THE DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1962-1970 VOLUME ONE CHAPTERS I-IV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00980R000400170001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 198
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE DIRECTORATE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VOLUME ONE CHAPTERS I-IV
THE DD/S&T HISTORICAL SERIES
HISTORICAL STAFF
June 1972
1962-1970
DD/S&T-1
by
Science and Technology
Carl E. Duckett
Director
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Directorate of Science and Technology
Deputy Director
Assistant
Deputy Director
Executive
Officer
Staf
Office of
Special Projects
Office of
Special
Activities
Office of
Eli nt
Office
Research
Development
I
of Office of
and Computer
Services
I
Foreign Missile
and Space
Analysis Center
I
Office of
Scientific
Intelligence
49121
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME I
I. Establishment of the Directorate for Research,
February 1962
A. Background
B. Mr. McCone Establishes the Directorate
for Research
Page
1
1
6
1. DD/R Organization: Activities to
be Included 10
2. Kirkpatrick-Coyne-Schuyler
Recommendations 13
3. DD/R Components 19
a. Office of Special Activities (OSA) 19
b. Office of Elint (OEL) 25
c. Office of Research and
Development (ORD) 28
4. Problems of Space and Personnel 29
5. The "R" Career Service Established 32
II. The Directorate Expanded and Designated
Directorate for Science and Technology,
August 1963 38
A. DD/R Organization Reviewed by Mr. McCone 38
B. PFIAB Recommendations on Technical
Capabilities
C. Dr. Scoville Resigns
D. The DD/R Acquires OSI
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III. Directorate Under Dr. Wheelon: August
1963--September 1966
A. Background of Wheelon Appointment
B. DD/S&T Organization: Additional
Components
58
58
61
1.
Office of Scientific Intelligence
(OSI)
62
2.
Office of Computer Services (OCS)
65
3.
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis
Center (FMSAC)
68
4.
Office of the DD/S&T: Staff
71
a. Plans and Programs Staff
72
b. Systems Analysis Staff
73
c. Action Staff
73
d. Spint Staff
75
5.
Office of Special Projects (OSP)
76
6.
Facilities and Properties
Acquired by DD/S&T
78
C.
Board, Committee and Panel Structure
80
1.
Research and Development Review
Board
80
2.
External Advisory Groups
82
3.
USIB Committees
87
4.
White House Committees and
Boards
90
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D. Management of the Directorate
Under Dr. Wheelon
93
1. Functional Organization: Priorities
93
2. Philosophy of Management
97
3. Budgeting for DD/S&T Programs
101
4. Personnel and Space
107
5. DD/S&T Career Service
109
6. Relations with Staff and
Office Chiefs
115
7. Intra-Agency Relationships
117
8. DD/S&T External Relations
124
a. The White House
124
b. Interdepartmental Relations
125
c. Scientific Community
128
9. Dr. Wheelon Resigns
129
IV.
Directorate Under Mr. Duckett,
September 1966--1970
131
A. Background of Appointment
131
B. Reorganization of Office of
the DD/S&T, 1966
133
C. Personnel and Training
139
1. Over-all Growth of Personnel
139
2. DD/S&T Career Development Course
140
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E. Coordination of Research, Development
and Engineering
145
1. Background
145
2. DD/S&T Made Coordinator
of RD&E
148
F.
Contract Management
156
1. DD/S&T Relations with
Procurement Division
156
2. Team Concept Inaugurated
159
3. Research, Development, and
Analysis Contract Procedures
161
G.
Additional Advisory Panels
Established
166
1. Strategic Intelligence Panel
166
2. Science and Technology Panel
166
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H.
Management of Directorate by Mr. Duckett
170
1. Philosophy of Management
170
2. Priorities
173
3. Production of Intelligence
176
4. External Relations
178
a. Intelligence Community
178
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5.
Support to Policymakers
182
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VOLUME II
V. DD/S&T Relations with the National
Reconnaissance Program (NRP) 187
A. The NRO Concept 187
B. The Initial NRO Agreement 188
C. First Revision of the NRO Agreement 192
D. NRO Staff: Working Arrangements Initiated 195
E. Negotiations Leading to Second Revised
Agreement 202
1. Funding Problem 203
2. CIA/USAF Relations Deteriorate
Under NRO 207
3. Dr. McMillan Succeeds Dr. Charyk
as D/NRO 211
4. Second Revised NRO Agreement,
13 March 1963 212
F. Dr. Scoville's Tour as DD/NRO 213
1. Terms of Reference, DD/NRO 215
2. Proposed NRO/JRC Agreement on
Air Operations 220
G. CIA Role in Satellite Reconnaissance 232
1. Pre-NRO Activities: 1958-1960 232
2. CIA Role Limited Under NRO 239
3. Dr. Wheelon Enters the Fray 244
a. Wheelon Views on CIA/NRO
Problems
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b. Purcell Panel and Drell Working
Group Recommendations
c. CIA Participation in the
NRO Staff
249
252
4.
CIA Efforts to Keep NRP Role
258
a. CORONA Management in Contention
258
b. PFIAB Inquiry Into NRO Workings
c. Contingency Plan for Satellite
262
Incidents
265
d. Mr. Kiefer's Resignation as DD/NRO
266
e. Agency Control of CORONA Payload
268
H.
Third Revised Agreement, 13 August 1965
277
1.
Mr. McCone Pushes for New Agreement
277
2.
PSAC Initiates the Land Panel
279
3.
Agreement Signed by Vance and Raborn
a. Personnel and Organizational
282
Changes
283
b. Partitioning of Projects
286
I.
Mr.
Duckett Assumes NRP Role
291
1.
NRO Participation Revamped
291
2.
Manned Reconnaissance Programs
of DD/S&T
294
a. Continuation of U-2 Program
294
b. The A-12 Program (OXCART)
295
3.
Satellite Vulnerability Studies
302
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VI. Summary
305
A.
Organizational Goals of the
Directorate
305
B.
Mission of the Directorate
307
1.
Requirements
307
2.
Directorate Tasks by Functional
Category
311
C.
Status Report by Offices
314
1.
Office of Special Activities
(OSA)
314
2.
Office of Special Projects (OSP)
318
3.
Office of Elint (OEL)
320
4.
Office of Scientific Intelli-
gence (OSI)
326
5.
Office of Computer Services (OCS)
332
6.
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis
Center (SAC)
335
7.
Office of Research and Develop-
ment (ORD)
339
Source References
Index
Chronology
Persons Consulted
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VOLUME III
Appendix A.
Appendix B.
Appendix C.
VOLUME IV
Appendix D,
Part 1
VOLUME V
Appendix D,
Part 2
VOLUME VI
Appendix E
Appendix F
Notices, Regulations and Directives
Governing Establishment and Activities
of the Directorate for Science and Tech-
nology (In Chronological Order)
Biographic Profiles of DD/S&T Management
Personnel
Charts: Organization, Manpower and Funds
NRP Documentation, November 1955-August 1963,
(Tabs 1-41)
NRP Documentation, September 1963-1970,
(Tabs 42-80)
Facilities and Properties Acquired by
the DD/S&T
External Advisory Committees
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I. Establishment of the Directorate for Research,
February 1962
A. Background
Early U.S. efforts in the collection and analysis
of scientific intelligence were principally motivated by
known, or suspected, advances in technology by hostile pow-
ers, such as the "secret weapons" of Germany during World
War II, and later the nuclear energy and missile developments
of the Soviet Union and Red China. There was no centralized
U.S. organization for these efforts until after World War II.
The first such entity to be established in the wake of the
demobilization of wartime agencies in the fall of 1945 was
a small "Scientific Branch" which was set up in the Cen-
tral Intelligence Group (CIG)* at the request of the Joint
Research and Development Board (JRDB)** to satisfy the
Board's scientific intelligence requirements. When the
National Security Act of 1947 established the Central
Intelligence Agency to replace the CIG, the JRDB continued
*The National Intelligence Authority, established by
President Truman on 22 January 1946, included an interim
Central Intelligence Group, set up to consolidate all
U.S. intelligence efforts related to national security.
**The Joint Research and Development Board, under the
Chairmanship of Dr. Vannevar Bush, replaced the wartime
Office of Scientific Research and Development. It was
created by charter of the Secretaries of War and Navy on
6 June 1946 to coordinate R&D activities of interest to
their departments.
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to place its requirements on the Scientific Branch, even
though the unit was understaffed and not able to fulfill
all the Board's needs. 1/
In 1948, two high-level investigating bodies looked
into the U.S. intelligence organization: the Task Force on
National Security Organization of the Hoover Commission heard
testimony from the JRDB on the inadequacy of scientific in-
telligence and recommended greater efforts in that area; and
the National Security Council's Intelligence Survey Group,
chaired by Mr. Allen Dulles, looked into the same area and
recommended the centralization of scientific intelligence
activities and the strengthening of the Scientific Branch of
CIA. As a result of pressure generated by these investiga-
tions, the Scientific Branch was enlarged and strengthened
through consolidation of scientific activities and was ele-
vated to a higher organizational level within the Agency as
the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), effective
1 January 1949. During its early years, OSI spent much
time in contention with the military and with other CIA
offices in an effort to establish its areas of responsibil-
ity. An unsuccessful effort was made to include a role for
OSI in collection, as well as analysis, of scientific
intelligence. lAttle progress was made by OSI, except in
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Elint and nuclear energy intelligence, until after 1955
when a reorganization under new leadership took place, and
the U-2 photographic collection began to pay off with an
attendant improvement in OSI's capabilities. 2/
The Soviet Union, meanwhile, had continued to
build up its war-making potential in great haste and utmost
secrecy behind the Iron Curtain. In August 1953 the announce-
ment that the Soviet Union had exploded a hydrogen device
demonstrated its capability to begin the production of
multi-megaton weapons. By 1957 further Soviet technologi-
cal advances included the firing of an ICBM and the launch-
ing of Sputniks I and II into orbit. CIA responded by
augmenting its technical collection programs as conventional
collections diminished.
During this period the influence of high-level
scientific advisory groups on the U.S. intelligence pro-
cess continued to be felt. In October 1954 the Office of
Defense Mobilization set up a Technical Capabilities Panel
(known as the "Surprise Attack Committee") under the chair-
manship of
study more
sources in
Dr. James
effective
the event
R. Killian, President of M.I.T., to
ways of mobilizing scientific
of an
emergency. A sub-panel
re-
of the
group, headed by Dr. Edwin H. Land, President of Polaroid,
was the motivating force behind the joint CIA/Air Force
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initiation of the U-2 project late in 1954. Drs. Land and
Killian, and other scientific advisers at the White House
level, were also instrumental in promoting CIA's partici-
pation, with the Air Force, in a photo-reconnaissance
satellite program beginning in 1958.
In the late 1950's, despite the advances in tech-
nical collection programs, such as Elint and photographic
reconnaissance, the U.S. Government lacked an effective
central mechanism for coordinating the conduct of all sci-
entific and technical intelligence operations, both in
collection and production, and in the systematic develop-
ment and application of new scientific and technical
methods. CIA suffered internally from the same lack of
centralized coordination of the various activities con-
cerned with collection and analysis of scientific intelli-
gence which had developed within the three separate
directorates of the Agency. A proposal was made to CIA
Director Allen Dulles in 1957 that all of CIA's scientific
and technical activities be combined under a new directorate
in order to ensure that the role of science in intelli-
gence operations would receive the emphasis and priority
which the current world situation demanded. 3/ Mr. Dulles
was better known as a devotee of classical methods of
espionage than for his interest in the increasing role of 25X1
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technology in intelligence, despite the fact that he had
backed CIA participation in the U-2 program and in the
first satellite reconnaissance program. (Those activities,
as previously noted, had been pressed upon CIA by high-level
scientific advisers.) The recommendation for a scientific
directorate was also referred to Mr. Richard M. Bissell,
Jr., who as Project Director for the U-2 was then completely
involved in maintaining high-level political acquiescence
in continuation of that program under CIA management (as
opposed to Air Force take-over), and in protecting the
U-2's primary mission of photography against the encroach-
ment of the Elint people and others who wanted to make use
of the U-2 capability for other purposes. Mr. Bissell pre-
ferred to keep his operation as small and tightly controlled
as possible, using the minimum of staff at Headquarters
Washington for direction and support, and preserving the
"special project" status of the U-2 program. Thus, the
idea of a large scientific directorate had small chance
for internal CIA consideration in 1957. Even in 1961,
when it was put forward by the new DCI as a concrete pro-
posal, there was opposition from many quarters.
It was inevitable, however, with the advances in
science and technology which were taking place on both
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sides of the Iron Curtain, and the continuing confrontation
between East and West, that there would be changes in CIA's
organization to meet the changing world situation.
B. Mr. McCone Establishes the Directorate for
Research
On 27 September 1961, President Kennedy named
Mr. John A. McCone to succeed Mr. Dulles as DCI, effective
upon the latter's retirement as of 29 November 1961.
Mr. McCone had a broad background of experience in engineer-
ing and had served as Director of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion under the Eisenhower Administration. The new DCI, on
taking office, immediately set in motion a review of the
organizational structure and activities of CIA. The CIA
Inspector General, then Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, was named
Chairman of the Working Group on Organization; the other
two members were
then Secretary of
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB),
and General Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, U.S. Army, Retired,
an adviser on the staff of Governor Nelson Rockefeller.
One of the major concerns of the group was the
proposal for the establishment of a new Directorate for
Research, supported by Mr. McCone and by Dr. Herbert
Scoville, Jr., then Assistant Director of Scientific
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Intelligence. The purpose in setting up the new research
directorate, according to Mr. McCone's original concept, was
...to pull scientific and technical talents of
the Agency together in one office headed by the
Deputy Director (Research) and thus provide more
complete intelligence and cross-fertilization of
our scientific talents on the one hand, and on
the other hand, create a sufficiently large "magnet"
to attract and offer an opportunity and a career to
new, highly-trained technical personnel. 4/
Mr. Bissell, who was then Deputy Director for
Plans but who was shortly to leave that post, gave a nega-
tive response to the proposal for the new Directorate for
Research. He said he believed it infeasible, as well as
bad organization, to transfer responsibility for Elint and
Comint collection activities out of the Clandestine Serv-
ices (CS)1
He was opposed to removing the Technical Services Division
(TSD) from the CS because there must be closely unified
control between development of equipment and its opera-
tional use by the CS. Lastly, he believed it was unwise
to place the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelli-
gence (AD/SI) under any superior officer other than the
Deputy Director for Intelligence. Mr. Bissell agreed,
after making the above exclusions, that the new Deputy
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Director should have the responsibility for advanced
reconnaissance projects, perhaps the Photo Interpretation
Center, and some of the larger Elint and Comint collection
enterprises. However, it was not clear to him why a Deputy
Director was required since he felt that a senior officer
attached to the Director as an assistant for special pro-
jects could handle the advanced reconnaissance projects with
the help of a small staff (in a set-up similar to that occu-
pied by Mr. Bissell during the U-2 development). 5/
Despite this negative reaction, and before the
Kirkpatrick
Schuyler report was written, Mr. McCone
informed the PFIAB on 22 January 1962 that he intended to
create a new deputy director for technical collection under
whom all of CIA's scientific activities would be brought
together. Dr. Killian, then Chairman of PFIAB, at the
same meeting had encouraged the DCI to maintain a scien-
tific approach to new problems of collection, and not to
allow the quality of imagination in CIA to be diminished.
On 14 February 1962, Mr. McCone gave advance notice of
the formation of the new directorate
*Appendix A, Tab 1.
which announced the resignation of
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Mr. Bissell and the appointment of Mr. Richard Helms to the
position of DD/P. An additional paragraph read
The organization of the DD/P is currently being
studied and certain changes are contemplated. There
will be created a Deputy Director for Research and
Development and certain of the Research and Develop-
ment functions now administered by the Deputy Direc-
tor (Plans) will be transferred to that Deputy. 6/
Mr. McCone offered the new Deputy Directorship
to Dr. Scoville, who accepted and immediately set to work
drafting a proposal on the make-up of the new directorate.
On 16 February, an- 25X1
flouncing the establishment, effective 19 February 1962, of
the Office of the DD/R and the assignment of Dr. Scoville,
who was to continue to act as AD/SI during the transition
period. 7/ Also on 16 February, Mr. McCone asked for a
proposal designating the elements of the Development Pro-
jects Division (DPD), heir to the U-2 project, which should
be transferred to DD/R and those to remain in DD/P. Be-
tween 17 and 28 February, Mr. Bissell, serving in the
capacity of Acting Chief of DPD, carried out the DCI's re-
quest, reaching certain general conclusions regarding the
reorganization of DPD and the establishment of the DD/R.**
**See "DD/R Components, OSA," pp. 19-24, below.
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1. DD/R Organization: Activities to be Included
Dr. Scoville's draft proposal on the organi-
zation of the DD/R recommended inclusion of three general
types of scientific and technical activities: (a) research
and development on technical collection and data reduction
systems; (b) production of intelligence on scientific and
technical capabilities of other countries; and (c) conduct
of all operations using technical collection methods and of
scientific and technical operations using classical agent
techniques.
Specific Agency activities recommended for
inclusion were: (a) the special projects component of DPD;
(b) the research and development and laboratory testing
component of TSD; (c) the DD/I's Office of Scientific In-
telligence (OSI), including all Elint activities; (d) the
Elint activities of the Office of Communications (0/C), and
its research and development in Comint and agent communica-
tions; and (e) a new Career Service under the chairmanship
of the DD/R to encompass scientific and technical person-
nel Agency-wide. 8/
Mr. Helms, then DD/P, after giving careful
consideration to the advantages and disadvantages of sep-
arating the research and development function from TSD,
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in consultation with senior CS officers, recommended
that research and development activities of TSD
which are performed in close support of Clandes-
tine Services activities remain within the Clan-
destine Services, and that the research and
development effort which is directed toward the
development of systems and equipment which do
not directly support Clandestine Services activi-
ties be transferred out of TSD to the Office of
the DD/R. 9/
Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., then DD/I, after
considering Dr. Scoville's draft, informed the DCI on
19 March 1962 that it would be undesirable and against
the best interests of the Agency to move OSI from the DD/I
to the DD/R for the following reasons:
a. The DD/R was being established to give
two arms to the Agency's collection effort: the classical
and the scientific (experience having shown that both
tasks were too big for one administrator). He felt the
direction of all advanced methods of intelligence data
collection was a demanding task and would fully occupy
the DD/R staff. The fact that more than one-third of the
Agency's budget was involved in these projects, Mr. Amory
felt, supported this view.
b. The assessment of a country's capabili-
ties and possible courses of action must include scien-
tific and technical factors along with military, economic,
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and political ones. Fusion of discipline rather than
separate compartmentation was necessary to balanced, rounded
intelligence, and integration must take place at all levels
of analysis and production for all finished studies, esti-
mates, and current intelligence publications.
c. Mr. Amory was opposed to lumping research
and development people in with intelligence-producing sci-
entists in the same career designation since the latter
were first and foremost intelligence officers utilizing
their scientific background to assist them in a process of
reasoning no different from that engaged in by political
scientists or economists.
d. The Director of OSI would be in a better
position to represent the Agency in questions of scientific
intelligence on foreign countries' capabilities if he were
not under the shadow of a senior Agency official engaged
in developing and promoting particular collection systems.
e. Lastly, Mr. Amory cited the supporting
views of the Kirkpatrick working group, and of the DD/I
officers responsible for National Surveys and Estimates,
and for Current Intelligence, all of whom agreed with him
that OSI should remain where it was. 10/
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2. Kirkpatrick
Schuyler Recommendations 25
The final report of the Working Group on
Organization, issued on 6 April 1962, was in some measure
overtaken by events with regard to the section on the organ-
ization of the DD/R, and stated
The Office of the Deputy Director (Research)
having already been created, we now make the follow-
ing recommendations as to those units which should
be included under this Deputy... 11/
Units listed were the special projects staff of DPD, includ-
ing necessary support elements, all Elint activities, all
TSD research and development, National Photo Interpretation
Center (NPIC) research and development, and certain research
and development of the Office of Communications. As for
OSI, although it was well understood that the DCI wished it
to go over to the DD/R, the report recommended against this.
Finally, calling attention to the DCI's intention to have
the DD/R carry out the operational phase of certain major
projects, the report underlined the likelihood that DD/R's
prospective key people (scientists and technical experts)
would have no professional intelligence operations experi-
ence and little background or interest in detailed opera-
tional problems, particularly security. It was suggested,
therefore, that as a general rule--granted that there
would be exceptions--when operations began, responsibility
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for operations should be with the DD/P, but that the DD/R
should retain responsibility for seeing that the equipment
he had developed continued to function properly. 12/ This
suggestion was strongly opposed by Mr. Bissell during the
February 1962 discussions, particularly with regard to the
projects being transferred to the DD/R from the DPD.*
Indications at that point were against the
achievement of the goal set by the DCI of gathering all
scientific and technical activities under the DD/R.
Mr. Kirkpatrick, who was appointed to the newly-created
post of Executive Director on 10 April 1962, collaborated
with Dr. Scoville in trying to pull together, during April
and May 1962, all agreed elements of the DD/R and draft a
Headquarters Notice setting forth the DD/R's terms of ref-
erence. They were unable to reach agreement on the draft.
The Executive Director returned to Mr. McCone
on 17 May 1962 with a recommendation that he accept less
than his desired goal. Mr. Kirkpatrick told the DCI that,
after extended discussions relative to the transfer of OSI
with Dr. Ray S. Cline (who had succeeded Mr. Amory as DD/I
on 23 April 1962), and with Dr. Scoville, it boiled down to
the fact that Dr. Cline felt if he lost OSI he would simply
*See "DD/R Components, OSA," pages 19-21, below.
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have to create another OSI in order to do his job of
intelligence production and estimates. The DD/R would like
to have OSI not only in order to centralize scientific and
technical efforts in one place but as a reservoir of talent.
