LETTER TO BERYL L. BOATMAN FROM J. E. LIPP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00708R000500140003-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 29, 1954
• Content Type: LETTER

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?S-1049 erieak.
L-12620
Dear Colonel Boatmans.
Office', Deputy Chief of Staff, Development
headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.
Assistant for Derelop~asnt Planning
Attentions Lieutenant Colonel Beryl L. Boatman
References AFDAP R, dtd 25 May 1954
several' other..Rand. personnel s ho - read, the.4draft.
.Near.+ the bottom, of page..$ of the. draft",, the deficiency in' intelligence
currently possessed as well. as in collection methods is pointed out.
A strong corollary point is that unless collection methods are rapidly
improved, our intelligence position will steadily decline, since much
of our present information is based on obsolescent (or obsolete) German
data.
The pre-b-day. `eeation of` the Intelligence and fceconneisaance DPO has
'.been reviewed:by'the persons "suggested mythe reference letter, as well
as by'other'interested RAND personnel. Commente:made by R. C. Raymond
and A. L. Hiebert were contained in letter number L-10014, dated 17 June
1954... The following paragraphs. contain, additional: comments made by the
We agree with the argument on page 35 that our best combat vehicles
should not be used for overflights, in order to avoid compromising
secrecy. A stronger argument is that the use of first line combat air-
craft could frighten the Russians into a full scale bombing attack against
the U.S. One inconsistency seems to'arise in the draft: at the top of
p. 33, the use of the "very best engines, as they become available" is
advocated. This seems, inconsistent with concealing our technology from
the Russians, since engines are a major index of our state of art.
The summary of performance characteristics of reconnaissance vehicle
possibilities, on p. 36, appears to contain an erroneous radius for the
B-52. Perhaps this is a typographical error.
The balloons described on page 42 should not necessarily be "naval
launched" - in fact, as far as we know, the operations ow being'planned
for ground launching, providing this can be arranged with the "real estate
dealers" involved.. In either case, however, the coverage shown in Fig. 21
would not be affected.
EXCLCDEr? F? CVS T~ p ET
automatic
downgrading 'and declassification.
GROUP-1
NOTICE-This material contains Information affecting the national defense of the United States within the moaning of the espionage laws, Title IS U.S. G,
Sections 793 and 794, the transmiulon or reelatlon of which In any manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited by law.
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a .a on. o, the ,aateUit. beginning ;on :page:47 is.- in . general agreement;
TOP SECRET
? with our opinions. Some aspects which seem to disagree, such as duration,
are partly matters of opinion or intuition that. can be decided finally
only by actual operation of the vehicle.
ror.,example, are tending toward. high- speed as a method of reducing, vul
rather than high speed is desirable for a reconnaissance vehicle. Bombers;
There is some doubt (page 56) that a special high altitude.airplane is
obtainable by.i95T. Furthermore,,it,.isn't made clear why.high altitude
CPB:JEL:sp
E.. Lipp'
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PROJECT 119L
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TITLE Pll _E
1T i;IIISIOi: (I-T,,CU^: '?)
V
:::.L : EPCRT
PtCJ' CT 119L
1 1 __ cc ^::zt - iic. ill be han -1=r'. ` --
accordance with he provisions of :,F'l 205-1. It cont ii ris
-if j !a`on ='_ the .L ionaJ. i e :nse C the Unite-7
ti^Jn
arZo, accoruL ly, ut-:ost security will be a_'iorde.' and
i1 tic-1 cf its Ccats:zts frill ba r-st.icted on i cto
basis. The i:lt?:?nati.:lll _'.':711C X1017^ Cf this ooeri iC i are
.uch that ex-tracrnary efforts ..1o'ai be ex.encier2 by ail to ':?ot'ect.
L'le _.o-rcrirnent even beyond the precise ;:rovisions of i.ir Force
re,,-ulations. In this retard, it is stroaLly urLed tha: all personnel
ac(,u.uainted with the Droject be a`ain cautione', aLainst L-i.-,cvsrtent
disclosure of information pert.tinin6 to the actual .Jro;;ect, even
though the operation has been terminated.
2. Tile ii^u, ocmation contained herein will not be released to
lore1-n nationals.
3. :'aproduction of this i'.ocu~lent in whole cr part is pro-
hihite:a, except w'_t: the perii ssion of the offic of origin.
. ~?. i l~.:LJ:
hridadier Gene:
Cc'n a-nder
:?,F - 5 c;,?,:,
i~,RDC - 2 cys
cGC
u - ~ C,I
cys
SiiC - ti. CyS
cys
H1 DCOM-2 cys
USAFSS-2 cys
TAC -2 cys
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I. A cut-off date of 5 March 1956 was established for
compilation of statisuics on this operation. Subsequent
to that date the following vehicles, which were originally
entered in the bas:c ?eport as "Successful Launches", have
been recovered in the European area. No transmissions were
received from these balloons. For any gross analysis of
the statistics contained in this report the category for the
following enumerated balloons should be changed from
"Successful launch" to "Failure" or "Stray" as indicated
below:
Flight
Number
ADA 109
Line
Number
2114
Balloon
Serial Number
648
Type
66CT
ADA 116
2124
655
66CT
ADA 150
2109
676
66CT
ADA 151
2110
646
66CT
GIE 96
5097
704
66CT
EVA 71
1071
826
66CT
B.
