PROJECT RAND: EXPECTED COST AND PAYOFF OF A HIGH INTENSITY BALLOON PIONEER RECONNAISSANCE CAMPAIGN OVER THE U.S.S.R.
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP89B00708R000500110001-2
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Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
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Publication Date:
December 10, 1953
Content Type:
REPORT
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U. S. AIR FORCE
THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 34 PAGE:
COPY / OF COPIES.SEiN3 C
PROJECT- RAND
RESEARCH MEMORANDUM
BALLOON PIONEER RECONNAISSANCE CAMPAIGN
OVER THE U.S.S.R. CSC
W. W. Kellogg
S. M. Greenfield
RM-U64
TS-882
10 December 1953
Copy No. 1
-SERIES c?
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within
the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 1$ U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or
the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by low.
ECPDCTED COST AND PAYOFF OF A HIGH INTENSITY
RAND, Research Memoranda are available to authorized persons or agencies for
their use. Further dissemination is not permitted: Distribution to abstracting
.agencies is 'not authorized:
:This is a working. paper.' It may be expanded, modified, or withdrawn at
? Q11 fl'Dom.,
-7
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EXPECTED COST AND PAYOFF OF A HIGH INTENSITY BALLOON
PIONEER RECONNAISSANCE CA}PAIGN OVER THE U.S.S.R. (5)
I. INTRODUCTION
The original analysis of the feasibility and utility of a balloon
pioneer reconnaissance system was completed at RANBID in November, 1950,
and almost immediately Project'Gopher was established to develop the system.
Since then RAND has, continued to keep in touch with balloon developments
as much as possible, and has from time to time made supplementary studies
to bring the original work up to date and to investigate certain special
features. The most extensive of these studies was RM-979, November, 1952,
which went into the cost estimates and expected coverage of the system,
based on information gained in the course of the work on Project Gopher.
One of the basic constraints on a balloon pioneer reconnaissance
system is the need for using it during a season when the winds are most
favorable. Without resorting to very large, high-altitude balloons,
operating above about 80,000 ft (see RM-979, p. 47), it would be neces-
sary to work during the winter months, when the westerly winds in the
lower stratosphere at middle and high latitudes are fairly strong and
steady. It was assumed in the previous system studies that the winter
months could be considered as November, December, January, and February,
and that there was therefore a period of roughly 100 days a year which
would be favorable for the operation.
Nothing has come up in the way of wind data to really affect this
assumption, but a criticism has originated based on quite a different
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consideration. It has been argued that the three-month period would be
too long for the operation from a political standpoint, and that it would
be better to get it over with much more rapidly. Granting that this might
well be so, the political advantages should be weighed against the con-
siderable increase in the difficulty and cost of compressing the operation
into a shorter time. Without attempting to weigh the political aspects,
the problems of running a "high intensity campaign" are spelled out below.
There are clearly two ways of shortening the duration of the operation
without accepting a decrease in coverage..
o It can be run with more effective arrays of balloon-
borne, long focal length cameras, which will increase
the data gathering ability of each balloon and thereby
reduce the total number required for a given level of
coverage, but will increase the weight and cost per
balloon. (Sections II and III.)
o It can be run at a higher rate of launching and re-
covery, resulting in greater cost for launching sites
and recovery facilities to carry the increased load.
(Section IV.)
These two avenues are both explored in this report, and it is shown where
the practical limits occur in each case.
Another consideration which has been receiving some attention is the
coverage as a function of the position of the launching point or points.
The coverage calculations in al-979 were based on one launching point
(65?N Lat., 00 Long.) In order to demonstrate the effect of changing the
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launching points, the coverage calculations have been extended to show the
coverage for a variety of launching patterns, using single or double
launching sites.
Thus, this report is essentially a further extension of the original
studies. However, an attempt will be made to present the material in such
a way that its implications can be understood without reference to the other
reports.
II. COVERAGE CALCULATIONS
As a reconnaissance balloon drifts cross-country during the daytime,
its cameras will photograph a strip of ground. If an array of cameras is
used it is possible to obtain pictures essentially from horizon to horizon.
Furthermore, the focal lengths of these cameras can, in principle, be
adjusted to give a scale which is suitable for photo-interpretation on large
features out to as far as 50 miles. It should be noted, however, that as
one looks over such a strip of photographs one would find long sections
which would show only cloud tops, and there would be at least twelve hours
out of each day's travel for which there would be no pictures because of
darkness. (For more on this subject, see Section III.)
We say that a feature of the terrain is "covered" if it is photographed
with a proper scale during a day with two-tenths cloud cover or less and
a visibility of six miles or better. With this definition, it is possible
to determine statistically the probability that a point in a given region
will be covered as a function of the number of balloons launched and the
position of the launching site. Clearly, a number of factors must be con-
sidered in arriving at these probabilities. The details are to be found in
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RM-979 (Section II.D and Appendix D), so it will suffice here to summarize
the factors briefly:
o The pattern of balloon trajectories, assuming a large
number of balloons launched more or less regularly
over the course of several days or weeks (in winter),
will look like a smoke trail spreading out from the
launching site and extending in the direction towards
which the mean wind blows. By actually computing a
number of such trajectories from upper air maps it is
possible to arrive at an estimate of the spread of these
trajectories and the point of maximum density along any
given meridian downwind. This was done for three launching
sites, corresponding to 600, 65?, and 70?N Lat. along the
Greenwich meridian. There will presumably be some variation
from year to year and from month to month within the winter
season, but the general features of the mean wind flow and
the spread of the trajectory patterns will probably not be
too different from those used in this study.
The question of altering the trajectory distribution by using trajectory
forecasting methods cannot be ignored. It seems certain that by selecting
certain times when the wind was "favorable" one could displace the pattern
north or south, or could change the mean speed of travel. However, it is
equally certain that one could not tell where a given balloon would go to
better than some 20 to 30 percent of the distance traveled, so it would be
quite impossible to direct individual balloons to individual targets more
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than a few hundred miles downwind. Thus, the concept of launching when-
ever possible appears to be the best scheme in the long run, and in a
"high-intensity campaign" it would probably be quite impractical to hold
up operations until the forecaster said, "Go."
o The balloons which travel a high-latitude trajectory
in winter will encounter fewer daylight hours per day,
so will "cover" less area per mile traveled than those
at lower latitudes. This darkness degradation factor,
a function of latitude, is taken into account.
o The distribution of cloudiness and obstructions to
visibility will determine how many useable pictures are
taken each day. The cloudiness factor was computed by
the Air Weather Service.
o The probability of recovering a balloon payload, once
it has been successfully launched, has been estimated
to be about one-half, i.e., two balloons launched for
each payload recovered.
There are so many variables that it has been difficult to devise a con-
venient and readily understandable way to present the melee of results. The
following pictorial presentation has been found the most satisfactory, since
it allows one to draw one's own conclusions without imposing preconceived
*Areal and Altitudinal Variations of Cloud Conditions Favorable for
Visual Photo-Reconnaissance Operations Over Eurasia, Directorate of
Climatology, Headquarters, Air Weather Service, October, 1952
(Secret).
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judgments as to just what is "optimum."
