Guyford (cont'd)
Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
Stewart, Maj. Gen. James T., Office of the Secretary of
the Air Force
Space Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 10
Strategic Intelligence Panel, App. F, Tab 13
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, App. F, Tab 9
Career Development Course IV, Director,
14G
Systems Analysis Staff, 0/DDS&T, 73, 113, 137-138,
App. A, Tab 30
Tape, Dr. Gerald F., Associated Universities, Inc.
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
Technical Services Division, DD/P
DeFlores Committee advisory to, 40
RD&E Review Board relations of, 149-150
transfer of its R&D activities opposed by DD/P, 7, 10-11
transfer of its R&D activities recommended by Working
Group on Organization, 13
Terhune, Lt. Gen. Charles H., USAF, Vice Cdr, Air Force
Systems Command
Strateeic Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
Special Asst. to DD/S&T and Chairman, COMOR, App. A, Tab 38
transfer of to COMIREX under DD/I, App. A, Tab 51
Tobias, Prof. Cornelius Anthony, Donner Laboratory
Life Sciences Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 8
Scientific Advisory Board, Member, App. F, Tab 1
Training, DD/S&T
A-12 training base, 78-79, App. E, Tab 1
Career Development Course, 140-143
Elint training center, 79, App. E, Tab 8
U-2 test and training base, 78, App. E, Tab 2
TRW Systems Group
contracts with DD/S&T, 161-165, 167, 168-170
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U-2 program
CIA/USAF agreement, 187
facilities maintained, 78, App. E, Tabs 2, 3, 4
program continued under NRP, 294-295
USIB Committees
COMOR/COMIREX, 89-90
DD/S&T responsibilities for, 87-90
guidelines for DD/S&T relations with, 87
Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence
Committee, 87-88
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, 88
Scientific Intelligence Committee, 88-89
Sigint Committee, 89
V
Vanstrum, Paul R., Union Carbide Corp.
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
'Chief, Management Systems Branch,
0/DDS&T, 135, 173, App. A, Tab 47
Watson, Dr. Kenneth M., Dept. of Physics, University
of California
Stern Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 5
Weber, Dr. Karl H.
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 31
Chairman Scientific Intelligence Committee, 88-89
Deputy Asst. Director for Production, OSI, under
DD/S&T, 62-63, App. A, Tab 28
produces OSI History, 65
Webster, William, President, New England Electric System
Chairman, Webster Panel, App. F, Tab 3
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
Wheelon, Dr. Albert D.
appointed Asst. Director for Scientific Intelligence,
DD/I, 58-59
appointed Deputy Director for Science and Technology,
60-61, 114
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Wheelon, Dr. Albert D. (cont'd)
biographic profile, App. B, Tab 32
Boston Dinners initiated by, 128'
Chairman, R Career Service Board, 110-111
Chairman R&D Review Board, App. A, Tab 11
confrontation with DNRO McMillan, 280-281, App. D, Tab 61
CORONA Short History by, App. D, Tab 59
Hyland Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 2
Hyland Panel usefulness questioned by, App. F, Tab 2
DD/R organization structure discussed by, 41, 48-50
Kiefer resignation, views on, App. D, Tab 56
NRO problems of CIA, views on, 246-249, App. D, Tabs 39,
41, 50, 53, 64
NRO Agreement, principles outlined by, App. D, Tab 60
personnel policies of, 60, 99, 110-111, 114-115
PFIAB briefed by, App. D, Tab 70
philosophy of management, 97-100
quoted:
budgetary restrictions on DD/S&T, 93
CIA role in manned reconnaissance, 229
DNRO opposition to monitoring by DD/S&T, 256-257
functional organization of DD/S&T, 94
NRO staffing by CIA, 252-254
outlook for increased computer use in CIA, 67-68
personnel policy, 114-115
Scientific Advisory Board usefulness, 84-85
technical direction of CORONA payload, 276-277
relations with:
117-120
scientific community, 128-129
White House, 124-125
higher echelons, intra-Agency, 117-127
staff of DD/S&T, 115-117, 129-130
resignation from CIA, 129-130
scientific input to DCI meetings, 47
testimony at Baker Panel hearings on NRO, App. D, Tab 54
White House
Boards and Committees, 90-92
NSC, 91-92
PFIAB, 42-46, 61-62, 90, 93, 124-125
PSAC, 90-91, 124-125
Science Adviser, 124, 180
DD/I,
59-60,
DD/P,
120-121
DD/S,
121-123
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Chief, Optics Division, ORD, 29
working uroup on Organization (Kirkpatrick-Coyne-Schuyler
Committee), 6, 8, 12, 13-14, 19, 21, 66
Worthington, Hood, E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
Nuclear Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 11
Roddis Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 4
York, Dr. Herbert, University of California at San Diego
Strategic Intelligence Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 13
Yutzy, Dr. Henry, Eastman Kodak Company
Purcell Panel, Member, App. F, Tab 6
v. Career Management Officer, DD/S&T, App. A, Tab 25
+
Chief, Administrative Support Staff, 0/DDS&T, 137,
App. A, Tab 47
Executive Secretary, R Career Service Board, 111
Personnel Officer, DD/S&T, App. A, Tab 28
Amami
lwa.7
4?4??????