Dr. Scoville wanted to have all TSD research and development
and felt that those items the DD/P was willing to release
were "cats and dogs." Mr. Kirkpatrick said, after consid-
erable study of the matter, that
it would appear to me preferable to allow the DD/R
to grow by evolution and accretion rather than any
drastic surgery on either DD/I or DD/P. I believe
the DD/R has a tremendous responsibility and a bur-
den in the two major projects for which he is now
responsible. However, I believe that he should be
given a high priority for borrowing or acquiring
personnel, when needed, from either the DD/I or
DD/P. Further, I think he should head and direct
a scientific and technical career service for those
individuals in the DD/I or DD/P who would prefer to
belong to such a service rather than the DD/I or
the DD/P career service. Finally, I would recommend
that he be given authority to recruit personnel and
develop his own research and development complement
with a broad charter as to the areas for coverage. 13/
A month passed with no progress toward organ-
ization of the DD/R other than the establishment of a Table
of Organization (T/0) for the immediate office of the DD/R.
The Director of Personnel reviewed the requested staffing
complement and found it in line as to positions and grades
with other Agency components. A ceiling of five supergrades
and eight administrative/clerical positions was requested
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and approved by the Director of Personnel and the Deputy
Director for Support on 22 June 1962, the supergrades to be
absorbed within the Agency ceiling and all 13 slots to be
accommodated within the total FY 1963 authorization.*
On 27 June 1962, Colonel Edward B. Giller, USAF,
(formerly Deputy Chief, TSD), was appointed Assistant DD/R.**
From TSD were also recruited to be 25X1
Dr. Scoville's secretary, and to 25X1
organize the DD/R Registry and serve as its Chief.
In view of lack of progress in carrying out
the DCI's directive for organizing the DD/R, Dr. Scoville
at the end of June reported to the DCI on the delays encoun-
tered. As a result, Mr. Kirkpatrick produced a further draft
organization plan, but Dr. Scoville was not satisfied with
the proposed language relating to the DD/R's research and de-
velopment mission and to the transfer of funds, personnel
and other assets.
Dr. Scoville's two assistants,
on 5 July 1962 presented a
compromise position paper, offering an alternative to the
course of action the DD/R had followed, thus far without
*See Fig. 1, overleaf, for first T/0.
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success, in trying to get the DD/R into productive business.
Noting that the task was not to create a wholly new function,
but rather to reorganize the management of existing ones, they
emphasized that freedom of action was circumscribed to an ex-
tent by Agency history, so that a distinction had to be drawn
between the desirable and the possible. The tenor of their
recommendations was to accept what was attainable from DD/P
and get on with the work of consolidation, after which,
inevitably, the question of OSI would be reopened. 14/
Dr. Scoville was, in the end, forced to accept
this philosophy, since Mr. McCone chose not to join battle
with the opposition. Mr. McCone said later
The reasons for the opposition appeared to me
to be valid and were based primarily on the funda-
mental concept of organization of the intelligence
establishment and specifically on the concept that
the interface between DD/I and OSI, and between
DD/P and TSD, was so important that to fracture it
by moving these two units out from under their re-
spective Directorships would incur great risk of
impairing the fundamental missions of DD/I and DD/P,
the success of which is basic to CIA's responsibility. 15/
Mr. Kirkpatrick notified the Deputy Directors
and the Comptroller by memorandum of 26 July 1962 of the
long-awaited
setting
forth the mission and responsibilities of the DD/R. In
order to avoid controversies in the future he spelled out
the division of responsibilities in those areas which had
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been at issue: the DD/P would continue to carry on research
and development (such as TSD's) directed primarily toward
supporting agent operations; any research to support Covert
Action would remain in DD/P unless specifically and mutually
agreed between DD/R and DD/P; any developments achieved by 25X1
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25X1
on reaching the breadboard stage; DD/R would be responsible
for over-all guidance of all Elint activities
It was recognized that in creating a new
entity in any governmental organization, which by its very
nature cuts across previously established jurisdictions,
there would be matters at issue which must be reconciled.
Mr. Kirkpatrick therefore urged that personnel in all di-
rectorates use their best diplomacy and tact in reconciling
differences among themselves, with the right of final appeal
to the Director's office. 16/ 25X1
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3. DD/R Components
stated that the mission of the Deputy Director for Research
was to conduct in depth research and development in the sci-
entific and technical fields to support intelligence col-
lection by advanced technical means, exclusive of those
research and development activities to support agent opera-
tions. It further announced the establishment of the Office
of Research and Development (ORD), the Office of Elint (OEL),
and the Office of Special Activities (OSA), under the
jurisdiction of the DD/R.
a. Office of Special Activities (OSA)
Recommendations on the transfer of DPD
elements to the DD/R, which Mr. Bissell had discussed with
the Kirkpatrick task force on organization, were presented
to Mr. McCone on 5 March 1962. The general conclusion was
to give responsibility for specialized reconnaissance pro-
jects, including research and development and operational
activities thereof, together with supporting activities to
the DD/R. Air activities in support of Clandestine Serv-
ices operations were to be left under DD/P
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Mr. Bissell said that some believed the
DD/R should have responsibility for all research and devel-
opment activities having to do with aircraft and other
reconnaissance systems, and the DD/P should have all opera-
tional responsibilities. He felt this unwise for it would
require a complex split within the subcomponents of DPD,
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and a vastly more complex interface between the personnel
and activities of the DD/R and the DD/P. For example, a
man developing a more accurate cargo parachute would be
responsible to one Deputy Director while the man who
would be conducting the cargo drops in the field, and who
might have his own ideas on how the parachute should func-
tion, would be responsible to the other Deputy Director.
Mr. Bissell said that one of the great lessons learned
from the U-2 project was
that the most intimate possible administrative
marriage of research and development and opera-
tions is essential if the development process
is to be both swift and at the same time re-
sponsive to operational needs. It is a source
of vast strength in the current and past organi-
zation of DPD that developmental, support, and
operational elements were brought under common
command at a level well below that of a Deputy
Director. This is the essence of "project"
organization as distinguished from "functional"
organization. 18/
The Kirkpatrick
chuyler report
recommended that the Special Projects Branch of DPD plus
the necessary supporting elements, "including those pro-
jects supporting the Department of Defense in advance
reconnaissance programs," be placed under the DD/R. On
was issued by the
newly-appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
(DDCI), General Marshall S. Carter, U.S. Army, announcing 25X1
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that the transfer would be made.* Details of this action
were left to be worked out between the DD/P and the DD/R.
After two months of negotiating the pre-
cise transfer of personnel and other assets to the DD/R,
the DPD continued to function as a single unit while await-
ing completion of arrangements. This created an increasing
lack of clarity with regard to policy and command decisions,
and on 15 June 1962 Dr. Scoville wrote to the DD/P
I believe that it is highly desirable to
effect at the earliest possible date a clearcut
delineation between the command and policy chan-
nels of the two major activities involved. While
there can be a mutual interchange of technical
assistance, I am convinced that it is highly de-
sirable that both these units begin to operate
on their own. To this effect I desire that
18 June 1962 be the date on which separate com-
mand channels should be activated. Thus, it is
expected that on that date air support activities
will report to the DD/P while the redesignated
Office of Special Activities will report to the
DD/R. 19/
The desired division of command did not come about and
Dr. Scoville, after turning down the DD/P's third draft
proposal for a split of DPD resources, wrote to the DD/S
on 28 June 1962 for assistance in obtaining the support
positions required by OSA. He said he quite understood
the DDP's reluctance to weaken his own structure by giving
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up personnel, but the DD/R did not wish to take the
responsibility for a critical program without the people
to do the job. 20/
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It had taken from February to November in
1959 to reach agreement on amalgamation of DD/P area air
support activities with the special aerial reconnaissance
projects under the DPD; it required from February to August
in 1962 to reverse this organizational arrangement.
The Chief of DPD at the time of its divi-
sion between OSA was Colonel Stanley W. Beerli, USAF,
whose tour with the Agency was to finish at the end of July
1962; therefore his Deputy, Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr.,
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was designated Acting Assistant Director for Special
Activities at the beginning of August 1962 when OSA was
established. Meanwhile, a candidate was sought for the
AD/SA job, which entailed the management of an organization
of more than
in Headquarters and at domestic and
foreign bases, as well as an equal number of contractor
personnel for whom the AD/SA would have indirect admini-
strative responsibility. The ideal individual for this
job, according to Colonel Giller's recommendation, which
was approved by Dr. Scoville, would be
...a relatively senior Air Force colonel or
brigadier general* having recent command experi-
ence in SAC, some familiarity with R&D problems
and a previous tour in Headquarters Air Force.
This officer's strong point should be the organ-
izing and managing of a diversified and dispersed
organization... 21/
The candidate proposed by the Air Force
and accepted by the DD/R and DCI was Colonel Jack C. Ledford,
who was designated Assistant Director for Special Activities
effective 4 September 1962. At the same time Mr. Cunningham
was named Deputy AD/SA. A detailed history of OSA from 1954
through 1968 is on file in the Office of the DD/S&T.
*Although the wisdom of placing an active duty Air Force
officer in this slot has been questioned from time to
time, the practice has continued up to the present (1972).
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b. Office of Elint (OEL)
The CIA Elint program, up to the time of
its amalgamation under the DD/R, had been the responsibility
of a number of components: Office of Scientific Intelligence,
DD/I; Office of Communications, DD/S; Technical Services
Division and Development Projects Division, DD/P: and sev-
eral DD/P area divisions. Coordination had been effected
by means of an Elint Advisory Committee and an Elint Staff
Officer, but unified control was badly needed, beginning
with research and continuing through collection, analysis,
and feedback, in order to exploit fully and successfully
this fruitful source of intelligence. Despite the number
of offices involved with Elint, the turnover to DD/R of
the Elint program was accomplished fairly smoothly, although
it did require many months to consummate.
Mr. George C. Miller, who was slated to
be the first Assistant Director for Elint (AD/EL), began
the early planning for OEL from his position as Chief of
the Elint and Special Projects Division of OSI in February,
1962, was officially named AD/EL effective 30 July 1962,
and was largely responsible for bringing the various ele-
ments of this new office together and defining its mission.
The AD/EL was charged with establishing and managing the
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Agency Elint Program; providing technical support and
guidance for Agency Elint projects and analyzing and re-
porting the product thereof; supervising or conducting all
research and development for Agency Elint and Comint activi-
ties; advising the CIA Sigint Officer in matters of Elint
policy; and maintaining liaison on technical matters with
the National Security Agency (NSA) and other government
agencies. 22/
formerly of the
Office of Communications, assumed the position of Deputy
to Mr. Miller on 15 October 1962.
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C. Office of Research and Development (ORD)
Unlike OSA and OEL, which were reorganized
from existing activities, ORD had to be organized "from
scratch"--a new organization with no existing structure,
positions, or ceiling authorization. The purpose of its
establishment was to make maximum use of science and tech-
nology in accomplishing CIA's mission by advancing the
frontiers of knowledge in some areas and developing new
concepts in the application of existing knowledge in other
areas. Dr. Scoville requested as a tentative T/0 for ORD
a ceiling of
an authorization of
for FY 1964, all of which was approved
against which to recruit, and
in principle by the
Acting Director, General Carter, on 9 November 1962. A
recruiting program to secure well qualified candidates
from the entire spectrum of scientific disciplines was
begun in coordination with the CIA Office of Personnel.
Colonel Giller was designated Acting
Assistant Director for Research and Development (in addi-
tion to his position as Assistant DD/R) on 29 November 1962
in order to give leadership to the planning and organiza-
tion of this new office.
the Deputy Assistant Director of ORD
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on 9 September 1963. Colonel Giller wore two hats until his
departure in May 1964, when Mr. Chapman became Acting AD/RD.
(He was confirmed as Assistant Director on 19 March 1965.)
At the end of 1962, ORD was given a few
of TSD's research projects (those which fell into the cate-
gory of general intelligence application and which were not
exclusively oriented toward the Clandestine Services' re-
quirements). One of these was the project looking into the
intelligence applications of
who was in charge of this activity in TSD,
moved to ORD along with that work, later becoming Chief
of the of ORD. The work of that division,
and the others which were formed as ORD became organized,
is described fully in the ORD History.
4. Problems of Space and Personnel
In the latter half of 1962, while the Direc-
torate for Research was slowly taking form, Dr. Scoville's
small staff faced the problems of finding appropriate and
sufficient space in the new Headquarters Building at Langley
for housing its current and anticipated personnel, and re-
cruiting, setting pay scales, and establishing a career
service for scientific and other professional personnel.
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Dr. Scoville and his personal staff first
occupied space in the 3-E-1400 complex at Langley; OSA
was divided between two overcrowded areas on the sixth
floor, B wing, and on the ground floor, E wing; OEL was
spread out in several non-contiguous areas on the second
and fifth floors; and ORD existed only on paper. The space
situation at Langley late in 1962 was extremely tight and
the DD/R's requests for more and better space were to little
avail at that time, even though the priority establishment
of the new Directorate had the personal interest of the
Director's Office.
An inquiry by the Director's Office in mid-
September 1962 concerning the fulfillment of the DD/R's
support requirements brought the reply from the DD/S that
work on the Directorate's T/0 was moving ahead and there
was no reason why progress should be held up since a ten-
tative ceiling could be issued with later review. The
transfer of personnel from other components to the DD/R
and recruitment of a full complement would take months at
best, possibly two years; therefore the DD/S did not con-
cur in Dr. Scoville's position that he could not take
over the existing units of his Directorate in place, or
that it was impossible for him to assume his responsibili-
ties until he got all his personnel into contiguous space.
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There were many problems and frustrations which the DD/R
and those trying to support him had to cope with in order
to launch the new organization; the DD/S felt, however, that
with a practical and cooperative approach, the organization
could move
forward in an orderly manner. 23/
By the end of 1962, through the relocation
certain Agency units outside the Langley Building, more
space was freed. The DD/R's priority needs were met little
by little during March and April 1963, so that OSA and OEL
had secure space behind barriers to cover their most press-
ing needs.
of
The recruitment program
1962 focused attention on the need to
pay scales for the various categories
which was begun in
establish grades and
of scientists required
to staff the new Directorate. When the first T/0 was ap-
proved in September 1962, Dr. Scoville requested of the
DD/S that an improved grade structure, or special salary
arrangement, be devised to enable the acquisition of the
caliber of personnel needed to carry out the Agency's mis-
sion in the scientific field. He asked that the Assistant
Directors for OEL, OSA, and ORD be set at supergrade GS-18,
and that their Deputies be set at supergrade GS-17; that a
special salary scale for hard-to-get categories be set up;
and that any supergrade activities transferred to DD/R
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should have their concomitant supergrade slots transferred
along with the activities. 24/ Colonel White, then DD/S,
..__
acted favorably on these requests and a proposal for a
special salary system covering scientific and technical
personnel was developed and circulated in due course for
Agency coordination. 25/ The plan was later published as
The initial DD/R personnel ceiling approved
in September 1962, and the first increase approved in mid-
November 1962, are shown below.
First Ceiling New Ceiling
Sept 1962
0/DDR
ORD
OEL
OSA
Nov 1962
A chart showing the over-all growth in personnel for the
Directorate from 1962 to 1970 can be found at Tab 2 of
Appendix C, along with explanatory notes on the specific
increases and decreases.
5. "R" Career Service Established
In Dr. Scoville's initial draft of activities
to be assigned the DD/R he included the establishment of a
scientific and technical career service, under the DD/R's
*See pp. 35-36, below,
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chairmanship, to satisfy Agency-wide needs. On 8 May 1962
the Chief, Plans Staff, Office of Personnel,
spelled out for the DD/R the agreed procedures
governing actions on personnel assigned to the DD/R during
the initial development of the Directorate, pending the
establishment of an appropriate scientific and technical
career service:
a. Transferees from other components would
retain their Service Designations, later transferring to the
"R" designation, unless otherwise agreed by the heads of
the two career services.
b. Recruits from outside would be desig-
nated "UD" until their identification with the "R" Service.
c. Support positions assigned to DD/R would
carry the designation of the appropriate support service.
d. Recruitment and assignment to DD/R from
outside would be handled between the Executive Officer,
DD/R, and the Personnel Operations Division.
e. The DD/R would approve promotions of all
personnel assigned to him except those who by mutual agree-
ment with the head of another career service were identified
as permanent members of that service. 27/
Failure to achieve the transfer of all Agency
scientific activities to the DD/R caused Dr. Scoville to
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reconsider the concept of an "R" Career Service and he
noted to the DCI on 20 June 1962
...The proposed assignment of responsibilities
contained in...2gr. Kirkpatrick's draff7 would
result in having a majority of the technical
personnel in the Agency not under the command
of the DD/R. OSI, TSD, and OC would each have
more technical personnel than the entire DD/R.
An analysis of the problems involved in carry-
ing out a true S&T Career Service within this
structure indicates that the problems would
be virtually insurmountable--therefore not a
practical concept. In the place of a career
service, the DD/R would now recommend a
watered-down career council type of arrange-
ment which would attempt to improve the
management of S&T personnel by mutual agree-
ment between the major Agency S&T components. 28/
The DD/R Executive Officer,
drafted a proposal to establish a"Scientific
and Technical Career Service Committee" with the objective
of improving the Agency's capability to attract, utilize
and retain qualified S&T personnel necessary to accomplish
the Agency's mission. The notice was circulated for con-
currence at the end of June 1962 but its approval and
formalization was delayed during the struggle to get the
DD/R organization off dead center. It was resubmitted for
approval on 2 November 1962 and several changes recommended
by the DD/P, DD/S, and DD/I were incorporated: (a) the
name was changed to "Scientific and Technical Personnel
Advisory Committee" in order to avoid the use of the words
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"Career Service" in its title; (b) the committee was to
be advisory to the Director of Personnel who would act as
Chairman rather than the DD/R; and (c) all Agency com-
ponents using S&T personnel would participate.
The DD/R on 19 February 1963 issued Direc-
torate Notice DD/R 20-1* setting up its internal career
service and outlining the administrative structure for
implementing the Agency Career Program within the "R"
Career Service.
its own internal
The
OSA, OEL and ORD each in turn set up
career panel.
establish-
ing the Scientific and Technical Personnel Advisory Com-
mittee was finally issued on 26 March 1963 and the first
meeting was held on 25 April 1963. The Director of Per-
sonnel, Emmett Echols, chaired the first meeting and
representatives of the four Deputy Directors attended as
members.
The first agenda item to be considered by
the Committee was the Scientific Pay Schedule (SPS),
which had been approved by the DDCI, General Carter.
was issued on
It
*Appendix A, Tab 5.
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and carried the title "Management of Specially Qualified
Scientific Personnel." It established a personnel manage-
ment and pay administration system for personnel assigned
to selected scientific positions involving (1) the plan-
ning, organizing, directing, and coordinating of major
scientific programs, or (2) the planning and execution of
productive research or consultation of a very high order
in a specialized branch of a scientific field.
Each position under the SPS was to be desig-
nated by title and occupational code used for comparable
general schedule positions but using the prefix SPS, rather
than GS. Pay rates were fixed between the minimum rate of
GS-16 to the rate of GS-18 (corresponding to the first four
steps of GS-16, the first four steps of GS-17, and GS-18,
a total of nine steps). The DDCI was authorized to estab-
lish ceilings for total SPS positions and total salary
Agency-wide. Qualifications for appointment were set out
along with particular responsibilities of the DDCI, the
Director of Personnel, the various Deputy Directors, the
Comptroller, and the S&T Personnel Advisory Committee.
The numbers of SPS and supergrade positions
authorized the DD/R for Fiscal Year 1964,by Office, were
as follows:
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0/DD/R
OCS
OSA
OEL
OSI
ORD
Supergrades
SPS
As of July 1963, when the allotment of these positions
became effective, the Directorate for Research was in
the process of being reorganized as the Directorate for
Science and Technology with two additional offices,
OSI and OCS, being assigned to the DD/S&T effective
5 August 1963.*
*Further developments in the "R" Cared/. Service under
the DD/S&T are covered in Chapter III, beginning at p. 109.
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The Directorate Expanded and Designated Directorate
for Science and Technology; August 10_2
A. DD/R Organization Reviewed by Mr. McCone
The frustrations encountered in the attempt to
organize CIA's scientific activities under one roof, with
less than the complete accord of the Agency's hierarchy,
were paralleled by the trials experienced in trying to
reach agreement with DOD on the respective roles of the
participants in the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP).
Dr. Scoville had the responsibility for both of these
interlocking efforts and thus suffered a double measure
of the resultant exasperations. It may be said that
Dr. Scoville probably did not pursue either goal as
aggressively as Mr. McCone would have desired. Some staff
members believed that Dr. Scoville was "too gentlemanly"
for the kind of fight which developed; others recall
hearing him on numerous occasions express his frustra-
tion over the lack of support from the top in what he was
trying to accomplish.
Mr. McCone's expectations with regard to his
planned scientific directorate had been equally dampened
by the lack of support for the plan displayed within the
Plans Directorate and the Intelligence Directorate. He
had stated his desires with regard to the kind of set-up
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he wanted and had left the reorganization up to the DDCI,
the Executive Director, and the DD/R. At meetings with
those three concerning the Research Directorate Mr. McCone
continued to press for a more vigorous effort toward com-
pletion of the reorganization; however, he stopped short
of issuing a directive to the DD/I and the DD/P ordering
them to relinquish all scientific elements under their
control to the DD/R.
On 1 October 1962, Mr. McCone in a private ses-
sion with Mr. Kirkpatrick discussed the DD/R set-up at
length and said he was not convinced the organization was
developing along correct lines. He felt the whole CIA
scientific effort was unimaginative and not sufficiently
aggressive, and that it did not make its weight felt in
the government. He said that in the entire time he had
been Director he had never had either the DD/P or the DD/I
raise scientific or technical matters with him. He was
personally convinced that scientific and technical collec-
tion would surpass that by agents. 30/
Mr. McCone inquired as to the status of the
scientific advisory group he had asked be set up, and
was told by Mr. Kirkpatrick that since the DD/R had not
succeeded in acquiring OSI and all of TSD, Dr. Scoville
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saw no immediate purpose in setting up such a group.
