PROJECT RAND: CASE STUDIES OF ACTUAL AND ALLEGED OVERFLIGHTS, 1930-1953

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00708R000500090001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 321
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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U. S. AIR FORCE
PROJECT RAND
RESEARCH MEMORANDUM
CASE STUDIES OF ACTUAL AND
ALLEGED OVERFLIGHTS, 1930-1953 (s)
A. L. George
RM-1349
15 August 1955
,,2
^^
Copy No. V
This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18 U.S.C., jets. 793 and 794, the transmission or thy:
revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
This is a working paper. Because it may be expanded, modified, or withdrawn
at any time, permission to quote or reproduce must be obtained from RAND.
The views, conclusions, and recommendations expressed herein do not neces-
sarily reflect the official views or policies of the United States Air Force.
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS
Not suitable for distribution to industrial contractors
or commercial organizations.
Not suitable for distribution by the Armed Services Technical
Informatiot., Agency (ASTIR), Authority AFR 205-43.
43-
Review for declassification on i_
r J
4e R~IID..
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FOREWORD
RM-1349
ii
This Research Memorandum is one of a series of four that
report the results of an. investigation of Soviet reactions to
near and actual overflights in peacetime. Each of the four
deals with a particular aspect of the problem.
RM-1346, Soviet Reactions to Border Flights and Over-
flights in Peacetime (TOP SECRET , examines the purposes
behind Soviet military, diplomatic, and propaganda response
to alleged and actual violations of its borders in different
historical periods and in different strategic contexts.
RM-1347,. Diplomatic Aspects of Soviet Air-Defense Policy,
1950-1953 (SECRET, discusses some of the difficulties faced
by Western diplomacy in attempting to oppose effectively the
severe Soviet air-defense policy of the years 1950-1953. The
study examines in detail the ingenious. diplomatic formula
which the Soviets used to describe and justify their action
against planes that threatened to intrude upon their air space.
RM-1348, Intelligence Value of Soviet Notes on Air
Incidents. 1950-1951 (CONFIDENTIAL Y, applies the technique of
content analysis to-Soviet diplomatic notes-in an attempt to
infer the Soviet intentions behind each air incident and the
degree of concern felt by Soviet policy makers over the
possible political consequences of their action in each case.
RM-1349, Case Studies of Actual and Alleged Overflights,
1930-1953 (SECRET) and its Supplement (TOP SECRET), contain
the basic data on which the three preceding RMts are based.
All known cases of real or alleged overflight of another
country's air space during the period 1930-1953 have been
studied, including Soviet and Satellite overflights of non-
communist countries. The case studies contain considerably
more information about major-air incidents than appears in
any of the first three Research Memorandums.
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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . .....
1
CASE STUDIES: 1
1. Overflights of Japan (1930-1941) (C) . . . . . .
4
2. Air Violations in Japanese-Soviet Relations
(1931-1941) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
3. Polish and Rumanian Protests of Soviet
Overflights (September, 1938) (U) . . . . .
14
4. German Prehostilities Air Reconnaissance of
Soviet Territory Prior to Invasion on
June 22, 1941 (S) . . . . . . . . . . .
15
5. Soviet Violations of SCAP Air Regulations
Over Occupied Japan (1945-1947) (S) . . . . .
26
6. U.S. Navy Plane Fired upon by Soviet Plane
Off Port Arthur (October 15 1945) (C)
27
7. Soviet Violations of Air Regulations Over
Occupied Germany (1945-1946) (U) . . . . . . .
30
8. Soviet Fighter Planes Fire Warning Bursts at
U.S. Navy Plane Off Dairen
(February 20, 1946) (C) . ... . . . . . . . .
31
9. Soviet Protest Against Three U.S. Overflights
of Big Diomede Island (Bering Straits)
(Between March 8, 1946, and January 31, 1947)
(C)
35
10. Soviet Protest.-Against Alleged U.S. Air
Violation of Iranian-Soviet Border
(April 5, 1946) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
36
11. Soviet Harassment-of U.S. Flights in Vienna
Air Corridor (1946) (C) . . . . . . . . . . .
36
12. Two U.S. Military Planes Fired upon by Soviet
Fighter Planes Over Austria (April 22, 1946)
(U) .
39
13. Yugoslav-U.S. Air Incidents (August 9 and 19, 1946)
(S) . . . . . . . . . .
40
14. Soviet Plane in Forced Landing in U.S.-
Occupied South Korea (August 25, 1946) (U) . .
*
72
15.
Soviet Overflights of Swedish Territory
(August, 1946, and November, 1947) (U) . . . .
73
16. Turkish Planes Reported Missing After Overflight
of Soviet Border (September 9, 1946) (U) . . .
74
17. Yugoslav Military and Diplomatic Action Against
Alleged Greek Overflights (September to
'jecember, 1946) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
75
The symbol following the title of each case study
indicates its original classification. Case studies
that are not included in this volume will be discussed
in the TOP SECRET supplement to the present Research
Memorandum (RM-1349-S).
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18. British R.A.F. Plane Forced To Land by
Yugoslav Military Plane (October 5, 1946)
(U) .......
76
19. Soviet Request for Temporary Restriction on
U.S. Military and Civilian Flights Over
Czechoslovakia Hungary, and Rumania
(October, 19463 (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
78
20. Bulgarian Charge of Overflights by Unknown
Planes from Greece (December 1, 1946) (U) . .
79
21. U.S. Plane in Emergency Landing in Hungary
(December 1, 1946) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . .
80
22. Soviet Plane in Forced Landing in Greece
(December, 1946) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
80
23. Soviet Protest of Three Alleged U.S. Air
Violations in Far East (August 3, October 28,
October 29, 1947) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . .
81
24. Soviet Protest of U.S. Overflight of Big
Diomede Island (Bering Straits)
(December, 1947) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
82
25. Soviet Effort to Limit Allied Use of Vienna
Air Corridor (April, 1948) (U) . . . . . . . .
83
26. Air Collision of British and Soviet Planes
Over Gatow Airfield, Berlin (April 5, 1948)
(C) ....... ..............
85
27. Berlin Airlift (1948-1949) (U) . . . . . . . . . .
91
28. Soviet Overflights of Danish Island of
Bornholm (September 9, 1948) (S) . . . . . . .
95
29. U.S. Overflight of Amstettin in Soviet Zone
of Austria (November, 1948) (C) . . . . .
96
30. Soviet. Protests Against U.S. Air Surveillance
of Soviet Shipping in Sea of Japan and
Far East Waters (1948-1949) (C) ... . . . . .
97
31. Soviet Allegation of Finnish-U.S. Aerial
Photography of Soviet Border (March, 1949)
(C) . . . . .
100
32. Chinese-Communist Charges of French Air
Violations of Indochina Border (December,
1949, to October, 1950) (U) . . . . . . . . .
100
33. Soviet Protest to Iran Regarding Aerial
Photographs in Soviet-Iranian Frontier
Area (May 14 and June 22, 1950) (U) . . . . .
101
34. Soviet Protests Against Dropping of Colorado
Beetles by U.S. Planes (May 22 to June 7, 1950)
(U) . . . . .
103
35. Czech Protest Against Dropping of Colorado
Beetles by U.S. Planes (June-July, 1950) (U)' .
104
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36. Czech Protest Against U.S. Air Violations
(July, 1950) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
37. Soviet and East German Communist Propaganda
Charge that U.S. Planes Dropped
Incendiaries Over Eastern Germany
(July 19 and 27, 1950) (S) . . . . . . . . . . 106
38. Communist Charges of British Air Violations
in Hong Kong Area (August 16 and
September 4, 1950) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . 107
39. Alleged U.S. Overflights of Communist China
Prior to Chinese Intervention in Korean
War (August to November, 1950) (C) . . . . . . 107
40. Soviet Plane Shot Down Over Yellow Sea by
U.S. Navy (September 4, 1950) (S) . . . . . . 112
41. Alleged U.S. Air Violations of Czechoslovakia
(October, 1950, to January 15, 1951) (C) . . . 118
42. Soviet Charge that:U.S. Jet Fighter Buzzed
Soviet Passenger Plane Over Germany
(November.11, 1950) (U) 120
43. Czech Protest of Alleged U.S. Air Violations
(Mid-January to June, 1951) (U) . . . . . . . 121
44. U.S. Admission of Air Violation of Czechoslovakia
(February 7, 1951) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
45. Bulgarian Charge of Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish Plot
To Carry Out Air Reconnaissance; Albanian
Charge of Greek Overflights; Greek
Countercharges (March 2, April 10 and 25,
1951) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . 122
46. Czech Detention of Two U.S. Jet Fighter
Pilots (June 8, 1951) (C) . . . . . . . . . . 123
47. Swedish Overflights of Soviet Territory
(July 17 and 26, 1951) (S) . . . . . .. . . . . 124
48. Alleged Air Drop of U.S. Espionage Agents Into
the Moldavian Republic, U.S.S.R.
(Summer, 1951) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
49. Soviet Effort To Change Route of Vienna Air
Corridor (August 1951) (S) . . . . . . . . . 127
50. U.S. Protest of Soviet Overflights of Tempelhof
Airdrome in Berlin (August, 1951) (U) . . . . 128
51. Soviet Protest of Turkish Air Violation
(August 13, 1951) (C) . . . . . . . . . . 128
52. Alleged U.S. Overflight of Rumania for Espionage
Purposes (October 18, 1951) (U) . . . . . . . 129
53. U.S. Navy Plane Shot Down by Soviet Fighters
Off Vladivostok (November 6, 1951) (S) . . . . 131
54. The Ransom of U.S. Fliers by Hungary
(November-December, 1951) (S) . . . . . . . . 141
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55. Czech Overflights of U.S. Zone of Germany
(March 4, 1952) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
56. U.S. Navy Patrol Bomber Fired On Over China
Sea (April 1, 1952) (U) . . . . . ? . . . . 151
57. French Commercial Aircraft Attacked by Soviet
Fighters in Berlin Corridor (April 29, 1952)
(S) . . 151
58. Soviet Protest Against French Air Violation of
Berlin Air Corridor (May 8, 1952) (C) . . . . 164
59. Soviet Protest Against Alleged French Air
Violation of Berlin Corridor (May 12, 1952)
(C) . . 166
60. Soviet Protest of Alleged British Violation
of Berlin Air Corridor (May 18, 1952) (C) . . 166
61. British Protest Soviet Buzzing of Cargo Plane
in North Berlin Air Corridor (May 22, 1952)
(C) . . . . . . 167
62. Soviet Protests Against Alleged U.S. Air
Violations of East German Territory
(May 26 and June 7, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . 168
63. Soviet Fighters Buzz Plane Carrying U.S. High
Commissioner to.Austria (June 4, 1952) (C) . . 168
64. Albanian Protest of Italian Air Violations
(June 5, 12, and 14, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . . 169
65. Chinese Communist Charges of French Air
Violations Along Indochina Border
(June 6, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6b. Soviets Shoot Down Two Swedish Aircraft Over
the Baltic (June 13 and 16, 1952) (S) . . . . 171
67. Hungarian Protest Against Yugoslav Air
Violations (June 13 and 25, 1952) (C) . . . . 199
68. Soviet Protest of Two Alleged U.S. Air
Violations of East Germany (June 19, 1952) (U) 200
69. Yugoslav Protest Against Hungarian Air
Violations (June 23, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . . 201
70. Czech Protest of Air Violations by U.S. Planes
(June 24, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
71. Yugoslav Protest Against Hungarian Air
Violations (June 24 and 25, 1952) (C) . . . . 203
72. Albanian Protest Against Yugoslav Air Drop of
Propaganda Leaflets (June 25, 1952) (C) . . . 204
73. Czechs Charge Colorado Beetles Dropped by
Foreign Planes (June, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . 204
74. German Communist Charge that U.S. Plane Dropped
Colorado Beetles (June, 1952) (U) . . . . . . 205
75. U.S. Admission of Violation of Berlin Air
Corridor (June, 1952) (U) . . . . . . . . . . 20b
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76. Report of Overflight of West German
Territory by Four Czech Fighters
(June, 1952) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
207
77. Soviet Protest of Alleged Violation of East
German Border by British Fighter
(June, 1952) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
207
78. Overflights of Danish Isles in Baltic by
Unidentified Planes (July 1, 1952) (U) . . . .
208
79. Soviet Violation of Berlin Air--Corridor
Flight Rules (July 1, 1952) ,(C) . . . . . . .
208
80. Bulgarian Protest Against Turkish Air
Violation (July 2,1952) (C) . . . . . . . . .
209
81. Overflight of Bornholm (Danish) by Unidentified
Jet Bombers (July 12, 1952) (C) . . . . . . .
209
82. Yugoslav Charge of Soviet Overflight
(July 14, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
210
83. Soviet Protest Against U.S. and French
Violations of Berlin Air Corridor
(July 15, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
210
84. Soviet Protests Against Alleged Violation of
Vienna Air Corridor by U.S. Planes (July
16, 1952?- also June 10, 11, 24, and July
10, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
211
85. Soviet Anti-American Propaganda Utilizing Air
Incidents (July 27, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . .
212
86. Finnish Protest of British Overflight of
Naval Base (July, 1952) (U) . . . . . . . . .
215
87. Report of Soviet Overflight of West Germany
(British Zone) (July, 1952) (U) . . . . . . . .
215
88. Albanian Charge of Air Violations by Greece
and Yugoslavia (July 1952) (U) . . . . . . .
216
89. Soviet Protest of Air Violations by U.S. and
French Aircraft in Germany (July, 1952) (U)
216
90. Report of Five Czech Overflights of West
Germany (U.S. Zone) (July, 1952) (U) . . . . .
216,
91. Czech Protests of Alleged U.S. Air Violations
(July and August, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . . .
217
92. Soviet Air Reconnaissance of the Western
Hemisphere (1952-1953) (C) . . . . . . . . . .
218
93. Reported Disappearance of U.S. Observation
Plane in Northwest Pacific (August, 1952) (C)
223
94. Czech Allegation of Aerial Surveying and Dropping
of Colorado Beetles by U.S. Planes
(August, 1952) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
223
95. Soviet Protest of Alleged Violation of Eastern
Germany by a U.S. C-54 (Actually a
Belgian Sabena Plane) (September 8, 1952) (S)
224
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96. British R.A.F. Plane.in Emergency Landing
on U.S. Air Force Base at Thule,
Greenland (September, 1952) (U) . . . . . . .
226
97. U.S. Unmarked Hospital Plane Fired Upon by
Soviet Fighters in Berlin Corridor
(October 8, 1952) (S) . . . . . . . . . . .
227
98. Yugoslav Charge of Bulgarian Air Violations
(October 26, 1952) (U.) . . . . . . . . . . . .
240
99. Alleged Air Drop of U.S. Saboteurs Into
Poland (November 4, 1952) (U) . . . . . . . .
240
100. Yugoslav Charges of Air Border Violations
by Hungary (January 1 to April 30, 1953) (U) .
241
101. Czech Air Violations of Bavaria, West Germany
(February, 1953) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
242
102. U.S. F-84 Shot Down by Czech MiG (March 10, 1953)
(C) . . . . . .
242
103. British Lincoln Bomber Shot Down and Two
Other Planes Buzzed by Soviet MiG's
Over Germany (March 12, 1953) (S) . . . . . .
261
104. U.S. RB-50 Fired Upon by Soviet MiG's Off
Kamchatka (March 15, 1953) (S) . . . . . . . .
284
105. Alleged Air Drop of U.S. Espionage Agents
Into the Ukraine (April 25-26, 1953) (C) . . .
293
106. Alleged Violation of Hungarian Air Space by
Foreign Plane Dropping Hostile Propaganda
Leaflets (June 30, 1953) (C) . . . . . . . . .
294
107. Danish Plane in Forced Landing in East
Germany (July 6 1953) (U) . . . . . . . . . .
295
108. Soviet Protest of Alleged U.S. Leaflet Drops
Over Soviet Airfields Near Berlin
(July 18, 1953) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
109. Czech Diplomatic Protest Against U.S.
Propaganda Balloons (July 20, 1953) (C) . . . 298
110. Soviet I1-12 Shot Down by U.S. Fighters Over
North Korea (July 27, 1953) (U) . . . . . . . 301
111. U.S. RB-50 Shot Down by Soviet Fighters Off
Cape Povorotny (Near Vladivostok)
(July 29, 1953) (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
112. Yugoslav Fighter Pilot Defects in Plane to.
Italy (September 12, 1953) (U) . . . . . . . . 310
113. Photo Reconnaissance Plane of Unidentified
Nationality in Landing in Italy
(October 24, 1953) (U) . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
114. British Plane Fired Upon by Unidentified
Plane over Yugoslavia (December 31, 1953) (U) 311
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INTRODUCTION
RM-1349
1.
The present Research Memorandum and its TOP SECRET
supplement report case studias of a large number of actual or
alleged overflights which have occurred during the period 1930
to 1953.2 An effort has been made to collect detailed
information about as many cases as possible of peacetime
overflight, especially about those that occurred between the
end of World War II and December, 1953. Systematic research
on this kind of problem involves many difficulties, however,
and the present compendium is incomplete in several respects.
Not every ease of overflight has been covered, the information
obtained on many cases is sketchy, and, even when it is
reasonably complete, there often remain important unanswered
-- perhaps unanswerable -- questions.
Many classified and unclassified sources have been used,
as indicated in the text. Within USAF, the major source was
the classified operational files of the Reconnaissance
Branch, Operations and Commitments Division, Directorate of
Operations, DCS/O. Additional material on some points was
obtained from the Collection Operations Division, Deputy
Director for Collection and Dissemination, Directorate of
Intelligence, DCS/O. The United States Department of State
was extremely helpful in making available from its classified
For earlier overflights and their treatment see Oliver J.
Lissitzyn, "The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent
Practice and International Law.," The American Journal of
International Law," Vol. 47, No.. October, 1953).
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files materials that were useful for this study. At the time
the study was made, some of the relevant materials were in
use at the State Department and were not, therefore, available
to the writer. Very little classified material of any kind
has been seen for the period after early 1953; the case
studies of incidents occurring in 1953, therefore, are based
largely on open sources. Diplomatic notes on earlier
incidents issued during 1954 have been incorporated into the
analysis, but no new incidents occurring in 1954 have been
included.
There are several specific limitations in the coverage
of possible overflights which should be explicitly noted:
(1) Cases in which the Soviets or their Satellites have
charged the United States with espionage overflights have not
been checked against classified data on U.S. covert operations.
(2) Cases of real or alleged overflight of Communist China
after its entrance into the Korean war were excluded from the
compilation. (3) We have not had access to official records
of classified air operations that may have been conducted by
other Western countries (e.g., Britain, Sweden) during the
postwar period. (4) Our coverage of actual or alleged
violations of the Berlin and Vienna air corridors is undoubted-
ly incomplete. (5) The case study on Soviet reconnaissance
flights of the Western Hemisphere since 1952 is based solely
upon disclosures which have appeared from time to time in.the
American press.
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Despite its limitations and incompleteness, a compilation
such as the present one may be of some use to intelligence
analysts and policy planners as a reference handbook on air
incidents which have taken place in the past.
The immediate purpose of these studies, however, is to
provide detailed documentation and elaboration for the
analysis of various aspects.of Soviet policy toward, and
handling of, overflights and near overflights. The cases
included in this collection have been studied from the
viewpoint of interests and purposes that have motivated the
overall research project, the results of which have been
reported in RAND Research Memorandums 1346, 1347, and 1348.
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1j4.
1. OVERFLIGHTS OF JAPANS
(1930-1941)
When Soviet overflights of northern Japan were occurring
in the autumn of 1952, the Department of State requested the
U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to provide information on all air
incidents, and unauthorized overflights which had taken place
over Japan prior to World War II. The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo
replied that it was unable to furnish complete information
because many prewar U.S. Embassy records had been destroyed
during the war, and because the Japanese government itself
had only fragmentary records on the subject.
A survey of available records by the Japanese Minister of
Justice brought to light only five known incidents from 1930
to World War II. Four were emergency landings on fields other
than those designated. No legal action was instituted by the
Japanese government in those four cases; in fact, the govern-
ment gave utmost aid and co-operation to the personnel
involved.
The fifth incident was the flight of Pangborn and Herndone
in July-August, 1930. They entered Japan from Russia and
landed in Tokyo without a permit. It is possible that they
were. fined 1,000 yen.
American Embassy, Tokyo l to Department of State; circular
airgram October 20, 1972; CONFIDENTIAL. (Document
classifications given throughout these volumes are the
ones that obtained at the time the. documents were
consulted.)
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2. AIR VIOLATIONS IN JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS4
(1931-1941)
At the beginning of this period, Soviet leaders evidently
viewed as probable a Japanese attack upon the Soviet Union in
the Far East; they saw the relationship of forces in that area
as markedly unfavorable to themselves. But they did not think
that the Japanese threat endangered the existence of the
Soviet regime unless it was coupled with an attack in Europe
by Germany and/or Poland.
At the same time that they feared a Japanese attack, the
Soviet leaders were also optimistic about the future. They
evidently estimated that, with growing Soviet strength,
grounds for serious concern over possible Japanese aggression
would be minimized in a few years. Accordingly, Soviet policy
in the early thirties played for time, hoping to deflect
Japan's aggressive impetus until Soviet military strength in
the Far East could be built up to a level sufficient to deter
the Japanese or cope with an attack.
In the meantime, the Soviets made an effort to isolate
the Japanese diplomatically and to discourage them from
aggression against the U.S.S.R. Soviet diplomatic relations
with China,, which had been broken off in 1929, were resumed in
December, 1932, when Japanese action in Manchuria posed a
This case study is based solely on unclassified sources
but bears a CONFIDENTIAL classification because of the
interpretation provided.
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d.
threat to the U.S.S.R. The Soviets also negotiated for
diplomatic recognition by the United States as a means of
discouraging Japanese aggressive designs. In Europe, finally,
Soviet diplomats maneuvered with considerable success to
dissuade and checkmate those who might be tempted to join
Japan in an attack upon the U.S.S.R.
Confronted by a variety of Japanese encroachments and
pressures in the early thirties, the Soviets at first adopted
a conciliatory policy toward the Japanese. They attempted to
accommodate Japanese demands to some extent, without giving up
vital Soviet interests or territory. This conciliatory
policy was not one of appeasement; it was merely that efforts
were apparently made to avoid clashes with the Japanese over
Soviet. interests in Manchuria, along common ground frontiers,
in the air, and on sea and river lanes.
During this time, the Soviets employed diplomatic protests
and negotiation, rather than military countermeasures, as a
means of opposing Japanese encroachments and pressure.
In December, 1933, Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov
summarized and justified this conciliatory policy in the face
of growing difficulties with Japan:
...the calmer and more patiently we behaved,
the more provocative became the Japanese
authorities in Manchuria. The impression
created was that they were consciously
provoking us to action more forceful than
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SECRET RM-137.
protests. Not wishing to give in to this
provocation, we made the proposal on May 2
of this year L193,37 that Japan buy ~he
Chinese Eastern Railway from us....
In the early thirties, as Litvinov's account suggests,
the dilemma of Soviet policy lay in deciding how best to
handle the Japanese policy of calculated provocation and
"testing." A conciliatory policy of accommodation ran the
risk of being interpreted as weakness and of inviting further
Japanese provocations. A policy of firmness, on the other
hand, might very well suit the Japanese aim of embroiling the
U.S.S.R. in a crisis that might lead to war. Forced to deal
with the Japanese threat from a position of relative military
weakness, Soviet leaders evidently feared the latter
contingency more.
As the Japanese threat began to focus more directly upon
Soviet territory proper, rather than on Manchuria, Soviet
leaders were forced to reconsider their conciliatory policy.
Litvinov, in his statement of December, 1933, noted that,
despite conciliatory Soviet gestures, the Japanese had
proceeded to concentrate forces near the Soviet frontier with
In this way...a direct threat to our frontier
was created. Under these circumstances there
was nothing for our Government to do but to
begin to fortify our frontier, transferring
the necessary forces for that purpose and taking
other military-measures.6
Report to the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.,
December, 1933.
Ibid.
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A turning point in Soviet-Japanese relations appears to
have been reached in late 1935 and 1936. The Soviets thought
that by this time the military balance of power in the Far East
had changed sufficiently to permit the Soviets to take a
firmer attitude. The reform and mechanization of the Soviet
Armed Forces in 1935-1936, a strengthening of Soviet defenses
in the Far East, and other developments which need not be
mentioned here evidently left Soviet leaders less fearful
than before of the outcome of a military clash with the
Japanese. The stiffening Soviet attitude was manifest in
Stalin's public warning, on March 1, that the U.S.S.R. would
assist Outer Mongolia against attack or encroachment by the
Japanese. This was followed on March 12, 1936, by a mutual
assistance pact with the Mongol People's Republic.
By January 1, 1937, Joseph Grew, U.S. Ambassador in
Tokyo, reported that "...we may be sure that the Soviet
Government will continue to act on the principle that the
only language understood by the Japanese is force, and that
when struck, whether by a minor frontier incursion or by some
broader form of aggression, the wisest policy is to strike
back with double force."
It is important to note that the change from a concilia-
tory policy to one of firmness -- which occurred more
gradually than is perhaps indicated in this telescoped
account -- did'not signify any change in the basic Soviet
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objective of avoiding a war with Japan if possible. The new
policy of firmly defending Soviet rights and interests in
.the Far East did not denote a disposition on the part of the
Soviet Union to take upon itself the task of smashing Japan's
aggressive potential. The change, rather, was in the method
of deterring a strong opponent. who harbored aggressive
intentions. The Politburo may have calculated that the
new policy of reacting sharply to Japanese encroachments
would make the prospect of expansion against the Soviet sphere
in the Far East less attractive to Japanese leaders than that
of expansion southward. But even when Japanese forces became
bogged down in China, the Soviets were not ready, for a
number of reasons, to provoke a military crisis with Japan.
In this conflict, Japanese air violations of Soviet
territory played a relatively minor role. More important
difficulties arose in connection with the Soviet-owned Chinese
Eastern. Railway in Manchuria, fisheries negotiations, shipping
disputes, and frontier disagreements.
Though data on Soviet-Japanese air incidents are far
from complete or reliable, the impression obtained from what
is available is that the Soviet reaction to Japanese air
encroachments was co-ordinated with its general policy for
handling the Japanese threat, and that it shifted as overall
policy shifted.
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(1) There was certainly no disposition on the part of
the Soviets, even in the later thirties, to regard Japanese
air violations (or other infringements of Soviet rights) as
a cause for war. (The Japanese, in turn, were never ready
to go to war over Soviet air violations.)
(2) It appears that the Soviets did not take direct
military action against Japanese overflights in the early
thirties, when their general policy was to conciliate and
accommodate the Japanese. The Soviets may have decided not
to attempt to shoot down Japanese air intruders at this time
because of an inadequate Soviet air-defense capability and/or
because of political considerations, such as a desire to
avoid tension-producing incidents entailing possibly dangerous
war risks.
(3) Following the build-up of Soviet military strength
in the Far East and the adoption of a firmer overall policy
toward Japanese pressure, the Soviets appear to have felt
freer to take military counteraction against intruding
Japanese planes.
(4) Air operations were evidently conducted by both
sides in support of ground action in at least two major border
clashes: the Changkufeng (Lake Hasan) incident in the summer
of 1938, and the Nomanhan incident (Manchukuo-Outer Mongolia
border) in the summer of 1939. In both these undeclared,
limited wars, air power was not used immediately, but only
after the ground fighting had continued for some time.
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SECRET
' 11.
In the Changkufeng incident, which broke out in late June,
1938, a Moscow communique asserted, as late as August 2, that
Soviet ground and air forces had obeyed strict instructions to
remain within Soviet territory, and Japanese reports of Soviet
overflights of Manchukuo and Korea were denied.? On August 7,
Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov closed an interview with
Japanese Ambassador Shigemetsu with a declaration to the effect
that the Soviets were determined in the future to use the
strongest measures in border fighting, including .the use of
artillery and aviation. As early as August 3, Japanese
accounts stated that, owing to Soviet air raids in Korea,
blackout measures were being introduced in Tokyo and elsewhere.
Japanese accounts also included frequent claims of Soviet
planes downed over the battle area.
The activity of Japanese planes in the fray apparently
received less attention in Soviet and Japanese accounts.
According to a former Soviet air officer who took part in the
campaign, however, Japanese reconnaissance flights penetrated
as far as Khabarovsk. According to the same source, there
were many air border violations by both sides, and neither
side had compunctions about shooting down its opponent's
It is reported that General Bluecher, commander of the
entire Soviet Far Eastern front, was relieved by Moscow
during the Changkufeng fighting in part because fearing
that a general war might result, he ordered Soviet
aircraft not to engage Japanese planes. (Cf. General
Alexei Markoff, "Stalin's Secret War Plans," Saturday
Evening Post, September 20, 1952.)
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SECRET RM-112.
planes, though such incidents were not protested or publi-
cized.,
In the Nomanhan incident,r fighting broke out on May 11,
1939, and was suspended at the end of May for about three
weeks. It was then resumed with both sides employing aviation.
Judging from newspaper accounts, bombing operations were
carried on well behind the lines.
(5) Soviet military assistance to the Chinese after the
renewal of the Japanese invasion in 1937 included four
completely staffed and equipped Soviet fighter squadrons and
two bomber squadrons.
The willingness of-the Soviets to shoot down Japanese
air intruders in the later thirties, to reconnoiter Japanese
territory, to employ air forces during the border wars of
1938 and 1939, and to give substantial air assistance to
Chiangfs forces in 1937-1939 were but part of the generally
tough Soviet policy toward Japan. Since the Soviet objective-
was still to avoid a military showdown, the use of the Soviet
air capability in this fashion was evidently not regarded as
seriously increasing the risks of war. That is, the Soviets
did not think that the Japanese would regard these activities
Interview of former Soviet air officer by Leon Goure, of
The RAND Corporation, January 3, 1953; COivb'IDEivTIAL.
The source also indicated that, during the border clash,
Russian planes bombed the.rear lines of the Japanese
forces, and also Korea, out not Formosa, which was
outside the range of Soviet planes.
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as an act of war. Nor, evidently, did they fear that their
air activities would have other consequences, immediate or
remote, unfavorable to Soviet objectives and interests.
Data-on alleged Soviet air intrusions over Manchukuo and
Japanese territory in this period are also sketchy and
generally of unknown reliability. Few cases are so well
attested to as that of December, 1937, when a Soviet mail
airplane came down in Manchuria and there were strong Soviet
protests at the failure to release its crew and cargo.9 The
most ambitious account of alleged Soviet air intrusions of
Japanese air space is presented in Manchoukuo--Soviet Border
Issues, a book compiled by Noboru Hidaka and published by the
Manchurian Daily News in 1938. This book, published in
English, had the avowed purpose of bringing the Japanese point
of view to Western audiences. It lists and describes a grand
total of 539 border "outrages" by the Soviets up to 1938, of
which 77 were "aerial invasions." Most of these alleged
intrusions were said to have taken place on the eastern border
(of the U.S.S.R. and Manchukuo) and to have involved
reconnaissance flights.lO
9 Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1929-
1
91, Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, London, 1949, p.
10 Sources (in addition to those cited above):
Claire L. Chennault Way of a Fighter, G. P. Putnam's
Sofa New York, 1949;
David'3allin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942,
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1942;
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3. POLISH AND RUMANIAN PROTESTS OF SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS
(September, 1938)
In his political biography of Stalin, Isaac Deutscher
notes that shortly before the Munich conference (September,
1938) half a dozen Russian aircraft were flown across
Rumania to Czechoslovakia.11 Although the Russians observed
all air traffic regulations, the incident, provoked a protest,
first from Colonel Beck, the Polish foreign minister, then
from his Rumanian colleague.12
10 (Cont'd)
Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow, Simon & Schuster,
New York, 1941;
Jane Degras (comp.), Calendar of Soviet Documents on
Foreign Policy, Roya Institute of International
Affairs London, 1948;
Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, Oxford
University Press, New York 1949;
Foreign Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union
(1933-39). Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1952;
Joseph Grew, Ten Years in Japan, Simon & Schuster, New
York 1944;
Harriet Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1 1-1 4 ,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1945;
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of
International Affairs for 1932, 1933, 19349 1935,, and
193 , London;
Clark W. Timh, "Quasi-War between Japan and the U.S.S.R.,
1937-1939," World Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January,
1951);
Charles A. Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge
Spy Ring, Dutton, New York, 1952;
Izvestiia, November 10, 1933; March 16 and 21, 1934;
June 11, 1935; January 24, February 15, 20, and 23,
March 14 and 17, 1936? April 12, 1938;
Japan Chronicle, March 8, 22, and 29, 1934; June 20,
1935; July 11, 1935;
The Times (London), February 25, March 18, 1936.
Stalin, p. 428.
Deutscher gives as his source Georges Bonnet's Defense
de la Paix: De Washington au Quai d'Orsay, pp. 121-140..
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4. GERMAN PREHOSTILITIES AIR RECONNAISSANCE
OF SOVIET TERRITORY PRIOR TO
INVASION ON JUNE 22, 1941
German prehostilities reconnaissance of Soviet territory
is the only historical occasion on which hostile air
reconnaissance has been directed at the U.S.S.R. as part of
a definite plan for full-scale military attack.
German aerial reconnaissance was on a considerable scale
and evidently involved some rather deep penetrations of
Soviet-held territory ("100 to 150 kilometers and more,"
according to the Soviets). This reconnaissance was-detected
and presumably analyzed by the Soviets as an indicator of
Nazi intentions. We may assume that it was viewed by the
Politburo, not as isolated hostile acts, but as part of the
broader international situation.
The general state of Nazi-Soviet relations was a matter
of increasing concern to the Politburo during the months
before the attack, a concern that was doubtlessly aggravated
by the possibility of an eventual drawing together of Nazi
Germany on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other..
Thus we may assume that decisions as to how to react by
military, diplomatic, or propaganda means to Nazi overflights
was dealt with by the Russians, not as a separate issue, but,
rather, with reference to some overall Soviet plan for keeping
the world balan,_:r of power from becoming unfavorable to the
Soviet Union.
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Scale of Nazi Overflights of Soviet Territory
Overflight of U.S.S.R. territory by Nazi planes was on a
considerable scale. The figures available come from Russian
sources, but we have no reason to assume that they seriously
exaggerate the scale of the Nazi effort. Each time a Nazi
overflight was detected, the Soviet Border Patrol filed a
protest with the German representatives at the border.13 On
four occasions in 1941 -- sometime in January, on March 28,
on April 21, and on June 21 -- the Soviet Foreign Office
protested these overflights in notes to the German Foreign
Office.
In the third and fourth Soviet notes, the following
number of air violations was noted:14
for the period March 27-April 18, 1941: 80 violations
for the period April 19-June 19, 1941: 180 violations.
An overall summary of the number of German air violations from
January to June 21, 1941, was given by Pravda shortly after the
Nazi invasion began. The number was listed as 324, and it was
indicated that Moscow had protested diplomatically in January,
13 Soviet note to German Foreign Office, June 21, 1941-.
.R.-J. Sontag?and J. S. Beddie (eds.), Nazi-Soviet
"Relations, 1939-1941,'pp. 353-355.
14 A record of the first and second notes is not available;
only the third and fourth notes are listed in Sontag and
Beddie, op. cit. A Soviet diplomatic representative who
received a German statement on the subject on May 17,
1941., remarked that.German air violations were continuing
a_~.: aere frequent (ibid., p. 343).
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March, April, and June.15 If the total given on this occasion
was based, as seems likely, on the number of violations
protested in all four Soviet notes, the number of violations
protested in the first two notes (covering January to March
27) must have been 64,. Together with the 260 violations
mentioned in the third and fourth notes, this would account
for the grand total of 324 given by Pravda.
Thus, there seems to have been a pronounced step-up in
the frequency of Nazi overflights from January through June,
1941.
Lack of Soviet Military Countermeasures and Reprisals
No military countermeasures were taken against Nazi
overflights; nor, insofar as we can establish, were reprisals
in kind (Soviet reconnaissance of German territory) undertaken.
The Politburo seems to have gone no further than to remind the
German government that the permissive Soviet air-defense policy
toward Nazi air intruders might have.to be reconsidered:
Consequently, the People's Commissariat deems
it necessary to remind the German Embassy of
the statement that was made on March 28, 1940,
by the Assistant Military Attache of the
Embassy of the U.S.S.R. in Berlin to Reich
Marshal Goering, according to which the
People's Commissar for Defense of the U.S.S.R.
made an exception to the very strict measures
for the protection of the Soviet border and
15
Pravda June 29, 1941, as cited in David Dallin, Soviet
Russiats Foreign Policy, 1939-1942, p. 365.
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gave the border troops the order not to fire
on the German planes flying over the Soviet
territory so long s such flights do not
1
occur frequently.
There is no evidence that the implicit threat conveyed in
this note was carried out by the Soviets in the two months
preceding the Nazi attack.17 Nor is evidence available that
the Soviets engaged in reprisals, i.e., in counter aerial
reconnaissance of German territory.18
16
17
18
Soviet note verbale of April 21, 1941, cited in Sontag
and Beddie, op. cit., p. 328.
The few accounts examined are contradictory and
inconclusive on this point. One Russian colonel recalled
that Soviet antiaircraft along the Soviet-German frontier
had been ordered not to fire upon German observation
planes. (Personal conversation reported by Charles W.
Thayer in Handsacross the Caviar, 1952 pp. 67-69.)
Another Soviet colonel who had held a leading command
position in a Red Air Force Fighter Division on the
Eastern front could not recall any orders limiting action
against German air intruders in the prehostilities
period.. He,recalled having heard that some German planes
had been forced down in the Kiev area by Soviet planes.
(Interview of ex-Soviet colonel by Leon Goure, The RAND
Corporation, January 3, 1953.)
Classified official correspondence in which leading
Nazis made countercharges of Soviet air violations of
German territory (e.g., Jodl's memorandum of April 23,
1941, to the. German Foreign office) should be viewed as
possible efforts by top Nazi leaders to conceal their
aggressive intention from subordinates in the hierarchy.
The important thing is that the Nazis never formally
protested any such alleged Soviet violations, although
they were referred to verbally on at least one occasion
by Weizsdcker when he received formal Soviet charges of
German air violations (Sontag and Beddie, op. cit.,
P. 353). Even the final German note to the U.S.S.R.,
which in Pffect announced the German attack, did not
includ;; soviet air violations in its documentation of
Soviet aggressive intentions which had "forced" Germany
to act (Sontag and Boddie, on. cit., pp. 347-349). Nor
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49
.
SECRET RM-119
The Politburo may have ruled out both direct military
action against Nazi overflights and air reconnaissance of
Nazi territory for fear that such actions might prejudice the
Soviet objective of maintaining the friendship pact with the
Nazis and of reaching a diplomatic resolution of tensions
then current between the two countries.
Soviet Diplomatic and Propaganda Handling of
the Overflights
But, though scrupulously avoiding military counteraction
or reprisals against Nazi overflights, Soviet leaders felt
it expedient at least to register diplomatic protests against
violations of their border. Two reasons for the policy of
diplomatic protest may be noted.
First, the Soviets generally feel obliged to protest in
some fashion any violation of their borders or of their rights
over international waters.19 While the preferred method of
protest is direct action, verbal protests are considered
obligatory as a substitute when the capability for action is
lacking or the use of such a capability is deemed unduly risky.
18 (ContId)
does General Haider, otherwise sensitive to any indi-
caticos of Soviet offensive intentions, make any mention
in his diary of Soviet prehostilities aerial reconnais-
sance, though he does refer to Nazi aerial reconnaissance
over Soviet areas. Isaac Deutscher's statement that both
sides were engaged in aerial reconnaissance of each
other's territory is iiot'documented (Stalin, p. 453).
See RAND Research Memorandum RM-1346, "Soviet Reactions
to Border Flights and Overflights in Peacetime," (TOP
SECRET) for evidence and argument in support of this
conclusion.
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Accordingly, Nazi overflights could not be completely overlooked
by the Soviets, even though political considerations ruled out
direct military counteraction.
A second, more specific policy consideration lay behind
at least the lat,:r Soviet diplomatic protests of Nazi overflights.
In contrast to the Nazi military build-up along the German-
Soviet border, which involved no technical. or legal violation
of Soviet rights, Nazi aerial reconnaissance did involve
overflights of Soviet territory. Therefore, given the overall
German-Soviet relationship, the overflights provided the
Politburo with a particularly appropriate and convenient
opportunity to disclose to the Nazis its nonbelligerent and
accommodating attitude, and its general willingness to negotiate
outstanding issues. And on at least one occasion (the fourth
Soviet note protesting overflights on June 21) the real purpose
of the protest was to find a pretext for engaging reluctant
Nazi leaders in a diplomatic discussion of the entire state
of Nazi-Soviet relations.20
Although, as we shall see below, the Politburo did not
consider that German overflights indicated certain and
imminent Nazi attack, the Soviet Foreign Office evidently
wished to convey some concern in its notes. The protest notes
of April 21 and June 21, while courteous and restrained in
tone, conveyed thin concern in several ways:
Thus, in summoning the German ambassador on the eve of the
attack Molotov utilized the Soviet protest note of June 21
(regarding Nazi air violations) merely as a pretext or
"hook" for asking what the Germans had against the Soviets
and what they wanted (Sontag and Beddie, op. cit., p. 355).
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RM-1349
21.
1. By noting a step-up in German air violations.
(Notes of April 21 and June 21)
2. By reporting that in a German plane which had
landed in Soviet-held territory (Rovno) "were
found a camera some rolls of exposed film, and a
torn topographical map of the districts of the
U.S.S.R., all of which gives evidence of the
purpose of the crew of this airplane." (Note of
April 21)21
3. By noting that the German government had made no
reply to the previous Soviet protest. (Note of
June 21)
By noting that.-the German air penetrations had
assumed a "systematic character." (Note of June 21)
By noting that in some cases German aircraft
penetrated "100 to 150 kilometers and more.",
(Note of June 21)
6. By explicitly drawing the conclusion that the
"systematic nature" of the flights and the extent
of the penetrations "preclude the possibility that
these violations of the border of the U.S.S.R. by
German aircraft could have been accidental."
(Note of June 21)
Finally, we should note that the Soviet government did
not make any propaganda statements on the subject of Nazi
overflights. To have done so would have inevitably destroyed
the public image of unimpaired Nazi-Soviet friendship which
Soviet propaganda was actively attempting to maintain. The
Politburo may have reasoned that any public mention of the
Nazi overflights would have made it more difficult to engage
the Nazis in serious diplomatic conversations. Similarly, any
21 This incident was not prtl~ sized by the Soviets... And the
Nazis not only did not make aiiy explanation or show
embarrassment, but they requested the Soviets to return
the plane! (Ibid., p. 343). It is not known whether the
Soviets complied.
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Soviet publicity might have encouraged those in Germany, France,
and England who continued to hope for a coalition of their
countries against the U.S.S.R. Therefore, the Nazi overflights
and Soviet diplomatic notes protesting them were not publicly
disclosed by the Sov4-sts until after the Nazi invasion.
Soviet Estimate of Nazi Overflights as an
Indicator of Nazi Intentions
Nazi aerial reconnaissance of Soviet territory was but
one of many indicators of Nazi intentions available to Soviet
intelligence. The widespread and impressive Nazi military
build-up along the Soviet border could not be concealed, and
there were, in addition, a number of other warnings.
It is not the purpose of the present report to examine the
development of Nazi-Soviet relations prior to the invasion, or
to account in detail for the evident failure of the Politburo
to estimate Nazi intentions correctly.22 Nor will it be
possible in this brief account to cite the evidence, mostly of
an indirect character, for the conclusion that the Politburo
was at least tactically surprised by the Nazi attack. Even at
the last moment before the Nazi invasion, Soviet leaders appear
to have believed that there would be an opportunity to engage
the Nazis in serious diplomatic discussions, and possibly to
22 For help with sour.,es and interpretations, the writer is
indebted to Leon Goure, of the RAND staff, who has in
preparation a detailed study of Nazi-Soviet relations
during this period. Among the hypotheses tentatively
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accommodate them. In other words, despite numerous indicators
of the Nazi intention, Soviet leaders evidently regarded an
attack as neither certain nor imminent. It is difficult to
account otherwise for the fact that Soviet defensive forces
were not placed in a state of alert and were thus, in most
cases, completely surprised by the Nazi attack. Significant,
also, are the Politburo's attempts -- the last of which came
even while the attack was beAnning -- to engage the Nazi
leaders in diplomatic bargaining by getting them to state the
reasons for their displeasure with the U.S.S.R.
We may infer, therefore, that knowledge of Nazi overflights
did not succeed in significantly altering the overall Soviet
estimate of Nazi intentions. No special importance appears to
have been attached to reconnaissance overflights as an indicator.
22 (Cont'd)
advanced by Mr. Goure to account for the Politburo's
incorrect estimate of the Nazi intention are the following:
(1) Stalin thought that Hitler, like himself, was a
"reasonable" and-"cautious" man who would not run
unnecessary risks; (2) the Politburo did not conceive
that Hitler would place such a low estimate upon the
Soviet capability for prolonged resistance against a
German attack; (3) the Politburo expected that Hitler
would respond to intimations of Soviet willingness to
consider German wishes and demands and that an opportunity
for discussion and negotiation would materialize; (4)
the Politburo thought that Hitler was.bluffing (for a
number of reasons which cannot be considered here); (5)
the Politburo thought that Hitler would not attack without
some sort of political preparation designed to provide a
plausible justification.
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Conclusion
The overall policy adopted by the Politburo for dealing
with the Nazi threat was based upon this incorrect estimate
of Nazi intentions. Evidently it was thought that, if Nazi
military preparations did in fact point to an attack upon the
U.S.S.R.., such action wag not yet imminent and/or the Nazi
intention to attack was not yet firm. The Nazi reconnaissance
overflights did not alter this estimate. The Politburo
apparently did not feel obliged, in the light of the
overflights, to reconsider the correctness of its policy of
dealing with the Nazi threat by diplomatic rather than military
means.
The Politburo's disinclination to start a war over Nazi
aerial reconnaissance and the permissive attitude adopted by
Soviet air-defense forces must be understood with reference to
the special balance of power context in which they occurred.
We cannot be certain that we have accurately assessed the
reasons for Soviet passivity in this situation. Nor can we
be certain that the Soviets would calculate in the same
fashion if faced with hostile overflights by another power in
the future. In particular, we cannot say what lessons, if any,
Soviet leaders have drawn from their mishandling of the Nazi
threat in 1941, and how this experience may affect their
reaction to new opponents co-isidered to be potential aggressors.
The predictive value of findings from the present case
study is further limited by the emergence of atomic and
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thermonuclear weapons. The risk in tolerating overflights by
hostile reconnaissance planes will be judged by the Soviets to
be much greater if these planes are thought to be capable of
carrying the new weapons. This does not necessarily mean that
penetrations by hostile planes capable of carrying the new
weapons will automatically lead.to war. But it does make it
less likely that the passive policy toward Nazi overflights
will be repeated if such planes attempt to make important
penetrations of Soviet air space with any frequency.
A repetition of Soviet passivity in the face of systematic
prehostilities reconnaissance overflights is less likely at
present and in the future for other reasons as well. The Nazi
overflights took place in a traditional multi-state balance-
of-power situation. A friendship pact, which the Soviets at
least wished to continue for the time being, was in effect
between Germany and the U.S.S.R. In part for this reason, the.
Politburo may well have ruled out hostile military. counteraction
against Nazi overflights. In contrast, the international
setting of the postwar world is unique in that there is marked
bipolarization around two major powers, the United States and
the U.S.S.R. It seems unlikely that, in this new international
setting, there could be a friendship pact between the United
States and the U.S.S.R. which would exercise a restraining
influence on Soviet reactions to systematic U.S. overflights.
Soviet restraint, if any, would have to be motivated by
different considerations.
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5. SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF SCAP AIR REGULATIONS
OVER OCCUPIED JAPAN
(1945-1947)
Soviet flights into Japan during this period were subject
to the regulations and control of SCAP. On August 20, 1946,
during the tense diplomatic dispute with Yugoslavia over the
shooting down of two U.S. transports, an authoritative
disclosure was made in Washington regarding hitherto unpubli
cized Soviet violations of air regulations over Japan:
Several high LU.4_7 official and military
sources confirmed reports that Russian
planes, which are supposed to follow a
specified route from Vladivostok to Tokyo,
frequently flew far off course. American
planes have held their fire but have radioed
the Russian planes to get back on course. In
a number of instances, the official sources
said the Russian aviators ignored the
warnings and simply took evasive action to
shake off the American planes .... 0ur policy
has been to avoid incidents, s the Russian
planes have not been attacked.'3
In August, 1947, SCAP protested to Soviet representatives
in Japan that regulations requiring advance notification of
incoming Soviet flights were being violated. On November 4,
1947, SCAP grounded two Soviet aircraft for violation of SCAP
flight regulations; it also informed Soviet authorities in
Japan that no further Soviet aircraft would be cleared for
entry into Japan. It was SCAP's estimate that repeated Soviet
violation of well-understood air-traffic control regulations
23 The New York Times, August 21, 1946.
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for Japan probably had an ulterior intelligence objective;
namely, to discover existing U.S. security capabilities in
areas other than routes of prescribed travel.24
6. U.S. NAVY PLANE FIRED UPON BY
SOVIET PLANE OFF PORT ARTHUR
(October 15, 1945)
This incident was evidently not publicly disclosed by
either side until a similar incident took place off Dairen
on February 20, 1946, when the U.S. Navy disclosed both
incidents, and an account of diplomatic communications
exchanged privately over the first incident.