asmoi,
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
marn IN THE HISTORY OF
THE DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
1961 - 1970
1961
6 September
rood
Initial letter of agreement on establishment
of a National Reconnaissance Program signed
by General C. P. Cabell, DDCI, and
Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary
of Defense.
.1 29 November Mr. John A. McCone named to succeed
Mr. Allen W. Dulles as DCI.
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5 December Working Group on Organization of CIA
established by Mr. McCone with the Inspector
General of CIA, Mr. L. B. Kirkpatrick, as
Chairman; one phase of its investigation was
to study and make recommendations with regard
to the establishment of a scientific direc-
torate in the Agency.
1962
5 January
10 January
14 January
19 February
Secretary of PFIAB,
and General Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, U.S.
Army, Retired, named to the Working Group on
Organization.
Mr. McCone's proposal for a scientific
directorate opposed by Mr. R. M. Bissell, Jr.,
Deputy Director for Plans, in memorandum to
the DCI.
Mr. McCone announced that a Directorate for
Research and Development was to be estab-
lished in the near future
Directorate for Research established and
Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., named as the DD/R
16 February 1962).
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1962 cont'd
23 February
6 March
19 March
6 April
8 April
10 April
15 April
Organization meeting on National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) held between Dr. Scoville and
Dr. Joseph V. Charyk, Under Secretary of the
Air Force.
Mr. Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans,
opposed the transfer of TSD's clandestine
support activities to the DD/R.
Mr. Robert Amory, Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence, opposed the transfer of the Office of
Scientific Intelligence to the DD/R.
Report of the Working Group on Organization
of CIA (Kirkpatrick l I rendered
to the DCI; included recommendations on the
functions to be transferred to the DD/R.
The DD/R received its first call for five-
year budget projections for FY 1963-67.
Mr. L. B. Kirkpatrick appointee Executive
Director of CIA.
Development Projects Division's special
reconnaissance projects transferred to the
DD/R 16 April 1962).
23 April Dr. Ray S. Cline named DD/I vice Mr. Amory,
transferred to the Bureau of the Budget.
2 May
3 May
2 June
NRO Agreement signed by Messrs. McCone and
Gilpatric; no provision made for a CIA
Deputy Director of NRO; control of funding
assigned to NRO.
Appointment of Dr. Joseph V. Charyk as
Director, NRO, agreed between Messrs. McCone
and Gilpatric.
Col. Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security,
CIA, requested by the DD/R to initiate action
to establish Security Policy Unit and Special
Security Control Center to carry out the terms
of the NRO Agreement regarding security.
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1962 cont'd
22 June
27 June
30 July
30 July
1 August
6 August
1 September
4 September
11 September
15 October
First Table of Organization for the Office
of the DD/R approved by the DD/S.
Col. Edward B. Giller, Deputy Chief of TSD,
appointed Assistant DD/R.
Mission of DD/R set forth; Office of Re-
search and Development, Office of Elint,
and Office of Special Activities estab-
lished under the DD/R; all functions and
personnel of Development Projects Division
except Air Support Branch transferred to
OSA.
Mr. George C. Miller named Assistant Direc-
tor for Elint, DD/R.
Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., named Acting
Assistant Director for Special Activities,
DD/R.
First CIA Security Officer assigned to the
NRO Staff 1
OSA Contracts Staff authorized by Acting
Director, General Marshall S. Carter, to
do covert procurement in furtherance of
NRP objectives.
Col. Jack C. Ledford, USAF, designated
Assistant Director for Special Activities,
DD/R; Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., named
Deputy Assistant Director for Special
Activities, DD/R.