Strays:
EVA 88
4088
353
66CT
ADA 35
2035
19
66CT
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PAGE
7
Introduction 8
General 8
Mission 8
Assignment of Mission 8
Activation of 1st Air Division 8
Concept of Operations 8
Initial Schedule of Actions 8
Organization 9
Selection of Operational Sites 9
Communications 11
Cover Plan 12
Training Phase 12
Moby Dick Hi 12
Training 13
Launch 13
Hydrogen Generation 13
Tracking 13
Recovery 13
Operational Suitability Test 13
Vulnerability Test 14
Moby Dick Far East 15
Command Post Exercises 15
Deployment Phase 15
6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile), 16
1110th Air Support Group 16
456th Troop Carrier Wing 16
Pre-Operational Decisions 16
Ground Cut-Down Stations 16
Surface Recovery Support 17
Preparations for Launch 17
Stipulations by Higher Headquarters 17
Cover Plan Launches 17
Placard 18
Launch Limitations 18
2G-BO Auxiliary Safety Unit 18
Locator Beacon 18
Planned Configuration 19
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PAGE
Operational Phase, Primary Mission 20
General 20
Launching 20
Tracking 21
Recovery 22
Major Problems 22
Suspensions of Operations 24
Termination of Operational Phase _ 25
Results 25
Tab "A" - Conclusions 28
CHAPTER II - PRE-PRIMARY MISSION ACTIVITIES
Part I Deployment
Part II Moby Dick Far East
Part III Communications
Part IV Cover Launches
Tab A The Balloon
Tab B The Gondola
Tab C Field Test for Modification to System 119L
Tab D Launch Operations
Tab E Hydrogen Generation
Tab F Tracking
Tab G Recovery
Tab H Control
Tab I Vulnerability
Tab J Analysis of DMQ-1
Tab K Discussion of DMQ-2
Tab L Information Services
Tab M Statistics
Tab N Analysis of Ballasting Performance
Tab 0 Materiel
Tab P Finance
Tab Q Personnel
Tab R Mission Analysis
Part I Meteorological Planning for Operation
Part II Guidance for Operation of Launch Control
Center Weather Facility
Part III Guidance for Operation of Recovery Control
Center Weather Facility
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Part IV Requirement for Weather Support
Part V Weather Support for Balloon Launching
Operation
Part VI Comparison of Climatological Estimate of Launch
Site Weather and Favorable Initial Trajectories
Part VII Losses of Vehicles due to Unfavorable Trajectories
Part VIII Accuracy of Climatological Estimate of Launch
Site Weather Conditions
Part IX Evaluation of Weather Conditions in Recovery Area
Part X Forecastability and Reliability of Current
Trajectory Launch Criteria
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A. General: This is the Final Report of Project 119L
conducted by Strategic Air Command through the 1st Air Division
(Meteorological Survey). This r1nort is intended to cover the
primary mission for which Weapons System 119L was designed, plus
related pre and post mission Pc;ivities. In the event a more
complete analysis of the project is contemplated, reference must
be made to those documents listed in Chapter V plus data
available to Air Force Cambridge 3esearch Center, ARDC. Weapons
System 119L is described in Tabs "A" and "B", Chapter III.
B. Mission: To obtain photographic and electronic reconnais-
sance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites
using Weapons System 119L.
C. ASE- _~..unent of Mission: Weapons System 119L was developed
by Air Force agencies and civilian institutions for the purpose
of conducting pioneer reconnaissance by use of high altitude balloons.
Headquarters USAF monitored this project during the initial planning
and development stages by direct coordination with individual
commands. It became apparent that a single command was required to
further develop, coordinate and conduct the operation. The
Strategic Air Command was assigned this responsibility in USAF
letter, Subject: "Assignment of Additional Mission to Strategic
Air Command", dated 21 March 1955.
D. Activation of 1st Air Division: To accomplish the mission,
Strategic Air Command activated the 1st Air Division at Offutt Air
Force Base i.n SAC General Order Number 26, dated 15 April 1955.
The Mission of 1st Air Division was established in SAC Regulation
Number 23-7, dated 15 June 1955.
E. Concept of Operations: The basic concept was to accomplish
launches from Western Europe. Balloons were expected to transit
the target area in seven to ten days and then be tracked and
recovered within the Far East a.. Alaskan areas.
1. Initial Schedule of Actions: The most favorable period
for launch was determined to be 1 November through 1 May during
which period the prevailing w'nd:l were predicted to be West to. East
at all altitudes. This was therefore established as the period
during which the operation would be conducted. Based on this period
of favorable winds it was planned to conduct Zone of Interior.
Operational Suitability Testing and Training during the period May
1955 through September 1955. There would then remain sufficient
time for the units involved to deploy to forward bases and prepare
such bases prior to the implementation date, 1 November 1955.
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2. Organization:
a. 1st Air Division was assigned operational control
of the 456th Troop Carrier Wing (TAC), equipped w'.th C-119
aircraft for recovery operations; 1110th Air Support Group (HEDCOM),
the balloon launching organization; and the 6926tti Radio-Squadron
(Mobile) (USAFSS), to perform the tracking function. Because of
the peculiar nature of the mission, responsibilit: for operational
control of the launch and recovery units was almost immediately
expanded to include responsibility for training units and crews.