On October 15, 1945, a Navy Mariner plane, said to have
been on a routine shipping identification mission in the Gulf
of Chihli, passed within a mile of Port Arthur, which had
been recently occupied by Soviet forces under the terms of
the Soviet-Chinese (Nationalist) treaty of August 14, 1945.
The Navy plane was leaving the area and had reached a point
twenty-five miles at sea from Dairen when it was overtaken by
a Russian fighter which opened fire during one of its several
approaches.
It is not entirely clear whether the Russian fighter is
considered to have fired for warning purposes only or with
24
SCAP cable to U.S. Embassy in Moscow; SECRET.
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28.
hostile intent. The U.S. Navy account did not state whether
the Mariner had been damaged; nor was there mention of return
fire. Press reports based on the U.S. Navy account of the
incident did not exclude the possibility that the Navy plane
had suffered damage. That the U.S_ Navy did not consider the
fire from the Soviet plane as merely a warning was perhaps
implied in its protest of the action as a hostile act. On
the other hand, it is possible that the Navy accepted the
incident as a warning but called it hostile because it took
place beyond the three-mile territorial waters limit.
The U.S. protest was made by the U.S. naval attache in
Moscow directly to the Soviet Navy Department. The Soviet Navy
replied (according to the account released later by the U.S.
Navy) that, according to the Soviet-Chinese treaty of August
14, 1945, the defense of Port Arthur was a Soviet responsibility,
and that U.S. planes might not enter boundaries of the Soviet
naval base at Port Arthur and Dairen or approach within twelve
miles of the coast at these points without obtaining permission
in each case-from the Soviet military command.25
Significance
In the absence of more definite information, the Soviet
intention in this case is being regarded as nonhostile;
25 The New York Times March 2, l9'+6; Th-j New York Herald
Tribune March 2, 1946; no classified accounts have been
available.
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otherwise, this would be the first occasion in the postwar
period on which the Soviets would have, attempted to shoot down
a foreign plane alleged to have been intruding upon Soviet
territory or territorial waters.
We have been unable to find any Soviet publicity given to
this incident. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy is regarded as
having (belatedly) initiated public disclosure of the incident.
Thus, this case constitutes particularly good evidence of the
Soviet willingness to let such incidents remain the private
knowledge of the governments concerned.
It would seem, also, that the Soviets did not initiate
diplomatic (private) disclosure by protesting the violation,
but that such disclosure, too, was made by the United States.
Therefore, this case provides evidence also for the general'
hypothesis of this study that the Soviets usually prefer their
military counteractions against aerial encroachments (alleged
or otherwise) to speak for themselves.
The incident raised, for the first time in the postwar
period, other problems in international law which were to be
of continuing interest in the next few years, as Soviet policy
toward air intrusion became better defined and more hostile.
The Soviet Assertion of a Twelve-Mile Territorial-
Waters Limit
We have noted that, in reply to the U.S. ::~.. j protest,
the Soviets stated that U.S. planes might not approach
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within twelve miles of the Soviet coast without first obtaining
permission. (Under international law, other powers claim a
territorial-waters limit of only three miles.) The U.S. Navy
noted in reply that they had not been previously informed of
the Soviet intention to apply the twel7e-mile limit to Soviet-
occupied territory as well as to Soviet territory proper.
The Problem of "Hot Pursuit"
We have noted that the Russian fighter intercepted the
Navy plane when it was twenty-five miles away from Port Arthur.
The incident, therefore, also raised the question whether the
Soviets were claiming the right to apply the doctrine of "hot
pursuit" with regard to air violations. The second U.S. Navy
communication noted that the Soviet reply had not explained
why the Navy plane had been fired upon twenty-five miles away.
It is not known whether the U.S. Navy explicitly queried the
Soviet right of hot pursuit. In any event, no further reply
was received from the Soviets, a fact that was noted in the
U.S. Navy statement to the press on March 1, 1946.
7. SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF AIR REGULATIONS
OVER OCCUPIED GERMANY
(1945-1946)
On August 20, 1946 -- in the coL..:,.; of a tense diplomatic
dispute with Yugoslavia over the shooting down of two U.S. air
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31.
transports -- an authoritative disclosure was made in Washington
regarding hitherto unpublicized Soviet violations of air
regulations over Germany.
Russian planes were said to have habitually deviated from
their prescribed courses over the American zone of C3rmany.
U.S. policy was to avoid incidents; accordingly, American
military planes withheld fire in such instances and radioed
Russian planes to get back on course. In a number of incidents,
the Russian planes were said to have ignored the warnings and
to have taken evasive action in order to shake off the
American planes.26
8. SOVIET FIGHTER PLANES FIRE WARNING BURSTS AT
U.S. NAVY PLANE OFF DAIREN
(February 20, 1946)
On February 20, 1946, while on a flight. from its base in
Tsingtao, China, a U.S. Navy plane flew near Dairen. Two
Soviet planes intercepted this plane and fired warning bursts
at it for about ten minutes. According to a public announcement
by the U.S. Navy, the Navy plane was not hit, and returned to
its base. There was no mention of return fire on the part of
the Navy plane. Evidently, an overflight was committed, for
the Navy also announced that disciplinary action was being
The New York Times, August 21, 1946; this disclosure also
referred to Soviet violationsof SCAP air regulations over
Japan, which have been dealt with in case study No. 5.
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taken against the pilot in question for having gone inland
contrary to orders.
It would seem that public disclosure of the encounter
would not have been made by the U.S. Navy were it not for the
fact that an erroneous account of the incident, attributed to
high U.S. government officials, leaked try the press. According
to this erroneous account, the pilot of the Navy patrol plane
became confused as to his position, and thought he was over
a Chinese city when he was in fact over Port Arthur (sic).
The Navy pilot buzzed an airfield, flying low over it. As he
pulled his plane away from the field,'Russian fighter planes
began a chase, overtaking him between Port Arthur and Chanshan
Island. The Soviet planes, according to the erroneous account,
shot away the Navy plane's aerial and made other-.hits as well,
damaging the plane but not wounding any of the. eight-man crew.
At the State Department, according to the press, the view
generally expressed was that the American pilot, even though
he had lost his bearings, had no legal right to fly over the
area controlled by the Russians under agreement with Chiang's
government.27
The U.S. Navy announcement, which gave the facts of this
incident, also'indicated that the Soviet government was being
informed that the action of the Soviet fighters in opening fire
was unjustifiable in view of the friendly relations existing
27 The New York Times, March 2, 1946.
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between the two countries. The U.S. Navy protest to the Soviet
Navy Department also pointed out that Dairen had been declared
a free port under the Soviet-Chinese treaty of.August, 191+5.28
In disclosing the incident of February 20, 1946, the U.S.
Navy also disclosed -- apparently for the first time --
similar incident that had occurred off Port Arthur on October
15, 1945.29
Significance
As in the case of the incident of October 15, 1945 (case
study No. 6), Soviet policy toward this overflight was, despite
the resort to warning fire, a nonhostile one.
Once again, the Soviets revealed a preference for not
disclosing, either diplomatically or publicly, incidents in
which some action had been taken by Soviet air defenses. As
in the October incident, the initiative, both in diplomatic
and public disclosure, was evidently taken by the United States.
There is no indication, in records examined, of any Soviet
reply to the American diplomatic protest, nor of any Soviet
publicity given to the case. However, though no reply was
mentioned in the U.S. Navy announcement of March 1, 1946, the
possibility of a later Soviet note cannot be ruled out.30
28
29
30
The New York Herald Tribune, March 2, 1946.
See case study No. 6.
Classified sources on this incident. have not been
consulted.
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Soviet motives in resorting to warning fire in this (and
possibly the earlier) incident were suggested by information
which the press attributed at the time to U.S. officials.
According to these accounts, reports over a period of months
had indicated that the Russians were taking the greatest
precautions to protect their installations in the China area
against American or other foreign observation, whether
deliberate or accidental. Some weeks previously, for example,
one of the Chinese-American truce teams set up by General
Marshall to restore peace in China had been refused the right
to make a landing at a Soviet-held city in the interior of
China. The pilot had got lost, sought permission to land at
the Russian field, but was refused.31 An eye-witness account
from Dairen, by Associated Press correspondent Richard Cushing,
reported full-dress Red Army maneuvers over extensive areas
north of Dairen.32
The Soviet policy of limited, nonhostile military
opposition to air intruders in this area might be said to have
been motivated by a fear of "yielding" to minor encroachments
against rights newly won in the August 1945 treaty with
Nationalist China. Soviet insistence on regulating foreign
flights in this area might also have been due in part to a
31
The New York Times, March 2, 1946.
32 Associated Press dispatch of February 26, published in
The New York Times, March 3, 1946.
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desire to retaliate in kind for SCAP regulation of Soviet
flights into Japan.33
9. SOVIET PROTEST AGAINST THREE U.S. OVERFLIGHTS OF
BIG DIODE ISLAND
(BERING STRAITS)
(Between March 8, 1946, and January 31, 1947)
A Soviet note to the United States, on February 25, 1947,
protested three alleged air violations of Big Diomede Island.
The United States reply on March 5, 1947, indicated that no
conscious violations had occurred, but that possibly
unintentional overflights had been made as a result of bad
weather over the Bering Straits.34
Apparently neither side made a public disclosure of the
incident, or of the exchange of diplomatic notes.35
Significance
In the absence of military interception, the Soviet
reaction took the form of diplomatic protest. This is in
contrast to the Soviet reaction to "violations" by U.S. Navy
planes in 191+5 and 1946, in which the action itself was
apparently deemed a clear enough indication of the Soviet
attitude to make a diplomatic protest superfluous.36
33 See case study No. 5.
34 State Department files; RESTRICTED.
35 Nothing on the subject could be found in The New York
Times.
3b See case studies Nos. 6 and 8.
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10. SOVIET PROTEST AGAINST ALLEGED U. S. AIR
VIOLATION OF IRANIAN-SOVIET BORDER
(April 5, 1946)
On April 15, 1946, the Soviet Foreign Office directed a
"complaint" to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow charging that, on
April 5', a two-engine U.S. plane had crossed the Soviet-Iranian
border in the vicinity of Astara and had penetrates 6 km. into
Soviet territory. The Soviet spokesman, Mikhailov, said it
was not the first incident of this sort; he said that several
U.S. flights had also taken place over the Soviet zone of
occupation in Iran. U.S. Amoassador Bedell Smith promised an
immediate investigation.37
Apparently neither the Soviet Union nor the United States
made a public disclosure of the incident, or of the Soviet
diplomatic complaint,38 and Ptirrther details are lacking. It
will be noted that the Soviet-complaint was made at a time
when the U.S.S.R. was under Western diplomatic pressure to
remove its troops from northern Iran.
11. SOVIET HARASSMENT OF U.S. FLIGHTS
IN VIENNA AIR CORRIDOR
(1946)
General Mark W. Clark, at one time American High Commissioner
for Austria, has described Soviet efforts to harass U.S. flights
37 U.S. Embassy, Moscow (Smith), to Secretary of State, No.
1212, April 16, 1946; CONFIDENTIAL.
''" Nothing about the incident could be found in The New York
Times.
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in the Vienna air corridor during the first part of 1946:
The Russians had stipulated that our planes
must follow a narrow corridor while flying
over Soviet-occupied territory. This, of
course, was inconvenient, but we observed the
rule. As relations deteriorated however,
our craft'began having trouble with Soviet
planes which suddenly would appear along the
route, flying close to ours as if intending
to crash them and, eventually, firing their
guns in the direction of our planes.
On several occasions I officially informed
Konev (Soviet High Commissioner) of these
incidents and asked him to put an end to them.
In each case he replied that he had investigated
and found.that there were no Russian planes
anywhere near the scene of the alleged incident,
and that, since no Russians were there, they
could not possibly have fired on or otherwise
harassed our craft. No matter what was said,
he always came back to that point--no Russians
were there. At one time, when a number'of
witnesses were available to show that Soviet
anti-aircraft had fired on American planes,
Konev blandly replied that there was no Soviet
anti-aircraft in that area. After a number of
such incidents, I decided that only force would
do any good. There was no question in my
mind that the Russians were making the attacks,
because my own plane had been fired on. So I
ordered the American planes armed and I formally
advised Konev that from that day on any Russian
plane that made a threatening gesture at an
American plane would do so at its own risk. I
added that my instructions to the American
gunners were to shoot first if they felt that
they were in danger. We didn't have a single
aerial incident after that.39
39
Mark Clark, Calculated Risk, Harper & Bros., New
York, 1950, pp. 72-73. In the course of the
diplomatic dispute engendered by the shooting down
of a U.S. military transport over Yugoslavia, the
Associated Press reported from Rome on August 11,
1946 that "...The Russians... have Indicated their
displeasure over such flights by buzzing U.S. planes
that attempted to land at Tulln. Threatening Russian
action against U.S. planes and the field itself
ceased after U.S. protests." (The New York Times,
August 12, 1946.) (See also case study No. 12.
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Significance
Apart from the fact that the Soviets retreated from an
aggressive air policy under the threat of American military
counteraction, this case is interesting for the light it
sheds on Soviet diplomatic policy. Thus, if we may
generalize from this one case, when taking particularly
outrageous extralegal actions, the Soviets prefer, if
challenged, simply to deny responsibility rather than attempt
to justify their actions.
Such diplomatic behavior contrasts with that adopted by
the Soviets after the Baltic incident of April, 1950, when
they began to shoot down foreign planes which approached the
Soviet perimeter. In most cases after this date, the Soviets
.took responsibility for their actions and defended them by
appropriate legal arguments, even when they sometimes went out
of their way to shoot down a plane over international waters.
They did not deny the incidents.
But the denial tactic was encountered again in late 1952
and early 1953. At that time, the Soviet government simply
refused to acknowledge, either privately or publicly, that
Soviet planes had been present over Hokkaido, even though
such planes had been detected and, in some cases, intercepted
and damaged.40
40 See case study No. 138 in RAND RM-1349, Supplement
(TOP SECRET).
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12. TWO U. S. MILITARY PLANES FIRED UP 4N BY
SOVIET FIGHTER PLANES OVER AUSTRIA~1
(April 22, 1946).
On April 22, 1946, four Russian fighter planes fired shots
off the wing of a U.S. Army C-47 transport plane as it came in
for a landing at Tulln Airport, just outside of Vienna.
Captain James G. Baxter, pilot of the plane, which was on a
test flight with no passengers, reported the incident to the
airport control tower before bringing the plane down. Four
members of the crew supported Captain Baxter's report that
the Russians fired between two and four 37 mm. cannon shots,
and they said that the Soviet fighters were so close at the
time that the concussion could be felt inside the American
plane.
Airmen at the field identified the Russian fighters as
outmoded P-39's, which had been furnished to Russia under lend-
lease during World War II. The Soviet fighters followed the
U.S. transport plane over the field and left after it touched
the ground.42
Several days later, on April 24, it was disclosed that,'
prior to the C-47 incident, another unarmed U.S. plane had been
41
These incidents came to the writer s attention after the
completion of RAND RM's 1346 1347, and 1348 and, therefore,
were not taken into account In the analysis of Soviet
policy there presented.
T` The New York Times, April 23, 1946.
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shot at by Soviet planes. Both these incidents were reported
to have been protested by General Mark W. Clark. The date of
the second incident was not given.43
It is not clear whether Soviet fire in these two cases
was with hostile intent.44
13. YUGOSLAV-U.S. AIR INCIDENTS45
(August 9 and 19, 1946)
A serious diplomatic controversy developed in August., 1946,
following hostile Yugoslav air-defense actions against two U.S.
planes that made unauthorized overflights of Yugoslavia. Both
American planes were unarmed military transports (C-47's), which
were flying from Vienna to Udine in northern Italy; this route
passes a point that is close to three countries: Austria,
Italy, and Yugoslavia.
On August 9, the U.S. plane flying this route was forced
by repeated machine-gun fire from a Yugoslav fighter to
crash-land in a field near Ljubljana. One passenger was
severely wounded, and the aircraft badly damaged.
43 The New York Times, April 25, 1946. In a summary of past
incidents given in its issue of September b, 1951+., the
Times identified the U.S. plane involved in this incident
as a Flying Fortress, and gave as the date of occurrence
April 22, 1946. The date of the C-47 incident was given
as April 21, 1946, in this summary.
T~ The account of these incidents is based entirely on
unclassified sources; however, reference to other
incidents necessitates a SECRET classification.
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A second incident followed ten days later, on August 19.
This time all five occupants of the U.S. transport lost
their lives when their plane was shot down by Yugoslav
fighters near Bled.
The facts of the two incidents were disputed in official
Yugoslav and U.S. communications. The United States asserted
that American military aircraft were under instructions to
avoid flying over Yugoslavia, and that if overflights occurred
they were unintentional and the result of bad weather.
Yugoslavia denied that the weather had been bad in nearby
areas at the time the incidents took place.
The United States charged that Yugoslav fighters had
opened fire against the first plane without adequate warning,
and that the plane was fired upon again while descending in an
effort to land. Yugoslavia did not effectively contest this
charge, but, with regard to the second incident, she alleged
that the American aircraft was repeatedly "invited" to land
for a period of twelve to fifteen minutes before the shooting,
and that the signals were ignored. Strong doubts about the
correctness of this allegation were expressed by the United
States.on the ground that, at the time of the alleged warning,
the American pilot had reported the plane over Klagenfurt,
Austria.46
46
For a more detailed account of official versions of what
occurred in these two incidents see Department of State
Bulletin, Vol. 15, pp. 415-419 501-505'-,- 725; The
New York Times for August, September, and October 4,
19 ; and Oliver J. Lissitzyn, "The Treatment of Aerial
Intruders in Recent Practice and International Law,"
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 47, No.
October, 1953, pp. 569-573.
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With the disputed facts of these two air incidents the
present report will not concern itself. It should be noted
that the diplomatic controversy hinged, not on the question
of whether a violation of Yugoslav air space had occurred, but
on (1) whether the Yugoslav fighters had, as claimed, warned
the U.S. planes to land before opening fire and, particularly,
(2) whether they were in any case justified in shooting down
planes of a friendly power.
Significance
The Yugoslav action was the first hostile incident of its
kind in the post-World War II period. As such, it constituted
a test case for both the communist and the noncommunist powers.
Thus, while the resolution of the dispute did not provide a
clear answer to all the questions it raised about the treatment
of aerial intruders, it may be assumed that the diplomatic
exchange was followed closely by Moscow, and that it may have
had some influence on subsequent Soviet attitudes and policies
toward air violations of their own borders.
At the time these incidents occurred, U.S.-Yugoslav
relations had already deteriorated seriously. The major
source of friction was Allied opposition to Yugoslav claims on
Italy. The situation was tense along the "Morgan Line," which
separated Allied and Yugoslav military forces in the Trieste
area. Incidents were occurring frequently along this frontier,
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and Yugoslav military intentions were of concern to the Western
Yugoslavs Modify Their Air-Defense Policy under U.S.
Pressure
The most significant result of the dispute was that strong
U.S. pressure forced Tito to withdraw the air-defense policy
which had led to the two incidents.
After the second incident, on August 21, the United States
announced that it was giving the Yugoslav government a formal
48-hour ultimatum. The demands were: (a) immediate release
of "the occupants of these planes now-.-in your custody"; and
(b) permission for American representatives to "communicate
with any of the occupants of the two planes who are.still
alive. X47
The demands themselves were not far-reaching. But, for
three reasons, the Yugoslavs may have interpreted the American
ultimatum more gravely than the explicit demands appeared to
warrant. First, the ultimatum followed closely upon a U.S. note
on the previous day, August 20, which had requested that
Yugoslavia give explicit assurance of innocent passage to lost
aircraft of a friendly power.48 This request' though it was
not repeated in the ultimatum of August 21, may well have been
47 De artment of State Bulletin, September 1, 1946, pp. 417-
416.
48 Ibid., pp. 415-416.
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considered by the Yugoslav government as part and parcel of
the demands now being made.
Secondly, the language of the American ultimatum appeared
to be more stern than seemed called for by the two specific
demands.
Finally, the ultimatum hinted-broadly that more than
mere acceptance of the two demands would be necessary to
satisfy the United States:
If within 48 hours from receipt of this note
by the Yugoslav Government these demands are
complied with, the United States Government
will determine its course in the light of the
evidence then secured and the efforts of the
Yugoslav Government to right the wrong done.
The U.S. ultimatum was handed to the Yugoslav Charge
d'Affaires in Washington by Acting Secretary of State Acheson
on August 21, and it was made public simultaneously. On the
following day it was read to Tito by U.S. Ambassador Patterson.
But, in the brief interim, Tito had moved quickly to meet the
U.S. demands and to alleviate tension:
1. The occupants of the C-1+7 involved in the incident
of August 9 were released, except for a wounded
Turkish officer who had been a passenger.
2. U.S. diplomatic representatives were told that they
could inspect both the aircraft that had been
damaged on August 9 and the wreckage of the
incident of August 19.
3. In written answers to the questions of two U.S.
reporters, Tito said he had given "the strictest
orders to Yugoslav Fourth Army commanders not to
fire on foreign planes, civil or military." He
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gave explicit assurance that, in the event other
planes flew over Yugoslav territory without
clearance, they would not be shot down. The
procedure followed by Yugoslav forces on August
9 and 19, Tito said, "will not be repeated."49
The third assurance, whichras an unmistakable retreat from
the air-defense policy in effect on August 9 and 19, was
repeated by Tito. orally in the meeting with U.S. Ambassador
Patterson at Bled on August 22. At this meeting, Tito
evidently agreed to put his statements in writing. However,
his letter. to Ambassador Patterson on the following day
omitted both the expression of regret and the assurance against
further occurrences, which he had conveyed orally.50 These
omissions were noted by Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson
at his news conferences on August 27 and 30.51 Placed under
additional pre3sure by Ambassador Patterson at a second meeting,
at the end of August, Tito gave a written assurance and a
formal apology in a note dated August 31.52
In giving such assurance, Tito in effect substantially
modified Yugoslav air-defense policy. But the precise character
of the new air-defense policy.implicit in Tito's official
assurance to the United States was not entirely clear. This
assurance had been given by Tito on three separate occasions
49 Dispatch of August 22, 1946 from Bled, Yugoslavia, by
Arthur M. Brandel, published in The New York Times,
August 23, 1946.
50 Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1946, p. 419.
51 The New York Times, August 28 and 31, 1946.
52 Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 194b, p. 505.
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and referred to on a fourth, but each time in slightly different
form.53 As+ a result, the new Yugoslav policy was unclear in
the following respects: (1) whether all or only certain types
of aircraft were covered by Tito's assurance; (2) whether the
assurance held irrespective of number'and frequency of
unauthorized overflights.
Tito's first assurance to the American reporters on August
22 was apparently not qualified in any way. But his second
assurance, given orally to Patterson later. in the same day,
contained seemingly contradictory phraseology. According to
Patterson's account, Tito "has now given orders that no foreign
planes are to be shot at under any circumstances. Incidents
will not be repeated, LEhe7 Marshal said...." But a qualification
was implied in the rest of Tito's statement, as paraphrased by
Patterson: "Yugoslavia will always accept planes forced off
course by weather trouble, loss of direction or mechanical
difficulties in reasonable numbers.... 1154
In an intervening note on August 30, Tito coupled an
allusion to his earlier oral assurance to Patterson with the
following proviso: "...presuming that for its part the
Government of the United States of America would undertake the
steps necessary to prevent these Lunauthorized7 flights, except
53
54
Such differences appear in the English translations of the
notes given in the Department of State Bulletin; the
Yugoslav texts have not been consulted..
Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1946, p. 418.
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in the case of emergency or bad weather, for which arrangements
could be made by agreement between American and Yugoslav
authorities."55
And finally, Tito's third assurance, given in his official
written statement of August 31, noted that safe passage was
assured. all intruding "transport" planes.56
The final, written Yugoslav statement of August 31 is, of
course, the most authoritative version of Tito's assurance.
However, as has been implied in the preceding discussion, neither
this statement nor those which preceded it could be taken as
unambiguous declarations of policy toward subsequent unauthorized
overflights. Nevertheless, although the exact extent of the
modification of Yugoslav policy remained unclear, at least in
certain cases failure to comply with a request to land was no
longer to be regarded by the Yugoslavs as justifying resort to
fire. Instead, the Yugoslavs. agreed to limit themselves to a
diplomatic complaint in these cases. In the written assurance
of August 31, Tito stated that orders had been given to Yugoslav
forces "to the effect that no transport planes must be fired
at any more, even if they might intentionally fly over our
territory without proper clearance, but that in such cases they
should be invited to land; if they refuse to do so their
55 Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1946, p. 502.,
56 The assurance to.II.S. correspondents had referred to
"foreign planes civil or military"; the oral assurance
to Patterson did not specify type of plane; and Tito's
note of August 30 used the term "transports and other
planes."
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identity should be taken and the Yugoslav Government informed
Zb_y Yugoslav military force17... so that any necessary steps
could be undertaken through appropriate channels."
The Yugoslav government's self-imposed limitation on its
freedom of action against intruding planes obviously did not
extend to all possible types of unauthorized overflight.
Nonetheless, to the extent that it was more than a paper pledge,
the commitment not to enforce a landing request made it more
difficult to determine the motive of an intruding plane. Since
the motive is not always immediately apparent, any limitation
on the sovereign power's right to require such a plane to land
limits its ability to determine whether there is hostile intent.
In this sense, the U.S.-Yugoslav case had far-reaching
implications, because any assurance that cases of aerial pene-
tration will be taken up through diplomatic channels, rather
than opposed directly, raises the possibility that a foreign
power may attempt to use the opportunity for engaging in
covert missions.
The Yugoslav concession to the American viewpoint in this
case, therefore, entailed potentially important cold-war
disadvantages for the communist powers and, conversely,
potential advantages for the United States and noncommunist
powers. It is not surprising that the Soviets later asserted
an air-defense policy which, in effect, reclaimed full freedom
of action for a sovereign government in dealing with air
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In addition to securing compliance with the ultimatum and
exacting both an official written apology and an assurance
against further occurrences of this sort, the United States
also demanded that indemnities be paid by Yugoslavia before
the case could. be considered satisfactorily closed.
That a claim for indemnification would be advanced was
implicit in the reference, in the American ultimatum, to the
necessity for Yugoslavia "to right the wrong done." Indemnity
claims were reported to have been presented by Ambassador
Patterson to Tito in the meeting preceding Tito's note of
August 31, which, according to the press, was stormy. On
subsequent occasions, the U.S. State Department publicly noted
the failure of the Yugoslav government to offer indemnification.
Still further pressure on the Yugoslavs developed with-the
strike called in the United States on September 5 by American
longshoremen, who, in retaliation for the shooting down of U.S.
fliers, refused to load UNRRA shipments to Yugoslavia. This
action was accompanied by public demands from various quarters
in the United States for political and military retaliation.
The strike was called off, on September 25, only after the State
Department assured the longshoremen that most of the American
demands had been met by Yugoslavia.
On October 9, it was announced that Yugoslavia.had paid
an indemnity of $150,000 for the five American;live-s that had
been lost in the August 19 incident. The amount was 'said to
approximate what the United States had demanded. But, as had
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50.
been foreshadowed in earlier State Department comments, the
Yugoslav government refused to pay damages for the two planes.57
The Question of International Law on the Treatment of
Air Intruders
Several aspects of Yugoslav behavior in the two air
incidents were denounced by the United States as violations of
international law. Specifically, the United States argued that
lost aircraft of a friendly nation had the right of assistance
and the right of innocent passage; that the use of force without
warning against planes making unauthorized intrusions without
hostile intent was unjustified under international law, and was
a violation of the United Nations Charter; and that consular
officers should be given prompt access. to plane and personnel
in such cases, and that personnel should be promptly released.58
In its August 20 communication to the Yugoslav government
the United States asserted that lost aircraft of a friendly
nation had the right to assistance and, also, the right of
innocent passage:
57
58
The United States was reported in the press to have asked
for a total of about $300,000 to cover indemnification for
the lives of the crew and restitution for the two planes.
The reference to "without warning" in this context creates
a possible ambiguity. In its stronger formulations, the
U.S. position was that under no circumstances, with or
without prior warning, was resort to force justified in
such cases. That was in fact what Tito conceded in
saying that the Yugosiavs would not use force when. an air
intruder disregarded a request to land, but would protest
.through diplomatic channels.
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It would be assumed that the authorities of
Yugoslavia would wish to render a maximum of
assistance and succor to aircraft of a
friendly nation when the latter are forced
by hazards of navigation in bad weather over
dangerous mountain barriers to deviate from
their course and seek bearings over Yugoslav
territory....
And the U.S. note requested
...an urgent Yugoslav statement whether in
the future the U.S. Government can expect that
the Yugoslav Government will accord the usual
courtesies, including the right of innocent
passage over Yugoslav territory to U.S. aircraft
when stress of weather necessitates such
deviation from regular routes.59
In its ultimatum of August 21, the United States government
condemned the Yugoslav actions in the two incidents as
violations of the United Nations Charter:
Regardless of whether the planes were a short
distance within or without the corridor, they
were unarmed passenger planes.en route to Udine,
in Italy. Their flight in no way constituted a
threat to the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. The
use of force by Yugoslavia under the circumstances
was without the slightest justification in
international law; was clearly inconsistent with
relations between friendly States, and was a
plain violation of the obligations resting upon
Yugoslavia under the Charter of the United
60
Nations not to use force except in self-defense.
The ultimatum further noted that at no time had the Yugoslav
government advised the United States government that
unintentional overflights of a minor character by U.S. planes,
because of weather difficulties, etc., would mean that Yugoslav
forces would shoot to kill. The note concluded that the
59 De artment of State Bulletin, September 1, 1946t 1 ~ > > pp. 415-
60 Ibid., pp. 417-418.
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Yugoslav actions of August 9 and 19 were "an offense against
the law of nations and the principles of humanity."
It should be noted, too, that the threat behind the U.S.
ultimatum was-that, if Yugoslavia did not comply with its
demands, the U.S. government would call upon the Security
Council of the United Nations "to meet promptly and to take
appropriate action."
Because the controversy between the two governments was
argued at least to some extent in the context of international
law, the resolution of the dispute may be regarded as having
some significance for the development of an international law
on the treatment of air intruders. Tito's assurance against a
repetition of such incidents, however, did not imply full
acceptance of the legal position taken by the United States.
There is, rather, some reason*to believe that Tito's modification
of.Yugoslav air-defense policy did not entail a corresponding
modification of the Yugoslav view of the international law
governing such matters.
Since the Yugoslav government did not state its legal
position during the dispute as explicitly as the United States
did, the extent to which it conceded the correctness of the
U.S. position is a matter for interpretation by specialists on
the subject. Lissitzyn, for example, cautiously states that
"The Yugoslav Government appears to have acquiesced in the
legal position of the United States with respect to military
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aircraft forced by stress of weather to make an unauthorized
flight-over foreign territory." But his later discussion of
the point appears to qualify and delimit the scope of this
statement.bl For there are indications that the Yugoslav
government reserved its position on some points of law. Thus,
in giving his written assurance against repetition of such
incidents in his note of August 31, Tito hedged his expression
of regret that American lives had been lost by asserting that
the American plane had crashed "after disobeying signals tD
land."62 Further, the Yugoslav offer to pay $30,000 to the
family of each of the lost American airmen was represented as
having been "inspired by human feelings." The implication
that this was not a matter of legal obligation was reinforced
by an express denial of responsibility for the "accident" and
the assertion that the American planes "illegally flew over the
Yugoslav territory and the damage was caused through the fault
of the LAmerican7 crew, which did not obey orders of the
Yugoslav authorities to land."63 Finally, the Yugoslavs gave
further point to their position by refusing to pay compensation
for the destruction of the two American aircraft.
It would appear, then, that the official assurance of
August 31 to the effect that force would not be used thereafter
to enforce a landing request was primarily a modification of
61 Op. cit., pp. 572-573.
62
Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1946; p. 505.
63 The New York Times, October 10, 1946.
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policy, and that some effort was made to maintain inviolate
the Yugoslav legal position. The statements cited immediately
above appear, in effect, to define the Yugoslav position in
international law as follows: a sovereign power has the right
to use force to secure compliance when an intruding aircraft
disregards instructions to land.64 If this interpretation is
correct, then in effect Tito agreed, as a matter of policy,
not to use force when an air intruder refused a landing request,
but did not concede his right under international law to do so.
It is possible, of course, that Tito was less interested
in maintaining an international position per se than he was in
minimizing loss of prestige entailed by having to modify his
air-defense policy under United States pressure. Or he may have
been motivated by a desire both to save face and to reserve a
legal right that might again be fully implemented under more
favorable circumstances.
Significance of U.S.-Yugoslav Dispute for Subsequent
Air-Defense Policy and Handling of Air Incidents
It may be assumed that the firm attitude and legal position
taken by the United States in the Yugoslav dispute were closely
studied by Soviet leaders. The Soviets may have seen in this
controversy an indication of what they might have to reckon
with in the event of similar incidents resulting from Soviet
action in the future.
64 This is essentially the interpretation made by Lissitzyn,
. op. cit., p. 573.
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There is, of course, little opportunity for ascertaining
directly the impression that the U.S.-Yugoslav dispute made
upon Soviet leaders. We may, however, note the differences
between the Yugoslav handling of the August, 1946, incidents
and the Soviet handling of the first comparable incident in
which its own air-defense forces were engaged. This was the
incident of April 3, 1950, in.which a U.S. Navy Privateer was
shot down by Soviet fighters over the Baltic Sea. It was the
first postwar incident of its kind involving American and
Russian planes, and was significant in that it marked the start
of a severe Soviet air-defense policy that lasted at least until
1953. The differences between this and the Yugoslav Incidents
are significant and noteworthy in themselves;' in addition, they
might support inferences about the "lessons" that Soviet leaders
may have drawn from the earlier Yugoslav experience.
1. Soviet leaders might very well have concluded that
any hostile action on their part against an "intruding" U.S.
plane would have to be more carefully arranged than was the
Yugoslav action in order to minimize the possibility of a strong
U.S. reaction. The Yugoslavs had attempted to justify their
action on the ground, among others, that American and British
planes had for some time engaged in flagrant overflights of
Yugoslav territory for purposes of reconnaissance and military
demonstration. But the planes that the Yugoslav forces shot
down were evidently neither combat nor reconnaissance planes;
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they were unarmed passenger transports that were guilty only
of unintentional overflights of a minor character.65 Thus,
the Yugoslav air-defense policy, which might have been
politically acceptable if implemented against reconnaissance
or combat aircraft, aroused sharp political objections when it
was applied against unarmed passenger planes.
It is perhaps not fortuitous, therefore, that the first
plane shot down by Soviet air-defense forces, on April 8, 1950,
was one that could be plausibly represented as having been on
a covert reconnaissance mission. We may conjecture that the
Soviets purposely waited for such an occasion to introduce
their new, severe air-defense policy. They may well have
reasoned that, if the plane shot down either had been, or could
plausibly have been alleged to have been, on a classified
reconnaissance mission, United States leaders would not have
wanted, or would not have been able, to react as they had in
August, 1946, when they had publicly threatened to cite Yugoslavia
before the United Nations Security Council. The silence which
the Soviet government preserved for three days after the
incident of April 8 might be construed as a tacit invitation
to the United States to avoid making a public issue of the
incident if it so wished.
65 While the mission of these planes has not been authenticated
in this study, it is not without significance that the
Yugoslavs, though they had had access to both planes and
to the personnel of one plane, did not accuse either
American plane of having been on an illegal mission.
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2. In later disclosing the incident, the Soviets
described their action against the U.S. plane in terms that
served to meet and undercut the position in international law
which the United States had taken in the Yugoslav case.
Thereby, the Soviets-further minimized the possibility that
they would be confronted by strong U.S. pressure.
In reflecting upon the U.S.-Yugoslav dispute of August,
1946, Soviet leaders would have noted that the American
position imposed important limitations upon the freedom of
action of the territorial sovereign whose air space was being
violated. Hostile action against a plane making an unintentional
overflight was justified, according to the logic of that
position, only if the intruding plane first committed a hostile
act; and refusal to heed signals to land was not necessarily a
hostile act, whereas firing upon the intercepting aircraft or
other targets of the foreign country clearly was.
In justifying hostile fire upon the two U.S. planes in
August, 191+6, the Yugoslav government did not claim that these
planes had fired first. But the Soviet government did make
just that claim in justifying its hostile actions on April 8 and.
in subsequent cases; it made that claim even when it had to
fabricate the facts to do so. According to the Soviet account
of the April 8 incident, the U.S. plane not only did not land
as requested, but "it opened fire" on the Soviet fighters, who
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were compelled to return the fire.bb In inventing the story
that the unarmed Navy plane opened fire, the Soviets implicitly
conceded -- or at least avoided contradicting -- the United
States claim that hostile counteraction against an unintentional
overflight by a plane belonging to a friendly power is not
justified unless the plane first commits an openly hostile act.
3. Soviet leaders may also have gained an impression from
the U.S.-Yugoslav dispute of the limits beyond which likely
U.S. reaction to the shooting down of one of its planes would
not go. They may have noted that, while the United States made
a strong diplomatic protest to the Yugoslav government, its
military reaction was limited in scope. Although there was talk,
at the time, of providing fighter-plane protection for U.S.
transport planes that had to pass near the Yugoslav border,
such a step was not taken.b7
b7
Perhaps to lend plausibility to its account, the Soviet
government stated, and persisted in contending, that the
U.S. plane making the alleged overflight was a B-29, i.e.,
an armed military plane, whereas in fact the plane in
question was an unarmed Navy Privateer.
The New York Times, August 21 and 23, 194b. The Forrestal
Diaries indicate that on August 21 Acting Secretary of
State Acheson called the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss
ways and means for providing fighter escorts to American
planes on the Austrian-Italian route near Yugoslavia.
Forrestal noted that this "brought up the whole question
of what we had with which to back up the very strong
protest note we were sending to the Tito Government in
Yugoslavia." On August 23, Forrestal had a talk with
Acheson in which he expressed similar apprehension "about
our capabilities to meet any sudden emergency in Europe."
(Walter Millis /d_7, The Forrestal Diaries, The Viking
Press, New York, 1951, PP. 195-196.)
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It is true that a U.S. naval task force happened to be in
the Mediterranean at the time of the.Yugoslav incidents and
that this may have served the purpose of a military demonstration
to some extent. And it is true, further, that U.S. flights on
the Vienna-Udine route, which had been canceled on August 20,
were ordered resumed, on August 25, with armed B-17 (Flying
Fortress) bombers.
But according to the U.S. note of September 3, the use of
armed planes on the Vienna-Udine route did not connote a
forceful military attitude. U.S. orders provided that if,
upon reaching Klagenfurt, Austria, the B-17's encountered bad
weather that created the possibility of an unintentional
overflight of Yugoslavia, they were not to proceed to Udine,
but were to return to Vienna.
Thus, Soviet leaders could have noted that, when American
planes were shot down, the United States did not precipitously
resort to military reprisals, and did not utilize or threaten
military sanctions in order to humiliate the Yugoslavs or to
force them to retreat. They probably noted that the 48-hour
U.S. ultimatum was backed only by a threat to cite the
Yugoslav government before the United Nations Security Council.
Such a threat, while probably not viewed with equanimity by
communist leaders, would not be considered by them to be as
serious as a threat of military counteraction.
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What is more, the Soviets would interpret such American
restraint as motivated not by principles or morality but
solely by considerations of political expediency. They
probably found, in the U.S.-Yugoslav dispute, confirmation for
their general belief that important steps in United States
foreign policy, such as the use or threat of military force
against opponents, are not taken impulsively but are part of
a carefully prepared and soberly deliberated overall strategic
policy. And they probably would have felt confirmed also in
their deep-seated belief that U.S. leaders are hard-boiled
power politicians who do not permit themselves to yield to
provocation, i.e., who do not permit their international
policies and behavior to be determined by such minor provocations
as the occasional shooting down of a plane.
In sum, from their analysis of the U.S.-Yugoslav dispute,
Soviet leaders might well have drawn two important conclusions:
(1) U.S. reactions to future incidents of this type could be
assigned predictable limits; and, therefore (2) similar Soviet
actions against American planes would entail limited risks so
long as the Politburo correctly read U.S. overall strategic
intentions. Moreover, the Soviets may have reasoned, if the
United States'did not take strong military steps against
Yugoslavia, it would be even less likely to do so against a
major opponent such as the U.S.S.R.
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4. Finally, and this is the most speculative possibility
of all, it is possible that, after the incidents of August,
1946, American planes went out of their way to avoid overflying
Yugoslavia. If this is so, and if the Yugoslavs should have
mentioned this to Moscow, it is possible that the Soviet Union
felt further emboldened to shoot down American planes by what
they might have construed as an indication that the United
States tended to adopt a more cautious position on overflight
following hostile interception of its planes. This hypothesis
is purely speculative, since we have no information whatever
on American reconnaissance overflights of Yugoslavia or on
Yugoslav communications to Moscow on the subject.
Yugoslavs Charge that U.S. Overflights Have Reconnaissance
and Demonstration Purposes
The two incidents of August 9 and 19, 1946, were preceded
and followed by Yugoslav charges that large-scale and systematic
overflights of Yugoslav territory were being made by American
planes. On several occasions the Yugoslav government charged
that these flights were being made for purposes of reconnaissance
and demonstration. According to press accounts, the Yugoslav
government was seriously concerned over aerial reconnaissance
that was said to be taking place over the "Morgan Line," which
divided the Allied and Yugoslav zones in the disputed Trieste
(Venezia Giulia) area. So far as is known, official U.S. notes
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to Yugoslavia during the dispute never explicitly discussed the
reconnaissance charge. Rather, the Americans refuted this
allegation indirectly by citing data on the limited number of
flights in that area by U.S. planes. It is difficult to
evaluate the motives behind the Yugoslav allegations.
In its note of August 10, 1946, to the United States, the
Yugoslav government charged that unauthorized overflights of
Yugoslavia by Allied planes, "mostly American," had begun in
February, 1946. Earlier, in the course of a foreign-policy
speech to the Yugoslav Parliament on April 1, 1946, Tito had
charged that Allied planes had been flying over Yugoslav
territory. He also stated that Great Britain had not yet
answered an official protest against such flights by British
planes.68 The British Foreign Office replied, on the fdlowing
day, that bad weather had forced British planes off course. 69
The Yugoslav Ministry of National Defense evidently took
up the problem of unauthorized overflights with U.S. military
and air-force attaches on several occasions. On July 10, 1946,
the Yugoslav chief of the General Staff sent a personal latter
to the U.S. military attache warning him of the seriousness of
these cases.70 According to the Yugoslav source, the American
military and air-force attaches replied, on July 16 and August
7, to the effect that they had received no replies on this
68
69
The mew York Times, April 2, 1946.
Ibid., April 3, 1946.
70
Vladimir Dedijer, Tito, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1953,
pp. 251, 253. This-information has not been checked
against official U.S. accounts.
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matter from competent American military authorities in Italy
and Austria. In the August 7 reply, the U.S. mi]Jtary attache
was said to have noted that a recent order issued by the United
States government prohibited American fliers from flying over
the territory of friendly countries without permission.71
It is perhaps not without significance that the first air
incident occurred two days after the reply of the U.S. military
attache of August 7. It is possible that hostile air-defense
measures were ordered by the Yugoslav government following its
failure to get what it considered a satisfactory diplomatic
reply to its protests.72 Another possibility is that with the
assurance, on August 7, that the U.S. government had forbidden
overflights of friendly countries, it now appeared politically
feasible to Yugoslav authorities henceforth to shoot down U.S.
planes caught in air violations.
71
72
Ibid. See also Yugoslav note of August 10, 1946: "Since
February 9 this.year Allied planes, mostly American, Shave
been flying independently in violation of Yugoslav
territory despite repeated warnings and notes to the
military attache in the American Embassy as well as in a
speech by Marshal Tito to the Yugoslav Parliament in
April. The LU.S_7 military attache reported that he had
delivered the note to the proper authorities and informed
the Yugoslav Government that Washington had issued an
order forbidding American planes to fly over the
territory of friendly nations." (Quoted in The New York
Times, August 12, 1946.)
Such an attitude was conveyed -- though possibly for
propaganda purposes -- by Tito in a speech on August 21,
just after the second air incident. Tito stated that the
Yugoslav government had protested "on numerous occasions"
recently against such air violations but had always
received the reply: "'give us the numbers of the planes."'
"How," he asked, "could we see the markings on planes
which fly at up to 6,000 feet?" (The New York Times,
August 21, 1946.)
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In a speech on August 21, Tito implicitly defended the
Yugoslav action against the two U.S. planes. Recalling his
earlier statement, of April 1, to the Yugoslav Parliament on
the matter of Allied overflights, Tito charged that the
violations had continued despite his protests:
...I would like to draw your attention to this
matter as I wish to prove who in fact wants
peace and who does not care about it; I wish
to prove who is making provocations and who
wishes to deny us our rights. On that
particular occasion I raised the matter of
the systematic violation of our frontiers and
our territories over which daily fly not single
but tens of planes. However, such violations....
did not stop after I raised the matter....73
The inability of the Yugoslav government to secure a
cessation of the overflights by diplomatic means was explicitly
stated by Kardelj, Yugoslav Vice-Premier, to be the reason for
resort to military action. Following the August air incidents,
Kardelj was interviewed by the press in Paris, where he was
attending the Peace Conference. He charged that, since an
earlier Yugoslav protest against Allied overflights, 126
violations, mostly by American aircraft, had taken place, and
that such violations were continuing. Kardelj added: "There
was nothing left but to shoot them down."7
73 The New York Times, August 22, 1946.
74 "Ibid., August 22, 1946. A similar attitude on the part
of the Yugoslav government was reported from Belgrade by
the New York Times correspondent. According'to this
account, Yugoslav authorities had felt insulted by what
they depicted as the U.S. failure to answer earlier
Yugoslav protests. "They claim they were thus forced to
take 'energetic action."' According to the Yugoslavs,
the British had immediately answered the first Yugoslav
protest by informing the Yugoslavs of an order prohibiting
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In his written statement to U.S. newsmen of August 22, Tito
publicly charged -- apparently for the first time -- that
overflights of Yugoslav territory were being staged by the United
States for purposes of demonstration and intimidation, "to
create the impression among the Yugoslavs that the forces of
the United States are so overwhelming that the Yugoslav
Government must take everything." Whole U.S. squadrons, he
said, had been flying over Yugoslav territory.75
Unexpected support for Yugoslav charges appeared in
statements made by crew members of the first U.S. C-47 shot
down on.August 9. Interviewed by Allied correspondents following
their release by the Yugoslavs, these crew members were reported
to have stated that they knew of "frequent flights of both
American and British airplanes over Yugoslav territory recently"
which numbered as many as twenty a day.76
An unofficial explanation of Yugoslav air-defense actions
was given to the press by Yugoslav sources at the Paris Peace
Conference, which was then in session. According to these
sources, the Yugoslav government had long been aroused by the
continued disregard of regulations forbidding unauthorized
74 (Cont'd)
such flights, and there had been no trouble with them
subsequently. In contrast, while the Americans said they
issued a similar order, it was -- according to the
Yugoslavs -- never carried out. (The New York Times,
August 25, 1946.)
Ibid. August 23 1946. Substantially the same charge was
repeated and elaborated by Tito in a fuller reply to the
U.S. correspondents several days later. (Ibid., August
25, 1946.)
to Ibid., August 23, 1946.
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66.
flights. Yugoslavia, these sources claimed, had the same right
to regulate air traffic over her borders as had other countries,
notably the U.S.S.R., which had done just that since the war.77
In a more complete reply to the written questions of two
U.S. correspondents, Tito, on August 24, was reported to have
brought "the real issue regarding United States planes flying
over Yugoslav territory into the open for the first time...."
Tito charged that "these flights over our territory, not only
on the part of fighter planes but also military transport
planes, aim at reconnoitering those regions in which-our
military units occupying Zone B and the rest of the frontier
LVenezia Giulia areal are situated.-"78 The Times correspondent
added that the obvious implication in all Yugoslav complaiLnts
against overflights was that they were protesting not merely
because of infringement of their international rights, but also,
since the only part of Yugoslavia mentioned in the protest
notes was the northwest corner of the country, because military
security was involved.79
When receiving the U.S. ultimatum from U.S. Ambassador
Patterson on August 22, Tito referred explicitly to the matter
of overflights of the Morgan Line by Allied planes. According
to Ambassador Patterson's cabled account of the meeting, Tito
"refuted the LState7 Department's figures of authorized flights
The Nev York Times, August 239 1946.
78 Ibid., August 25, 1946.
79 Ibid.
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as not including frequent unscheduled excursions of military
aircraft from Allied fields near Morgan Line. He said such
flights numbered it thousands and were deliberate flouting of
Yugoslav sovereignty and attempt to impress Yugoslavs with
Allied strength." 80
The most detailed refutation of Yugoslav charges of air
violations was contained in the U.S. note of September 3.81
The United States noted that in each of the time periods
mentioned by the Yugoslav government the total number of flights
by American planes which passed close enough to Yugoslav
territory to have possibly committed inadvertent overflights
was appreciably below the number of violations alleged. From
this, the United States did not explicitly infer that Yugoslav
charges were contrived, but it concluded that the violations
set forth in the official Yugoslav notes must have been made
by planes other than those of the United States.