Dr. Scoville requested the DD/S to set up
a special salary scale for scientific
personnel; the result was the Scientific
Pay Schedule (SPS).
Office of Communications,
named Deputy Assistant Director for Elint,
DD/R.
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1962 cont'd
29 November
1963
23 January
30 January
19 February
1 March
8 March
13 March
21 March
26 March
Col. Edward B. Giller named Acting Assistant
Director for Research and Development, DD/R,
in addition to his position as Assistant
DD/R.
Dr. Eugene G. Fubini named as interim
Director of NRO by Mr. Gilpatric, following
the resignation of Dr. Charyk.
Mr. Gilpatric agrees with Mr. McCone to
have a CIA-appointed Deputy Director of
NRO (to be approved by Secretary of Defense).
"R" Career Service inaugurated and DD/R
Career Service Panel established in DD/R.
Dr. Brockway McMillan appointed Director
of NRO by Mr. Gilpatric with Mr. McCone's
agreement.
The President's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
visory Board recommended action by CIA and
DOD to improve their capabilities in the
scientific and technological intelligence
field.
Revised NRO Agreement entitled "Agreement
Between the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence on Man-
agement of the National Reconnaissance
Program" signed by Messrs. Gilpatric and
McCone.
Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr. appointed DD/NRO
by Mr. McCone with Mr. Gilpatric's con-
currence.
Scientific and Technical Personnel Advisory
Committee established to advise the Director
of Personnel on management of S&T personnel.
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1963 cont'd
13 April
15 April
16 April
25 April
4 June
26 June
1 July
2 July
16 July
Scientific Pay Schedule (SPS) established
for specially qualified scientific person-
nel in CIA.
Purcell Panel initiated to advise the DCI
on the future course of the National
Reconnaissance Program; Dr. Edward Purcell
of Harvard University, Chairman.
Research and Development Review Board
established with the DDCI as Chairman to
review and integrate research and develop-
ment activities and scientific and techni-
cal efforts in the various Agency components
concerned.
Dr. Scoville writes letter of resignation to
the DCI, effective 1 June 1963 (later ex-
tended to 14 June 1963).
Mr. Gilpatric requests that the DCI,
Mr. McCone, not raise with higher levels
the issue of CIA's responsibility for plan-
ning and conduct of overflights of denied
territory for intelligence collection;
Mr. McCone agreed not to raise the issue.
Mr. McCone briefed the PFIAB on the con-
flict in the NRO between CIA and the Air
Force on the CIA role in the NRP.
Scientific Advisory Board established to
review and advise the DCI on the total
scientific functions of the Agency.
Dr. Augustus B. Kinzel appointed Chairman.
Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer's appointment as
Deputy Director, NRO, announced by the
Director of the NRO Staff.
Dr. Ray S. Cline, DD/I, recommends
strongly against the transfer of OSI to
the DD/R.
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1963 cont'd
17 July
1 August
2 August
5 August
22 August
9 September
Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, AD/SI recommends to
the DCI that OSI be transferred to the DD/R
and lists his other requisites for taking
over as Deputy Director of an enlarged
DD/R.
Mr. McCone directs the DD/R to develop
proposals for new and better satellite
systems.
CIA plan for establishing an analysis center
for foreign missile and space intelligence
was discussed with Defense Department by
Dr. Wheelon.
Deputy Directorate for Research renamed
Deputy Directorate for Science and Tech-
nology; OSI transferred from DD/I to the
DD/S&T; Automatic Data Processing Staff
renamed Office of Computer Services and
transferred from DD/S to DD/S&T.
Dr. Albert D. Wheelon named Deputy Direc-
tor for Science and Technology, and
Chairman of the Research and Development
Review Board, vice the DDCI; Mr. John F.
Blake named Executive Officer, DD/S&T.
Dr. Donald F. Chamberlain named Assistant
Director for Scientific Intelligence, and
to continue as Chairman of the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee of USIB;
confirmed as Deputy
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelli-
gence (Production), and to continue as
Chairman of the Scientific Intelligence
Committee of USIB.
Assistant Director to) Research and
Development, DD/S&T.
16 September Mr. Joseph Becker appointed Assistand Direc-
tor for Computer Services, DD/S&T.
appointed as Deputy
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1963 cont'd
25 September
1 October
21 October
30 October
4 November
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1.11?41111,
7 November
8 November
13 November
18 November
DD/S&T Career Service Board Established;
Chairman to be appointed by DD/S&T and
hold the chair for one year.