Mr. Kirkpatrick had therefore asked
the Director's Office, to take over the
of
setting up of a
scientific advisory board to supersede the DeFlores Com-
mittee, which then was concentrating principally on
scientific applications of interest only to TSD/DD/P.
Mr. McCone alluded to the fact that the White House Sci-
ence Adviser had acted to reestablish the Bethe Panel to
evaluate the current Soviet nuclear tests. He regretted
that the Agency had failed to take the initiative and
do that job. 31/
Mr. Kirkpatrick referred to the possibility that
Dr. Scoville might resign due to his frustrations, a matter
which Dr. Scoville had discussed with others, but not with
the Director or Mr. Kirkpatrick. Mr. McCone said that he
did not care whether it was Dr. Scoville or someone else
who ran the DD/R, as long as it was organized properly and
the job was done correctly. He said he would not discuss
the DD/R organization further with Dr. Scoville until he
(Mr. McCone) had thoroughly thrashed the matter out with
General Carter and Mr. Kirkpatrick. He expressed an int-
erest in knowing why the members of his Executive Commit-
tee felt the present set-up was satisfactory, but he
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said he had no intention of conducting such a poll since
it was the DDCI's responsibility to run the Agency. 32/
On 3 October 1962 Mr. Kirkpatrick met with
Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, who had succeeded Dr. Scoville as
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence on 1 July
1962, and told him that the Director was not satisfied
with the organizational structure of the DD/R, but still
felt that all scientific people in the Agency should be
included. Dr. Wheelon said he felt that OSI at that time
continued to fit more logically into the DD/I. He said,
however, that if the DD/R should inherit
the proposed Missile and
Space Technical Intelligence Center** then it would be
more logical for OSI to come under the DD/R. He said he
had suggested to Dr. Scoville that both of these activities
should be within the DD/R, but had not been able to stimu-
late much interest on Dr. Scoville's part in pressing for
their acquisition. 33/ 25X1
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CIA's Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC).
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Dr. Scoville's reluctance to reach out for
additional activities is understandable when one consid-
ers the difficulties he had already encountered in trying
to bring together those which had received the Director's
blessing.
B. PFIAB Recommendations on Technical Capabilities
Several months passed with the DD/R organiza-
tional status unchanged. Activities related to the Soviet
missile build-up in Cuba took precedence over almost all
other activities between September 1962 and the end of
the year. In January 1963, Dr. James Killian, then
Chairman of PFIAB, raised with Mr. McCone the question of
progress in the organization of the Agency's scientific
and technical intelligence activities, indicating that
further pressure toward that end could be expected.
At the March 1963 meeting of the PFIAB, recom-
mendations for action by the Intelligence Community to
improve its capabilities across the board were given to
Mr. McCone and to the Secretary of Defense. Section 13
of those recommendations related specifically to scien-
tific and technological intelligence and because of its
influence on subsequent developments in the Agency's sci-
entific and technological activities, it is quoted here
in full.
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13. Strengthening Technical Capabilities.
The Board recommends that top priority be given
to the creation, organization and exploitation
of new resources of science and technology for
use in intelligence activities.
Except in limited fields, of which photo-
graphic reconnaissance is one, we have merely
scratched the surface in exploiting the use
of science and technology for intelligence pur-
poses.
To move ahead with an adequate program,
the Board proposes the following:
(a) The creation of an organization
for research and development which will couple
research (basic science) done outside the intel-
ligence community, both overt and covert, with
development and engineering conducted within
intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA.
Institutional research, academic and industrial,
must be joined to mission-oriented research.
(b) The installation of an administra-
tive arrangement in the CIA whereby the whole
spectrum of modern science and technology can
be brought into contact with major programs
and projects of the Agency. The present frag-
mentation and compartmentation of research
and development in CIA severely inhibits this
function.
(c) The clear
vesting of these broad-
ened responsibilities in the top technical
official of the CIA, operating at the level of
Deputy Director. Recasting and extending the
CIA's present Office of Research may accomplish
this. If it does not, alternative administra-
tive arrangements must be devised. This tech-
nical official as we conceive his responsibilities,
should have reporting to him the following groups,
each managed by a competent technical leader:
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(1) Technical Requirements
Group, to generate and review the technical
needs of the whole CIA operation (close
coordination with the Defense Intelligence
Agency is implied.)
(2) Systems Engineering Group,
constantly to examine technical requirements
as to feasibility, cost and values, in the
light of evolving knowledge and discovery.
(3) Development Group, to
undertake execution of suitable, approved,
systems plans. (Contracting for components,
assemblies, and equipment might be a pre-
ferred mode, but this is different from the
"project management" so often used now.)
(4) Field Engineering Services
Group, to aid operational elements in instal-
lation, use and maintenance of new facilities.
A quality control regime should be instituted
to follow reliability and other performance
of equipment.
(5) Behavioral Sciences Group,
to augment classic roles of psychology and
medicine in intelligence planning and opera-
tions. For example, professional anthropology,
programmed teaching and learning and audio and
visual perception might be covered. (Programmed
instruction may have a particularly strong
place in role playing, disguise and "foreign"
operations by agents.)
(d) Formation of a few special research
and development groups that may be part of a
natural science division, probably coordinated
with the behavioral sciences group, that cross-
connects various classic disciplines in ways of
primary importance to intelligence missions.
Thus, studies of camouflage in plant, bird and
animal systems (where it seems to be a highly
developed element in survival) coupled with
physical optics, radiation and spectroscopy,
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might reveal new methods of both disclosure
and concealment.
(e) Actions within the DOD: (1) to
emphasize research in advanced sensing systems,
advanced photographic systems, and in other
sophisticated areas of intelligence gathering
and (2) to strengthen advanced research in the
signals intelligence field, particularly to
prepare for the environment in which signals
intelligence must function over the course of
the next ten years.
The importance of intelligence warrants a
major effort to draw fully upon the most ad-
vanced science and the best scientific brains
in the nation. Our scientific intelligence
should be so sophisticated and advanced that
it will be beyond the capabilities, if not
the imagination, of our adversaries. 34/
Mr. McCone responded to the PFIAB's recommenda-
tions via the President's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, on 15 April 1963.
Since no specific organizational or administrative devel-
opments geared to the comprehensive concept spelled out
by the PFIAB had occurred, it was deemed best to gener-
alize about progress to date and plans for the future.
Mr. McCone reported that since taking office he had given
top priority to the creation, organization, and exploita-
tion of new resources of science and technology for use
in intelligence activities through the creation of a new
Deputy Directorate for Research with three offices under
it. He also reported with regard to future plans
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In addition, I considered the addition to the
DD/R of the Office of Scientific Intelligence
from the DD/I and the Technical Services Division
from the DD/P, but upon strong staff advice sus-
pended action on this for a period of observa-
tion. That period has now elapsed and I will
move ahead with additional changes, starting with
an intra-Agency board for staff direction of the
scientific and technical effort, and giving the
DD/R expanded responsibilities...35/
C. Dr. Scoville Resigns
Mr. McCone's undertaking to the PFIAB to move
ahead with expanding the DD/R's responsibilities was not
put into immediate action. Meanwhile, on 25 April 1963
Dr. Scoville presented Mr. McCone with a letter of resigna-
tion wherein he outlined the frustrations he had suffered
in attempting to accomplish the Director's objectives. He
said that with few exceptions the working components had
resisted any transfer of their responsibilities or person-
nel to the new Directorate and that senior officials had
been dilatory and indecisive in facing up to the problems
of establishing a new organization within the Agency.
Dr. Scoville said in his letter of resignation
While in my discussions with you, you have always
indicated your belief in the original basic con-
cept of the DD/R, the actions and statements of
senior Agency officials have made it very clear
that they do not agree with this concept and that
no one is willing to face up to the problems of
implementing it. During the year virtually none
of my recommendations have been adopted. 36/
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Dr. Scoville added that, while the Deputy Directorship of
the National Reconnaissance Office had been granted to
CIA, he felt his own tenure in that position would be un-
rewarding because of the previous stormy history of the
program. He therefore wished his resignation to take
effect by 1 June 1963. (The date was later extended to
14 June 1963.)
Mr. McCone's choice for a successor to the DD/R
soon settled upon Dr. Wheelon (then AD/SI), for whose
talents the DCI had developed a high regard. Dr. Wheelon
in the spring of 1963, as AD/SI, had begun to attend the
Director's morning staff meetings, first in connection
with preparations for the nuclear test ban treaty nego-
tiations scheduled for July 1963. Mr. Kirkpatrick later
remarked of the great input from the scientific and tech-
nical side of the house due to Wheelon's attendance at
the morning meetings, and said
...I am impressed by the fact that his presence
not only adds to the breadth of analysis that
we receive, but I am sure also tends to keep
this particular "game honest." I am impressed
by the fact that we did not have that type of
input before his attendance. 37/
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D. The DD/R Acquires OSI
There still remained to be settled the question
of enlarging the scope of the Directorate, a matter on
which Dr. Wheelon had firm ideas. Mr. McCone solicited his
recommendations as to the form such a reorganization should
take and, after speaking at length with a variety of people
having unusual knowledge or historical perspective on the
pressures against the DD/R concept, Dr. Wheelon concluded
that there were two options open to the DCI: (1) Abolish
the present DD/R and create a small research and develop-
ment review staff which would report to the Director, and
would review all programs and budgets for CIA R&D including
that for joint programs such as NRP; this would require
that OEL, OSA, and ORD be reintegrated into other Agency
components. (Dr. Wheelon noted that he understood the DCI
was not in favor of this option.) (2) Create an improved
DD/R invested with authority over all research and devel-
opment, including budgetary review, funding all R&D money
to the DD/R for transfer to the accomplishing component
(TSD, 0/C, etc.); also make the DD/R the DCI's delegate in
the review of all budgeting and programming for the NRP,
just as Secretary McNamara delegated his responsibility
to Dr. Fubini. 38/
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Assuming the DCI's preference for the second
option, Dr. Wheelon said he now believed OSI should be trans-
ferred to the DD/R, although it should continue to use the
DD/I as its primary channel for reporting substantive intel-
ligence and contributing to national intelligence estimates.
However, the DD/I should be relieved of management re-
sponsibility for OSI. OSI should be set in a scientific
and technical environment and selection of supervisors
and decisions on reorganization should be made in an atmos-
phere of thorough understanding of its problems and common
professional experience. (Dr. Cline was at the time work-
ing on a plan to reorganize OSI which Dr. Wheelon and
others felt would fragment the Agency's scientific and
technical effort rather than giving it greater emphasis.)
Dr. Wheelon believed that additional benefits would accrue
from the transfer of OSI through joint use together with
other components of the DD/R of contractors, computers,
and specialized personnel. It would become easier to pro-
mote the desirable rotation of scientific personnel between
analysis and development, and an organizational fusing of
analysis and development would ensure prompt technical
feedback from foreign developments to our own programs. 39/
The above views of Dr. Wheelon were stated in
his memorandum to the DCI of 17 July 1963, on which date
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he met with Mr. McCone and General Carter. He had listed
in addition the following R&D functions which he considered
should be assigned to the DD/R:
1. All CIA Elint development and operations
except clandestine operations.
2. All overhead reconnaissance development and
operations assigned to CIA by NRO.
3. All computer development and scientific
computation activities
4. Development and operation of a collection and
analysis center for foreign missile and space intelligence.
5. Responsibility for basic R&D for assigned DD/R
activities.
6. Responsibility for basic R&D for NPIC, DD/P,
DD/S, etc., as requested, or as deemed appropriate in
subsequent budget and program reviews. 40/
Thus, Dr. Wheelon at the 17 July meeting put his
cards on the table by cataloguing his prerequisites for
taking on the DD/R job.
A determined effort was meanwhile being made by
the DD/I, Dr. Cline, to persuade the Director that the
whole concept of a scientific directorate was faulty and
that the DD/R should not be given any more activities,
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particularly not those of OSI. He wrote to the Director
on 16 July 1963
My understanding of the DD/R concept is that
creation of a new Deputy Directorate was based
on three arguments:
a. Pete Scoville needed a Deputy Directorate
for leverage with the Pentagon and to show the
outside world that CIA takes science seriously.
b. The DCI wanted in every way to emphasize
scientific inquiry into new techniques of intel-
ligence collection.
c. Pete Scoville wanted all "scientists" to
work together on the grounds that they are clubby
and a "critical mass" of them makes for new
ideas. 41/
Dr. Cline did not disagree with these arguments but noted
that most of the scientists at work in CIA were not the
inventive-engineer type but scientific intelligence ana-
lysts (such as those in OSI) who worked best in close
intellectual contact with other analysts working in the
economic, political, and other fields which supplement
the study of foreign technology and science. He con-
cluded that the Agency should maintain its "scientists"
in three administrative compartments according to task,
as currently was the case, and suggested that a new DD/R
should head a small, high-quality, creative research and
development staff which would operate as an idea factory
rather than a line component of the Agency. 42/
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On 24 July 1963, Mr. McCone set down in a
memorandum for his own use in making a decision on the
expansion of the DD/R the background and developments
since the establishment of the DD/R eighteen months pre-
viously. He underlined the fact that he had never been
satisfied with the views expressed by the Agency's hier-
archy which had the net effect of reducing the scope of
the DD/R; however, the arguments had been persuasive for
him to leave certain units where they were. He now
wished to go forward with plans to bring the DD/R up to
its original concept, but wanted to be assured that the
following questions were satisfactorily answered:
a. If OSI is under DD/R, can I be abso-
lutely sure that OSI will take directions
concerning tasks envisaged by DD/I, that the
support for DD/I and the Board of National Esti-
mates and the components thereof is continuous,
timely and uninterrupted under all circumstances,
that there will be a proper integration of tech-
nical findings and reporting on Soviet missiles,
space, nuclear weapons, etc. with corresponding
economic and political opinions developed in OCI,
ORR, etc., and finally that we will not have im-
paired the so-called "flow of information"
essential to DD/I and BNE.
b. If the research and development of TSD
is placed under DD/R, can DD/P always be assured
of timely and adequate support in connection
with their research requirements?
c. If the Automatic Data Processing Staff
is pulled together as contemplated under DD/R
(and this seems logical) would it break the
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line of command in all three Directorates so as
to seriously disrupt the respective organiza-
tions. If such is the case, it might be that
DD/R could own a small highly specialized com-
puter planning staff that could direct the
utilization of all our computer assets...
I can see great advantages to the plan. I
can also see dangers after a year and a half
of study (and the loss of Scoville because we
refused to go this route), unless Cline, Helms
and White are all aboard 100% and agree that
the above questions have been satisfactorily
answered. 43/
Having put these questions, Mr. McCone left to
General Carter the task of persuading the Deputies to go
along.
On 27 July General Carter had a meeting with
Dr. Cline, who stuck adamantly to his position with regard
to OSI. Later the same day he sent General Carter a memo-
randum in which he recorded at length his very strong views
in the matter. He said that the correlation and evaluation
of intelligence relating to national security must be done
in an impartial and intellectually objective manner, free
from operational or departmental bias. CIA's reputation
had been damaged in the past by the "Bay of Pigs" charge
that the Agency's operational people evaluated their own
activities and product. Therefore, while the concept of
a separate entity in CIA to conduct scientific and
technical intelligence collection activities was valid,
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the assignment to the same entity of responsibility for
evaluation and analysis of S&T data would certainly be
suspect. Perhaps more important, Dr. Cline said, was the
loss to the DD/I of the S&T analysis function which would
sorely handicap him in the task of insuring a CIA capa-
bility for providing an objective, integrated attack on
the key problems of Soviet strategic weapons development
and deployment, and other S&T developments abroad, and of
integrating the results with the over-all analysis of
related political, military, and economic developments. 44/
General Carter knew that the die was already
cast with regard to OSI and he passed Dr. Cline's memo-
randum to the DCI with a note recommending no general
meeting to discuss its contents but suggesting Mr. McCone
have a private talk with Dr. Wheelon on the future
method of operation he envisaged for OSI under the new
set-up, after which the DCI could better chart a course
with Dr. Cline. 45/
At that point, the lines were fairly clearly
drawn with regard to enlarging the DD/R:
1. The DCI, with the urging of PFIAB,
wanted to reconstitute the DD/R as originally envisaged
and he wanted Dr. Wheelon to run it.
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2. Dr. Wheelon was willing, given the
transfer of OSI, the over-all control of R&D, a computer
center, and promise of a missile intelligence center.
3. The DD/P felt TSD should retain all R&D
related directly to agent operations, which was largely
applications engineering and hardware development.
4. The DD/S did not oppose the centraliza-
tion of computer activities, provided all users throughout
the Agency were afforded the services they required.
5. The DDCI and the Executive Director, who
had earlier had some qualms over enlarging the DD/R, had
been won over to the McCone/Wheelon position.
Mr. Kirkpatrick, while opposed to change for
change's sake, or even for the accommodation of an individual,
said that he felt developments over the last year warranted
the changes planned. He felt that Dr. Cline's arguments
for retaining OSI were. not persuasive and that the DCI
could be sure that support for the DD/I under the new set-
up would be continuous, timely and uninterrupted in all
circumstances, and that the senior officers of the Agency
had sufficient breadth, quality, and good will to ensure
the success of any decision made. 46/
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At the end of July, Mr. McCone left Washington
for a ten-day trip and General Carter
on 5 August 1963 signed and published
which stated
Effective 5 August 1963, the following organi-
zational changes are announced:
as
Acting Director,
1. The Deputy Directorate for Research is
renamed the Deputy Directorate for Science and
Technology.
2. The Office of Scientific Intelligence is
transferred from the Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence to the Deputy Director for Science and
Technology.
3. The Automatic Data Processing Staff is
renamed the Office of Computer Services and is
transferred from the Deputy Director for Support
to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology.
At the same time,
announced
that Dr. Albert D. Wheelon was named Deputy Director for
Science and Technology, and Chairman of the CIA Research
and Development Review Board, and that Mr. John F. Blake
was named his Executive Officer.
A formal announcement of the reorganization and
introduction of Dr. Wheelon was made by General Carter
at a mass gathering of about 500 of the Directorate's staff
in the Agency Auditorium.
*Appendix A, Tab 10.
**Appendix A, Tab 11.
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Dr. Cline, even though the battle to keep OSI
was obviously lost, felt impelled to make a last, emotional
rejoinder to the publication of the organizational change.
He wrote to General Carter on 6 August saying that he was
distressed to learn of the reorganization of the Agency to
expand the functions of the DD/R at the expense of the DD/I
analytical complex. He said he wished to put clearly on
record his professional judgment that the decision taken
complicated the clean assignment of responsibility for
specific analytical tasks in the Agency among the several
Deputy Directorates; diminished the capability of the DD/I
complex to provide objective, integrated evaluations of
foreign developments involving scientific and technical
data intimately enmeshed with military, economic, and
political data; and, in short, would prove unfortunate
for CIA. 47/
In setting up the DD/S&T, there was no further
withdrawal of DD/P functions (i.e., the remaining TSD
research and development,
were left in place, with the expectation that there would
be further discussions at a later date).
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III. Directorate Under Dr. Wheelon: August 1963 -
September 1966
A. Background of Wheelon Appointment
Dr. Albert Dewell Wheelon received the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Physics from the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology in 1952, at the age of 23. In 1953 he
became a senior member of the technical staff of the Space
Technology Laboratories of Ramo-Wooldridge, the principal
work of which related to the U.S. Air Force ballistic mis-
sile and space programs, and missile technical intelligence
collection and analysis. Dr. Wheelon had nine years of
experience with STL during which time he also lectured in
Electromagnetic Theory at the University of California in
Los Angeles, and served in an advisory capacity to the
Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee of USIB, the Air
Force Scientific Advisory Committee, and the President's
Scientific Advisory Committee.
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When in February 1962 Dr. Scoville was asked by
Mr. McCone to head the new Directorate for Research,
Dr. Scoville, with Mr. McCone's support, persuaded
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Dr. Wheelon to take on the direction of OSI.
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Dr. Wheelon came into OSI in June 1962 shortly
after Dr. Ray Cline became Deputy Director for Intelligence.
During the ensuing period of adjustment, certain differences
became apparent between the two in their general orienta-
tion and method of operation, and some accommodations were
made in mutual respect. At the end of four months in the
position of AD/SI, Dr. Wheelon, in a conversation with
Mr. Kirkpatrick, commented on Dr. Cline's brilliance and
energy, but noted that the DD/I's interest in the current
intelligence field was far greater than in scientific in-
telligence. Dr. Wheelon said he had been taken to task by
the DD/I for reportedly having been a bit irascible with
various DD/I staff members. Regular meetings had been in-
stituted between Dr. Wheelon and Dr. Cline in order to
keep the latter informed of what was going on in OSI. 48/
In the same conversation with Mr. Kirkpatrick
Dr. Wheelon confessed that he at first had misgivings about
the job, but now felt confident that he could handle it.
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He feared, however, that if he did the job as it should be
done for a few years, he might have to annoy or offend a
number of people and thus would not be able to continue to
make a career in CIA. He had instituted quite a number of
changes in OSI, particularly with regard to personnel mat-
ters. His senior supervisors were to devote at least 30%
of their time to personnel, getting to know their people
and what they were doing, easing out any who fell below
standards of performance, and on the other hand encourag-
ing analysts to write better reports and working to get
better grades for those who performed well. 49/
In June 1963, when Dr. Scoville resigned as
DD/R, Mr. McCone asked Dr. Wheelon to take on the task of
directing the reorganization of the Directorate to encom-
pass all scientific and technical activities of the Agency,
as recommended by the PFIAB. When Dr. Wheelon accepted
that challenge, he carried to the new job the same purpose
he had followed as AD/SI--to do the job as he believed it
should be done even though he might annoy or offend some
people along the way. The problems he faced in organizing
the Directorate are described in the preceding and follow-
ing pages; i.e., the general antipathy within the Agency
toward the carving out of a separate scientific director-
ate; budgetary stringencies; personnel problems; and the
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difficulties involved in integrating all scientific functions
of CIA under one roof. In addition to these internal prob-
lems, there was a continual struggle with the Pentagon in
the effort to maintain a CIA role in overhead reconnais-
sance within the National Reconnaissance Program.
