(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00709R000500900007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 23, 1956
• Content Type: CABLE

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A ITACHi " TT j`1 TO
Page 1 of 5
TO Headquarters
(GENERAL Operations
SUBJECT I SPECMC
Estimate of mission success. Being the first operational mission,
it was considered a highly successful operation even with only
approximately 25% photographic coverage accomplished. The re-
action information gathered from this first mission in itself
would warrant a highly successful score. The information re-
garding fighter interceptors, radar defneses and ground to air
anti-aircraft and missiles is most valuable. Negative reactions
are valuable intelligence information and can be used in develop-
ing future operations. The negative information gained through
sion will be helpful in all future operations.
i
thi
s
s m
(2) Lessons learned from mission and other comments. See paragraphs
c(6)(7)(8)?
(3) Recommendations. See paragraph c(7)o
c. Comment on adequacy of support items.
Air Rescue - Procedure to effect its use established but not
required for this mission.
Pipeline or supply report - No problems to date.
Base Facilities - Excellent.
Target and Intelligence Data - Believe daily operations order
should be more detailed, specifying types and dates of the
charts used by your headquarters for planning purposes; also
sug;est,,g^eneral comments be provided concerning the overall
mission Wallow the unit to make an intelligence intpretation
and is for mission preparation briefing and debriefing.
Under present situation, intelligence data available to this
headquarters are considered inadequate for briefing purposes.
This is particularly true in air order of battle and target
information. Also lacking is intelligence material on sur-
a. Unit and mission number:
b. Conclusions:
2 3 JUN 1956
25X1
25X1
25X1
(1)
FOR
MARM1949 51-28A
,T~SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
r ."P SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
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Page 2 of 5
2 3 JUN 1956 25X1
vival, i.e., geographical data, etc. Recommend that more
detailed intelligence on above subject be furnished this head-
quarters. To pass intelligence information to interested
parties in this area, certain communication equipment is needed.
The lack of this equipment hampered the operation of this mission.
When such equipment is in place, this situation should be
alleviated.
(5) Internal Security: Satisfactory.
(6) Coordination with Air Defense Command. Overall coordination
and assistance from 12th Air Force has been excellent. In
a'diion to fully briefing the ComMander, 12th Air Force on
this project, the Operations Officer and three senior controll-
ers of the TACO were briefed to a limited degroe. Under the
original concept of operations, it was not intended to brief
any personnel of 12th Air Force TACO on the aspects of the
project except insofar as necessary to provide assistance to
the pilot in the event of an emergency. However, the missions
flown by this unit on 13 June 1956 in coordination with L 25X1
proved beyonl a doubt the TACO had the facilities available in
this theater to paint the article even thought the specific
altitude was not detertgned. In order to suppress the friendly
radar an' the alert intercept system, it was necessary to brief
the TACO senior control officers (3) to insure, insofar as is
possible, the suppression of friendly radar alert, and scramble
system. The problems involved are not new to these people as
they have been exposed to missions of this nature over the past
ten years. Therefore, they are well aware of the problems in-
volved both from the security aspect and personnel requirements
to assure complete coverage of operation. To insure complete
coverage of all facets, they requested the authority to brief
two more senior controllers.
(7) Coo-:dina.tion with The specific operational, material 25X1
and logistics requirements any. procedures for the conduct of
operations from this area were provided by this unit to~ 25X1
The action and results to date have been most gratifying. Our
re uirements have been dis'eminated to the subordinate units
of~ for implementation. 25X1
(8) Provide prerlanned missions over a wide range of denied terri-
tory in order to assist the flight planning section by reducing
the pre-takeoff computation time. This will provide more flex-
ibility to the overall operations. All or parts of such plans
can be used on last minute changes dictated by changes in the
weather etc. Under the present system of operations, personnel
manning and available time, chances of preparation and launching
of more than two missions at any one time are remote. This could
only be supported for a period of approximately three days.
SECRET
/ 01 copies
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Page 3 of 5 -RIP' SECRET
d. Comment on effect of following on mission.
2 3 JUN 1956
(1) Aircraft main'enance ~md supplies were excellent with the follow-
ing comments.
SEXTA TT
1. The sextant was not used during the mission by pilot's
decision. The gear was completely ope'ational on the
preflight and post flight check. Precomputed data was
furnished by navigators in the Flight Planning Section
for return to 1iesbaden.
2. Pipeline time for support of this mission was adequate.
There was a time delay in receiving a spare sextant which
did not effect the mission.
Base facilities are adequate. Cleanliness is not ideal
but will meet minimum standards for this short period of
temporary duty. The use of a lathe and an arbor press
would be helpful. Local arrangements will be made for the
use of this equipment.
Conclusions and recommendations.
a. None at present on mission use.
b. Use of commercial transportation to move spare sextants.
c. Base facilities, while not ideal, are satisfactory.
,CTTO_J r C
..JJ ~.~. V
1. Support.
a. Pipeline time to H-Good.
b. Pipeline time to PCPRIME should be improved.
c. 3ase facilities are adequate for a short time, "advance
base" type operation.
2. Results of Mission---Good.
a. Almost continuous data received. No equipment malfunct-
ions. To recorder slow-downs.
Conclusions.
a. The approximate maximum signal strength over target
areas was 2 milliwatts per square meter. This lasted
for a few seconds several times during the mission.