The United States stated that the facts adduced in its note
were based on a thorough and comprehensive investigation: The
records of various U.S. military headquarters in Europe had
been consulted in order to verify the whereabouts of every
American plane on the dates in question. Therefore, the U.S.
note implicitly answered Tito's charge that a large number of
the overflights in question were taking place over the Morgan
80 `text of Patterson's report on the visit to Tito dated
August 22, 9:00 p.m.;.The New York Times, Augusi 25, 1946.
81 The Yugoslavs charged 278 violations from July 16 to
August 29, 1946, as follows: 172 in the period July 16 to
August 8; 44 in the period August 10 to 20; 62 in the
period August 20 to 30.
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Line in Venezia Giulia (Trieste). The U.S. note, however, did
not explicitly. take up the charge of aerial reconnaissance,
perhaps because this charge had not been conveyed in any of
the official Yugoslav diplomatic notes to the United States.
On August 25, the Yugoslav Ministry of Information charged
that 110 violations of Yugoslav territory had been committed
by "Anglo-American military planes" (of which 91 were war
planes, and the remainder transports or unidentified planes)
between August 10 and August 20. This oblique reference to
Allied excursions over the Morgan Line was promptly challenged
by General Morgan, Supreme Allied Mediterranean Commander, who
described the Yugoslav charges as "irresponsible or malicious,"
and pointed out that the most stringent precautions had been
taken to prevent such occurrences.82
Following the U.S. reply of September 3, 1946, there were,
apparently, no further public Yugoslav charges of U.S. air
violations for several years. In April, 1948, the Yugoslav
government, in a note to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, which was circulated also to members of the Security
Council, alleged "steadily increasing violations of the Yugoslav
air-space by American airplanes." The Yugoslav note listed
twenty-one such violations in the period from January 1 to
March 31, 1948, and stated that it had vainly protested to the
U.S. government.83
82 The.New York Times, August 26, 1946.
83 United Nations, Press Release M/421, April 20, 1948.
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At this time the Yugoslav government did not threaten action
against further intrusions, and if any of the alleged violations
did occur, no military counteraction appears to have been taken.
In fact, the only air incident involving U.S. planes over
Yugoslavia known to have occurred after Tito's pledge in
August,,-1946, was the forcing down in November, 1951, of a U.S.
military plane which strayed outside the area in which it was
authorized to search for a missing U.S. plane.84
Yugoslav-Soviet Reaction to U.S. Ultimatum
We have noted that Tito quickly moved to meet U.S. demands
during the short period after the American ulimatum of August
21, 1946, was disclosed in the United States but before it was
formally presented to him in Yugoslavia. Evidently, Tito wished
to avoid the damaging impression that his retreat was in-
response'to the ultimatum. Treatment of the dispute in public
Yugoslav sources also was designed to preserve Tito's prestige.
Initial domestic Yugoslav treatment contained no hint of
any tension in the situation. Belgrade newspapers carried brief'
stories of developments in the diplomatic dispute over the two
air incidents. None of them spoke of the American note of August
21 as being an ultimatum. The second air incident, on August 19,
was first mentioned in the Yugoslav press only on the morning
of August 23. The Yugoslav press version of the conference
84
The New York Times, November 23, 1951.
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between Tito and U.S. Ambassador Patterson at Bled, at which the
ultimatum was delivered, was also face-saving: "The result of
this meeting gives hope that in the future such incidents will
be abolished by joint action of both Governments."85
Later, to the domestic Yugoslav audience, the Belgrade
radio stated that Tito had "rejected" the ultimatum. In
English-language broadcasts, however, the term "declined" was
used. The contents of the ultimatum were said to have become
"irrelevant" with the release of the interned American fliers
before receipt of the U.S. note.bb
On the following day, August 24, the General Secretariat
of the Cabinetcf the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
issued a statement that Tito had set aside the U.S. ultimatum
as "inapplicable."87
Evidently, a similar position had been taken by Tito
himself when U.S. Ambassador Patterson presented him, on August
22, with the note containing the ultimatum. Referring to this
meeting later, when giving written confirmation of his
earlier oral assurances to Patterson, Tito added: "I also
confirm my statement made on that occasion... that I consider
objectless the American Government's note which was, to our
surprise, unnecessarily and without reason too strong toward
an Allied country as is Yugoslavia."88
nr-
Ibid.,
August 24,
1946.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.,
August 25,
1946.
88
Ibid.,
September 4, 1946.
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RM-1349
71.
By August 25, despite initial Yugoslav efforts to conceal
the diplomatic crisis, popular anxiety had evidently reached a
point which made it incumbent upon Yugoslav authorities. to deal
openly with the issue. The Belgrade press now carried a strong
denunciation of the Western powers for what it called a planned
campaign to utilize the air incidents for purposes of
discrediting Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference. The
official Yugoslav communist organ, Borba, carried a four-column
editorial, "Invented Campaign against Yugoslavia," which
assailed the foreign press for describing the U.S. note as an
ultimatum. "This campaign," Borba charged, "is aimed not only
at Yugoslavia, but simultaneously it is an attempt to poison
the international situation.... This provocation has been brought
about just at a time when Yugoslavia is trying to fight for
a democratic peace and for her rights."89
On the same day, Moscow, which had similarly played down
the emerging diplomatic crisis-and_had not as yet published the
U.S. ultimatum note, openly denounced the ultimatum as
"unprecedentedly impertinent pressure...by no means justified
by the circumstances." Yakov Victorov in Pravda stated that
the United States "took advantage of the fact that Yugoslav
planes had forced an American plane to land and sent an
unprecedentedly sharp note... demanding in ultimatum form the
release within 48 hours of the interned passengers."90
89 Ibid., August 26, 1946.
90 I bid.
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Paralleling Yugoslav comment, the Pravda article charged
that the strong U.S. reaction was not justified, and that the
two air incidents were being utilized as a pretext to exert
pressure upon Yugoslavia and to-discredit her at the Paris
Peace Conference. Similarly, the Pravda article attempted, as
had the.Yugoslavs themselves, to obscure the fact that Tito
had been forced by the ultimatum to make concessions.
The Pravda article implicitly regarded the U.S. ultimatum
as a provocation to which, by making appropriate concessions,
Yugoslavia had not yielded. Thus, after noting that Yugoslavia
had released the-interned U.S. crew, the Pravda article
concluded: "Thanks to the wisdom of the Government of
Yugoslavia, the 'incident' was not aggravated.1191
More generally, Pravda observed that the "abrupt and
arrogant position taken by the United States in connection with
the incident is proof that the tendencies for conducting a
policy of force are winning over the American policy-makers."92
14. SOVIET PLANE IN FORCED LANDING IN
U.S.-OCCUPIED SOUTH KOREA
(August 25, 1946)
A two-seater Red Army liaison plane en route from
Vladivostok to Dairen landed at Kimpo airfield outside of
91 Earlier press reports from the Paris Peace Conference carried
1r ubstanliated ruinois that MMolotov h da ur ?de~Cestr int upon
the Yugc?s avs In e r con 13c w th he ci sta es in a t meeting on August 22 with Yugoslav V ce-P mier Karde
(The New York Times Au ust 23 and 2 , 1946). There is no
reference to oscowls attitude toward the U.S.-Yugoslav
dispute in Dedijer's official biography of Tito (op. cit.).
7` The New York Times, August 26, 1946.
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Seoul on August 25 without incident. The Soviet pilot explained
he had lost his course, which included Pyongyang, capital of the
Soviet-occupied North Korean Zone, and had run dangerously low
on gasoline when he sighted the field and landed.
Announcement of the forced landing was made by U.S. Army
authorities in Seoul on August 26. After obtaining clearance,
the Soviet plane resumed its flight on the following day.93
15. SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS OF SWEDISH TERRITORY
(August, 1946, and November, 1947)
During the dispute with the U.S.S.R. over the shooting
down of two Swedish planes in June, 1952, the Swedish government
had occasion to recall earlier violations of Swedish territory
by Soviet planes. The Soviet government contended that its
planes never violated the frontiers of other states. The Swedish
government promptly recalled, in its note of July 1, 1952, that
the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs had on two previous
occasions admitted overflights of the fortified (Swedish) area
of Karlskrona.
Those two Soviet overflights had been protested by the
Swedish government in notes dated August 28, 1946, and September
25, 1947. Soviet notes admitting the overflights were dated
93 The New York Times, August 27 and 28, 1946.
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October 24, 1946, and November 14, 1947. The dates on which
the overflights actually took place, however, were not disclosed.
The Soviet government in its reply on July 16, 1952, recalled
that, as had been conveyed to the Swedish government at the
time, the Soviet overflights in question had been due to faulty
navigation. No other details regarding the overflights were
given by either the Swedish or the Soviet governments. 94
The Swedish government's reference to the earlier Soviet
air violations seems to have been a belated disclosure; we
have no evidence that the Soviet overflights were publicized
at the time.95
16. TURKISH PLANES-REPORTED MISSING AFTER
OVERFLIGHT OF SOVIET BORDER
(September 9, 1946)
The Turkish newspaper Tasvir reported that two Turkish
planes which overflew the eastern border adjoining Soviet Russia
were missing. No further details were contained in the dispatch
from Istanbul of September 9, 1946.96
94
Attacks upon Two Swedish Aircraft over the Baltic in June
1 2: Documents Published by the Royal Ministr for
Foreign Affairs, New Series 11:2, Stockholm, 1952.
95 See also case study No. 66.
96 Th.-e- York Times, September. 10, 1946.
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17. YUGOSLAV MILITARY~AND DIPLOMATIC ACTION
AGAINST ALLEGED GREEK OVERFLIGHTS
(September to December, 1946)
RM-1349
75.
On September 6, 1946, it was reported that the Yugoslav
government had charged a violation of its frontier on the
preceding day by a Greek reconnaissance plane. According to
the Yugoslav account, which alleged that similar violations
had occurred in the past, the Greek plane was forced down by
Yugoslav fighters. The Greek account held that the incident
was of no importance; the plane in question was-said to have
been off course when it was hit and forced down by anti-
aircraft fire. The Greek statement added that the Greek
plane did not carry a camera.97
The incident touched off a diplomatic controversy in
which both sides accused each-other of new air violations.
Major developments were reported as follows in the New York
Times on the dates indicated:
September 7. 1946:
Belgrade charged a provocation by Greek
planes; it alleged that a Greek Spitfire
which crashed in Yugoslav territory had
fired its machine guns and that documents
discovered in the wreckage showed that the
flight had been planned for provocational
purposes.
September 11, 1946:
The Greek Government demanded the release
of the pilot of the plane forced down on
September 5.
97 The New York Times, September 7, 1946.
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76.
September 29, 1946;
The Yugoslav Government accepted a Greek
proposal fora joint inquiry.
.October 213 ].946:
The Greek plane and pilot were freed.
November 24, 1946:
The Yugoslav Government charged border
violations by Greek planes and announced
its intention to protest to the United
Nations.
November 25, 1946:
The Greek Government charged the Yugoslavs
with making overflights of Greece.
November 263 1946:
The Greek Government denied the Yugoslav
charges and was reported as ready to ask
for a U.N. inquiry.
December 9, 1946:
The Greek Government was reported
investigating a Yugoslav complaint of a
new air incident.
18. BRITISH R.A.F. PLANE FORCED TO LAND
BY YUGOSLAV AQ LITARY PLANE
(October. 5, 1946)
An R.A.F. courier plane en route from Bucharest to Beri,
Italy, was forced by signals from a Yugoslav combat craft to
land near Nish, Lugoslavia. The British overflight was not
unauthorized; it had been cleared by Yugoslav air authorities.
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The R.A.F. plane was not shot down, and the character of the
signal employed by the Yugoslav plane was not mentioned in
the public report of the incident. Following the incident,
all R.A.F. flights over Yugoslavia were canceled.98
On the following day it was announced that the R.A.F.
plane had been freed after a protest by the British ambassador
to Belgrade. It was also reported that the British regarded
the incident as resulting from a misunderstanding and planned
no diplomatic action.
Significance
The present incident occurred shortly after the U.S.-
Yugoslav dispute over the shooting down of two U.S. transports
over Yugoslavia in August, 1946.99 That dispute had resulted
in a Yugoslav assurance that U.S. planes making unauthorized
flights would not be fired upon even if they did not follow
instructions to land. The present incident involving-the
British plane cast no light on the question whether Tito's
assurance to the United States also applied to British planes
making unauthorized overflights of Yugoslavia. For, in this
instance, the British plane observed the signal from the
Yugoslav plane requesting it to land, and there is no indication
that the Yugoslav'plane resorted to fire.
98 The New York Times, October 6, 1946.
99 See case study No. 13.
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19. SOVIET REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY RESTRICTION ON
U. S. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN FLIGHTS OVER
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND RUMANIA
(October, 19")
On October 9, 1946, U.S. military authorities in Frankfurt,
Germany, disclosed.that they had placed a temporary ban on
flights by U.S. military and civilian planes to Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Rumania. The disclosure was made by a public
relations officer, who stated that no further details could be
given.
Efforts made by the press to clarify the nature of the
ban resulted in disclosure of additional information in the
next few days. But the reasons for the temporary ban were not
clarified. On October 10, U.S. authorities in Frankfurt
indicated that Czechoslovakia and Hungary had been removed
from the ban. Higher U.S. officers were reported to have been
under the impression that the order in question was in response
to a Russian request for a temporary ban on such flights. But
U.S. Air Force Headquarters in Frankfurt, from which this
statement originated, was reported by the press to have back-
tracked later and to have insisted that an explanation could
be obtained only in.Washington. The Russian request, it was
guessed, might be related to the possibility that the Soviets
were planning either large-scale troop movements or demolitions
in the areas in question. Information reportedly coming from
the Pan American Airways office in Germany was said to have
given October 9-14 as the period of the ban on such flights.
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From Washington, D.C., the Associated Press was able to
report on October 10, 1946, that a similar ban, introduced
apparently at the request of the Russians, had been in effect
earlier in the year.
On the same day, London sources attributed the October
ban to Russian military and air maneuvers. But, at the same
time, British commercial aircraft companies indicated that
they had received no orders to suspend flights traversing the
same areas. This raised the possibility that the United
States may have itself voluntarily initiated the ban on flights
to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania.
On October 11, the U.S. Army was reported to have restored
air traffic to Central Europe, though it remained silent on
the reason for the temporary ban.100
20. BULGARIAN CHARGE OF OVERFLIGHTS BY
UNKNOWN PLANES FROM GREECE
(December 1, 1946)
In the New York Times of December 2, 1946, the Bulgarian
government was reported to have charged that planes of unknown
origin coming from Greece had overflown Bulgarian territory on
seven occasions in five weeks.
100 The New York Times, October 1(,, 11,,and 12, 1946.
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21. U.S. PLANE IN EMERGENCY LANDING IN HUNGARY
,(December 1, 1946)
Em-1.x,+9
80.
While on a training flight over Germany on December 1, 1946,
a U.S. attack bomber (A-26) became lost and was forced to make
an emergency landing 18') miles east of Budapest.
A public announcement by U.S. officials in Frankfurt,
Germany, gave no indication that the A-26 had been intercepted
by Soviet planes or had encountered any form of military
counteraction while over Soviet-dominated territories. United
States officials emphasized, on December 6, that the plane was
not being held by the Russians but was undergoing routine
clearance procedures. They were unable to explain the delay
in clearing the plane.
There is no record of a Soviet or Hungarian protest of an
air violation in this case, 101
22. SOVIET PLANE IN FORCED LANDING IN GREECE
(December, 1946)
A Soviet plane was reported to have made a forced landing
on Greek territory (Sirirocastron). A Greek military
investigation of the incident resulted in a finding that there
was no cause for suspicion. Several days later, it was announced
that the Soviet plane and its crew had been freed.102
The New York Times, December 7, 194b.
102 Ibid., December 24 and 27, 1946.
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23. SOVIET PROTEST OF THREE ALLEGED U. S. AIR
VIOLATIONS IN FAR EAST
(August 3, October 28, October 29, 1947)
A Soviet note dated December 1, 1947, protested the
following alleged violations of Soviet territory by U.S. planes:
(1) August 3, 1947: In the Sea of Chukotsk, 35 miles
northeast of Cape Wellen, a U.S. plane violated
Soviet territorial waters and circled a Soviet vessel.
(2) October 28, 1947: Three two-motored,U.S. bombers
overflew two Soviet islands (Akiura-Sima and Iuri-Sima)
in the Lesser Kuriles chain.
(3) October 29. 1947: A single U.S. plane overflew
Akiura-Sims in the Lesser Kuriles chain.
The Soviet note concluded by expressing the hope that the
U.S. government would give necessary instructions to appropriate
military authorities regarding the inadmissibility of future
violations.
(USAF later told the State Department103 that the only
U.S. planes in the vicinity on October 28, 1947, had been two
Piper Cubs on an around-the-world mission, and a B-17 which had
accompanied them part of the way; no overflights were indicated
on the flight log.)
Apparently neither side publicized the alleged air
violations or the Soviet protest note.. Nothing on the subject
was found in the New York Times.
103 Both the Soviet note and the USAF communication are
available in the Department of State files; RESTRICTED.
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Significance
The unwillingness or inability to take any military
counteraction against the alleged air intruders was evidently
felt by Soviet leaders to make it necessary once again to
resort to diplomatic communi-cation in order to make known their
opposition to such "encroachments." We are unable to account
for the delay in the Soviet protest, or for its timing.
24. SOVIET PROTEST OF U.S. OVERFLIGHT OF
BIG DIOMEDE ISLAND (BERING STRAITS)
(December, 1947)
In a note on January 5, 1948, the Soviet government charged
that a U.S. four-engined plane had made a two-mile penetration
over Big Diomede Island on December 27, 1947. USAF later told
.the State Department that a U.S. plane on a search mission on
December 25, 1947, had flown over Little Diomede Island (which
is U.S. territory) but not over Big Diomede Island. This formed
the substance of an official reply to the Soviet note, in which
the U.S. government stated that it was convinced that no
violation of Soviet frontiers had occurred.101+
The tone of the January Soviet note was somewhat stronger
than that used in earlier notes regarding alleged U.S. air
violations in the Far East, but it contained no threats, either
104 The Soviet note, the USAF communication to the State
Department, and the U.S. reply are available in the
Department of State files; RESTRICTED.
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direct or implicit. The note concluded by observing that the
Soviet Foreign Office "reiterates its protest and insists that
the Government of the United States undertake urgent measures
for the elimination of violations of Soviet frontiers in the
future."
Apparently neither side publicized the alleged air
violation, or the Soviet note.. Nothing on the subject was
found in the New York Times.
Significance
This case appears to illustrate, once again, a principle
of Soviet behavior: if no action is taken against an
"encroachment," then it must be protested verbally.
25. SOVIET EFFORT TO LIMIT j4.IED USE
OF VIENNA AIR CORRIDOR
(April, 1948)
On April 7, 1948, Soviet authorities in Vienna were
reported as persisting in their demand that U.S. authorities
remove their aviation-range station from Soviet territory,
five miles from Tulln airfield, which was being used by U.S.
forces. The Soviet insistence followed a letter of protest,
dated April 7, from Lt.. General Geoffrey Keyes, U.S. Occupation
Chief. The aviation-range station in quc,= lion, had -.been erected
105 This case study is based on unclassified materials only;
access to classified materials would be necessary for a
fuller account of developments.
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84.
a year before with the knowledge and co-operation of the Soviets.
The removal of the station, General Keyest letter pointed out,
might lead to inadvertent violations, by U.S. aircraft, of the
twelve-mile-wide air corridor into Vienna. It was the
impression of U.S. observers thc-.t the Soviet demand might be
the first in a series of atto'pts to isolate the Western
occupation forces in-Vienna, as had happened in Berlin, 106
On April 16, it was reported that Colonel General L. V.
Kurasov, Soviet commander in Vienna, had called on the British
to "cease forthwith the violation of agreements by your use of
Schwechat airport for civilian aviation." Kurasov's statement
was made in reply to a protest by Lieutenant General Galloway,
British commander, against a Russian denial of free and unimpeded
access to the British airfield. A British spokesman said that
the flights by British aircraft would continue, since the
agreement signed by the Russians in July, 1945, had not specified
the type of planes authorized to fly the corridor.107
Soviet pressure on the Allied position in Vienna at this
time was also aimed at blocking the highway to the U.S. airport
at Tulln. It was intimated to the press that Kurasov, in a
forthcoming reply to a protest from General Keyes about a
roadblock on the highway, would charge violation of air
agreements.108
l06
The New York Times, April 0, 1'48.
.&W( Ibid., April 17, 1948.
108 Ibid., Vienna dispatch dated April 16.
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However, on the fQUowing day, the Russians suddenly lifted
the ground blockade of Tulin airport.109
Later in April, Soviet authorities in Vienna proposed a
pact curbing use of airfields in the Vienna area. Following
a quick rejection of the Soviet proposal by the Western powers,
the plan was dropped by the. Soviet authorities.110
26. AIR COLLISION OF BRITISH AND SOFT PLANES
OVER GATOW AIRFIELD, BERLIN
(April 5, 1948)
On April 5, 1948, a Russian fighter plane suddenly dove
into a British passenger plane, as the latter was preparing to
land at Gatow airport in the British sector of Berlin. Both
planes crashed. The Russian pilot and all fourteen passengers
of the British plane, including two Americans, were killed.
The Gatow incident occurred almost at the beginning of the
crisis over the Berlin blockade. The Soviets were just
beginning, by various pressure devices, to feel out the Western
powers before instituting a full blockade. The Allied airlift
to Berlin had not yet been organized. Diplomatic efforts to
resolve the issue of responsibility for the Gatow air accident
were unsuccessful. But the handling of the Gatow incident may
109 The New York Times, April 18, 1947; Vienna dispatch dated
110 April .
Ibid., April 27 and 30, May 1, 1948.
ill This account is based solely on newspaper sources.
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have had some importance in providing both sides with certain
indications as to the measures and risks the other was likely
to take in the developing Battle of Berlin.
Significance
From the reaction of the Western powers to the Gatow
incident the Soviets may well have derived an indication of the
Allies' determination to resist by force, if necessary, any
direct Soviet effort to deny them the free use of.the Berlin
air corridors. According to this hypothesis, the Gatow incident
could well have been indirectly responsible in part for the
caution and restraint which the Soviets subsequently observed
in attempting to interfere with the Western airlift into Berlin.
Immediately following the Gatow crash, General Robertson,
British occupation chief, ordered fighter escorts for all
British passenger planes. General Clay, the American commander,
promptly followed suit. On the day of the incident, April 5,
Robertson conferred with Marshal Sokolovsky, the Soviet
occupation chief, and vigorously protested the incident.
According to the account of the meeting appearing in the New
York Times of April 6, 1948, Sokolovsky expressed deep regret,
and assured Robertson that no interference with the passage of
British planes through the agreed corridor was "or is" intended.
British Foreign Secitary Bevin later told Parliament that
Sokolovsky had given Robertson oral assurances to this effect,
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and that the British were then waiting for the assurances to be
put in writing.112
Upon receiving the Soviet commander's oral apology and
assurance that the action of the Russian plane was not
deliberately hostile, General Robertson canceled his order for
fighter escorts.113 A Times story from London on April 6 noted
that the earlier decision to provide fighter escorts for British
and American planes had proved that Britain and the United
States were willing to risk war, or something approximating it,
unless the Russians ceased their provocation. It was reported
that the British Foreign Office had taken a "very serious view"
of the Gatow incident, but that tension had been eased by
Marshal Sokolovsky's assurances to General Robertson.
Robertson followed up his oral and written protest of
April 5 with another letter to Sokolovsky, on April 6, which
outlined specific guarantees sought for British planes flying
the corridor.114 Several days later, the texts of both of
General Robertson's letters were released.115 In them,
Robertson charged that the usual routine warning that a Soviet
plane was in the air had not been given in the case of the
fighter plane which crashed into the British plane. Robertson
demanded from Sokolovsky an "assurance that you condemn as
112
The New York Times, April 7, 1948.
113
Ibid.,
April 6,
1948.
114
Ibid.,
April 7,
1948.
115
Ibid.,
April 10,
1948.
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strongly as I do the fact that this fighter aircraft was in
the air without prior notification and that it was flown in a
manner to cause this catastrophe."116 Robertson also
requested "positive assurance" that British aircraft would be
"immune from molestation" and announced his intention to send
up fighter craft as protection until Q'ich assurance had been
received.117
On April 7, however, Sokolovsky reversed his position
on the incident and put out a version of the "facts" which
laid responsibility for the accident on the British plane.
In his reply to Robertson (published in TOgliche Rundschau on
April 8 and reported in the New York Times on the same day),
Sokolovsky charged that British efforts to present the Gatow
accident as. the result of a planned action by the Soviet
pilot were a.defamation which apparently had provocative aims.
Sokolovsky claimed that the accident was due to the British
planets action in coming out of the clouds over Dallgow, a
nearby Soviet airfield, and crashing into the tail of the
Soviet fighter as it was landing. The British plane had
"violated" regulations laid down by the Allied Control
Authorities in that the Soviets had not been informed of its
departure.
116 The New York Times, April 10, 1948.
117 I bid.
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Sokolovsky's note ended with an implicit threat: "I hope
you will issue the necessary orders to British planes for the
strict following out of air-safety directives outlined by the
Allied'Control Council. This will forestall me from the
necessity of taking measures for the protection and security
of traffic over the Soviet occupation zone of Germany...."
In London it was believed that Sokolovsky had been
reproached by Moscow for his earlier apology, and forced to
write the letter of April 7 placing blame for the incident on
the British.118
Confronted by--the new Soviet countercharge, British
authorities changed their own position. In a new letter to
Soko?lovsky, Robertson dropped a demand for a quadripartite
investigation that he had made in his letter of April 6.119
118 The New York Times, April 9, 1948.
In'his letter of April 7, Sokolovsky had indicated
willingness to participate in a'joint Soviet-British
commission to investigate the circumstances of the
accident, but had objected to a quadripartite investigation
on the ground that delays would ensue. Subsequently, the
effort to conduct a joint British-Soviet investigation into
the accident quickly broke down as a result of Soviet
objections to hearing testimony from German and American
eyewitnesses. The British went ahead with the inquiry on
their own. Later, when the British had concluded the
inquiry and were.about to issue a report, the Soviets made
a last-minute effort to re-establish the joint commission.
In a letter to the British, the Soviets withdrew their
initial objection, agreeing to hear all witnesses,
regardless of nationality. The Soviet effort was
unsuccessful however; the British commission its.
report shortly after receipt of the Soviet letter
possibly before it was opened and. read. The British
report blamed the Soviet plane for the crash. Subsequently,
a Soviet investigation report was published which accused
the British of falsifying their report. Both sides filed
diplomatic claims for compensation. (The New York Times,
April 14, 17, 18, 20, 23; May 2, 21, 194&-.-)
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Robertson also dropped his earlier demand for written
assurances of the safety of Western planes, and he assured
the Soviet commander that British planes had been strictly
instructed to observe the quadripartite flight safety rules.120
A possible reason for the British retreat was suggested
by the press. A technical violation of flight rules had
possibly been committed in the case of the ill-fated flight
of the British passenger plane. Although the British plane
was on a regularly scheduled flight, a specific report on
its departure and arrival times had not, as required, been
transmitted to Soviet authorities.121
It was agreed by British, French, and United States
officials in Berlin that the Russians had gained a definite
tactical victory in this second battle of the "war of face."
Closer Russian policing or the Western Allies' air corridor
to Berlin was now expected.122.
Of some interest, too, in terms of the ensuing Berlin
blockade and airlift is the fact that, in contesting
responsibility for the Gatow crash, both sides invoked the
Allied Control Authority (ACA) air safety rules. Therefore,
the authority and continuing applicability of the ACA air
agreements were, if anything, strengthened by the Gatow incident.
This incidental result was perhaps of some value to the Western
Allies, for their airlift, destined to be inaugurated several
months later, was justified by them under ACA air regulations.
120 The New York Times, April 10, 1948.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
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27. BERLIN AIRLIFT123
(1948-1949)
The Western powers reacted to the Soviet blockade of Berlin
in mid-1948 with an airlift which was initially on a modest
scale but assumed increasingly larger proportions. Planes
participating in the airlift all passed through the narrow air
corridors governing air traffic between West Germany and Berlin.
Technical violations of the corridor by Allied planes
were undoubtedly numerous. But it is noteworthy that, apart
from filing complaints through channels, the Soviet forces
did not use these violations as a pretext for creating serious
incidents. On several occasions, Soviet authorities in Berlin
formally notified Western officials that any Western aircraft
caught outside the air corridor would be compelled to land.
No effort to implement this threat was evidently made.124
Harassment of planes engaged in the airlift was fairly
frequent, but generally it took limited forms. On numerous
occasions, Soviet sources publicly announced forthcoming air
maneuvers or gunnery practice which, had they been carried out,
would have jeopardized the safety of planes engaged in the
airlift. But actual Soviet activity was rarely of a scope or
nature in keeping with the terms of the warnings, and did not
constitute a serious hazard.
123
The following account is based on unclassified sources.
124
The New York Times, July 8 1948; Der Tagesspiegel
(Berlin), November 11 194A. This behavior was in shar
contrast to later Soviet practice, beginning with the
Air France case of April 29, 1952 (case study No. 57),
p
of.
forcing down by hostile fire all Western planes alleged
to have been violating the Berlin corridor.
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Soviet efforts at harassment were, more often than not,
more noteworthy for the scrupulous care taken by the Soviets
to avoid manufacturing fatal incidents. Similarly, with regard
to Soviet antiaircraft fire along the air corridor, a high
United States official was able to note: "Don't lake this too
seriously since it has been happening for the 7a,st three years.
Now it has added importance because the air corridors are a
vital need." The same official noted that on one occasion
Soviet flak had occurred "at a comfortable distance" from the
air corridor.125 In mid-September, Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay,
USAF commander in Europe, gave a reassuring picture of the
threat to the airlift: "A lot of Russian flak, Yaks, balloons
and blinding searchlights have been reported -- but they have
not bothered our pilots."126.
In addition to contributing to the Soviet_"war of nerves,"
the practice of giving public notice and "warning" of forthcoming
Soviet maneuvers may also have been intended to minimize the
possibility of accidents and to avoid blame if they did occur.
On numerous occasions, Soviet officials tried to limit
the effectiveness of the airlift by proposing changes in
existing air-traffic regulations which would have limited the
Westts use of the air corridors. For example, the Soviets
proposed that night-flying and all flights by U.S. commercial
airlines be prohibited, and that instrument-flying be
125 The New York Times, August 12, 1948.
126 Ibid., September 13, 1948.
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restricted;127 that passenger lists and 24-hour notice be
given for each flight;128 that specific information on each
flight be given "not later than an hour before the take-off."129
Following Allied diplomatic conversations with Stalin in Moscow
during the summer of 1948, technical discussions were held by
the four occupying powers in Berlin. At these discussions,
General Soko.lovsky proposed new restrictions on existing air
traffic, endeavoring to limit.Western flights to Berlin
strictly to those necessary to meet the needs of the Western
occupation forces. He also demanded that the transport of
commercial freight and passengers via the air corridors be
placed under the control of the Soviet command. Western
representatives rejected all-these demands.13O
The limits observed by the Soviets were also evidenced
by their prompt release of Western fliers participating in the
airlift who made emergency landings in Eastern Germany.131
Significance
The Soviets clearly attached great importance to their
.reaction to the Berlin blockade asa means of reaching certain'
127 The New York Times, Aril 11, 1948; also Der Tagesspiegel
(Berlin), September 28, 1948.
128 The New York Times, April 24, 1948.
129
130 The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions,
12&, Department of State, Publication 3298 "European and
rritL sh Commonwealth Series" I. September, 1 48, pp. 42-43,
Ibid., September 11, 1948.
The New York Times, August 23, 1948, and September 15,
19497
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political objectives. While they exerted considerable pressure
on the Allied position in Berlin, and accepted certain risks
in the process, the underlying prudence and caution of their
tactics is revealed by the fact that they did not go beyond
administrative devices in attempting to ease the Western Allies
out of Berlin, The unwillingness of the Soviets to use methods
which might unduly increase political risks is seen also in
their limited attempts to interfere directly with planes
engaged in the airlift; it is generally agreed that they could
have disrupted the airlift quite effectively had they interfered
with radio-controlled landings on which the airlift was
dependent, especially during the fog-bound winter months. They
also made no effort to force down Western planes allegedly
violating East German territory outside of the air corridor.
Evidently, therefore, the Soviets denied themselves certain
methods of interfering with the airlift because they did not
wish to force the Western Allies to resort to extreme measures
to maintain themselves in Berlin.
The Berlin airlift experience would seem to illustrate
a general rule of behavior which has been regarded as part of
the Politburo's "operational code"; namely, in deciding whether
to take an action against an opponent, the Politburo must be
careful not to grasp promising opportunities for immediate
success if it thereby sets into motion a chain of events which
it cannot control and which may ultimately have serious
unfavorable consequences.132
132
See RAND Report R-239, A Study of Bolshevism (UNCLASSIFIED),
May 1, 1953, p. 9.
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28. SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS OF DANISH ISLAND OF BORNHOLM
(September 9, 1948)
RM-1349
95.
According to a press dispatch from Copenhagen on September
9, 1948, observers on the Danish isle of Bornholm reported
repeated violations of Danish sovereignty by Soviet military
planes on that day. Scores of Soviet bombers and fighters
were said to have flown over Bornholm all morning. Russian
warships were also observed in the area. The dispatch further
reported that no diplomatic steps had yet been taken. The
Danish foreign minister was in Stockholm attending a conference
at which mutual Nordic defense was being discussed.133
Danish reports of such overflights were ridiculed and
refuted by Soviet radio broadcasts as "mischief-making rumors."134
The occurrence of the overflights in conjunction with
Russian naval maneuvers in the immediate vicinity was interpreted
as a possible "demonstration" designed to convey Soviet
displeasure over the meeting then being held by the Scandinavian
foreign ministers in Stockholm for the. purpose of discussing
military defense policies.135
133 The New York Times, September 10, 1948.
134
FBIS Survey of Moscow Broadcasts, September 16-22, 1948;
CONFIDENTIAL.
X35 USAF Air Intelligence Digest, October, 1948; SECRET.
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29. U.S. OVERFLIGHT OF AMSTETTIN IN
SOVIET ZONE OF AUSTRIA
(November, 1948)
U.S. Air Force authorities at first denied and then,
after an investigation, conceded the possibility that their
planes may have overflown Amstettin, in the Soviet zone of
Austria, as charged by the Soviets. A Soviet protest of the
incident was made to the U.S. Command in Austria, and was
later publicized.
Soviet forces evidently made no effort of military
counteraction against the six U.S. planes involved in the
overflight. The incident was disclosed by Moscow in a TASS
dispatch, which charged U.S. fighter planes with having made
"provocative" flights and mock attacks over the town of
Amstettin.136
U.S. Air'Force headquarters in Wiesbaden quickly denied
that any U.S..planes had flown anywhere near Amstettin, but
U.S. officials in Vienna were said to be awaiting a more
detailed report.137
A few days later it was reported in the press that USAF
headquarters in Wiesbaden had sent an embarrassed retraction
to U.S. headquarters in Vienna:
136
FBIS Survey of Soviet Broadcasts November 26 1948;
CONFIDENTIAL. The exact date of the incident Is not
available; the TASS dispatch appeared in Izvestiia on,
November 18.
137 The New York Times, November 19, 1948.
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According to a spokesman for the U.S. Command
in Austria, the Command in Wiesbaden now
reports six such planes were operating at the.
time in the vicinity of Linz and Ems, only a
few miles from Amstettin. The American
commands in Germany and Austria agree, however,
that the TASS report that the pilots practiced
dive-bombing over the Russian-occupied town was
an obvious propaganda invention. It is assumed
here that the pilots had strayed off thei
course in the bad weather that prevailed.'38
Significance
The case is another illustration of the Soviets' tendency
to resort to diplomatic protest when they have not taken any
military countermeasure against an "encroachment."
Available materials do not permit us to check the
possibility that the incident was publicized by the Soviets
only after they received an initial disclaimer of responsibility
from U.S. authorities in Austria.
30. SOVIET PROTESTS AGAINST U.S. AIR
SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET SHIPPING
IN SEA OF JAPAN AND FAR EAST WATERS
(1948-1949)
During 1948-1949, the Soviet government addressed a series
of protests to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow against alleged
"violations of freedom of commercial navigation" by United
States planes in Far East waters and in the Sea of Japan. The
138
The New York TimesNovember 23, 1948; Vienna dispatch
dated November-f2-,.'1948.
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Soviets also charged that the U.S. planes in question "buzzed"
Soviet vessels and thereby endangered their safety. The
exchange of notes in this series was as follows:139
Soviet Note
U.S. Reply
January 30, 1948
Unanswered
March 4, 1948
Unanswered
April 8, 1948
May 25, 1948
July 8, 1948
Unanswered
February 16, 1949
Apparently unanswered
The Soviet notes listed specific instances of "interference"
and "buzzing."
The first note (January 30, 1948) ended with a polite
statement of expectation that the U.S. government would give
necessary instructions to appropriate military authorities
regarding the inadmissibility of such violations in the future.
The second note (March 4, 1948), observing that the first
protest had gone unanswered and that "interference" with Soviet
shipping continued, concluded with a somewhat stronger
diplomatic stereotype: the Soviet Foreign Office "insists
that immediate measures be taken for the elimination of such
violations." After the third Soviet note (April 8, 1948),
which noted that the two previous protests had gone unanswered,
139
Copies of the notes are available in Department of State
files; RESTRICTED. The records examined for this study
appear to indicate that the February 16, 1949, note was
the last in the series; the possibility exists, however,
that other notes were exchanged which have not come to
our attention.
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an article appeared in Izvestiia (April 11, 1948) entitled
"Irresponsibility or System?," which contained the following
statement:
If, however, as facts suggest, this observation
/of Soviet shipping by U.S. planes7 is becoming
systematic, it is doubtful whether such a system
will contribute to consolidating normal
relations between states.
The U.S. reply of May 25, 1948, rejected the Soviet protests
and asserted that surveillance of shipping around Japan was
necessary and did not constitute hindrance to commercial
navigation. The Soviet note of July 8, 1948, refuted arguments
advanced in the U.S. note and insisted upon an "immediate
cessation" of such practices without implying, however, that
any Soviet counteraction would be taken.
The Soviet note of February 16,. 1949, called attention to
previous Soviet notes, listed-new instances of alleged
"violations," and noted that the U.S. government had not replied
to the last Soviet note on the subject.
All Soviet notes were given publicity in Soviet media.
Significance
U.S. air surveillance of shipping around Japan was
protested by the Soviets possibly by way of diplomatic
retaliation for SCAP complaints of, and action against, Soviet
air violations of rules governing flights in and out of Japan.14O
140
See case study No. 5.
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If this explanation is correct, this instance would be another
example of the generally observed communist tendency to match
every accusation with a similar counteraccusation.
31. SOVIET ALLEGATION OF FINNISH-U g AERIAL
PHOTOGRAPHY OF SOVIET BORDERi4i
(March, 1949)
In a commentary by Demidov, in a late February, 1949, issue
of Red Star a news story of a wolf-hunt along the Finnish-Soviet
frontier was dismissed as an attempt to conceal reconnaissance
activities. Under the guise of hunting wolves and with the aid
of radio, aircraft, and aerial photography, Demidov charged,
"a large-scale military expedition" had been organized in the
Soviet frontier area. It was claimed, further, that representatives
of the Supreme Command of the Finnish Army had participated, and,
also, that Anglo-American observers took part in the expedition.
An American correspondent was named as having taken many
photographs with him when leaving Finland.
32. CHINESE COMMUNIST CHARGES OF FRENCH AIR
VIOLATIONS OF INDOCHINA BORDER
(December, 1949, to October, 1950)
In November, 1950, the Chinese communist government publicly
disclosed its diplomatic protest of alleged French air and ground
141 FBIS Weekly Survey of Moscow Broadcasts, March 24-30, 1949;
CONFIDENTIAL.
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violations of Chinese territory in the southern border
provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwantung.
The catalog of incidents listed by the Chinese communists
included 22 alleged air violations of Kwangsi from December
14, 1949, to August 31, 1950; 18 alleged air violations of
Kwangsi in September-October, 1950; 30 alleged air violations
of Yunnan in September-October, 1950; and 2 alleged air
violations of Kwantung in September-October, 1950. A number
of casualties were said to have occurred in some of these
incidents.
The account of the Chinese announcement, which appeared
in the New York Times on November 24, 1950, contained no
indication whether the Chinese'reported their forces as having
taken any military counteraction against the alleged air
violations. However, the Chinese announcement did include
the following warning: "Our border defense troops have been
instructed to hold the frontier firmly and to deliver
counterblows to the provocateurs."
33. SOVIET PROTEST TO IRAN REGARDING AERIAL
PHOTOGRAPHS IN SOVIET-IRANIAN FRONTIER AREA
(May 14 and June 22, 1950)
A Soviet note to Iran of may 14, 1950, which was publicized
by Moscow. radio on the following day, protested i' _c aerial
survey activities employing American experts were being carried
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out along the Iranian-Soviet border by the Iranian Oil Company,
Ltd. The note stated that border surveys made during oil
prospecting operations were of "military significance," and
that the Soviet Union strenuously objected to their being
carried out by foreigners. It was asserted that the Iranian
Oil Company, Ltd., had brought in United States technicians
and equipment despite an earlier Soviet protest of January 31,
1948, to the effect that such activity by foreign representatives
in Iran "can create a danger to the frontiers of the U.S.S.R."
On May 16, a U.S. Department of State spokesman commented
on the report as follows: "The implication that Iran is in
cahoots with the United States in spying is utter and complete
nonsense. There have been no aerial surveys of the type
mentioned in the Soviet note. We understand that as part of
Iran's seven-year economic development program the Iranian
government signed contracts with an American company for
drilling of exploratory oil wells in northern Iran. This was
purely an Iranian operation. No American commercial, government,
or other interest is concerned in the matter."
The Iranian government's reply to the Soviet charges
elicited a second Soviet note on June 22, 1950. To this, the
Iranian government replied on Judy 15, denying the specific
Soviet charges and stating that this was an internal affair,
and that "no foreign power has the right to interfere or to
express an opinion on such matters." The note also stated that,
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although the establishment of an Iranian oil company was
entirely an Iranian venture, Iran considered itself free to
purchase machinery from foreign countries and to engage the
services of foreign technicians. The note pointed out
specifically that the purchase of two drilling. machines from
the United States required the use of United States citizens
for installation purposes.142
34. SOVIET PROTESTS AGAINST DROPPING OF
OF COLORADO BEETLES BY U. S. PLANES
(May 22 to June 7, 1950)
On July 2, 1950, Moscow radio announced that a note had
been sent to the United States government, on June 30,
protesting the air-dropping of Colorado beetles over East
Germany. The Soviet note referred to a report by the East
German government "to the effect that between May 22 and June
7 of this year American planes, violating'existing rules
concerning aviation flights, dropped a large quantity of
Colorado beetles" over East Germany "with the aim of inflicting
damage to the food supplies of the German people and also of
creating a threat that the Colorado. beetle would spread to the
potato-growing areas in countries bordering on the German
Democratic Republic." The note also declared that "the Soviet
142
Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy,
May-June, 1950, and July-August, 1950, Vol. 3, No. 10
and Vol. 4, No. 1 published by the Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C.
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. 1
Government insists that the guilty persons be brought to book
and expects the United States Government to adopt proper
measures to guarantee that there is no repetition of similar
acts in the future."143
Evidently the Soviet note was issued after U.S. sources
had ridiculed East German charges about t1'4c same alleged
air-drop.144
The United States Department of State issued a press
statement on July 6, 1950, ridiculing and refuting the charges
contained in the Soviet note. An official reply was made in a
note dated July 7, 1950.145 There is no indication of a Soviet
reply.
35. CZECH PROTEST AGAINST DROPPING OF
COLORADO BEETLES BY U. S. PLANES
(June-July, 1950)
In a note dated July b, 1950, the U.S. Government refuted
and ridiculed charges by the Czech press and radio to the
effect that U.S. planes had dropped Colorado beetles over
Czechoslovakia. On the same day, the State Department refuted
similar charges by the Soviet government.146
143
144
145
146
Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy,
Vol. , No. 1, The Brookings Institution, Washington,
D.C., July-August, 1950, p. 13.
The New York Times, July 2, 1950.
Department of State Bulletin, July 24, 1950, p. 134.
See case study No. 34.
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Confronted by the official communication of the U.S.
government on this subject, the Czech government evidently
felt it necessary to bolster its propaganda charges by issuing
an official protest. A Czech note of July 10 stated that
there was "undeniable proof" that U.S. planes had dropped
Colorado beetles.147 An accompanying note also charged that
there had recently been an increase in violations of Czech
air space by U.S. planes.148
36. CZECH PROTEST AGAINST U.S. AIR VIOLATIONS
(July, 1950)
A Czech note of July 10, 1950, charged that U.S. planes
had recently "increased their illegal flights over Czechoslovak
territory." Some eight instances of alleged violations were
cited in the Czech note which demanded an investigation and
immediate explanation by U.S. officials.
On the same day, a USAF spokesman in Wiesbaden, Germany,
denied the Czech charges as "utterly ridiculous and absolutely
untrue."
There is no indication of further communications on the
matter.149
147 4
t
i
Department of Sta
e Bullet
n, July 2 , 1950, P? 135,
Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy,
Vol. 4, No. 1, The Brookings Institution, Washington,
D.C., July-August, 1950, p. 13.
See case study No. 3b.
The New York Times, July 11, 1950; Current Developments
in United States Foreign Policy, p. 13.
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37. SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN 'COMMUNI ST PROPAGANDA
CHARGE THAT U.S. PLANES DROPPED
INCENDIARIES OVER EASTERN GERMANY
(July 19 and 27, 1950)
TASS repeated an ADN (East German communist news agency)
charge that on July 27, 1950, an American B-45 er. route from
Frankfurt to Berlin had dropped two incendiary bombs on
Oranienbaum from an altitude of 1,500 meters. A similar
incident had taken place on July 19, it was charged, when an
incendiary had been dropped over Klietz in Saxony-Anhalt.150
Significance
There is no independent verification of any overflights
of these areas, by U.S. or other planes, on the dates in
question.
The communist ADN reported, on August 10, that the East
German government had asked the U.S.S.R. for protection
"against such criminal plots," i.e., alleged dropping of
potato bugs and incendiaries. This story was withdrawn from
press and radio circulation shortly afterward. A State
Department research report commented as follows: "Numerous
reasons have been advanced for these atrocity stories -- alibi
for poor crops, shortage of insecticides,, build-up for
subsequent interference with Western air access to Berlin,
excuse for establishing an East German air 'police' -- but
150
ADN broadcast, August 7, 1950; TASS, August 9, 1950.
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their fundamental purpose is undoubtedly to foment hatred of
the United States."151
38. COMMUNIST CHARGES OF BRITISH AIR VIOLATIONS
IN HONG KONG AREA
(August 16 and September 4, 1950)
On August 16, 1950, Chinese communist authorities warned
all foreign ships and aircraft against infringing on Chinese
territory and territorial waters, especially in the vicinity
of Hong Kong. Chinese communist mi]ftary commanders were
ordered to fire on any planes or ships, including warships,
that failed to heed the warning.
A TASS dispatch from Peiping charged that British armed
forces at Hong Kong were carrying on border violations "for
purposes of provocation."152 The article also charged that
one hundred British planes had flown over Chinese territory on
fifty different occasions between June and August, 1950.153
39. ALLEGED U.S. OVERFLIGHTS OF COMMUNIST CY~4A
PRIOR TO CHINESE INTERVENTION IN KOREAN WAR ~2``**
(August to November, 1950)
The problem of communist response to air reconnaissance
and overflights by foreign planes was encountered under unusual
151 Soviet Affairs, U.S. Department of State (OIR), September,
152 1950;
Pravda, September 4, 1950. -
153 Current Developments in United States Foreign Polic , Vol.
No. 2, The Brookings Institution, Washington, J.
.,
154 Se'pteber bwere used in the preparation of this
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circumstances in the months preceding the entry of Chinese
communist forces into the Korean war. Violations of the air
space of one communist country (China) were allegedly being
committed by a noncommunist power (United States), which was
engaged in military operations against another adjoining.
communist state (North Korea).
The Chinese communist reaction to these overflights must
be viewed in the context of the overall policy adopted by
Chinese communist and Soviet leaders for dealing with the
"threat" raised by the U.N. police action against North Korea.
The main outlines of communist policy in this instance
appear to be sufficiently clear from the course of developments
and from public accounts.
The major problem for historical analysis is to consider
what role, if any, actual and alleged U.S. air violations of
Chinese communist territory played in the decision to. intervene
with Chinese "volunteers" in the Korean war. The following
tentative answers to this question appear to be most plausible:
(1) Air violations of Chinese communist territory were
not what brought China into the Korean war. The
decision to intervene was motivated by other
considerations. The U.S. attitude on Formosa and
15+ (Conttd)
case study. In view of the interpretation providel,
however, the study has been classified CONFIDENLt.AL.
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the decision in October to send U.S. forces north
of the 38th Parallel were probably of greater
importance in this respect than the air violations
of Manchuria, though we cannot say whether these
events were crucial or merely contributory to the
communist decision.