Dr. Wheelon took on the job of Deputy Director for
Science and Technology in August 1963 at the comparatively
young age of 34. Among Directorate personnel who worked
with him there was no lack of respect for his technical
brilliance, or admiration for his energy and drive. There
were some, however, who believed that his human relations
on the job were in some cases unnecessarily harsh, resulting
in the alienation of some staff members. This was part of
the price for building up the Directorate which Dr. Wheelon
had indicated he was prepared to pay.
B. DD/S&T Organization: Additional Components
A period of consolidation and build-up of the
Directorate for Science and Technology took place during
1963-64, encompassing the integration into the Directorate
of the newly acquired Office of Scientific Intelligence
and the Office of Computer Services; the later establish-
ment of the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
(FMSAC); the recruitment of qualified staff, including a
number of high-level appointments to the various components
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of the Directorate; and the organization of several boards
and panels to advise the DCI and the DD/S&T on scientific
and technical matters.
Mr. McCone, reporting to PFIAB on the reorgani-
zation of the Directorate, wrote in September 1963
...I believe we have now created a complete and
inclusive scientific and technical organizational
unit, allowing for the greatest degree of cross-
fertilization of the various scientific disciplines.
The matter of insuring the most complete and appro-
priate marshalling of the Agency's competencies in
this field will be kept under continuing review. 50/
1. Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI)
The integration of OSI into the DD/S&T was
effective 5 August 1963.* The DD/S&T acquired
on the Headquarters T/O and
At Mr. Cline's insistence,
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personnel
were retained
from DD/I. 25X1
by DD/I 25X1
in order to man his Collection Requirements Staff. Also
acquired was responsibility for administrative support
along with the Chairmanships of the USIB's Guided Missile
and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee, and Scientific Intelligence Committee.
Dr. Donald F. Chamberlain, previously Chief of the Atomic,
Biological and Chemical Division, OSI, was named Assistant
Director, OSI, effective 22 August 1963. Dr. Karl H. Weber
continued in his position as Deputy Assistant Director
*Appendix A, Tab 10.
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for Production, OSI, and on 1 October 1963, Mr. Carl E.
Duckett was appointed Deputy Assistant Director for Col-
lection, OSI, on a temporary basis, also assuming the
Chairmanship of GMAIC. He was recruited by Dr. Wheelon
specifically to chair the GMAIC, as well as to head up
FMSAC, once that office was established.
Dr. Chamberlain was one of those who favored
the transfer of OSI to the DD/R, and he had written to
Dr. Scoville in February 1962
The DD/R must seek to be an intelligence
producing organization, in addition to collect-
ing and processing raw information. To decide
otherwise, it seems to me, would be a complete
negation of efforts over the past years by OSI
to bring collector and producer closer together...
Certainly all our experience of the last several
years indicates that the intelligence cycle de-
pends on the closest integration of collector and
analyst. Our experience also casts doubt on the
possibility of achieving real integration except
under one head. 51/
Once the transfer of OSI had taken place, the
DDCI, General Carter, laid down guidelines for the work-
ing relationship between the DD/S&T and the DD/I, noting
that it was essential that the organizational change
which had been effected should enhance the free flow of
basic intelligence information and exchange of substan-
tive views between the two Directorates at all levels.
Over-all responsibility for production and publication
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of finished intelligence and its dissemination outside of
CIA was to remain with the DD/I, and while the DD/S&T
carried the basic responsibility for production and pub-
lication of scientific and technological intelligence,
dissemination outside of CIA would require prior DD/I
coordination. The DD/I, on the other hand, had the re-
sponsibility to coordinate all finished intelligence
incorporating scientific and technical material with the
DD/S&T prior to its dissemination outside CIA. That di-
rective, dated 30 October 1963, is still in effect.*
The Inspector General's Staff made a survey
of OSI in the summer of 1964 and reported with regard to
OSI staff attitudes toward their removal from the DD/I
OSI is not yet over the shock of the
transfer of its subordination from the DD/I
to the DD/S&T. Almost without exception, OSI
professionals, who volunteered comment, be-
lieve that scientific intelligence production
could be carried out more effectively if OSI
were within the Directorate of Intelligence.
We do not think it appropriate to re-examine
at this time all of the pro's and con's of
OSI's location in one directorate or another.
The decision to place OSI in the DD/S&T was
not lightly made, and OSI has had less than
a year of experience in living with its new
chain of command--too little to permit a
valid assessment of the soundness of its
subordination. 52/
*Appendix A, Tab 15.
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Seventeen recommendations were made by the IG report, the
majority of which related to organization, staffing,
career management, and supervisory problems. Only three
or four related to the quality of S&T intelligence pro-
duction. A statement in the report also noted that it
was too early to assess the effect of the transfer on
CIA's S&T intelligence production.
OSI has continued to carry the responsibility
for the production and publication of DD/S&T's intelligence
information for more than six years now, and despite the
earlier dissatisfaction and friction, there are now
well-established working relationships with all levels of
the DD/I in carrying out the important function of pro-
duction of intelligence.
A detailed history of OSI from its inception
through 1967, prepared by Dr. Karl H. Weber, Deputy Direc-
tor, OSI, is on file in the Office of the DD/S&T.
2. Office of Computer Services (OCS)
Prior to the formation of OCS in August 1963,
the Agency's computer activities, initiated in 1950, had
been vested in the Automation Staff of DD/I and the Man-
agement Staff of DD/S, later being merged into the Auto-
matic Data Processing Staff (ADPS) under the DD/S.
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ADPS was charged with establishing a computer center,
using IBM 1410/1401 equipment; carrying on Project CHIVE
(a joint OCR/OCS project to apply computer techniques to
the upgrading of the central reference facilities of the
Agency); technical supervision of the ADP Division of the
Comptroller's Office; and general electronic data process-
ing for CIA as a whole.
When the DD/R was being set up in February
1962, Colonel Giller, Assistant DD/R, reviewed the use of
computers and the ADPS activities being carried out on
behalf of DD/P, DD/I, and DD/S. He concluded that the
DD/R had only a minor interest at that time, although if
a requirement developed for a sophisticated, special pur-
pose computer for which the Agency would finance research
and development, then the DD/R should be responsible.
The Kirkpatrick-
Schuyler report of 25
April 1962 recommended that the ADPS remain under the
DD/S inasmuch as it was a support mechanism, but strongly
recommended that the DD/S in consultation with other Dep-
uties concerned, direct the ADPS to pursue aggressively
the objective of automation in the Agency in such a way as
to ensure the ultimate compatibility of automatic data
processing systems throughout the Intelligence Community.
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When Dr. Wheelon was giving consideration
to taking on the job of DD/S&T in the summer of 1963, the
need for computer services had already arisen in OSA in
connection with satellite programming as well as in the
A-12 manned aircraft project. Dr. Wheelon and Mr. McCone
both believed all Agency computer assets should be con-
solidated into one center, and that it should be placed
under the direction of the DD/S&T. At the time of the
5 August 1963 reorganization, therefore, the ADPS was
transferred from the DD/S and became the Office of Com-
puter Services. Mr. Joseph Becker was appointed as
Assistant Director for Computer Services, DD/S&T, ef-
fective 16 September 1963.*
The Automatic Data Processing Division of
the Office of the Comptroller was added to OCS effective
18 November 1963. The integration of the two groups of
personnel and equipment required the professional serv-
ices of an outside management firm which was contracted
in July 1964 to organize OCS for maximum servicing of
the Agency's automatic data processing.
The outlook for increasing use of com-
puters by CIA was forecast by Dr. Wheelon early in 1966
*Appendix A, Tab 13.
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in view of the requirement to analyze and evaluate
increasing volumes of collected data.
...The evaluation of secret intelligence data
and overt information is our principal respon-
sibility; and is frankly the most difficult to
relate to specific technologies. It involves
the collation, correlation and distillation of
vast quantities of raw data from all sources,
covering topics which range from economics to
politics and back to basic science. It is here
that technology may make its greatest contribu-
tion since we are collecting raw data faster
than we can adequately evaluate it, and the
difference grows steadily. The solution lies
somewhere in the use of computers, ADP tech-
niques, and a better understanding of our own
existing distillation process. The evaluation
of increasingly large volumes of photography
is just one painful example of this data ex-
plosion and indigestion problem. 53/
3. Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
(FMSAC)
Late in 1962, Mr. McCone and members of his
staff began discussions with the Department of Defense
concerning the possibilities for improving the analysis
and interpretation of data on foreign missiles and space
activities. There was general dissatisfaction with the
results currently being obtained from the various agen-
cies involved in collection and analysis of this data.
A proposal developed out of these discussions for a
Missile and Space Technical Intelligence Center (MISTIC).
This concept, looking toward a national capability with
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joint participation of all agencies concerned, was further
discussed through the spring of 1963 by representatives
of CIA, DOD, DIA, and NSA, but the jurisdictional problems
involved in such a venture seemed, to some, to be insur-
mountable.
Mr. McCone was quite anxious that the MISTIC
proposal be carried out regardless of what agency might
eventually inherit the organization and he therefore, in
April 1963, directed Dr. Wheelon (then AD/SI, and also
Chairman of GMAIC) to pursue the matter. A proposal put
forward by the AD/SI recommended that a center be operated
under the DCI's authority with the purpose of providing
coordinated tasking of U.S. assets for optimum perform-
ance in collection and reduction of technical data on
foreign missile tests and space events, and to use the
improved collection/analysis system for production of
timely intelligence reports for GMAIC, USIB, and the
Intelligence Community generally. In order to avoid
procedural delays in setting up such a center through
USIB action, it was recommended that an Executive Order
be sought from highest authority.
No action was taken on the proposal for
several months. Dr. Scoville resigned from the post of
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DD/R and Dr. Wheelon moved up to reorganize the Directorate.
Mr. McCone meanwhile informed Under Secretary of Defense
Gilpatric of the intended initiation by CIA of a missile
and space intelligence center, and on 2 August Dr. Wheelon
met with Dr. Eugene Fubini of Defense Research and Engi-
neering and outlined the scaled-down CIA plan for an
analysis center with complete CIA funding and technical
control within its regular budget as a service of common
concern to the whole Intelligence Community. 54/
The general consensus of the meeting was
that CIA should establish an all-source analysis capability
since this would not duplicate any activity in being but
would fill an existing void. Dr. Wheelon put his under-
standing of the sense of the meeting in writing to
Dr. Fubini on 23 August 1963: that CIA with community sup-
port would proceed incrementally in creating the missile
analysis organization and that further discussion of a
parallel collection function would be delayed until the
analysis activity was a working reality. Mr. Carl E.
Duckett was expected to enter on duty at CIA, leaving his
current job as Director of Missile Intelligence at Red-
stone Arsenal about 1 October 1963, and would size up the
task, after which further implementation would be
effected. 55/
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Mr. McCone on 21 October 1963 signed the
directive setting up the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis
Center and on 7 November 1963
announced the formal establishment of the Center and the
appointment of Mr. Carl E. Duckett as Director of FMSAC.
The appointment of Mr. David S. Brandwein of Space Tech-
nology Laboratories as Deputy Director was approved by
the Executive Director on 2 December 1963.
FMSAC became operational on a 24-hour basis
on I March 1964 and by 1 May 1964 was operating with a
staff
Effective 25 October 1965, the missions,
functions, and analytical responsibilities of the Ballis-
tic Missiles and Space Division of OSI were transferred
to FMSAC.**
After this merger FMSAC had a staff of
25X1 approximately
4. Office of the DD/S&T: Staffs
The support staff under the DD/R in 1962-63
had included administrative, security, personnel, career
*Appendix A, Tab 16.
**Appendix A, Tab 39.
***A comprehensive history of FMSAC is currently (1972)
in first draft.
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and logistics personnel. The former Special Requirements
Staff of DPD (consisting of the Chairman and Secretariat
of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, COMOR) had
also been transferred to the Office of the DD/R with
Chairman of COMOR, being named Special
Assistant (COMOR) to the DD/R. The COMOR Secretariat re-
mained a part of the Office of the DD/S&T, also, until
1 July 1967, when the Committee was reconstituted as the
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX)
under USIB, and the Chairman and his staff were transferred
to the DD/I's jurisdiction for administrative support.
The personnel authorization for the immediate
Office of the DD/R had been set at
for Fiscal
Years 1964-65. With the reorganization under Dr. Wheelon
this number was deemed inadequate for the scope and depth
of the responsibilities he had undertaken. No allowance
had been made for staff officers to assist him in the
guidance, coordination, planning and review of substantive
activities. Advice was obtained concerning the ratios of
staffs to operating components in other Directorates, and
an increase of
new staffs:
was requested to man the following
a. Plans and Programs Staff,
Chief. This staff was responsible for overseeing
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development of the annual budget and operating programs
of the operating components, and for insuring the closest
collaboration and coordination between current and pro-
posed activities and most efficient utilization of mone-
tary and personnel allowances. It also served as the
administrative point of reference for external research
components of the DD/S&T.
b. Systems Analysis Staff,
Chief. This staff consisted of a small group of
highly qualified officers able to study and conduct theo-
retical tests on proposed technical collection devices,
and to analyze failures and inadequacies in current sys-
tems and devices. It worked closely with consultants,
advisers and contractors to develop new system designs.
Members of this staff were active in support of the
Agency's satellite reconnaissance activities and out of
SAS came the nucleus of the group which later formed the
Office of Special Projects. The residual SAS staff was
transferred in June 1967 to the National Intelligence Pro-
grams Evaluation Staff (NIPE).
c. Action Staff,
Chief.
The Action Staff was designed by Dr. Wheelon to furnish
the DD/S&T a quick reaction capability for answering imme-
diate information requests, and to represent the operating
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d. Spint Staff,
Chief. On 4 November 1963, in his capacity as
CIA Sigint Officer, was transferred from the DD/I and named
Special Assistant to the DD/S&T, as well as Chairman of the
USIB Watch Committee.* On 21 April 1964 the Executive Di-
rector ordered the transfer of the Agency Spint Staff to
the jurisdiction of the Sigint Officer under the DD/S&T,
and this was accomplished effective 9 July 1964.** The
Spint Staff was disestablished as of 2 February 1970 and
its functions were split up among the CIA Sigint Officer,
the Intelligence Requirements Staff of DD/I, and the Of-
fice of Security.***
The organizational structure of the DD/S&T
was completed at the end of 1963 insofar as acquisition
or formation of new offices was concerned, and changes
occurring since then have been through assignment of new
projects, growth of activities in being, or internal re-
organizations, such as the separation of satellite recon-
naissance activities from OSA and the establishment of a
separate Office to manage those activities.
*Appendix A, Tab 18.
**Appendix A, Tab 23.
***Appendix A, Tab 61.
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5. Office of Special Projects (OSP)
The last major office to be set up under the
DD/S&T, effective 15 September 1965, was the Office of
Special Projects.*
Mr. John J. Crowley was named Director,
and Mr. John N. McMahon was named Deputy Director. This
Office, as indicated above, did not represent a new acti-
vity but resulted from the splitting away from OSA of the
satellite reconnaissance activities, which had developed
over the previous five years into the most prolific source
of photographic intelligence information CIA had ever
developed. In order to facilitate the management of the
program assigned to CIA under the NRP, it was decided to
compartment the two separate and distinct activities--the
manned aircraft reconnaissance projects, and the unmanned
satellite reconnaissance projects. This was accomplished
in two stages: first, the majority of the members of the
Systems Analysis Staff of the DD/S&T's Office were shifted
to form the nucleus of a Special Projects Staff charged
with responsibility for consolidating the various satel-
lite-oriented activities of the Directorate into one
office; second, personnel from OSA assigned to satellite
*Appendix A, Tab 37.
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activities, including detailees to the Pentagon and the
field, were transferred to SPS and, once the new NRO
Agreement of 13 August 1965 was signed, assuring CIA's
role in the NRP, this combined group was reorganized as
the Office of Special Projects.
An agreement was reached on 1 October 1965
governing the transfer of resources, responsibilities, and
authorities from OSA to OSP, and setting out the direct
support which OSA would render to OSP in the functional
areas of financial operations, communications, registry
and courier services, travel arrangements, logistics,
and computer services. A period of adjustment was neces-
sary before OSP could build up its capabilities to assume
complete management responsibilities for all phases of
the satellite reconnaissance program. 56/
The relationship of OSP to the National
Reconnaissance Program, under which its projects are
financed and directed, is treated in some detail in
Chapter V of this history.*
*See pp. 285-291, below. A separate history of OSP and
its four major projects, covering CIA satellite activities
from 1958 to 1970, was completed in March 1972 and is in
process of being edited for publication.
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The airborne collection activities of CIA sub-
sequent to 1962 were blanketed under the National Recon-
naissance Program and funds for their operation were
budgeted through the Defense Department. While the day-
to-day management of the field installations supporting
these programs remained with OSA, OEL, and later OSP, the
funds required to maintain them depended on the continua-
tion of the airborne collection programs. Dr. Wheelon,
from 1963 to 1966, played a vital role in preparing the
justifications for these programs, and presenting them
convincingly in high level briefings, making excellent
use of effective graphics and other visual aids.
herited by
Dr. Wheelon's
history.
A short history of each of the facilities in-
the DD/S&T, as well as those developed during
tenure, can be found in Appendix E to this
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C. Board, Committee and Panel Structure
1. Research and Development Review Board
On 16 April 1963
announced the establishment of a Research and
Development
Review Board for the purpose of reviewing and integrating
research and development activities and scientific and
technical efforts in the various Agency components con-
cerned, and to ensure that all scientific and technical
activities were constantly related to the broadest inter-
pretation of the Agency's mission. The Board was also to
constitute a reviewing body for the Agency's research and
development effort as a whole, and was to provide an ef-
fective internal mechanism for discussion and implementation
of recommendations of the Scientific Advisory Board, once
that body was established.
Membership of the R&D Review Board at the
time of its initial meeting on 17 May 1963 was as follows:
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman
Deputy Director, Research
Chief, Technical Services Division, DD/P
Director of Communications, DD/S
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, DD/I
Director, National Photo Interpretation Center
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When Dr. Wheelon was named DD/S&T in August
1963, he was also named Chairman of the Research and Devel-
opment Review Board, vice the DDCI. It was Dr. Wheelon's
desire that all Agency R&D should be coordinated by the
DD/S&T, and he had been led to believe, in his discussions
with the Executive Director in July 1963, that this would
be the case. 57/ However, the other Directorates involved
were anxious to retain certain of their R&D functions under
their own operational or user components, and they continued
to do so in the absence of any further directive to the
contrary.
The Research and Development Review Board
thus did not assume the role of coordinator of all CIA R&D,
but acted more as an arbiter of ad hoc compromises among
_
the various components. Central coordination of R&D was
not achieved during Dr. Wheelon's tenure, but agreement was
finally reached on 17 July 1967, when
giving that authority to the DD/S&T.*
The Research and Development Review Board went out of
existence when the new "Coordination of Research, Develop-
ment and Engineering" agreement came into effect.
*See Chapter IV, pp. 145-155, below.
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2. External Advisory Groups
The PFIAB's 8 March 1963 recommendations for
strengthening technical capabilities in the Intelligence
Community urged a major effort to draw fully upon the most
advanced science and the best scientific brains in the
nation. Mr. McCone had the same purpose in mind when in
April 1962 he had asked for an advisory board of eminent
scientists to be established to advise him; however because
of the delay in carrying through the plan to bring all of
the Agency's scientific activities together under the
DD/R, the advisory group did not materialize until July
1963.
The formation of the Scientific Advisory
Board was announced by dated
16 July 1963. The Board was to be responsible for re-
viewing and advising the Director on the total scientific
functions of the entire Agency, replacing the former CIA
Research Board which had been responsive principally to
the specialized needs of the Clandestine Services.
Dr. August B. Kinzel, Vice President for Research of the
Union Carbide Corporation, was appointed Chairman of the
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*Appendix A, Tab 9. 25X1
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Board, and several other outstanding men of science and
industry agreed to serve.*
By the time the Board was organized and held
its first meeting on 9 September 1963, the DD/R had been
reorganized and Dr. Wheelon, as DD/S&T, became responsible
for the administrative support and guidance, and for the
substantive follow-up on the Board's work, as well as for
the several expert panels which had been set up in 1962-63
to deal with specialized S&T problem areas, such as Soviet
and Chinese Communist nuclear activities, Soviet guided
missile and space developments, overhead reconnaissance,
optics, and life sciences.
The end-of-the-year report to the PFIAB by
Mr. McCone on 13 December 1963 made note of the Board's
establishment as follows:
A most important measure recently taken to
accomplish the interfacing of the U.S. store-
house of scientific knowledge and intelligence
was the activation of the Agency Scientific
Advisory Board. The impressive array of senior
U.S. scientists who have accepted assignments
on this Board are meeting at regular intervals
to review our present status and needs and to
offer guidance and direction. In addition to
the benefits derived from Board appraisals of
our approaches and activities there is a
"fall-out" of suggestions and offerings by
*Terms of reference and membership of this Board, and
other advisory groups mentioned in this Chapter will be
found in Appendix F.
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each member based on his comprehensive knowl-
edge of the state of the art across a broad
frontier of scientific discoveries and devel-
opments. These ideas are fed into the admin-
istrative pipeline for further development
either by referral to the Agency Research and
Development Review Board or to the Office of
Research and Development. 58/
Despite this optimistic report on the Ad-
visory Board's functions, and the unquestioned scientific
competence represented among its members, the Board did
not contribute as greatly to advising on the formation
and direction of the Agency's research and development
programs as Mr. McCone and Dr. Wheelon would have desired.