In Fig. 1 through 5 are presented maps showing the variation of cover-
age in western and central Russia for several launching points or combi-
nation of launching points. The lines are lines of constant coverage,
referred to as "isopleths of coverage," and the number assigned to each
isopleth will depend on two things:
o The number of balloons launched, or balloon force*
o The width of the strip which will yield useful infor-
mation.
The values assigned to each isopleth for a given combination of balloon
force and strip width are given in Table I.
TABLE I
Values (in Percent) to be Assigned to Isopleths in Coverage
Figures for Various Combinations of Balloon Force and Strip Width
Strip Width (Statute Miles)
Number of
140
60
100
Balloons
Launched
Isopleth Label
Isopleth Label
Isopleth Label
al b
CI
d
e
a
b
c
d
e
a
b
c
d
e
1000
75 11 55
45
3 28
17
86
70
55
37
214
96
83
75
55
37
2000
95 80
68
47
30
100
90 1
80
60
140
100
97
93.
80
60
14000
100 95
90
174
50
100
100
95
83
65
100
100
100
95
83
8000
100 X100
100
90
73
100
100
100
97
83
100
100
100
100
97
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0
0
N
0
0
C
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0
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The coverage is expressed in terms of a percent, which can be in-
terpreted in either of two ways:
o A given percentage of the large features in a given
region will be photographed.
o A feature in a given region will have a given percentage
probability of being photographed.
It will be noted that the coverage of the northern part, above about
60? to 65?N Lat., is rather poor due to the darkness deeration. This means
that relatively more balloons are required to obtain the same coverage in
the northern part. Thus, the launching scheme shown in Fig. 5, where twice
as many balloons are launched from the northern end of the launch line as
from the southern end, seems to be somewhat the best in that it gives the
broadest coverage of the whole region of interest.
In order to give a better idea of the. orientation of the various patterns,
Fig. 6 shows an outline map of Russia and some of the regions which, for one
reason or another, are considered to be of interest for a pioneer reconnaissance
operation. It is drawn to the same scale, so the coverage patterns can be
used as overlays on this map.
It can readily be seen that an appraisal of the coverage must necessarily
be rather subjective, due to the fact that the balloon coverage pattern is
such that one cannot hope to get all of the areas of interest properly re-
connoitered, and also due to the fact that one cannot specify the "target
system" precisely. (See Fig. 6.) However, it may be of some interest to
inquire how the overall coverage would vary with the various changes of strip
width, overall coverage being rather arbitrarily defined as the fraction of
the whole area of Russia west of 100?E Long. (A few rough checks indicate
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a
60
0
0 50
d
0
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5 6 7 8 9
Total number of balloons launched (thousands )
Fig. 7- Coverage of the USSR west of longitude 100? E
by balloons launched from 65? N latitude , 0? long
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that the numbers for overall coverage would not be greatly altered by in-
cluding all of the area of Russia and Communist China.) The overall cover-
age is shown in Fig. 7, where the case of a single launching point at 65?N
Lat., 0 0 Long., is considered, and the 40, 60, and 100 mile strip widths are
each treated. The numbers would be somewhat different for the different
launching schemes, but the relative effect of changing the strip width would
be about the same.
III. BALLOON-BORNE CADS AND THEIR USE
The conception of a balloon photo-reconnaissance system is not new, but
much remains to be learned about how to use it to best advantage. The
present section will suggest how photographic equipment can be used to
obtain more information than that which is ordinarily gathered from aerial
strip photography.
It will be evident to anyone reading this section that some important
decisions must be made with regard to the best way to use the balloon-borne
cameras. Since special cameras and special lenses will have to be procured
for this operation, and since relatively large numbers will be required, it
is of the utmost importance that the camera payload and its output be given
immediate attention.
Focal Lengthsvs. Strip Widths
In Section II it was shown how much the coverage per balloon would be
increased by increasing the width of the photographed strip which would
reveal useful information. It should be remembered, however, that one does
not arrive at an increased width without extending the range of the cameras,
and this can be done by one of two methods. If one grants that photo
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interpreters must have a certain effective resolution on the ground in
order to identify a feature such as a factory, airfield, population center,
etc., then one can get greater range by going to either:
o Longer focal lengths in order to increase the scale
at a given range.
o Greater resolution and/or contrast on the negative.
The question of the scale or resolution required for pioneer reconnais-
sance is far from settled, but a range of scales which would bracket the
scale requirements would be:
1:100,000 to 1:500,000
It is assumed here that the usual 10 to 14 lines per mm is the image reso-
lution of the lens and film. If very fine lenses and fine grain film were
used,-the allowable scale would be somewhat smaller, but this is a complex
question which will not be dealt with here. (See, for example, the Beacon
Hill Report, Appendix C.) For the sake of illustrating the situation, let
us adopt a scale of 1:250,000 as acceptable for pioneer reconnaissance.
For a balloon at 60,000 ft altitude, a 3 in. focal length camera would
provide this scale in the vertical. However, for the same floating altitude,
the range to the ground is greater for obliques, and there is also the
problem of distortion of a horizontal feature due to the obliquity.
a balloon at 60,000 ft, a 12 in. focal length will be required to provide
the effective scale for an-object at a horizontal distance of about 30 mi.
*Personal discussion with Mr. Amrom H. Katz, Photo Laboratory, Wright
Air Development Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
The horizontal and vertical scales in an oblique, Sx and Sy respectively,
are not the same. For an object near the axis of the camera:
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As one goes to still greater ranges, another factor enters, the degra-
dation of contrast due to haze. The 30 mi horizontal distance corresponded
to a depression angle of about 220. To reach out 50 mi the depression angle
would be less than 15?, and at such small angles of depression the required
focal length on a day with average visibility may be two to four times
greater than that which would be required on an ideally clear day. (See
Beacon Hill Report, Appendix C.) Thus, to give the resolution required
for pioneer reconnaissance, the focal length for a 50 mi horizontal range
would probably have to be at least 36 to 48 in.
These trial calculations are not to be considered as final, but are
intended to show how fast the focal length goes up as one tries to reach
out to greater ranges. The weight of the camera would go up roughly as the
cube of the focal length, and the weight of film would go up roughly as the
square of the focal length. In a system where weight of payload is an
important factor in determining the cost and reliability, this will run
up the cost per balloon and will tend to decrease the reliability; but the
increased cost per balloon could be about balanced by the increased cover-
age per balloon.
Nighttime Photography
In the preceding section it was pointed out that a very large degra-
dation factor had to be introduced to take into account the short duration
S .if! 2
X LSIn ] -1 Sy e f [-s-in-T] 9 and the effective scale is defined
as Se =JSX y, where H is altitude, f is focal length, and 9 is angle of
depression of the camera axis.
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of daylight in winter at high latitudes. Thus, virtually no coverage is
obtained north of 65? to 70?N Lat.,.a region along the arctic coast of
Asia which may be of considerable interest.
It is usually assumed that only daylight photography will be practical,
for with the motion of the balloon it would not be practical to take time
exposures at night in order to pick up terrain features. There is an
application of night photography which might give useful information, how-
ever: Artificial lights on the ground, such as street lights, will leave
faint "trails" on the film of a camera set for normal daylight exposure. If
the camera were to be used with a larger aperture at night, fainter lights
could be detected, and possibly the reflected illumination from shaded lights.