(2) U.S. overflights may have been regarded by Chinese
communist leaders as indicators of hostile U.S.
intent. But, if so, communist leaders probably
did not believe that U.S. leaders were firmly
committed to an immediate military attack upon
communist China. Even for purposes of domestic war
propaganda and indoctrination, the Chinese
communists did not usually portray their intervention
in Korea as necessary in order to forestall an
imminent U.S. invasion of China. Rather, they
attempted to legitimize the intervention more in
terms of longer-range strategic interests. In any
event, the U.S. action in neutralizing Formosa,
continued U.S. opposition to seating communist
China in the United Nations, and the sending of
U.N. forces north of the 38th Parallel were probably
regarded as more serious indicators of hostile U.S.
intent than such air violations as actually took
place.
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(3)' U.S. air violations were employed as a convenient
peg for communist diplomatic efforts to contest
U.S. and U.N. actions in Korea. Thus, formal.
protests to the U.N. against alleged U.S. air
violations were accompanied by demands that
communist China be admitted to the deliberati.rns
of the U.N. on the Korean issue, and that the
United States be forced to withdraw its forces
from Korea.
(4) Allegations of U.S. air violations were probably
in large part contrived and intended for the
purpose of giving additional. propaganda legitimacy
to the Chinese communist entry into the Korean war.
It is probably significant in this respect that
communist charges of U.S. air violations were
greatly stepped up in late October and November,
after initial Chinese forces had already entered
Korea, but before the full-scale Chinese offensive
was launched in late November.
We have noted, in other historical situations, that the
communists sometimes adopted a passive, permissive attitude
toward overflights by planes of a foreign power, and sometimes
took hostile countermeasures. In the present instance, there
is evidence that, as early as August 22, hostile countermeasures
were taken (in the form of antiaircraft fire) against U.S.
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planes flying close to the Manchurian-Korean border. The first
protest against U.S. air violations came a week later, and
concerned an overflight of the Manchurian border on August 27.
The first U.S. plane to be shot down by Chinese communist
antiaircraft fire from the Manchurian side of the border was
an F-51, on October 15. The first reported occasion on which
communist planes based on Manchurian-airfields attacked U.S.
planes over Korea and then returned to their sanctuary was on
November 1, when a flight of U.S. F-51's was jumped by six to
nine communist jets.
Evidently, then, a policy of hostile military counteraction
against air intruders or near-intruders was decided upon at a
relatively early stage. It was perhaps not fortuitous that
the Molotov-Mao Tze Tung meeting in Peiping in mid-August, at
which the decision to intervene may have been taken, was shortly
followed by the first evidence of the tough policy toward U.S.
planes approaching the Manchurian border.
Finally, it would seem that communist leaders did not
believe that hostile military action against U.S. planes
approaching or violating the Manchurian border would materially
alter U.S. intentions or policy in a more hostile direction.
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40. SOVIET PLANE SHOT DOWN OVER YELLOW SEA
BY U.S. NAVY
(September 4, 1950)
According to an official U.S. account, a two-engined
bomber bearing a Red Star insignia flew toward the center of
a U.N. naval formation off the west coast of Korea at approxi-
mately the 38th Parallel on September 4, 1950. The bomber
opened fire on a U.N. fighter patrol, which returned the fire
and shot down the bomber. A U.N. destroyer picked up the
body of one of the crew members, a Russian flier whose name
and serial number were ascertained and disclosed in the
official U.S. press release on September 5.155
The United States delegate to the U.N., Warren Austin,
made an announcement of the incident before the U.N. Security
Council on September 5. Evidently lacking instructions from
Moscow, Soviet delegate Malik confined himself on this
155
A detailed account of the incident was given in a press
interview -- by Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen, Tactical Air
Commander of the U.S. Navy formation in question (Task
Force 77) and his flag operations chief, Commander
R. C. Jones -- several days later as the fleet cruised
off Inchon Harbor prior to the amphibious assault.
Two of three unidentified planes from the direction of
Port Arthur.turned back as soon as the first U.S.
fleet units came into their view. The third bored
straight on, inside the "safety tolerance ring" around
the fighting ships. A U.S. Navy plane patrol radioed
that the rear gunner of the intruding plane was firing
at the Navy fighter plane. Ewen then agreed with Jones
to "splash" the plane. "All of us felt that if we
didn't, there might be Russian snoopers all around us
in a day or two." (The Chicago Tribune, October 19
1950; publication of the interview was delayed until
October 19.)
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occasion to labeling the announcement made by Austin as just
one more act of "provocation" on Washington's part.
On September 6, a Soviet note to the United States held
that the account of the incident given by Austin to the U.N.
was "mendacious," denied that the Soviet plane had been near
Korea, and demanded reparations and punishment of those
responsible. The Soviet plane was said to have been on a
routine training flight from Dairen.
Significance
Soviet Motives and Handling of Incident
If the mission of the Soviet plane was to conduct
reconnaissance of the U.S. fleet in the Yellow Sea, it remains
unexplained why this plane, according to the official U.S.
account, should have opened fire. Possibly, the Russian
flier thought that the U.S. fighter patrols which intercepted
him would surely attempt to shoot him down and that therefore
he had nothing to lose by opening fire on them.
It is by no means certain that the Politburo would have
protested the incident were it not for the American public
statement to the U.N. on September 5. Soviet leaders may have
felt obliged to discuss the incident also because of the
context in which the U.S. disclosure was made. It may be
noted that, even before he was informed by his own government
that such an incident had occurred, Soviet delegate Malik
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149
immediately labeled Austin's announcement as provocative.
Malik thus implied that the story about a Soviet flight over
a U.S. naval formation in the Korean theater might be a.
fabrication, tailored for the current debate on a U.S.
resolution regarding possible spread of the Korean conflict.
Considering that one of its planes had been shot down
over international waters, the Soviet reaction to the
incident must be viewed as mild. The explanation appears
to be twofold.
First, in order to achieve its reconnaissance and intelli-
gence objectives, the Politburo may be prepared to take risks
and to accept occasional losses. If a reconnaissance vehicle
or an intelligence agent is lost, the Soviets may feel that
the incident need not be protested, and that it should not
be publicized unless some special purpose will be served thereby.
Secondly, and perhaps more specifically relevant to the
present case, the Politburo is sometimes anxious lest an
opponent's counteraction against Soviet reconnaissance
operations be a provocation designed to embroil the U.S.S.R.
in some sort of international crisis. In the case of the
Soviet bomber shot down over the Yellow Sea, the Politburo
may have been disturbed by the possibility that the action was
designed to implicate the U.S.S.R. militarily or diplomatically
in the Korean war. At a very early stage in the Korean war,
the Soviets had announced a policy of nonintervention in the
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"Korean civil war." Just prior to the air incident in question,
Soviet delegates at the U.N. on several occasions had resisted
efforts to charge the U.S.S.R. with complicity for the North
Korean attack. For example, in August, 1950, Malik stated that
no Soviet supplies had been given to North Korea since before
the war broke out. The shooting down of the Russian plane off
Korea, therefore, may have been viewed by the Politburo as yet
another effort to embroil the U.S.S.R. in Korea.156
Hence the apparent intent behind the Soviet diplomatic
handling of the incident to minimize the international
consequences. The Soviet Foreign Office attempted to have the
incident regarded as purely a U.S.S.R.-U.S. problem, and not
as a matter for U.N. attention. After reading the Soviet note
to U.S. Ambassador Kirk in Moscow, Vishinsky tried four times,
during an unsuccessful half-hour meeting, to get Kirk to accept
the note. Vishinsky even sent the note to the U.S. Embassy
shortly after his meeting with Kirk, but it was promptly
returned.157 At the same time, an unsuccessful effort was also
being made by the Soviet Embassy in Washington to deliver the
note to the U.S. State Department.158
156 Cf. also Soviet Affairs, September, 1950; SECRET.
157 A rather full account appeared in the New York.Times.
Additional details are contained in a cable from the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow (Kirk) to Secretary of State, No. 623
(September 6, 1950); SECRET. Vishinsky was reported by
Kirk to have been very courteous though persistent in
arguing that the incident had nothing to do with the Korean
war and was a matter of direct contact between the two
governments.
Memo for files by Richard H. Davis (EE), Department of
State, Washington, D.C.
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116.
Further, in reading the Soviet note before the U.N.
Security Council on September 6,. Malik tried to keep the matter
out of council discussions of the Korean question, saying it
was a matter which concerned solely the U.S.S.R. and the United
States.
The desire to minimize the international consequences of
the incident may be inferred, too, from the studied underplaying
of the affair in Soviet propaganda treatment of it. Although
Moscow rebroadcast the Soviet note in standard fashion, no
commentaries followed.
Perhaps for similar reasons, Soviet authorities made no
effort to claim the body of the Russian flier which had been
recovered from the sea by the U.S. Navy. While presumably
less concerned than we with the proper disposition of the body
in such e. case, the Soviets might nonetheless have demanded the
body and accorded ceremonial honors had they wished to exploit
the incident for propaganda purposes. The flier was buried in
a Pusan cemetery.
Thus, far from reacting strongly to the shooting down of
one of its planes, the Politburo seems to have been concerned
lest it be tricked into "yielding to provocation" and permit
itself to become more directly implicated, militarily or
diplomatically, in the Korean affair.
The general Soviet position on the Korean war at this
time required Soviet diplomacy to dispute the fact that the
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U.S. was acting legally in Korea under the United Nations.
This was probably an additional reason for the Soviet refusal
to agree that the U.S. action against the Soviet plane was
properly a matter for U.N. consideration, as the United States
was contending.
U.S. Handling of the Incident
The U.S. government, too, viewed the incident within the
larger context of the Korean war and its peculiar policy
problems. In instructing U.S. delegate Austin to disclose the
incident before the U.N., the State Department said to him:
"The Department does not wish this incident to be blown up to
a point which will engage Soviet prestige or which will be
harmful to the unity of our Allies in respect to the U.N. action
in Korea. it 159
The incident could have. been used by the United States to
contradict the Soviet contention of nonintervention and
nonparticipation in the Korean war by charging, for example,
that the Soviets were engaging in reconnaissance of the U.S.
fleet on behalf of the North Koreans. But, contrary to what
appear to have been the Politburo's fears, U.S. policy was to
play down the incident before-the United Nations in order not
to "engage Soviet prestige." Policy considerations having to
159 Department of State to USUN (New York), September 4, 1950;
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do with maintaining Allied support behind the U.N. action also
evidently played some role in the U.S. decision not to exploit
the Red bomber incident.
U.S. disclosure of the incident before the U.N. was
confined to the bare facts of the case and did not include a
demand for a U.N. investigation. In making the announcement,
Austin said that the incident pointed up the urgency of taking
steps to prevent the spreading of the war in Korea. In a
supplementary statement, U.S. delegate Ernest Gross went so
far as to note that, since the plane sank, it was not clear
whether it was a Soviet or a North Korean plane.
41. ALIEGED U.S. AIR VIOLATIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
(October, 1950, to January 15, 1951)
A Czech note dated January 22, 1951, charged that U.S.
planes had committed 58 violations of Czech air space between
October, 1950, and mid-January, 1951. It is not known whether
.the note itself (which has not been available for inspection)
itemized the alleged violations or gave monthly breakdowns.
A month-by-month tabulation of the alleged U.S. air
violations of Czechoslovakia in the period covered in the Czech
note, however, was disclosed-in a Czech English-language
brca dcast over the Prague radio on March 13, 1953, following
the shooting down of a U.S. jet fighter over northern Bavaria
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19.
on March 10, 1953.160 The number of alleged violations was as
October, 1950:
8
November, 1950:
18
December, 1950:
6
January 1-15,
1951:
26
According to a Reuters dispatch, the contents of the
Czech note were as follows:161
(1) The United States was accused of dropping radio
transmitters by parachute for subversive elements;
some of them were said to have landed accidentally
in Austria.
(2) The U.S. planes were said to have intentionally
'dolated Czech-air space in order to carry on
espionage and to support subversive elements.162
(3) The United States was called upon to investigate
the 58 cases cited.and to report the results.
160
FBIS Daily Report March 17, 1953. It has not been
possible to determine whether the same charges appeared
in Czech domestic media.
161 mL_ ---- ~?- -A- - - ---------- -,
Similarly, the Czech broadcast of March 13, 1953, stated
that the aim of the alleged air violations was "hostile
reconnaissance espionage activities" and support of
"individual and terrorist actions of hostile elements
on the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic."
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On January 23, the day following the Czech protest note,
an official USAF spokesman in Frankfurt termed the charges of
spying by U.S. planes as "completely ridiculous."163
On February 7, 1951, U.S. authorities in Frankfurt
rejected the charges contained in the Czech note of January 22,
stating that they appeared "to have been fabricated solely
for propaganda purposes."164
There was no comment in Moscow broadcasts on the Czech
protest.165
42. SOVIET CHARGE THAT U.S. JET FIGHTER BUZZED
SOVIET PASSENGER PLANE OVER GERMANY
(November 11, 1950)
In a letter to U.S High Commissioner, John McCloy, Soviet
High Commissioner General V. Chuikov charged that on November
11 a U.S. jet fighter deliberately "buzzed" a Soviet passenger
plane in the vicinity of Frankfurt, Germany. The Soviet plane
in question was carrying the French Communist leader Thorez to
Moscow for medical treatment. General Chuikov characterized
the attitude of the U.S. pilot as "provocative" and demanded
severe punishment.
The Associated Press reported U.S. officials in Germany
as promptly denying the charge.166
163 The New York Times, January 24, 1951.
164 Ibid., February 10, 1951.
165 FBIS Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts, January
31, 1951; CONFIDENTIAL.
166 The New York Times, November 16, 1950.
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43. CZECH PROTEST OF ALLEGED U.S. AIR VIOLATIONS
(Mid-January to June, 1951)
In the course of diplomatic exchanges over the June 8,
1951, incident, involving the landing of two U.S. jets in
Czechoslovakia,1b7 the Czech government charged, on June 22,
that U.S. planes had committed a total of 116 violations
since January 15, 1951. Whether initial public disclosure of
this charge was made by Czech or U.S. sources is not clear;
reference to it appears in a special Washington dispatch of
June 26 to the New York Times (issue of June 27, 1951), and
also in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly by the Czech
delegate, David, on March 23, 1953.
A U.S. note of June 24, 1951, dismissed these charges as
unsubstantiated.168
44. U.S. ADMISSION OF AIR VIOLATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
(February 7, 1951)
On February 9, 1951, the U.S. Embassy in Prague received
an official note from the Czechoslovak government protesting
that two U.S. jets had penetrated almost to Prague on February
7. The note declared the flights to be "a real provocation."
The U.S. Embassy in Prague immediately denied the charge,
b'it added that-it would be carefully investigated.169
167 See case study No. 46.
168 The New York Times, June 27, 1951.
169 Ibid., February 10, 1951.
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Following an investigation, the U.S. Embassy rendered a public
apology to the Czech Foreign Office on February 17. Two U.S.
jets had "inadvertently crossed the border of the U.S. zone
Zo-f Germany7 with Czechoslovakia on February 7, when they became
lost on a training mission, and, mistaking the Prague beacon for
the Mammendorf beacon, flew to the vicinity of Prague."
The U.S. note further declared that steps were being taken
to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents, and pointed out
"that crews of the United States Air Force flying high-speed
aircraft are under standing orders not to go within ten miles
of the Czechoslovak border."170
45. BULGARIAN CHARGE OF YUGOSLAV-GREEK-TURKISH PLOT
TO CARRY OUT AIR RECONNAISSANCE; ALBANIAN CHARGE
OF GREEK OVERFLIGHTS; GREEK COUNTERCHARGES
(March 2, April 10 and 25, 1951)
The Bulgarian charge was made before the United Nations.
Previously, members of the Communist Information Bureau,
espedally Bulgaria and Albania, had regularly filed complaints
before the U.N. of Greek overflights. The March 2 note from
the Bulgarian government, however, was the first which linked
Yugoslavia with Greece and Turkey in this respect. The
Bulgarian note listed seven violations, all involving flights
which allegedly circled low over the frontier area. The warning
170 The text of the U.S. note was released on February 17,
1951; it is quoted in the Brookings Institution's Current
Developments in United States Foreign Policy, February,.
1951, pp. 30-31.
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was added that Bulgaria would take legitimate defensive measures
if such violations continued. The Bulgarian charge was promptly
rejected as "propaganda" by the Greek premier.171
Albania renewed charges of Greek violations on April 10.172
On April 25, a countercharge of Bulgarian air violations was
made by Greece.173 On August 14, Bulgaria denied violating
Greek air space.174
The Soviet radio did not take note of the charges filed by
its Balkan Satellites.175
46. CZECH DETENTION OF TWO U.S. JET FIGHTER PILOTS176
(June 8, 1951)
On June 10, 1951, two U.S. Air Force jet fighters were
reported in the press as missing from the U.S. Zone of Germany
since June 8, 1951,. while on a training mission. After
unsuccessful searches near the East German border, U.S.
authorities, on.June 12, asked the Russians to search for the
missing planes in communist territory.
171 The New York Times, March 3 and 4, 1951.
172 Ibid., April 11, 1951.
173 Ibid., April 26, 1951.
174 Ibid., August 15, 1951.
175 FBIS Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts, March
7 and May 16,'1951; CONFIDENTIAL.
176
The New York Times for the period-in question; apart from
FBIS reports, classified sources were not utilized.
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Receiving no reply, U.S. sources intimated on June 14
that the jet pilots were being held by the Czech government.
The Czech government, however, replied only on June 16,, after
an official U.S. statement of June 15 had charged the Czechs
with lagging in the search for the missing planes.177
In its statement of June 16, the Czech government reported
that the two U.S. jets and their pilots were being held pending
an investigation. A U.S. note on June 24 renewed demands for
immediate release of the two U.S. fliers, and held that the
landing of the jets on Czech territory had been unintentional.
After repeated U.S. demands for immediate release of the
pilots, the Czechs agreed on June 30 to~release one pilot, an.
American, to the United States, but stated that the pilot of
the second U.S. jet, a Norwegian, would be returned to Norway
"at his request."
The Moscow radio all but ignored the incident. The
detention of the pilots was not mentioned by the Moscow radio.178
47. SWEDISH OVERFLIGHTS OF SOVIET TERRITORY
(July 17 and 26, 1951)
In the coursed an exchange of notes on the shooting down
of two Swedish planes in June, 1952,179 the Soviet government
177 For text, see De artment of State Bulletin, Vol. 24, No.
626, June 25, IV)Ij p. .
178 FBIS, Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts, June 27
and December 5, 1951; CONFIDENTIAL.
179 See case study No. 66.
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125.
had occasion to recall earlier air violations by Swedish
military aircraft on July 17 and 26, 1951. Evidently the
latter violations had not been mentioned publicly at the time
by either side; the reference to them in the Soviet note of
June 19,. 1952, therefore, constituted a belated disclosure.
It would seem that disclosure was made at this time in order
to strengthen the diplomatic and propaganda position taken
by the Soviets with respect to the June, 1952, incidents,
which had inflamed Swedish opinion.
Following Soviet disclosure of the earlier violations,
the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs immediately confirmed
(in a press release dated June 20, 1952) that the two
violations had taken place, and that the Swedish government
had conveyed its regrets to the Soviet government at the time.
The only facts available regarding the 1951 Swedish
violations are those contained in this press release.
According to it, on July 17, 1951, "a Swedish military aircraft
came by mistake to a point northwest of Libau about 2.2
nautical miles from the coast." And, on July 26, 1951, "a
Swedish military aircraft had been in the area northwest of
Vindau and at one moment came to a point somewhere more than
five nautical miles from the coast."
-Significance
Both of these earlier Swedish violations, it will be noted,
took place in a part of the Baltic considered extremely
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sensitive by the Soviets, in fact very near the area in which
the U.S. Navy Privateer had been shot down on April 8, 1950.
It would seem either that the Soviets did not attempt hostile
military counteraction against these two Swedish planes or
else that, if such action was attempted, it was not successful.
On the basis of the scanty information available, therefore,
the possibility cannot be excluded that the Soviets were not at
this time applying their hostile air-defense policy toward
Swedish and perhaps other planes skirting the Soviet perimeter
in the Baltic. Another possibility, of course, is that the
intention to apply hostile countermeasures existed at the time,
but that Soviet air-defense forces did not have an opportunity
to implement it in these two cases.
In the absence of more information, we can only speculate
on the true meaning of the two incidents in terms of Soviet
air-defense policy. The interpretation favored here is that
the Soviets either had not been able to take military
counteraction against the two Swedish planes in July, 1951, or
else did not want to. We rule out, in other words, the
possibility that Soviet planes attempted hostile counteraction
and were unsuccessful. For in this event, judging by general
Soviet disclosure practice in such cases, they would not have
initiated diplomatic disclosure of the incidents via a protest
to the Swedish government. In general, the Soviets have
resorted to disclosure -- diplomatic and public -- only when
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they did not attempt military counteraction against the allegedly
intruding plane.
48. ALLEGED AIR DROP OF U. S. ESPIONAGE AGENTS
INTO THE MOLDAVIAN REPUBLIC, U.S.S.R.
(Summer, 1951)
On December 19, 1951, TASS announced that two U.S.-trained
spies who, it alleged, had been parachuted into the Moldavian
Socialist Republic in the summer of 1951, had been executed by
a firing squad. TASS gave the men's names as A. I. Osmanov and
I. K. Sarancev180 and said that they had admitted having been
recruited from displaced-persons camps in West Germany by the
U.S. intelligence service, and that they had pleaded guilty to
charges of espionage and diversionist activities.
At.the trial, according to TASS, the men said they had been
dropped from a U.S. plane under cover of night. Open parachutes
were said to have been found near the spot where the two men
were arrested.181
49. SOVIET EFFORT TO CHANGE ROUTE OF
VIENNA AIR CORRIDOR
(August, 1951)
In August, 1951, the Soviet members of the Quadripartite
Air Directorate in Vienna introduced a proposal to substitute
180. This name was translated as Tarantsev in the FBIS translation
if the broadcast version of a pamphlet on vi ilance by
181 khalkov. (FBIS, Daily Report, July 15, 1953, p. CC-2.)
TT e TASS announcement as reported by Reuters, appeared in
e New York Times, December 19, 1951.
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a new air corridor for the existing Vienna-Graz corridor
which had been agreed upon in 1946.
The Soviet proposal was advanced on the grounds that it
would contribute to flight safety, since, it was stated,
Allied flights in the present air corridor conflicted with
Soviet military air traffic.
The undisclosed motive behind the Soviet proposal,
according to U.S. intelligence estimates, was to deny Western
powers opportunities for important air reconnaissance which
the existing air corridor afforded.182
50. U.S. PROTEST OF SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS OF
TEMPELHOF AIRDROME IN BERLIN
(August, 1951)
The New York Times reported briefly, on August 16, 1951,
that U.S. officials in Berlin had protested to the Soviets
against a flight by Soviet jets at 600 feet over Tempelhof
airdrome. No further details are available.
51. SOVIET PROTEST OF TURKISH AIR VIOLATION
(August 13, 1951)
A Soviet note to Turkey, apparently sent on August 13,
p--ested an alleged violation of Russian air space. The Soviet
182 U.S. Embassy, Vienna (Donnelly) to Secretary of State,
No. 840 (August 30, 1951); SECRET.
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radio did not in this case observe its custom of broadcasting
the contents of the note; nor, evidently, did the Soviets make
any public disclosure of the incident.183 It would seem,
therefore, that disclosure of the Soviet note was made by
Turkish sources. It has not been possible to verify this;
FBIS personnel were unable to locate references to the note in
Turkish broadcasts.
Shortly after the Soviet note, the Beirut radio reported
that the Turkish government had apologized to the U.S.S.R. for
an unintentional overflight by eight Turkish planes, caused by
bad weather.184
52. ALLEGED U.S. OVERFLIGHT OF RUMANIA
FOR ESPIONAGE PURPOSES
(October 18, 1951)
In a diplomatic note dated December 15, 1951, and
publicized shortly thereafter, the Rumanian government charged
that the United States had parachuted two spies into
Transylvania on October. 18, 1951. The flight of the U.S.
plane was said to have originated in Athens. The Rumanian note
further alleged that the two spies had confessed having been
recruited in an Italian displaced-persons camp and trained in
183
BIS, Trends and Hi hli nts or Moscow Broadcasts, August
29 and December 5, 1951; CONFIDENTIAL.
- FBIS, Daily Report, August 22, 1952; RESTRICTED.
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an "American special spy school" in Italy. Their mission,
according to the alleged confession, was to organize guerrilla
activity and to gather information about the Rumanian Army.
. In a note of December 20, the U.S. government rejected
these ^harges as "ridiculous," and said it could not "avoid
the conclusion that this fantastic incident ...Z-had7 been
conjured up by the Rumanian Government in order to furnish some
basis for an over-all propaganda campaign directed against
the United States." The U.S. note stated further that "the
purposes of this propaganda campaign and of the invention of
such incidents are best known to those controlling the Rumanian
Government," and that the government of the United States was
unwilling to dignify them with further comment.
The Rumanian Foreign Ministry stated, on December 22, that
the United States reply, which had "ignored the obvious facts,"
would not be accepted and was an attempt to evade "the
responsibility of the United States government for its
aggressive step against the Rumanian people."
On December 27, the Rumanian government announced that five
men, not two as previously reported, had been dropped by
parachute on Rumanian territory, and that they had been tried
and convicted as "terrorists, diversionists and American tools."
The announcement stated that four of the men had been executed,
and that the other had committed suicide.185
185 Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution, December, 1951, pp. 31-32. For
texts of notes see Department of State Bulletin, December
31, 1951.
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53. U.S. NAVY PLANE SHOT DOWN BY SOVIET FIGHTERS
OFF VLADIVOSTOK
(November 6, 1951)
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A two-engine U.S. Navy bomber of the Neptune type was shot
down near Vladivostok by Soviet fighters on November 6, 1951.
Diplomatic disclosure of the incident was made on November 7,
when Gromyko attempted to deliver an official Soviet note to
Mr. Cummings, U.S. charge d'affaires in Moscow. The Soviet
note protested an alleged violation of Soviet frontiers by the
Navy aircraft. After considerable discussion Mr. Cummings
accepted the note from Gromyko for "information" only, on the
grounds that U.S. aircraft in the Far East were under U.N.
command.186
Neither the air incident nor the Soviet note. was publicized
immediately by the Soviets or by the U.S. government. The first
public disclosure of the incident came only on November 23, and
was made by the U.S. Navy.187 At the same time, news of the
Soviet protest of November 7 was given to the U.S. press. It
was intimated in the press that U.S. officials had delayed
disclosing the incident because the Navy plane in question,
unlike the Navy Privateer shot down in the Baltic in April, 1950,
was on a U.N. rather than a U.S. mission. News of the Soviet
186 Moscow (Cummings) to Secretary of State, No. 801 (November
7, 1951); CONFIDENTIAL; see also The New Yrk Times,
November 25, 1951.
187 The New York Times, November 24, 1951.
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note had been withheld -- according to a State Department source
-- to give the U.N. Command in the Far East time to investigate
the incident and to search for survivors.
U.S. press accounts speculated that the Navy Neptune had
been on antisubmarine patrol. The official U.S. Navy
announcement November 23), however, stated merely that the
plane had been on patrol duty. Still another version of the
Navy plane's mission was contained in an official U.S.
communication to the U.N. (November 24), which stated that the
plane had been on "weather reconnaissance."188
U.S. sources did not state that the plane had been armed,
but this was implicit in the absence of a specific disclaimer.
Instead, the U.S. communication to the U.N. contented itself
with a denial that Soviet territory had been violated and a
charge that the Navy plane had been attacked without warning.
The prescribed route of the plane, it was.pointed out, did not
approach closer than 40 miles to U.S.S.R. territory, and the
plane's crew had been thoroughly briefed not to approach closer
than 20 miles to Soviet territory under any circumstances. The
U.S. communication to the U.N. could only surmise that an
intentional or unplanned violation of Russian territorial
waters had not been made. A subsequent Navy announcement
188 The New YorL Times, November 25, 1951. A classified cable
from CI'CUNC (Tokyo) to Dept. AR (Washington, D.C.) for
OSD, ivumber CX 57014 (November 10 1951) stated that the
missing Navy plane was on a "routine daily shipping
reconnaissance of the Japan Sea in connection with U.N.
operations in Korea." SECRET.
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(November 26), however, asserted categorically that the missing
plane had been tracked by radar andias known to have followed a
prearranged course which would have positively kept it 40 miles
from the Siberian coast.189
The United States did not request a U.N. investigation,
nor did it give any indication that the Soviet government
would be asked to discipline those responsible for the incident,
pay damages, or give assurances against a repetition of the
incident. U.N. Secretary Lie indicated that no action would
be taken by the U.N. unless the Soviets or the United States
demanded a Security Council debate.190 The matter was dropped
by both sides, the Soviets contenting themselves with a request
(December 7, 1951) that the Soviet version of the incident be
circulated to U.N. members.191
Significance
Soviet Motive and Handling of Incident
Available evidence supports the view that the shooting
down of the U.S. Navy plane was not accidental but a matter of
deliberate policy. The Soviet protest note contained the same
stereotyped version of the "facts" that had been used in the
April 8, 1950 (and subsequent) incidents:
189 The New York Times, November 27, 1951. The facts reported
in this U.S. Navy press release were substantially the
same as -in CINCUNC (Tokyo) to Dept. AR (Washington, D.C.)
for OSD,,Number CX 57014 (November 10, 1951) ; SECRET.
190 The New York Times, November 25, 1951.
191 Ibid., December 8, 1951.
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134.
...Upon the approach of two Soviet fighters with
the intention of forcing the American plane,
which had violated the Soviet state frontier, to
land.on -a Soviet airport,., the American plane
opened fire on them. The Soviet airplanes were
forced to open return fire, after which the
American airplane went off in the direction of
the sea and disappeared.192
It is our impression that this stereotyped version of the
"facts" is used whenever the Politburo wishes to convey the
idea that the incident in question occurred as a result of
op licy, i.e., operational implementation of standing air-defense
instructions to the Soviet forces concerned. The fact that in
the present case, unlike earlier and later incidents, these
instructions were not cited in a Soviet diplomatic note does not
weaken the interpretation advanced here. For, as has been noted,
the instructions are cited not in the first Soviet note on an
incident but in a subsequent.one, if diplommtic exchanges
continue. In the present case there was only one Soviet note;
hence, no special significance can be-attached to the failure
to cite the instructions.
The same interpretation of Soviet motives is also suggested
by the fact that, as in the case-of the Navy Privateer incident
in the Baltic, the Soviet pilots responsible for the act were
decorated and publicly commended.193
192 Soviet note of November 7 1951; Department of State
Bulletin, December 3, 1951.
Soviet p.~,_:: announcement of November 23, 1951, which was
given prominen'W, front-page display. The two Soviet fliers
in this case were awarded the same medal as the Soviet
fliers in the Baltic incident of April, 1950. The
announcement itself was virtually the same noncommittal
citation as in the Baltic case. (Department of State, OIR,
"Intelligence Brief," November 28, 1951; CONFIDENTIAL.)
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None of the commentaries on the incident, public or
confidential, which have been examined in preparing the present
study speculated that a special political motive underlay the
Soviet action in this case. The Politburo's unwillingness to
exploit the incident for propaganda purposes also points to
the absence of a specific political motive; the official Soviet
note was broadcast without any commentaries. Thus, no effort
was made in Soviet diplomatic or propaganda communications to
point up any specific political lesson or conclusion to be
drawn from the incident by the United States, and no such
political conclusion is evident. For example, in arguing that
Mr. Cummings should accept the Soviet protest note, Gromyko
made no effort to indicate that the Soviet action had anything
more than a technical air-defense motivation. When Cummings
expressed regret that an American plane might have violated
Soviet territory, Gromyko replied: "This is good to hear from
you, but it would be even better if U.S. authorities take all
measures to assure no further action of this nature. This is
not the first time...as you know, such actions have occurred
not only in the East but in the West beginning in 1950.1,194
Two or three subsidiary questions-about Soviet motives
remain which are possibly relevant in assessing the significance
of the air incident. First, given a technical air-defense
motive as hypothesized, did the Soviets go out of their way to
194 Moscow (Cummings) to Secretary of State, No. 801 (November
7, 1951); CONFIDENTIAL.
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create the incident, or did they really believe the U.S. Navy
plane to be guilty of a violation? We have already noted the
official U.S. report that according to radar-scope data-the
plane in question did not approach closer than 40 miles to the
Siberian coast on t-lis mission. On the basis of this information,
the possibility cannot be excluded that the Soviets deliberately
went beyond their 12-mile territorial waters limit to shoot down
the Navy plane. If so, alternative explanations suggest
themselves. The Soviets may have been looking for a convenient
occasion -- i.e., a U.S. flight which approached near enough --
on which to demonstrate that they had a new air-defense policy
in the Far East. They might have desired to convey this change
in policy.to us as soon as possible -- and hence did not oait
for a real violation to occur -- perhaps in order to undo the
impression created by the remarkable passivity of their air
defenses when two U.S. jet fighters attacked one of their
airfields in the Vladivostok area on October 8, 1950.195
Extension of Severe Soviet Air-Defense Policy to the
Far East
In any event, whether deliberately staged outside Soviet
territorial waters or not, the incident revealed an extension
to the Far East of the new and tougher Soviet air-defense policy
that had been demonstrated. first in the Baltic incident of
195 See RAND RM-1349-Supplement (TOP SECRET).
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April, 1950. Before November, Soviet military reaction to
"hostile" flights around its borders in the Far East did not
go beyond firing warning bursts; in some cases, it was even
more permissive. Now in the Far East, as in the Baltic, the
Soviet Union served dramatic notice by deed rather than words
that air intruders would be forced to land and, if they
"resisted," shot down.
Soviet Disclosure and Propaganda Policy
We have hypothesized that, when Soviet forces have shot
down a foreign plane, the Politburo generally prefers to let
the action speak for itself as an indication of its attitude
regarding defense of Soviet "rights." In this instance, however,
the Politburo deviated from its usual custom and followed up
the Soviet military reaction immediately with a diplomatic
communication one day after the incident.
Why did the Soviets initiate disclosure in this case,
contrary to their usual custom? The answer-is suggested if one
recalls the April 8, 1950, Baltic incident when the Soviets
became quite concerned over the meaning.of a U.S. air search for
the missing plane. With the Baltic incident in mind, the
Politburo may have deemed it expedient on this occasion to open
up diplomatic communication immediately in order to forestall or
control any undesirable U.S. reaction that might ensue.
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Some interest has been raised by the fact that Soviet
propaganda follow-up to the present incident was unusually
reticent.196 When a U.S. Navy Privateer was shot down in the
Baltic, there was considerable Soviet propaganda comment and
celebration of the even.. In the present case, however, it is
quite likely that thA politburo would have been satisfied with
a private diplomatic warning to the United States of the new
and firmer Soviet air-defense policy along its Far East perimeter.
The official Soviet note of November 7 and, indeed, the incident
itself were not disclosed publicly by the Soviets, but by
Warren Austin in his statement before the United Nations on
November 23. The first Russian broadcast of the note did not
come until November 30.
however, Soviet propaganda reticence in the present instance
was consistent with the restrained treatment that had been given
previous air incidents in the Far East since the onset of the
Korean war. In the downing of the Soviet plane in the Yellow
Sea and the attack on a Vladivostok area airfield by U.S. Jet
fighters, the Kremlin did not play up the incidents in its
propaganda, though it did promptly publish the text of its
diplomatic protest notes.197 In those two incidents and in the
present one, Soviet propaganda reticence may have been dictated
in part by a desire to avoid becoming associated in any way with
the Korean war. In the present case, also, the Politburo may
196 FBIS, Survey of U.S.S.R. Broadcasts, December 13, 1951.
197 See case studies Nos. 40 and 124.
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have decided against a propaganda follow-up of the incident
lest it stiffen thereby the attitude of the U.N. negotiators
at the Korean cease-fire talks.198
U.S.. Handling of the Incident
U.S. policy-makers decided that, since the U.N. had been
used previously as a channel for handling plane incidents
growing out of the Korean war, it should be used again in the
present instance. A recommendation was made by the State
Department, with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
that the United States not reply directly to the Soviet note
of NovemVer.7 but that, rather, the commander-in-chief of U.N.
forces in Korea, General Ridgway, be asked to submit a special
report on the matter.199
By making use of U.N. offices in the present case, the
United States supported its general position that its military
operations in the Korean theater were under U.N. jurisdiction.
But this procedure was not without disadvantage. It appears to
have ruled out a direct diplomatic approach to the Russians
later, when, as might have been anticipated, discussion of the
incident within the U.N. proved ineffectual.
The State Department did not consider it feasible to
press charges against the Soviets -'in 'the present case -- as, for
198 This possibility was suggested in a State Department OIR
"Intelligence Brief" (November 28, 1951); CONFIDENTIAL.
Department of State to American Embassy, Paris, for the
Secretary of State (date not available); SECRET.
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example, by requesting an international investigation of the
incident. The State Department's attitude in this respect was
based upon an appreciation of certain problems and risks which
such a course of action would have entailed:200
1. Had the Soviets ac^epted a demand for an international
investigation, the United States would have found itself.in an
awkward position. Not handicapped by any reluctance to fabricate
evidence where necessary, the Soviets would have had little
difficulty in "proving" their case by "documented" charges and
"eyewitness" accounts. In contrast, the United States would
have few "facts" to present owing to the nature of the incident
-- the fact that we knew the fate of the plane only from the
Soviet protest note, that there were no survivors or records
apart from the radar-scope report, etc.
2. To take the case to the Security Council would certainly
have stirred up public interest, but with no result other than
to show the ineffectiveness of the Security Council and of the
U.N. in a case of this kind. Nevertheless,
3. It might have been useful to publicize the case
further if it were desired to convince the U.S. public of the
ruthless and unprincipled nature of the Soviet regime. But since
200 The following statement of considerations which deterred the
State Department from taking further diplomatic action in
this case paraphrases remarks made by Mr. U. Alexis Johnson,
Department of State (FE). to Captain J. F. Enright, U.S.
Navy (Op-35) on April ~e,.) 1952, and by Mr. Johnson, Mr.
Henkin (UND), and Mr. Notting (G) to Captain Enright and
Mr. Sullivan (Office of the Secretary of Defense) on May 22,
1952.. See State Department memo of conversations;
CONFIDENTIAL.
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this was already known to the U.S. public, "revival of the
incident would therefore only increase the already great tension
between the two countries to no apparent specific purpose."
THE RANSOM OF U.S. FLIERS BY HUNGARY201
(November-December, 1951)
On November 18, 1951, a U.S. military plane, a C-47, was
reported missing while en route from Munich to Belgrade. The
plane, manned by a crew of four, was carrying diplomatic cargo.
Two days later, the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade announced that the
missing plane had been fired upon by Hungarian and Rumanian
border guards.202 On the following day, the Hungarian and
Rumanian governments charged-that the U.S. plane had violated
their frontiers. This.charge was contained in official notes
to the United States which apparently were in reply to U.S.
requests to the governments concerned for information on the
whereabouts of the missing plane.
On December 3, TASS stated that the missing plane had been
forced down by Soviet fighters near Papa, Hungary, after
violating the Rumanian border. The TASS report also took pains
201 The following case study is based largely on unclassified
materials; only a few classified State Department cables
were available for inspection at the time the study was
prepared.
202 Later information, however, definitely confirmed that the
U.S. plane 'had not been fired upon. See cable from
rCOG Munich, to Secretary of State, No. 436 (January
3, 192); SECRET.
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to justify the action of the Soviet fighters as being in accord
with treaty provisions governing the stationing of Soviet
forces in Hungary. The U.S. C-47, TASS charged, was engaged
in an espionage mission. The four U.S. fliers, TASS reported,
had been turned over to the Hung-Tian government.
The U.S. State Department Dressed for immediate release
of the plane and its crew, denying the charges of espionage
which were being widely publicized by communist sources. At the
United Nations, Vishinsky made several strident statements on
the C-47 incident, which he depicted as an instance of U.S.
efforts to incite revolt within the U.S.S.R. bloc. Following
Vishinskyts explicit threat of strong action against the fliers,
the Hungarian government in a note to the United States on
December 21, announced that the four airmen were to be tried.
The U.S. charge d'affaires in Moscow delivered an oral protest
and requested Moscow to intervene (December 22). On December 23,
Budapest announced the "confession" and conviction of the fliers,
each of whom was sentenced to a three-month prison term or a
fine of $30,000. Confiscation of the plane was also announced.
On December 26, the U.S. government stated it was willing
to pay the fines if the fliers were promptly released. Two days
later, the fine was paid and the fliers were released. Several
days after that, the U.S. government announced that, in
retaliation, Hungarian consulates in the United States would be
closed and that issuance of passports for travel in Hungary
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439
would be discontinued. American public opinion and many U.S.
political leaders called for sterner action against the
Hungarian government, such as, for example, breaking off
diplomatic relations.
Some weeks later, Secretary of State Acheson was reported
to have given the Senate Armed Services Committee."top secret"
reasons for payment of the fines. Members of the Senate
committee later stated that disclosure of these reasons would.
do more harm than good. (February 5, 1952.) 'Acheson's reasons
were, therefore, not made public (and were not available for
inclusion in this report).
Subsequently, the U.S. State Department threatened both
the Soviet and Hungarian governments with legal action unless
they gave a satisfactory explanation of the detention of the
four U.S. airmen and returned the plane and its cargo. The
United States charged that an "exhaustive survey" had revealed
"serious discrepancies" between the facts and the statements
made by Soviet and Hungarian authorities. The United States
also complained that it had been deprived of the appropriate
legal documents of the trial. The Soviet government, in reply,
refused to receive the demands made in the U.S. note on the
ground that they were misaddressed. Hungary, in turn, rejected
the U.S. demands. The U.S. position was reiterated in a new
note and was again rejected by the Hungarian government.203
203 Texts of the notes are in the De artment of State Bulletin:
(1952), pp. 7, 128, 980-984; (1953)t pp. 51-521 257-259.-
See also The New York Times December 3, 5, 7, 12, 22-30
1951; December 11 and 16, 1 52; January 24; February 1 and
119 1953.
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449
In March, 1953, the U.S. Department of State presented new
notes to the Soviet and Hungarian governments, in which it
presented in considerable detail its case against the two
governments. The United States demanded return of the plane
and its cargo, return of the fines pe{_d to obtain the release
of the crew, and payment of damages to the airmen arising from
their detention and treatment, as well as damages to the
United States. A detailed statement of the facts of the
incident and of the subsequent treatment of the crew was given
in the U.S. notes. Finally,. it was asserted that, if the two
governments contested liability, the U.S. government proposed
that the dispute be presented for hearing and decision in the
International Court of Justice.204
The Soviet and Hungarian governments replied negatively
on June 19, 1953, and November 2, 1953, respectively. 'Thereupon,
on March 3, 1954, the United States filed suit for damages
before the International Court of Justice at The Hague. At the
same time, in an official announcement, the U.S. government
indicated that its purpose in bringing the case before The Hague
204 U.S. Department of State, "Text of Notes Presenting Formal
Diplomatic Claims by the United States against the Soviet
and Hungarian Governments in the Case of the Four American
Airmen and the C-47 Airplane 6026 Brought down in Hungary
on November 19, 1951." (State Department release of March
17, 19531 summarized in Department of State Bulletin ol.
28 (19531, p. 496, and in The New York Times, March 18V,
1953.) For a detailed summary and interpretation of the
case from the standpoint of international law, see Oliver
J. Lissitzyn, "The Treatment of'Aerial Intruders in Recent
Practice and International Law," American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 47, No. 4, October, 1953.
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145.
was to call attention to the need for an "authoritative...
formulation of the rules of law which civilized governments
should observe in these fields." It may be noted, however,
that the issue presented to the court concerned the willful
and unlawful seizure of the U.S. plane and the treatment of
its crew.205 This excludes, therefore, the additional
important question of the agtions which a territorial sovereign
may properly take against an unauthorized overflight. On
July 15, 1954, the International Court of Justice announced
that the Soviet Union and Hungary had refused to accept its
jurisdiction in the suits brought by the United States government.
Accordingly, the court stated, the suits were being removed
from its list of pending cases.206
Significance
The present case is a striking demonstration of the manner
in which the Soviet Union or its Satellites may seize upon air
incidents in periods of nonhostilities to advance cold-war
objectives. In this case, the communists quickly incorporated
the fact that a U.S. C-47 made an emergency landing behind the
Iron Curtain into their then current campaign against alleged
205
The New York Times,'March 4, 1954. For the official U.S.
announcements on this occasion, see Department of State
Bulletin, March 22, 1954, pp. 449-451.
206
The New York Times, July 16, 1951+.
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U.S. efforts to create subversion inside the Soviet orbit.207
This Soviet propaganda campaign was focused on the provision
in the Mutual Security Act of October, 1951, which was alleged
to set up funds for "subversion." The section of the Act in
question provided funds to finance the integration of "selected"
Soviet-bloc refugees into NATO armies, nr "for other purposes."
A communist propaganda build-up on this theme had already
been underway for several months when the C-47 episode occurred.
The purpose of the preparatory propaganda. campaign was evidently
to pave the way for Soviet charges against this provision of
the Mutual Security Act before the United Nations. From Moscow's
standpoint, the C-47 incident was eminently suited for this
purpose; and it was heavily exploited by communist propaganda.
(In contrast, the shooting down of a U.S. Navy plane off
Vladivostok, shortly before the C-47 incident, was given only
routine treatment by communist media.)208 The propaganda value
of the C-47 episode for Moscow's attack on the above-noted
provision of the Mutual Security Act is indicated by the
extensive use made of it by Vishinsky before the United Nations.
207 It is of interest that initial Soviet interrogation of the
pilot of the American C-47 was directed toward ascertaining
whether he had dropped parachutists. He was told by a
Soviet colonel on approximately November 30, after the close
of the interrogation: your case has been decided; you are
to be freed." But, instead, on December 3, the personnel of
the C-47 were turned over to Hungarian authorities. (Munich
to Secretary of State, No. 426 Decw?'-.r 30, 1951; SECRET.)
A further analysis of the debriefing of the crew upon their
release by the communists disclosed that the Russians and
Hungarians had not been able to yobttaiin any evidence that the
thew n n c-4 ioingn oged Mi unich to vSecretaryioly Stated,
teton o a
No. 27, December 31, 1951; CRET.)
See case study No. 53.
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47.
A more far-reaching cold-war set-back for the United States
that might have arisen from this incident was possibly avoided
by the firm attitude taken by U.S. officials and American public
opinion in the face of communist threats to try the crew of the
C-47 on charges of espionage.209 The development of events
suggests a quick change in communist plans in this respect,
possibly in response to the angry U.S. reaction. On December 19,
in a strident speech before the U.N., Vishinsky hinted that
the trial of the U.S. fliers would be a full-dress propaganda
demonstration of the thesis that "subversion does not pay."
Vishinsky intimated that the U.S. fliers might be tried for
espionage and expressed the hope that they would receive "all
due attention by military justice authorities." He declared
later that, while he did not know personally what would happen
to the U.S. fliers, "any spies caught" in the Soviet bloc "will
be tried according to Soviet z5ic7 law."210
209
The materials examined in preparing this study do not
indicate how far the State Department went in making clear
to the Hungarian government its attitude in the event the
U.S. crew memoets were tried for espionage. It is unlikely,
however, that a formal ultimatum as in the Yugoslav case
(case study No. 13) was given the Hungarian government. The
present account is'adapted from the analysis presented in the
Department of State, OIR, Intelligence Brief, "Trends in
Soviet-Communist Tactics," December 27, 1951; CONFIDENTIAL.
A State Department cable z Budapest to Secretary of State,
No. 461 (December 28, 1971, CONFIDENTIAL) reported that
Vishinsky's remarks were taken in Budapest as a forecast of
an espionage trial with a probable death sentence. "Tension
throughout the city mounted visibly on December 21 and 22."
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48.
Vishinsky's statements received added emphasis in the
simultaneous and highly unusual announcement by Moscow that
two self-admitted spies for the United States had been executed
after parachuting into the U.S.S.R.211 These "spies," it was
alleged, were two D.P.'s who had been recruited, in West Germany
and dropped into the Moldavian Republic by a U.S. plane based
.in Greece. Vishinsky's speech was published in full in the
Soviet press of December 21. On the same day, a Hungarian note
to the United States, published in Moscow, announced officially
that the fliers would be tried for overflying Hungarian
territory "with the criminal intention of dropping spies and
diversionists." The Hungarian Foreign Office stated explicitly
that the U.S. fliers were to be tried on both counts. On the
following day (December 22), however, the Hungarian government
announced that the trial was over. The American fliers were
convicted (only) of "deliberately" violating the Hungarian
frontier because they had failed to land voluntarily although
they knew they were over Hungary. Furthermore, instead of
claiming a "premeditated intention" to drop spies, the Hungarian
communique contained the weak assertion that the presence in
the plane of such equipment as parachutes and a separate radio
made it "plausible" that they were to be dropped to "spies and
diversionists."
The sudden trial and relatively mild sentence suggest a
desire on the part of the Politburo to dispose of an explosive
211
See case study No. 4+8.
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issue as expeditiously as possible without loss of face. In
view of the extreme expectations created by the communist
propaganda build-up and by Vishinsky's statements, the hasty,
unpublicized, trial and the sentence of three months'
imprisonment or fines totaling $120,000 -- where Hungarian law
provided for a possible five-year imprisonment -- were
anticlimactic.
The C-47 incident was of some interest also insofar as
it reflected Soviet air capabilities and policy with respect
to unauthorized overflights of its European Satellites. After
a thorough investigation of the facts of the incident, the U.S.