Dr. Wheelon felt there was a need for a
small, very senior group to provide the DCI with an inte-
grated
one
opinion of
or two of the
in Dr. Wheelon's
the Agency's
Kinzel Board
opinion, for
R&D effort; however, only
were broad gauge enough,
the larger role he had in
mind. The Kinzel philosophy of age diversity and high
specialization in the membership of his group was more
appropriate, Dr. Wheelon felt, for a technical panel and
the Kinzel Board members should be contributing largely
to such panels. Dr. Wheelon noted to Mr. McCone in
December 1963 that
...By its own design and selection, the Kinzel
Board is a mixed bag spanning all ages and
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disciplines with eight men. While each of its
members is extremely competent, it is not a
group to whom one can subordinate the Purcell
Panel, the Hyland Panel, the Webster Panel, the
Roddis Panel, the Stern Panel, or the Covert
Instrumentation Panel...In order to attract
the caliber of personnel necessary to give
these special panels the expertise required,
it is necessary that they understand in a real
way that they are working directly for the DCI.
The Chairman of each Panel should have consid-
erable latitude in selecting his own members
without regard to the Kinzel Board. 59/
Dr. Wheelon said he would continue to work
with the Kinzel Board and the Research and Development
Review Board to identify the topics needing to be cov-
ered, then form specialized panels as indicated. Once
those panels were established and operating, the question
of the role of the Kinzel Board would need to be
settled. 60/
Consideration was given in October 1964 to
enlarging the Kinzel Board and possibly extending its
role to cover over-all S&T responsibilities of the whole
Intelligence Community, but there was doubt among the
participants as to the wisdom of such a move and as to
the usefulness of such a community-wide S&T advisory
group. It was left that the Board would continue under
its original July 1963 charter for a second year.
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On 19 July 1965, Dr. Wheelon held a meeting
of his Office Directors to discuss a proposal to restruc-
ture the set-up of S&T boards and panels advisory to the
DCI. He outlined a proposed reconstitution of the exist-
ing expert advisory panels, and agreement was reached
that (1) all panels would be co-equal in stature, appointed
in the name of the DCI, and that there would be neither a
senior board nor a senior single scientific adviser to
the DCI; (2) eleven functional panels were recommended,
nine relating to activities of the DD/S&T, and one each to
61/
those of the DD/P and the DD/S, as follows: --
DD/S&T: Space
Strategic Capabilities
Nuclear
Basic Science & Technology
Radio Physics, Electronics
and Countermeasures
Life Sciences
Optics
Computation and Analysis
Audio and Counter-Audio
DD/P/TSD: Covert Instrumentation
DD/S/O/C: Communications
The Kinzel Board's tenure was allowed to
lapse after two years in being, and
which had set it up
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was canceled in November 1965
on the instruction of the DD/S&T. New or reconstituted
panels organized by Dr. Wheelon and his staff have operated
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since 1965 under the restructured system, including:
Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel, Space Intelligence
Panel, Nuclear Intelligence Panel and Science and Tech-
nology Panel. It was found in the various areas of the
life sciences that a more useful means than a formal
panel for obtaining the expert advice required was
through individual consultations with the experts on
particular and widely divergent subjects. Therefore the
Life Sciences Panel ceased to meet as a formal group.
3. USIB Committees
At the time of the transfer of OSI to the
DD/S&T in August 1963, guidelines laid down by the DDCI,
General Carter, for changes in responsibilities due to
the transfer, included the following directive with re-
gard to the DD/S&T's relationship to USIB:
The DD/S&T will act as the immediate link
between the DCI and the USIB scientific commit-
tees, GMAIC, JAEIC, and SIC, while recognizing
that these committees are elements of USIB and
are not subordinate to either DD/I or DD/S&T.
The DD/S&T will take the initiative in preparing
briefing memoranda and position papers for the
DCI on matters arising out of those committees,
and will coordinate such matters with the DD/I.*
The DD/S&T acquired the Chairmanship of
the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
*Appendix A, Tab 15, para. 10. 25X1
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in August 1963 when OSI was transferred from the DD/I.
Dr. Wheelon had previously served as Chairman while he
was AD/SI (August 1962 to October 1963) and he continued
to play an active and influential role in the Committee's
work, which was in the field of his own specialization.
The OSI staff continued to have the major responsibility
for support of the Committee on behalf of the DD/S&T
until FMSAC was established. The first FMSAC Director,
Mr. Carl E. Duckett, was appointed Chairman of GMAIC in
October 1963 and served until October 1966, when the
Chairmanship passed to the Pentagon for two years. In
1968 it reverted to the DD/S&T's control with the appoint-
ment of Mr. David S. Brandwein, the second Director of
FMSAC, as Chairman.
The Chairmanship of the Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee was also acquired, along with OSI,
by the DD/S&T. The Nuclear Energy Division of OSI con-
tinued to be responsible for the DD/S&T's contribution to
the support of the Committee's work. Dr. Chamberlain,
Director of OSI, has continued to serve as Chairman of
JAEIC since 1963.
The Scientific Intelligence Committee of
USIB has also been supported by the OSI staff, and has
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been chaired on behalf of the DD/S&T since 1963 by
Dr. Karl H. Weber, Deputy Director of OSI.
The DD/S&T's relationships with the above
three USIB committees are fully described in the related
appendices of the OSI History, and of the FMSAC History.
The Chairmanship of the Sigint Committee of
US IB
time to time since it
1965.
to the DD/S&T, served
has also been a responsibility of the DD/S&T from
was transferred from the DD/I in
while Special Assistant
as Chairman from 4 February 1965 to
20 May 1966, when both the incumbent and the position
were moved to the Office of the Director. The Chairman-
ship reverted to the Office of the DD/S&T on 1 October
1969 with the appointment of to suc-
ceed
The Chairmanship and Secretariat of the
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), acquired
by the DD/R in July 1962 from DPD (where it had first
been established as an ad hoc requirements committee to
support the U-2 program), passed to the DD/S&T in
August 1963. served as Chairman
during all of this period and until September 1965,
when
succeeded him. In July 1967,
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after Mr. Duckett became DD/S&T, COMOR was reconstituted as
the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
(COMIREX), and was transferred to the aegis of the DD/I
for administrative and secretariat support. Very close
relations have been maintained by the DD/S&T with this Com-
mittee throughout its existence since it has been the body
responsible for placing requirements against the Directorate's
overhead photography collection programs, both manned and
satellite.
4. White House Committees and Boards
Presidential advisory boards and committees
dealing with scientific and technological activities have
had a tremendous influence on the affairs of the DD/S&T,
a prime example being in the very organization and compo-
sition of the Directorate, as recommended by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.*
The President's Science Advisory Committee
(PSAC) has also tasked the DD/S&T from time to time for
reports and studies of mutual concern, and has made recom-
mendations concerning the Directorate's activities. The
Land Panel of PSAC (inaugurated in July 1965) during the
tenure of Dr. Wheelon as DD/S&T had a direct influence on
*See Chapter II, pp. 42-46, above.
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the CIA share in the management of the satellite reconnaissance
program under the NRP, which the Land Panel was set up to
oversee.
The National Security Council issued a good
number of directives and memoranda during Dr. Wheelon's term
as DD/S&T which required his participation and that of his
staff in preparing position papers and following through
in some cases with programs. Notable among these were:
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A continuing relationship between the DD/S&T
and the National Security Council has been in the partici-
pation by the DD/S&T in the activities of the "Special
Group" established under NSC 5412 in 1955, later called the
"303 Committee," which considered and passed on the accep-
tability of "black" activities proposed by CIA. In this
group the DD/S&T has had the responsibility to support the
DCI, or to act for him when appropriate, in presenting and
defending the operational overflight programs of OSA, OSP,
and OEL (under the NRP) in order to gain high level
approval for the actual launching of collection missions;
also to recommend to the DCI the approval or disapproval
of the monthly overflight schedule proposed to the 303 by
the Joint Reconnaissance Center of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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I
I
I
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D. Management of the Directorate Under Dr. Wheelon
1. Functional Organization: Priorities
In the first year-end report to the White
House following Dr. Wheelon's appointment as DD/S&T,
Mr. McCone reported to Mr. McGeorge Bundy with regard to
PFIAB's recommendations of 8 March 1963 that the majority
of the recommendations for strengthening the Agency's
technical capabilities were now in process of being car-
red out. He noted that there were still many problems
inherent in the recruiting of suitable top-flight scien-
tists to man the new Directorate, including problems
resulting from budgetary restrictions. 62/
Dr. Wheelon, in a 4 February 1964 memorandum
to the Executive Director, pointed up the budgetary prob-
lem he was facing in trying to make assumptions for
future year DD/S&T planning, and said
In FY 1964 and 1965 our planned growth is
seriously interrupted and forward-looking action
deferred, because of restrictive personnel and
funds limitations. I appreciate that all Direc-
torates have had similar restrictions on funds
and personnel, but this becomes a more serious
hurdle in a Directorate as newly organized as
the DD/S&T. Unlike the old line Directorates
which are restricted to doing a little less of
the same thing, the DD/S&T finds itself denied
the capability to get a fair start in many areas
of research I feel are of the utmost importance
in creating a balanced organization. 63/
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In March 1964, Dr. Wheelon reported to the
DCI on current progress in manning the Directorate and in-
cluded a functional chart showing the areas in which the
various Offices of the DD/S&T were concentrating their
efforts. He said he conceived of the product of scientific
and technological intelligence as
...a continuous stream beginning with the clear
understanding of the requirements, the basic
research and preliminary design of collection
systems, the development of those systems, their
operation..., the data reduction of their results
the engineering analysis which converts scien-
tific data into English appraisals, and finally,
the estimative step which draws the estimative
judgments from these analyses. 64/
He furnished the DCI an organizational chart of the Direc-
torate as then organized, and a functional chart illustrat-
ing the various stages of the continuous process in which
each Office of the Directorate carried out its functions
in coordination with the others. Dr. Wheelon said that
the greatest benefit of having all of these functions
under the same roof was that he could "close the loop"
between the various steps in the process of producing
scientific and technological intelligence. (The func-
tional and organizational charts referred to are repro-
duced, overleaf, Figures 2 and 3.)
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? ag aippigi FateaggoLvas : oppago9.11004.googs IN
FIGURE 2
DD/S&T FUNCTIONS
(March 19A4)
RESEARCH
DEVELOPMENT
OPERATIONS
DATA, REDUCTION
ANALYSIS
CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ESTIMATES
OFFICE OF RESEARCH >
8, DEVELOPMENT
SECRET
OFFICE OF SPECIAL N
ACTIVITIES
OFFICE OF ELINT
A p p rimip rl Er
COMPUTER>
SERVICES
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC \
INTELLIGENCE /
r PPIPACP 9nm/rm.' -4
FOREIGN MISSILE 8, >
'SPACE ANALYSIS CENTER
? riA_PnPRcmnricumdrinnAnni 7nnnt..,
1111 NI III IIIFPPIIII' Fclill1eallff0401113 1111?P1111,091111001111100111 1111 III IN III
Figure 3
EPL1 R LCTOR All KM S(.11,NLE AND I LCII N( )IA)(
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR
SPEC.ASST. to DEP. DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE
OFFICER
STAFF
OFFICE OF
ELINT
OFFICE OF
SPECIAL
ACTIVITIES
OFFICE OF
RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE OF
SCIENTIFIC
INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF
COMPUTER
SERVICES
FOREIGN
MISSILE & SPACE
ANALYSIS
CENTER
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Within the functional organization of the
Directorate the establishment of priorities among the areas
of activity was controlled in the first instance by the
requirements levied by USIB and higher authority. Since
the priority demands for intelligence in the national se-
curity area have been, and continue to be, for information
on Soviet missiles, nuclear weapons, and naval build-up,
and on Chinese Communist nuclear activities, the DD/S&T's
production of intelligence has been aimed principally at
satisfying those demands.
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Beyond those activities governed by priority
requirements, the emphasis assigned by Dr. Wheelon to spe-
cific programs was necessarily subjective to a degree.
Some collection operations could be precisely defined and
carried out, such as the collection of information on spe-
cific Soviet missile firings. Choices among other opera-
tions had to be made on a judgment of their comparative
contributions to national security, or alternately, the
consequences if they were not done, keeping in mind that
the operational phase of most S&T projects must be down-
stream from the time of decision by a number of years, and
that the opposition, meanwhile, is not standing still.
As to priorities in the expenditure of his
own time and effort, Dr. Wheelon gave a large portion of
both to the advocacy in the NRP of CIA's research and de-
velopment role in satellite reconnaissance, focusing
strongly on future technical collection systems. These
were high priority programs and the stakes were high.
From time to time, Office Directors not associated with the
NRP would become concerned at what seemed to them the undue
amount of the DD/S&T's time given to NRP problems in com-
parison to their own. However, Dr. Wheelon was acutely
aware of the importance of the work of all Offices of the
Directorate.
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2. Philosophy of Management 65/
Since the Directorate for Science and Tech-
nology was a new entity in the Agency and its missions rel-
atively unique, its management processes and practices had
to be developed and implemented to serve its special needs,
always with the best interests of the Agency and the Com-
munity in mind. Management tools such as computer-based
reporting and systems analysis were introduced under
Dr. Wheelon to ensure that complete and accurate information
was available to him and his staff for monitoring project
accomplishment, measuring results, and making timely and
well-advised decisions.
While these management tools were being ap-
plied with varying degrees of success and modified as expe-
rience dictated, it was still vital that the Deputy Director
maintain continuous and personal involvement in the whole
spectrum of Directorate activities. This he accomplished
through daily morning meetings with his key officers, who
had previously been briefed in their own areas. Monthly
reports were required of each Office, supplemented by
communications and meetings on specific topics.
Within the Directorate's research and de-
velopment activities, Dr. Wheelon instituted a review
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program in which quarterly critiques were held on each
project underway in the Directorate. Office Directors and
project officers briefed him in detail, progress and prob-
lems were fully analyzed, and follow-up actions were moni-
tored at the Directorate level. These project reviews
were later organized in accordance with the planning
gories, sub-categories, and elements as set forth in
cate-
the
Combined Program Call (first issued in January 1966) to
enable Directorate activities to be more closely aligned
with established objectives.
External contract proposals were subjected
to a thorough review at Office and Directorate level to
relate them to requirements, and were coordinated with a
view to avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort. A
computer-based reporting system to provide monthly status
summaries of all DD/S&T contracts was initiated. It did
not reach its full utility during Dr. Wheelon's tenure, but
did become a very useful management tool after two years
of building a substantial base.
In the area of scientific intelligence pro-
duction by OSI and FMSAC, Dr. Wheelon relied heavily on
his morning meetings and the actual publications to keep
current on new information and analyses, and to provide
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guidance on areas of analysis, research, or reporting
which required increased or decreased emphasis. He con-
tinued to display the interest he had shown as AD/SI in
improving the quality of analysis, and in weeding out non-
productive people and projects.
The DD/S&T and his staff reviewed all scien-
tific intelligence production, both Agency and external,
and regular briefings by OSI and FMSAC on their proposed
production programs provided Dr. Wheelon with a continuing
opportunity to give direction to their efforts. The year
1964 saw an increase in publication of scientific intelli-
gence by the Directorate, with FMSAC beginning its daily
and special missile and space activity reports, and OSI
initiating the Daily Surveyor and later a weekly version.
Analyses in support of National Estimates
prepared by OSI and FMSAC were reviewed with Dr. Wheelon
prior to USIB consideration. The Board of National Esti-
mates, principal consumer of DD/S&T's major intelligence
production, has been well satisfied with the quality and
timeliness of the contributions received from the Direc-
torate since its establishment.*
*From a conversation in December 1970 between the writer
and Mr. Abbott Smith, Vice Chairman, and later Chairman,
of the Board of National Estimates, 1958-1970.
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The DD/S&T's operating responsibilities in
the technical collection of Sigint and photographic intel-
ligence were carried out by OSA, OSP, and OEL, and were
monitored on his behalf during most of his tenure as
DD/S&T by his Special Assistant,
Dr. Wheelon 25
kept fully informed on those activities through his daily
meetings
and
spent in
and frequent conversations with his Office Chiefs
A large part of his time and effort was
the advocacy of these programs in the various
bodies concerned with the National Reconnaissance Pro-
gram.*
Reporting on his stewardship as DD/S&T to
Admiral Raborn in February 1966, Dr. Wheelon wrote that
there was opportunity for improvement within the Direc-
torate, and his plan for achieving it was to apply a
"closed loop" reporting and control system to the manage-
ment areas of planning, organization, control and communi-
cations, so as to ensure that each operated in harmony
and consistency with the other three. 66/
*See Chapter V, pp. 244-290, below.
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3. Budgeting for DD/S&T Programs
Prior to the placing of all overhead
reconnaissance activities under the management of the
National Reconnaissance Program, CIA had budgeted for
its share of these programs together with its other acti-
vities and had received obligational authority over the
funds from Congress.
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The first Directorate of Research five-year
projections (FY 1963-67) were prepared in answer to a
call by the BOB and were to be used as a basis for prepar-
ing the FY 1964 budget. Two major phases in the process
as outlined by the Director of the Budget were (1) a
spring program review concentrating on major long-range
issues, government-wide, through 1967, against which
general guidelines and planning figures would be established
in July; and (2) a summer and fall period of preparing and
reviewing detailed budget estimates for FY 1964 in which
the projections through 1967 would be used as background,
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but concentration would be on short-term decisions. 67/
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Budget hearings for FY 1965 opened with the
announcement that the 1965 budget would be the tightest yet
under President Johnson; that the intelligence community
would be under particularly close scrutiny; and that Con-
gress would be taking a hard and questioning look at all
research and development. 68/ Dr. Wheelon, who had just
begun to build up the Agency's scientific and technological
capabilities, requested an increase in FY 1965 funds of
approximately 50% over the Congressional budget figure.
However, the budget request was cut below the Congressional
submission, and an exhortation to the Executive Branch by
the President in August 1964 urged improved efficiency and
economy. The Office of Budget, Programs and Manpower, CIA,
in the first quarter of FY 1965, instituted quarterly re-
porting by Directorates of economies effected, the first
report being due 15 September 1964.
In January 1965, the Executive Officer of
DD/S&T, Mr. Blake, told OBPAM that the DD/S&T found it ex-
tremely difficult to continue to report the accomplishment
of economies. The Directorate was reaching the point of
no return in trying to effect further monetary and person-
nel savings and still continue to discharge its responsi-
bilities in an acceptable fashion. 69/
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A further BOB exercise in identification by
each agency of programs or activities wherein budgetary
reductions could be applied in order of relative priority
drew the reply from the DD/S&T in June 1965 that no pri-
orities would be listed by the DD/S&T because its activi-
ties were so closely interrelated in a "closed loop" that
reductions could only be applied to reduce the scope of
activities rather than by elimination of any one of the
interrelated programs. 70/
Looking ahead to FY 1967 budgeting, the
President in June 1965 said that all agencies of the Exec-
utive Branch must make hard choices, that program review
would be a year-round affair, and that the BOB would begin
program and cost effectiveness analyses in depth.
In the spring of 1966 the BOB imposed on CIA
the DOD-style cycle of planning, programming and budget-
ing, which added a major responsibility to the DD/S&T's
Plans and Programs Staff. Whereas it had formerly moni-
tored and consolidated Office estimates into Directorate
estimates, it now had to become involved in detail with
each Office in defining goals, and in preparing five-
year detailed programs and cost estimates. 71/ A
"Planning-Programming-Budgeting Timetable" giving a graphic
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display of the sequence of events in the budgetary cycle
can be found at Tab 6 of Appendix C, and shows clearly that
budgeting for DD/S&T, as for all other Government entities,
had become not only a year-round affair, but a day-to-day,
continuous operation.
The importance of a mechanized system for
obtaining the various categories of data required to satisfy
the BOB was recognized in DD/S&T and the Administrative Staff
was first given responsibility for developing procedures, in
conjunction with OCS, for furnishing the data. This respon-
sibility was later given to the Management Information Offi-
cer, appointed in mid-1966.*
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In May 1966, the Comptroller system of
management was adopted by DD/S&T and
as Comptroller, presented his first five-year estimates
in response to the BOB requirement with the following
1967-72 levels set for DD/S&T funds and manpower:
Fiscal Year
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
*See Chapter IV, pp. 158, 173.
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These estimates can be compared with actual obligations of
CIA funds by the DD/S&T up to FY 1970, as shown on the
chart at Tab 4 of Appendix C, in order to learn how much
the estimates have been reduced by program cuts, project
cancellations, etc.
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The cancellation of OSA A-12 project
and its supporting photographic and electronic systems,
(even though its principal support came from NRP),
was a large factor in this reduction, but a general lower-
ing of sights due to tight money and a BOB brake on re-
search and development spending contributed to the
leveling off of the DD/S&T's CIA-funded budget at about
As indicated above, FY 1964 and succeeding
years' funding of DD/S&T projects falling under the NRP
has been accomplished within the over-all NRP budget,
which is firmly in the hands of the NRO Comptroller. The
unhappy relationship between CIA and the D/NRO and his
Staff existing during the Wheelon tenure as DD/S&T had
its beginning, to a large extent, in differences over
money. The DD/S&T was placed in a position of having to
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seek funds from the Director of NRO to carry out programs
for which CIA had previously budgeted and had full manage-
ment responsibility. Dr. Wheelon raised the question of
CIA's having budgetary control over funds to support its
NRP projects several times during his tenure as DD/S&T, but
he was unable to force the issue, or to loosen the grip of
the DNRO and his Comptroller on the NRP purse strings.