(Exposures of around 1/25 to 1/50 of a second would probably be adequate for
these, though longer exposures would make the trails on the film longer and
easier to spot. The light from a moving point source falling on a film will
make an exposure which is independent of the exposure time as long as the
circle of confusion of the image moves a distance equal to its own diameter
while the shutter is open.)
If a balloon destined for a northerly trajectory were set to operate
continuously, day and night, the nighttime portions of its film strip could
be analyzed to show signs of habitation and human activity, on the assumption
that arctic installations would not be completely blacked out. The purpose
of pioneer reconnaissance is to a large extent to determine the extent of
enemy activity in a broad sense, and it is fairly certain that in the arctic
any activity at all would be of strategic interest.
It should be noted that balloons with northern trajectories will tend
*The author is indebted to Professor James G. Baker, Harvard College
Observatory, for suggesting this application.
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to enter the recovery network in its extreme northern end, and recoveries
would have to be made over the Arctic Ocean north of Alaska. This area
is a difficult region in which to operate aircraft, particularly in winter,
when the ground cold and short day multiply the normal difficulties many
times. Thus, one should not expect a very high level of recovery in this
region without a special effort.
IV. COST AND EFFORT REQUIRED TO INCREASE THE LAUNCHING AND RECOVERY RATE
Let us now examine what increases in cost and effort might be expected
if we desire to drastically shorten the total time of operation, keeping
the total number of balloons constant. In order to do this, we would have
to step up the intensity of launching and recovery. In this case, we must
still live with the fixed requirements of the launching and recovery methods.
These will determine the increased cost and effort and, in the long run, the
probability of success of the stepped-up operation.
Launching Requirements
The vehicle involved is considered to be a 73' diameter balloon. This
balloon is composed of polyethelene material .001-.002 in. thick, and is
expected to take off with a gross load of 1500 lbs. Being large and sail-
like initially, it is very much affected by surface winds during the pre-
paration period. Using unconventional methods, some of which are described
in a previous report (RM-979), it has been found possible to launch these
balloons in gust velocities up to 15 knots, but to date this remains as the
upper limit. We are faced,.then, with the problem of releasing a number of
large, cumbersome, fragile vehicles that are greatly affected by ground
conditions at the time of launching. There have been two basic philosophies
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developed on how best to get these balloons off the ground. One involves
launching from a ground station, at which you take advantage of all the
available wind shelter and launch only under the proper conditions. The
second involves launching from a ship at sea (such as an aircraft carrier
or seaplane tender), on which you steam downwind at a proper speed so as to
eliminate a certain percentage of the adverse minds. Although each philosophy
has its specific advantages, it was found, surprisingly enough, that when the
15 knot limitation is imposed, from the standpoint of winds alone, both types
of launching bases are suitable for operation about 50 percent of the time
during the winter months. The main differences between the two were those
involving ease of setting-up, mobility, security, and replenishment of lifting
gas supplies.
Although it is true that a ship is easier to launch from, more mobile,
and certainly more secure than a land base, the supplying of lifting gas is
a substantial problem, and in the long run could become the equalizing factor
between the two systems. It has been estimated that an aircraft carrier can
store 2 x 106 cubic feet of gas on its flight deck. At the usual rate of
2 x 104 cubic feet/balloon, this is enough for only 100 balloons. This gas
can be replenished in two ways. One is by resupply, and the second is by
installing gas generation equipment. (If helium is used rather than hydrogen,
this second method is impossible.) Under the first method, let us suppose
we are running a campaign of 2000 balloons, which would require in the order
of 4 x 107 cubic feet of gas. Subtracting the 2 x 106 cubic feet already on
the carrier, this would leave 3.8 x 107 cubic feet to be supplied. Put in
more understandable terms, if it were necessary to transport this amount of
gas over land it would require the use of 190 special railroad tank cars,
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or 11110 special tank trucks. This is certainly a substantial resupply problem,
made even more difficult by the non-availability of this number of special
tank cars or trucks.
It should be noted, however, that this tremendous resupply problem is
generated by the assumption that the entire campaign is run from only one
ship. If ten carriers were used as launching bases, they would be able to
carry half of the gas needed, and each would have to be resupplied only once.
Thus, the multiple launching site scheme, for this and a number of other
reasons, will be shown to be preferable.
On land it is, of course, possible to store the entire necessary supply
of gas at the various overseas bases that would be used. However, assuming
that helium would be employed, this 4 x 107 cubic feet would still have to
be transported from the U.S.
If we are allowed to use hydrogen as the lifting gas, there exists the
possibility of generating this gas aboard ship. It has been estimated that
a generator which had an output of 200,000 cubic feet/hour could be installed
aboard a carrier, at a cost of about one million dollars. It is also estimated
that a generator with an output of 110,000 cubic ft/hour could take care of
2 launchings/hour, and would cost about $500,000. The larger generator
operated 20 hours a day would allow balloons to be launched from a single
carrier at the rate of 200 per day. It is believed possible* to launch as
many as 15 balloons at a time from the deck of an aircraft carrier,
Allowing for aborts and decreased efficiency, each three crews could, with
*Lt. S. G. Malcolm Ross, USN, S of Feasibilit : Report on Naval
Usage of Plastic Balloons, 1952 (ecret
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proper assistance in preparing the balloons, launch 4 per hour or two crews
could be capable of launching 2 balloons per hour. At this rate of 20
balloons per hour it would be possible to use up a day's generation of gas
in about 10 hours. Since this proposed generator approaches the limit (in
size) that can be placed aboard a carrier, this number of 200 launchings
per day represents an upper limit to the number of launchings per carrier.
It should be noted at the outset, however, that due to the need for a
certain degree of dispersal of the balloons, anything approaching 200 balloons
per day from one base would result in the balloons being too closely bunched,
and so it would be more advantageous to have several bases, both in the land
and sea cases.
The Recovery Requirements
There are essentially four methods of affecting the recovery of a balloon
payload. These area
1. Snatch it from the air by a recovery plane.
2. Snatch it from the sea by a recovery plane.
3. Recover it from the sea by a surface craft.
lt. Let it travel for a longer period of time and recover
it from a land area.
We may eliminate the fourth possibility due to the strain that it imposes on
the balloon system, and the haphazard and uncontrollable way that it must be
carried out. Of the remaining three, it is estimated that the first, the
"air snatch," would be most economical. On this assumption, such a system
was field tested and was proven feasible.
In this section the probability of a payload being recovered by this
method is not treated. The recovery probability only affects the total
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number of balloons launched to achieve a given coverage, a phase that was
treated in an earlier section. Instead, we will examine the force require-
ments necessary for a given campaign, assuming that a recovery attempt will
be made on every balloon launched, and estimate the resulting cost.
Quoting from RM-979, these are the pertinent force requirements:
1. Length of the recovery network, from Okinawa to Fairbanks
is about 4000 n mi, extending in a curved line from SW to NE.
2. Bases at or near Okinawa, Tokyo, Shemya, and Fairbanks should
be able to provide coverage for the area.
3. The fraction of aircraft out for maintenance at any one time
is 1/3, and the abort rate is 0.2 (the usual factors con-
sidered in a bombing campaign). This means that 1.7 air-
craft are needed for every aircraft required to be in
? operation.