Department of State was able to characterize the Soviet and
Satellite air-defense response to the unintentional overflight
committed by the C-47 as follows:
During the flight and thereafter both the Soviet
Government and the Hungarian Government were
fully aware...that the Z-C-4.27 airplane flew north
of its fixed course in Yugoslavia on its trip
eastward, had overflown Yugoslavia and entered
Rumania and had while attempting to return
westward crossed the Hungarian frontier. The
airplane was observed and monitored in its entire
westward flight by Soviet and other Soviet-arced
ground authorities from approximately 4 p.m. to
6 p.m. local time, first in Rumania and then in
Hungary; and when the plane was brought down at
6 p.m. by the Soviet aircraft it had almost
reached the British occupied zone of Austria.
Moreover, the Hungarian authorities near the
eastern border of Hungary had notified Soviet
authorities in Hungary of the westward course of
the plane and the Soviet and Hungarian Governments
thereupon agreed that the plane should be permitted
to overfly Hungary, be observed in its flight and
then be.brought down by the Soviet aircraft
stationed near the western border of Hungary.
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...The Soviet authorities and their allies
deliberately permitted the plane to cross the
Hungarian frontier and to overfly Hungarian
territory, and then brought it down lest,
continuing in its flight, it would In a few
minutes arrive safely in the British zone of
Austria, or in other territory not controlled
by the Soviet Government or its allies....212
The U.S. note added that the C-47, having repeatedly
signaled that it was in distress and was seeking a safe landing
place, was finally intercepted by aircraft and shown to a
landing place. The crew members of the C-47 were not aware
of having overflown Rumania or Hungary; they thought that the
plane was over Yugoslavia throughout the entire flight. Nor
did they realize until later that the intercepting aircraft
were Soviet and that they were being led to a Soviet airfield.
Nor, finally, were they of the impression that they were being
"forced down."
The reaction of the Soviet and communist air-defense
system to the overflight of the C-47 thus suggests that at
that time a more flexible and less severe air-defense policy
was in effect over these Satellite areas than was being applied
elsewhere around the Soviet perimeter.
55. CZECH OVERFLIGHTS OF U.S. ZONE OF GERMANY
(March 4, 1952)
According to a West German police report, tw_^ M'LG's with
Czech markings were sighted over Weiden, in the U.S. zone of
212 U.S. State De artment note to the Soviet government
March 17 19 , as cited in Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. 28 1953 , p. 496.
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Germany (approximately twelve miles from the Czech border).
This report was confirmed several months later, on June 6,
by a U.S. Army representative in West Germany. No further
information on this incident has been collected.213
56. U. S. NAVY PATROL BOMBER FIRED ON OVER CHINA SEA
(April 1, 1952)
On April 4, 1952, the U.S. Navy reported that one of its
patrol bombers had been slightly damaged by gunfire from an
unidentified trawler in the China Sea on the night of April 1.
The incident took place about 100 miles southeast of Shanghai.
The Navy plane was able to return to its base. No mention
was made of casualties. No other information about this
incident is available.214
57. FRENCH COMIERCIAL AIRCRAFT ATTACKED BY
SOVIET FIGHTERS IN BERLIN CORRIDOR
(April 29, 1952)
On April 29, 1952, while flying the air corridor from
Frankfurt to Berlin, an Air France commercial DC-4 was
intercepted by two Soviet MiG's. The Soviet planes maneuvered
in such fashion as to force the French plane down from 7,500
213 The New York Times, March 5, 1952, and June 7, 1952.
214 Ibid., April 5, 1952.
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to 2,500 feet; they also fired upon it, inflicting material
damage to the craft and wounding two passengers. The plane
succeeded in evading the Soviet planes and in reaching Berlin
safely.
On the same day, French-British-U.S. occupation officials
protested the attack to Soviet authorities. The Soviet reply
by Major General Trusov, also made on April 29, charged that
the French DC-4 had violated East German territory, had
ignored signals from Soviet fighters ordering it to land, and
had continued to make a deeper penetration over East German
territory in the direction of Leipzig. Thereupon, the Soviet
note continued, Soviet fighters fired a "warning burst" at
the DC-4.
On'April 30, a second three-power note rejected the Soviet
contention, claiming that the French plane had been within
the air corridor. But even if the French craft had violated
the corridor, the Allied note continued, "to fire in any
circumstances, even by way of warning, on an unarmed aircraft
in time of peace, wherever that aircraft may be, is entirely
inadmissible and contrary to all standards of civilized
behavior." Simultaneously the French government issued a note
on the matter to the Soviet government.
No Soviet reply to these notes was forthcoming; accordingly,
on May 9, the three Western powers invited Soviet occupation
authorities at the Berlin Air Safety Center to participate in
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15.
a joint examination of the extent of the damage. This request
was ignored by the Soviet chairman of the Soviet Control
Commission. On June 26, the high commissioners of the three
Western powers asked Soviet High Commissioner Chuikov to hasten
a reply to their note of April 29. Nc evidence of a Soviet
reply has come to our attention.
Significance
Western Speculation as to Soviet Motives
The Air France incident occurred at atime when Western
observers were noting with some apprehension signs of renewed
Soviet pressure in Germany. The air incident, viewed from
this perspective, touched off considerable speculation as to
the underlying Soviet motive.
There was little disposition to view the Soviet action
against the French plane as anything but deliberate.215 The
215
USAFE A-2 estimated Soviet radar and air-defense
capability along the Berlin air corridors at that time
as follows: Soviet fighter aircraft are kept on the
alert and are able in a minimum period of time under
visual conditions to intercept Western aircraft straying
outside the prescribed air corridor. (CINCUSAFE,
LWiesbaden7 to CS, AF LWashington7, No. EOOTA 13 093
June 5, 19527; SECRET.) Not only does this tend to
rule out the likelihood that the MiG attack was the
result of irresponsible action by "trigger-happy" Soviet
pilots in an accidental encounter with the French plane;
it also suggests, as another USAFE A-2 evaluation
concluded, that the MiG attack was. ordered and possibly
directed by ground radar control:,. (See CINCUSAFE
/Wiesbaden/ to CS, AF LWashington7, No. E 1A1 12100
May 10, 19527; SECRET.)
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chief question in the minds of Western observers was whether
the Soviets had staged the incident for "political" reasons,
i.e., to further Soviet diplomatic objectives in the struggle
for Germany, or whether the Soviet objective was merely a
"technical" one, i.e., to di?courage further Western air
violations over Germany.
The major alternative explanations of the Soviet motive
that were considered by Western analysts at the time were:
(a) The attack on the French plane was deliberate
and had a political motive. It was not the irresponsible
action of individual Soviet pilots who happened to be in
the vicinity of the French plane. The Soviet objective
was to test, by means of this air incident, Western
strength and intentions before imposing further
restrictions on Allied air traffic in and out of Berlin.216
(b) The Soviet action, deliberate and politically
motivated, was designed to emphasize Soviet displeasure
at the Western Allies' effort to integrate Western Germany
into NATO, and to remind the Allies of the Soviet
216
This explanation was suggested in a USAFE A-2 estimate,
cited in CINCUSAFE (Wiesbaden) to CS, AF (Washington),
No. EOOTA 13093 (June 5, 1952); SECRET. The same
hypothesis was implicit in the State Department's
suggestion, immediately after the incident took place,
that for the sake of the effect on the Soviets, full
Berlin air traffic be resumed by the Allies at the
earliest moment consis`:: with safety. (State Department
LAcheso7 to HICOG-Bonn, Apiil 29, 1952; SECRET.)
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155.
capability for blockading Berlin.217
(c) The Soviet action was deliberate, but had a
technical rather than a political motive. The Soviets
staged the incident in order to teach the Western Allies
a "lesson" and in order to discourage- further, air
violations of this character.218
Political explanations of the Soviet motive can be ruled
out for a variety of reasons:
1. A major reason for rejecting explanations (a) and
(b), which attributed political or diplomatic objectives to
the Soviet action, is that the French commercial airliner was
apparently guilty of a fairly substantial violation of the
air corridor, though in all probability it was unintentional.219
217 A similar hypothesis appears, for example, in the State
Department's Soviet Affairs for May, 1952,. issued by OIR;
SECRET. This analysis notes that the incident involving
the French airliner took place at a time when the three
Western powers vere~taking important steps toward the
integration of West Germany. Following the delivery to the
Western powers, on April 9, 1952, of a second Soviet note
on this issue, a rash of incidents and bellicose statements
were forthcoming from Soviet and East German sources. The
attack on the French airliner was one of these incidents
which, if not manufactured by the Soviets for this
purpose, pointedly demonstrated to Western observers the
Kremlin's ability to control access to Berlin.
This explanation was favored in a State Department report.
(Berlin LLyon7 to Secretary of'State, No. 1298, May 1, 1952;
CONFIDENTIAL.)
219 While the three Western powers never admitted that the
French plane had strayed from the corridor, a U.S. radar
reading showed it to have been 8-10 miles south of the
corridor at the time it was being forced down by the
circling MiG's. The French pilot, however, asserted that
his plane remained within the corridor throughout the
entire engagement, the radar reading notwithstanding. The
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The fact that an air violation took place makes it necessary
to consider more seriously explanations attributing technical
motives to the Soviet action. It is interesting that the French
Foreign Office initially attributed a political motive to the
Soviet attack on the French airliner, its hypothesis being that
the Soviets wished to indicate their opposition to.the contractual
agreements between the Western powers and the West German
government. But within a few days the French came to the view
that the Soviet attack, while deliberate, stemmed from technical
motives.220
2. It is unlikely that the Soviets regarded the general
political situation in Germany at this time as being suitable
for beginning a new blockade of Berlin. According to a State
Department analysis, there was no other evidence that the
Soviets had made a general policy decision on Berlin which would
call for a step as serious as that of shooting down an Allied
plane in the authorized air corridor.221 Such a challenge of
the right of access to Berlin, the analysis noted, would be
219 (Cont'd)
possibility remains that the French plane may have been
forced out of the corridor, or further out than it might
otherwise have strayed by the maneuvers and attacks of
the MiG's. (State cable, Bonn LMcCloy7 to Secretary of
State, unnumbered, April 29, 1952; RESTRICTED.)
"`" State Department cable, Paris (Dunn) to Secretary of State,
No..6726 (May 2, 1952); SECRET.
HICOG Berlin (Barnes) to jdapartmenl of State, May 8, 1952;
CONFI 3ENTI AL .
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made only if the Soviets considered integration of West Germany
with Western Europe to have become a probability. This was
considered unlikely as yet by the State Department analyst,
who noted, moreover, that the Soviets were continuing their
"German Unity" campaign..
3. The fact that the whole incident was almost ignored
in, Soviet propaganda also argues in favor of the view that the
Soviet motive was technical rather than political.222
Apparently no effort was made by the Soviets, either by
diplomatic communication or overt propaganda, to drive home the
political meaning, if any, of the Soviet action. The incident
of April 29 was followed, instead, by a series of Soviet
diplomatic protests of similar air violations by French aircraft.
These subsequent protests seemed intended to justify the Soviet
action, but, in effect, they also clarified the Soviet intention.
Thus, the Soviet protest of May 8 (regarding a new violation of
the corridor by a French military plane) scored French authorities
for failing to take corrective measures despite several
remonstrances from the Soviet command. (The French reply of
May 10 acknowledged that a brief violation had taken place in
this instance.) Another Soviet note (May 15, 1952) protested a
new violation by an Air France plane on May 12.223
me soviet note on the 1nciaent was reported in Soviet
domestic news broadcasts, but otherwise the incident was
ignored. (FBIS, Trends and Highlights or Moscow Broadcasts,
April, 1952; CONFIDENTIAL.)
"-' See case studies Nos. 58 and 59.
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The explanation that seems most plausible to the present
writer is that the Soviet action against the Air France plane
had a technical motive. This hypothesis is favored not only
because, as noted abo'e, it is difficult to support political
explanations. There are other indic:.tions which suggest that
the incident resulted from a top-1_avel Soviet decision to
extend gradually the severe air-defense policy (first encountered
in the Baltic on April 8, 1950) to other parts of the Soviet
perimeter.
The terms used to describe the incident in Major General
Trusov's note of April 29 recall the stereotyped version of
the "facts" given in Soviet diplomatic notes on earlier air
incidents, specifically the incidents of April 8, 1950, and
November 6, 1951, in the Baltic and off Vladivostok. The
stereotype implicitly conveys the content of Soviet air-defense
policy itself. In the Baltic case of April 8, 1950, both the
stereotyped version of the "facts" and, later, an explicit
statement of Soviet air-defense instructions (or policy) were
given in Soviet diplomatic notes. The connection between the
stereotype and the policy was further strengthened by their
repetition in the case of other air incidents which occurred
after the Air France incident.224 From the mere use of the
stereotype, therefore, it could be inferred with some plausi-
bility that the Soviet action in questsnn was in implementation
of the severe air-defense policy.
224 See case study No. 66 and the RB-29 Hokkaido incident of
October 7, 1952, in RPM 1349-Supplement (TOP SECRET).
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59.
In the Air France case, the essential component of the
stereotype used in the Soviet note was the assertion that
Soviet fighters ordered (signaled or requested) the French
plane to land. This reflects the key requirement of Soviet
air-defense policy; namely, that foreign planes suspected of
intruding into Soviet air space are required to land at a
Soviet airfield and "in case of resistance" are fired upon.
In the Air France case, the Soviets could not easily
fabricate, as they did in earlier and later incidents, the
charge that the foreign plane fired first, because the plane
escaped destruction, and could have been shown to have been
unarmed.
The fact that the French plane was not shot down appears
to have raised the question of whether the Soviet intention
(and Soviet air-defense policy in this geographical area) may
have been limited to firing warning bursts only, some of which
accidentally hit the French aircraft. This hypothesis was
advanced at the time by the State Department.225 It was
supported by two observations: (1) the U.S. authorities in
Berlin had had difficulty in finding a ranking Soviet official
to whom to deliver their protest note of April 29, and (2) the
Soviet note itself admitted only shooting across the front
of the French plane. These two observations were linked together
in the following hypothesis: Soviet officials in Berlin had
been thrown off balance by the fact that the French plane was
225" Berlin (Lyon) to Secretary of State, No. 1298 (May 1,
1952); .CONFIDENTIAL.
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160.
actually hit by the warning bursts. The incident was more
serious than had been anticipated, and they wished to avoid
discussing it until they had formulated a "line." Therefore,
they contrived to be "not available" for awhile.
This hypothesis is of questionable plausibility, however,
for several reasons:
1. The unavailability of Soviet officials, if intentional,
may have been motivated by a desire to obtain. detailed
information on the incident from Soviet sources and to formulate
the basis for the initial Soviet communication on the incident.
2. The Soviet statement that the MiG's fired only "warning
bursts" at the French plane can hardly be taken as evidence of
the true Soviet intention in this case. For it is not likely
that, having failed to bring down the French plane (if they
intended to), the Soviets would admit that they 'shot with the
intention of hitting it. Even in cases when Soviet fighters
have shot down "intruding" Western planes, Soviet diplomatic
notes have employed euphemisms which suggest rather than
directly indicate that Soviet fire was responsible for the
plane's."disappearing in the direction of the sea."
3. The damage sustained by the French plane, according
to a USAFE A-2 estimate, was sufficient proof that the Soviet
fighters had intended to destroy it.226
226
CINCUSAFE (Wiesbaden) to CS, AF (Washington,, No. EOOTA
13 093 (June 5, 1952) ; SECRET.
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Extension to Berlin Air Corridor of Tough Soviet
Policy Toward Alleged Air Violations
The Soviet attempt to shoot down the Air France plane and
the terms in which the Soviet diplomatic note described the
action were the first indication -- and a strong one -- that
the hostile air-defense policy governing violations of Soviet
air space proper was being extended to the territory of the
East German Satellite. This impression is further strengthened
by the occurrence on October 8, 1952, of a similar incident
involving a U.S. unmarked hospital aircraft.227
However, there is reason to believe that the Soviets
intended to apply only a modified version of their air-defense
policy to the Berlin air corridor. The four occupying powers
had, in 1946, agreed on air-traffic regulations which ruled out
resort to hostile fire against violations of the corridors.228
Moreover, joint machinery for implementing these regulations and
for hearing complaints had been provided in the Berlin Air
Safety Center. Therefore, the introduction by the Soviets of
a hostile air-defense policy in this area would have marked a
sharp break from existing commitments and practices and, hence,
would have offered a more difficult problem than had been
raised by the introduction, in April, 1950, of the new, hostile
air-defense policy around the U.S.S.R. proper. The problem for
227 See case study No. 97.
228 These regulations are summaized in case study No. 97, .v.
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the Soviets was further complicated by the fact that Western
air traffic in the corridors was heavy and minor violations
probably were not infrequent. Strict application of a hostile
air-defense policy to all violations of the Berlin air
corridors would have resulted in many inciden~s. Any such
development could well have had potentially 4xplosive inter-
national consequences.
The Soviets may well have deemed it prudent, therefore,
to mesh any new and more hostile air-defense policy toward
corridor violations with political considerations and strategy.
For this reason, it is likely that in extending its severe
air-defense policy to East Germany the Politburo modified it
in at least two important respects:
(1) Soviet air-defense forces in East Germany may have
been told to force down intruding planes only when they
committed gross violations and, in such cases, to make a real
effort to force the intruding plane to land without destroying it.229
229
Available accounts indicate that, before resorting to
hostile fire, Soviet fighters in this case may have tried
by signaling and maneuvering to request and force the Air
France plane to land. (The New York Times, April 29, 1952;
State Department cable from Bonn (McCloy) to Secretary of
State, unnumbered, April 29, 1952.) See also possible
warning passes and signaling by Soviet M1G's in the
hospital plane incident of October 8, 1952. In contrast,
in incidents around the Soviet perimeter proper, Soviet
fighters appear to have resorted to hostile fire immediately,
without warning.
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63.
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(2) Provision may have been made for flexibility in
operational implementation of the policy, in order to avoid
taking hostile action in circumstances which would have
undesired effects on political and diplomatic developments in
this area.
From a political and diplomatic standpoint, the Air France
incident should have been of major concern to the three Western
occupying powers. For the incident gave the first indication
that the Soviets were trying to apply a new and much more severe
policy'toward Western violations of the air corridors. The
Soviets had threatened as much during the Berlin airlift, but
they had not carried out their threat.230 From a global
standpoint, moreover, this appears to have been the first
occasion on which the Soviets attempted to apply their severe
air-defense policy to violations of communist air space other
than that over Soviet territory proper.231
According to available information, none of the Western
powers appears to have perceived clearly the significance of
the Air France incident in this respect. No diplomatic effort
was made to clarify whether, indeed, the Soviets were now
claiming the right-to force down planes which departed from the
air corridor and to shoot them down if they refused to land
in Soviet-held territory. It was not until the U.S. hospital
230 See case study No. 27.
231 The downing of the U.S. plane in Hungary in November,
1951, does not provide as clear-cut a test of the
extension of this air-defense policy to the territory
of Soviet Satellites; see case study No. 54.
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649
aircraft incident some five months later that Allied officials
attempted seriously to challenge the Soviets' right to apply
such an air-defense policy in this area.232
Rather, the main objective of Allied diplomatic protests
in the Air France case appears to have been to get the Soviets
to admit legal responsibility for having damaged a plane which,
the Allied held, had not violated the corridor. The only
suggestion of a broader diplomatic objective which Allied
authorities might have entertained, but one 4iich they did not
pursue until confronted by the hospital aircraft incident in
October, 1952, was contained in the initial Allied note of
April 29:
To fire in any circumstances, even by way of
warning, on an unarmed aircraft in time of
peace, wherever that aircraft may be, is
entirely inadmissible and contrary to all
standards of civilized behavior.23
58. SOVIET PROTEST AGAINST FRENCH AIR VIOLATION
OF BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR
(May 8, 1952)
A Soviet protest of a French air violation of the Berlin
corridor on May 8, 1952, was publicly disclosed by the East
German news agency on May 9, 1952. The Soviet protest was
232 See case study No. 97.
233 State Department cable, Berlin (Lyon) to Secretary of
State, No. 1296 (April 30, 1952); CONFIDENTIAL. See also
The New York Times, May 1, 1952.
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signed by Major General Trusov, deputy chief of staff of the
Soviet occupation forces, and was directed to his counterpart,
the French deputy chief of staff.
The Soviet note charged that a French aircraft of the
type Beachcraft C-49 Voyageur departed from the air corridor
north of the town of Erfurt at 12:08 local time on May 8, and
flew over the towns of Soemmerdan, Merseburg, and Wittenberg,
"which are at a considerable distance from the air corridor."
Major General Trusov's protest was reported to have
emphasized that "the renewed violation of flying regulations
by French aircraft over the territory of the German Democratic
Republic showed that the French authorities, regardless of
repeated demonstrations by representatives of the Soviet
Command, in particular that of April 29, 1952, had taken no
measures to stop these improper acts." The French occupation
authorities, Trusov held, were fully responsible for the
consequences of such acts.234
In a reply on May 10, 1952, French officials explained
that the French plane had briefly swerved off course, but had
immediately corrected its course.235
234
FBIS monitoring service.
235 The New York Times, May 11, 1952. For significance, cf.
case study No. 97.
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59. SOVIET PROTEST AGAINST ALLEGED FRENCH
AIR VIOLATION OF BERLIN CORRIDOR
(May 12, 1952)
On May .15, 1952, Soviet authorities publicly announced
that another French plane, a DC-4, had left the Berlin air
corridor on May 12. It was also stated that Major General
Trusov had sent a letter on the violation to French officials
in Berlin, emphasizing once again that French authorities
would be responsible for any consequences arising from any
similar incidents.236
u0. SOVIET PROTEST OF ALLEGED BRITISH
VIOLATION OF BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR
(May 18, 1952)
ADN, the official East German (Communist) news agency,
reported on-May 24, 1952, that Soviet officials in Berlin had
protested a violation of the air corridor by a British plane
on May 18.
The Soviet protest, signed by Major General Trusov,
deputy chief of staff of Soviet occupation forces, held that
the British plane (type unidentified in ADN dispatch) had
violated the corridor "in the area of Ludwigslust" (Mecklenburg)
and had overflown East Germany "for some time.... considerably
236
FBIS Daily Report, May 16, 1952; The New York Times,
May 16,, 1952.
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off the permitted flight route." Trusov's protest was said
to have called the attention of British authorities to the
fact that "the responsibility for the consequences of such
incidents" would rest upon them.237
61. BRITISH PROTEST SOVIET BUZZING OF CARGO PLANE
IN NORTH BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR
(May 22, 1952)
A British European Airways cargo aircraft was buzzed by
a Soviet fighter (apparently on May-22, 1952) while flying
the north air corridor to Berlin. No shots were fired, and
no damage was incurred by the British plane.
The British made a routine protest to the Soviet controller
at the Berlin Air Safety Center. The incident was not
considered too unusual and, therefore, was not viewed with
undue alarm.238
There is no indication that the incident received any
publicity from either side. Nothing about the incident could
be found in the New York Times.
237 FBIS, Daily Report, May 26, 1952; brief account in The
New York Times, May 25, 1952. For interpretation, see
also case study No. 97.
Berlin (Lyon) to Secretary of State, No. 1154 (May 22,
1952) ; RESTRICTED.
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689
62. SOVIET PROTESTS AGAINST ALLEGED U.S. AIR
VIOLATIONS OF EAST GERMAN TERRITORY
(May 26 and June 7, 1952)
That the Soviet Command in Germany had protested U.S. air
violations on May 26 and June 7, and warned against further
occurrences of this sort, was apparently publicly disclosed
only on June 22, 1952, in a Berlin radio broadcast.239
The disclosure was made in the context of a new protest
on June 21, 1952, by Major General Chuikov, Soviet occupation
chief.240 Further details on the, alleged violations of May 26
and June 7 are lacking. It is possible that U.S. Major General
Mathewson's admission, on June 17, that a U.S. unmarked
hospital plane had strayed from the corridor was in response to
one of these earlier Soviet protests.241
63. -SOVIET FIGHTERS BUZZ PLANE CARRYING
U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER TO AUSTRIA
(June If, 1952)
On June If, 1952, while flying in an authorized Vienna air
corridor, a U.S. plane carrying U.S. High Commissioner Donnelly
was buzzed by two Soviet MiG's. The Soviet planes apparently
did not fire their guns. On June 7, U.S. authorities in Vienna
239 The New York Times, June 23, 1952.
240 See case study No. 68.
241 See case study No. 75. For significance of this incident,
of. case study No. 97.
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protested the incident to Soviet High Commissioner Sviridov.
Soviet authorities admitted the buzzing, but held that the
U.S. should have given advance notice of the flight.
The State Department advised the U.S. Embassy in Austria
to give a strong answer to the Soviet request for advance
notice for air corridor flights. "In view of the significance
of the Soviet admission that their jets were near the
Ambassador's plane and their renewed effort to restrict traffic
on corridors, the Department believes that every effort should
be made to publicize our strong position.11242
On June 19, Acting U.S. High Commissioner in Austria
Dowling rejected the Soviet proposal for notification of U.S.
flights in Austria, citing existing agreements on the question.
64. ALBANIAN PROTEST OF ITALIAN AIR VIOLATIONS
(June 5, 12, and 14-, 1952)
An Albanian home service broadcast of July 2, 1952, stated
that the Albanian government had protested violations of its
air space by single Italian aircraft on June 5, 12, and 14.
Circumstantial details of the overflights were given.
The Italian government was reminded "once again" of its
responsibility for all consequences of "such a constant practice
as this." Reference was made, too, to the intention to create
242 Department of State (Acheson) to American Embassy, Vienna,
June 16, 1952.
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SECRET RM-170
bases of aggression in the Balkans, "in the interests of. the
war-mongering Anglo-American imperialists.i243
65. CHINESE COMMUNIST CHARGES OF FRENCH
AIR VIOLATIONS ALONG INDOCHINA BORDER
(June 6, 1952)
On June 6, 1952, the New China News Agency (Communist)
charged French planes with strafing Chinese villages along
the Sino-Vietnamese border, with resultant loss of life and
property damage. The charges, elaborated in Radio Peking
broadcasts on June 8, also alleged that French military aircraft
were dropping supplies to "remnants of the Kuomintang troops
operating on the Sino-Vietnamese border."
In rebroadcasting these charges, Moscow did not repeat
Radio Peking's statement that "reasonable protests" had been
made on several occasions by the Chinese People's government.
Moscow accounts also omitted Peking's official threat that
the "French Government must be held fully responsible for these
air violations and the resultant losses in lives and property."244
243 FBIS Daily Report, July 3, 1952. A slightly different
version of what was apparently the same Albanian charge
appeared in the New York Times. of July 4, 1952.
244 FBIS, Survey of U.S.S.R. Broadcasts (11-24 June 1952);
CONFIDENTIAL.
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66. SOVIETS SHOOT DOWN TWO SdEDISH AIRCRAFT
OVER THE BALTI C2'45
(June 13 and 16, 1952)
During a flight over the Baltic on June 13, a Swedish Air
Force aircraft of the DC-3 type disappeared. An energetic
search for the aircraft by sea and air started immediately.
In the afternoon of the same day, Swedish military authorities
requested the Finnish military attache and the Soviet air attache
in Stockholm to communicate whatever information might be
available in their countries regarding the missing Swedish DC-3.
Finnish authorities stated that no such information was at their
disposal. No reply was received from the Soviet authorities.
Later in the same day, June 13, because of unfavorable
atmospheric conditions, one of two Swedish sea-rescue aircraft
of the Catalina type participating in the search made an
unintentional overflight of Soviet territory at.the Island of
Dag$. This was ascertained by Swedish officials only on June
17, upon interrogation of crews. On the same day, the Swedish
Embassy in Moscow was instructed to inform appropriate Soviet
authorities of the unintentional overflight. This message was
transmitted on June-18, and formed the subject of a Swedish
press release of the same date.
245 For a summary of circumstantial details of the two
incidents and a verbatim translation of all diplomatic
notes exchanged during the controversy, see the Swedish
.blue book, Attacks upon Two Swedish Aircraft over the
Baltic in June 192: Documents Published by the Royal
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, New Series 11:2, Stockholm,
1952.
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.
While continuing the search for the missing DC-3, another
flight of two Swedish Ca.talinas was attacked by two Soviet MiG
fighters northwest of Dag8 in the early morning of June 16.
One of the Swedish planes was pursued and hit several times, but
it succeeded in making a forced landing in the immediate
neighborhood of a West German vessel which was en route to
Finland. The crew was rescued by the German vessel, but the
plane sank.
These three incidents -- the loss of two Swedish planes on
June 13 and 16, and the overflight of Dago by another Swedish
plane on June 13 -- became the subject of a series of diplomatic
exchanges between the Swedish and Soviet governments. Most of
the key facts surrounding the loss of the two Swedish planes
were disputed by the two governments, and the diplomatic
controversy was not resolved.
Though it acknowledged the unintentional violation of
Soviet territory, the Swedish government maintained that
neither of its two other planes had violated Soviet territory or
territorial waters.
The Swedish government held that both of the missing planes
had been unarmed. With regard to the one shot down on June 16,
therefore, the Swedish government rejected the Soviet contention
that this plane had opened fire upon Soviet fighters when
requested by them to land.
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The Soviets refused to accept explicit responsibility for
the fatality involving the Swedish DC-3 on June 13. The
Soviet note on this incident did not allege that the Swedish
plane had opened fire. The Soviets stated merely that on June
13 "two Lsic% foreign aircraft" whose nationality could not be
ascertained owing to unfavorable atmospheric conditions
violated the Soviet frontier "in the region of Ventspils" and
"were driven off by Soviet aircraft."
The Soviet government never directly acknowledged that
the aircraft involved in the June 13 incident was the missing
Swedish DC-3. It persistently maintained that the identity
of the "two foreign planes" involved at that time was not
known by the Soviet defense forces. There is little doubt,
however, that the Soviets were responsible for the shooting down
of the DC-3.
The Swedish account of the June 13 incident referred to
only one Swedish plane in that area. Therefore, the accounts
of the incident put out by the two governments differed on the
number of planes involved. This discrepancy, perhaps unimportant,
was not singled out for attention by either government.
None of the eight-man crew of the Swedish DC-3 survived,
and, so far as is known, authoritative details of the mishap
are lacking.
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SECRET RPM-1
Significance
Soviet Motives
There is reason to believe that the Soviet motive in
shooting down two Swedish planes within a matter of four days
was not necessarily the same in both cases. The explanation
for the second incident, involving the Catalina search-plane,
is more readily established than the circumstances and motivation
of the first incident, involving the DC-3. The second incident
was the direct aftermath of the first incident, though it was
not necessarily connected with it in Soviet planning. It will
be useful at this point to evaluate alternative explanations
of the Soviet motive behind the initial incident.
(1) There is little ground for believing that the June 13
incident was accidental, i.e., the result of a "trigger-happy"
Soviet pilot who happened to be in the area. This hypothesis
has never figured seriously in discussions of the case. It is
generally agreed that the attack was deliberate -- i.e., the
result of Soviet policy -- and the intelligence problem has been
to establish whther the Soviets had a political or technical
motive and, more precisely, what motive.246
(2) Among possible political motives for the attack, the
following have been considered: (a) the two Soviet actions
against the Swedish planes might have been intended to remind
the Swedes of their close proximity to the U.S.S.R., and to
246 parts of the report of the investigation of the incidents
by the Swedish Air Accidents Commission, it was noted,
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discourage incipient Swedish moves toward modification or
abandonment of Sweden's traditional neutrality policy; (b)
the incidents may have been intended by the Soviets to offset
the Enbom spy case, which was coming to a close in Sweden at
jut this time and which had deeply implicated Soviet Embassy
officials; thus, the air incidents would "show" that the
Swedes, too, were "spying" on the Soviets by means of air
reconnaissance.
The international context in which the air incidents
occurred at first lent a certain plausibility to these
explanations of the Soviet motive, and they were seriously
considered by the Swedish government for a time. 21+7 The Soviet
government could well have found reason to be displeased with
recent Swedish moves which might be taken as indicative of
a move away from strict neutrality. Thus, as The Economist
observed in its issue of July 12, 1952, a high officer of the
Swedish Air Force and the Swedish premier had both been to the
United States, and, at the beginning of June, a British
submarine flotilla visited Stockholm and was followed a few
days later by a senior RAF officer.
246 (Cont'd)
were to remain classified for the time being, for use,
possibly, if the case were submitted'to international
adjudication. (American Embassy, Stockholm il Marshall
Gre'en7 to Department of State, No. 17 July 19527;
RESTRICTED.)
Stockholm (Butterworth) to Secretary of State, No. 1464
(June 17, 1952); SECRET.
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176.
Within a relatively short time after the incidents occurred,
however, the Swedish government was disposed to reject these
early hypotheses. Political interpretations of the Soviet
intention were regarded as dubious, in part because Soviet
diplomatic and propaganda handling of the incidents did not
seem designed to support a political motive. There was little
evidence, apart from the two air incidents themselves, to suggest
that the Soviets were now inaugurating a new stage in their
relations with the Swedish government. The defensive tone of
Soviet diplomatic and propaganda communications on the incidents
and, particularly, the insistence of the Soviets that action had
been taken on June 13 against unidentified foreign aircraft
pointed to the absence of a deliberate Politburo intention to
create an incident with the*Swedish government or the Swedish
public. The Swedish Foreign Office is reported to have been
impressed with the fact that the Soviets were not playing upon
the incidents politically, and to have noted particularly the
relative silence maintained by the Soviet propaganda machine.2 8
A political motive behind the initial incident could not be
conclusively ruled out because the possibility remained that
the Kremlin had miscalculated the extent to which such an incident
would arouse Swedish opinion. According to this theory, the
Politburo indeed wanted to intimidate the Swedes by shooting down
21+8 American Embassy Stockholm (Butterworth) to Department of
State; No. 9 (Juiy 3, 1952); SECRET.
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SECRET RM-177.
one of their planes, but had not foreseen the extent of national
anger which such an incident would arouse. In considering this
hypothesis, however, the Swedish Foreign Office was perplexed
as to why the Kremlin should now suddenly act contrary to its
recent policy of placating Sweden in order to promote the
concept of Swedish neutrality. The only answer which suggested
itself was that the Soviets were attempting to promote Swedish
neutralism by a simultaneous or alternating application of
intimidation and placation.249
On balance, however, the Swedish government tended to
attribute a technical motive to the Soviet action.
. (3) The fact that the Soviets referred to two foreign
planes of undetermined nationality aroused speculation about
whether a plane other than the Swedish DC-3 might also have
been in the vicinity at the time. The other foreign plane may
have been the sole intended target of Soviet action. There
was the further possibility, considered at the time, that Soviet
air defense might have quite naturally mistaken the silhouette
of the Swedish DC-3 for an American plane.
Following a query by the Swedish government, USAF and the
U.S. Navy reported that none of their planes had been in the
vicinity at the time of the incident.250 The possibility
2+9 American Embassy Stockholm (Butterworth) to Department of
State; No. 9 (July 3, 1952); SECRET.
~5`) USAF Memorandum, Col. George A. Blakey, USAF State Liaison
Officer, to Mr. Andreas G. Ronhovde (Officer-in-Charge,
Northern European Affairs, State Department), September 8,
1952; CONFIDENTIAL.
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remains, however, that there was a mistaken identification of
silhouette.
It is possible, of course,'that only one foreign aircraft
was really identified by the Soviet air defense and that the
reference to "two foreign aircraft" was contrived in the Soviet
note of June 24 for some special reason. It might be that
the Soviets, chagrined at learning later that the "American"
DC-3 turned out to be a Swedish plane, contrived the reference
to "two foreign aircraft" of unidentified nationality in order
to cover up their mistake and to soften the unintended impact
of the incident upon Swedish sensibilities.
Another hypothesis, preferred by the present author, is
that the Soviets. indeed intended to shoot down the Swedish DC-3
and contrived the story about two unidentified foreign aircraft
for purposes of "cover" or diplomatic deception. The Kremlin
may have calculated that, if the circumstances under which the
DC-3 disappeared did not remain a mystery and the Soviets began
to be implicated, then a story about two unidentified aircraft
could be released. This version of the "facts" would spare
the Soviet government full onus by, raising the possibility that
its intended target had been another foreign plane. Indirectly
supporting this hypothesis is the fact that the Soviet
government ignored all Swedish inquiries regarding the DC-3,
missing since June 13, until the Swedish note of June 22
announced specific evidence (based upon examination of bits of
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the wreckage) that the DC-3 had been fired upon. It was only
then, in its third note of the series, on June 24, that the
Soviet government referred for the first time to the initial
incident. Had the Swedes not acquired evidence that the DC-3
had been the victim of hostile action,,the Soviets might never
have acknowledged, even indirectly, their responsibility for
shooting it down.
The Soviet delay in disclosing its role in the June 13
incident need not have been due to prearranged calculation; it
may have been in response to fortuitous circumstances. The
possibility cannot be excluded that the Soviets decided to
withhold information about their role after noting that the
Swedes were initially disposed to regard the loss of the DC-3
as accidental. (The initial Swedish announcement on June 14
had mentioned the possibility that a spontaneous explosion of
the DC-3 had taken place. Privately, however, Swedish government
sources believed that the DC-3 had probably been shot down,
though they may have lacked conclusive evidence of this at the
time.)251
(4) The fact that the Soviet Baltic fleet was holding
secret maneuvers somewhere in the southeastern Baltic at the
time when the June 13 incident took place suggested another
hypothesis as to the Soviet motive.
251
Stockholm (Butterworth) to Secretary of State, No. 1464
(June 17, 1952); SECRET.
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160.
On July 12, 1952, The Economist suggested that the Soviets
"might well have been so suspicious of any foreign aircraft
that stumbled into -- or was sent to investigate -- their
maneuvers that they shot it down, particularly if-it had an
'American' silhouette and the visibility was rather poor...."
The Swedish government, of course, considered this possi-
bility very seriously but did not appear to be entirely
satisfied with it. The explanation would be a very good one
if the DC-3 had in fact been sent close to or over the area of
Soviet maneuvers; we may assume that the Swedish government
knew where these maneuvers were being held. But the DC-3 was
evidently not sent into this part of the Baltic. Swedish
government sources indicated privately to U.S. Embassy officials
that the only possibility considered by them was that the DC-3
accidentally strayed into the Soviet maneuver area. Even this
possibility does not seem to have been deemed very likely by
Swedish officials, who considered it more probable that the
Soviets went out of their way to intercept the DC-3.252 As
officially and publicly announced by the Swedish government,
the flight plan of the DC-3 would have taken it around the
southern tip of the Swedish island of Gotland.
Other evidence bearing on this possible explanation is
inconclusive. Little can be made of the fact that there was
252 Swedish officials stated that they did not know exactly
where the DC-3 had been attacked, but concluded from the
preponderance of evidence that Soviet planes went out of
their way to intercept this plane either near Swedish
territory, or at least clearly-over international waters.
(American Embassy Stockhol /Butterworth7 to Department
of State, No. 9 L~'uly 3, 19T52?; SECRET.)
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SECRET RM-181.
no reference to Soviet naval maneuvers in the Baltic in the
Soviet diplomatic or propaganda communications. The fact that
a Finnish communist paper, cited by The Economist on July 12,
1952, stated that the Swedes got what they deserved for
trespassing on a Russian "training area" is no more than
suggestive since it might be based on inference rather than on
special information as to what actually took place.
Soviet reluctance to disclose the circumstances and details
of its military counteraction against the DC-3 may also be
taken as an indication supporting the above hypothesis. For,
if indeed the DC-3 wandered over the international waters of
the Baltic where secret Soviet naval maneuvers were being held,
Soviet unwillingness to give any details would be understandable.
It is noteworthy that, while claiming a violation of the Soviet
frontier on June 13, the Soviet note of June 24 was singularly
uncommunicative regarding the extent of the alleged penetration
in kilometers. (In contrast, the precise distance of the
alleged penetration by the Swedish Catalina on June 16 was
given in the Soviet protest.) Nor did the Soviet account
specify the locus of the alleged violation of June 13 beyond
stating that it took place "in the region of Ventspils." The
means by which the alleged violation by the DC-3 was detected,
too, were left vague in the Soviet account (but not so in the
Soviet version regarding the Swedish Catalina incident of June
16). Thus, the Soviet note of June 24 merely stated, with
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829
regard to the "two foreign aircraft" (i.e., Swedish DC-3).:
"On the basis of control measures undertaken by competent
authorities, the ,[Soviet Foreign? Ministry states that a
violation of the Soviet frontier was committed.... The said
aircraft were driven off by Soviet aircraft." This formulation,
it may be noted, is sufficiently general to include almost any
type of detection and interception.
The peculiar Soviet reticence regarding the circumstances
of the June 13 incident, however, would equally well support
another hypothetical explanation of the Soviet motive.
(5) The Soviet'attack on the DC-3 on June 13 may have
been a deliberate attempt to eliminate a specially-equipped
plane and a highly-trained crew. This hypothesis was favored
by the Swedish Foreign Office as an explanation of the Soviet
motive.253
U.S. Embassy officers in Stockholm were privately
informed that the Swedish DC-3 was carrying radar or other
special eglpment. No public announcement of this was made.
Evidently the specially-equipped DC-3 had earlier engaged in
intelligence missions. It was assumed by Swedish authorities
that the Soviets knew that the craft was being used for radar
reconnaissance of Soviet installations.
253
American Embassy, Stockholm (Butterworth) to Department
of State, No. 9 (July 3, 1952); SECRET.
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183.
Available data are contradictory on whether the DC-3 was
engaged on a radar reconnaissance mission when it was shot
down.2 5 Whether the specially-equipped DC-3 was actually on
an intelligence mission on this occasion or, as officially
stated, on a training mission is an item of information relevant
for purposes of establishing the Soviet plan for shooting it
down and, perhaps, their method of detection. But it does not
appear to affect the hypothesis that the Soviet motive was to
intercept and destroy this plane.
The possibility that the Soviets deliberately went out of
their way to shoot down the DC-3 over international waters is
indirectly suggested-by the diplomatic language employed in the
Soviet note of June 24. Although explicitly claiming a violation
of Soviet territory "in the region of Ventspils," the note
254
The Embassy cable from Butterworth (Stockholm) implies that
the DC-3 was on such a mission on June 13, 1952. However,
a U.S. Air Force report from Stockholm--which reported that
the DC-3 in question had radar and/or VHF monitoring
equipment, and also noted that the Swedish Air Force had
made several such flights in the past without incident--
stated that "considering the time of day and route followed,
see no reason to doubt Royal Swedish Air Force statement to
the undersigned that the aircraft was-making a routine
training flight." (USAIRA, Stockholm signed RFW7 to C/S
AF Lidashington, D.C,z7,. No. Air-68 dune 18, 19527; SECRET.)
It may be noted, too, that in a news dispatch from
Stockholm (Chicago Daily News July 17, 1952), William H.
Stoneman claimed that the Swedish had admitted that the
DC-3 was loaded with modern radio equipment, but had denied
it was carrying radar. Stoneman also reported that the
DC-3 carried six top-notch Swedish radio experts.
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conspicuously failed to employ its usual diplomatic stereotype
of the "facts" of an air incident.255 The significance of the
omission is clear if it is recalled that the stereotype has
been used both before and after the DC-3 to intimate that the
Soviet government took public responsibility for what it regarded
as legitimate defensive action against a hostile air encroachment
against the Soviet border. The Soviet government's failure to
use the stereotype in this case may even have been designed as
an indirect reassurance to the Swedish government that the action
against the DC-3 was of an unusual character, and that it did not
inaugurate a practice of going out of the way to shoot down
Swedish planes flying over international waters.
If the DC-3 were indeed on a training mission, and were
keeping relatively close to Swedish territory, this would suggest
that the Soviet action against it was the result of a special
plan designed to take advantage of this fact. The ill-fated
training flight took place in daylight whereas, presumably,
intelligence missions of this type are usually undertaken at
night or under the cover of heavy overcast in order to decrease
vulnerability to enemy countermeasures. It is possible,
255 It will be recalled that, in previous incidents of this
type, Soviet protest notes always stated that the foreign
aircraft caught in an air violation was armed, refused
instructions to land, fired first, and then was fired upon
by Soviet aircraft. A similar stereotype was used in
protesting the June 16 alleged violation of Dag8 by the
Swedish Catalina whichaas shot down. In its account of the
June 13 incident, however, the Soviet note did not claim
that the "two foreign aircraft" were armed, that they were
asked to land, and that they were fired upon by Soviet
aircraft only after being fired upon.
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therefore, that a special operation was devised by Soviet
authorities to destroy the plane whose special characteristics
and intelligence operations, we are told, were known to them
on an occasion, i.e., the daylight training flight, when
detection and interception would be easier.
The possibility of a special Soviet operation in this
case is suggested by the cautious and reticent disclosure
policy which the Soviets subsequently followed. It is also
supported by an estimate recently advanced by Swedish
intelligence that the DC-3 was shot down not by the regular
Soviet Air Force but by planes under the control of the Soviet
MGB.256 One basis for this view was said to be that in speeches
before the Bolshevik Party Congress held in Moscow during
October, 1952, the incident was referred to by Beria, who
controlled the MGB, but by none of the Soviet generals.257
On the other hand, even if the MGB's role in the affair
could be plausibly inferred, this would not necessarily indicate
256
Moscow (Beam) to Secretary of State, No. 312 (January 28,
1953); CONFIDENTIAL. The source was the counsellor of
the Swedish Embassy who, prior to his departure for Stockholm,
mentioned in confidence that his government had made a
study of this possibility.
An inspection of Beria's speech to the 19th Party Congress,
however, reveals no mention of any specific air incident,
though he did refer to "the demonstrative, brazen
provocations and ventures by the American military against
the U.S S.R....the activity of the American Air Force on
the western and eastern borders of-the U.S.S.R...." For a
translation of the Beria speech, which appeared in full
text in Pravda, October 9, 1942, see Leo Gruilow (ed.),
Current Soviet Policies, 1953, pp.-161-166.
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a special operation, for the MGB apparently had standing
responsibilities for border security.
(6) Closely related to the preceding hypothesis is another
explanation of the Soviet motive behind the DC-3 incident.
According to this theory, also considered by the Swedish
government, 258 the Soviets shot down the DC-3 as a direct
warning to Sweden to keep its reconnaissance planes out of the
eastern Baltic. That the Soviets are specially sensitive to
foreign intrusions into this area is well known, and the
reasons for it are obvious. Elsewhere around the Soviet periphery,
the U.S.S.R. is protected by Satellites, deserts, mountains,
and tundra, but the Baltic Sea'washes Soviet shores close to
the heart of Russia. Dag8, the scene of the second incident
involving the Swedish Catalina, commands the entrance to the
Gulf of Finland, and the DC-3 shot down on June 13 was flying
not far from the Latvian coast, where new Soviet vessels are
tested.259
(7) With regard to motive behind the shooting down of the
Catalina search plane on June 16, Swedish authorities were
disposed to-regard it as a local implementation of general
standing orders for dealing with unfriendly intruders.260
258 Swedish Foreign Office officials cited in American Embassy,
Stockholm (Butterworth) to Department of State, No. 9
(July 3, 1952); SECRET.
259 ,..bid.
260
Ibid.
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SECRET M-187.
However, Swedish authorities thought that the decision to shoot
down the DC-3 must have been taken in Moscow, and only after
the political factors and consequences were taken into account.
A weighing of these various possibilities suggests that,
while the shooting down of the DC-3 probably had one or more
"technical" motives -- (5) and/or (7), above -- the possibility
cannot be ruled out that a political motive, (2), was also
operative.
Swedish Handling of the Incidents
Perceiving, in the two incidents, a possible challenge to
Sweden's right of free flight over the international waters of
the Baltic, the Swedish government reacted forcefully to make
it known that it would not accept'such a limitation. Immediately
following the shooting down of the Catalina search plane on June
16, the Swedish government announced that the search would
continue under the protection of armed pursuit planes.261
261 That the Swedish government was not intimidated by-.the.
Soviet actions was made plain, too, in connection with the
annual Swedish naval, air, and coast guard maneuvers which
began the following month, July, 1952. "Sweden has already
informed Moscow that it regards the Baltic Sea as free to
be used by all nations and the Swedish forces are under
orders to return fire If the Soviets attempt to interfere
with them. The Swedish maneuvers are thus a challenge to
any.Soviet effort to convert the Baltic Sea into a Russian
lake..:."; (The New York Times, July 19, 1952.) In their
autumn war games in the Baltic in 1953, Swedish planes and
naval craft were reported to have carried live ammunition
and to have been under orders to fire in case of inter-
ference in order to insure against*a repetition of the
June, 152, incidents. (The New York Times,' September 21,
1953.)