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4. Personnel and Space
The increase in personnel of the immediate
Office of the DD/S&T--by December 1963 the T/0 called for
a staff ?necessitated additional suitable office space,
square feet. Placing this require-
estimated at about
ment with the DD/S in December 1963, the Executive Officer,
*See Appendix C, Tab 5.
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Mr. John F. Blake, noted specific deficiencies in the
DD/S&T's allotted space and said that, while not unmindful
of the difficulties and expense of levying such a large re-
quirement, the fact was that the DD/S&T could no longer
conduct his daily business efficiently or securely within
current space allocations. Included in the space require-
ment was a request for two interview rooms, a conference
room, and offices for the Scientific Advisory Board which
had been formally organized in September 1963. 73/
Despite the continuous pressure for space, it
took almost a year to acquire sufficient suitable space for
the immediate office staff of Dr. Wheelon. By December
1964, however, he and his staff were suitably ensconced in
the 6-E-60 complex at Langley Headquarters, which has con-
tinued since then to be occupied by the DD/S&T. Meanwhile,
during 1964, some of the more pressing needs of the Offices
of the Directorate (ORD, OCS, OSA, and FMSAC) were met by
small additional area allocations.
The Directorate's manpower level for FY 1965
(approved July 1964) was
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DD/S&T shows the location of all Offices of the Directorate
in the Langley Headquarters as of 21 December 1964. The
principal changes from that date through 1970 were the re-
moval of ORD from Langley to the Ames Building at Rosslyn
in March 1966;
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5. DD/S&T Career Service
To bring the "R" Career Service management
into the DD/S&T frame of reference, a Senior Career Serv-
ice Board was set up by Dr. Wheelon by direction of
DD/S&T Instruction 20-1 on 25 September 1963. The Chair-
man was to be appointed by the DD/S&T to serve for a one-
year period, the Assistant Directors of the five Offices
were named to serve as permanent members, and
was nominated by the Director of
Personnel to serve in DD/S&T as Executive Secretary of
the Board (non-voting). A first consideration of the
*Appendix A, Tab 14.
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Board was to make appropriate recommendations to the
DD/S&T for an administrative structure to implement the
S&T Career Service Program within all elements of the
Directorate. An agreed instruction outlining functional
responsibilities of the Board was issued on 20 November
1963 as DD/S&T Instruction 20-2* and later revised on
30 December 1964 to bring the Board's functions more
into line with the over-all personnel policies of the
Agency.**
A principal responsibility assigned to the
Career Service Board was the review and recommendation
with regard to assignments, transfers, and promotions in
the supergrade and SPS areas. Pressure by the Bureau of
the Budget to hold down numbers of supergrades through-
out the government during Fiscal Years 1965 and 1966
prompted Dr. Wheelon to take over the Chairmanship of the
*Appendix A, Tab 19.
**Appendix A, Tab 29.
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"R" Career Service Board late in December 1965 in order
to give closer attention to personnel matters, particularly
promotions and performances of senior officers of grades
GS-15 through GS-18.
Following Dr. Wheelon's departure from the
Agency, Mr. Duckett as Acting Deputy Director for Science
and Technology, took the position that an Office Director
should chair the Board, providing the DD/S&T the opportu-
nity to act on recommendations of the Board without having
been personally involved in the deliberations. Although
the stated policy called for annual rotation of the Chair-
manship among Office Directors, Dr. Chamberlain has, in
fact, served as Chairman since 1 December 1966. From
October 1964 to June 1970,
served as
Executive Secretary. The incumbents of two positions have
been added to the membership of the Board since its in-
ception, namely in June 1968, the Executive Officer of
DD/S&T, then
and in February 1970,
the Assistant DD/S&T, then Dr. Donald H. Steininger.
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The numbers of SPS and supergrade assignees
in DD/S&T
have changed
since 1964 from the originally
ap-
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proved
supergrade slots to ceilings of
slots for FY 1970. A chart at
supergrade
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Appendix C, Tab 3, shows the increases in numbers of
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Master of Science and Doctor of Philosophy degree-holders,
in the various Offices of the Directorate between 1963 and
the end of 1966, and indicates the measure of effort ex-
pended in recruiting and retaining qualified scientists
in the Directorate during Dr. Wheelon's tenure.
*Appendix A, Tab 26.
**Appendix A, Tab 41.
***Appendix A, Tab 59.
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Maximum use was made of established recruit-
ing services of the Office of Personnel in building up the
Directorate's manning complement. Special measures were
also taken to attract candidates. Unlike most Agency re-
cruiting, which aims at the college campus, Dr. Wheelon and
his professional staff recruited essentially from industry.
Dr. Wheelon, being well known in industry and government,
was able to draw a number of highly qualified people inter-
ested in working for him. He was personally responsible for
recruiting a number of men whose professional backgrounds
and capabilities were known to him including, to name a
few: Mr. Carl E. Duckett, to chair GMAIC and direct FMSAC:
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to act as Computer Science Adviser
to OCS during its organization; and
to head the DD/S&T's Systems Analysis Staff.
Dr. Wheelon had an impact on the recruitment
of three Offices in particular. In OCS,
was en- 25X1
couraged to hire a better caliber of computer personnel
with emphasis on technical analysts rather than straight
computer operators. A great deal of emphasis was also
given by Dr. Wheelon to the technical backgrounds of the
OSI analysts. This was not without its painful aspects
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since many tried and true OSI analysts had been with the
Office for ten years or more and had reached relatively
senior positions, even though they had little technical
background. Dr. Wheelon felt OSI analysts should be tech-
nically qualified first and should learn the intelligence
business on the job. OEL was also a target for the up-
grading of technical personnel and a second Deputy was
added to the Office to strengthen its technical base.
Dr. Wheelon's predilection for Ph.D.'s was
based on the indication of the disciplined training the
individual would have received. On the other hand, he
fully recognized that the degree did not ensure outstanding
performance, and occasionally a Ph.D. who did not measure
up had to be terminated. The introduction of many high-
grade officers into the Directorate was not accomplished
without a certain abrasive effect in some quarters, as il-
lustrated by the case of one employee of five years' tenure
who, on resigning, presented a bill of substantial criti-
cism against the personnel policies of the DD/S&T.
Dr. Wheelon personally investigated the case and reported
his findings to the DDCI with the following summary opinion:
I now feel that we have not lost a major asset,
but do recognize that his statements are symp-
tomatic of a number of people within the org-
anization who are being upstaged in the
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professional pecking order by new talent we
are bringing in. This is a price we expected
to pay and my only hope is that we are not
discouraging or failing to recognize really
able people in the present organization. 74/
6. Relations with Staff and Office Chiefs
When Dr. Wheelon became DD/S&T, the position
of Assistant DD/S&T was filled by Colonel Edward B. Giller,
who had been Acting DD/R during the transition period of
June and July 1963. Colonel Giller remained in that posi-
tion until May 1964, when he returned to the Air Force.
His principal activities in the Directorate had been on
the research and development side, and he spent a large
part of his efforts in helping to launch the Office of Re-
search and Development. After Colonel Giller's departure,
Dr. Wheelon, by his own choice, did not seek a replace-
ment for the Assistant DD/S&T slot, feeling that he could
operate as well, or better, without one. (The position
remained vacant for two years, until in May 1966,
Mr. Carl E. Duckett was moved from his job as Director of
FMSAC to take over the Assistant DD/S&T slot, through
action of the Director.)
In addition to the Staff Chiefs listed in
III-B-4, above, and the two Special Assistants previously
noted
, Dr. Wheelon added to
his staff a Special Assistant for Research and Development, 25X1
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(drawn from the OEL Staff), on
15 September 1965. The very able and experienced Execu-
tive Officer, Mr. Jack Blake (who was relied upon heavily
by Dr. Wheelon for his Agency expertise), rounded out the
DD/S&T's immediate staff.
During the period when there was no
Assistant DD/S&T (May 1964 to May 1966), per- 25
formed some of the duties of that position and, during
was usually named
absences of Dr. Wheelon,
the Acting DD/S&T.
Dr. Wheelon gave forceful leadership to the
Directorate in achieving its mission. He ran the Direc-
torate with a firm hand and with extreme confidence and
self-assurance. He was exceptionally effective at chair-
ing meetings at all levels, being always firmly in command
and control, bringing,out the points at issue in clear, con-
cise exposition. His ability to design and make use of
charts, graphs, and other visual media, became one of the
Directorate's trademarks.
Dr. Wheelon's drive and energy were seem-
ingly boundless, and he also demanded maximum effort and
the highest quality of performance from his personnel.
The demands for excellence which he made on his staff,
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however, were matched by his own aggressive defense of the
Directorate's prerogatives, and his energetic efforts to
achieve external recognition for the Directorate's achieve-
ments. An example of the latter was his personal interest
in the design and use of distinctive DD/S&T covers and
formats for all of the Directorate's publications.
7. Intra-Agency Relationships
Dr. Wheelon was fortunate to have, during
the organizing period of his Directorate, the strong sup-
port of the Director, Mr. McCone, and the Deputy Director,
General Carter, in what he was attempting to do. He also
enjoyed friendly relations with, and the support of, the
Executive Director, Mr. Kirkpatrick. Mr. McCone was anxious
to see a strong technological orientation introduced and
carried forward in CIA. In this effort, as has been
pointed out in preceding pages, he had the backing and
continuous interest of the President's Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board, the membership of which at that time
was rather strongly weighted on the scientific side.
The relationships of the DD/S&T with other
Directorates of the Agency during Dr. Wheelon's regime
were less amicable than those with the Director's Office.
As noted in pages 59-60, above, Dr. Wheelon and Dr. Cline
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were at odds over the Administration of OSI when it was
under the DD/I, and their differences continued after OSI
was transferred from Dr. Cline's bailiwick to the DD/S&T.
Almost immediately after the transfer, Dr. Wheelon, in
October 1963, had occasion to rebuke Dr. Cline over what
he described as "OCI raiding parties contacting their fa-
vorite analysts in OSI and by-passing the line of command,
which is responsible for the substance of...L6SI's7 con-
tributions." 75/ He told Dr.
possible terms that this must
Cline in the strongest
cease, and also advised
Dr. Chamberlain to "let everyone in OSI know that they
are not to take assignment unless you personally, or your
designated officer, are in the loop and have control of
the problem. I believe only in this way can we cauterize
the free-wheeling tendencies of the DDI action types." 76/
In February 1964 the Assistant for Manage-
ment, DD/I, and Mr. Blake reached a truce with regard to
a proposed DD/I plan for standardizing printing priority
indicators. Agreement was reached that DD/S&T would make
a study and determine whether OSI publications would use
identical priority indicators to those of DD/I, but at
the same time, DD/S&T reserved the right of judgment in
establishing its own printing priorities.
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In March 1964, an exchange of memoranda
between Dr. Chamberlain and Dr. Otto E. Guthe, Assistant
Director for Research and Reports, DD/I, sought to develop
an understanding between the two principal producers of
intelligence reports in the Agency with particular refer-
ence to interoffice coordination of draft reports. The
analysts of each of these Offices were encouraged to co-
ordinate with their colleagues of the other Directorate
during the research and early production phases of their
papers, and arrangements were made for "last look" coordi-
nations when desired by either Office. 77/
Dr. Wheelon continued to hold the line
against any real, or apparent, encroachments by the DD/I
on his prerogatives. When the DD/I established his Col-
lection Guidance Staff to assist information collection
and intelligence production activities to meet the needs
of the Agency and the Community, Dr. Wheelon took a dim
view of its "broad charter" and insisted that it not inter-
pose its assistance where none was needed. The services of
CGS were not used to a great extent during its three years
of existence by the Offices of the DD/S&T.*
*See Chapter VI, pp. 308-310, below.
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Relationships with the DD/I smoothed out
somewhat with the passage of time and the later change of
leadership which took place in both Directorates during
1966, and since then have run a fairly normal course.
The DD/S&T's relationships with the Plans
Directorate in the beginning developed two points of con-
flict: (1) the attempt to centralize all Agency R&D under
the DD/S&T would have appropriated all R&D activities of
the DD/P's Technical Services Division;
*See Chapter IV, Section E, pp. 145-155, below.
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When the DD/R was being organized in 1962, the
DD/S, then Colonel White, had a favorable interest in the idea
of a scientific directorate and felt its purpose was valid,
and that the problems involved in setting it up would be only
practical ones. He later had some differences with the DD/R
over the latter's demands for contiguous space for his entire
organization, and felt that Dr. Scoville had become too emo-
tional over what could be regarded as the normal frustrations
involved in setting up a new organization.*
When the Directorate was being enlarged in
the summer of 1963, Colonel White did not oppose the trans-
fer of the computer services from the DD/S to the DD/S&T,
as desired by Dr. Wheelon, even though Colonel White felt
that, from a functional point of view, a case could be made
for insisting that these services remain in the Support Di-
rectorate. He believed that the DD/S organization, which
was, perforce, big and expensive, had enough on its plat-
ter, and that possibly the new and "sexy" S&T Directorate
*See pages 30-31, above.
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could more readily obtain the necessary funds to bring the
computer services of the Agency to a high level of accom-
plishment. The one stipulation of the DD/S in relinquish-
ing the computer activities was that the DD/S&T undertake
to administer this Agencywide service in an evenhanded man-
ner. As far as this latter point was concerned, Colonel White
believed that the DD/S&T had complied, even though in subse-
quent years there had been established small computer en-
claves for special purposes here and there in the Agency.
In his position as Executive Director-Comptroller he saw
the possible future need to bring all computer activities
under a central control for better time-sharing and pro-
gramming of available equipment, in view of the costs in-
volved, although he was aware that this would be a matter
requiring considerable study.*
The DD/S&T has had good support from the
DD/S since its establishment, and only a few rough spots
have developed from time to time. Some initial problems
developed with the Procurement Division of the Office of
Logistics regarding the backlog of procurement requests
*This, and the preceding, paragraph based on conversation
with Colonel L. K. White, Executive Director-Comptroller,
on 24 June 1971.
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early in 1964, and the failure of the DD/S&T to receive
the high priority treatment its Offices expected. These
matters were ironed out on an ad hoc basis while the over-
all procurement policies of the Agency were undergoing re-
view, looking toward eventual decentralization of procurement,
which was initiated on a small scale in 1968.*
Communications support has continued at a high
level throughout the life of the DD/S&T, maintaining the
Directorate's vital communications links, through special
channels, with its overseas operations, and with the contrac-
tors producing its equipment and carrying out its research
and development. The Office of Security has also given the
DD/S&T excellent support, particularly in the area of indus-
trial security, where the Offices of the Directorate require
a large commitment of specially trained security officers;
in the support of "exotic" clearance control and procedures;
and in the handling of special category documents and ma-
terial in transit, such as the couriering of exposed film
from operational missions from the field to processing facil-
ities and to Headquarters. Other relationships with the
Support Directorate have been of a generally routine and
beneficial nature.
*See pp. 156-161, below.
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8. DD/S&T External Relations
a. The White House
The DD/S&T's work with White House boards
and committees is summarized under III C, above. In addi-
tion to those White House groups listed there, Dr. Wheelon
developed excellent rapport with Dr. Donald F. Hornig, the
President's Science Adviser, appointed by President Kennedy
in November 1963, and retained by President Johnson.
Dr. Wheelon, between 1964 and his departure in 1966, made
a point of meeting with Dr. Hornig and members of his staff
on a bi-weekly basis, and in ad hoc sessions as circumstances
demanded, briefing them on the Agency's complete span of
S&T activities, from the technical aspects of collection
systems development, to interpretation of substantive in-
telligence. These meetings were fruitful for both sides:
it was helpful for the Science Adviser to have these full
and frank discussions of S&T activities in the Intelligence
Community, and it was equally useful for the DD/S&T to have
a hearing at the White House level.
Besides the DD/S&T's contributions to
annual and special reports by the DCI to PFIAB, and to
talking papers for the DCI's use at PFIAB meetings,
Dr. Wheelon's personal participation in the deliberations
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of PFIAB and PSAC during 1964-66 was almost entirely related
to problems developing out of the National Reconnaissance
Program. He was called on to testify before these groups
and their specialized panels on all aspects of the Direc-
torate's technical collection programs, including capabili-
ties and technical characteristics of systems, feasibilities,
and costs, and on occasion he was queried with regard to the
relationships within the NRO between CIA and the Air Force.
In his technical presentations he gave uniformly clear and
succinct expositions, with well-marshaled facts and figures,
thus gaining a reputation as a most persuasive advocate for
the Agency's role in science and technology. With regard
to his appearances before the PFIAB and its panels to
testify on the CIA/NRO situation, he frankly and forcefully
brought the problems into the open, but the net result was
a widening of the breach.*
b. Interdepartmental Relations
In Dr. Wheelon's relations with the
Pentagon, the most frustrating problem he faced, as had
also been the case with Dr. Scoville before him, and the
*Two very descriptive reports of such testimony by
Dr. Wheelon before the PFIAB and its Baker Panel on NRO
activities can be found at Tab 54 of Appendix D.
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one which overshadowed other more amicable and productive
joint activities, was his struggle with the NRO, and par-
ticularly his relationship with Dr. Brockway McMillan during
the latter's tour as Director of NRO. The CIA/NRO story is
told in Chapter V of this history; therefore it will only be
noted here that one of the most outstanding achievements of
Dr. Wheelon during his term as DD/S&T was his part in help-
ing to salvage for CIA a respectable role in the National
Reconnaissance Program, particularly in the satellite re-
connaissance field.
The DD/S&T's relations with DOD's National
Security Agency in the collection and analysis of Elint
have been strained from time to time, but generally speaking,
no harm to the National Elint Program has resulted.*
In other DOD relationships during the
life of the Directorate, varying from area to area and
project to project, it can be said that cooperation with
Defense agencies has produced fruitful results. Over-all
governmental economies have been effected by the sharing
of successful research and development, the joint use of
*See Chapter VI-C-3, "Office of Elint," and Appendix E,
Tab 9, "Headquarters Elint Processing Center" for further
details of this relationship.
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each other's facilities, and the mutual exchange of
intelligence in S&T fields.
(b) FMSAC's good working relationship with the Defense
Special Missile Analysis Center which was set up at
Fort Meade in 1964,'and particularly the improvement in
FMSAC's ability to task DOD collection assets; (c) ORD's
research and development coordination with DIA and ARPA
and the application of ORD's research and development
resources to the problems of the Defense agencies; and
(d) the close DD/S&T cooperation with NASA initiated in
1963 when Dr. Wheelon was AD/SI, developing into mutual
assistance agreements for analysis of intelligence data
on foreign space arents and technology, and for consulta-
tion on U.S. national space problems.
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c. Scientific Community
In carrying out the PFIAB's recommendation
that the whole spectrum of modern science and technology be
brought to bear on intelligence problems, Dr. Wheelon fos-
tered the closest cooperation between his staff and the
American scientific community, both academic and industrial.
His usage of expert advisory panels has been noted above,
pages 82-87. In addition, he, in coordination with the
President of M.I.T., Dr. James R. Killian, organized a ser-
ies of scientific discussions known as the "Boston Dinners,"
several of which were held at the M.I.T. Faculty Club dur-
ing 1964 and 1965. Participating, besides the top staff of
the DD/S&T, were outstanding men of science of the United
States, such as Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Dr. Edwin H. Land, and
former science adviser to President Eisenhower, Dr. George
Kistiakowsky.
A series of "Dining-In's" was organized
by Dr. Wheelon and held in the Director's dining room at
Langley Headquarters, allowing Directorate staff to listen
to invited guests from Defense and Industry and to join in
round-table discussions. Symposiums were held at intervals
to bring together the experts in various fields of science
and technology and to explore the state-of-the-art in such
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fields as microminiaturization, lasers, and over-the-horizon
radar, to name a few.
In the interest of maintaining the pro-
fessionalism of the DD/S&T staff and in keeping each scien-
tist abreast of the latest developments in his own specific
field, the professional personnel of DD/S&T were encouraged
by Dr. Wheelon to maintain their relationships with scien-
tific societies and organizations and to attend appropriate
conferences and seminars of a substantive nature. In ac-
cordance with this policy (which was established by DD/S&T
Instruction 22-1 of 7 May 1964) such personnel were given
the opportunity of attending one conference in their field
each year at Agency expense.
9. Dr. Wheelon Resigns
The close personal involvement of Dr. Wheelon
in the many facets of the Directorate's activities has been
noted in various contexts in the preceding pages, along
with an indication of the strong leadership which he exer-
cised over the Directorate's affairs, and his zealous
guardianship of his own and his Directorate's prerogatives.
It could be said in retrospect, however, that his most out-
standing accomplishment was in actually bringing the Direc-
torate for Science and Technology to a viable state, with a
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staff
during a period of budgetary stringency in
government and of sharp competition for available scientific
talent, and with less than the wholehearted endorsement of
two of the other three Directorates. A less aggressive
and self-confident man would probably not have succeeded.
Paradoxically, the characteristics which
enabled him to succeed in his undertaking were those which,
on other occasions, made it difficult for some people to
deal with him. He was a young man of great brilliance,
but as an adversary he was known to some as an in-fighter,
with no holds barred.
Dr. Wheelon tendered his resignation to the
Director, Mr. Helms, in July 1966 and said that, in accord-
ance with his promise to Mr. McCone to take the job as
DD/S&T for no less than three, and no more than four,
years he had decided to accept an offer from industry which
he found most attractive. It was known that he kept a
checklist of the things he intended to do before he consid-
ered his job complete. He had reached the end of his check-
list by mid-1966 and in his letter of resignation he said
he felt he had accomplished his major objective in creating
a technical intelligence component for the Agency. His
resignation was effective as of 23 September 1966.
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IV. Directorate Under Mr. Duckett, September 1966--1970
A. Background of Appointment
Mr. Duckett's appointment in May 1966 as
Assistant DD/S&T, as previously noted, followed a period
of two years in which Dr. Wheelon worked without an Assist-
ant Deputy Director. When the new NRO Agreement was signed
in August 1965, Dr. Wheelon indicated that he could not
work under that Agreement and that he intended to resign.