4. The network is "saturated," i.e., there is always at least
one balloon in the patrol area of each aircraft, so all
sectors of the network must be continuously patrolled during
the daylight hours.
5. Each aircraft can attempt to recover, on the average, five
payloads in a day's operation. Thus, as the flux of balloons
through the network increases there will be a point where more
aircraft must be added to keep the average work load at five
recoveries per aircraft per day. (The maximum number of re-
coveries for a given aircraft might be as much as ten or
fifteen per day, if they were quite closely spaced, but the
average work load is kept low to allow for the random
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6.
7.
fluctuations in the number of balloons passing through a
given sector. )
The plane that appears to be best suited for this job is
the C-119H.
The cost of flying such an aircraft, including the cost of
fuel, maintenance, and depreciation, is estimated to be
roughly $500 per flying hour. Each of the recovery aircraft
flies an average of ten hours per operational day.
8. The minimum number of operational aircraft over the entire
recovery network is taken to be nine.
9. In all cases the network is designed for an estimated daily
peak density. This peak density is assumed to be the number
of balloons released per day.
10. Adverse weather grounds recovery aircraft 10 percent of the
time.
U. Based on the minimum and maximum time for a balloon to cross
Russia, it is assumed that the recovery operation will extend
from three days after the first balloon is launched, to 10
days after the last balloon is launched.
Desired Launching Pattern
For the calculated coverage to have any validity, trajectories must be
independent of each other. It is, of course, apparent that in any operation
involving multiple launching sites, many balloons, and a limited time of
operation, trajectories will be close together, and there will be a tendency
for "clumps" of balloons to travel across Russia. It is imperative, therefore,
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that every effort be made to minimize this clumping by maximizing the
initial spacing of the balloons, and thereby make them follow independent
trajectories. This is especially true in the case under consideration,
in which we are attempting to cram as many balloons as we can into as short
a time as possible.
There are several ways in which this can be done. One such method would
be to spread them far enough apart in time to insure independence, and the
second would be to spread them far enough apart in space. Due to the fact
that the area along the Greenwich meridian between 60?N and 70?N was found
to be the most suitable launching line for a balloon survey of Russia, there
will be a basic limitation to the spacing possible. Time spacing will be at
a premium because of our desire to get the balloons across Russia in a short
time. Some compromise will therefore have to be worked out. Based on
assumptions about the persistence of the local wind vector, and the normal
distribution of streamlines in the atmosphere, we have set up the following
constraints on the space and time distribution of balloon launchings:
1. All stations (both land and sea) will be located between
60?N and 70?N.
2. The north-south spacing between stations will be no less
than the useful width of the strip which is photographed
from the balloon. This is to allow for the worst case of
balloons launched at the same time from different stations
having parallel trajectories. In this case there would be
no overlap of photographed strips.
3. No more than 2 balloons/hour will be launched from each
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station. There is no objective basis for this number.
It is considered that if the trajectories do not fan out
rapidly from a station there should not be too many
balloons flying one behind the other, and if there is a
tendency to fan out there should still be enough vehicles
in the air t o do the job.
For this short duration, intense campaign, we will assume the following
two daily launching rates as being representative of "reasonable" and "extreme"
levels of operation:
o 200 total launchings per favorable day.
o 500 total launchings per favorable day.
Let us examine what the above constraints mean in terms of space dis-
tribution of launching stations.
TABLE II
Number and Arrangements of Launching Sites
Balloons/day
favorable for
launching
Width of strip
photographed
from balloon
Number
of stations
needed
Number possible
along a north-
south line
Number of
north-south
lines needed
200
100 miles
10
8
1
60 miles
10
12
1
500
100 miles
25
8
3
60 miles
25
12
2
It can be seen almost immediately, from the above table, that one would be
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inclined to disregard the 500/day case due to the tremendous logistics
problem that would be involved in maintaining 25 launching stations. More-
over, it is felt that, despite any spacing imaginable, we are still limited
to an area approximately 100 on a side, and launching 500 balloons a day
into this relatively small area can only result in a severe concentration
of vehicles, which would mean many pictures of the same strip. For the
sake of completeness, however, we shall continue to carry this case through
the next section on costing.
Cost of the Intensive Campaign
Bef ore tabulating the cost let us set down the approximate duration of
the launching operation. As stated previously, consideration of the climate
of the North Atlantic and northwestern Europe indicates that both on sea m d
land about half of the days will be favorable for launching.
TABLE III
Approximate Duration of Launching Operation
Total Number of Balloons in Campaign
Balloon/day
1000
2000
4000 6000
10,000
200
10 days
20
40
60
100
500
4
8
16
24
40
The table below lists the campaign requirements including dollar costs,
equipment amounts, and personnel. It should be noted that, as in the previous
report, the costs considered here are only the explicit costs of the
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expendable gear, the specially procured ground equipment, and the-costs of
operating the recovery aircraft. Actually, the total cost to the Department
of Defense will be much more, since there will be an extensive training
program (as indicated by the number of specially trained personnel), recovery
aircraft and launching facilities to allocate and maintain, and the cost of
transporting such a complex task force. These are not included in the dollar
costing, but are indicated in the calculations and should be kept in mind
when contemplating the level of effort required to mount a campaign of a
given size.
In an effort to integrate all the material, a set of "ground rules" by
which the campaign requirements were estimated are also given. In essence
they reiterate the pertinent information presented in the preceding sections.
We will make one more basic assumption before starting: The campaign
is run using hydrogen, and the hydrogen is procured by generation at the
launching site.
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TABLE IV
Campaign Requirements for 200 Balloons/Day Favorable for Launching
Total Number of Balloons
Launched in C ai
Requirements
1000
'2000
4000
6000
10,000
1. Total number of launching stations
10
10
10
10
10
2. Number of balloons launched per
20
20
20
20
20
station per day
3. Number of launching crews and
20
20
20
20
20
associated gear required
4. Cost of gas generating equipment
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
(millions of dollars)
5. Recovery aircraft which must be in
40
40
40
40
40
air each day when weather permits
6. Total force of recovery aircraft
68
68
68
68
68
7. Total number of days of recovery
17
27
47
67
107
operation
8. Approximate total number of flying
6800
9720
16920
21120
} 38520
hours spent on recovery missions
9. Cost of operating and maintaining
3.4
4.9
8.5
12
19.3
the aircraft (millions of dollars)
10. Total explicit cost of non-
8.7
10.2
13.8
17.3
24.6
expendable equipment and operation
of recovery aircraft (millions of
dollars)
U. Cost of balloon and associated
8.35
16.7
33.4
50.0
83.5
expendable gear (millions of
dollars)
12. Total explicit cost (millions of
17.15
26.9
47.2
67.3
107.9
dollars)
13. Number of specially trained
568
568
568
8
56
568
personnel for launching, tracking
.
and recovery
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Campaign Requirements for 500 Balloons/bay Favorable for Launching
Requirements
1. Total number of launching stations
2. Number of balloons launched per 20
station per day
3. Number of launching crews and 50
associated gear required
4. Cost of gas generating equipment 12.5
(millions of dollars)
5. Recovery aircraft which must be in 1 100
the air each day when weather permit
6. Total force of recovery aircraft 170
7. Total number of days of recovery 11
operation
8. Approximate total number of flying 9900
hours spent on recovery missions
9. Cost of operating and maintaining 5.0
the aircraft (millions of dollars)
10. Total explicit cost of non- 18.25
expendable equipment and operation
of recovery aircraft (millions of
dollars)
11. Cost of balloon and associated 8.35
expendable gear (millions of
dollars-)
12. Total explicit cost (millions of f 26.55
dollars)
13. Number of specially trained 11360
personnel for launching, tracking
and recovery
Total Number of Balloons
Launched in Campaign
I 2000
I )4000
I 6000
10,000
25
1 25
1 25
25
20
20
20
20
50
So
50
12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
100
100
100
100
170
170
170
170
1000
25
15 23 31 47
13500
6.8
20700
10.4 1
27900 f
14.0
42300
21.2
19.95
23.55
27.151
34.35
16.7
33.4
50.0
83.5
36.65
fl
56.95{
77.15
127.85
1360
1360 1360 1360
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SUMMARY OF RULES FOR CALCULATING THE CAMPAIGN REQUIREMENTS
Items 1 Maximum number of balloons launched from a station not to
and 2 exceed 20/day.