This expansion of responsibility was a-cDmplished by mutual agreement,
between the Commander, 1st Air Division, and the Commanders of the
parent commands. Also, because of the tremendous quantities of
material involved which required shipment overseas to meet deadline
dates, it became apparent that 1st Air Division should be given the
responsibility of monitoring procurement, development, shipping,
etc. Accordingly, these logistical responsibilities were also
transferred by mutual consent of commanders concerned.
b. 1st Air Division established Detachment 1, 1st Air
Division, as a forward command post for the
purpose of coordinating launch, support and public information
requirements and effecting necessary liaison with supporting
agencies. This detachment was activated 9 June 1955. Its mission
was later expanded to include the requirement to exercise operational
control of all European area launches. Headquarters 1110th Air
Support Group, directed the
activities of the five launch detachments.
c. Headquarters 456th Troop Carrier Wing was
established at and functioned as a forward command
post for the purpose of coordinating tracking, recovery and public
information requirements and effecting necessary liaison with
supporting agencies in the Far East. The 456th Troop Carrier Wing
exercised operational control over tracking and recovery activities.
d. A graphic presentation of comma nc. relationship is
contained on the following page.
3. Selection of Operational Sites:
a. Prior to assignment of Project 119L to Strategic
Air Command. it was considered that all balloons should be launched
from . A further study of meteorological data indicated
that more complete coverage could be obtained if sites were widely
dispersed in Western Europe; besides, surface weather,
was expected to be unsuitable for launch activities a large part
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rfl
HE
0
LC
FEI
u
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of the time. In addition, the distance from the area of interest
resulted in a day or so of balloon travel before the photographic
mission could be started, an important factor when the criticality
of balloon life expectancy is considered. Based on studies of
trajectory and surface weather, general areas for the location of
launch detachments were selected.
After selection of
the general areas, USAF directed that specific locations be selected
by CINCUSAFE. This permitted consideration of logistical feasibility,
physical adequacy, and other pertinent information pertaining to the
theater and known to USAFE Headquarters. Criteria for physical
gdequacy to support balloon operations were stated by 1st Air Division.
In June 1955, the Commander,
1st Air Division, and members of his staff visited each of the primary
sites with a view toward inspecting the physical facilities available
and stating ^necific requirement for site preparation.
b. The three squadrons of the 456th Troop Carrier
Ving were divided into detachments comprised of eight C-119 aircraft
each and placed at recovery sites believed to be compatible with
the predicted upper air trajectories.
c. Location of tracking sites was predicated upon
the forecasted flow ?f balloons into the recovery area and the require-
ment to obtain adegi)a.te "cuts" of lines of position (bearings) to
establish fixes.
At termination of the project an
additional site had been activated at Nome, Alaska, due to a require-
ment based on experience gained during actual operations, and Formosa
was being surveyed to determine the feasibility of .lo catin, a site
on that island.
4. Communications:
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a. The 1st Air Division communications network was
composed of commercially leased and allocated military teletvpe
circuits. The network was parallel to c am*nand control char.--361s;
i.e., f--7m the launch sites to the Launch Control Center
.from the recovery base to the Recovery Control Center
any: from Headquarters 1st Air Division to both_the Launch
and Recovery Control Centers.
II. TRAINING PHASE:
The training phase for ZI units was originally scheduled for
the period 10 May to 1 September 19.55, leaving a month for deploy-
ment and a month for shakedown overseas. However, due to the fact
that equipment non availability resulted in very little activity
during the month of July and the fact that equipment deficiencies
dictated further testing prior to beginning operations, decision
was made by Headquarters USAF that the operational date would be
postponed 30 days (from 1 November to 1 December. 1955).
'phis decision and other considerations made it possible
to extend the trai,.:Lng phase until mid-October.
A. Moby Dick Hit. Limited information was available concerning
balloon operations, therefore 1st Air Division conducted Moby Dick
Hi operations in The Gone of Interior during the period 10 May 1955
through 16 October. 1955 for the purpose of testing operational
suitability, developing procedures and tactic:, resolving defi.r.ien-
cies, determining capabilities and accomplishing or-the.--job
training. Originally, only twenty-five balloon systems were t-, be
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provided for this project; however, 1st Air Division estimated
that a minimum of 150 would be needed if the testing and training
were to be accomplished on an acceptable basis. A requirement
for this number of systems was established, and later was slightly
increased. The final report or this operation is contained in
lst Air Division TOP SECRET document entitled "Final Report of
Operational Suitability Test Project 119L".
1. Training : With ii,ltial guidance. from AFCRC and
General Mills (balloon manufacturer), the training and suitability
testing of the system was conducted in the Zone of Interior in
accordance with lst Air Division Operations Order 201-55.
a. Launch: During project Moby Dick Hi the 1110th
Air Support Group launched 162 119L systems. These launchings
provided the only opportunity for development of procedures and
the accomplishment of initial and final training prior to actual
operations.
b. Hydrogen Generation: It was anticipated that
the hydrogen gas required for Moby Dick Hi would be produced by
primary mission generators at Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyoming.
