INTRUDER FLIGHTS OVER THE USSR DURING JULY 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00709R000500930002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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SC-06595-56 Series A 25X1
INTRUDER FLIGHTS OVER THE USSR DURING JULY 1956
I. INTRODUCTION
1. On 4th, 5th, tth, 9th and 10th July 1956 a number of aircraft
made daylight intruder flights over the western USSR. These flights
were tracked by the Soviet air warning organization with varying accuracy
and continuity. There was very little evidence of any fighter activity
which they may have stimulated.
2. The maps appended to this report show separately each day's
intruder flights and any other tracks which were reported by the Soviet
air warning organization at about the same time and in the same area as
the intruding aircraft. All times are given in MOSCOW tim (Z plus 3).
The following paragraphs provide a commentary on these maps and include
information obtained from voice interception in GERMANY. Fighter code
messages relating to the intruder tracks were interceepted on only one
ground/ground net, once only on one Air Situation Broadcast and not at
all on PVO Command links.
3. This dearth of fighter code traffic onground/ground nets has
been noted before during large exercises when there must in fact have
been a great deal of fighter interception activity. It can only be attributed
to the widespread use of land line.
4. Some estimate of the height and speed of the intruders can
be made from the traffic available although soviet height-finding, even
on familar targets at familiar heights, is notoriously inaccurate.
During these flights estimates rangiing from 15,000 to 20,000 metres were,
hewever, frequent enough to suggest that the true height of the
targets must have been somewhere withing this range. The calculation
of ground speed from Soviet radar plots is also liable to be inaccurate, but at no
time did the speed of the intruders appesa to have been above about 420 knots.
4th JULY
5. The intruder track on 4th of July began near HALLE and continued
east north-eastwards across POLAND into the USSR, passing north of
BARANOVICHI, turning north-west when shot of BOBRUJSK and then returning
over MINSK, VILNA, NORTH of KALININGRAD, along the BALTIC Coast as far as
SWINOUJSCIE and then across northern GERMANY. The speed of the aircraft
computed from the Soviet plotting would have been about 420 knots and the
height estimates reported began at 7,000 metres and rose to 15,700 metres
near MINSK, falling again to 11,000 metres over North GERMANY at the end of
the track. Nearly four hours were spend over Soviet-Controlled territory.
6. Fighter activity from Voice traffic
A pair of fighter aircraft, suffixes 1+88 and 490 of
Regiment A Fighter Division T0104 (FINOW) were patrolling at a height
of 12,000 metres in the vicinity of base between 1112 and 1135 whilst
the target aircraft was still over Northern POLAND and the sea. At
1135 they were instructed by Northern Fighter Corps HQ to fly on
______.course 50? or 600 (the traffic was garbled)for eight minutes.
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Between 1143 and 1156 as the target aircraft entered Eastern GERMANY
the fighters were given successive vectors of 900, 1500, possibly 3500
and 220 but the leader reported at 1156 that he still could not see
the target, and the fighters returned to base.
7. It is not all all certain that these fighters were being
vectored on to track 4513. The vectors, if they were intercepted
reliably, would have take the fighters well into POLAND by the time
the target aircraft crossed the BALTIC coast into GERMANY.
8. It is unlibkely that either of the tracks (5607 and 9795)
plotted in the vicinity of the intruder track at this time represents
this pair of aircraft; nevertheless, although the tracks were not
given a precise description to the air warning traffic, they do appear to be
of fighter aircraft. Tracks 787 and 5604 probably also
represent attempted interceptions. No fighter tracks over RUSSIA
were reported by the air warning organization.
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ascent and remained throughout the flight. He was still able to see through
it in the vertical position however. As this effect has been consistent
on recent missions, a TWX was sent to the manufacturer asking for a
solution to the problem.
The film was not trackable from Homeplate to 5311N2050E. At this
point the track was found to be 14 miles North of course. The track crossed
the city of Bialystack just below check point "C". The remainder of the
mission was flown within a five mile limit of the course line with the
following exceptions:
a.
b.
c.
Eight miles off between points "C" and "D".
Ten miles off between points "Q" and "R".
Six miles off on turn point at "S".
Poor weather precluded plotting of flight line from 5554N2110E to
5437N1656E , and from 5318N to Homeplate. Coverage of route was estimated
to be between 60 and 70 percent.
Three hours and forty-five minutes after take-off the electronics
system showed evidence of new-type signal. It was a rapid-scan two
blips per-second every second unsymetrical. The sounds appear to be that
of a rapid-scan height-finder. The"tinkling-bell" signal was also heard
again at take-off plus 2:53 hours. The recorder motor stalled after 5:30 hours
and did not start again. This was caused by an excessively dirty commutator.
This item has been added to the pre-flight check list to preclude
recurrences.
During the mission ~ made two sun shots, which he felt were 25X1
very poor, on the way home. He knew his actual position at the time so
that it could be determined he was actually 35 miles and 25 miles off
respectively on the two LOPS. Both spots placed him too close to the sub-
solar point. This degree of accuracy, while not the best obtained, is
thought to be not unreasonable, and consistent with the general requirements
of the instrument. Further shots will be correlated by sextant number and
by name to see if syste s are present, either in otiyl
instruments or in use by individual~ 7 25X1
Supply support is building up slowly. FAK is reported on its way
here. Commercial air too was utilized for badly needed replacement 25X1
of a component last week. Time from request to receipt was two days,
allowing installation time. Had the component not arrived, the sextant
would have been usable but much less accurate during current operations.