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9
The major objective of Sweden's diplomatic policy in
subsequent exchanges was to support this determination to
insist upon its-rights over the Baltic. The effort to bring
the Soviet government to account for its actions, while pursued
vigorou:.ly, was nonetheless a subsidiary objective of Swedish
diplomacy and was not allowed to obscure the fundamental
Swedish national interest in the matter. The circumspection
with which Soviet notes on the incidents avoided challenging
the right of free flight over international waters'as evidently
not lost upon the Swedish government, for it pointedly asserted
this right as being one which the Soviet government itself
conceded:
Swedish military aircraft are, of course,
entirely free to fly over the free sea and
will in the future, as hitherto, make use
of this right. Soviet military forces
cannot any more than the military forces
of any other country exercise sovereignty
over aircraft of another nationality in
such waters. From the three communications
of the Z-Soviet7 Ministry for Foreign Affairs
the Swedish Government finds it clear that
this view is shared by the Soviet Government.262
In its next note (July 16, 1952), the Soviet government
stated with reference to the preceding passage that it was not
"necessary to enter into a discussion of the statement...as
the Soviet Government has never disputed this right...." Thus,
the Soviets were maneuvered into making a public acknowledgment
of Swedish rights. And, to signal the fact that an explicit
262 Swedish note of July 1, 1952.
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189.
and sweeping commitment on this point had been obtained from
the Soviets, the next Swedish note (August 5) opened as follows:
The Swedish Govrnment takes note of the
statement under point 4 in the note of the
Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to
the effect that the Soviet Union has never
denied that-Swedish military aircraft are
entirely free to fly over the free sea.
The Swedish Government presumes that the
instructions in force for the Soviet armed
forces are in accordance herewith.
This assurance was one which could be publicly presented
as a Swedish diplomatic "success," and this was done by
Swedish Prime Minister Erlander at the time.
The full significance of Sweden's-determination.to continue
unrestricted its flights over the international waters of the
Baltic was evident, however, only to those who were aware of
Sweden's strategic intelligence requirements and its policy
of air reconnaissance of the Soviet coast in the Baltic. In
insisting upon free flights over international waters, the
Swedish government was implicitly insisting upon the right to
conduct unhampered intelligence reconnaissance of Soviet coasts
so long as boundary limits were observed. The Swedish action in
this case is the strongest defense yet made by a Western power
of the right to use international air space for purposes of
perimeter reconnaissance.
The Swedish government considers it vitally necessary, in
case of a Russian attack, to have adequate advance warning.
They must be able to detect any Soviet offensive build-up on
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the other side of the Baltic. For this purpose, various types
of air reconnaissance over?East'Baltic waters have been made
over a period of time.263 This is the reason for Swedish
determination to continue its program of aerial reconnaissance,
-77
a determination thatlwas:conveyed to U.S. Embassy officers in
Stockholm following the two incidents in question.264 The
decision to arm or escort Swedish reconnaissance planes was
evidently taken at this time. Interestingly, it was felt by
the Swedish Foreign Office that this step would actually
minimize risks of Soviet attacks on Swedish planes, even though
a relaxation of tension was hardly to be expected in view of
the forthcoming appearance of armed Swedish planes in the
sensitive East Baltic region.265
Noteworthy in this case is the Swedish government's
assumption that its air-reconnaissance operations are a perfectly
legitimate use of the right to free flights over international
waters. Noticeably absent in the forceful Swedish diplomatic
handling of the two incidents and in the skillful assertion of
the right of free flight is any sense of embarrassment over the
fact that matters of secret intelligence and air reconnaissance
263 An authoritative, highly placed Swedish Foreign Office
official cited in American Embassy, Stockholm (Butterworth)
to Department of State, No. 39 (July 10, 1952); SECRET.
Ibid. See also memo of conversation with Swedish Ambassador
Boheman b,,- Mr. U. Alexis Johnson (FE) and Mr. William Sale
(E UR) ui the State Department, dated June 23, 1952; SECRET.
265 Ibid. Information on subsequent developments in Swedish air
.reconnaissance has not been available for the present study.
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were really at stake. Though not publicizing this fact, neither
did the Swedish government seem to feel handicapped diplomatically
by what might be regarded by some as a morally or legally tenuous
position. Such lack of embarrassment when dealing with Soviet
challenges to perimeter reconnaissance of its borders would seem
to be incumbent upon Western policy-makers also.
Failing to obtain satisfaction for the shooting down of two
of its planes through bilateral diplomatic channels, the Swedish
government proposed to the Soviets that resort be had to
international arbitration. This request was turned down on the
ground that such a procedure was not needed for the examination
of questions connected with encroachments on the Soviet Union's
frontiers. Thereupon, despite considerable domestic pressure,
the Swedish government decided against submitting the case to
the United Nations. An important consideration was the belief
that to have recourse to the U.N. might involve Sweden in the
East-West controversy and perhaps lead the Soviets to counter-
charge Swedish collaboration with the West and spying upon the
U.S.S.R.266
Soviet Diplomatic and Propaganda Handling
of Incident
Attention has already'been directed to aspects of the Soviet
handling of the DC-3 incident which support one or another of
266 American Embassy, Stockholm (Butterworth) to Department of
State, No. 9 (July 3, 1952); SECRET; Department of State
(Bruce) to American Embassy, Prague (October 24, 1952);
SECRET.
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the possible explanations of Soviet motives. But the overall
Soviet diplomatic and propaganda handling of the two incidents
deserves a fuller examination.
In the weeks following the incidents, Soviet Ambassador to
Sweden Rodionov -as reported to have been more ingratiating
than usual in conversations with Swedish officials. Rodionov
accepted the first Swedish protest in the mildest manner,
merely stating that the Soviet Air Force was under strictest
instructions not to attack Swedish planes over international
waters. In accepting the second Swedish note, Rodionov
contented himself with saying that "Mr. Vishinsky cannot be
wrong.," but in such a way as to convey to the acting Swedish
foreign minister the suggestion that he did not wholly approve
of the attitude adopted by the Soviet government in the reply
under discussion.267
The Soviet notes themselves were moderate in tone and in
the claims advanced. They were clearly intended to minimize
affront to Swedish sensibilities and to forego any challenge
to Swedish air rights over the Baltic. The Soviet action
against the Catalina search plane was pointedly depicted as
resulting only from implementation of a general Soviet policy
for air defense of its borders, and there was an explicit
acknowledgment of Sweden's right of free flight over inter-
national waters. Soviet air-defense policy was held to be no
267 As reported in American Embassy, Stockholm (Butterworth)
to Department of State, No. 9 (July 3, 1952); SECRET.
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more than that which any state adopts in defense of its
sovereignty. In its second note (June 19), as if to soften
the impact of its recent action in shooting down Swedish
planes, the Soviet government drew attention to the fact that
it had treated earlier Swedish air violations of Soviet
territory with forebearance, having contented itself at the.
time with calling the violations to the attention of the
Swedish government.268 The third Soviet note (June 24).drew
attention to the "characteristic fact" that Soviet aircraft
never violated the frontiers of other states. Perhaps to
emphasize that Soviet air-defense policy and actions were not
aimed exclusively or even predominantly at the Swedes, the
same Soviet note added that several cases had occurred earlier
when violation of the Soviet frontier took place by foreign
aircraft, "among them also Swedish aircraft." Finally, the
Soviet note of October 8 took up the Swedish charge that the
Soviet government had not co-operated in clarifying the
circumstances of the initial loss of the DC-3, which indeed it
had not. The Soviet reply, while not a. convincing one,
nonetheless conveyed a certain sensitivity to the charge.
It may be recalled that, even when wishing to take public
responsibility and credit for what it regards as a legitimate
air-defense action, the Soviet government uses a diplomatic
268 See case study No. 47.
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stereotype which does.not explicitly acknowledge that the
intruding aircraft was hit by Soviet fire. The Soviet phrasing
is that its planes "return" fire whereupon the foreign plane
"disappears in the direction of the sea." But in the case of
the Swedish DC-3, lost on June 13, the Soviets appear to have
been still more reluctant to take overt responsibility for
having inflicted damage on the aircraft. Thus, the Soviet note
of June 24 did not even state that the intruding "foreign
aircraft" had been fired upon by Soviet planes; they were merely
"driven off."
Nor would the Soviets accept the implication, made by the
Swedish government in its note of July 1, that the action
against unidentified foreign aircraft finally admitted by the
Soviets. must have involved the Swedish DC-3. In its reply,
the Soviet' government explicitly rejected this charge and merely
reiterated that "the nationality of said aircraft was not
ascertained owing to mist and unfavorable atmospheric conditions."
Thus, the Kremlin made it plain that it was unwilling to discuss
the June 13 incident at all, and Soviet news and propaganda
maintained strict silence on this incident.
Soviet propaganda commentary on the Swedish plane incidents
was restrained both in quantity and in tone. In contrast to
the earlier Baltic incident involving a U.S. Navy plane, there
was no effort to blow ur these incidents into a preEtige
"victory" for Soviet arms and defensive preparedness. Soviet
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95.
commentary was factual rather than hortatory, and implicitly
justificatory rather than belligerent. This commentary took
the form of two interviews with the chief of staff of the
Soviet Naval Air Force, Lt. General A. M. Shuginin, in which
Shuginin painstakingly attempted to pick flaws in the
circumstantial investigation of the incidents conducted by
the Accidents Commission of the Swedish Air Force.269
The use of a responsible, high-ranking military officer
to refute the Swedish account indicates a desire to keep
discussion of the incidents above a purely propaganda plane,
and to justify authoritatively the diplomatic position taken
by the Soviets in the matter. Apart from a reference to the
possible reconnaissance purpose of the Swedish flights and an
allusion, in this context, to their apparent similarity to
reconnaissance flights in the Baltic by American aircraft in
1950, Lt. General Shuginin did.not add substantially to the
official diplomatic position enunciated in the Soviet notes.
It is noteworthy that the two Shuginin interviews focused
exclusively on the second incident, involving the Catalina; the
first incident, involving the DC-3,'was ignored by him and by
Soviet propaganda generally.
269
The interviews were published in Krasny Flot on July 18
and September 30, 1952.
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Swedish Challenge of Soviet Air-Defense Policy
During the exchange of diplomatic communications, the
Soviets held that their air-defense policy was the same as that
which all other states had adopted in defense of sovereignty.270
As a matter of fact, the Soviets were vulnerable precisely on
this point, in that their stated air-defense policy was
significantly more severe than that of some other powers.
Seeking to score a diplomatic point, the Swedish government
at this time contacted most of the Western European governments
to find out what were the prevailing practices regarding warning
in the case of overflights by foreign planes. None of the
governments canvassed had published regulations on this point.
Accordingly, the Swedish government had to confine itself to
citing its own air-defense instructions in challenging the
contention that the Soviet method of dealing with Swedish planes
had been in accordance with standard international practice.271
,The Swedish government pointed out that its own regulations
permitted a foreign aircraft caught in a border violation to
turn away after a warning, i.e., the foreign aircraft was not
fired upon if it changed its course and flew away. In contrast,
instructirns to Soviet air-defense forces stipulated that a
270 The LForeign7 Ministry Zo-f the U.S.S.R_7 finds it likewise
necessary to recall to mind the instructions in force in
the Soviet Union as in all other States to the effect that,
if a foreign aircraft v'.olates the State frontier and if a
foreign aircraft peiie ates 'nto the territory of anotner
Power, it is the duty of the airmen of the State concerned
to force such aircraft to land on a local airfield and, in
case of resist nce, to open fire on it." (Soviet note of
June 241, 1952.)
271 American Embass , Stockholm (Marshall Green) to Department
of State, No. 1J (July 18, 1952); RESTRICTED..
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foreign aircraft caught in a violation was to be asked to land
at a Soviet airfield and be fired upon if, instead of landing,
it attempted to leave Soviet territory.272 Confronted with
this explicit challenge to its air-defense policy, the Soviet
government pretended not to see the difference between its own
and the Swedish air-defense instructions.273
Though its challenge remained without immediate effect,
the Swedish governmentts diplomatic action on this occasion may
have stimulated the Western powers to join efforts for countering
the more rigid and severe aspects of Soviet air-defense policy.
Following the Swedish lead, the U.S. Department of State has
272 Swedish notes of July 1 and August 5, 1952. To its note
of July 1 the Swedish government appended a summary of
Swedish air-defense regulations; the relevant portions
are as follows:
"1. Individual aircraft which without permission fly in
over Swedish territory shall be turned off by means of a
warning. If the aircraft does not change its course away
from Swedish territory, effective fire shall be opened.
The warning is given
from aircraft: by warning shots
from antiaircraft batteries and warships: by
means of warning shots fired, if possible, at
least 600 meters ahead of the aircraft.
An aircraft which is obviously in distress or which,
by signals and/or maneuvers, clearly indicates that
it wishes to land is, if possible, given directions
where to land.
"2. An aircraft which, with obviously hostile intentions,
commits an act of violence against targets within Swedish
territory, and groups of aircraft over Swedish territory,
shall be met with force of arms, without preceding warning."
(Swedish blue book, OD. Cit., p. ?P: also quoted in
Lissitzyn, op. Cit., pp. 575-576.)
273 Soviet note of July 16, 1952.
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explored the possibility of formulating a standard code of
international practice which would govern, and presumably limit,
air-defense action in such cases.274
Change in Swedish Air-Def^nse Policy
Prior to the June, 1952. air incidents, the Swedish
government was uniformly lenient toward foreign overflights of
Swedish territory. An informal protest would be made after
the event to representatives of the government whose plane had
violated Swedish territory. Until that time, there were
apparently no cases in which foreign planes making unauthorized
flights over Sweden had been intercepted, forced to land, or
driven off. In fact, while navigational aid was sometimes
given to such.planes,:it does not appear that any attempt was
even made to notify the aircraft in question that it was making
an unauthorized overflight.275
Following the June incidents, the Swedish government
informally indicated to the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm that it
would henceforth act to prevent unauthorized overflights by
"unfriendly" (Soviet) planes. It strongly. hinted that armed
Swedish fighters would be used to drive off such planes, or
force them to land.276
274 Department of State circular airgram, October 20, 1952,
Control 1874; CONFIDENTIAL-
`(' American Embassy, Stockholm (flare Adams) to Department of
276 State, No. 401 (October 30, 1952); CONFIDENTIAL.
Ibid.
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99.
Thus, if the Swedish intention were carried out and an
opportunity presented itself, a "reprisal" for the June incidents
might be forthcoming.
The earlier lenient Swedish air-defense policy remained
in force in the case of "friendly" overflights. The Swedish
government, however, did not wish the differentiation in its
policy to become public.277
67. HUNGARIAN PROTEST AGAINST YUGOSLAV
AIR VIOLATIONS
(June 13 and 25, 1952)
Shortly after the Yugoslav protests of Hungarian air
violations on June 24 and 25,278 the Hungarian government made
countercharges against the Yugoslav government. In a note
dated June 28 and broadcast on the same day, the Hungarians
accused the Yugoslavs of forty-eight "provocative frontier
violations" during the prevous few months.
Included in the charges were alleged overflights by Yugoslav
planes on June 13 and 25. The Hungarian broadcast noted that
the Yugoslav government had not replied to an earlier Hungarian
protest against more than two hundred frontier incidents, and
had taken no steps to curb the excesses of its frontier guards.
277
American Embassy, Stockholm (Ware Adams) to Department of
State, No. 401 (October 30,-1952)'; CONFIDEP'TIAL.
278 See case study No. 71.
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These frontier violations, "constantly recurring and ever
more frequent," according to the Hungarian broadcast, bore
testimony "to the fact that the Yugoslav government is resolved
further to stimulate the hostile-atmosphere against Hungary."279
68. SOVIET PROTEST OF TWO ALLEGED U.S. AIR
VIOLATIONS OF EAST GERMANY
(June 19, 1952)
ADN,the official (communist) East German news agency,
reported on June 22, 1952, that Major General Chuikov,. Soviet
occupation chief, had protested two more air violations by U.S.
planes. Both of the alleged violations were said to have taken
place on June 19:
A four-engined U.S. C-54 transport was charged
with having flown across the demarcation line at
Hasenthal at 05:00, and with having overflown
Ilmenau, Ohrdorf, Eisenach, Heiligenstadt, and
Teistungen.
A single-engine U.S. plane was charged with
having twice crossed the coastal territory of
East Germany, once in the region of Heiligendamm,
15 kilometers from Rostock (an area reported by
West Berlin papers on the same day as being one
where extensive Soviet fortifications were under
constructtn), and the second time in the region
of Darmgarten, also on the Baltic coast.
According to the ADN dispatch, Chuikov noted that illegal
flights by U.S. planes were being repeated despite warnings
279
FBIS, Daily Report, June 30, 1952.
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from the High Command of the Soviet occupation troops in
letters of May 26 and June 7.280
The New York Times special dispatch from Berlin which
carried the ADN report also gave background information on the
number of recent air incidents alleged to have occurred over
Germany.. In the previous two months, the New York Times noted,
the East German press had twice printed charges that planes of
the Western powers en route to Berlin had deviated from assigned
corridors to take aerial photos of possible future military
targets. The Times dispatch indicated that Soviet authorities
in Germany had made seven complaints in eight weeks of Allied
air violations of East German territory.
The cumulative total of notes exchanged in Berlin during
the previous eight weeks, according to the Times, was approxi-
mately fifty-two (forty, if allowance were made for the cases in
which the three Western powers issued identical note 4.281
69. YUGOSLAV PROTEST AGAINST HUNGARIAN
AIR VIOLATIONS
(June 23, 1952)
A Yugoslav note of June 24, broadcast by Belgrade radio on
the same day, charged Hungarian planes with having violated
280
The ADN report broadcast by Berlin radio and carried in
the New York Times, June 23, 1952.
-- For interpretation, see case study No. 97.
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Yugoslav air space ten times on June 23. The alleged violations
were said to have occurred along various sections of the
Yugoslav-Hungarian border, and to have been made by groups of
from two to seven planes which penetrated up to 14 kilometers
within Yugoslav territory.
'rh.e Yugoslav Foreign Ministry stated that these incidents
proved beyond doubt that the Hungarian government desired to
intensify hostile activities against Yugoslavia.
There was no indication whether Yugoslav forces had
attempted or had an opportunity to take military counteraction
against the Hungarian planes.282
70. CZECH PROTEST OF AIR VIOLATIONS
BY-U.S. PLANES
(June 24, 1952)
On June 24, the Czech government protested in a note to
the U.S. against the "intentional violation" of Czech air space
by USAFE planes based in Germany.
It is unclear whether the Czech note was publicly disclosed
by either side. Up to July 8, neither Soviet nor Satellite
media had reported or commented on the Prague note; and this
282
FBIS, Dally Report, June 25, 1952.
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apparently included Czech media as well.283 Nor did a check
of the New York Times reveal any reference to such a note.
Classified sources nave not been consulted in the preparation
of this case study.
71. YUGOSLAV PROTEST AGAINST HUNGARIAN
AIR VIOLATIONS
(June 24 and 25, 1952)
A,Belgrade broadcast on June 25 charged that during that
morning Hungarian planes had again violated Yugoslav air space
to a depth of 15 kilometers.
On the same day, another Yugoslav protest note, covering
the new violation, was given the Hungarian Legation. In
publishing the new protest note, Radio Belgrade announced that
copies of its two notes would be sent to the United Nations.
The Belgrade broadcast noted also that the Hungarian
government had not yet indicated what measures it was taking
to bring such violations to an end, and that the Yugoslav
government was taking the necessary measures to prevent similar
violations of its territory in the future. The broabast also
listed in detail the violations which had occurred on June 24
and 25.
283
284
FBIS Survey or I',;;.S.R. Broadcasts, July 10, 1952;
CONFIDENTIAL.
FBIS, Daily Report, June 25 and 26, 1952.
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72. ALBANIAN PROTEST AGAINST YUGOSLAV AIR DROP OF
PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS
(June 25, 1952) -
On July 12, 1952, the Albanian radio announced that a note
had been sent to the Yugoslav government protesting five cases
of land and air "provocations" between June 18 and 25. One of
these was an alleged overflight of several Albanian villages by
a Yugoslav plane on June 25, in the course of which "subversive
propaganda material" was said to have been dropped.
The Albanian note charged, further, that despite repeated
protests no steps had been taken by the Yugoslav government to
reduce such actions, but that, in fact, "hostile activities"
against Albania had been intensified.
A copy of the Albanian note was said to have been dispatched
to the Secretariat of the United Nations. The accompanying
letter, signed by the Albanian foreign minister, included a
demand that the United Nations take necessary measures to end
such activities on the part of the Yugoslav government, "activity
which serves the plans of the Anglo-American imperialist war
mongers."285
73. CZECHS CHARGE COLORADO BEETLES DROPPED
BY FOREIGN PLANES
(June, 1952)
A Czech home service broadcast of June 23, 1953, charged
that Colorado beetles had recently been dropped by foreign
285
FBIS, Daily Report, July 14, 1952.
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aircraft.286 While the nationality of the planes was not
indicated, references to "Western imperialists" and "the
American beetle" left little doubt that the Czech intention
-was to implicate the United States once again.287
As far as is known, in the present instance, no diplomatic
protest was made. to the United States by the Czech government.
74. GERMAN COMMUNIST CHARGE THAT U.S.. PLANE
DROPPED COLORADO BEETLES
(June, 1952)
The charge was made in an East German news agency dispatch.288
So far as is known, no diplomatic protest was transmitted; nor
was the allegation repeated by Soviet sources.
The ADN dispatch stated that "a two-engined U.S. aircraft,
flying from the direction of Helmstedt, crossed the demarcation
line a few days ago and dropped boxes containing Colorado
beetles over the villages of Beendorf and Schwarefeld, according
to information received from the People's Police and the
population of the Marienborn area. The population established
the exact places the beetles were dropped and cleared the fields
affected so that there will be no damage to the potato crop."
286
FBIS, Daily Report, June 25, 1952.
"'' See case studies Nos. 34 and 35 for earlier Soviet-Czech
protests against aliebad drcpping of Colorado beetles by
--- ADN, June 19, 1952.
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75. U.S. ADMISSION OF VIOLATION OF
BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR
(June, 1952)
RM-1349
206.
A note of June 17, 1952, signed by U.S. Major General
Lemuel Mathewson and made public on June 18, stated that a
U.S. unmarked hospital plane had strayed from the air corridor
to Berlin. 'ine U.S. note added that appropriate disciplinary
action had been taken.
The U.S. note was in a reply to a Soviet charge that a
U.S. plane had committed a "gross violation" of East German
territory. The date of the aaeged air violation and of the
Soviet protest were not'given in the account published in the
New York Times, June 19, 1952.
The Times dispatch also noted that, as on previous
occasions, the latest Soviet note stated that the U.S. would
have to accept full responsibility for the "consequences of
such actions." This latest exchange, the Times continued,
brought to more than forty the number of notes and protests
hurled back and forth_in Berlin during the previous seven weeks.
The Times account did not make clear whether either the
Soviets or the East German communists had publicly disclosed
their latest protest.289
289
For interpretation, see case study No. 97.
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76. REPORT OF OVERFLIGHT OF WEST GERMAN TERRITORY
BY FOUR CZECH FIGHTERS
(June, 1952)
RM-134 9
207.
On June 18, 1952, West German border police reported
that four Czech fighters had crossed into Bavaria and had
circled two small border towns, Arzberg and Matredwitz, for
several minutes before returning to Czechoslovakia.290
77. SOVIET PROTEST' OF ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
EAST GERMAN BORDER BY BRITISH FIGHTER
(June, 1952)
ADN, the official East German news agency (communist)
revealed, on June 14, 1952, that Soviet officials in Germany
had filed a formal protest with British authorities, charging
that a British jet fighter had crossed the East German zonal
frontier.
The protest, dated June 13, was signed by Major General
N. M. Trusov, Soviet deputy chief of staff, and was addressed
to Major General John Kirkman,, British deputy chief of
staff.291
290 The New York Times, June 19, 1952.
291 The New York Times, June 15, 1952. For interpretation,
see case study No. 97.
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78. OVERFLIGHTS OF DANISH ISLES IN BALTIC
BY UNIDENTIFIED PLANES
(July 1, 1952)
A special dispatch from Copenhagen to the New York'Times
(July 3, 1952) reported that foreign jet planes had overflown
most of the Danish islands of Falster and Lolland in the
Baltic Sea south or Zealand on the night of July 1-2. The
dispatch added that planes had been observed over the islands
in great numbers in the last few days, and that the strong
gunfire heard over the Baltic was thought to indicate that
maneuvers were being held in the southern area of the Baltic.
The dispatch noted further that no official Danish statement
on the flights had yet been made.292
79. SOVIET VIOLATION OF BERLIN
AIR CORRIDOR FLIGHT RULES
(July 1, 1952)
On July 1, 1952, a single-engine Soviet plane was
observed towing a target for air-to-air gunnery practice
within the southern Berlin air corridor. Two Soviet MiGts
were also observed making firing passes at this target in the
same vicinity, also well within the southern air corridor.
The U.S. controller in the Berlin Air Safety Center was
instructed to make an oral protest of the above violation of
292
See case study No. b6 for indication of secret Soviet
naval and air maneuvers in the Baltic at about this time.
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A.C.A. air directorate flight rules, which prohibit the towing
of targets within the corridor.293
80. BULGARIAN PROTEST AGAINST
TURKISH AIR VIOLATION
(July 2, 1952) .
On July 15, 1952, the Bulgarian radio announced that a
note had been sent on the preceding day to the Turkish
Legation, protesting an overflight, on July 2, by two Turkish
planes. The planes, identified as single-engine fighters, were
said to have penetrated for 7 miles into Bulgarian territory
in the neighborhood of Lesova village, Elhovo Okoliya, "with
the obvious intention of reconnoitering."29
81. OVERFLIGHT OF BORNHOLM (DANISH)
BY UNIDENTIFIED JET BOMBERS
(July 12, 1952)
The Stockholm radio was reported as stating that two planes
of unidentified nationality which flew over the Danish island
of Bornholm on July 12, 1952, were four-motored jets. Military
observers were cited as believing that these planes were a new
model Soviet jet bomber.295
293 Berlin (Lyon) to Secretary of ;;uate, No. 8, July 2`', 1952;
RESTRICTED.
294 FBIS, Daily Report, July lo, 1952.
295 Ibid., July 14, 1952.
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210.
82. YUGOSLAV CHARGE OF SOVIET OVERFLIGHT
(July 14, 1952)
On July 15, 1952, the Yugoslav government charged that a
Soviet jet fighter plane, carrying Soviet markings, violated
Yugoslav air space for about three minutes near the village of
Lukos.296 A French AFP Radioteletype broadcast on July 15,
datelined Belgrade, added that, according to an official
Yugoslav announcement, the violation took place on the
Hungarian-Yugoslav border at Mukos, near Subotica. The Paris
dispatch noted that this was the first time that a Soviet
plane had overflown Yugoslav soil,'earlier violations having
been made by Satellite planes.297
83. SOVIET PROTEST AGAINST U.S. AND FRENCH
VIOLATIONS OF BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR
(July 15, 1952)
On July 26, 1952, the official (communist) East German
news agency disclosed that Soviet authorities in Germany had
made a protest, on July 24, against violations of the air
corridors by French and U.S. planes on July 15.
The type of U.S. plane alleged to have violated the
southern air corridor and the place of the alleged overflight
were not given in the ADN dispatch. Similarly, the French
296 , , - .. --- .. _,- rs - _ , __ ,, ,
`'t FBIS, Daily Report, July 16, 1952.
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plane was not further identified, though it was alleged to
have made the violation "west of Halle."298
The wording of the Soviet notes, signed by Major General
Trusov, was said to be almost identical with that in previous
Soviet protests regarding alleged deviations from the air
lanes.299 The notes held that the United States and the
French would be responsible for any "undesirable consequences"
that might result from future violations of this sort.300
84. SOVIET PROTESTS AGAINST ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF VIENNA AIR CORRIDOR BY U.S. PLANES
(July 16, 1952; also June 10, ill 24, and July 10, 1952)
In a letter dated July 16, 1952, Soviet High Commissioner
in Austria Sviridov held that the 1946 agreement, which
stipulated that advance notice of U.S. flights in the Austrian
air corridors would not be required, applied only to transport
and liaison flights of the occupying powers. The issue of
advance notice had been raised by the Soviets earlier in
connection with the buzzing of High Commissioner Donnelly's
plane on June If, 1952.301
298
FBIS, Daily Report, July 28, 1952?
The New York Times, July 27, 1952.
300 -- - --- -- ....
J"y See case study No. 63.
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Sviridov charged that the air corridor was being used
illegally for flights by U.S. military planes of the B-26
type. He charged that violations by military planes took
place on June 10, 11, 24 and July 10. One of the alleged
violations included an overflight of the Soviet air base at
Wiener Neustadt at a height of 600 meters. Sviridov added
that U.S. planes had been using these air corridors at night
and had left the corridors; he cited, in this context, an
alleged corridor violation by a U.S. C-47 on the night of
July 9-10, 1952.
Sviridovrs protest ended by informing the U.S. High
Commissioner that Soviet authorities would take strict measures
against violations in the future.302
Apparently Sviridovts protest was not published; however,
a thorough check on this point has not been made. Further
details are lacking.
85. SOVIET ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA
UTILIZING AIR INCIDENTS
(July 27, 1952)
In connection with the annual Soviet air show in Moscow,
wide distribution and publicity were given to an official
Russian poster which depicted Soviet fighter planes wax.ng off
302 U.S. Embassy, Vienna, to Department of State, No. 187
(July 28, 1952); RESTRICTED.
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alleged intrusions over Soviet frontiers by U.S. planes.
Three air incidents were depicted in the poster; in each case
a U.S. military aircraft was under attack by Soviet jet
fighters. Descriptive information on the poster identified
the U.S. planes as the "B-29" (actually a U.S. Navy Privateer)
shot down in the Baltic on April 8, 1950, the U.S. plane
downed by Soviet fighters in Hungary in November, 1951, and
the Neptune (U.S. Navy) shot down off Vladivostok in November,
1951.
The poster was emblazoned with the following slogan:
"Glory to Stalin's Falcons, standing on guard of the peace
and security of our country."
The purpose of the celebration of these three air incidents
on Soviet Air Force Day was spelled out in a Pravda editorial
on July 16, 1952. "Today," stated the editorial' "the Soviet
Air Force keeps the frontiers of our country well locked....No
air pirate on whatever aircraft he might fly, however fast his
airplane might fly, and however high he might try to fly it,
will dare to cross the air frontier of our great peace-loving
country...." Apparently referring to the April 8, 1950, Baltic
incident, the editorial warned the West against violating
Soviet frontiers in the future.303
303 FBIS Survey of U.S.S.R. Radio Broadcasts (12-18 July 1950);
CONFIDENTIAL.
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.
21
U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan
deliberately stayed away from the air show to emphasize the
U.S. protest against the posters, which had been delivered
at the Soviet Foreign Office on July 26. On August 1, Pravda
replied to Kennan's protest, contending that the poster had
presented facts. In a sharply-worded editorial, Pravda
commented that, in-all three cases, the "uninvited guests
were given a deserved lesson" and held them up as a "warning
to those who would try. to violate the Soviet frontiers. It
cited in this context the Colliers special World War III
issue, and a map printed in Fortune that depicted U.S. military
bases around the Soviet Union, and similar instances of
"warmongering."301
In a dispatch to the Department of State, Ambassador Kennan
noted that the Soviet poster was only a small part of the then
current flood of anti-American propaganda, against which the
United States had not protested. He felt, nonetheless, that
the present poster could not be allowed to be unnoticed by
the United States because it was "so studiously insulting and
arrogant...so directly addressed to U.S. armed force." 305
The Soviet intention behind the posters was analyzed by
Kennan as follows: "Putting out of these posters is, of course,
designed as a means of emphasizing (as was done in granting
304 Ya. Viktorov, "Straight to the Mark!," Pravda, August 1,
1952; translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
September 13, 1952, T. 12.
305 U.S. Embassy, Moscow (Kennan) to Secretary of State, No.
152 (July 23, 1952); RESTRICTED.
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awards to crews of Soviet fighters in certain of these incidents)
that the Soviet Government has no regret for American lives lost
and:is proud of its flyers' exploits in shooting down or forcing
down these presumably non-resisting aircraft.t1306
86. FINNISH PROTEST OF BRITISH
OVERFLIGHT OF NAVAL BASE
(July, 1952)
According to a New York Times dispatch of July 17, 1952,
Finland protested that a British plane carrying forty athletes
to the Olympic games had overflown the naval base of Porkkala,
treaty-leased to the U.S.S.R. Further details are lacking.
87. REPORT OF SOVIET OVERFLIGHT OF WEST GERMANY
(BRITISH ZONE)
(July, 1952)
A New York Times dispatch of July 6, 1952, cited a report
from the Lower Saxony Mirt stry of Interior that, on July 4, a
Soviet aircraft had circled ashort-wave transmitter near Luchow
in the. British Zone (about 5 miles from the Russian Zone
frontier). Confirmation from Allied sources and further details
are lacking.
306 U.S. Embassy, Moscow (Keenan) to Secretary of State, No.
152 (July 23, 1952); RESTRICTED.
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88. ALBANIAN CHARGE OF.AIR VIOLATIONS BY
GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA
(July, 1952)
According to a New York Times dispatch of July 24, 1952,
Albania charged before the United Nations that Greek and
Yugoslav planes had violated its borders. The charge was
denied by Greece in a letter to the United Nations.307
89. SOVIET PROTEST OF AIR VIOLATIONS BY
U. S. AND FRENCH AIRCRAFT IN GERMANY
(July, 1952)
ADN, the official East German news agency (communist),
reported on July 3, 1952, that General Chuikov, Soviet High
Commissioner for Germany, had protested to the United States
and French High Commands on recent air violations by their
planes. No further details were given in the ADN report, which
was cited by the New York Times, July 4, 1952.308
90. REPORT OF FIVE CZECH OVERFLIGHTS OF
WEST GERMANY (U.S. ZONE)
(July, 1952)
The Bavarian border police reported, on July 7, 1952, that
five overflights of West Germany had been made in the preceding
307 The New York Times, July 29, 19;2.
308 For interpretation, see case study No. 97.
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week by Czech jet planes. Reports of such flights had come
from Zwiesel, Wolfstein, and Mehring. According to aBavarian
border police spokesman, the planes flew a few miles over the
border, circled over the villages, and, it was presumed, took
photographs. 309
Confirmation by U.S. sources and further details are lacking.
91. CZECH PROTESTS OF ALLEGED U.S. AIR VIOLATIONS
(July and August, 1952)
In addition to the Czech note of June 24, 1952, protesting
alleged U.S. air violations, an unknown number of similar
protests were evidently made to U.S. authorities by the Czech
Defence Ministry during the three-month period~June-August, 1952.310
Apparently, these protests were not publicly disclosed by
either side. It may be'noted that during the diplomatic dispute
following the incident of March 10, 1953, Czech officials gave a
detailed statistical resume of alleged U.S. air violations from
mid-1950 to mid-1951.311 However, no resume was given for the
period following mid-1951. Rather, the more general assertion
was made that "notwithstanding assurances to the contrary from
the United States Government, flights by American planes continued
309 Tinm N mw V,?lr T4 ,n... Tii l v P l aK ]
Bonn (Donnelly) to Secretary of State, No. 23L7, November
21, 1952, citing cable received by USAREUR from'U.S. Air
Attache on November 18 (SX 5311); CONFIDENTIAL.
311 See case study No. 102.
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at the same rate in 1952. The Czechoslovak Government once
again issued protests and warned that"the entire responsi-
bility...lay squarely on the shoulders of the United States
Government."312 A Czech broadcast in English to Europe, on
March 13, 1953, was even less specific for the period after
the middle of 1951, tnougn it gave a detailed resum'e' for the
earlier period: "...since that time June 8, 19517 there
have been repetitions of intentional hostile actions...."313
92. SOVIET AIR RECONNAISSANCE OF THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
(1952-1953)
Only public accounts of Soviet (or Satellite) aerial
reconnaissance of noncommunist territories have been examined
for this case study.
The only overall statement encountered in public accounts
on the extent of Soviet strategic air reconnaissance was that
made by the Alsop brothers in their syndicated column on March
17, 1953. The essential assertions presented by these
columnists, for which no source was given, were as follows:
(a) Soviet air reconnaissance of the Western Hemisphere
began in the summer of 1952; the earliest sightings
312 Speech before the U.N. General Assemhl.v ay the Czech
delegate, David, on March 23, 1953. (Italics added.)
313
FBIS, Daily Report, March 17, 1953.
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19.
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of such flights were over Alaska and northwestern
Canada.
(b) Detection of unidentified aircraft (presumed to be
Soviet reconnaissance planes) has been made mainly
by means of visual sightings of contrails (vapor
trails that consolidate in cold air in the wake of
high-flying aircraft); few of the contrail sightings
have been accompanied by radar detection.
(c) Approximately twelve sightings have been confirmed
as undoubtedly resulting from Soviet reconnaissance
missions, of which two occurred in early March,
1953, one in northern Canada and the other in the
vicinity of the important U.S. air base in Thule,
Greenland.
(d) No Soviet reconnaissance planes have been intercepted.
Subsequent to the Alsop brothers' statement on this
subject, authoritative sources in Washington disclosed
essentially the same information regarding at least twelve
Soviet overflights within the previous year over the polar
area of the North American continent and Greenland.314
Official disclosures by USAF of instances of suspected
Soviet air reconnaissance.of the Western Hemisphere have been
made on at least two occasions.
314 Special dispatch of August 1, 1953, The New York Times,
August 2, 1953.
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20.
On December 13, 1952, USAF disclosed that contrails of an
unidentified aircraft had been spotted from a U.S. Air Force
plane over Greenland on December 10, 1952. Although the
Northeast Air Command Headquarters. in Newfoundland, the Air
Defense Command, and the Pentagon were at once notified, no
general alert was sounded, because no pattern was established
through sighting of. the unidentified aircraft by a number of
sources. The radar network covering Greenland did not pick
up the unidentified plane. The direction of the contrails
indicated that the plane making them would be flying away from
the United States.315
On March 16, 1953, a USAF spokesman stated that vapor
trails from engines of unidentified planes had been sighted
occasionally over the far northern approaches to the North
American continent.316 The most recent report of such activity,
he stated, had come from an airborne observer over Alaska on
March 10; it resulted in a brief "yellow alert." The USAF
spokesman was apparently queried on an A.P. dispatch of March 11
from Fairbanks, Alaska, quoting the Fairbanks News-Miner, which
reported a "yellow alert" there on the night of March 7.
In an article entitled "Russian Planes Are Raiding Canadian
Skies," Colliers, October 16, 1953, William A. Ulman reported
an eyewitness account of an unsuccessful attempt by U.S. Jet
315 The Washington Post, December 14, 1952.
316 Ibid., March 17, 1953.
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221.
fighter-interceptors of the Alaskan Air Command to intercept
an unidentified plane, "almost certainly a Russian," which
had been picked up by radar stations on the west coast of
Alaska. Ulman did not explicitly state whether the unidentified
plane in question had actually violated U.S. territory or
territorial waters, but added the following statement: "Almost
every day, at least one unidentified airplane violates Lsic7
our continental borders." A general in the Alaskan.Air Command
was quoted as saying: "They Lussian planes7 come in at all
times and places and some have even penetrated deep into north
central Canada."
The frequency of Soviet air violations in this area as
reported by Ulman appears to contradict information previously
released to the press by authoritative sources in Washington.317
Similarly contradictory is Ulman's reference to the detection of
unidentified planes by means of radar, since information disclosed
previously had indicated that detection of unidentified planes
had been made mainly by means of visual sightings of contrails
and that few contrail sightings had been accompanied by radar
detection.
317 It is possible, of course, that there has been an increase
in detections since the earlier disclosure by the Alsop
brothers (March 17, 1952) and by "authoritative sources"
in Washington (August 1, 1953). This possibility seems
unlikely, however. The Ulman article, published in mid-
October, 1953, was probably several months in preparationr
he refers to the day on which the incident took place as
an "Arctic summer day." .
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From the context of Ulmants story it seems likely that
most of the violations detected by U.S. Alaskan coastal radar
defenses refer to a type of Soviet air reconnaissance which,
so far as we know, has not been heretofore. publicly disclosed.
The twelve or more detections disclosed earlier had reference,
apparently, to high-flying Soviet planes which penetrated the
northern part of the Western Hemisphere in some depth and.,
perhaps, at points other than the Alaskan coast. The almost
daily violations reported by Ulman, on the other hand, appear
to be, for the most part, instances of perimeter reconnaissance
of the Alaskan coast by Soviet planes. Such flights need not
commit actual violations of Alaskan territory or territorial
waters to accomplish their mission, though Ulman did not make
that point. And, as Ulman reported, such planes are difficult
to intercept since they can quickly return to international air
space or, given the proximity of Soviet territory to Alaska at
some points, to their own territory as soon as U.S. fighter-
interceptors take to the air:
Their mission Lthat of the Soviet planes detected
by U.S. radar-posts on the Alaskan coast7 apparently
is. to. -feel out our radar defenses and photograph
our coast and when our jets go out to meet them,
they run. i18
318
Ulman, op. cit.
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93. REPORTED DISAPPEARANCE OF U.S. OBSERVATION
PLANE IN NORTHWEST PACIFIC
(August, 1952)
The FBIS's Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts
of August 13, 1952, listed as an "omission" in Soviet
broadcasts for the preceding week any reference to the
"reported disappearance of an American observation plane in
the Northwest Pacific."
We have been unable to find any other reference to this
incident in public or classified sources. FBIS personnel
were unable to locate the original reference which formed the
basis for their report.
94. CZECH ALLEGATION OF AERIAL SURVEYING AND
DROPPING OF COLORADO BEETLES BY U.S. PLANES
(August, 1952)
A Moscow broadcast of August 19, 1952, stated that "American
planes systematically violate the Czechoslovak frontier for
aerial surveyinp, of.Czechoslovak territory. In an effort to
cause damage...they dropped agricultural pests, particularly
the Colorado beetle." This charge was said to have been
contained in an article in Pravda on the subject of American
hostility to Czechoslovakia written by the Czech Minister of
Security Bacilek.319
319 FBIS, Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts, August 27,
1952; CONFIDENTIAL.
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224.
No further details are available. Evidently the public
allegation in question was not followed or preceded by a Czech
diplomatic protest to the U.S. Perhaps the article in
question -- the full text of which has not been examined -- made
no fresh charges, but simply rehashed old ones.
95. SOVIET PROTEST OF ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
EASTERN GERMANY BY A U. S. C-54 (ACTUALLY A
BELGIAN SABENA PLANE)
(September 8, 1952)
The Soviets mistakenly attributed a violation of East
German territory by a Belgian Sabena plane to a U.S. C-54.
In their reply to the Soviet protest, U.S. officials in Germany
stated merely that the plane in question was of "foreign.
registry" and that it was "overflying the U.S. Zone." From
this, State Department offish is in Berlin assumed, Soviet
officials could easily infer by consulting timetables of
scheduled flights that the plane in question came from
Czechoslovakia and that it must have been a Belgian Sabena.
No evidence of a public disclosure of the incident by
either side has come to our attention.
Significance
The incident is interesting in clarifying some policy
considerations governing U.S. replies to Soviet protests at
the Berlin Air Safety Center.
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.
The Department of State expressed a reservation to HICOG's
reply to the Soviet protest (see above) on the ground that the
reference to "aircraft of foreign registry" might have created
an unnecessary suspicion in the Soviets' minds.320 It queried,
further, whether it would not have been to the best interests
of the United States to have. given the foreign carrier's name,
and the Department suggested further that this might be adopted
as a general policy unless HICOG had persuasive reasons to the
contrary.
In reply HICOG commented as follows:
It has always been the policy of the Berlin
Element to reply to protests voiced by the
Soviet controller at the Berlin Air Safety
Center promptly and in an honest, straightforward
fashion. (The few exceptions to this rule
have been dictated by operational necessities
of the U.S. Military Forces.) However, we have
studiously refrained from giving the Russians
any more information than was absolutely
required. In other words, we have rendered no
gratuitous help to the Soviets.
Indeed, there have been cases when we had
occasion to believe that a British or French
aircraft of American manufacture might have
committed the offense which the Soviets
ascribed to us. In such cases we have given
the Soviet controller nothing but a flat
disclaimer. Upon receipt of our reply, the
Soviet has often canvassed our British and
French colleagues in turn. 'Major Gubanov has
good reason to know that he can expect from the
U.S. controller only the same minimum of
cooperation which he gives us...the British and
French follow the identical policy.321
320 Department of State cable, No. A-494 (October 13, 1952).
321 HICOG, Berlin Element to HICOG, Bonn "Soviet Protests in
Berlin Air Safety Center" (October 31, 1952); SECRET.
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269
The HICOG reply noted, finally, that the reason for not
giving the actual identification of the plane in replying to
the Russians was that it was considered politically undesirable
to make such an admission regarding our Belgian ally.
96. BRITISH R.A.F. PLANE IN EMERGENCY LANDING ON
U.S. AIR FORCE BASE AT THULE, GREENLAND
(September, 1952)
This incident is of relevance to the present study in that
it illuminated and, indirectly, disclosed U.S. policy toward
unidentified planes which approach or intrude upon U.S. air
space. After the Kamchatka incident of March 15, 1953, a USAF
spokesman referred to the Thule incident in precisely this
context, in an effort to illustrate U.S. air-defense policy
toward nonhostile air "intruders."322
According to newspaper accounts, the present incident
involved one of the R.A.F.'s most prized aircraft, a specially
fitted navigational bomber, which was on a transpolar flight to
White Horse on the Yukon. Mechanical failure in one engine
while in the Polar region led to a change in course for Thule.
The U.S. airfield at Thule, however, was fog-bound, and
atmospheric disturbances ruled out a radar landing.
A further complication arose in that U.S. personnel at the
Thule base had no means of identifying the plane as friendly
322 See case study No. 104.
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SECRET RM-227.
or unfriendly. According to the newspaper accounts, Thule is
on a constant alert for unidentified aircraft. The U.S. tower
control at Thule talked with the R.A.F. plane by radio. The
possibILity was considered that the request for an emergency
landing was a carefully contrived ruse, though the voices and
facts transmitted from the unidentified plane seemed to
authenticate its identity.
As a result of the lack of standard British-U.S. radio
and navigation procedures, the R.A.F. plane came within minutes
of plunging into the Arctic waters. It finally landed after.
radar disturbances cleared up.323
97. U.S. UNMARKED HOSPITAL PLANE FIRED UPON
BY SOVIET FIGHTERS IN BERLIN CORRIDOR
(October 8, 1952)
While en route to Berlin on October 8,'1952, an unarmed
U.S. twin-engine transport (C-47) was harassed by two Soviet
jet planes which fired several machine-gun bursts in its
vicinity. The incident took place in the same area where,
on the preceding April 29, a French airliner had been damaged
by Soviet fighters.324 The U.S. plane did not suffer any
damage. The moral gravity of having fired on a hospital plane
was spared the Soviets in that the C-47 carried no special
markings to indicate it was a hospital plane. .
323 The New York Times, September 20, 1952.
324 See case study No. 57.
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Within a few hours, General Mathewson, U.S. Commander in
Berlin, officially protested the action as "uncivilized."
But, at the same time, the U.S. protest note left it open
whether or not the plane had at one point accidentally flown
outside the assigned air corridor.325
On the following day, October 9, Major General N. M.
Trusov, chief of the Russian occupation staff, rejected the U.S.
protest. He charged that the U.S. plane had "grossly violated"
the air corridor by as much as 30 Km. (18 miles), and for a
period of fifty-five minutes.326
The U.S. protest was reaffirmed by General Mathewson on
October 16. Conceding the possibility of an unintentional
violation, Mathewson focused the dispute on Soviet air-defense
policy, that is, on whether Soviet planes had the right in such
circumstances to fire weapons in a militant fashion, a ,practice
which violated existing quadripartite air traffic rules.327
This protest, too, was rejected by the Soviets as "groundless,"
this time by the Soviet representative at the Berlin Air Safety
Center. Thereafter, diplomatic discussion of the incident
between the two powers was evidently conducted on a private
basis. Several oral statements on the issue were exchanged by
the U.S. and Soviet representatives at the B.A.S.C.
325 The New York Times, October 9, 1952.
326. The text of Trusov's protest was not broadcast, but an
account of it was transmitted by TASS and other communist
media. See FBIS, Daily Report, October 10, 1952, and
The New York Times, October 10, 1952.
327 The New York Times, October 17, 1952.
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229.
Significance
Soviet Motive
The hypothesis must be seriously considered that the Soviet
fighters fired with-full hostile intent upon the U.S. C-47 in
implementation of Soviet policy on treatment of aerial intruders.
Although the U.S. plane was not hit, it would seem that only
rapid evasive action and utilization of cloud cover, not self-
imposed limitations on the part of the Soviet fighters, saved the
C-47 from damage. or'destruction.
The first U.S. communique following the incident stated
that the shots fired by the Soviet fighters had apparently been
intended as a warning or as a device to attract attention.328
General Mathewson's formal protest note of October 8, however,
held-that the maneuvering and fire of the Soviet planes
constituted "a definite and hostile threat to the flight safety
of the aircraft." He added that "only by taking full advantage
of available cloud cover had the plane been able to escape."329
The Soviet motive appears to have been a technical one,
i.e., one concerned with the problem of air violations. Unlike
the case of the Air France incident of April 29, the present
incident did not lead Western analysts to speculate on the
possibility that a political or diplomatic motive lay behind the
Soviet action. Not only did the political situation in Germany
at this time itself fail to suggest any apparent political
328 ml,- ~T...., v...1. mJ..._,, n non
Ibid.
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motive for the Soviet action; the diplomatic and propaganda
handling of the incident by the Soviets, too, seemed consonant
with a purely technical air-defense motivation. No effort was
made by the Soviets to suggest that the incident had political
significance in terms of current international disputes. The
incident and the diplomatic notes which followed received a
minimum of attention in Soviet media.330
The hypothesis that the Soviet motive was a technical one
is even more plausible when it is remembered that the U.S.
plane had indeed deviated from the assigned air corridor. On
October 16, in reaffirming his earlier protest, General
Mathewson conceded that the C-47 may have been off course owing
to strong crosswinds and the failure of navigational equipment.331
Bearing on Soviet Air-Defense Policy in Berlin Corridor
Once again, as in the Air France case, the Soviet version
of the facts of the incident resembled the stereotype associated
330 FBIS, Survey of U.S.S.R. Broadcasts, October lo, 1952,
p. o; CONFIDENTIAL.