Initially these generators proved incapable of providing the
required quantities and quality of hydrogen. Major revisions in
procedures and ad 2tions of mechanical aids rendered the system
serviceable.
c. Tracking: Moby Dick Hi. balloons were tracked by
USAFSS, FCC, and AACS. No training was accomplished by the 6926
Radio Squadron (Mobile) (primary mission tracking unit), since it
was manned at overseas stations during and subsequent to the Moby
Dick Hi operation. (See paragraph IIB below.)
d. Recovery: Recovery operations were conducted by
the 456th Troop Carrier WinE operating from their home base at
Charleston AFB, South Carolina. Air-to-air and air-to-surface
recovery techniques were without precedent and the first SOP's for
such were developed during the Moby Dick Hi operation. Air-to-air
recovery action was successfully accomplished on twelve of the
thirty-nine systems on which attempted recoveries were possible.
As of completion of Moby Dick Hi, the air-to-water recovery tactic
had not proven successful dre to water station deficiencies.
2. Operational Suitability Test: During Moby Dick Hi,
techniques of varying balloon initial floating altitudes were
investigated and developed into SOP. Also it was found that ascent
rates and hydrogen purity were less critical than previously
believed. It was also determined that the basic equipment for
primary mission operations was adequate with the following major
exceptions:
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a. The 128TT balloon was determined to be marginally
serviceable. The unacceptably high failure rate of this balloon
type (approximately 50%) which was experienced through the month
of August, led to a decision that the contract for this type should
be terminated at the mid-point and the 66CT balloon substituted for
the remainder. Although not fully tested at the time, the 6(:T was
the only other balloon in the inventory capable of doing the job
and had been developed expressly for this project. Becaus-cf its
cylindrical design it was thought to be stronger structurally and
less apt to fail under stresses of ascent. It had similar life
expectancy, but flew at lower maximum altitudes (45,000 - 60,000
as compared to 75,000 -. 85,000) than the 128TT. At the lower alti-
tudes it picked up faster winds and, as a result, doubled the
expected rate of arrival in the recovery area. A disadvantage was
the possibility of increased vulnerability; however, ADC was unable
to demonstrate that the increase would be greater than sli ht in
attempting to locate and intercept the small number (15-20) of
these balloons launched in the Z I. As a result of the decision to
convert the contract from the large balloon to the smaller one,
there were approximately 1,300 of the 128TT type and 1,500 of the
66CT type available for accomplishment of the primary mission.
b. Minor mechanical innovations and a major revamping
of procedures were required to render the gas generation system
serviceable.
c. The degree of success to be expected from air-to-
air and air-to-water tactics remained in doubt.
d. Launch Device: The forklift launch vehicle was
determined to be inadequate and unsafe due to size, weight, limited
visibility and limited mobility. The forklift was replaced with
the Fisher Launcher, which was a 2- ton 6X6 truck with a super-
imposed structure from which the gondola was suspended and rel.eased.
3. Vulnerability Test: During Moby Dick Hi, a test was
conducted to determine the vulnerability of the 119L system ; To
accomplish this test Air Defense Command instructed suboi?:l:^.te
units to attempt detection and termination of Moby Dick Hi balloons
to maximum degree short of interference with the ADC primary
mission. During the test ADC was advised of launch times, d?' ected
trajectories, and balloon fixes as they became available. Results
indicated a limited capability to track balloons using either radar
or ground observers. It was demonstrated that balloons at altitudes
attainable by fighter aircraft could be destroyed by fighter action
if located. It was concluded that the degree of vulnerability to
be expected would be directly proportional to enemy capability to
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locate and track the balloons. Although inconclusive insofar as
Russian radars were concerned, test results did not indicate radar
tracking capability to be good, (See Tab I, Chapter III),. and it
was estimated that the balloon system was not unacceptably
vulnerable.
B. Moby Dick Far East: The Moby Dick Far East program (1st
Air Division Operations Order 202-55) was established primarily
to provide training for, and to obtain factual information on the
capabilities and limitations of, the 6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile).
This was done by simulating primary mission operations in the Far
East and Alaska areas during the period '7 Septemher 1955 to 27
December 1955. A total of 211 Moby Dic}, balloons were
launched by two launch teams from sites in
All pha-!~s of the tracking functions were exercised during
this period. After 23 November 1955-the balloons carried VHF
trr,nsceivers, which made it possible for recovery crews to fly
realistic training missions actually intercepting and homing on
balloon signals. Additional benefits derived from this project
were:
1. Provided information on frequency propagation
characteristics.
2. Provided additional trajectory information.
3. Served to add considerably to the cover plan.
C. Command Post Exercises: Commencing in late October 1955,
Command Post Exercises involving the primary mission communications
network were conducted almost continuously to provide maximum
training for all personnel and test the adequacy of the system.
Each exercise was approximately 5 days duration with a short break
of 2 to 3 days to evaluate results. These exercises were planned
to simulate balloon launching, tracking, fixing and recovery
operations. Wherever possible command functions and procedures
were employed to add realism. Applicable reports required by 1st
Air Division. Manual. 55-8 were submitted and Air Weather Service
support capability and other facets of the operation were exercised.
A. The deployment schedule of launch and recovery unit
personnel and equipment was finally predicated upon the designated
date for commencement of operations and the requirement to attain
operational proficiency prior to deployment. Also it was desired
to have all. operational units in place as far in advance of the
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implementation date as possible to assure time for base "shake-
down" and mission preparation. As previously stated, the target
date for commencement of operations was advanced from 1 November
to 1 December 1955. See Part Y. Chapter H.