Mr. Carl E. Duckett appointed Deputy
Assistant Director for Scientific Intel-
ligence (Collection), and Chairman of
the Guided Missile and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee of USIB.
Mr. McCone issued a directive for the
setting up of the Foreign Missile and
Space Analysis Center under the DD/S&T.
Guidelines for relationships between
the DD/I and the DD/S&T with regard to
the transfer of OSI to the DD/S&T issued
by the DDCI, Gen. Carter.
named Special
Assistant to the DD/S&T; also to continue
to serve as CIA Sigint Officer.
also named Chairman of the
USIB Watch Committee vice the DDCI.
The Foreign Missile and Space Analysis
Center (FMSAC) established; Mr. Carl E.
Duckett named Director.
Dr. Wheelon designated by the DCI as
monitor of NRO activities on the DCI's
behalf.
Satellite Photography Working Group, with
Dr. Sidney Drell as Chairman, convened by
the DD/S&T to explore problems of the
CORONA improvement program.
Automatic Data Processing Division trans-
ferred from the Office of the Comptroller
to OCS/DD/S&T.
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1963 cont'd
2 December
1964
Mr. David S. Brandwein, formerly with
Space Technology Laboratories, appointed
Deputy Director, FMSAC.
27 March Mission and functions of the DD/S&T
published
21 April
4 May
9 September
28 September
1965
13 January
Executive Director ordered the transfer
of the Agency Spint Staff to the juris-
diction of the Sigint Officer under the
DD/S&T (to be effective 9 July 1964).
Mr. Robert M. Chapman named Acting
Assistant Director for Research and
Development, DD/S&T, vice Col. Giller,
reassigned to the Air Force.
appointed Deputy
Assistanti ec o or Computer Services,
DD/S&T.
assigned as Career
Management Otficer an Senior Training
Officer, DD/S&T, vices
reassigned.
The DDCI, Gen. Carter, tabled a draft
agreement at the NRP ExCom meeting giving
CIA technical direction of the CORONA
satellite payload.
16 February Dr. Edwin Land, as a member of the
President's Scientific Advisory Committee,
made a plea for accord between CIA and
the Air Force in the NRP in the national
interest.
18 February Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer resigned as Deputy
Director, NRO.
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1965 cont'd
26 February Mission and functions statements for
DD/S&T Staff Units issued.
3 March Dr. Max S. Oldham designated Chief,
Systems Analysis Staff, Office of
the DD/S&T.
11 March Mr. Robert M. Chapman appointed
Assistant Director for Research and
Development, DD/S&T.
31 March Contingency Plan for Satellite Recon-
naissance promulgated by the D/NRO to
cover all accidents or incidents
relating thereto.
19 June
27 July
13 August
20 August
1 September
13 September
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel
established to advise the DCI on foreign
strategic weapons programs; the Panel
was dissolved in September 1967.
The DD/S&T Office heads' titles were
changed from "Assistant Directors" to
"Deputy Directors."
New NRO Agreement signed by the DCI,
Admiral William F. Raborn, and the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cyrus
Vance; the Executive Committee (EXCOM)
was formalized, and projects were par-
titioned giving CIA a firm role.
appointed Chief,
Special Projects btaff, DD/S&T, vice
Mr. Jackson Maxey, who was appointed
Special Assistant to the Chief, SPS.
formerly Chairman of
COMOR, appointed as Deputy Director, NRO,
by Admiral Raborn.
Space Intelligence Panel established to
advise the DCI on Soviet and other foreign
space activities; Dr. Simon Ramo, Chairman.
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1965 cont'd
15 September
30 September
1 October
1 October
6 October
25 October
8 November
Office of Special Projects established,
taking over satellite responsibilities
from Special Projects Staff and OSA,
DD/S&T; Mr. John J. Crowley named
Director of Special Projects; Mr. John N.
McMahon named Deputy Director of Special
Projects.
named Director
of Reconnaissance for CIA by the DCI,
Admiral Raborn, at the Director's
Morning Staff Meeting. (Interim assign-
ment.)
'named Special
Assistant to the DD/S&T by Dr. Wheelon.
Dr. Brockway McMillan resigned from his
position as Director of NRO, and as Under
Secretary of the Air Force.