Item 3 It is assumed that two launching crews of four men each
could launch 2 balloons/hour for a 10 hour day.
Item 1; It is assumed that a gas generation unit capable of supplying
20 balloons per day would cost $500,000. It should be noted
that it was also assumed that the land stations would use this
generator, whereas there is a possibility of obtaining the gas
commercially at $100 per launching. If this is true, the gas
cost for land launching will be a very small fraction of the
cost as assumed.
Item 5 The number of aircraft on patrol is kept at a level to insure
recovery of peak flow through network (number of balloons launched
per day), at an assumed rate of 5 recoveries/aircraft/day.
Item 6 To take into account preventive maintainence and aborts, 1.7
aircraft are needed for every aircraft required in operation.
Item 7 It is assumed that the recovery operation will start three days
after the first balloon is released, and end ten days after the
last balloon is launched.
Item 8 Each operational aircraft flies, on the average, a daily ten hour
mission. The operation lasts for the number of days as given.
Ten percent of the time the aircraft are grounded due to weather,
an average for the network.
Item 9 Fuel, oil, maintenance, and depreciation of the aircraft cost about
$500 for each flying hour.
Item 10 The average launching equipment cost per crew (on sea or on land)
is assumed equal to $10,000. Gas generation costs are as given.
A DF tracking network (ground) is used to first pick up the
balloons. This consists of four stations and has a total cost
of $200,000
Item 11 Each complete set of flying gear (balloon, gondola, etc.) costs
about $8350. None are recovered in time to be used over again in
one campaign.
Item 12 Sum of items 10 and U.
Item 13 Four men per launching crew. Two men per launching crew for
readying the gondola. Ten men per DF tracking station, and four
stations. Six trained men on each recovery aircraft, and the
same number of crews as total aircraft.
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CONCLUSIONS
With the information contained in the above section., it is now possible
to evaluate the feasibility of increasing the launching and recovery rate.
Let us first compare the cost in dollars and the requirements in trained
men and aircraft needed for the short duration "high intensity" campaign
and the 100 day campaign originally proposed. This is done in the following
table:
Suirmmary of Campaign Requirements
Total No. of Balloons in Campaign
1000
2000
1.000 6000 10,000
Type of
at
200/
at
500/
in
100
at
200/
at
500/
in
100
at
200/
at
500/
in
100
at at in
200/ 500/ 100
at
200/
at
500/
campaign
day
day
days
day
day
days
day
day
days
day day days
day
day
Trained men
628
1510
11.8
628
1510
151
628
1510
232
628 1510 316
628
1510
needed
Explicit
17.2
26.6
13
26.9
36.7
21
47.2
57.0
41
67.3 77.2 62
108
127.21
total dollar
costs
(millions)
of dollars
Aircraft
68
170
17
68
170
17
68
170
28
68 170 140
68
170
needed
No of days
needed to
10
4
100
20
8
100
40
16
100
60
211 100
100
40
complete
launchings
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00
days.
520
103
70
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As can be seen, in the short duration campaign we fix the launching rate,
and this immediately fixes the size of the launching and recovery establish-
meets, regardless of the total number of balloons launched. As may be
imagined, this is wasteful for small total numbers of balloons, but is
effective in cutting down on the total time involved. It is surprising
to note that dollar costs are not further apart for the various campaigns.
However, we must remember that this is only the explicit cost (which is mainly
dependent on the total numbers launched), and does not accurately reflect the
total cost of a campaign requiring a given force level (aircraft, ships, men,
etc.). It should be noted that the reason for disagreement between the
10,000 balloon, 100 day campaign and the 10,000 balloon,200/day campaign,
which also takes 100 days, is due to the original assumption that the former
is run from only one launching station. The main differences between the
systems are then:
o As can be seen from the table, the level of effort in
terms of trained personnel and aircraft is much higher
for the short duration campaign, and this will contribute
to a much higher total cost to the Defense Department,
o The logistic problems are much greater for the short
duration campaign because of the multiple launching sites,
and would tend to completely rule out the 500 balloons/
favorable day case.
We may conclude then that a short duration campaign (200 balloons/favorable
day) is feasible but would require a high level of efforto
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If 1i17cIu51i!is 8fd Cvithc~rnWi air not attached ihla
cl.ts>ifi;::.Uon Of this c6rras po ld I Cc t II be
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W. W. Kellogg &
S.- Greenfield
Rand
1700 MAIN STREET
SANTA MONICA, CA.90406
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SECIJRLIYI INFORMATION
`U14 RY OF A REVISED ST1J)Y
PIONEER PHOTO RECONU N B-LLDON (S)
12-5-52
I. COST VS- COVERAGE
A, Coverage vs- Number of Ba.llcoons Launched
The Gopher system is basically limited to pioneer reconnaissance.
altering the launching point and by trajectory forecasting it should be possible
to improve the coverage of specific areas in Western Russia, but the trajectories
are not sufficiently controllable to eliminate the essential randomness of the
coverage pattern. Therefore, the "total coverage" is considered as a fraction
of the entire area of Russia which could be photographed, with no weighting of
specific-areas for their military or economic importance,
In Fig, la is shown the total coverage of the whole of Russia west of longi-
tude 100.E as a function of the number of Gopher balloons launched. (It would
probably be essentially the same for all of Russia, since'the completed tra-
jectories go all the way across the country.) In calculating this total coverage
account has been taken of the statistical distribution of the trajectories (Figs.
2, 3, 4 and 5), the degradation due to hours of darkness and cloud cover, which
varies from place to place (Fig, 6), and an overall operational loss of 50 per-
cent, or one balloon recovered for every two launched.
The total coverage is probably somewhat dependent on the launching point,
since, as can be seen from Figs. 3, 4, and 5, the statistical distribution of
the coverage by a certain number of "effective balloons" shifts with the launchiA
point, and this will bring different degradation factors to bear. The compu-
tation presented here should be considered as approximate only, and the coverage
might be improved slightly by chasing an optimum launching point or by using q
NOTICFA TNIS MATt*IAL CONTAINS INFORMATION
AFRECTIi. TNt NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNrTED
*rATtf WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE
LAW" TW%s t. U.I.C.. SECTIONS 793 AND 794.