331 There appears to be little doubt that the U.S.-aircraft was
outside and south of the air corridor, though reports from
Berlin, Bonn, and USAFE disagreed about the distance
involved, reporting variously that the aircraft was ten,
thirteen, twenty-five, and twenty-six miles out of the
corridor. Since radar readings were taken at different
times, several or all of these estimates may be correct.
(Draft summary memo, State Department; SECRET. See also
Wiesbaden to Secretary of State, unnumbered October 18,
1.2527; SSE 9ET; CINCUU USAFTLWiesbaden7 to Secretary of State /October
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RM-1349
231.
with the tough Soviet air-defense policy-332
In neither case could the full Soviet stereotype be
reproduced, since neither plane was shot down. But the
essential portion of the stereotype, regarding an alleged
failure on the part of the intruding plane to follow instructions
to land at a Soviet airfield, was reproduced in both these
incidents. This permits us to infer with some plausibility
that the severe Soviet policy was in effect at the time of
these two incidents, though failure to shoot down the two
planes indicates that it was unsuccessfully implemented.
The Soviet note of October 9 referred unmistakably to the
key provision of the severe Soviet air-defense policy when it
charged that "the American plane ignored orders of the Soviet
aircraft to land and attempted to hide in the clouds." This
unmarked hospital plane incident, theefore, reinforces the
interpretation derived from the Air France incident that the
.Soviets were attempting to extend to the Berlin corridors the
tough air-defense policy that they had previously applied to
their own borders.
The possibility that the severity of Soviet air-defense
policy was modified in certain respects when applied to
violations of the air corridors has already been discussed in
connection with the Air France case.333 Several aspects of the
332 See case studies of April 8, 1950, and October 7, 1952,
in Supplement (TOP SECRET), and casa studies Nos. 53 and
66 in present volume.
333 See case study No. 57.
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232.
present incident serve to reinforce this impression. First,
as we have seen, there is no doubt that the C-47 made a
substantial violation of the corridor, one which the local
Soviet air-defense command might well have considered a "gross
violation." Secondly, as in the Air France case, the
intercepting MiG's may have given some sort of signal or
warning before opening fire.334 Thirdly, during the five-month
period between the Air France case and the present one, the
Soviets seem to have deliberately passed up opportunities to
create similar incidents, perhaps out of a desire to avoid
undue political complications which might have arisen from too
frequent repetition of such clashes.
At least two or three of the twelve air violations of the
corridor charged by the Soviets in the five-month period between
the two incidents could well have been considered "gross"
violations by the Soviets. Yet, to our knowledge, all of these
alleged violations were unopposed by Soviet air-defense forces.
Since Soviet capability and -- we may assume, at least in some
of the twelve cases -- opportunity for military counteraction
existed, the absence of such counteraction was probably deliberate,
and may be attributed to Soviet policy calculations.
334 The Soviet MiG's were reported to have made several passes
at the U.S. plane before opening fire. (The New York Times,
October 10, 1952.) Apparently, also, one of the MiG's
rocked its wings before opening fire on the third pass.
Such a signal, however, was not in accord with procedure
outlined in quadripartite air regulations, for, according
to these regulations, rocking of the wings meant "you may
proceed." (Frankfurt LDonnelly7 to secretary of State,
No. 709; October 10, 1952; SECRET.)
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1-44
SECRET RM-2
339
These intervening alleged violations, protested
diplomatically by the Soviets, have been listed in separate
case studies and need only be summarized in Table I.
Information on these incidents is incomplete because of lack
of access to appropriate U.S. and. Allied records. It will
be noted that in at least seven of their twelve notes of
protest the Soviets explicitly warned that responsibility for
the consequences in case of'a repetition of the violation
would rest with the Western power concerned..
U.S. Diplomatic Handling of Incident
We.have noted that Western authorities in Berlin had been
disposed to view the earlier Air France incident as an
isolated occurrence. After the unmarked hospital plane
incident, however, U.S. State Department officers in Berlin
became concerned lest the hostile action of the MiG's against
the U.S. C-47 indicate a new and tougher Soviet air-defense
policy.335 This, in turn, gave new focus and urgency to the
U.S. diplomatic response to the incident.
In contesting the Soviet action against the C-47, U.S.
officials in Berlin appear to have followed recommendations
contained in the State Department report Just cited. In this
report it was noted that existing quadripartite agreements
335
A State Department report postulated that such Soviet
counteraction against Allied planes along the corridor had
been confined thus far to cases where the Allied aircraft
was "well outside the corridor." (Frankfurt LDonnelly7 to
Secretary of State, No. 709 (October 10, 1952/; SECRET.)
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xM-1,31+9
236.
covering air traffic to and from Berlin ruled out action such
as had been taken by the Soviet planes against the c-47. It
was pointed out that DAIR/PP(46)132, second revision, December
9, 1946, entitled "Agreement on procedure for visual signals
between aircraft in flight, where permission to fly has not
been given,".-provided, in part, as follows:
(A) Intercepting aircraft may wish to lead
the intercepted aircraft away from the particular
area and then release it, or
(B) Intercepting aircraft may wish to require
the3inntercepted aircraft to land before releasing
Quadripartite approval of DAIR/PP(46)132, second revision,
had been recorded in DAIR/MM(46)29, minutes of ACA Air
Directorate meeting of December 12, 1946... However, the State
Department report went on, "while these minutes apparently were
never officially confirmed because of a technicality arising
from ACA reorganization which occurred at that time, Lwe7 have
reason to believe that the Soviets are unaware of the discrepancy."
336 Additional provisions contained in this quadripartite
agreement ruled out the Soviet action even more decisively,
and were cited in subsequent communications to the Soviet
representative in the Berlin Air Safety Center. The
quadripartite agreement also stated:
"II B (1) The intercepting and intercepted aircraft
will under no circumstances open fire unless fired upon.
"(2) The pilot of the intercepting aircraft will make
a full report after landing if the intercepted aircraft
fails to comply with his orders....
"(6) In no case shall the intercepting aircraft point
its nose directly toward the intercepted aircraft."
(Frankfurt Uonnelly7 to Secretary of State, No. 778,
October 28, 1952; CONFIDENTIAL.)
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SECRET RM-237.
The Department's report noted that Soviet Air Force authorities
in Germany might not be aware at all of the quadripartite
agreement in question.
In view of the fact that Soviet harassment of Allied planes
had been apparently limited to aircraft caught in gross
violations of the corridor, the State Department report
recommended that it would be preferable for the United States
not to emphasize air-corridor crises, but to insist firmly on
mutual adherence to the terms of the quadripartite agreements,
"the preservation of which is entirely to our advantage."
The policy background of subsequent U.S. diplomatic action
in this case is not fully illuminated in the materials examined.
However, the preceding State Department recommendations, or a
similar set of considerations, would seem to have been
implemented. Thus, General Mathewson's second protest note,?on
October 16, insisted that, even if a violation of the corridor
had occurred, the "militant use of weapons by Soviet fighter
aircraft for whatever purpose it was intended to serve not
only placed American lives in jeopardy but constituted a gross
violation of the agreed rules and procedures governing air
traffic to and from Berlin." This protest, and the position
taken therein by General Mathewson, were subsequently rejected
as "groundless" by the Soviet representative at the Berlin Air.
Safety Center.
If this Soviet-rejection had been permitted to go unanswered,
the Soviets might have construed it as U.S. acknowledgment of
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SECRET R14-2
389
the implicit Soviet claim that Allied aircraft caught outside
the air corridor must comply with Soviet fighter aircraft
instructions to land at a Soviet airfield. State Department
officials in Germany were alert to this danger;337 therefore,
additional efforts were made by U.S. personnel to obtain Soviet
adherence to the quadripartite agreement. Resort was now had
to confidential channels, and several "oral statements" were
exchanged between representatives of the two powers at the
Berlin Air Safety Center, as follows:
November
1,
1952
--
U.S. statement
November
12,
1952
--
Soviet rejection
November
22,
1952
--
U.S. statement
December
8,
1952
--
Soviet rejection
The position taken by the Soviets in these exchanges was
that the flight rules in question had been only worked out, but
not confirmed. "I must remind you once more," the Soviet
representative at the B.A.S.C. stated on December 8, 1952,
"that the Control Council in Germany has no flight safety rules
confirmed for the flying over of the Eastern Occupation Zone of
Germany."338
.Having failed at the B.A.S.C. level to set the record
straight regarding quadripartite air rules governing corridor
violations, the State Department then considered it desirable
337 Frankfurt (Donnelly) to Secretary of State, No. 778
(October 28, 1952); CONFIDENTIAL.
Cited in Office of Chief Controller, U.S., Berlin Air
Safety Center to CINCUSAFE, December 10, 1952; SECRET.
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239.
to transfer its diplomatic effort to a higher and more formal
channel, in view of the importance of the matter and the
Soviet threat to U.S. corridor rights.339 Subsequently, it
would appear, the Soviet position was again reaffirmed by
Major General N. M. Trusov, chief of staff of the Soviet
occupation forces. While information on developments in the
dispute after January, 1953, are not available, the State
Department showed no tendency to back down in such an important
ma,tter.34o The motivation behind the Soviet effort to deny
the existence of any quadripartite flight safety rules governing
possible corridor violations was regarded as "possibly ominous"
by the State Department.341
In sum, therefore, the United States focused the diplomatic
dispute arising from the October 8 incident squarely on the
significant question of Soviet policy in these matters. This
in itself was a major step forward in the history of Western
efforts since the Baltic incident of April, 1950, to contest
hostile Soviet actions of this type. Apparently, the United
States did not succeed, in this instance, in forcing the Soviets
to retreat from their new tough policy toward corridor violations.
339 State Department (Acheson) to HICOG, Bonn; SECRET.
34o f 14
t
t
D
ll
I C
u
OG (.er n) January
Department o Sta
e (
es)
o H
23, 1953 (CONFIDENTIAL).advised as follows: "3epartment
believes strong refutation of Soviet denial BASC
jurisdiction over air corridors is called for, and should
assert Quadripartite agreements this nature not subject
unilateral arbitrary reinterpretation, nor are Soviet
obligations under these agreements lessened by such
attempted distortion of facts."
Ibid.
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Yet the steady and persistent U.S. pressure applied against
Soviet policy in connection with the incident may well have
played some role in persuading the Soviets to reconsider their
policy in mid-March, 1953, following the British Lincoln-bomber
incident.342
98. YUGOSLAV CHARGE OF BULGARIAN AIR VIOLATIONS
(October 26, 1952)
The Belgrade radio reported that three new violations of
Yugoslavia's air space had taken place on October 26. The
broadcast, which quoted the Yugoslav Foreign Office, added that
Bulgarian troops had opened fire on a Yugoslav pillbox across
the border in the same area as the air violations.343
99. ALLEGED AIR DROP OF U.S. SABOTEURS INTO POLAND
(November 4, 1952)
On January lb, 1953, the Polish government, in a note to
the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, protested against "spying and
diversionist activities on Polish territory." An account of
the protest was broadcast by the Warsaw. radio on the following
day.344 The Polish note claimed that two "diversionists,"
342 See case study No. 103.
343 The New York Times, October 27, 1952. Mrs
344 Reuters dispatch dated January 17 1953 The?Ifsw York
Times, January 18, 1953). The Polish note was also
published in the Warsaw press (The LWashin-ton7 Evening
Star, January 19, 1953). The S=arispatch contains a
more detailed account of Polish charges.
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trained in a United States "spy center" in West Germany, had
been parachuted into Poland from a U.S. Air Force plane on
November 4, 1952. The two men were said to have been captured
by Polish security agents on the same evening.
Evidently the charge had been made by Polish sources on a
previous occasion and had been labeled by American Air Force
officers as a fake.345
100. YUGOSLAV CHARGES OF AIR BORDER
VIOLATIONS BY HUNGARY
(January 1 to April 30, 1953)
According to a semiofficial YUGOPRESS summary, a total of
972 "grave" border incidents took place, particularly on the
frontier with Hungary, in the period from January 1 to April
30, 1953. These incidents were said to have included firing on
Yugoslav territory, throwing of rockets, violations of air
space, and dispersing of anti-Yugoslav propaganda.
Yugoslav authorities noted that these incidents had taken
place most frequently along the Hungarian border, and involved
chiefly violations of Yugoslav air space by jet planes. The
belief was expressed that these violations covered up maneuvers
of troops near the border.
At the same time, Yugoslav military authorities commented
that receit troop movements and other activities in the Soviet
345 The''
Evening Star, January 19, 1953
?
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Satellites, particularly along their borders with Yugoslavia,
implied an increased rather than a decreased threat to peace
in that part of Europe.346
101. CZECH AIR VIOLATIONS OF BAVARIA, WEST GERMANY
(February, 1953)
According to a dispatch of March 12, 1953, in the New
York Times, West German frontier.police in Furth-im-Wald held
that Czech planes overflew the Bavarian frontier several times
in February, 1953.
102. U.S. F-84 SHOT DOWN BY CZECH MIG347
(March 10, 1953)
On March 10, 1953, two U.S. F-84 jets based in the U.S.
Zone of Germany were attacked over German territory near the
Czech border by unidentified MiG's. One of the F-84's was
shot down, its pilot parachuting to safety; the other F-84
managed to escape.
The facts of the incident were disputed by the Czech and
U.S. governments. The Czech account, given in a note dated
March 11, 1953, charged that the two U.S. fighters penetrated
346 , mI-- ITw._. V-...1. m-1...-- u. 1 P7 , nr'9
''4' Only unclassified sources of information on the F-84
incident were available for this analysis; a few
classified sources were utilized in interpreting the
significance of the incident.
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Czech territory to a point "18 kilometers south southwest of
Plzen at a distance of 40 kilometers from the State frontier,"
where they were intercepted by Czech fighters and "requested
to land." The note continued: "This request was not obeyed.
In the air-battle Lwhich ensued7 one of the U.S. aircraft fled
in a westerly direction, the second was hit and, steadily
losing altitude, disappeared in a southwesterly direction."348
As is the communist practice in such cases, there was no
subsequent elaboration or alteration of this account. A Czech
note dated March 28, 1953, reiterated the accuracy of its
version of the incident, and stated: "The previously mentioned
facts are based on the logbook records of the land radiomechanics,
the goniometer records, and the radar reports, as well as on
the statements of the Czechoslovak pilots." 349
Quite a different version of the incident was given in the
U.S. note of March 13. Additional details appeared in U.S.
news accounts, especially in those based on interviews with the
U.S. pilots of the two U.S. planes.350 The most detailed
official account of the incident was presented in the U.S. note
of August 18, 1954, which preferred a diplomatic claim against
the Czech government;. this note contained important new
statements of fact which bear on the question of the communist
348
349
350
FBIS, Daily Report, March 12, 1953.
Department of State Bulletin, August 10, 1953, p. 183.
See especially an Associated Press interview with the U.S.
pilots in the (Washington) Evening Star, March 11, 1953;
and an account of the incident by Lt. Warren G. Brown the
pilot who was shot down, in Life magazine, March 23, 1953.
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motive behind the incident.351
In this note the U.S. government made the following findings
of fact (abbreviated here) with regard to the incident and
indicated its readiness to prove them by evidence before an
appropriate forum:
(1) On March 9 and during the morning of March 10, 1953,
military aircraft from Czechoslovakia engaged in "repeated"
unauthorized overflights of the border of the U.S. Zone "in
circumstances which could not be fairly interpreted as innocent
or accidental."
(2) At 9:38 a.m.(Greenwich Mean Time) on March 10, 1953,
two U.S. F-8+'s were dispatched toward the Czech border in
order to intercept, identify, and report on unidentified
aircraft overflying the U.S. Zone.
(3) Before taking off, "in accordance with the standard
practice then obtaining in such cases, the guns of both
aircraft LF-84'17 had been rendered inoperative...." this
fact, evidently not previously disclosed in official or
journalistic accounts of the incident, provides the answer to
queries made at the time as to why the F-81+'s had not fired
back~7
(4) At no time did the F-84's cross into Czechoslovakia.
/The U.S. note of March 13, 1953, had already stated that U.S.
351 For texts of the notes exchanged see Department of State
Bulletin, March 30, 1953; August 10, 1953; August 30,
1954.
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radarscope data showed conclusively that the F-84's had not
crossed the Czech border at any time-7
(5) When the two F-84's reached the border area in which
unidentified aircraft from Czechoslovakia had been observed,
the overflying aircraft had disappeared from view. The F-84's
then were directed to conduct the usual border patrol flight,
in the course of which, at approximately 9:59 a.m. (GMT),
"unidentified military aircraft were again observed to be
flying within Czechoslovakia toward the German border on a
bearing which would bring them within one minute directly into
and within the United States Zone of Germany." Visual
identification of two MiG's, which crossed the border at about
10:00 a.m. (GMT), was made by the U.S. pilots who, however,
were not able to identify their nationality.
(6) The MiG's crossed the path of the F-84's over the
German town of Kritzenast at about 10:02 a.m. (GMT), while
the F-84's, for the purpose of avoiding a collision, were
executing a turn carrying them deeper into Germany. At this
point the F-84's became separated, and the two MiG's split up
too, each following one of the F-84's.
(7) One MiG placed itself directly behind Lt. Brown's
F-84, assuming "a hostile and aggressive position, both
evading identification and making ready to fire...." Lt. Brown
took evasive and defensive action "in ever-tightening counter-
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clockwise circles," but failed to throw off the speedier
MiG.
(8) At this point, "several additional MiG aircraft then
appeared... coming from Czechoslovakia and responding to
Czechoslovak controlling authorities." These MiG's joined
with tho other MiG in a "concerted, deliberate and hostile
action in order to effect the destruction of Lieutenant Brown's
aircraft and his death."352
(9) The firing against Lt. Brown's F-84 began at about
10:05 a.m. (GMT) near Pemfling, a German town more than 10
miles from the closest point of the Czech border. The attack,
initially.'unsuccessful, was pressed by the MiG's until the
F-84 was disabled over the German town of Friedersried, almost
15 miles from the Czech border. Lt. Brown lost control of
his aircraft and dived sharply south; the MiG's "nevertheless
continued pursuing him." Lt. Brown regained control of his
plane and headed farther into Germany. But the pursuing MiG's
"reopened fire" over Thiermietnach, more than 18 miles from
the Czech border. His aircraft-mortally hit this time, Lt.
Brown bailed out. "Nevertheless...the pursuing MIG aircraft
continued firing, the last firing taking place in the air space
352
The fact that other MiG's later joined the two original
MiG's, it is believed was not previously disclosed,
though it was foreshadowed in some of the inquiries put
to :.~ Czech government in the U.S. note of July 29, 1953.
Elsewhere in the note of August 18, 1954, as well as in
the note of July 29, 1953, the U.S. government by implica-
tion raised the possibility that not all of the MiG's
taking part in the action against the F-84's had been
Czech planes.
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247.
between the German towns of Hofstetten and Sasselberg, twenty
and one-half miles from the nearest point of the Czechoslovak
border." The MiG's withdrew at about 10:08 a.m. (GMT).
(10) No request to land (as alleged in the Czech note of
March 11, 1953) was made to theF-84's. (In this connection,
the U.S.. note also recalled that the Czech government, in its
reply of February 25, 195+, had refused to specify, although
duly requested, the signals or the contents of the alleged
communication from the Czech aircraft to the American aircraft,
or the method by which it was supposed to have been made.)
Significance
The detailed account of the incident presented in the U.S.
note of August 18, 1954, and some of the disclosures made for
the first time on that occasion, tend to rule out the hypothesis
that the Czechs were, on this occasion, merely implementing
their air-defense policy. Such a hypothesis had been somewhat
more plausible on the basis of the public accounts available
shortly after the incident. Until August, the possibility
seemed to remain that Czech air-defense personnel might have
mistakenly thought that a violation by the F-8+'s had taken
place, even though authoritative statements showed that the
entire encounter had taken place over the U.S. Zone. However,
the U.S. note of August 28, 1954, showed that the incident took
place in a context of repeated. communist overflights of the
border zone on March 9 and 10.
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It would seem, then, that the communist air force,in
Czechoslovakia deliberately adopted an aggressive posture,
for reasons that are not clear. One possibility is that the
Czechs wanted to demonstrate that they had a new, tough air-
defense policy. It should be noted that the F-84 incident was
the first 11r,jstakable manifestation of a stern Czech air-
defense policy similar to that applied over the U.S.S.R. after
April, 1950. It is possible that the incident was deliberately
staged over German territory, without waiting for an actual
violation of Czech air space, because it was thought desirable
to demonstrate at this particular time that the Czechs had a
tough air-defense policy,
In the light of the previous history and development of
Czech-U.S. air-border incidents, the shooting down of the F-84
on March 10, 1953, did not come as a complete surprise. In
August-and September, 1952, Czech aircraft were reported on
several occasions to have flown along their side of the border
parallel to U.S. fighters which were engaged in border patrols.
U.S. officials at that time drew the conclusion that Czech
aircraft would make armed interception against any U.S. aircraft
which happened to violate the border. This expectation was
very much strengthened in November, 1952, when the Czech
Transport Ministry (responsible for civil-air matters) issued
a formal warning that aircraft violating Czech air boundaries
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would be forced to land or be shot down.353
That the F-84 incident was an implementation of this earlier
warning was suggested-by the phrasing of the Czech note. The
Czechs charged that the F-84's, having made a "violation" of
Czech territory, "were requested to land," and that one of the
planes was shot down when "this request was not obeyed.,,354
If the F-84 incident was connected in some way with Czech
air-defense policy, then the question arises whether it signified
the inception of a new policy to be applied by the Czechs in
every case of an air-border violation, or whether "an example"
was being made in this instance in order to convey dramatically
and forcefully the Czech attitude toward overflights. While
available evidence is inconclusive in this regard, we lean toward
the hypothesis that the F-84 incident did not signify that
353 Bonn (Donnelly) to Secretary of State, No. 2347, November
21, 192, citing cable received by USAREUR from U.S. air
attache on November 18 (SC 5311); CONFIDENTIAL.
351+ This version of the incident resembles that used in similar
cases by the Soviets, with one important exception. The
Soviet stereotype always charged the foreign plane with
having fired first in response to a request to land. In
omitting this charge, the Czech statement in this case was
clumsy, because it left the Czech international law position
vulnerable to diplomatic attack. In effect, the Czechs
overtly claimed the right to shoot down an intruding plane
simply if it did not follow instructions to land. While
Soviet policy was actually the same, Soviet diplomacy
carefully shielded such actions by advancing the additional
justification that the foreign plane had fired first. In a
subsequent incident (involving two U.S. Navy planes fired
upon over Czechoslovak1a.on March 12, 195+) the Czechs
charged the intruding planes with opening fire as well as
refusal to land, thus adhering to the earlier Soviet
diplomatic stereotype.
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hostile military action would be applied as a matter of routine
to all air violations.
Some light is shed on this question by the Czech diplomatic
treatment of the incident. At no time during the dispute did
the Czech government state that the action against the F-84 on
March 10 was tA.!r?'n on the basis of standing instructions.355
This omission appeared to be significant, the more so with the
passage of time. In its note of July 29, the U.S. government
explicitly requested "copies of all general and special orders
from competent LCzech7 authorities to the commanders and the
ground radio controllers and to pilots" in effect at the time
of the incident, which would illuminate "the circumstances
under which such joreign7 aircraft might be attacked, and the
circumstances in which overflight of the Czechoslovak-German
border by Czechoslovak aircraft was permissible or directed."356
The U.S. also requested the text of specific instructions give n
to all Czech fighter pilots with respect to the flights in
question on March 10, 1953. These requests, and all others
contained in the U.S. note of July 29, 1953, were ignored by the
Czech government in its reply of February 25, 1954.
355
It may be recalled that, in several earlier incidents
involving the shooting down of a U.S. plane, and in the
case of the Swedish Catalina (June, 1952) as well, the
Soviet Foreign Offir,e subsequently stated what were,
ostensibly, the air-defense instructions under which its
planes had .:i.
The latter part of this request may be interpreted as an
effort to find out whether the Czechs claimed the right
of "hot pursuit."
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251.
Possible Political Motivation Behind the Incident
It should be noted that the fact of deliberate Czech
excursion into West Germany in order to shoot down the F-84ts
does not necessarily indicate that the action had a special
political or diplomatic motivation. The possibility remains
that technical difficulties of intercepting fast-flying jet
aircraft in a limited time and space are such that it would
have been difficult to intercept and shoot down a jet plane
which made a minor violation of Czech territory. Therefore,
in order to have an incident to back its earlier warnings, and
in order not to have to. wait too long for an opportunity to
demonstrate their air-defense capability, the Czechs may have
decided to lure American planes into a trap at a time and
place of their own choosing, even though this meant that the
incident might have to be staged on the German side of the
border. This explanation is suggested by the fact, as noted
earlier, that the U.S. F-84's were sent up to investigate the
presence of unidentified aircraft -- presumably violating West
German air space -- and were then attacked by the two MiGfs.
The possibility of a special political motivation behind
the incident, on the other hand, derives some support from
the diplomatic and propaganda handling of the incident on the
part of the Czechs. The incident was utilized by the Czech
regime to support its protests against alleged intervention by
the United States in the domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia.
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In this context, the shooting down of the F-84 manifested the
Czech governmentts determination to resist such efforts. The
Czech note of March 13 concluded on such a political note:
American Government authorities must realize
that Czechoslovakia is not a Marshallized
State, an American colony over which U.S.
planes can fly at will, as they do in Western--
Europe. Every Czechoslovak citizen considers
it his most sacred duty to vigilantly guard
the freedom independence and sovereignty of
the Czechoslovak Republic.
The incident of March 10 was used for a similar purpose
before the U.N. General Assembly in support of the Czech-
sponsored motion against the United States' "aggressive
intervention" in the domestic affairs of other states. The
Czech delegation had asked for the inclusion of this item on
the agenda. In a long speech on March 23, Mr. David, Czech
foreign minister, made. a series of'charges against the United
States which included a detailed account of U.S. air violations
of Czech territory over the previous few years, which he held
to have been "systematic and deliberate."357
Other political explanations of the F-84 incident emerge
if the incident is related to'the problem of succession in
Soviet leadership following Stalints death. Such explanations
became prominent especially after a British bomber was downed
by Soviet MiGts in Germany two days after the F-84 incident.
357 Some of the instances of alleged U.S. air violations
listed by.,Mr. David had been publicly aired earlier.
A Czech broadcast on March 13 had contained similar
charges. (See FBIS, Daily Report, March 17, 1953.)
These charges are included in separate case studies, in
chronological order, in the present report.
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253.
These hypotheses are considered in the case study on the
British Lincoln-bomber incident.358
In conclusion, we should note here the position taken
in the U.S. note-of August 18, l95+,with regard to the Czech
motive;
The United States Government charges further
that these acts and directions were without
provocation or justification whatever; ... that
they were carried out in an effort to exert
terror, threats and illegal force over the
area of Germany near the Czechoslovak border,
and thereby to make it possible to overfly
the United States zone of Germany and other
areas unlawfully, at will, for such purposes
as espionage, aggrandizement and propaganda
demonstrations of strength....
U.S. Diplomatic Handling of Incident
The United States immediately protested the Czech action
of March 10 in strong diplomatic language. A preliminary note
protesting the shooting down of the F-84 "in strongest terms"
was filed in Prague by Ambassador George Wadsworth on the day
of the incident. The gravity of the incident was at once
emphasized by Dr. James B. Conant, U.S. High Commissioner in
Germany, who called it an "outrage" and predicted that U.S.
forces in Germany "will know how to'deal with any further
excursion of this type." Secretary of State Dulles asserted
that the United States took "a serious view of the situation.
3 58
See case study No. 103.
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However, prior to issuing the fuller protest note of
March 13, State Department officials made it clear that they
did not contemplate an open break with the Czech government.
By this time, too, it was evident that the U.S. military
reaction to the incident would be confined to improving the
U.S. capability and readiness for.taking defensive action
against any similar Czech action in the future.
The Czech note of March 11 evidently influenced the
formulation of the fuller U.S. protest delivered on March 13.
The U.S. note rejected the Czech version of the incident as a
"falsification of facts"; it called upon the Czech government
for a formal expression of regret, indemnities, and assurance
against repetition of such an incident.
The Czech note had given a distorted picture of the history
of air-border violations along the Czech-West German border,
attempting to portray U.S. forces as engaged in unilateral air
violations and the U.S. government as unmindful of Czech
protests and warnings. The U.S. note of March 13 refuted
these charges in detail and__.took to task the Czech government
for its own attitude toward the problem of air-border violations.
The Czechs were reminded that "in the interest of border
tranquility and international amity" the United States had
always taken strict measures to avoid any air violation of the
Czech border. When, despite such measures, inadvertent
violations had taken place in the past, the United States had
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acknowledged them and had taken renewed precautions. However,
in the great majority of cases, careful investigation by U.S.
authorities had shown Czech charges of alleged U.S. air
violations to be false. On its side, the United States had not
pretested repeated Czech violations of the border without
careful investigation of the facts. The Czech government was
further reminded, in the American note, that on frequent
occasions in the past the United States had called the attention
of the Czech government to its refusal to recognize air
violations by its own planes, and to its failure to state what
measures were being taken to prevent such incidents.
Further, the U.S. note disclosed (evidently for the first
time) that on August 10, 1951, the U.S. Embassy had finally
obtained a statement from the Czech government to the effect
that the Czech Air Force was instructed to keep a distance of
20 kilometers from the zonal border; thereafter, the Czech
government had admitted several violations by Czech aircraft.
The recent incident of March 10, the.U.S. note concluded,
indicated that the Czech government had reverted to "its
previous practice of misrepresentation."
On July 29, another U.S. note was dispatched to the Czech
government. It demanded that the Czechs supply detailed
information on the shooting down of the U.S. F-84. If such
information were not produced, the note continued, the United
States twill consider itself entitled to take such further
action as it may then find appropris a in this matter."
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569
On February 25, 1954, the Czech Foreign Office informed
the American Embassy at Prague that they "have not replied
and do not intend to reply" to the U.S. note of July 29, 1953.
The reason given was that the Czech government in its previous
notes had already presented sufficient facts to prove that
the U.S. planes had violated Czech territory.
The U.S. note of August 18, 1954, already referred to in
some detail above, preferred a formal diplomatic claim against
the Czech government and demanded payment of damages to the
extent of $271,384.16. It invited the Czech government, in
the event it contested the validity of the claim, to join in
submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
The U.S. note charged the Czech government with having knowingly
made false statements of fact about the incident.
In charging the Czech government with violations of
international law, the United States, in the note of August 18,
1954, conveyed aposition of its own regarding the proper
treatment of air intruders. The relevant passage was as follows:
Even if, as is not the fact the ground
authorities in Czechoslovakia or the pilots
of the MiG aircraft from Czechoslovakia
had erroneously believed that they had
intercepted the United States F-84 aircraft
within Czechoslovakia, it was the duty of
the intercepting aircraft and the duty of
the ground controllers to make intelligible
signals to the overflying American aircraft,
such as by flying across the path of the
American aircraft in an easterly direction
toward a suitable airfield and directing the
aircraft to land at that airfield, or to
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257.
take similar action, to acquaint-the overflying
aircraft with the fact that they were
overflying Czechoslovak territory without prior
authorization and should turn and proceed back
to the United States Zone of Germany.
U.S. Militarv'Reaction
The incident of March 10 was doubly embarrassing to the
U.S. in that neither of the F-84's was able to return the
fire of the attacking Czech MSG's. Statements by the U.S.
pilots and a USAFE spokesman did not make clear why defensive
action was not taken.359 Indeed, by refraining on security
grounds from answering reporters' queries as to why they had
not fired upon the MiG's, the U.S. pilots gave the impression
that their orders had prevented them from doing so.360 Later,
at the.same conference, a USAFE spokesman in Wiesbaden was
reported to have stated.that the only reason for not returning
fire was that.the..F-84 pilots had had no opportunity to do so.
He revealed that U.S. pilots on such patrols "are told to
avoid all possible trouble when encountering strange aircraft"
but have orders to "fight back if attacked with a clearly
hostile act or if it is a matter of saving life." In trying
to avoid an incident and in holding their fire, the USAFE
spokesman indicated, the F-84 pilots had acted correctly. That
359
360
The New York Times,. March 12, 1953.
USwr (Washington, D.C.) stated that it knew of no
directive or instruction to prevent pilots from answering
such questions. It speculated that the F-84's were too
slow to get into position to return fire. (The
Washington? Evening Star, March 11, 1953.)
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the guns of the F-84's had been rendered inoperative prior to
becoming airborne, "in accordance with standard practice then
obtaining in such cases," was evidently not disclosed until
the U.S. note of August 18, 1954.
Public statements following the incident gave a somewhat
contradictory impression of U.S. air-defense policy over West'
Germany, and did not make clear whether it was changed following
the incident. It was not clear under what conditions U.S.
fighters could resort to force in coping with air intruders.
One account implied that, even before the F-84 incident, U.S.
patrol planes intercepting alien craft over U.S.-controlled
territory were to lead them to an American landing field and
to enforce landing orders with gunfire in case of redstance.361
Another account indicated that new instructions, presumably
tougher than the earlier ones, had been issued following the
March 10 incident.362 But a USAFE statement reported by the
New York Times on March 14, 1953, indicated that U.S. pilots,
even after the F-84 incident, were permitted to fire back only
when attacked, but not to initiate aggressive action against
unidentified planes discovered over the U.S. Zone. The character
of U.S. air-defense policy at the time of the F-84 incident was
clarified to some extent in the following passage of the U.S.
note of August 18, 1954:
361, he Washington Post, March 11, 1953.
362 the (Washington) Evening Star, March 13, 1953.
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At all times, before and on March 10, 1953,
the pilots of such interceptor aircraft
were under instructions under no circumstances
to cross the border of Germany, and the
.persons controlling their movements were under
instructions under no circumstances to permit
the border to be crossed, or to engage in
violence or force in effecting interception
or identification. Underlining added./
Immediately following the March 10 incident.-the U.S. 12th.
Air Force in Germany announced that it did not intend to alter
the pattern of patrol missions. On March 13, USAF announced
that twenty-five Sabre jets (F-86's), which were planes with
higher performance capability than the F-84's, would soon be
sent to Germany from the United States. On March 16, however,
it was announced that U.S. Sabre jets had been shifted to
Germany on temporary duty from England.363
On another point, too, public accounts initially gave a
confused picture of the U.S. military reaction to the March 10
incident. On March 13., it was reported by the New York Times
that, unlike the 2nd Tactical Air Force in Northern Germany
under British command, the U.S. 12th Air Force had not received
instructions to stay ten miles away from the East German. or
Czechoslovak frontiers. The USAFE spokesman added that there
was no "off limits" area for U.S. fliers along the Czech border,
but that generally pilots kept well away from that frontier.
On the following day (March'14) a USAFE spokesman in Wiesbaden
stated in the same vein that pilots patrolling the German-Czech
363 The New York Times, March 17, 1953.
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border had been instructed "not to give an inch"; they would
continue to fly up to the Czech border in carrying out their
duties.
On March 19, however, USAFE announced that it had banned
itc planes from flying within thirty miles of communist East
Germany and Czechoslovakia, except on border defense missions
or authorized flights in Soviet-recognized air corridors. At
the same time, the U.S. Air Force statement asserted that
"these regulations have been in effect well over a year" but
were "reaffirmed today."
Thus, apparently, the March 10 incident did not really
lead to any change in policy governing U.S. flights near the
Czech border, even though public accounts on this point may
have conveyed the impression that curbs were belatedly instituted
following the shooting down of the F-84.
.It should be noted, finally, that neither the U.S. Air
Force nor the State Department took any overt recognition of
the Czech government's assertion (in its note of March 11) that
the U.S. Embassy in Prague had earlier assured it that U.S.
pilots "of particularly fast aircraft are prohibited ...Lfrom
flying] in a ten-mile-wide strip along the Czechoslovak frontier."
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103. BRITISH LINCOLN BOMBER SHOT DOWN AND.TW THER
PLANES BUZZED BY SOVIET MIG'S OVER GERMANY96
(March 12, 1953)
RM-134 9
261.
On March 12, 1953, within a matter of less than twelve
hours, three British planes, on separate flights over Germany,
were intercepted by Soviet MiG's.
(1) In the first incident, a British bomber of the
Lincoln type was subjected to a mock attack by two
M1G's. Allied sources placed the attack "over the
town of Kassel," which is well inside West Germany.
(2) The second incident, less than two hours later,
resulted in the shooting down of another Lincoln
bomber. According to initial Allied accounts, the
British plane was flying in the Hamburg-Berlin air
corridor, and the attack took place near the zonal
frontier between the British Zone and East Germany.
(3) Less. than six hours after the second incident, a
British European Airlines Viking commercial passenger
plane was intercepted and fired upon by Soviet MiG's
while en route from Munich to Berlin.
The two Lincoln bombers had been brought in from England
for a training flight over Germany. The second plane was
making a flight from Leconfield, an RAF gunnery training station
in Yorkshire, England. British "aviation sources" in Luneburg,
364 Only unclassified sources on the March 12, 1953, incidents
were available for this analysis.
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Germany, stated that the crew. of this Lincoln bomber, unfamiliar
with German terrain, may have made a brief unintentional
violation.365 A British Foreign Office spokesman emphasized:
"We have no reason to think-that this British aircraft had
deviatcd from the corridor. in any material way. A warning would
have hgen fair enough...."366 Later, Prime Minister Churchill
also conceded that the British plane "may through a navigational
error have accidentally crossed into the Eastern Zone of Germany
at some point." But he asserted that the plane was "actually
over our Zone when first and mortally fired upon."367
According to the Soviet account (Chuikov protest letter of
March 13), on the other hand, the Lincoln bomber was guilty of
a considerable violation of the border; "it penetrated 120
kilometers (72 miles). into the German Democratic Republic
territory". on the line Boizenburg-Parchin-Rostock.
The British plane was subjected to sustained attack by
the Soviet MiG's. According to the published account of the
incident, the main wreckage of the plane fell burning just
across the Elbe River, the zonal frontier, near the East
German town of Boizenburg; other debris dropped into the British
365 The New York Times, March 13, 1953.
366 The (Washington) Evening Star, March 13, 1953.
367 The New York Times, March 18, 1953. Mr. Churchill's account
contained what may'have been a discrepancy. Initial
'.i_^:.rmation on the incident had stated that the Lincoln
bomber was flying in the Hamburg-Berlin air corridor. Mr.
Churchill, however, stated that its prescribed course ran
parallel to the Soviet Zone boundary and forty miles on
the British side of it. As in initial accounts, Churchill
also stated that the plane was on a routine training flight,
adding that it was engaged in exercises of a kind which
had been carried out for eighteen months.
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263.
Zone on the west bank, about 30 miles southeast of Hamburg.
Two crewmen parachuted into British territory, but they, as
well as the single survivor who fell into Soviet hands, died
shortly thereafter, bringing the total death toll to seven,
the entire crew.
Significance
The occurrence of three air incidents.in Germany on the
same day, only two days after the shooting down of the U.S.
F-84 near the German-Czech border, immediately suggested that
the Soviet attacks were part of a pattern. And the firing
upon a U.S. RB-50 by Soviet MiG's off Kamchatka three days
later reinforced that speculation. The quick succession of
five incidents in five days -- perhaps an unprecedented
concentration of . such. incidents since World War II -- seemed
at first glance to point-to-a more. hostile Soviet attitude
on the part of Stalin's successors. than had been the case before
then..
0n. the, other hand, the Soviet government conveyed a
conciliatory attitude in its diplomatic handling of the
incidents, especially with respect to the British Lincoln bomber
shot down on March 12.. Not only did the Soviets invite the
three Western powers in Germany to an air-safety conference for
the ostensible purpose of eliminating similar incidents in the
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649
future, but the Soviet version of the-facts of the incidents
gave subtle indications of a possible modification of the
severe air-defense policy of the late Stalin era, 1950-1953.
The Air Incidents as an Indicator of New Soviet Policies
Str'in died on March 5, 1953. Among the first concrete
indications of his successors' outlook on foreign policy was
the unprecedented succession of air incidents in mid-March.
On the surface, the incidents seemed to betoken a new policy
of greater toughness and aggressiveness-on the part of the
new regime. However, it was not immediately clear, and perhaps
it never will be determined, whether the incidents were
deliberately'staged at this time, either for calculated effect
on the Western powers or,. possibly, as an assertion of communist
strength for internal purposes. The possibility cannot be
excluded that the timing of some or most of the incidents was
fortuitous. Although occurring so closely in time, these
incidents may have been isolated occurrences rather than part
of a deliberate policy of hostile pinpricks against the West.
The likelihood that the incidents indicated a tougher
attitude on the part of the new Soviet regime is much reduced
when it is recalled that, for several years preceding Stalin's
death, Soviet air-defense policy had been quite hostile. From
an intellige-ice standpoint, it is useful to consider systemati-
cally to what extent the five mid-March incidents can be
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365.
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accounted for in terms of the air-defense policy of the late
Stalin era. Such intelligence exercises are handicapped by
the difficulty of ascertaining the facts, and of knowing just
what was believed to have taken place by the Soviets, and, in
some cases, by Western personnel. With these difficulties in
mind, an analysis of the five incidents in the context of the
post-1950 severe Soviet policy yields the following alternative
interpretations:
1. The five mid-March incidents can.be explained In
large part by postulating no more than a
continuation of the air-defense policies of the late
Stalin era.
2. A small but quite probable increase in aggressiveness
was manifested by Soviet air defense. There may
have been a general order to Soviet military forces
issued by Stalin's succemors immediately after taking
over. This general order may have gone no further
than to enjoin defending forces to exercise special
vigilance in implementing standing instructions in
case of foreign encroachments of any kind. As a
result, border defense forces may have been more
sensitive to possible air violations, and, in case a
violation was thought to have occurred, they may have
implemented their instructions for military counter-
action somewhat more sharply and aggressively than
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66.
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3. It is unlikely that the new Soviet regime introduced
a substantially tougher air-defense policy; for
example, a policy calling on Soviet fighter planes
to violate common ground frontiers with the West in
order to harass Western planes. Rather is it likely
tr?t one result of the March incidents themselves may
have been the introduction of a somewhat less severe
Soviet air-defense policy than had been in effect
during Stalin's later years.
The data and reasoning on which these alternative inferences
are based are as follows below.
1. There is little difficulty in explaining several of
these mid-March air incidents in terms of the air-defense policy
of the late Stalin era.
The shooting down of the British Lincoln bomber, which
admittedly violated East German territory, was not without
precedent. Soviet fighters had fired with hostile intent, it
may be recalled, upon an Air France plane on April 27, 1952, and
upon a U.S. unmarked hospital plane on October 8, 1952. The
significance of those two incidents, particularly the first one,
in terms of the hostile policy behind them was not immediately
apparent because neither plane was shot down. The successful
implementation of hostile intent against the British Lincoln
bomber was, therefore, only a more dramatic and unmistakable
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67.
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manifestation of the same Soviet policy that gave rise to the
earlier incidents. Moreover, the impact on the West, was
especially great because this was the first Allied plane shot
down by the Soviets over Germany and because seven British
airmen lost their lives.
Several aspects of the British Lincoln-bomber incident,
on the other hand, remain obscure and may possibly indicate
a Soviet air-defense attitude even more severe than the one
in force when Stalin was alive. if, as alleged by the Soviets
(Chuikov note of March 13), the British plane had made a gross
violation of East German territory, then the Soviet hostile
action against it was in line with the two earlier actions in
1952. However, if, as claimed by the British, the Lincoln
bomber made only a minor violation, then it is possible that
the Soviet action was tougher than in the case of earlier
violations. (It may be recalled that, earlier, the Soviets
had seemed to assert the right of hostile action against air
intruders in Germany only in the event of "gross" violations;
minor violations had been frequent and had not encountered
hostile action.)
Secondly, considering that the British plane flew back
toward the British Zone and did not return fire, the Soviet
fighters pressed their attack against it in a highly aggressive
and ruthless fashion. In fact, according to an account of-
the incident given by Winston Churchill, the Soviet fighters
pursued the British plane across the border and finally downed
it on the British side of the boundary. The question naturally
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arises, therefore, whether the Soviets were asserting the right
of "hot pursuit." That they were doing so is not very likely,
however, in view of the possibility that the Soviet fighters
unknowingly pursued the British plane for a short distance into
the British Zone. .t is perhaps significant, too, that the
Soviet note on t`- incident not only did not assert the right
of hot pursuit; it also did not even admit that Soviet planes
crossed into the British Zone..
The Kamchatka incident of March 15 is even more easily
accounted for on the basis of the late-Stalin-era policy toward
air intruders and close perimeter flights.368 While this
appears to have been the first incident of its kind in the
Kamchatka area, 3b9 U.S. planes venturing close to Soviet
territorial waters elsewhere had been subjected to hostile fire
on many previous occasions. Some of these earlier incidents,
especially those resulting in fatalities, had been publicized.
Hence, even if the Soviet MiG's went beyond their twelve-mile
territorial-waters limit to attack the U.S. RB-50, as claimed
by official U.S. accounts, this would probably not signify an
intensification of the late-Stalin-era practice; for, available
information on earlier incidents strongly suggests that the
Soviets had tended to interpret the twelve-mile limit liberally
368 See case study No. 104..
369 According to a USAF srokesman (The Washington Post, March
18 1953) there had been prior Soviet attempts at
interception of, though no previous attacks on U.S.
flights in this area. Therefore, this may well have been
the first occasion on which Soviet MiG's actually had the
opportunity to intercept and fire upon planes in the
Kamchatka and Northwest Pacific area.
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69.
in challenging unidentified planes, especially those thought
to be engaged in hostile reconnaissance. Finally, it may be
noted, an incident of this type -- which did not result in
fatalities -- would not normally have been publicized by U.S.
sources. In this case, special considerations evidently
dictated a public disclosure of the incident.370 Otherwise
the incident', a "routine" one from both the Soviet and U.S.
standpoints, would not have been available for public speculation
concerning the motives of the new Soviet regime.
2. Despite the discussion immediately above, there remain
several of the mid-March air incidents that cannot be easily
subsumed under the late-Stalin-era policy. Rather do they
indicate a slight increase in the aggressiveness with which the
Stalin-period policy was applied.
Of the five mid-March incidents, the shooting down of the
U.S. F-84-by Czech MiG's over northern Bavaria is the one which
is most likely to have been the result of a special top-level
political decision to intensify hostile policy toward foreign
planes.371 Available information suggests that the Czech
planes must have knowingly crossed into Bavaria in order to
down the U.S. F-84, which did not commit any violation. If this
is the case, the incident has no precedent in Stalin-era
incidents. Earlier instances in which Soviet planes may have
370 These are discussed in case study No. 104.
371 See case study No. 102.
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deliberately gone out of their way to attack Allied planes took
place over international waters, never over Allied-controlled
territory.
On the other hand, the. significance of the F-84 incident
in this respect may be s:mewhat less great than appears at first
glance. Even if deliberately staged by the Czechs over the U.S.
Zone of Germany, the. incident seems to have been an individual
action in line with late-Stalin-era developments. For such an
incident was clearly foreshadowed by Czech air actions during
1952; and, in fact, an explicit diplomatic warning to U.S.
officials by the Czech government, in November, 1952, stated that
thenceforth intruding planes would be forced to land and would
be shot down if they resisted. Therefore, an incident of this
character may have been planned for some time to demonstrate
that the diplomatic warning was not mere bluff. The staging of
the incident over the U.S. Zone may have been necessary for
technical purposes, i.e., the difficulty of making an interception
against fast-flying jets which actually do violate the border
briefly.372
Yet the possibility cannot be excluded that the timing of
the F-84 incident was indeed connected with post-Stalin policy
calculations. The political exploitation given the incident
by the Czech government lends some support to this possibility.
Thus, in addition to its rather obvious intention of dissuading
372 See case study No. 102.
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the United States from continuing border flights (a long-
standing Czech concern), the incident may have had the more
general political purpose of demonstrating the vigilance of
the Czech communist government to any effort at outside
intervention following Stalin' s death.
In the last analysis, however, whatever the relationship
of the F-84 incident to post-Stalin communist foreign policy,
the Czech action appears to have been an isolated one taken on
the basis of special instructions. It does not seem likely that
standing instructions were issued to Czech air-defense forces
calling for similar hostile action against any and all possible
air intruders.
The third incident over Germany, on March 12, 1953, also
does not easily fit the late-Stalin-era pattern for treatment of
alleged air intruders. In that case, the British commercial
plane, a Viking, admittedly violated the southern Berlin air
corridor. The depth of the penetration into East German territory
was not given by either side, the Soviet account contenting itself
with the charge that the Viking flew a distance of about 150
kilometers outside of the corridor "in the direction of
Soemmerda, Naumburg and Leipzig.K373
According to British accounts, the Viking was fired upon
not directly but for purposes of warning. (Official protest
notes to the Soviets implied a more sober view of the nature of
373 Chuikov letter, March 19, 1953.
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the fire to which the plane was subjected, but this may have
been for purposes of diplomatic emphasis. The Soviet account
did not explicitly admit the firing; it stated merely that the
British plane had been "warned by generally customary signals"
from Soviet patrol aircraft.