1. 6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile): Deployment respons
bility for tracking units was retained by USAFSS, since personnel
were to be obtained from USAF-wide resources and USAFSS intention
was to reassign such personnel and equipment-within the Far East
upon termination of the project. Deployment of personnel and
equipment was commenced in June 1955 and was completed in August
1955. 725 personnel and 1,280,000 pounds of equipment were involved
in this deployment.
2. 1110th Air Support Group: Deployment of the main body
of the 1110th Air Support Group commenced on 10 October and was
completed on 1. November 1955. A total of 743 personnel and 47?,500
pounds of equipment were involved.
3. 456th Troop Carrier Wing. Deployment of the main body
of the 456th Troop Carrier Wing commenced on 5 October and was
completed on 20 November 1955. A total of 1,763 personnel, 2,751,290
pounds of cargo and 50 C-119 aircraft were involved.
B. There were 27,000,000 pounds of special equipment (Grand
Union) shipped ~in support of this operation in addition to the
previously mentioned equipment. This, plus other commitments,
equaled an approximate overall total of 3,231 personnel and 32,000,
000 pounds of car-Li,
IV. PRE--OPERATIONAL DECISIONS:
A. Ground Cut-Down Stationsz The original plan of op rations
called for high altitude operation (80,000 ft) of the 128TT balloon
where winds were expected to be of moderate speeds posing a reason-
able problem for intercepting C-11.9 aircraft. As a result, electroni
balloon termination equipment was installed in project aircraft and
no other means of termination was provided. The. decision made during
Moby Dick Hi to emp'-y 66CT balloons (which fly at lower altitudes)
in approximately eq-al numbers to the 128TT required a re-evaluation
of termination and, recovery plans. It was ird.i_:.ated that at the
lower altitudes, 1rind spuds encountered would bpi such as to nearly"
double the expected rate of arrivals in the recovery area. Also,
proximity to jet stream altitudes on arrival would result in rapid
transit of the recovery area such that balloons might arrive during
night and adverse weather-, transit the area, and pass far beyond
before aircraft could inter" ept them. It was known that under these
conditions the balloon would travel at, such. spe,.~ds as to render
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overtaking by C-119 aircraft impossible. It was immediately
apparent that a requirement existed for a means to terminate
balloons from the ground. From spare airborne electronic equipment
available, ground cut-down stations were established at
and at each of the recovery squadron bases except
T- improve performance a specially constructed Yagi
antenna was used. The range of these stations was such tha+. un-
broken grruri cut-down coverage was provided from the northern
tip of Formosa to the northern tip of Hokkaidt, around Adak, and
around Kodiak. During the operation, an additional station was
established at The concept of employment of these
ground cut-down stations contemplated that at night, during adverse
weather, or in the absence of aircraft for the purpose. balloons
would be terminated by the ground stations
It was thought, and later confirmed, that there
would be little possibility of recovering gondolas from the open
Pacific. In addition to requiring ground cut-down stations, the
increased speed of the balloons required that the exposure rate
of the duplex camera be changed from 121 minutes to 64 minutes; to
assure overlapping coverage.
B. Surface Recovery Support: With the expected increase in
arrival rate and the installation of ground termination equipment,
it was anticipated that many gondolas would fall on land with no
opportunity for recovery by the C-119 aircraft, or in water where
the aircraft recovery effectiv'.t y would depend upon state of the.
sea and proper functioning of the unproven water station. Based
on these considerations a decision was made that supplementary
recovery support was required. Through FEAF and AAC arrangements
were made with CINCAL, CINCFE, and CINCPAC for recovery assistance
from all United States forces operating within their theaters.
News releases in the theaters solicited the cooperation of civilians
by offering a reward for returned gondolas. Plans made were
complete and detailed, and later proved to be most effective.
C. Preparations for Launch: In anticipation of'starting the.
operation oi. 1 December 1955, action was taken to be prepared to
launch ?3ach sit,- at the maximum rate, from the first day.
These preparations included the generation and storage of hvdrogen_,
and stockpiling of prepared systems in the mechanical ani
configura`iv'S required.
D. Stipulations by Higher. Headquarters:
1. Cover Plan Launches. USAF directed that cover plan
balloon launchings be conducted in the Pacific area c-o.,ru.??rentl.y
with the conduct of the primary mission. This operation was ni.cknam- c-1.
White Cloud and was implementated by 1st Air. Division Operation:
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Order 207-56; it provided for the launching of ten 124A type
balloons each at , Hawaii, and Alaska during the period
9 January 19`6 to July 1956. The first of these balloons was
launched on 9 January 1956 with complete press coverage. This
was one day prior to commencement of primary mission operations
as had been requested by the State Departmei~.
2. Placards: At the direction nf.USAF, a cartoon placard,
multilanguage placard and Russian language placard were affixed to
that part of the gondola housing the cameras. The placards
indicated that a monetary reward would be given if the package w:_r-,~,
turned over to the proper authorities. Due to delayed delivery,
the Russian language placard was affixed first on 23 January 1956,
13 days after the operation began.
3. Launch Limitations: For the first seven days of
operation, launchings were restricted by Headquarters USAF to a
total of ten effective balloons per each 24 hour period with an
altitude ceiling restriction of 55,000 feet. (Note: An effec ti?re
balloon is one which has been successfully launched, reaches planned
altitude, and-can be assumed to penetrate the area of interest.)