THE TMN{NflSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN
ART H*KIBR TO AN UNAUTHOiIIZED PERSON IS
rRO018=9 By LAW. BafAAB RRt r.-rwi
TOP C~O]PY NO. ------ I--------- OF _ . .. tt
T
` y
T
1. f I . 'yI I
cro 1
~~LJ~ti1~ 1 , ~ ~ 1 1 1 ~ 1 A f I a N IExempte~ from nutdtn:~t. c do wrtgrading.
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SECS sITY INFORMATION
multiple .Launching Points.
It should be pointed out that the coverage is relatively poor in the
northern part of Russia due, to the long darkness and the frequent cloud cover.
This will always be true in winter, which is the only time when the winds are
favorable below about 80,000 feet, The degradation factors shown in Fig, 6 were
estimated for Jknuary' 15 conditions, based on hours of daylight between sunrise
and sunset and the Air Weather Service study prepared for Project "Hope Chest,"
They will definitely improve toward the and of the period, which may be around
the vernal equip r in the latter part of March.
B. Coat vs- Nmnber of Mlloons tweed
The 'explicit cost of launch(" a specified number of balloons in one
season's operation has been estimated, taking into account the purchasing of
certain special fixed equipment (such as hydrogen generators, tracking stations,
eta.) as well as the expeble equipment, and including the cost of operation
of the recovery aircraft. The dollar coating does not include the cost of
training and maintaining the military personnel, the cost of the launching bass
(whether aircraft carrier or ground base ), the initial cost of the recovery air-
craft, or the cost of transporting the task force. The probable coat as a function
of number of balloons launched is shown in Fig. lb, and a more detailed cost break-
down is given below.
It will be noted that the explicit cost of the non-expenddble equipment
which has to be specially procured, plus the cost of the aircraft recovery oper-
ation, seems to be about one-fifth of the-cost of the expendible equipment over
most of the range, This is due to the fact that, for an operation of more than
" "Areal and Altitudinal Variations of Cloud Conditions Favorable for Visual
Photo-Reconnaissance Operations over Eurasia," H s., Air Weather Service,
Directorate of Climatology, October, 1952 (SECRET),
T Z SECR
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SEUL : s'~ INFORMATION
-3-
about 2000 balloons in a season, the launching and recovery costs will proba-
b3y go up almost linearly with the number of balloons, The major part of the
non-expenadblo cost comes from the lifting gas generation and the coat of
operating the recovery aircraft (mostly the latter),
The problem of supplying enough lifting gas to operate thousands of large
balloons (about 20,000 ft3 per balloon at S,T.P,) is a very grave one, and it
appears that the most satisfactory solution from a logistios standpoint is to
manufacture it on the spot and to store only a limited amount (say, one to two
days of operation. However, the generating equipment is expensive, and the
best estimate seems to be $50,000 dollars for each 1000 ft3 per hour generating
capacity for the first 10,000 ft3 per hour capacity, with a decrease in this
figure-as the capacity increases still further. (A very large .75 i 106 ft3 per
hour plant, for example, was built at a cost of 1.7 s 106 dollars, which amounts
to about 2,300 dollars for each 1000 ft3 per hour capacity.)* To this must be
added the cost of the compressing and storage equipment. To transport very large
amounts of hydrogen from an industrial plant will mean procuring large quantities
of tanks (either trailers or tank cars), and this would result in a saving in
gas generating cost but a large logistics cost. There is, or course, the possi-
bility that a land based launching site could be established within piping distance
of an existing generating plant, which would out the gas cost tremendously. For
a shipboard launching operation it appears that generation on the spot and limited
storage would be the only practical way for a large operation.
This matter will require much more study, and such a study would include a
* "Lifting Gas Requirements of a Balloon Delivery System," Aaron. Rea, labs.,
General Mills, Inc., Rapt. No,. 1073, 21 March 1952 (SECRET).
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a survey of available hydrogen in Europa, especially in England, An excellent
preliminary survey of the problem of gas supply has been prepared by General
Mills, Inc.
It will be noted that the costing has been carried out separately for a land
or a carrier based launching site. The difference in explicit cost between the
two appears to be very small, however, since the larger cost of the lifting gas
aboard a carrier is approximately offset by the cost of the launching facilities
(wind screens, eta.) on land., The modifications required to make a carrier of the
CVE type or seaplAne tender fit for this operation would consist primarily of
providing hydrogen generators and storage tanks aboard, and the difficulty of
doing this has not been determined. For the smaller scale of effort, where, for
ezample, a 2000 balloon operation would require a gas generation capacity of
about 20,000 ft3 per hour, plus a 2 x 106 ft3 storage, it is estimated that such
an installation would cost in the order of $600,000.
A carrier launching base is very attractive for a number of reasons. The
primary advantage of such a platform is the ease with which a balloon can be
inflated in winds up to the cruising speed of the carrier. The creation of a
no-wind condition permits a vertical launching, which is by far the most reliable
method. (A vertical launching probably requires less than 4 knots of with against
the balloon, even with a "reefing tube," and this is hard to obtain on land, A
second advantage of a carrier is the security of the operation,
It is urged that the use of carrier launching bases be considered in more
detail than has been done here, in order to determine whether it would in fact
be as advantageous as it appears at first sight,
* "Lifting Gas Requirements of a Balloon Delivery System," Aaron. Res, Labs.,
General Mills, Inc., Rept. No. 1073, 21 March 1952 (SECRET).
' ?A
G UP SECT T
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Eansndable Eauiument
A reasonable estimate of the components of the Gopher package and their
coat is as follows:
o 73 ft diameter, 2 mil laminated balloon,
complete with.linea, appendix, etc. (lay
be somewhat less in large production
quantities.)
o Gondola (Developed by Stanley Aviation Co.;
the cost is based on procurement in lots
of 3000 and would be lose in larger
quantities. )
$1400
4500
o cameras (still being developed by Eastman, 1500
under contract with Photo Iab., WADC;
5 cameras per flight; 3" focal length
lens, 4 1/2" x 4 3/2" negatives.)
0 Film 100
o Solar elevation angle recorder (Developed by 500
Eastman, under subcontract from Stanley
Aviation. Probably somewhat leas in large
quantities.)
a Hydrogen peroiide, 150 lbs. 150
o Government furnished equipment
(parachutes, dye markers, etc.)