The aircraft had an "effective radar area" of one
square meter.
b. There is a probability that fleeting returns could have
boo- seen on radar screens for short periods of time.
c. The crude analysis equipment and lack of information on
radar sets makes this conclusion little more than a haz-
ardous guess. It is submitted as a rou,_;h field estimate
of performance.
l ~oo41e~
COY-/
TS
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Page 4 of 5
AI~.c 7 .,117
1. Pipeline an sup_ly support--adequate.
2. Base Facilities-adequate. Local base support has been
excellent. Accurate refueling is not possible with pre-
sent unitsi however, arrangements hre being made locally
to have tankers with correct and accurate metering devices
installed.
ATTTO 'ILO`"
1. Pipeline and supply support-adequate.
2. Base facilities--adequate.
2 3 JUN 1956
1. Supply support for this mission was adequate.
2. Base facilities in support of operational missions are
adequate. "esult.nt comments and equipment performance
on this mission are cover d by Field "llgincer report 'To.
1, dated 21 June l95`>-
(2) communications. Believe the time element needed to establish
required communication should be carefully studied especially
in considering staging operations.
Photography and photographic equipment. See paragraph 1 above.
'leather. See attachment 2.
Navigation. Are turns being considered in Route Planning) ie,
time, course and distance?
Flight Planning. Excellent chock points were made to the minute.
Flight following. The greater portion of mission x;'2003 was
undercast and thus tracking by means of photographs was impons-
ible. At those places where the ground was visible, major
cities could be idcntf ied by reference to Army Topographic
Taps. It should be noted that the horizons did not appear
clearly on the 'uplicate positive transparency of this mission.
is re:uced the accuracy of the plot. The loss of the horizon
lines may have been due to the general hazy conditions and this
was the belief expressed by the camera con-Lractors. This question
should be answered by the photographic results of the first
mission through favor_ible weather conditions. At present, no
other method of track following; exists. Pecommend that more
latitude in receiving c.rtain type intelligence information be
a_?antcd.
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44W SEOP T COPLL-
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Page 5 of 5
25X1
2 3 JUN 1956
(8) Tactics. See pj .r,.~raph 7.
(9) To other comments.
DISTRIBUTION:
Copy 1 - Headquarters
/ 2-
copy___ o ,r.._:oopTeD
71 /55- 7
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.TO1 ' SECRET
FIELD ENGINEERING REPORT MISSION A-2003
Ser.#8 Pilot:
A/C 53-172 Flown: 20Jun56 25X1
R6 LS
Camera 25 32 13 Tracker: Ser.dl
Shutter 3697 3363 2669
Footage: 500* 25X1
Lens 1474 1449 1456
--F lter: Yellow
Magazine 25 33 60
Cycles 749 749 749
25X1
Footage 1120 1120 1120
Filter Red Red Red
RESULTS: Visual inspection, post flight check, pilots debriefing and fi'- clips
indicate that all photographic equipment worked properly throughout
the entire mission.
DISCUSSION: Approximately 80% of this mission was flown over heavy clouds at which
time 75% to 100% of the ground area was covered. The film clips were
difficult to evaluate clue to the dense cloud coverage, however ground
areas were observed on both the vertical and left oblique. These indicated
good focus. Due to the sun angle and the solid clouds, the right oblique
did not permit evaluation.
Three lenses selected from the best USCM results were utilized. The
collimator was received in time to recheck all lenses. Photographic
records indicated proper focus.
The message pertaining to masking of the data housing arrived too late
for action on this mission.
The configura+?inn was turned on at 0700 and remained on for the entire
flight until 1010, per Headquarters instructions. (3 hrs,l0 min total)
Pre and post flight shutter speed checks indicated proper speed settings.
Post flight inspection indicated that the shutter blades were in
excellent condition.
The cockpit tape recording evidenced p--roper tone operation throughout
flight.
,,1inlow covers were ejected just after take off. Frost appeared on the A/C
while climbing. Suggest evaluation to see if windows cleared up.
The scope was removed the day before the mission, completely dismantled,
an:', cleaned due to oil file, on the optics. This could have caused an
abort anl indicates the urgency for having a spare scope on hand.
advised that this was to have been furnished, however to date it
has not been received. 25X1
The clock in the tracker stopped after 4 hr. 10 min. which was 40 min
before take off'. This clock had been timed and tested the previous week.
-TBP-SECRET
TS
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-MP'SECRET
Post tests show that this clock now runs good for 4 to 5 hrs then stops,
therefore it will. be removed from service and sent to a watch repair.
Considerc.ble moisture was noticed on the crystal after the mission. This
may shorten the clock life thus substantiating our request for 100;
spares. In lieu of the event recorder, th'e Century recorder was utilized
with L-pad atenuators for pre an' post flight recording of electrical
programing.
Compiled by
21 June 1956
-TOP-SECRET
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``- 20 June 1956
Mission 2003 20 June 1956
A-2 Configuration, 5 and 6
Pilot
Significant observation;
River Northwest Breslau docks extending approximately 100 ft. in
river from both sides for several miles. New airfield at approximately
5213 N 1804 E long Eastwest runway. Big airfield at Bdygozczc, asphlt
runway, concrete ramp which appeared to run into edge of town. Airfield
at Torun appears small. Grosstein big airfield easy to see. Breig big
airfield easy to see. Ohla, big airfield easy to see. No route deviation.
Weather;
1 thru 7, 6 to 8/8;
8, 3 to 5/8;
9, 6 to 8/8;
10, 3 to 5/8
ii, 6 to 8/8
12, 6 to 8/8
13, 3 to 5/8
14 to 18, 6 to 8/8
Winds unknown.
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