4
not at all customary for violations of the Berlin air corridors.37
The possibility suggests itself, therefore, that the action
against the Viking was taken on the basis of a new, post-Stalin
directive requiring that warning fire be directed against Allied
aircraft making minor violations of the air corridors. This
inference would not hold if it turned out that the British
plane had made what the Soviets considered to be a gross
violation. In that event, the most likely explanation would be
that the Soviet air-defense command in Germany did not in that
instance apply the full penalty for gross violations
forcing or shooting down the offending plane -- because the
Lincoln bomber had been shot down just five hours earlier. (It
is possible that Soviet air-defense instructions in Germany in
the late Stalin era called for avoiding more than one fatal
incident within a given time period and for resorting to warning
374 Quadripartite air regulations, dating back to 1946, forbade
resort to fire for any purpose in the. case of suspected
violations. As far as is known, despite the Soviet
reference to "customar"" .arning signals, this was the
first occasion on which the Soviets referred to such a
practice. It was also one of the few cases, if not the
first, on which they resorted to warning fire to signal a
plane back into the.corridor.
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fire as a substitute. This latter possibility seems more likely
than a new, post-Stalin policy calling for warning fire against
minor air-corridor violations.)
Even more ambiguous than the two incidents discussed above
was the first of the three incidents over Germany on March 12.
The Soviet and Allied accounts of this incident are so
contradictory that it is not even clear that they refer to the
same air encounter. According to the Allied account, a British
Lincoln bomber-(not the one shot down a few hours later) was
subjected to a mock attack by two MiG's over Kassel, which is
well inside of West German territory. The Soviets denied that
any of.their planes had been over Kassel and, instead, referred
to a "violation" of the southern air corridor by a British plane
of the York type. The Soviet account alleged a penetration of
fifteen kilometers (9.3 miles) and stated that "customary warning
signals" had been given by intercepting Soviet aircraft in order
to direct the York plane back into the corridor.375 Whether,
as in the Viking incident later in the same day, the "customary
warning signals" had taken the form of warning fire, it is not
possible to say. Neither the British nor the Soviet account of
this incident mentioned that the Soviet aircraft had fired on
the Lincoln -- or York -- plane.
A Soviet "mock attack" on the British plane over Kassel,
with or without warning fire, could be interpreted as indicating
375 Chuikov letter, March 19, 1953.
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an even more extensive air-defense policy.than that of the late
Stalin era, if we assume that Soviet planes in question knowingly
violated the border. If this interpretation is true, it would
appear that post-Stalin directives authorized air forays across
the borders within Germany, even though these foreign forays
may have been limited to nonhostile action. On the other hand,
in the Soviet version, the incident was portrayed in a more
conventional and less aggressive way, in terms that were more
in keeping with Stalin-era policies.
Also, in inviting the British to an air-safety conference,
the Soviet note of March 19 referred cryptically to "the
present speeds of aircraft" (presumably jets) as making such
talks expedient.376 Since only Soviet jets had been involved
in the three incidents of March 12, it is possible that the
allusion in question was intended as an indirect explanation or
excuse for boundary transgressions that may have been committed
by Soviet MiG's in pursuing the ill-fated Lincoln bomber into
the British Zone and in coming over Kassel in the earlier mock
attack againstanother British plane. In other words, the Soviet
reference in this context to "present speeds of aircraft" may
376 The relevant passage in Chuikov's letter of March 19 to the
British High Commissioner reads as follows: "In view of
the need to safeguard in the future the safety of aircraft
during flights, and to remove further misunderstandings in
this connection, I express the wish that an appropriate
conference by competent militA*y representatives of the
USSR and Great Britain might meet in Berlin. Such a
conference seems to me all the more useful, inasmuch as the
present speeds of aircraft would make it expedient to discuss
and resolve jointly concrete measures aimed at guaranteeing
the observance.of the regulations laid down for the aircraft,
and thus preventing undesirable air incidents."
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have been a veiled assurance to the Western powers that its own
air violations on March 12 -- which, characteristically, it
would not openly acknowledge -- did not signify a new, more
aggressive air policy on its'part.
3. In sum, if "indeed there was a shift toward a tougher
air policy under new Soviet leadership immediately following
Stalin's death, such a shift was not as far-reaching as the
concatenation of air incidents in mid-March seemed to indicate.
To some extent, these incidents were fortuitous and unrelated;
that is, some of them probably occurred in implementation of
Soviet air-defense instructions which had been in force for some
time prior to Stalin's death. A few of the incidents -- or,
at least, their more bellicose aspects -- may have reflected
a general directive by the new regime to its armed forces calling
for greater vigilance and more energetic implementation of
standing defense instructions. But the possibility cannot be
excluded that the new regime also put into effect new and
somewhat more forward measures for dealing with minor air
violations over Germany. It is also possible that the Czech
action against the U.S. F-84 was intended in part as a
demonstration of communist willingness to resort to military
force in order to defend the Satellite countries against any
excursions which the U.S. might initiate for purposes of probing
and exploiting post-Stalin confusion and weaknesses.
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Possible Modification of Air-Defense Policy of
Late Stalin Era
As actions, the mid-March air incidents conveyed an
unmistakably tough Soviet attitude, possibly going beyond that
previously displayed toward alleged air intruders in the late
Stalin era. However, the subsequent diplomatic handling of the
incidents by the new Soviet regime gave quite a different
impression of their attitude.
There are several possible explanations of the striking
difference between the severity of the actions themselves and
the conciliatory tone and content of Soviet diplomatic
communications on the matter of the incidents. The hypothesis
favored by the.present.writer is as follows: The severe (late
Stalin era) air-defbnse policy was in effect for a short while
following Stalin's death in early March. This policy may have
been further toughened, intentionally or unwittingly, by
instructions issued by the new regime in the days immediately
after Stalin's death. However, the new Soviet leaders were
disagreeably surprised by the rash of air incidents in mid-March,
and were concerned over the political consequences of the
incidents.' These incidents, especially the shooting down of
the British Lincoln bomber, may have pressed upon the new regime,
heretofore preoccupied with other problems, the necessity for
immediate reconsideration of the old air-defense policy in order
to bring it in line with the general :._.:tica] shift toward the
"softer" policy toward the West which was probably already being
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considered and was about ready to unfold. Indeed, the unique
Soviet expression of regret that British lives were lost in the
Lincoln-bomber incident and the invitation to engage in
discussions aimed at preventing similar incidents in the future
were among the first in a series of conciliatory gestures
toward the West on the part of the new regime.
This hypothesis finds support in the following considerations:
A. Soviet diplomatic communications on the mid-March
incidents yield evidence of unprecedented concern over the impact
of such actions on Western audiences.
In earlier, fatal air incidents, in which hostile Soviet
intent was completely successful, a highly stereotyped version
of the incidents was given in Soviet diplomatic communications:
the allegedly intruding plane was intercepted by Soviet fighters
and asked to land; the intruding plane not only failed to comply
with this request but opened fire on the Soviet planes, which
were therefore obliged to return fire.377 The basic stereotype,
it may be noted, itself contains a justification of Soviet
resort to fire -- i.e., the allegation that the intruding plane
377
This stereotype, applied in amended form to cases in which
the foreign plane escaped total destruction, was closely
patterned on Soviet air-defense instructions publicly
disclosed on several occasions. According to these
instructions, when a violation occurs, Soviet airmen are
to "force" the intruding plane to land on Soviet territory
and, "in the event of resistance, to open fire on it."
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refused to land and opened fire. The extent to which additional
justificatory details are added to this stereotype, it is
postulated here, provides a convenient and probably reliable
barometer of the degree of concern felt by Soviet leaders as to
the possible political impact and consequ?.ces of their action.378
The extent to which justificatory d'tail was added to the
Soviet note on the ill-fated British Lincoln bomber was
unprecedented. Thus, according to the Soviet account, the
British plane was intercepted and asked to land (only) after it
"continued to fly further into German Democratic Republic
territory," that is, after having already made a gross violation.
As in the basic stereotype, the Soviet. account further alleged
that the British plane fired first, but Soviet fighters
responded to this (only) with warning fire; they fired directly
at the British plane only when it continued to fire upon them.
Further, in an unprecedented effort to lend credibility to the
claim that the British plane had fired its guns, the Soviet note
claimed that armaments and "used cartridges" had been found in
the wreck of the British plane.
The Soviet version of the Kamchatka incident also contained
unusual justifications of the Soviet action. Thus, it was
allegedly (only) the second violation of Kamchatka territory by
the U.S. B-50 to which Soviet air defense reacted. The Soviet
378 This plat is further developed in RAND Research Memorandum
RM-1348 "Intelligence Value of Soviet Notes on Air
Incidents, 1950-1953" (CONFIDENTIAL).
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note implied, further, that the Soviet counteraction against the
B-50 took place (only?) because its violation of Kamchatka was
"clearly premeditated" and not accidental.
B. Soviet diplomatic communications on the mid-March
incidents also indicated a reluctance on the part of the new
regime to subscribe publicly to the severe air-defense policy
of April, 1950 to March, 1953,
The changes in diplomatic phraseology introduced at this
time may have been intended merely to propitiate the Western
powers and to minimize the possibility that they might directly
challenge Soviet air-defense policy as such.
On the other hand, these verbal changes may also have been
intended to veil a real modification of Soviet air-defense
policy, a modification quickly decided upon by the new regime
in Moscow following the tension-producing Lincoln-bomber
incident of March 12.
The indications found in Soviet diplomatic communications
are admittedly inconclusive as regards a real change in air
policy. These clues should be crosschecked, of course, against
other types of information on Soviet air-defense policy
following Stalin's death. The possibility of a veiled
modification of Soviet air-defense policy should be given
careful consideration. For there would be important advantages
from the Soviet standpoint to carrying out such a modification
unilaterally, without explicitly and formally disclosing the
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retreat. Not only would a veiled modification spare the Soviets
a cold-war defeat, but, in the absence of any overt or formal
commitment to a more moderate air-defense policy, the Soviets,
would be unencumbered should they wish on some future occasion
to reintroduce severe air-defense measures.
On three earlier occasions, after shooting down Western
planes, the Soviet government, in official diplomatic communi-
cations, explicitly disclosed what were purportedly its standing
instructions to Soviet air-defense forces.379 In no case.after
Stalin's death, however, have these standing instructions been
repeated in full.
In the British Lincoln-bomber case, the Soviet note
reproduced these instructions only in part, saying tkat the
British plane had been requested to land,""according to
regulations of the Soviet Air Force...." Omitted, however, was
the more offensive provision that if, when requested to land,
an intruding plane "resisted," Soviet fighters were to fire
upon it. Since the Soviet note in question was issued after the
strong British reaction to the incident, the omission Just noted
may have reflected an awareness by the new Soviet leaders of the
desirability of moderating the old policy, or at least a certain
indecision on their part as to the wisdom of reasserting
publicly the severe air policy of the late Stalin era.
Since the British Lincoln-bomber case, the Soviets have not
made an explicit statement of their air-defense instructions.
379 These three occasions were the Baltic incident of April 8,
1950 the Swedish Catalina incident of June 16, 1952 and
the M. RB-29 incident off Hokkaido on October 7, 152.
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Therefore, it is appropriate to examine closely the Soviet
version of the facts of subsequent air incidents for any possible
clues as to a modification in the earlier air-defense policy.
Several days after the Soviet note on the British Lincoln-
bomber incident -- presumably after additional reflection as to
the desirability of continuing the earlier air-defense policy --
Soviet authorities issued a second note. This referred to all
three incidents of March 12 over Germany and, in doing so,
introduced an entirely new diplomatic phraseology. In describing
the action of Soviet fighters in the two nonfatal incidents of
March 12, the Soviet note said nothing about a "request to land"
to the allegedly intruding British aircraft, a phrase which had
been connected with the earlier hostile Soviet air-defense policy.
Instead, the Soviet note stated that the two British planes in
question had been given "customary warning signals," presumably
to get them to rectify their error. As a matter of fact, despite
the reference to "customary" on this occasion, to give warning
signals was not customary Soviet behavior in such cases, as
has been noted above. Therefore, from the new diplomatic
phraseology on this occasion we may tentatively infer that a new
nonhostile policy was being introduced, and that the term
"customary" was simply a device for veiling or blurring the
change.
Several days later, in giving its version of the facts of
the Kamchatka incident, the. Soviet government avoided altogether
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the earlier stereotype which, as noted above, it had only partly
reproduced in the British Lincoln-bomber case. This time the
Soviet note did not even state that the Soviet fighters which
intercepted the U.S. plane asked it to land. The last remnant
of the stereotype associated with the severe air-defense policy
of the late Stalin era was abandoned.
Similar indications of a real, though veiled, modification
of Soviet air-defense policy appeared in the Soviet diplomatic
version of the B-50 incident of July 29, 1953, off Vladivostok.380
C. Accounts made public thus far on the four-power air-
safety talks held in Berlin strengthen the impression derived
from Soviet diplomatic communications that the new Soviet leaders
were disposed to make a real modification of the earlier air-
defense policy, at least with respect to air violations over
Germany.381 The talks were held under conditions of secrecy.
It was evident from public accounts, however, that the Soviet
negotiators were attempting to get as much as possible from the
three Western powers in return for any commitment to modify
their practices.
Agreement was reported between the Soviets and the Western
powers on a system of signaling between planes. If a plane
deviated slightly from its authorized air space, it was to be
shepherded back to its air lane. If a plane should trespass too
380 a-- ..., .._ _a..a.. ?r_ It 11 1
The major source used here is the summary account of the
negotiations in the New York Times, September 21, 1953.
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deeply, both sides were reported as agreeing that it should be
ordered to land. One of the points which remained at issue
was to define more exactly when a plane would be considered too
far off course and when only slightly so. The Russians,
according to the account in the New York Times, apparently
wanted to leave this undefined. The Times did not comment on
the advantages that would accrue to the Soviets if they were free
to decide when a gross deviation was being made.
On the important question of whether gunfire was to be
permitted as a means of signaling, the Times account reported
that in the new system the Russians "appear" to have renounced
gunfire for this purpose.
Theretas no mention in the Times report of what would or
could happen if a plane accused of a violation did not obey
signals to land. The air-defense policy of the late Stalin era,
it may be recalled, asserted that "in case of resistance" an
intruding plane which did not obey a request to land Was to be
fired upon.
At one stage, the Soviet negotiators proposed that the
three 20-mile-wide air corridors theii in use be consolidated
into one broader air corridor. The ostensible reason for the
change, as given by the Soviets, was that this would reduce the
likelihood of air violations and of.incidents. If the Soviet
proposal were accepted, however, it would reduce opportunities
available to the Allies to observe East Germany from the air
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corridors. This was probably a concealed motive behind the
Soviet proposal. In any event, the Western powers were reported
as having apparently rejected the Soviet proposal for a single
corridor on the ground that.itwould lengthen flight routes.
104. U.S. RB-50 FIRED UPON J 2SOVIET MIG'S
OFF KAMCHATKA
(March 15, 1953)
On March 15, 1953, a U.S. RB-50 was fired upon by a Soviet
MIG off the Siberian peninsula of Kamchatka. The RB=50
returned fire and took evasive action; the MiG,.one of two which
made the interception, broke off the attack. Neither plane was
damaged.
According to the official U.S. Air Force announcement, the
incident took place 25 miles east of Kamchatka. The RB-50 was
said to have been on a routine weather reconnaissance mission.
According to an official spokesman, such missions are regularly
flown into the same general area where the RB-50 was attacked.383
The attack took place in daylight, at 12:30 p.m. (local
time in Kamchatka area).
The incident was initially disclosed by the U.S. Air Force
on March 17. Announcement of the incident was delayed, it was
explained by Pentagon spokesmen, until the Department of State
could be notified.
382 This study utilizes only public accounts of the incident.
The interpretation, however, draws upon classified materials.
383 The New York Times March 18, 1953. See also detailed
account or incident given by the pilot of the RB-50,
Washington Evening Star, March 18, 1953.
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The attack was officially protested by the U.S. on March
18.384 A Soviet note of March 21 rejected the U.S. protest as
without foundation and gave a different version of the incident.
Alleging that the RB-50 had violated Soviet territory and had
opened fire, the Soviet note called upon the U.S. government
to prevent further occurrences of this type.385 On March 24,
a State Department press statement rejected the Soviet account
as a "fabrication" and reiterated the position taken in the U.S.
note of March 18.386 There has been no further diplomatic
exchange on the matter.
Significance
Soviet Motive
Coming shortly after a series of air incidents in Germany,
ti .
the present incident reinforced speculation that-a new,air
policy: had been adopted by the Soviet leaders who succeeded
Stalin.
The Kamchatka incident, however, hardly constitutes an
indication of changes in Soviet air policy or of post-Stalin
political maneuvers. For similar incidents had occurred on
many occasions in the Stalin era. U.S. planes venturing close
to Soviet territorial waters had, for some years, been subjected
384 Ml,- u..... v_~.i~ ma _,. _ ~?.. -_i n I nr~
-'%O%' The New York Times, March 25, 1953.
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to hostile interception, i.e., they had been shot at and
sometimes downed.
Such incidents had not previously occurred off Kamchatka,
however. According to a USAF spokesman, Soviet attempts at
interception of U.S. planes had occurred in this area, but US.
planes had not actually been attacked..387 Therefore, this may
well have been the first occasion on which Soviet MiG's had a
good opportunity to fire upon U.S. planes in this area. The
attack took place in good weather and visibility.
The facts of the encounter were, as often in previous
cases, disputed by the contestants. The official U.S. account
held that the RB-50 was no closer than 25 miles to Kamchatka.
But this, in itself, does not signify a departure from the
Stalin air-defense policy. Even if the Soviet MiG's ventured
beyond the 12-mile territorial-waters limit claimed by the
Soviet government to attack the RB-50, this would not signify
a departure from Stalin-era policy and practice. Even in
previous incidents it is likely that the Soviets interpreted
broadly their claimed 12-mile territorial-waters limit in
challenging unidentified planes, especially those thought to
be engaged in hostile reconnaissance.
It is most likely that the Soviet attack upon the RB-50
in this instance resulted from operational implementation of
387 The Washington Post March 18, 1953. Hanson Baldwin
added that Soviet M~G's had been encountered on both
of the Arctic flanks off the Kamchatka and Chukotsk
Peninsula in Siberia, and directly across the Norwegian
frontier near Murmansk (The New York Times, March 22,
1953).
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long-standing and familiar air-defense instructions. Its
occurrence shortly after Stalin's death and in conjunction with
a series of air incidents over Germany probably was purely
fortuitous.388
U.S. Disclosure Policy
If the United States had not disclosed this incident on March
17, it is likely that the Soviets themselves would not have
taken the initiative to protest or disclose it.
This judgment is based on a careful analysis of disclosure
practices followed by the United States and the Soviet Union in
previous air-border clashes. Generally speaking, the Soviets
protest an air violation -- that is, taken the initiative in
doing so -- only as a substitute for military counteraction
against the intruding plane. Where Soviet forces do take some
military action against an intruding plane, the Soviet government
does not protest diplomatically as a general rule, unless the
incident is first publicized by U.S. (or Allied) sources. The
rule of thumb followed by the Soviets, therefore, appears to
be as follows: actions not only speak louder than words, but
they are preferable to words; and words are not needed when
action itself coneys the Soviet attitude toward violation of
what the U.S.S.R. conceives to be its rights or interests.
This Soviet.approach to disclosure is not always immediately
evident to the outside observer, however, because it usually
388 See also case studies Nos. 103 and 111.
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happens that U.S. sources promptly disclose air incidents. The
present case is of some value for confirming the hypothesis
regarding Soviet attitudes toward disclosure in that, on this
occasion, U.S. disclosure of the incident took place only after
some delay. Presumably, had the Soviets had some special reason
for making a diplomatic protest and/or publicizing the incident.
they would have had time enough to do so in this case before the
U.S. announcement was finally made. There have been cases in
which the Soviets filed a diplomatic protest on the day following
the air incident. The fact that they took no such action in
this case supports the thesis that, especially in air encounters
where, as in the present case, neither side suffers mortal loss,
the Soviets do not take the initiative in making disclosure,
either via diplomatic or via propaganda communications.
The preceding background information on Soviet disclosure
policy would have been relevant in deciding whether the United
States should initiate public disclosure of the Kamchatka
incident. According to the press, the Pentagon and the State
Department differed on the advisability of making a public
announcement of-the incident:
The State Department had the bare facts of the
Kamchatka clash early Monday LMarch 167, it was
learned, and advised caution in announcing the
event because neither the attacking MiG-15 nor
the defending B-50 s 5ered human casualties or
any apparent damage.
389 The (Washington) Evening Star, March 18, 1953.
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89.
Other considerations motivating the State Department's
recommendation, as summarized by the Star, were as follows:
(1) Silence by Washington might help to smoke
out Russian intentions. (2) Publicity could
weaken the psychological impact of the strong
United States and British protests in recent
days over the unopposed shooting down of two
allied aircraft over Germany.39()
However, the Star account continued, "The Pentagon won
the decision to announce the Kamchatka affair...after maintaining
the military view that it would be better to get out the factual
story before Moscow could use a perverted version for propaganda
purposes or to exert diplomatic pressure."391
The expectation that Moscow might take the initiative in
making public disclosure, however, did not take into account the
pattern and attitudes implicit in Moscow's handling of ear23er
incidents. The expectation held by the Pentagon, according to
the press account cited, would have been justified only if
there had been some basis for assuming that Moscow might have
unusual reasons in that case for wanting to publicize the
incident. The Star's account of the Pentagon's views is not
illuminating in this respect, but it is possible independently.
to think of one or two special considerations which might have
led Moscow in this instance to violate its own rule (or habit)
of not initiating disclosure. Thus, Moscow might have reasoned
that the flight of the RB-50, so close to Siberia and so far
390 The (Washington) Evening Star, March 18, 1953.
391 Ibid.
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.
from U.S. territory, would provide excellent propaganda material
for discrediting the United States and for countering any
unfortunate impression created by the then recent shooting down
by communist planes of the U.S. F-84 and the British Lincoln
bomber over Germany. Such propaganda would have been effective,
it might have been thought, since Moscow could plausibly have
charged that the RB-50 was engaged in reconnaissance of Soviet
territory.
The full significance of the U.S. decision to initiate
disclosure emerges only in noting that, for .a case of this type,
disclosure was unusual also for the United States.392 An
exception to U.S. disclosure policy was apparently made in this
instance because of considerations growing out of the immediately
preceding air incidents in Germany.
Soviet Handling of Incident
As already noted, the Soviets did not make any mention of
the incident until disclosure was made by the United States.
Thereupon, the Soviet government issued a note on March 21
protesting the action of the RB-50. The Soviets did not
publicize their own note, however, until March 23. The note
was then broadcast thirty-five times on various Moscow radio
beams but without comment, a pattern of publicity not at variance
392 For elaboration and documentation of this point see RAND
Research Memorandum RM-1346 (TOP SECRET).
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with that observed in cases of previous notes of this character.393
The Soviet note presented an account of the incident which,
as usual, contradicted the U.S. version at all important points.
The RB-50 (referred-to in the Soviet note as a "B-2911) was
alleged to have made two consecutive violations of the Kamchatka
peninsula. As far as can be made out from information contained
in the Soviet note, the first violation was a minor one indeed.
The "B-29" was alleged to have flown 15 to 17 kilometers (9.3
to 10.5 miles) "from the edge of the shore" (i.e., over the water)
for a total distance of up to 70 kilometers. Since the
territorial-waters limit claimed by the Soviets is twelve miles,
a flight which penetrated that limit by only two or three miles
is a minor violation even from the Soviet point of view.
The extent and duration of the second alleged violation
was not indicated. The Soviet note merely stated that the
"B-29" this time "violated the State frontier of the U.S.S.R.
northeast of the town of Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka in the
area of the village of Zhupanovo." (The latter town is also
on the coast.) Thus, the Soviet account leaves vague the
question of whether the second alleged violation involved a
deeper penetration than the'first.
Soviet aircraft were evidently sent up to investigate the
first alleged violation and, according to the Soviet note,
393 FBIS, Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts, April 1,
1953; CONFIDENTIAL.
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"approached the American bomber aircraft" when it was making its
second violation. The American plane thereupon "opened fire,"
and one of the Soviet fighters "for the purpose of self-defense...
had to open fire, after which the infringing aircraft turned
arourx, left the Soviet coast and disappeared in an eastern
direction."
It is interesting that the account of the encounter given
by the Soviets in this instance deviates from the diplomatic
stereotype employed in cases when U.S. planes were shot down.
Only a minor violation was alleged in this case, whereas U.S.
planes which have been shot down have always been charged with
gross violations. Similarly, in this case the Soviet note
omitted the usual claim that the Soviet planes first asked the
intruding plane to land. These deviations from the stereotype
may be due, simply to the fact that the U.S. plane was not shot
down, but they may also have more far-reaching significance as
an indicator of a milder Soviet air policy.394
The reference to "visual reconnaissance" carried out by
the U.S. plane was, from a propaganda standpoint, quite restrained.
The Soviets did not take advantage of the opportunity provided by
the Kamchatka incident to discredit the United States or to
bolster their own position in the dispute then underway over
air incidents in Germany.
The Soviet note may be regarded in fact as a purely routine
protest which, we have hypothesized, would probably not have
394 Cf. case study No. 103.
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been issued at all had not the United States made initial
public disclosure of the incident.
105. ALLEGED AIR DROP OF U.S.
ESPIONAGE AGENTS INTO THE UKRAINE
(April 25-26, 1953)
On May 27, 1953, TASS announced the apprehension and
execution of four U.S. espionage agents who were said to have
been parachuted into the Ukraine on the night of April 25-26.
According to the TASS report, the Soviet Ministry of Home Affairs
had received data that same night about the overflight of the
Ukraine by a foreign aircraft of unknown country of origin. Two
of the agents, said to have been arrested on*April 27, were
reported to have told Soviet authorities that they had been
parachuted from an American four-engined aircraft without
identification marks.
The TASS report in many ways paralleled the December 19,
1951, announcement concerning American spies arested in the
Moldavian Republic. The account of the present case, however,
differed from that of the earlier one in including the charge
that an American aircraft violated Soviet frontiers, in the
specificity with which American espionage schools and teachers
were named, and in the specificity with which the items of
their espionage equipment were enumerated.395
395 FBIS Survey of U.S.S.R. Broadcasts, May 28, 1953, p. 10;
CONFIDENTIAL.
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The TASS announcement was widely broadcast by Radio Moscow,
and was carried by most central newspapers.396 A month later,
the story was revived and exploited propagandistically for
purposes of a domestic "vigilance" campaign.397
106. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF HUNGARIAN AIR SPACE BY
FOREIGN PLANE DROPPING HOSTILE PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS
(June 30, 1953)
On June 30, 1953, a-Hungarian broadcast (in English to
North America) alleged that the air space of Hungary had been
violated recently "when a foreign plane crossed our borders
and dropped printed leaflets over some villages in Vas county."
The leaflets were said to have "slandered Hungary, censured the
People's Democratic system, and called for sabotage."
As far as is known, the alleged air violation and propaganda-
leaflet operation were not publicized in Hungarian domestic news
media,-nor were they protested diplomatically by the Hungarian
government to any foreign government.
The alleged propaganda operation was indirectly attributed
to the U.S. government in the Hungarian broadcast by a reference
"in this connection" to a Viennese report on alleged "subversive
396 FBIS, Survey of U.S.S.R. Broadcasts, May 28, 1953, p. 10;
CONFIDENTIAL.
397 Ibid., June 25, 1953, P. 13. See also ibid., June 11 1953,
p. 10; July 23, 1953, p. 11; and FBIS, Radio Propaganda
Report, "New Soviet Treatment of Emigres and Western Agents,"
CD.8, June 25, 1954; CONFIDENTIAL.
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95.
activities" carried out by Americans against the Peoples'
Democracies. The Hungarian broadcast. made specific mention
of a leaflet in Hungarian, "calling for sabotage and terrorism,"
.which was said to have been dropped from a plane accidentally
over Austria.
No mention was made in the Hungarian broadcast of any
effort at military counteraction against the unidentified plane.
Nor was there any threat of future Hungarian military action
in the event of similar violations of Hungarian air space.398
107. DANISH PLANE IN FORCED LANDING IN EAST GERMANY
:_. , (July 6, 1953)
The New York Times of July 8, 1953, reported that two
Danish businessmen and their light plane were released by
Soviet authorities at the zonal border forty-eight hours after
they had lost their way and landed in East Germany.
108. SOVIET PROTEST OF ALLEGED U. S. LEAFLET DROPS
OVER 'SOVIET AIRFIELDS NEAR BERLIN
(July 18, 1953)
On July 18, 1953, following repeated charges that the
United States was responsible for the June 17 riots in East
398 FBIS, Dail Report, July 1, 1953; The Washington Post,
July 1, 1953.
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Germany, Soviet High Commissioner Vladimir S. Semyenov sent a
written note to U.S. High Commissioner James B. Conant protesting
against air-leaflet drops over Soviet airfields near Berlin.
The Soviet note was publicly disclosed the evening of the same
day by ADN, the official East German news agency.399 However,
Soviet media do not appear to have rebroadcast the note or
publicized the matter.
The Soviet note charged that, almost daily in the previous
two weeks, U.S. aircraft of the C-47 type had grossly violated
flying regulations by circling, at a very low-altitude (50 to
100 meters), around the Soviet airfields of Werneuchen and Elstal.
These flights were held to constitute a serious threat to the
air safety both of Soviet aircraft and of transport planes of the
United States, Great Britain, and France flying between Berlin
and West Germany.
Then, in a separate paragraph, the Soviet note drew
attention to the fact. that the U.S. planes in question had dropped
leaflets containing hostile attacks against the Soviet forces
over the Soviet airfields. "It is a matter of course," observed
the note, "that the Soviet military authorities cannot tolerate
this." No more explicit threat of military countermeasures was
made in the Soviet note.
There was no indication in the Soviet note, nor in any
other available sources, that the Soviets had taken any military
399 FBIS, Daily Report, July 20, 1953.
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countermeasures against the'alleged leaflet operation. According
to the New York Times of July 19, 1953, both the Soviet airfields
in question are within the authorized operating area for Allied
planes -- i.e., within a twenty-mile radius of the Allied
headquarters building in downtown Berlin. This would certainly
account for the omission from the Soviet note of a charge that
an air violation of East German territory had taken place.
Rather, as noted above, the alleged leaflet operation was
.protested on the grounds that it constituted an air-safety hazard.
But it is not possible to say whether, for the same reason, the
Soviets did not take hostile military action against the leaflet
planes.
Soviet public disclosure of their protest may have been
motivated in part by a desire to bring the matter to the
attention of British and French authorities, as well as to the
public. By representing alleged U.S. air-leaflet operations as
entailing a hazard to the safety of British and French -- as
well as Soviet and U.S. -- aircraft, and by depicting the United
States as engaged in covert propaganda activities likely to
entail an intensification of the "cold war," the Soviets may
have believed that the issue would help isolate the United
States from its allies.
At the time of writing, no public announcement has been
made of an official U.S. reply to the Soviet note. The immediate
reaction of a U.S. official in Berlin (Cecil B. Lyon), as
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reported in the press, was to reject the Soviet charge as
untrue.400
109. CZECH DIPLOMATIC PROTEST AGAINST
U.S. PROPAGANDA BALLOONS
(July 20, 1953)
A Czech note of July 20, 1953, to the U.S. government
protested that balloons carrying propaganda leaflets had
recently been sent over Czechoslovakia from West Germany.401
The leaflets were said to be "of an inflamatory character...
aimed at creating unrest among the population... and of inciting
it to activities against the Z_Czech7 State." The Czech note
did not refer explicitly to the "Crusade for Freedom," but
mentioned "U.S. citizens specially sent to Germany for this
purpose."
It is noteworthy that the Czech protest against the
propaganda balloons was not based on,the grounds that this
activity constituted a violation of Czech air space. Rather,
the Czech note held that for the U.S. authorities to permit
such activities in their zone of Germany was a "gross abuse of
the United States' position as an occupying power, incompatible
with the Four-Power agreements on Germany." The propaganda
activity in question was also denounced in the Czech note as
400 TV_ _i1 - -1_ - -- _1 T__ 7 __ %^ %^F-1
T".' FBIS, Daily Report, July 20 and 21, 1953?
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99.
designed to hamper the relaxation of international tension "at
a time when the nations of the world are intensifying their
efforts to strengthen peace and to secure international
cooperation."
The Czech note concluded with.a request that the Czech
government be informed by the U.S. government of "steps taken
to prevent similar provocations, aimed against peaceful
relations among nations and constituting gross interference in
the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia...."
The Czech note was disclosed to the Czech public on the
following day, July 21, 1953. But the subject of propaganda
balloons had been discussed in Czech domestic propaganda 'several
days earlier. 402 The contention that the leaflets in question
were ineffective, and had even backfired, was given a minor
position in the-Czech note itself, but was much emphasized *in-
the Czech domestic commentary. The substance of the domestic
press and radio attack.on the propaganda balloons was repeated
by Radio Moscow in a home service broadcast, July 20, 1953.
On July 31, the U.S. government replied to the Czech protest
in a formal note which was immediately made public. Though
observing that the balloons in question had been released by
the Crusade for Freedom, "an organization established by private
American citizens," the U.S. note did not avoid an expression
of its attitude toward the action in question.
402 Czech home service, July 18, 1953, 18:50 GMT.
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It is a fundamental conviction of the American
Government and people that free communication
between peoples constitutes a principle upon
which the very life of the international
community should be founded. If any government
attempts to erect a wall sealing off its people
from contact with the outside world, it is
inevitable that ways will be found both by the
people inside that country and by the peoples
of other countries outside to penetrate that
artificial barrier....The United States
believes that the best assurance that this
means of communication Zb-alloons7 will not be
used is to obviate the need for it by permitting
what is natural and necessary in the modern
world, namely, free contact between nations and
the free exchange of information and ideas.
The U.S. note also rejected the Czech allegation that such
activities from the U.S. Zone of Germany involved any misuse of
the position of the United States as an occupying power. So
far as is known, the U.S. note was not published in Czechoslovakia,
nor has there been, at the time of writing, a Czech reply to it.
'An'Associated Press dispatch from Munich reported that the
Crusade for Freedom balloon operation had taken place on the
night of July 13, 1953.403
In his syndicated column of September 8, 1953, Drew Pearson
gave additional information (unverified from any other source)
on the balloon operation:
Last July the Crusade for Freedom launched 6600
balloons into Czechoslovakia from West Germany,
carrying eight million pieces of Czech paper
money and 1,500,000 leaflets telling the Czechs
about the Berlin riots and the purge of Marshal
Beria....The leaflets gave pictures of the
Berlin riots, so the Czechs knew they told the
truth.
403 The Washington Post, July 22, 1953.
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When the Communists got wise to the first
balloon barrage, they used seven MiG''s-for an
entire day trying to shoot down the balloons.
Result.-- the MiG's bagged three balloons in
two hours, while the balloons were being
launched at the rate of 200 an hour. Next
the Reds brought out five ME-109's to 4~ to
stop the balloon barrage. No success.
110. SOVIET IL-12 SHOT DOWN U.S. FIGHTERS
OVER NORTH KOREA 65
65
(July 27, 1953)
On July 27, 1953, U.S. Jet fighters shot down a Russian-
built I1-12 transport plane over North Korea. The incident,
which took place about eight miles south of the Yalu boundary,
was one of the last air actions before the Korean truce went
into effect ten hours later.
The action was disclosed immediately by the U.S. military
command, but not in such fashion as to indicate an international
404
This information was given by Mr. Pearson in a column
expressing criticism of Secretary of State Dulles and
other State Department authorities for having allegedly
disapproved plans to balloon-drop food parcels to East
Germans and bibles behind the Iron Curtain.
Several days later, however, it was reported in the press
that the project.for balloon-dropping 10,000 bibles into
Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, previously held up
over a question of State Department approval, would now
be put into operation. The International Council of
Christian Churches, which sponsored the project, stated
that it had information that such State Department approval
was not needed, (The Washington Post, September 10, 1953.)
This account is based on unclassified sources. For
verbatim texts of notes exchanged and official comment see
the De artment.of State Bulletin, August 10, 1953; August
24, 1953; March 15, 19 .
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incident between U.S. and Soviet forces. That the I1-12 was a
Soviet passenger plane was disclosed by the Soviet government
only on July 31, in a note charging U.S. fighters with having
intruded 112 kilometers into Chinese territory in order to
make the attack. According to the Soviet note, the I1-12 was
flying on a regular route from Port Arthur to the U.S.S.R.
Fifteen passengers and six crew members were said to have died
as a result of the incident.
The Soviet note and version of the incident were immediately
rejected by the U.S. government. In a note of August 1,
delivered in Moscow, the U.S. government fixed responsibility
for the incident upon the Soviet government on the grounds that
the action took place over North Korea before the termination
of hostilities.
On the next day, August 2, the Soviet press carried a TASS
rejoinder which denounced the U.S. version of the incident. A
map was published which purported to show the real route taken
by the Soviet plane. It was charged that the U.S. airmen had
acted deliberately to intercept the Soviet plane on a route
well known to them.
Somewhat belatedly, considering that its territory was
alleged to have been violated, the Chinese communist government
announced over the Peiping radio, on August 2, that an official
potest against the U.S. air violation was being made.
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In a note dated August 11, 1953, the Soviet government
reiterated its version of the incident in somewhat greater
detail, and referred to an investigation conducted by the
Chief Administration for the Civil Airfleet of the U.S.S.R.
The Soviet note demanded compensation and damages totalling
$1,861,450.
On January 26, 1954, the United States replied, expressing
its willingness to recognize and meet any obligation arising
out of the I1-12 incident if the Soviets could adduce documentary
evidence on a number of matters which were itemized in detail
in the U.S. note.
Possible Soviet motives in making disclosure of the incident
only after the RB-50 incident of July 29 are considered in the
case study on the latter incident.406
111. U.S. RB- 50 SHOT DOWN-BY SOVIET FIG
iTERS
OFF CAPE POVOROTNY (NEAR VLADIVOSTOK) ~U'/7
(July 29, 1953)
On July 29, 1953, a U.S. RB-50 was shot down by Soviet
MiG's over the Sea of Japan.408 The B-50 was on temporary duty
406
407
408
See case study No. 111.
Only unclassified sources on the incident have been consulted;
classification of the case study is required by the interpre-
tation of Soviet air-defense policy, and by reference to
other incidents.
Whereas in earlier accounts of the incident, and as late as
in the U.S. note of January 26, 1954, the U.S. plane was
referred to as an RB-50 in the most recent U.S. note
(October 9~ 1951+), which preferred a diplomatic claim against
the U.S.S. ., the plane was identified only as a B-50.
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with FEAF from the 343d Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron
based at Forbes Air Base, Topeka, Kansas.409 The State
Department notes to the U.S.S.R. dated July 21, 1953, and
October 9, 1954, respectively, referred to the mission of the
B-50 as a "routine navigational training mission" and as a
"" itine navigational mission."
As usual in such incidents, the Soviet version of the
facts of this case contradicted the U.S. version on the
following crucial points: whether a violation of Soviet
territory was made; whether some sort of warning was given by
the Soviet intercepting aircraft; and which plane opened fire.
-In addition, the Soviet government denied having any knowledge
of survivors from the destroyed B-50, whereas the U.S.
government (especially in its note of October 9, 1954) cited
indications available to it that the Soviets were withholding
information on this score.
The incident is of unusual interest for several reasons.
First, since_a survivor of the B-50 was rescued, the U.S.
government was in a position to make a stronger case against the
U.S.S.R. than-it would have been able to do otherwise. Secondly,
the Soviet government described its action against the B-50 in
terms which suggested a new, less hostile Soviet air-defense
1+09 This was disclosed by the Forbes Air Force Base information
fice. (The New York Times, August 1 1953; see also The
Lwa3hixigto_ Evening Star, July 31, l9~3.)
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305.
policy. Thirdly, in its most recent note on the incident
(October 9, 1954) the U.S. government explicitly rejected the
Soviet claim to a twelve-mile territorial-waters limit,. though
at the same time maintaining that the B-50 did not approach
that close to t'he(U.S.S.R. Fourthly, the Soviet government
made the unprecedented admission that one of the attacking
MiG's had been damaged by the U.S. plane.410
The exchange of diplomatic notes following the incident
was as follows: 411
1st Soviet note - July 30, 1953
1st U.S. note - July 31, 1953
2nd Soviet note - August 4, 1953
2nd U.S. note - August 4 1953
3rd'Soviet note - August 26, 1953
3rd U.S. note - January 26 1954
4th U.S. note - May 25, 19+
5th U.S. note - October 9, 1954
The most detailed U.S. version of the incident appears in
the note of October 9, 1954; the most detailed Soviet version
apparently was given in the note of August 26,'1954. The
Soviet government did not reply to the 3rd and 4th U.S. notes,
nor, thus far, to the most recent U.S. note which preferred a
diplomatic claim of $2,785,492.94, and invited the U.S.S.R.,
if it denied liability, to join in submitting the dispute to
the International Court of Justice.
410 Soviet note of July 30, 1953.
411 For verbatim texts of some of these notes see State
Department Bulletin, _August 10, . 1953;_August 253;
Soviet note and 4th U.S. note) have not been published.
In addition, accounts of the incident were given to the
press by the sole survivor rescued by U.S. forces, co-
pilot Captain Roche. (The New York Times, August 1, 1953;
The Washington Post, August 3, 1953.)
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Significance
The shooting down of the U.S. B-50 raised once again the
question of Soviet air-defense policy toward alleged air
intruders. There had been certain indicators in Soviet
diplomatic handling of the mid-March, 1953, incidents of a
possible modification in the severe policy of the late Stalin
era.
At first glance, therefore, the fact that a U.S. plane was
shot down several months later, on July 29, seemed to provide a
conclusive answer to any speculation regarding a modification
in Soviet policy. But the occurrence of the incident did not
rule out the possibility that there had been a temporary
amelioration in Soviet air policy from mid-March to late July.
.-Nor-did the occurrence of the incident rule out an
alterrgtive hypothesis, namely, that the shooting down of the B-50
took place not in implementation of standing air-defense
instructions (as in the late Stalin period) but, rather, in
implementation of special Soviet orders authorizing only this
one incident.
In the latter event, the B-50 incident would have more
limited significance. It would not indicate a resumption of
the earlier hostile policy, though it might indicate a readiness
to stage such incidents occasionally for special purposes.412
412 For exa'nplb, the possibility suggests itself that the Soviet
action against the B-50 was taken in retaliation for the
U.S. shooting down of a Russian I1-12 on July 27. A
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While the shooting down of the B-50 tended to show
toughness on the part of the new Soviet regime, the diplomatic
handling of the incident by the Soviets gave a somewhat
contrary impression. In protesting the alleged violation by
the B-50, the Soviet note of July 30 did not reiterate the old
stereotyped version of the facts associated with the severe
air policy of the late Stalin era.413
Rather, the version of the facts of the July 29 incident
was quite new and implied a much milder Soviet policy toward
air intruders. The relevant passage in the Soviet note reads
as follows:
When two Soviet fighters drew near with the
aim of showing the American aircraft that it
was within the bounds of the U.S.S.R. and to
propose that it leave the airspace of the
414
Soviet Union, the American plane opened fire ....
412 (Cont'd)
connection between the two incidents was suggested by the
fact that the Soviets did not disclose the July 27 incident
until after they protested the July 29 (B-50) incident.
And it may be significant that Gromyko handed the Soviet
protest of the July 27 incident to Bohlen when, on July 31,
the latter delivered the U.S. protest on the B-50 incident.
(See State Department Bulletin, August 10, 1953, and March
15, 195 The connection between the two incidents, of
course, may have been otherwise than suggested above; the
I1-12 incident may have been protested by the Soviets in
order to justify or divert attention from their aggressive
action against the B-50. Moreover, it is not possible to
say whether retaliation could have been decided upon --
presumably at the highest policy level in Moscow -- and
implemented within two days of the shooting down of the
I1-12.
413--
414
FBIS, Daily Report, July 31, 1953; RESTRICTED.
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308.
This version clearly implies that Soviet air-defense policy
at the time was, at least in the first instance, to warn an
intruding plane that it was over Soviet territory in order that
it might rectify its error. This is at complete variance with
the earlier, riore severe Soviet policy, as conveyed both in the
older stereotype and in earlier disclosures during Stalin's
day of the (ostensible) standing instructions to Soviet air-
defense personnel. The Soviet note of July 30 entirely omitted
any explicit or implicit reference to. the key provision of the
late-Stalin-era air policy -- namely, the rigid requirement that
an intruding plane must land at a Soviet airfield or, "in case
of resistance," be fired upon.
.It is curious, then, that in undertaking once again hostile
action against a U.S. plane venturing close to Soviet territorial
waters, the new Soviet regime should use diplomatic phraseology
which conveyed a new and much milder policy toward air intruders.
It is possible, of course, that the changed language did not
in fact indicate a softer policy on the part of the new regime.
On the other hand, the new Soviet diplomatic terminology so
clearly implied a milder air policy that it could not be easily
dismissed as merely a matter of verbal strategy.. For the
terminology employed left the Soviet government open to a
diplomatic request that it explicitly confirm the milder policy
implied therein if warning and turning off air intruders. It
does not seem likely that the Soviets would lay themselves open
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09.
to such a query unless they were indeed prepared to acknowledge
that their policy was, as implied in the July 30 note, to warn
an intruding plane in order to turn it off.
Thus far, the U.S. government has not explicitly asked the
Soviet government to confirm or deny that its air-defense
policy is, as implied in its account of the B-50 incident, to
warn off intruding planes. However, such clarification may
have been part of the intention behind the following inquiry
put to the Soviets in the U.S. note of January 26, 1951+:
6. With respect to the alleged warning of
Soviet aircraft to the RB-50, the Soviet note
is not clear as to whether the Soviet
Government claims any attempt was made to
warn the RB-50 to leave Soviet territory
prior to its destruction by Soviet fighters.
In this regard the Soviet Government is
requested to describe, with specificity and
detail, the precise actions which were taken
by the Soviet personnelinvolved (whether in
the air or on the ground) to communicate,
prior to the firing at it, any warning at all
to the RB-50, or any suggestion to it that it
was flying over Soviet territory and that it
should leave the air space....
Another possible explanation for the introduction of a new
Soviet diplomatic formula may be suggested, one which cannot
be evaluated on the basis of available-information. Soviet
leaders may have become concerned lest the United States and
other Western powers adopt in the future a tough air-defense
policy against communist planes, i.e., that they might resort
to force, if necessary, to compel foreign planes suspected of
overflight to land.
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310.
Their own action, in other words, may have been a way of
avoiding establishment of a precedent.
It may be noted that the new Soviet diplomatic stereotype
was repeated in the case of the U.S. Navy plane shot down off
Vladivostok on September 4, 1954, and in the case of the U.S.
B-29 shot down Pff Hokkaido on November 7, 1954.
112. YUGOSLAV FIGHTER PILOT DEFE CTS
IN PLANE TO ITALY
(September 12, 1953)
An Associated Press dispatch of November 15 from Udine,
Italy, reported that Italy had returned a fighter plane-in
which a Yugoslav-pilot had escaped on the previous September
12, 1953. Lt..Nicol Jake Jaksek had landed his plane at the
Italian air base at Aviano, and had asked and received political
asylum. Stripped of its armament,-the P-47 Thunderbolt,
originally supplied by the United States, was flown back by
a Yugoslav captain on November 15.415
113. PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE PLANE OF UNIDENTIFIED
NATIONALITY IN LANDING IN ITALY
_(October 24, 1953)
An Associated Press dispatch of October 26, 1953, from
Bari, Italy, cited a report that an airplane "of origin still
415 The New York Times, November 16, 19530
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cloaked in mystery" had landed shortly before dawn on Saturday
(October 24) at the Brindisi military airbase, with four persons
aboard.
"In the plane, according to unofficial reports, army
investigators found a.powerful aerial camera--but'no documents
to identify the four crewmen or passengers. Inquiries at the
airbase were answered tersely with: 'Investigation is under
way by authorities. For security reasons no information can
be given.'"416
114. BRITISH PLANE FIRED UPON BY
UNIDENTIFIED PLANE OVER YUGOSLAVIA
(December 31, 1953)
On January 7, 195+, the Yugoslav Air Force Command issued
an official communiqu6 in connection with a.report from British
sources that on December 31, 1953, in the sector of the Yugoslav
town of Maribor, a jet plane several times opened fire at a
British plane belonging to the Eagle Aviation Transport Company.
The Yugoslav communique stated that at 17:20 hours on that day
a jet plane of unknown make as noticed flying at an altitude of
5,000 meters. It flew into Yugoslav air space on a course of
160 degrees, circled once over the sector of Maribor, and flew
away on a course of 360 degrees. However, it has not been
established whether this aircra t opened fire.
416 The (Washington) Evening Star", October 26 (or 27), 1953.
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312.
The communique stated in conclusion that, with the
exception of two JU-58 transport planes, no aircraft of the
Yugoslav Air Force flew on December 31, 1953.417
According to an Associated Press dispatch from Belgrade,
cited in the Washington Post, January'7, 1954, the British
plane, attacked nea: agoslavia's northern border with Hungary,
escaped undamaged, and the unidentified plane sped away. In
London, the Air Ministry said it had received no reports of
such an attack on a British plane.
417 FBIS, Daily Report, January 7, 1954.
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