Dr. Alexander Flax, Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Research and Develop-
ment, appointed D/NRO.
Agreement signed between OSP and OSA on
the transfer of resources, responsibilities,
and authorities regarding CIA satellite
reconnaissance programs.
25X1
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designated Special 25X1
Assistant to the DD/S&T (COMOR), vice
reassigned to NRO.
Ballistic Missiles and Space Division of
OSI combined with FMSAC. Mr. Duckett and
Mr. Brandwein to continue as Director and
Deputy Director of FMSAC.
Nuclear Intelligence Panel established to
advise the DCI, evaluating information
from all sources on foreign nuclear activi-
ties; Mr. Louis H. Roddis, Jr., Chairman.
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1965 cont'd
6 December
22 December
1966
12 January
31 January
11 March
19 April
16 May
appointed Executive
Officer, DD/S&T, vice John F. Blake,
appointed Deputy Director of Logistics.
The DD/S&T, Dr. Wheelon, assumed Chair-
manship of the DD/S&T Career Service
Board.
Terms of Reference of the Director of
Reconnaissance, CIA,
spelled out by the DCI, Admiral Raborn.
Assistant to Director of Reconnaissance
for Financial Management established to
assist Mr. Sheldon with NRO budgeting;
designated as
incumbent.
The Director of Special Projects charged
with responsibility for nominating CIA
assignees to NRO Staff, and for their
administrative support during their tour
of duty with NRO.
relieved of responsibilities
as Special Assistant to the DD/S&T and
appointed Special Assistant to the DCI
with duties as Chairman of the USIB Watch
Committee; CIA Sigint Officer; and
Director of Reconnaissance, CIA.
Mr. Carl E. Duckett appointed Assistant
DD/S&T; Mr. David S. Brandwein appointed
Director, FMSAC, vice Mr. Duckett.
Comptroller system of management estab-
lished in the DD/S&T; I I 25X1
named Comptroller, DD/S&T.
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1966 cont'd
18 May
1 June
appointed Deputy
Director for Computer Services.
Mr. Charles A. Briggs appointed Director
for Computer Services, vice Mr. Becker,
reassigned as Special Assistant to the
Executive Director.
25X1
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AMON'
7?11101
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appointed Deputy Director
for &Lint.
July Staff reorganization
DD/S&T resulting
Executive
Comptroller,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief,
Chief
in the Office of the
in the following pattern:
Officer
Budget Branchd
Plans and Programs Branch,
Management inroriation
Branch,
Procurement Management Staff,
25X1
WOW
Chief
Chief,
Chief,
Security managemenr staff,
25X1
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Administrative suppolt Staff,
Intelligence Liaison and
Support Staff,
1 August
an,
*010
Col. Paul N. Bacalis, USAF,
Director of Special Activities,
vice Brig. Gen. Jack C.
reassigned to USAF.
Mr. John Parangosky appointed
Director for Special Activities,
Mr. James A. Cunningham,
as Special Assistant to
appointed
DD/S&T,
Ledford,
Deputy
vice
Jr., reassigned
the DD/S&T.
Deputy
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Director for TecnnologY,
Director for Technology
MININe
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OSA, appointed
vice Mr. Parangosky.
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1966 cont'd
18 August
23 September Dr. A. D. Wheelon's resignation as
DD/S&T was effective this date. (His
letter of resignation to the DCI was
dated two months previously.)
26 September Mr. Carl E. Duckett appointed Acting
DD/S&T, vice Dr. Wheelon.
11 October Executive Director/Comptroller approved
the setting up of a DD/S&T Career
Development Course.
28 October Mr. Duckett appointed Dr. Chamberlain
Chairman of the DD/S&T Career Service
Board.
28 December The White House directed the termination
of the A-12 manned reconnaissance program
by OSA/DD/S&T.
1967
13 January
The DCI (Mr. Helms) reassigned responsi-
bility for reconnaissance activities:
relieved of Director of Recon-
naissance responsibility and that job
canceled; Ito support the DCI
in the EXCOM of the NRP; Mr. Duckett to
deal with the NRO on the DCI's behalf in
the management of CIA's NRP assignments.
20 April Mr. Carl E. Duckett confirmed as Deputy
Director for Science and Technology.
16 May
White House approval received for A-12
deployment to Okinawa for coverage of
North Vietnam.
5 June Dr. Lloyd K. Lauderdale appointed Assistant
DD/S&T.