He did not carry through this plan right away, and it be-
came necessary for the Director to make some changes in
order to maintain the truce reached with the Pentagon and
get on with carrying out the Agreement which he and
Mr.
Vance had signed. Dr. Wheelon was removed from the
NRO arena by the transfer to
on
an interim basis as of 15 September 1965, of the responsi-
bility for CIA's NRO activities. Dr. Wheelon's departure
was anticipated as being imminent, and a quiet search for
a replacement was initiated by Admiral Raborn.
Dr. Wheelon continued to stay on as DD/S&T,
however, through the end of 1965 and into 1966. On 16 May
1966, just a month before Admiral Raborn resigned as DCI,
and his function as Director of Reconnaissance
*From a conversation between the writer and Mr. Duckett,
July 1971.
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for CIA were removed from the DD/S&T's Office and
transferred to the Director's Office. On the same day
Mr. Duckett was appointed Assistant DD/S&T, and during
the next four months until the effective date of Wheelon's
resignation (23 September 1966), Mr. Duckett had the re-
sponsibility of running the Directorate for a great deal
of the time while Dr. Wheelon was out of the country or
on leave.
When, on Dr. Wheelon's departure from the Agency,
Mr. Duckett was made Acting DD/S&T, he began a difficult
period of about seven months when he had the responsibil-
ity of carrying on the affairs of the Directorate without
feeling free to revamp the organization, since at any time
a new Deputy Director might be appointed. He felt he
should only make what decisions were critical and remedy
any crisis situations, for instance with regard to person-
nel assignments.
The Director, then Mr. Helms, wished to confirm
Mr. Duckett as Deputy Director, and in the fall of 1966
he consulted with responsible White House advisers to
that end. Some opposition arose on the part of a few mem-
bers of the PFIAB who believed the position must be filled
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Mr. Duckett had no degrees, but had more than twenty years
in operational engineering and program management in the
fields of radio communications, radar, electronics, and
missiles. His last previous position before coming to
CIA as Director of FMSAC and Chairman of GMAIC had been
as Director of Missile Intelligence at the Army Missile
Command, Redstone Arsenal.
Several candidates for the DD/S&T position were
considered over the ensuing months but none had all the
desired qualifications and was also available and willing
to take on the assignment. Meanwhile, Mr. Helms, who
felt satisfied that Mr. Duckett was equal to the job,
made every opportunity for his exposure before the PFIAB
in giving briefings on the Agency's S&T programs, and in
providing technical back-up for the Director's own ap-
pearances. After a few months, the members of the Board
were impressed enough with Mr. Duckett's scientific back-
ground and capabilities to withdraw their opposition, and
Mr. Helms proceeded to confirm him as DD/S&T effective
20 April 1967.
B. Reorganization of Office of the DD/S&T, 1966
There was no Directorate-wide reorganization as
a result of Dr. Wheelon's departure; however, the staff
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of the Office of the DD/S&T had undergone a reorganization
between May and July 1966 just prior to Dr. Wheelon's
leaving, and while Mr. Duckett was
appointed
Assistant DD/S&T.
The DCI, Admiral Raborn, in September 1965 had
to the newly-designated
position of Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, in addition to
his other duties which included that of Special Assistant
to the DD/S&T. He was to serve as the Agency's focal
point in all liaison with the NRO and to formulate, with
appropriate coordination, the CIA position on all matters
relating to the National Reconnaissance Program (including
budgeting). In March 1966, added to his staff 25
the position of Assistant for Financial Management to sup-
port him in coordinating budget and financial management 25X1
matters relating to the NRP.* was
appointed to this post on 11 March 1966.
On 16 May 1966, when the DCI directed that
and his position as Director of Reconnaissance
be transferred to the DCI's Office for reporting purposes,**
function was retained in the Office of the
DD/S&T and, in order to centralize control over the Direc-
torate's planning, programming, and budgeting for both
*Appendix A, Tab 42.
**Appendix A, Tab 43.
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CIA-funded and NRO-funded programs, a comptroller
form of
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management was adopted by the Directorate and
was named DD/S&T Comptroller.
Further staff realignments proposed by the
Executive Officer,
(who had suc-
25X1
ceeded Mr. Blake in
December 1965), were considered
and
revised, and on 1 July 1966 additional staffing plans were
announced, resulting in the following organization:
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Procurement Management Staff,
Chief. Within both the NRP and the CIA research and develop-
ment programs, substantial resources were being devoted to
contract procurement activities and the point had been
reached where Directorate overview was essential to ensure
that, apart from substantive considerations, the best int-
erests of the Agency and the U.S. Government were being
served. The Chief of the Procurement Management Staff was
made responsible for the general overview of contracting
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*Appendix A, Tab 47.
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and procurement management activities of the whole
Directorate and was responsible for advising and recom-
mending policy to ensure uniform handling of Directorate
contract submissions, in coordination with the Office of
Logistics and the Security Management Staff.
Security Management Staff,
Chief. Security implications of the widespread activities
and programs of DD/S&T demanded a centralized security re-
sponsibility. Domestic and foreign field activities, as
well as increasing industrial relationships required the
formulation of consistent security policies and procedures
and over-all direction of the security activities of the
individual Offices of the Directorate. Immediate goals to
be pursued were the promotion of greater uniformity in
personnel and physical security standards of the three com-
partmented systems--SI,
TKH --in which the
DD/S&T was most heavily involved, and a simplification of
the complex machinery for granting clearances and approv-
als; standardization of security approach to research and
development projects to reduce special access lists; and
coordination with the Office of Security to reduce the
number of clearance options in dealing with contractor and
consultant personnel.
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Administrative Support Staff,
Chief. The responsibilities of the Administrative Support
Chief included overview of personnel management, training,
and career development under the Chief of Personnel,
and logistics support and planning under
Logistics Officer; also reporting to
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the Administrative Support Chief were the Registry with
in charge, and the Graphics Section
under
Intelligence Liaison Support Staff,
Chief. This officer was made responsible for the
continuous overview of intelligence production and for pro-
viding substantive support and coordination with other
components of the Agency and other members of the Intelli-
gence Community. He served as a focal point for intelli-
gence requirements of the Directorate and monitored DD/S&T
involvement with USIB, the National Security Council and
its bodies, and the President's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
visory Board.
All of the above staffs reported to the DD/S&T
through the Executive Officer,
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and rounding out the organization were the previously 25X1
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as Chief, and the Special Assistant to the DD/S&T for
R&D Coordination,
This organizational set-up has been retained
by Mr. Duckett since he took over as DD/S&T with only a
few changes. In June 1967 the Senior Executive Group,
advisory to the DCI, recommended, and the DD/S&T agreed,
that the Systems Analysis Staff, headed by
and consisting of three Physical Scientists (Research)
and one secretary, be transferred from the Office of the
DD/S&T to the National Intelligence Programs Evaluation
(NIPE) Staff, attached to the Office of the Director, in
order to assist that staff in its systems evaluation
work, covering the entire Intelligence Community. The
Design and Analysis Division of OSP was well established
and staffed to carry on the Directorate's satellite
systems analysis.
Other principal changes in Mr. Duckett's imme-
diate staff since 1967 have been: (1)
named Executive Officer on 20 November 1967,
following the transfer of
designated Comptroller 21 January 1969, vice
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*Appendix A, Tab 54.
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reassigned;* and (3) Dr. Donald H. Steininger,
(formerly on the staff of the White House Science Adviser,
Dr. Hornig), appointed Assistant DD/S&T on 1 November 1969,
succeeding Dr. Lauderdale, who resigned to take a position
in industry.**
C. Personnel and Training
1. Over-all Growth of Personnel
When Mr. Duckett took over as DD/S&T, the
approved personnel ceiling for FY 1967 had reached the top
figure for the Directorate to that time of
Besides the general growth Directorate-wide, a large part
of the more recent increase at that time was due to the
activation
in the Far East in
program in FY 1968 lowered the ceiling by about
of an overseas A-12 detachment for operations
1967. The cancellation of the A-12
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*Appendix A, Tab 57.
**Appendix A, Tab 60.
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The Agency Retirement Program has
not af-
fected the staffing of the Directorate as yet. Between
September 1967 and the end of 1970, only
retire-
ments occurred, but on an increasing scale. Routine re-
cruitment through the Office of Personnel, and shifts
within the Directorate have been adequate to fill occur-
ring vacancies and to staff new projects.
2. DD/S&T Career Development Course
Early in 1966 it became clear that S&T pers-
onnel, many of whom had been hired since 1963, required
in-house training which would focus on the functions and
responsibilities of DD/S&T and also provide insight into
other Agency elements dealing with technology. The CIA
Career Training Program could not satisfy this need and
although OSI had previously established and operated a
Scientific Intelligence Officers Training Program, it ad-
dressed primarily training germane to the analytical
functions of OSI officers. Dr. Wheelon expressed an
interest in developing a DD/S&T Career Development Course
to run for a year with representation from each DD/S&T
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Office, and to begin in September 1966. Office Directors
felt it would be advisable to delay the course a year,
spending the interim in carefully developing goals and con-
tent of the course. Dr. Wheelon, however, held firm for
beginning in 1966, and the summer months were spent in
developing the course and selecting students. The program
was approved by the Executive Director/Comptroller in
September 1966; Dr. Wheelon had then resigned from the
Agency and Mr. Carl Duckett, as Acting DD/S&T, continued
to carry the program forward.
of OSI was selected as
the first Course Director. He cooperated closely with the
Office of Training in launching the first program and work-
ing out details. The all from DD/S&T, 25X1
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grades GS-9 through GS-13. The cost of the first course, 25X1
exclusive of salaries but including travel
(which was absorbed in
the DD/S&T budget). After Directorate-wide consideration
of the planned curriculum, it had been decided to cut the
length of the course from a full year to nine months.
Categories of study undertaken were (1) Agency
orientation and background on Communism, (2) collection
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of technical information, (3) analysis of technical
information, (4) systems development and deployment,
(5) research and development, and (6) operations. Through
various techniques (examinations, written and verbal re-
ports, and instructor evaluations), students were graded
on their performance in the course and the evaluations
were recorded for purposes of future assignments. At the
end of the 1966-67 course, a critique by the participants
resulted in a restatement of objectives for the course and
a comprehensive syllabus and structure based on the exper-
ience of the first course.
There had been four courses held by the end of
1970, the last two being shortened from nine months to
five months duration
ond course, directed by
representatives from
as a result of experience. The sec-
DD/I(NPIC) and DD/S
the third course, directed by
attended by the largest class to date
students coming from the other three Directorates; the
of OEL, added
(Communications);
of OSI, was
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The fourth course included visits to U.S. tech-
nical/military facilities, a special one-week Operations
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Course
and a one-week visit to the Office
of Communications Training Center
The course has proven to be of great value in
familiarization for career development, uncovering talent
for new positions, and improving coordination among the
Offices of the Directorate, and among Directorates. At
the end of 1970 a fifth course was being prepared for
January-May 1971, under the direction of
of the ORD Analysis Division.
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E. Coordination of Research, Development and
Engineering
1. Background
After the establishment of the DD/R in 1962
and its later evolution into the DD/S&T, the question of
the coordination of the total research and development ac-
tivities of the Agency, particularly as between ORD/DD/S&T
and TSD/DD/P, did not develop into a smooth working agree-
ment. As pointed out in connection with the establishment
of the Directorate for Science and Technology, Dr. Wheelon
did not gain control over all Agency research and develop-
ment. In mid-1965 when the DD/S&T draft statement of mis-
sion and functions was being circulated for Agency-wide
concurrence, the R&D coordination issue again came to the
fore.
expressed reservations concerning
language in the draft statement which he feared might
allow DD/S&T to intervene in operational activities abroad,
infringing on DD/P's prerogatives, particularly in the
audio operations field.
At the same time, an Inspector General's
report on NPIC indicated serious technical problems and
lack of coordination with other Agency technical components,
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and recommended formal program review be conducted jointly
by NPIC and the technical components responsible for de-
velopment of reconnaissance systems, with a timely oppor-
tunity for NPIC to contribute to systems design.
The over-all problem of R&D coordination in
the Agency was then given precedence over agreement on
the DD/S&T mission and functions statement. The DCI agreed
with Dr. Wheelon to entertain a proposal for a draft charter
putting the DD/S&T in an authoritative position over all
Agency technical activity in order to simplify and
strengthen the Agency's R&D efforts.
A draft proposal attempting to satisfy all
parties was circulated to the Deputy Directors for comments
on 21 March 1966. This draft represented efforts begun in
September 1965, and encompassed approximately fourteen
separate versions of the proposal. The concept of a single
point of responsibility was maintained throughout all the
drafts. Points of difference were reflected principally
in the details of implementation, in the administrative
location of the Special Assistant who would perform the
day-to-day coordination, and in similar particulars.
Doubts were expressed as to whether the
DD/S&T could be objective in a staff responsibility to the
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DCI for over-all R&D coordination while his own Offices
pushed claims in competition with the other technical com-
ponents; however, the idea of a super "Technical Director"
was not seriously considered and the basic search was for
a structure which was workable in terms of achieving the
Agency's objectives and being acceptable to all of the
Directorates.
The proposal hung fire for more than a year,
from March 1966 to June 1967, during which time there was
a change in Directors (Mr. Helms replaced Admiral Raborn),
and Dr. Wheelon late in 1966 departed from the Agency.
An effort to regularize procedures and im-
prove the quality of R&D work in the DD/S&T, prior to
attempting to improve the over-all Agency R&D activities,
led to the production, under the leadership and guidance
of the Special Assistant to the DD/S&T for Research and
Development,
icers' Manual. The objective of
a working aid for those officers
of a Project Off-
the Manual was to provide
having a direct responsi-
bility for the initiation and monitoring of contracts for
research, development, and engineering, and for studies
pertaining to scientific fields, and to establish certain
common procedures and common definitions of terms for
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their use. After coordination Agency-wide, the Manual was
printed in early January 1967 and was put into use begin-
ning in April 1967 by the Offices of DD/S&T. The Office
of Communications, NP1C, and TSD later confirmed that their
R&D project activities were generally consistent with the
Manual, with certain small differences in office procedures.
In the spring of 1967, as a result of an
attempt by the Office of Planning, Programming, and Budget-
ing to develop a coordinated R&D program for audio opera-
tions, difficulties were encountered in getting ORD and TSD
to agree on the scope of their respective roles. A series
of meetings was instituted by Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief of
TSD, to resolve problems and improve the over-all efficiency
of both offices' operations in the audio field. Again it
was apparent that the coordination of one segment of the
Agency's R&D activities was dependent on the reaching of
accord on over-all coordination of all research and devel-
opment.
2. DD/S&T Made Coordinator of RD&E*
The draft proposal
which had 25X1
languished for some 14 months, was then revived and with
minor changes was forwarded to the Executive Director with
*This section based on ennvprsations with the Special Assist-
ant to DD/S&T for R&D, , in January 1971. 25X1
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a covering memorandum by the DD/P and the DD/S&T outlining
the current situation, endorsing the objectives of the
draft notice, and concurring in a "Memorandum of Understand-
ing" between ORD and TSD concerning their mutual technical
efforts. The Notice* was published on 17 July 1967 and
promulgated the original objective, unchanged, i.e., that
subsequent to centrally coordinated planning, the DD/S&T
was to monitor decentralized execution of the R&D program,
making use of all available Agency talent and expertise and
retaining engineering support in close contact with opera-
tional elements.
25X1
Procedures set forth in gave the
DD/S&T responsibility as staff officer to the DCI for co-
ordination of all Agency RD&E and authorized him to appoint
a Special Assistant to aid him in the assignment. He was
required to convene all Deputy Directors at least annually
in response to the Agency Program Call.
There was some dissatisfaction with the
arrangements under
on the part of TSD's officers
who contended that the DD/S&T acts as both protagonist and
judge, or decision-maker, in the meetings wherein RD&E
*Appendix A, Tab 52.
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projects are reviewed for approval, and that ORD gives TSD
less than wholehearted support in the area of broad-base
research which TSD is not authorized or funded to do for
itself.*
Ad
procedures under
Special Assistant to
hoc
arrangements
were put
prevailed
for a time as
into operation. The
the DD/S&T for R&D was able to report
at the end of 1968 that there had been better planning,
through extension of past coordination practices and the
participation of the other Deputy Directors with the
DD/S&T in helping to steer the R&D program. Further,
there was an improvement in R&D contracting practices
through the introduction of the contracting teams, and
better data and management control through use of the
automatic data system for monitoring contracts throughout
the Agency's technical components.
In September 1970, Mr. Carl Duckett,in his
position as RD&E Coordinator, proposed to the DCI that
his previously informal RD&E coordination and monitoring
activities under
be formalized; that a Research,
Development, and Engineering Board replace the old
*Based on a conversation between the writ pr and the
Deputy Chief of TSD, I December, 1970.
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Research and Development Review Board (which had been
discontinued at the end of 1967); that membership of the
new Board consist of two representatives from each Direc-
torate, two from PPB, one from OSP, and others as might be
necessary to carry out the instructions of
and 25X1
that the Special Assistant to the DD/S&T for R&D should
serve as Chairman. The principal task of the Board would
be preparation and submission to the DD/S&T of coordinated
plans and cost estimates for the Agency RD&E program,
ensuring against unnecessary or wasteful duplication, and
placing special emphasis on identifying gaps in the
Agency's RD&E efforts.*
A distinction should be drawn between dupli-
cation which is unnecessary and wasteful, and that which
is controlled and purposeful. The latter type is consid-
ered to be generally a wise policy in research, both
basic and applied, due to the high degree of uncertainty
which may be associated with any given research problem,
as well as the difficulty of most researchers to remain
unbiased and to maintain an open mind. An example of the
latter type is the duplication by ORD of some of TSD's
*Appendix A, Tab 62.
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exploratory work in secret writing, which was requested
by the Chief of TSD, Dr. Gottlieb, and which paid off with
an operationally feasible system after the reinforcement
of a "second look" by a separate research team.
Two interrelated problem areas in the Agency's
RD&E program have been, and remain, matters of concern to
Mr. Duckett, both as DD/S&T and as Coordinator of RD&E
for the entire Agency. First, research and development
requirements, Agency-wide, have continued to be so broad
that they do not furnish needed guidance, and neither the
Office of National Estimates nor the Office of Planning,
Programming and Budgeting has been helpful in this respect
during the preparation of the over-all RD&E program. The
Agency has undoubtedly undertaken some work which has
proven valueless, and in other instances has turned in
poor performances in research or failed to maintain an
ideal balance in its various efforts. Looking to the
future, work was begun in 1970 on refining research and
development requirements, under the leadership of the
RD&E Board to the end that such poor performance will not
be repeated.
The other problem area stems from budgetary
restrictions which have resulted in centering the
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principal RD&E efforts of the Agency on the development of
operational systems to meet previously established require-
ments, rather than on broad-based, exploratory research,
looking to scientific breakthroughs. Mr. Duckett would
like to see about 80% of the RD&E budget going to the
former, while 20% is given to unfettered research, not
tied to requirements.
It is the judgment of DD/S&T officials con-
cerned, using the criteria that basic research is directed
toward improving the state of knowledge, and applied
research is mission-oriented and has a clear relationship
to the Agency's work, that there is really no basic re-
search in the Agency's program, and very little applied
research. For example, of the total Agency RD&E budgets
for FY 1969 and FY 1970, amounting to
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In the case of computer research being done
by ORD, it is important to consider several factors; the
decision to establish and maintain the Intelligence Pro-
cessing Research and Development Center (IPRD) has been
hotly debated and will probably remain a questionable way
of advancing the Agency's capabilities in using computers;
it could be said, perhaps, that this activity is simply
to put the Agency in the position to remain aware of all
developments in this field; it might also be said that
one purpose is to retain some particularly valuable staff
employees who might otherwise resign if they could only
work on mundane programs.
In summary, with regard to the DD/S&T's
RD&E program, as well as the over-all Agency program, it
can be said that the comparatively small amount of re-
search sponsored by CIA from time to time is undertaken
for a wide variety of reasons and purposes.
In order to compare the Directorate's total
obligations for RD&E with the total Agency obligations,
the figures are given below in millions of dollars for
Fiscal Years 1963 through 1970.*
*Figures on page 155 furnished by PPB from Congressional
Budgets.
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FY 1963
FY 1964
FY 1965
FY 1966
FY 1967
FY 1968
FY 1969
FY 1970
DD/S&T RD&E
Obligations
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Total Agency
RD&E Obligations
Mr. Duckett's principal dissatisfaction as
Coordinator of RD&E for the Agency is that the whole
coordination process hangs on the dollar sign; that is,
the principal concern is in the share of the total
RD&E budget assigned to each Directorate. He believes
it is much more important to be able to advise the
Director that the total RD&E budget is being spent in
proper balance among the areas of research open to the
Agency's exploitation. (Conceivably, the question of
whether all Agency RD&E should be placed under one
Directorate could again be raised in the future.)
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F. Contract Management
1. DD/S&T Relations with Procurement Division
When the DD/R first came into being, the
decision was made, after discussions pro and con, to leave
intact the special contracting mechanism which had been
developed within the Office of Special Activities (form-
erly DPD), beginning with the U-2 project, but to reserve
its use for truly sensitive undertakings. All other con-
tracting for the Directorate was to be handled normally
through the Procurement Division of the Office of
Logistics.
In February and March 1964, during consid-
eration by the Director of Logistics and the DD/S of a
proposal for restating the Agency's over-all procurement
policy, DD/S&T concern was expressed over a backlog of
about 44 contract negotiation requests worth about
which had not been completed, and the fear
was voiced that the proposed policy might only add more
complicated procedures, thus lessening even more the
quick reaction capability of the DD/S&T in accomplishing
his mission.