4. 2G-BO (Auxiliary Safety Unit): Safety measures against.
free fall of the equipment in the event of balloon failure during
and after ascent were provided the 119L system by a safety chute and
by the electronic package control unit. To give back-up production
against free fall, in addition to the above, USAF determined that
an auxiliary safety unit, the 2G-B0, would be included in the system.
Delivery of the 2G-BO to launch detachment was subsequent to termina-
tion of the primary mission, therefore it was never actively
employed.
5. Locator Beacon: In May 1955 a requirement was stated
for a locator beacon which, attached to the gondola, would send
signals from a downed position to direct searchers to the location.
Without such a beacon it was considered that downed gondolas would
be difficult to find on land and practically impossible to find in
water. For technical. reasons, development was limited to a beae:on
which would work in water but not on la' 47, It was designed with a
salt water activated battery to transmit a UHF signal for 48 hour,,
to a range of 100 - 150 nautical miles. Recovery aircraft and th.
Air Rescue aircraft were oapabl.e of Komi:. a these si gru,.1 uzi.ng
the AN/ARC-27 with the AN/kRA-25 homing adapter. Early attempts to
test prototype and first production models of the bear.^n were irn-~
conclusive, and considerable delay was experienced in getting first
article approval. However, because the beacons were known to 1-
capable of functioning, 501 were accepted and shipped to launch
for use prior to receipt of first article approval. This approva-l
was received on 4 January 1956. A beacon was to be attached to -.arn
system launched.
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E. Planned Configuration: The configuration of balloon-
gondola assemblies planned for the beginning of operation wab in
consonance with other operational decisions and was standardized
for all launches regardless of balloon type. Principal features
were :
1. Basic configuration was normal, consisting of balloon,
load straps, rotator, bar assembly, parachute cluster, water station,
DMQ-1, thermal package for electronic gear, and two ballast boxes.
2. A 24 foot emergency parachute was rigged between the
gondola and the balloon to prevent free fall of any portion of the
vehicle in the event of balloon failure during ascent.
3. Four packages of chaff were attached to the bar assembly
and rigged in such a manner as to be automatically dispersed on bar
separation. The purpose was to provide positive fixing of termina-
tion position by radar.
4. A radiosonde unit was attached to the system to provide
information on level-off altitude if the ascent were successful., or
to give a positive indication if failure occurred within approxi-
mately two hours of launch.
F. Tactics: Because of the relatively inflexible nature of
the the balloon system and the fact that maximum altitude had been
prescribed, few tactical decisions were necessary. Those found
necessary are described briefly below:
1. Based on meteorology, radio transmitter turn on times
were established to insure that regardless of wind speed encountered
(within reasonable limits) the transmission would begin prior to
arrival of the balloon in the recovery area.
2. Camera turn on times were to be delayed long enough in
each case to avoid the possibility of photographing friendly
territory.
3. The 66CT balloons were to be launched from t' .. t,ro
German sites so as to penetrate the border during hours of darkness.
The 128TT was not restricted as to hours of darkness, nor was tht,
66CT when launched from the other three sites.
4. To obtain sufficient balloon life expectancy (7-8 days)
and stay within the prescribed altitude ceiling, the 66CT balloons
were prepared for a planned initial altitude of approximately
46,500 feet and a ballasting altitude of 40,000 feet; 128TT balloons
were prepared for an initial altitude of 50,000 feet and a ballast-
ing altitude of 45,000 feet.
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V. OPERATIONAL PHASE, PRIMARY MISSION:
A. General: By 1 December 1955, the established date for
commencement of operation, all units were in place and operationally
ready. Pending receipt of an execution order command post exercises,
Moby Dick Far East, and other training in mission accomplishment
continued. Also advantage was taken of this period to continue the
distribution of additional production material to the overseas
locations.
1. The mission was ordered executed on 10 January 1956.
Eight effective balloons were launched on that date.
B. Launching:
1. Subsequently, balloons were launched daily at rates
consistent with the directed limitations except as further limited
by political considerations rxd surface weather. Launch teams of
the 1110th Air Support Group turned in exceptional performances,
demonstrating on some occasions capability to exceed the maximum
launch rate programmed.
2. The limitation to 10 effective launches per day
continued in effect until 17 January when it was increased to 20
per day. On 25 January it was increased to 30 per day; and to 40
per day on 28 January.
3. Although experiencing their worst winter weather for
several years at the launch sites, pre-mission predictions of
percentage of weather favorable for launch were found to be.quite
accurate. As expected, from standpoint of surface weather,
was the poorest site and the best. The original concept in
regard to weather was that balloons could not be launched in the
presence of any precipitation, fog, or icing. Because such restric-
tion would have an adverse effect on capability to meet daily quotas,
it was decided to test feasibility of launching under these. condi-
tions. From these tests it was concluded that balloons can be
successfully launched during periods of fog and light precipitation
in the absence of severe icing conditions. Weather criteria for
launch were changed accordingly.
4.