T Total cost $8350
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2,
The items which must be speoially procured or turned over to the project are
listed below, with a cost attached where an estimate is possible. The costs of
transporting supplies, of maintaining the launching base, and of training and
maintaining special personnel do not show up in the dollar coating, though they
maybe fairly large items.
o launching base (An aircraft carrier of
the CVE type, a seaplane tender, or
a land base; one such base could be
sufficient to launch over 10,000
balloons in a 3 to 4 mop period,)
o Recovery aircraft (Presumably of C-119
type; number will'depend on-density
of balloons, since each aircraft can
probably make about 5 recoveries, on
the average, per day.)
o Operation of recovery aircraft (A rough $500/flying hour
costing which estimates the expenditure
for fuel, maintenance) and aircraft
depreciation.)
o launching equipment per launching crew:
Carrier bass $1000
land Base $20,000
w S
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i ~, N_1 k'+1 .rr s
o Equipment at launching base for monitoring $10,000
and out-dawn
o Gas generating and storage equipment (Be- Sam:
quired for a carrier base, which can Minimum of $500,000
probably only store about 2 x 106 ft3 Maz4"um of $1,000,000
or the equivalent of 10 railway tank
cars. For a land bass the generator
can be reduced in capacity with larger
storage facilities, or can be eliminated
entirely if the bass is close to an
industrial generating plant. )
jam: $100 per
inflation
o Recovery DF stations (Four required as $5,000 - adoock
minimum. It is not yet decided whether
$25,000 to $50,000 -
adoock type will be adequate, but it will rhombic
probably not be. For this costing,
assumed $200,000 for initial cost of net-
work. )
3,, Trained Personnel
The military personnel which must be specially trained for the operation (in
addition to bass and maintenance personnel) are as follows (no further breakdown
in terms of MS or rank is attempted here):
o launching, per crew:
Carrier base
land bass
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VEV'J.Li1~!i t?i~~~~l
o Loading and checking gondola, per crew
o DF stations, per station
o Recovery aircraft, per crew
2
10
6
4,0 g?ar?,m a sm Asssumtions
The following rules have been established to permit the costing to be carried
through. The various factors have been estimated from the best available in-
formation, but they are necessarily approximate, The whole operation period is
taken as 100 days.
o Launching:
Carrier B&ga
50 percent of days have
favorable weather (winds
20 knots)
10 hra, available for launching
on each favorable day (must
steam back upwind)
1/2 hr. required per launching
Can. store 2 x 106 ft3 of lifting
gas. Can generate for 20 hrs..
per day every day, and can
launch the full quota of
balloons oiioii day for an in-
definite period.
50 percent of days have
favorable weather
10 hrs. available for launching
on each favorable day
1/2 hr. required per launching
Cost of gas is $100 per launch-
ing, which implies an
industrial source for the
gas and a nominal cost for
the transporting (or piping)
of
the gas to all the launching
sites.
EGRET
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o Recovery (See Fig. 9 )s
Aircraft grounded due to weather 10 percent of
time (an average for the network).
Each operational aircraft flies a 10 hour mission,
and attempts to recover an average cf 5 gondolas
per mission.
There must be enough aircraft in the air each
operational day to recover the total number
launched per operational day, i.e. they may
come in clusters, and there must be sufficient
aircraft in the air to handle the 'macimum flta.
It will usually not be possible to predict the
flay of balloons through the network. For the
smaller operation (less than about 2000 balloons)
each aircraft will be able to take care of a
sector about 500 miles long, and this will re-
quire a minimum of nine aircraft flying each day.
As the operation becomes larger the force must be
increased to maintain the average of five re-
coveries per mission.
There are four bases for the recovery aircraft
(roughly, Okinawa, Tokyo, Shenya, Nome).
One third are out for maintenance at all tines,
plus one or two standby aircraft to replace
aborts.
E CRET
ILW
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SEA R1 Y I,1FURMT1ON
There are as mater crews as there are aircraft,
which permits each crew almost every other
day off (about four missions per week).
No aocount has been taken of attrition of air
craft.
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II.
It will be impossible to keep a full scale Gopher operation (over 500
to 1000 balloons) a secret. First, a certain number will be seen, since the
balloon is visible to the naked eye, and some will probably be detected by
radar. Then, in spite of all precautions, it is quite certain that a few will
come down in enemy territory, and experience in the U.S. has shim that there
will usually be spotted and recovered. It must therefore be assumed that the
full intent of our reconnaissance effort will be revealed soon after it begins.
It is necessary to try to guess what the enemy may be able to do physically
to prevent the operation from ocatinning. In what follows, there is no discussion
of the political or psychological reaction of the U.S.S.R, and of the rest of the
world,
A. Sa~gd of the to n: SSi?te
If a violent reaction is anticipated, then the operation would
probably not be-undertaken at all in peacetime. However, it would obviously be
necessary to take measures to prevent attempts to sabotage the launching site if
it were on land. A carrier should be immune from amything but an overt and
fairly large scale attack.
B. Destr notion of the Vehicle
The effects of energy weapons on the Gopher balloon has not been de-
termined. There are only a few facts which can be inferred from what little is
known about Russian weapon capabilities.
o An extensive manned visual observation network, the observers
being equipped with binoculars, could spot the balloons
J1111i l 1:+~'i ~
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on clear days. This would mean a relatively low spotting
efficiency in western Russia, because only about one day
in five to seven, on the average, would be sufficiently
clear.
o The Russian V radars my be able to track the present Gopher
gondolas because of their antennas, the radar cross section
being roughly as big as a bomber. 1forowave radars, judging
from eakperience in the U.S., would not be able to track them
successfully. (It may be practical to retract the balloon
antennas in flight over Russia, since they are not being
used then, and this should be investigated.)
o If a balloon flies at an altitude below a fighter's ceiling, then
it can probably be shot down (though it has not been tried yet).
The Resent Gopher altitude of 60,000 to 70,000 feet is at
least 5000 feet above the ceilings of any Russian fighters which
have been reported in combat in Korea, even if these were
equipped with afterburners. In the next two years the ceilings
of operational fighters may be raised to 60,000 to 70,000 feet,
ath, if there is evidence that this has happened, it would be
necessary to use a larger Gopher balloon which could fly higher
(at an increase in cost),
o Anti-aircraft of the conventional type could not be effective
against these balloons.
T, r1, ECP
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o Anti-aircraft type rockets with some sort of guidance could be
very effective against these balloons. The cost of bringing
down the large number of balloons which is visualized would,
however, be considerably more than the cost of the Gopher
system, and this factor could be further increased by the
use of balloon decoys. It seems probable, also, that there
would be some time lag for the procurement of suitable missiles
and setting up launching sites over a wide area, and the recon-
naissance operation might be completed before the missile defense
system could be brought up to a level of great effectiveness;
C. HIMering the Ran
The recovery network should be set as close to the cost of Asia as
possible in order to shorten the required duration of the balloons, However, this
makes it possible for the enempr to hinder the recovery effort in certain ways.
There is the possibility that the recovery aircraft would be attacked, If
this were the case, the recovery network would have to be moved back, since there
would be no practical way of protecting it.
A more likely enemy countermeasure is the jamming of the balloon DF network,
which, as it is now designed, receives CW signals at frequencies between about
3 and 15 ABC. It would be impractical. to increase the beacon power beyond about
5 (or possibly 10) watts, due to the limited power available in the gondola's
batteries. There are methods which might improve the reception in the presence
of jamming, one being the use of a pales interrogation system, where the ground
station triggers a HF pulse transmitter in the balloon. This also has the virtue
of giving range as well as azimuth. The cost of such a system would probably be
greater, however, and the components have not been developed.
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A more simple "quick fix" to overcome eneiq jamming would be the exclusive
use of the VHF beacon on the balloon, in conjunction with VHF'-DF receivers on
the recovery aircraft. This would give a potential range of some 200 to 300
miles to the aircraft (as compared to about 1000 for the HF ground based system),
and this would almost be sufficient to permit an aircraft to locate the balloons
in its sector of operation, even without the help of the ground network. Develop-
ment of a VHF pulse interrogation system for the aircraft would make this scheme
work very well, since then a single aircraft could get a complete fix on each
balloon which it could contact.