Until supply strength increases, it is requested that channels other
tha e all shipment of components. Entire instruments will ?r'x1
be shipped only via ~hannels or messenger. 25X1
PROBLEM AREAS
1. The most critical operational problems to be encountered 25X1
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concern the operation of the engine at the temperatures being 25X1
encountered at altitudes on the operational missions. The temperatures
being experienced at altitudes have been ranging from -43 degrees to -51
degree These temperatures are considerable warmer than those encountered
in the erations. Th temperatures have adversely 25X1
affec a operations of the in the following three areas: ZoA"i
(1) decreases the operational altitudes by several thousand feet, (2)
increases the fuel consumption (1205 gals in 8 hours on mission 2014)
and (3) increases the probability of a . This information is being 25X1
sent to and the Hartford Office by the 0 representatives 25X1
on local; on, New curves for fuel consumption and operations limits are
being prepared by the 0 representatives at 0 and will be 25X1
completed as soon as additional information becomes available. As the
result of this new phenomenon it is recommended that a temperature
measuring instrument be made available to the Q to indicate to 25X1
him the engine inlet compressor temperatures so that he can control his
altitude to keep within the operation envelope thereby preventing a
will probably help in this area. 25X1
2. has continually been plagued with the problem of 25X1
moisture in a equipment bay in all of our operations in[
andQ Water condensation in the equipment bay is most serious. 25X1
Mission 2010 0 malfunctioned as the result of this moisture 2bX1
condensation in the equipment bay. As much as a cupful of water collects
in the camera windows during fli t and all equipment is heavily covered
with moisture upon landing. recommended upon the conclusion of 25X1
its USCM that a heater-blower sys em for the equipment bay be designed to
prevent this difficulty we knew would be encountered in this geographical
area, 0 has been requested to look into this problem and determine if 25X1
such an item may not be procurable off the shelf. Also if this recommendation
is considered it is suggested that L be given the problem to come up 25X1
with a piece of hardware to keep the equipment bay dry during flight.
3. It was suggested too during his last visit here that more 25X1
target information be included in the Ops Order or in any other manner for
use by the unit in better brief in on their missions. This 25X1
information would be a list of the targets by type, i.e., airfield, city,
type of factory, etc. With maps as poor as they are in the area of
nneratiohp., any additional information such as the above will help the
fly his mission. 25X1
4. On every flight to date, the viewfinder has been fogging up to
the degree that the lateral and full forward and aft positions of the
viewfinder travel cannot be utilized. The nitrogen purging has not been
effective in eliminating this problem. Details have been forwarded to
E or their information and action to see if a fix can be devised for the 25X1
elimination of this fogging problem.
5. In accordance with existing procedures established by Project
Headquarters and defined in Operations Manual r -1 "Re orts Control
Manual", should be in receipt of the twf j 25X25X1
-' f`nnv of opies
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prior to takeoff. The need to provide the detachments with essential
information was recognized in the compilation of Operations Manual 55-1,
and proven during the USCM. The problems faced by this unit due to
the limited time factor in the preparation and launching of assigned
operational missions have been discussed personnally and in numerous
messages. The most recent requested that every possible effort be
made to expedite the reports within the established time 25X1
limit of not later than 12 hours prior to scheduled takeoff time. I
would like to reiterate how very essential it is that this unit be
provided with the necessary information on time schedules as established
in Operations Manual 55-1 to allow for proper nlannin and management
of personnel and materiel resources. If co tinna to be 25X1
late, as in all past mission directives so far received, cannot 2oA~
be responsible for launching more than two sorties for any one day's
operations at specified takeoff times. The ability to plan and execute
for three or four sorties in the time authorized is extremely margipal.
Therefore request the be received 18 hours prior to the 25X1
first takeoff time when ree or more sorties are programmed for any
one days operations. If above is not feasible, the squadron operations
staff must be augmented by one (1) Pilot AOB and one Navigator
in order to meet the tight schedule and high sortie rate now in effect.
Operations pressure is greater under our present field conditions than
was experienced during the USCM. The squadron proved that extended
conditions of operations as were experienced during the USCM could not
be supported for an extended period of time. The same is true under
actual field operations where the pressure is even greater.
An alternative to the above would relieve this pressure if ore-planned
missions were furnished the unit in order that pre-planning could be
accomplished by the squadron operations planning staff where only last
minute changes and wind factors could be worked into the flight planning
at the last two hours prior t Another suggestion would be
to include the mission in the report so that additional
planning time for the unit wo a ava able. Then, if there were any
last minute than es due to weather or other factors, these could be
included in the report with sufficient time to make the
changes prior to the m ssion.
Under the present organization the two main suppliers feel that the
maximum sortie rate they can support over an extended period will be two (2)
per day. Additional sorties may be added after a period of one or more
days shutdown. For example, during the normal two sortie per day rate,
if a shutdown occurred for one or more days then the next operational day
it would be possible to dispatch three (3) and perhaps four (4) sorties
for one day. After that maximum effort, the sortie rate would again fall
to the two figure as a constant capability. However, this rate could be
innr over an extended period with the increase of one U-2 and one
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*L, V "Copy _L of Zo,,pfe&
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In addition to the above factors on sortie limitations,
consideration o availability must be considered. Under a
maximum sustained effort, the factor may be the greatest
limitation. To date, this has not been true, but it very well could
develop as the main limitation if operations were speeded up to the
point where proper crew rest could not be given.
DISTR:
Original - Headquarters
ATTACHMENTS:
1 - Weather Report, Mission A2013 7S
-tee
4F, ~~! at,
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