20 D?cti'.r
operationally, both types were launched-in-approximately-equal -number-s
at the beginning of operations. Moby Dick Hi results had indicated
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that the 128TT ascent success rate to be expected would vary from
about 80% success with higher serial numbers, to 50% with lower
serial numbers; the break point being at or near serial number
1000. In order to pin down within the number of 128TT balloons
available a point below which the failure rate would be excessive,
it was decided to launch in serial number blocks of 100, starting
from the highest numbered balloons and launching in numerical
progression downward at each site, except that
a test quantity of low serial numbered balloons would
be launched to determine if failure rate confirmed the Moby Dick
Hi findings. After several days of operation, the ascent success
rate of the lower serial numbers was found to be 47% as compared
to 83% for the higher serial numbers. A decision was then made
that all 128TT balloons with serial numbers lower than 950 would
be set aside and not used. This resulted in a reduction of the
useable balloon inventory by approximately 700 balloons and left
a deficit of 500 which would be required if the mission objective
of launching 2500 was to be achieved. To eliminate this deficit,
a requirement was stated for delivery by 1 March of balloons of
a new type which would combine the strength of the 66CT and
approach the altitude capabilities of the 128TT, at the same time
providing more operational flexibility. Such a balloon was designed
(the 83CT) and a few were test flown by AFCRC. Procurement was on
schedule for delivery in March 1956, but was halted when operations
were suspended and none were ever delivered.
5. Since the decision to set aside the low numbered 128TT
balloons left only a limited number in the inventory, it was decided
to conserve these for a later period when their use might be manda-
tory to avoid attrition by flying at higher altitudes. (The 66CT
was not capable of use at higher altitudes without drastic reduction
in life expectancy). Accordingly, only 66CT balloons were launched
beginning 22 January 1956.
6. By 3 February 1956 it became apparent that attrition
was unacceptably high at the lower altitudes and 128TT launchings
were resumed using slightly higher altitudes than previously (54,000
ft initial floating altitudes; 50,000 ft ballasting altitude.). This
was maximum possible altitude under the existing directives, and
Headquarters USAF was asked to raise the ceiling to a minimum of
60,000 ft, or to el.2.:ainate it entirely.
F. Suspension of Operation: On 6 February stand-down of all
launches was directed.
1. An appraisal of the situation at this time indicated
that one of two courses of action should be followed in the event
resumption of operations was authorized, -One was to launch all
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usable balloons (including the supplementary 83CT's) at maximum rate
possible and at maximum altitude. The objective would be to saturate
or avoid defenses and end the mission on the earliest date possible.
Capability to complete entire mission by mid-April existed if
operations were resumed prior to'15 February. The alternative was
to continue only with the remaining 400 high serial number 128TT
balloons which could possibly be flown above defenses. TO- .increase
the difficulty of detection, water stations would be removed and the
maximum altitude would be flown. Through these measures it was
thought that the operation might attract less attention and thus be
acceptable. These proposals were made to Headquarters USAF on 9
February 1956.
2. Headquarters USAF favored the alternate proposal
(launch only the 400 128TT balloons) if operations were to be resumed,
but removed altitude restrictions entirely for only 10% of the number.
The re,a;.ining 90% were limited to a maximum of 58,000 ft. On 24
February, Headquarters USAF advised that a proposal for resumption
of operations under these ground rules at the earliest possible date
had been sent to the Secretary of the Air Force.
Termination of Operational Phase:
1. Informally on 29 February and by message on 1 March
1956, USAF directed termination of the operational phase of the
project, except that search for and recovery of unaccounted for
gondolas would continue.
2. By Headquarters USAF directive, 1st Air Division and
Strategic Air Command relinquished operational control of operational
units to parent commanders on 26 March 1956. (Redeployment of these
units and disposition of surplus materiel became a responsibility
of the parent commands and Air Materiel Command.)
VI RESULTS:
A. During the operational period, 516 balloon systems were
launched. Of these systems 399 were considered to be operational;
there were 117 known failures, and 12 of those considered operational
were later recovered from friendly areas without having entered the
target area. Of the remaining 387 operational balloons, 144 were
later heard to transmit, of which 123 were tracked, and 21 were
termination signals Heard as the first transmission; 243 were never
heard from after launch. Of the 123 which were tracked, only 67
entered the recovery area. 57 of these were terminated and 44 of them
had been returned as of 5 March 1956. Of the 13 which were terminated
but not recovered, 4 have terminal positions on land, 9 in the sea (?
Pacific, 2 in Sea of Japan). The 10 which arrived but were not termi-
nated are presumed to be down in the Pacific or in the Polar regions.
Although termination was attempted on 6 of these, all attempts were un-
successful, presumably because of failure of balloon el.ectrccnic gear
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respond. Four entered the recovery area only by definition,. since
they were too far to the north for interception.
. Fifty-eight balloons heard to transmit, were tracked,
but never arrived. These were functioning systems and from all
indica'.ions most of them should have been blown into the recovery
area. However, the vast majority of them ceased their trans-
misoinn prior to their seventh day of life. One cluster of
eighteen balloons was being tracked across the North China area
heading directly for Japan, - only three actually arrived and
nothing more was heard from the remainder. There are several
possible causes. Flectronic malfunction could have resulted in
cessation of transmissions; over-ballasting, as previously discussed,
could have resulted in premature flight termination behind the lines;
they could have been terminated by enemy action; )- their trajectories
may have been such as to carry them beyond listering range.
C. Two hundred forty three balloons were never heard from after
launch. This means that. they were either travelling in the wrong
direction completely; they experienced complete failure of the HF
transmitter; or they failed to live until their programmed turn-on
time. Since many of these balloons were launched close in time to
balloons which later arrived, trajectory is thought to be responsible
for only a small percentage. From Moby Dick Hi statistics it was
reasonable to assume that 85% of the transmitters would function
properly. This leaves the vast majority in the category of not
having lived long enough to transmit. It is reasonable to assume
that some launches which were considered successes, in actuality
were not. Perhaps the launch personnel were unable to monitor the
flight long enough to observe failure;,perhaps minute holes were in
the balloon allowing the gas to leak out over a period of hours;
perhaps the ballasting mechanism failed and caused the balloon to
descend to the ground. Although over-ballasting is known to have
shortened balloon life to e degree, this degree was not such that
a large number would expire for this reason prior to turn-on time.