ECJ= QTY IN RI'1ATION
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III. SPECIAL RECD :JDATIONS
A. Central Balloon Authority
The development of a balloon system of any kind will require
the coordination of a large number of functions, and there seers to be general
agreement among those who are working with the balloon development program
that such coordination will require a central authority, presumably at the
level of the JCS. Such an organization should have control aver:
o Research and development on the balloon vehicle
o Balloon launching facilities
o Radio tracking networks
o Recovery facilities
o Planning for the use of the balloon as an operational
vehicle, e.g., design of the gondola, processing of
reconnaissance films, SOP for B'rd dispersal, etc.
B. Use of Available and Tested Components for Gopher in an Orerational
Service Test
The consensus of opinion is that, with one possible exception,
the ecmponents of the Gopher systeLi have been developed to the point here an
operation could get underway now with a good chance for success. Techrnieally,
the system is feasible. The one possible exception is the air-snatch recovery
technique, which has been successfully demonstrated but not yet proven.
The 73-foot diameter balloon (about 200,000 ft3 volume) can lift the
present Gopher gross load of 1500 lbs to an initial altitude of about 58,000
feet. With the components as they now are there will be about 700 to 900 lbs
of ballast. The probable daily loss of lift for such a balloon, equipped with
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an improved type of appendix is about 6 to 7 per cent due to change in super-
heat (for a quasi-constant altitude flight, not taking advantage of the ther-
modynamic stability of a balloon) and, at most, 2 per cent for leakage. Such
performance would give an endurance at altitude of about ten days. This pro-
vides a good margin of safety over the minimum required, which is about six
days.
To show more clearly how such a balloon would perform, refer to Fig. 7.
The daily loss of 8 per cent of the gross load remaining will result in a
steady lightening of the weight on the balloon, so at each sunrise it will
rise higher (assuming an air-tight appendix on the balloon). The initial alti-
tude of 58,000 feet will only last until the first sunrise following a sunset,
and each day it will rise from 1500 to 2000 feet, ending up at about 74,000 feet
on the tenth day. Fig. 8 shows the performance of a rather poor balloon, with
15 per cent daily lose of lift. Such a balloon will show the same rise in
altitude, but will only last for about six days. In this diagram is also
shown the behavior of NH3 as a "ballast." If some convenient and lightweight
means can be devised for allowing it to vaporize from a liquid form into the
balloon each night, then the performance of even such a "poor" balloon could
be stretched to about eight (possibly nine) days.
The performance described above can be achieved without any major develop-
ment in balloon design, but by merely fixi._; on the best features of balloons
which have already flown successfully. It is reasonably certain that the Univei-
sity of Minnesota and General Mills, Inc., will in the course of their further
research learn to improve balloon performance still more, but it is not neces-
sary to postulate such further advances in order to guarantee success.
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The performance of the present Gopher gondola is not yet proven, but
there does not appear to be anything basiely inadequate in it. The radio
beacons will require more power than they now have, and the special purpose
cameras are still being developed, but both of these deficiencies will be
remedied in time.
The generation of hydrogen poses a serious cost constraint on the system
if there are not large local sources. This is particularly serious for ship-
board launchings, but may also be a problem ashore. However, here again the
technical knowhow certainly exists, and it is primarily a problem of procure-
A satisfactory launching technique for the large Gopher balloons, per-
mitting an operation on land in winds over 4 to 5 knots, has not been developed.
The methods which are now being used generally involve some handling of the
balloon, and the manufacturer feels that this is undesirable. An operation
from a carrier would avoid this very serious handicap by permitting a vertical
launching, and this is probably the method which will insure the greatest reli-
ability of the balloon.
The question of the recovery technique is not so clear. The tests to
date at.Z1 Centro of the air-snatch shows that a trained pilot can get his
hook into the parachute between 80 and 90 per cent of the time, and that the
parachute and aircraft gear can be built to stand the shock, even with 300 to
400 lbs hanging on the parachute. However, of all the components in the system,
this is the least well-proven, and, since it is so crucial to the overall
success, it should be urged that the test program of the air-snatch recovery
be given more support.
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It is recommended, therefore, that, if a Gopher operation is desired,
the initial emphasis be placed on an operational service test ng of the
complete system (over the U.S.), with research and development of components
being continued at the same time. This would provide:
o A means for testing new components under operational c onditions.
o A training program for the launching, tracking, and recovery
crewse
o A means for properly assessing. the overall utility of the system?.
C. Worldwide 1.ioby Dick
One of the chief advantages of the balloon reconnaissance system
is that, on the face of it, it is not an instrument of aggression. There will
be objections from the enegy, to be sure, but it can be argued that we have
no conurol over the course of our balloons, and that they operate in an air
space which is too high to endanger enemy aircraft operations and which is,
in a sense, public domain.
In order to establish this contention to the world, it could be well to
avoid the impression that there is a covert activity connected with our
balloon operation, and the best way to avoid t -is is to give. it fill publicity
under a different guise. It is likely that the enemy will not be fooled by
this, but it will provide a valuable "talking point" for propaganda purposes.
The different guise is obviously geophysical research. The 14oby Dick
project has already been given publicity, and there is no obvious reason why
it should not be considered for a worldwide project. A suggested course of
action would be:
MFORMATION
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I WW W L. SFCU 1TY 4NF R I1A11ON
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o Propose to the International Meteorological Organization
(IMO) that the upper air radiosonde network be supplemented
by an upper air trajectory network. There are many sound
reasons why data on upper air trajectories would be valuable
to meteorologists. The flight equipment would be provided
by the U.S., and all that would be required of the other
participating countries would be tracking by radio DF networks.
(These are probably already in existence, as are our own ARCS
and FCC networks.) The European countries should be willing to
cooperate, since so little effort is required on their parts.
The U.S.S.R. is also officially a member of the IMO, and would
be asked to participate.
o Moby Dick gear with increased duration would be launched, then,
and these would in some cases go for every great distances. With
a six to eight day duration a good fraction will pass half way
around the world. If the Russians find these (as they surely
would) it would be clear what they are. (They would be iden-
tified by labels in various languages stating their mission,
plus the clear intent of the telemetering equipment.)
o The enemy would possibly try to shoot these down. 'Perhaps this
should be encouraged by setting the flight altitude at between
40,000 to 50,000 feet, so that his fighter aircraft would be
effective with a large operational effort on his part,
o When the Gopher gondolas begin to be interspersed with the
Moby Dick gondolas, these would fly higher and would be less
susceptible to his weapons. Some would come dam, however, and
T ET
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the presence of the cameras could be explained as a project
to study cloud formations and to detem.ne, in retrospect,
the path of the balloon-since the U.S.S.R. had been uncoopera-
tive in supplying the tracking information requested of them.
o The Russians will recognize thIs tongue-in-cheek attitude, since
they adopt it so frequently themselves. However, it may suffi-
ciently confuse the basic issue so that they will have difficulty
in making valid their claims of aggression on the part of the
?J?
Note: The above is partly the outcome of a discussion with Major Thomas 0. Haig,
Geophysical Research Division, AFCRC, the Moby Dick Project Officer.
: S rE R E T
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MEW
Fig.9
The recovery network, showing
the approximate patrol areas of
the aircraft from the four bases
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