Discussions between 0/L and DD/S&T repre-
sentatives resulted in agreement on simplified procedures,
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with proper front office safeguards, for preparing and
submitting procurement requisitions. Corrective action
was also taken in scheduling and priorities to assist 0/L
in expediting the truly urgent procurement actions.
In July 1966 a study of the CIA procurement
system by
was undertaken at the direction of the Executive Director,
pursuant to an IG recommendation. The survey report recom-
mended among other things (1) the establishment of a Con-
tract Review Board at the DD/S level; (2) decentralization
of the Agency procurement system; and (3) the establishment
of a team concept for procurement based on the audit firm's
favorable impression of the OSA experience. 78/
Actions taken within the DD/S&T to improve
contracting procedures as a result of the survey included:
a. The addition to the immediate staff of
the DD/S&T of an officer (nominated by the Director of
25X1
Logistics) charged with over-all procurement management
responsibilities for the Directorate.*
b. Appointment of the Special Assistant to
the DD/S&T for R&D Coordination,
as DD/S&T member of the Contract Review Board.
*See pp. 135-136, above.
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c. The setting up of a Contract Information
System within the DD/S&T Comptroller's shop. This system
provided, when fully developed, for the storage, collating
and retrieval of budgetary, monetary, contractual, and
technical information concerning Directorate projects.
This was the first system in the Agency having the capa-
bility to provide machine assistance in control of budget,
projects and contracts in a systematized manner. The
Management Information Officer, was
charged with providing monthly computer runs listing con-
tract information on all DD/S&T research and development
and production contracts. These listings were later
augmented, with the agreement of the other offices con-
cerned, to include R&D contract information for TSD,
the Office of Communications, and NPIC.
d. Quarterly forecasting of Agency-funded
contract actions planned for the ensuing quarter was ini-
tiated by Mr. Duckett beginning in January 1967, and the
DD/S&T Comptroller was charged with conducting a review
by program categories, sub-categories, and elements, with
the aid of computer listings furnished each Office.
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2. Team Concept Inaugurated
The recommendation made by the audit firm
for a decentralized procurement system to be instituted
throughout the Agency with contracting authority being
delegated to each of the Deputy Directors was not re-
ceived favorably by the Deputy Directors, but eventually
a compromise plan was worked out whereby the Director of
Logistics would appoint contracting teams from his own
staff to work in each of the Directorates for a trial
period.
On 4 March 1968, the OEL Contracting Team
was set up to accomplish Agency-funded RD&E, external
analysis, and other procurement contracting for the
Offices of Elint, Computer Services, and Scientific In-
telligence, and the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis
Center. A senior contracting officer,
was provided by 0/L, and two contract specialists and an
industrial contract security officer completed the team.
Contracting authority was delegated to the Team Leader
subject to review by the Contract Review Board in speci-
fied cases. 79/
Review of the Special Contract and Procure-
ment Branch of OEL (as the contracting team was known)
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after a year's work brought a favorable appraisal by the
Chairman of the Contract Review Board and the DD/S&T,
and on 27 February 1969, another Contracting Team was
added to operate in ORD at Rosslyn. This gave contract-
ing team coverage to all Offices of DD/S&T. The OSA
Contracts Staff continued to manage the covert procure-
ment for sensitive projects assigned to OSA. At the
time OSP broke away from OSA in September 1965, complete
separation of the contracting activities of the two Off-
ices was agreed, and delegation of special contracting
authority was made to Mr. James H. McDonald, thus giving
OSP its own contracting capability.
Mr. Duckett recognized three areas of con-
cern in the DD/S&T contracting system: (1) the prolif-
eration of contracting authority and policy throughout
the Directorate; (2) the necessity for consistency in
the business and security approach to contractors deal-
ing with Directorate Offices; and (3) the necessity for
economic utilization of all contracting, security, and
audit personnel assigned to the Directorate. He there-
fore took action in February 1969 to assign to the
Chief, Procurement Management Staff, then
25X1
additional duties as Senior Contracting Officer for
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Agency-funded contracts. The Director of Logistics
delegated contracting authority to
who in 25X1
turn delegated to the chiefs of the two teams. The
Senior Contracting Officer is responsible for exercising
policy guidance over the operations of both teams, re-
viewing contracts as appropriate, and assuring optimum
use of team personnel. 80/
_
Because of the early history of total com-
partmentation of the special programs of OSA and OSP,
their Contracting Officers have continued to receive their
authority by direct delegation from the DCI. The Chief,
Procurement Management Staff, however, as principal ad-
viser to the DD/S&T on procurement, maintains liaison
with the OSA and OSP Contracting Officers with a view to
keeping the DD/S&T informed of all contracting policy
matters.
3. Research, Development, and Analysis
Contract Procedures
In the fall of 1968, during an Inspector
General's survey of FMSAC, an inquiry into external re-
search contracts was carried out, with two companies
being singled out for special investigationd
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In explanation of the procedures employed
in coordinating the two particular contracts under IG scru-
tiny as well as the other research, development, and analysis
contracts of the Directorate, Mr. Duckett on 3 October 1968
gave the Executive Director a full description of those pro-
cedures, which is summarized as follows. 81/
Programs requiring external contract action
received their first coordination and review during the
budget submission and approval, after which quarterly re-
views were conducted by the DD/S&T, his Office Directors,
and the project officers. Current and projected contract
programs were scrutinized with the aid of Contract Informa-
tion System data.
Once a technical requirement was established,
consistent with the mission and within the budget of an
individual office, the contractor's proposal and the off-
ice staff study supporting it were reviewed by the Office
Director and submitted to the DD/S&T for approval if for
more than $25,000 in the case of research and analysis,
and more than $50,000 in the case of research and devel-
opment. If over $150,000 the action required approval of
*See also Section IV-G-3, "Conflict of Interest Impli-
cations," pages 168-170, below.
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the Executive Director, after review by the PPB.
Agency-funded contracts for more than $150,000 also re-
quired approval of the Contract Review Board. Task and
change orders involving additional work were handled
similarly, according to the amounts of money involved.
25X1
The Contract Information System in DD/S&T
provided data for the recording of contractors' progress
and for technical inspection reports by the project offi-
cers. It also produced exception reports when deviations
from planned programs exceeded predetermined tolerances.
These reports were used by the DD/S&T and his staff to
monitor the contractors' progress and expenditures.
Additional coordination of DD/S&T programs
was accomplished through Directorate representation on
USIB panels and committees, such as GMAIC and SIC, which
levy requirements on the Community and are the recipients
of the finished products.
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Mr. Duckett personally attended and took
an active role in the annual meetings
to
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review progress and plans for future tasks under their
contracts. His best insight went into insuring that the
tasks assigned to contractors added up to a sensible over-
all program. He also insisted on attendance at those
meetings of his Office Directors and project officers con-
cerned, and the contractors were represented by their
senior officers, including company presidents, and the
technical people involved in the work.
The IG report following its FMSAC survey
contained recommendations relating to the Directorate's
contracting as follows; (1) that the DD/S&T review mis-
sile and space intelligence arrangements in the Community
(including contracting) to check on duplication of effort;
(2) that the General Counsel periodically review make-up
of Agency advisory panels for conflict of interest impli-
cations in the light of existing contracts; (3) that the
DD/S&T establish a central file of all external contracts,
review contracting procedures for adequacy, and strengthen
procedures for evaluating contractor performance; and
(4) that FMSAC's contracts be reviewed to determine if
some of the work could not be better performed in-house. 82/
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Replying to these points on 3 February 1969,
Mr. Duckett (1) deferred the question of a Community-wide
review in the missile and space intelligence field to the
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Programs Eval-
uation; (2) raised no objection to the General Counsel's
continuous review of advisory panels, but noted that every
contract entered into by the DD/S&T was reviewed by a Gen-
eral Counsel representative before issuance and that since
1968 all Agency-funded contracts and amendments exceeding
$150,000 were reviewed by the Contract Review Board;
(3) stated that the establishment of a central file of
external contracts would not ensure against duplication
and that the Contract Information System and other specific
measures already taken by the DD/S&T would best avoid du-
plication and evaluate performance of contractors; and
(4) agreed that FMSAC could perform some of its contracted
work in-house if given additional manpower. 83/
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G. Additional Advisory Panels Established
1. Science and Technology Panel*
The relatively small and very senior group
of scientists envisioned by Dr. Wheelon as a replacement
for the Kinzel Board to advise the DCI on the over-all
science and technology program of the Agency was not
established during Dr. Wheelon's tenure. Such a panel
did come into existence in November 1967. The initiative
for its establishment was in the
15 August 1967 from
prospective members
the DCI, Mr.
of a Science
requesting them to serve. This
on behalf of the DD/S&T by OSI,
pose of the new panel which was
form of a letter dated
Helms, addressed to
and Technology Panel,
letter was originated
and set forth the pur-
to advise the Director
on the formulation and assessment of the Agency's goals
in the scientific and technological area. Dr. William
Perry
of Electromagnetic Systems Laboratories, who agreed to
serve as Chairman, and five additional scientists, made up
the initial membership. This panel, which is known famil-
iarly as the "Perry Panel," has met on a bi-monthly basis
since its first session was held 16-17 November 1968.
*Appendix F, Tab 12.
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It has dealt intimately with all phases of the Agency's
S&T program and the DD/S&T gives great weight to its
recommendations. For example, in considering the feasi-
bility of using a particular system to satisfy a particu-
lar collection requirement, the Panel's expert judgment
could be the deciding factor.
2. Strategic Intelligence Panel*
On 6 September 1968, the Director, Mr. Helms,
sent letters to a list of prospective members of a new
panel to advise him on matters of Soviet objectives in
strategic technological areas. The letter was originated
on behalf of the DD/S&T by OSI, and received a good re-
sponse from the addressees. Dr. Ruben Mettler of TRW
agreed to chair the panel and eight members drawn from
the scientific, political, and military communities made
up the initial membership. The panel, which met first
on 1 and 2 October 1968, has continued to meet several
times a year since then, usually for two-day sessions, and
has been a valuable source of advice to the DCI, particu-
larly with regard to the question of U.S. capability to
monitor a strategic arms limitation agreement with the
Soviets.
*Appendix F, Tab 13.
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H. Management of Directorate by Mr. Duckett
1. Philosophy of Management
The organization which Mr. Duckett inherited
was fairly well established and manned by highly skilled
professional people, despite the fact that its charter
for expansion had been given at a time of retrenchment
within the Federal Government. The functional set-up of
the Directorate, and the philosophy of intra-Directorate
coordination flowing therefrom, continued to be followed
by Mr. Duckett with the principal differences between his
own and Dr. Wheelon's management being more in the way of
style and application.
An initial difference in their methods of
operation was evident in Mr. Duckett's early choice of
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an Assistant Deputy Director, and his reliance upon the
A/DD/S&T to share the responsibilities for carrying on
the Directorate's business. Mr. Duckett felt he needed
a man who could handle the research and development and
the hardware side of the business, while the DD/S&T de-
voted himself more fully to substantive intelligence and
support to the policymakers.
The Director, Mr. Helms, agreed with
Mr. Duckett that there was talent available within the
Agency and therefore no need to recruit an outsider.
The candidate chosen, Dr. Lloyd K. Lauderdale, had all
the necessary requisites and had for the previous two
years conducted a very successful development phase of
Besides R&D and
systems responsibilities, Mr. Duckett assigned to his
Assistant Deputy the duty of keeping tab on the Direc-
torate's reconnaissance activities under the NRP, which
duties consumed about half of Dr. Lauderdale's time.
(When Dr. Steininger replaced Dr. Lauderdale in November
1969, the same relationship and division of responsi-
bilities held good.) Mr. Duckett looked to the A/DD/S&T
to be on top of all the technical details of the Direc-
torate's programs and to keep the DD/S&T completely and
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currently knowledgeable so that he would always be in a
position to back up the Director in any briefings or hear-
ings to which he might be called.
In his management of the Directorate,
Mr. Duckett feels that he has sought more advice from his
Staff and Office Directors, and on a more formal basis,
than Dr. Wheelon did, and, generally speaking, has made
his decisions with that advice as a basis. Mr. Duckett
also felt that Dr. Wheelon had a tendency to "steer the
vote" of his Office Directors; for example, in his taking
over the Chairmanship of the "R" Career Service Board,
where he participated in the discussions of personnel ac-
tions brought before the Board, and made his own views
known. Mr. Duckett did not continue this practice but
made one of his Office Directors Chairman of the Board.
He does not attend the Board's meetings, but acts on the
recommendations which it puts forward.
Mr. Duckett has relied heavily on his regu-
lar morning staff meetings, and on the Quarterly Reviews
held with each Office of the Directorate to keep himself
up to date on all of the Directorate's business. The
Quarterly Review also gives him the opportunity to regi-
ster any doubts or disagreements on the direction in which
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any program might be proceeding, and to redirect the program
if that should be necessary. The Contract Information
System, using automatic data processing for controlling
expenditures and fulfillment of contracts, was brought
to its operational stage under Mr. Duckett as a management
tool. There was some opposition and footdragging on the
part of some Offices toward complying with the system;
however, Mr. Duckett ordered that all Offices must coop-
erate and make it work. Selling the plan to the Direc-
torate's management by giving them a clearer understanding
of the plan's workings was a function of the Management
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The system, once its base
was established, together with the very specific procedures
followed in contract sign-off, has given Mr. Duckett a re-
liable means of control over the expenditure of Agency
funds for external research and analysis, and other pro-
curement.
2. Priorities
Because of the interrelationships between the
functions of the Directorate's seven Offices, and the split
budgeting between CIA funds and National Reconnaissance
Program funds, it is difficult to keep an optimum balance
of emphasis, particularly in the funding, among these
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functions. The tendency, according to Mr. Duckett, has
been to overspend on collection and underspend on analysis;
however, this does not mean that the amount of funds awarded
one Office as compared to another is a judgment of the im-
portance of that Office's function vis-a-vis the other. For
example, the sophisticated technical collection systems
developed by the Directorate are very costly, and it is
therefore in the nature of things that a large share of the
budget must be awarded to developing, building, and operat-
ing them, as long as they are successful in meeting priority
requirements.
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3. Production of Intelligence
Mr. Duckett has maintained a close overview
of all intelligence production, receiving a copy of every
report produced by the Directorate. The quantity of pro-
duction has been fairly constant over the years, up a
little in some years and down in others. Fiscal Year 1969
was high, but the following year there was a drop, one
factor being the heavy contribution in analyst time and
effort devoted to preparation for and participation in
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
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In June 1967, OSI formed a new "Future
Threats Branch" in the Physical Sciences and Engineering
Division to fill the need in the Intelligence Community
for attaining as much lead time as possible in identifi-
cation of future Communist military threat systems and
improving long-range planning for S&T intelligence col-
lection. Initially the Branch spent its efforts largely
in the evaluation of forecasting methods; it has since
concentrated its attention on a computer-supported deduc-
tive methodology under an external research contract.
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The specialized publications of OSI and
FMSAC continued to be produced through the 1967-70 period
and contributions to the National Estimates averaged be-
tween 15 and 20 per year. Section 7 (Scientific) and
45 (Health and Sanitation) of the National Intelligence
Surveys were produced by OSI and contributions to Sec-
tions 62-63 (Fuel and Power, and Minerals and Metals) were
made annually. At the end of 1968, responsibility for
preparation of Section 45 of the Surveys was transferred
to DIA, due to OSI's manpower and funds limitations and
the need to concentrate its assets on more urgent S&T
developments in the USSR and China.
4. External Relations
a. Intelligence Community
In the opinion of Colonel White, Executive
Director of CIA until his retirement in February 1972, a
noticeable improvement occurred in the S&T Directorate's
community relationships after Mr. Duckett became Deputy
Director. Colonel White felt this was largely due to the
fact that Mr. Duckett was a "team player" as opposed to
Dr. Wheelon's more individualistic style of operation, and
therefore Mr. Duckett was more acceptable to the community
and had better rapport, particularly with the Pentagon.
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Mr. Duckett has relied on the Assistant
DD/S&T and the CIA-appointed Deputy Director of NRO (since
1969 Dr. F. Robert Naka), for the Directorate's day-to-day
participation in the NRP, but maintains complete and current
knowledge of those matters in order to be able to make any
decisions devolving upon him. When Mr. Helms confirmed
Mr. Duckett as DD/S&T, he said that, as DCI, he did not in-
tend to go through another "war" with NRO, and would look
to Mr. Duckett to solve all his problems with Dr. Flax,
the Director of NRO.
While all NRP decisions since Mr. Duckett's
assumption of responsibility for CIA's role in overhead re-
connaissance have not been uniformly satisfactory to CIA
(e.g., the cancellation of the Agency's A-12 reconnaissance
system in favor of the Air Force SR-71 in 1968), there has
been a calmer air in the settling of differences and the CIA
position has been on a firmer base. Mr. Helms, as a member
of the NRP ExCom, has played a stronger part with increasing
appreciation of the contributions of technical collection to
his mission as head of the Intelligence Community. In the
early days of the overhead reconnaissance program, he had
considered those exotic activities as an offshoot from the
Agency's normal field of operations, but by 1970 he was able
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to agree with Mr. Duckett that those activities for which
the Agency had spent
of NRP funds between
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FY 1963 and 1970 could truly be regarded as CIA business.
The DD/S&T's relationship with the White
House Science Adviser, begun during Dr. Wheelon's tenure, was
continued by Mr. Duckett. He met with Dr. Hornig up to the
change of Administration at the end of 1968. During the time
Dr. DuBridge served as Science Adviser (8 February 1969 to
20 August 1970), the regular meetings lapsed and instead there
were occasional briefings and discussions as situations arose
that required them. Since August 1970 when Dr. Edward E.
David, Jr., succeeded Dr. DuBridge, there have been insti-
tuted regular monthly meetings at which Mr. Duckett or
Dr. Steininger bring the Science Adviser up to date on new
developments and on substantive intelligence. This relation-
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ship has continued to be beneficial to both sides.
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5. Support to Policymakers
Since Mr. Helms, prior to being appointed
Director of Central Intelligence, had spent the greater
part of his career in "classical intelligence" work
within the Clandestine Services, Mr. Duckett felt that
he would need to lean heavily upon the DD/S&T for brief-
ings on priority national security matters such as the
Soviet ABM system, which currently was in the forefront
of national consideration. Not having a broad scientific
background, the Director would naturally be a bit uncom-
fortable in technical discussions of such matters as
missiles, space, and nuclear energy.
Mr. Duckett therefore made it his highest
personal priority to keep himself completely informed
on all S&T matters in the Directorate, in the Agency,
and in the Community, in order to be prepared to give
the Director the support he might need. The capability
for technical back-up in support of the Director, but-
tressed in turn by the expertise of the entire Director-
ate, has benefited both parties. Because of the ascendancy
of science and technology in relation to intelligence and
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national security, Mr. Duckett has become the most widely
used of the Deputy Directors in supporting the DCI at
Congressional Committee and budget hearings, NRP Executive
Committee meetings, and other such forums in which matters
critical to the Agency's and the Directorate's programs
are discussed. The Director has developed confidence in
Mr. Duckett's ability to give clear expositions on tech-
nical subjects and to give answers which take into consid-
eration the thinking of the entire organization. In addition
to supporting the DCI at such meetings, Mr. Duckett has
been entrusted by the Director to carry out some missions
on his behalf for the purpose of briefing and enlisting
support of individual Senators and other government figures.
When Mr. Helms made the presentation of the
Intelligence Medal to Dr. Wheelon on his departure from the
Agency in September 1966, after he had extolled the bril-
liance and accomplishments of the first DD/S&T he gave a
sly dig at Dr. Wheelon's propensity for erudite technologi-
cal exposition by adding at the end of his speech: "And
when he wanted to, he could make technical subjects under-
standable to non-technical people."
This remark gives a little insight into the
reasons for the Director's more cordial attitude in recent
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years toward the DD/S&T. It might be said that Mr. Duckett
has a facility for making technical subjects understandable
to non-technical people most of the time, which doubtless
has given the Director a better background for dealing with
these subjects. In the current world situation, the DCI
must rely heavily on science and technology, and the
Agency's reconnaissance capability is very important to
him. In Mr. Duckett's opinion the Director has come to
rely upon the Directorate for Science and Technology as
an organization capable of presenting consistently well-
thought-out and defensible opinions.
Other personal priorities of Mr. Duckett
have been ad hoc and sometimes unpredictable as to the
amount of his time which would be monopolized. For example,
he was appointed by the DCI to represent the Agency in the
preparatory sessions for the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks in mid-1969, and during the balance of that year
and the next he spent nearly half of his working hours in
support of the SALT Working Group and its Verification
Panel.
Another priority which arose in May 1969
related to the National Estimates with regard to Soviet
offensive and defensive weapons. The White House
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(specifically Dr. Kissinger) felt that Soviet weapons
were possibly being underestimated. A round of meetings
ensued with Dr. Kissinger in which an exhaustive review
was held. Mr. Duckett was heavily involved in this review
and in the subsequent effort to retrieve credibility for
the Estimates at the White House level.
The dissatisfaction of Dr. Kissinger, as
well as of the President, in relation to the crucial esti-
mates on Soviet offensive and defensive weapons, was that
they were so watered down, in order to make it possible
for all concerned to agree to their publication, that
they were of little help, in the final analysis, to the
policymakers.
Mr. Duckett and the DD/I, Mr. R. J. Smith,
together with their advisers, worked out a new plan for
writing Estimates which would give the policymakers more
of a feeling for how much disagreement there was in the
Intelligence Community and on what points; also, the plan
gave the producing officers a greater role in the writing
of the Estimates. The DCI was asked for approval, which
he gave, and the 1970 Estimates for Communist offensive
and defensive weapons systems followed the new plan. This
made for longer and more detailed Estimates, which did
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not please everyone (particularly the Pentagon). The
President and Mr. Kissinger, however, expressed their
satisfaction with the new form of Estimate which they
considered to be more helpful, from the policymaker's
point of view, in establishing national security policy.
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