Although no exact values can be placed on any of the above factors;
even in combination, it is considered unreasonable that they could
have been responsible for early termination of such a large number
of balloons. It is concluded, then, that the major contributing
factor to loss of these balloons was attrition by enemy action.
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, enjoying the
ele,;;en-:; of surprise, balloons launched prior to 26 January were
fairly successful; however, of 184 balloons successfully launched
on and after 26 January only 28 were heard to transmit and only two
were recovered. This indicates that after two weeks in which to
react, the USSR had come up with an exceptionally effective defense.
Contrary to the radar tracking capability _d_wemonstrated in the Z I
during Moby Dick Hi,-12th Air Force radars ere able to track balloons
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up to 150 miles across the line; it is assumed, therefore, that
Russian radars were similarly capable. The length of the metal
cross-bars and the metal water station increased radar vulnera-
bility. It was known b-)forehand that Russian fighters were
capable of attaining the altitudes to which the balloon flights
were restricted (55,000 ft). Vulnerability was certainly affected
by balloon behavior, as previously discussed, in descending to
ballasting altitude (40,000 to 45,000 ft) shortly after noon.
1. As the effect of attrition became noticeable, such
steps as were possible were taken to minimize the vulnerability?
Altitude was increased to the limit possible within the directed
ceiling and radio turn-on times were delayed to deny use of these
signals as an aid to the enemy. Plans were made to remove the
water station entirely, in order to minimize radar detection;
removal or raising of altitude restrictions was recommended to
USAF; balloon transmitters were not to be turned on until the
very last day of programmed life. Operations were suspended before
all of these measures could be placed into effect.
D. All systems launched carried the DMQ-1 (photographic)
gondola. No DMQ-2 (electronic ferret) packages were launched since
this type of equipment was not perfected in time.
E. A summary of photographic accomplishments processed b-
the Aeronautical Chart and Information Service as of 30 March
1956, is as follows:
1. Total number of missions from which photography was
obtained - 40.
2. Total number of usable exposures - 13,813.
3. Gross statute miles of charting photography -
19984v173-
4. Net statu+o miles of charting photography - 1,661,869.
(equal to approximately 51% of the Continental United States)
5. Gross square statute miles of charting photography
for Sino-Soviet area - 3,388,745.
6. Net square statute miles of charting photography for
Sino-Soviet area - 1,116,449 - (equal to 37% of the Continental
United States, or approximately 8% of Sino-Soviet area).
-7.--Cost per square mile- (net) $48.49.
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I. CONCLUSIONS: It is concluded that:
A. Weapons System 119L was a reasonably effective means of
obtaining pioneer reconnaissance at comparatively shall
cost.
B. The predicted upper air trajectories over the USSR and
its satellites was as accurate as could be expected.
C. The delay in commencing the operation (from 1 December
1955 to 10 January 1956) compressed the project, time-
wise, to within a very short period of favorable winds.
However, the operation could have been completed (2500
launches) by 1 May 1956, if project had been permitted
to continue.
D. The element of surprise contributed appreciably to the
successful results obtained during the initial days of
the operation.
E. Vulnerability to unfriendly countermeasures and over-
ballasting were the two factors contributing most to failure
to transit the target area.
F. Ground termination stations are a mandatory back-up
for other recovery techniques.
G. Deficient polyethelyne and manufacturing defects caused
a deficit of approximately 700 balloons in the operation-
al inventory.
H. The type of photography obtained affords an excellent
source for pioneer reconnaissance, but due to limiting
factors, detailed analysis of new intelligence is
difficult. (See Tab "J", Chapter III)
I. The findings of the Moby Dick Hi vulnerability tests,
involving the Air Defense Command, were misleading.
Since 12th Air Force radars (MSQ-2) were capable of
tracking balloons at high altitude and at ranges up to
150 nautical miles, it is concluded that Soviet radars
have similar capability; therefore, in design of any
future system for this purpose, care should be taken to
minimize radar reflective surfaces and materials.
J. More specific knowledge of balloon performance must be
obtained, and design influenced thereby, in order to
obtain everything possible from this weapons system.
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K. The C-119 aircraft:
1. Is useful to perform air-to-air electronic cut-down,
however, this could'be accomplished by several other
aircraft types.
2. Is too slow to overtake the balloon due to approxi-
mately equal ground speeds of the balloon and aircraft
under certain jet stream conditions. Success was
assured only when the aircraft could assume a position
ahead of the balloon.
3. Air-to-air recovery capability was dependent upon the
existence of daylight and VFR conditions.
L. Surface recovery of all packages should be planned as the
primary method of recovery with a suitable and fell-proof
method of locating the package, such as a beacon capable
of operating on land and water.
M. Due to excessive ballast rates, duration was marginal.
The reconstructed profiles indicate that the life expec-
tancy is somewhat shorter than the theore',ical average of 7
and 8 days for the 66CT and 128TT respectively. See
Tab "N", Chapter III.
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