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1967
30 June
1 July
17 July
15 August
Systems Analysis Staff residual personnel
transferred to the National Intelligence
Programs Evaluation Staff from the Office
of the DD/S&T.
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Ex-
ploitation established. COMOR staff with-
drawn from Office of the DD/S&T and joined
with the Targets Branch of the disestablished
Collection Guidance Staff to form the staff
of the Chairman of COMIREX. The DD/I
assumed administrative responsibility for
COMIREX from that date.
Procedures for Coordination of Research,
Development and Engineering by the DD/S&T
published
Science and Technology Panel established to
advise the DCI on the formulation and
assessment of CIA's goals in the field of
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Animp.
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20 November
1968
science and technology; Dr. William Perry,
Chairman.
Mr. Duckett, as DD/S&T, given full responsi-
bility by the DCI for supporting him in all
matters relating to overhead reconnaissance.
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Executive
r_kppointed
Officer, DD/S&T, vice
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Acting.
First Contracting Team set up in OEL/DD/S&T
to do procurement contracting for OEL, OCS,
OSI, and FMSAC.
Cancellation of the A-12 program reaffirmed
by President Johnson after the six month
4 March
21 May
ammo,
extension covering the deployment to cover
North Vietnam; close-out date 30 June 1968.
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1968 cont'd
12 July
6 September
7 November
1969
21 January
27 February
3 September
1 October
6 October
1 November
1970
9 January
2 February
USAF designated
Director tor special Activities,
DD/S&T, vice Brig. Gen. Paul N. Bacalis,
reassigned to USAF.
Strategic Intelligence Panel established
to advise the DCI on Soviet objectives in
strategic technical areas; Dr. Ruben
Mettler, Chairman.
Director, FMSAC.
DD/S&T, vice
reassigned.
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appointed Deputy 25X1
designated Comptroller,
Second Contracting Team set up in ORD,
to do procurement contracting for ORD.
'designated Chief,
Security Management Staff, DD/S&T.
named Chairman of
the Sigint Committee, vice Mr. Sheldon.
named DD/SA vice
Mr. John Parangosky reassigned.
Dr. Donald H. Steininger appointed
Assistant DD/S&T, vice Dr. Lauderdale,
who resigned as of 21 March 1969.
effective.
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Spint Staff, DD/S&T dissolved; functions
separated and assumed by Sigint Officer,
Chief Intelligence Requirements Staff,
and Director of Security, respectively.
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Persons Consulted in the Preparation
of This History *
Dr. Donald F. Chamberlain, Director, Office of Scientific
Intelligence, DD/S&T
Mr. Robert M. Chapman, Director, Office of Research and
Development, DD/S&T
Mr. Carl E. Duckett, Deputy Director for Science and
Technology
Stati, 0/DU
yNational Intelligence Programs Evaluation
Office of Special Activities, DD/S&T
Analysis Division, ORD, DD/S&T
Chief, Intelligence Liaison Support
Staff, 0/DD/S&
Mr. Eugene P. Kiefer, Formerly Deputy Director, NRO
Deputy Chief, Technical Services
Division, DD/P
DD/S&T
Chief, Contract Management Staff,
Mr. John N. McMahon, Deputy Director, Office of Elint,
(Formerly Deputy Director, Office of Special
Projects, DD/S&T)
Mr. George C. Miller, Director of Elint, DD/S&T
Mr. John Parangosky, Director, Special Project Staff,
DD/S&T
orrice
Chief, Ground Systems Division,
or DD/S&T (Formerly with NRO Staff)
Former Deputy Director, NRO;
Chairman, Sigint Committee, 0/DD/S&T
Chief, Plans and Programs Branch,
Office of Elint, DD/S&T
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Special Assistant to the
DD/S&T for Research andl Development
Deputy Director, Office of Special
Activities, DD/&T
Mr. Abbott Smith, Chairman of the Board of National
Estimates
Executive Officer, Foreign Missile
and Space Analysis Center, DD/S&T
Dr. Donald H. Steininger, Assistant Deputy Director for
Science and Technology
Dr. Karl H. Weber, Deputy Director, Office of Scientific
Intelligence, DD/S&T
Col. Lawrence K. White, Executive Director/Comptroller,
CIA
Staff, 0/DD/S&T
Chief, Administrative Support
*Titles used herein are those held by the individuals at
the time they were consulted for this History, between
March 1970 and July 1971.
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