1ST AIR DIVISION (METEOROLOGICAL SURVEY) STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND FINAL REPORT PROJECT 119 L

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 510
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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PROJECT 119L
i E?duo'nd ircre a Io-..io,ic
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NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION -:~
AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED
STATES WITHIN THE MEAI.I NG OF THE ES ,01041
LAWS. TITLE IS U.S.C.. SELI IONG 793 AND 794.
THt TRANSMISSION OR RFb`:Af10N OF WHICH IO
ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHONIIED PE23QM A
PROHIBITED BY LAW.
RAND TS- / '/i
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TITLE PAGE
11 :.IN N PTI'' T 5ION, (N." SuT ^ TUY)
1ST n 'r'T_ ~C`1.CL0(?.ICbL
I.J
F--'-;!,L :LPCRT
P:.CJECT 119L
1. This is TOP ..; LC:117 document and Will be handled in
. S of FP. 20 It cont.; iris
acCJ'idance v, w_ .t,'_'1 the provisi0:1 O1 ii. _ 5-1.
information ? i e 3`ting the Nation l Defense of the United `:tat--s
and, accordingly, utmost security will be afforded and isribution
C.TlI-~ -~issemi~ atio i1 of its contents will be r3stricted on a 'need to
'cnOTr< basis. The international implications of this operation are
such that extraordinary efforts should be expended by all to protect
the Government even beyond the precise provisions of Air Force
regulations. In this regard, it is strongly urged that all personnel
acquainted with the project be again cautioned against inadvertent
disclosure of information pertaining to the actual project, even
though the operation has been terminated. (C)
2. The information contained herein will not be released to
forei_n nationals. (U)
3. '_.eproduction of this document in whole or part is pro-
hibited, except wi la the permission of the office of origin. . (U)
U F- 5 cys
ans~C-2 cys
?GC-2 cys
IN.) - ? cys
Si1C - 4 cys
t 1FCRC- 2 cys
`4C -2cys
t1EDCOM--2 cys
USAFSS-2 cys
TAC -2 cys
FISHES
Brigadier Generral,
Commander
GROUP-1
Exc!udad from uutomaLc
downgroding r:lid c!~L1 i1ictdioa
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I. A cut-off date of 5 March 1956 was established for
compilation of statistics on this operation. Subsequent
to that date the following vehicles, which were originally
entered in the bas-,? -eport as "Successful Launches", have
been recovered in the European area, No transmissions were
received from these balloons. For any gross analysis of
the statistics contained in this report the category for the
following enumerated balloons should be changed from
"Successful launch" to "Failure" or "Stray" as indicated
below:
(C)
Flight
Line
Balloon
Number
Number
Serial Number.
Type
ADA 109
2114
648
66CT
ADA 116
2124
655
66CT
ADA 150
2109
676
66CT
ADA 151
2110
646
66CT
GIE 96
5097
704
66CT
EVA 71
1071
826
66CT
(C)
B.
Strays:
EVA 88
4088
353
66CT
ADA 35
2035
19
66CT
(C)
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CHAPTER I - GENERAL SUMMARY
PAGE
7
Introduction 8
General 8
Mission 8
Assignment of Mission 8
Activation of 1st Air Division 8
Concept of Operations 8
Initial Schedule of Actions 8
Organization .9
Selection of Operational Sites 9
Communications 11
Cover Plan 12
Training Phase
Moby Dick Hi
Training
Launch
Hydrogen Generation
Tracking
Recovery
Operational Suitability Test
Vulnerability Test
Moby Dick Far East
Command Post Exercises
12
12
13
13
13
13
13
13
14
15
15
Deployment Phase 15
6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile) 16
1110th Air Support Group 16
456th Troop Carrier Wing 16
Pre-Operational Decisions 16
Ground Cut-Down Stations 16
Surface Recovery Support 17
Preparations for Launch 17
Stipulations by Higher Headquarters 17
Cover Plan Launches 17
Placarci a 18
Launch Limitations 18
2G-BO Auxiliary Safety Unit 18
Locator Beacon 18
Planned Configuration 19
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Operational Phase, Primary Mission 20
General 20
Launching 20
Tracking 21
Recovery 22
Major Problems 22
Suspensions of Operations 24
Termination of Operational Phase _ 25
Results 25
Tab "A" - Conclusions 28
CHAPTER II - PRE-PRIMARY MISSION ACTIVITIES
Part I Deployment
Part II Moby Dick Far East
Part III Communications
Part IV Cover Launches
Tab A The Balloon
Tab B The Gondola
Tab C Field Test for Modification to System 119L
Tab D Launch Operations
Tab E Hydrogen Generation
Tab F Tracking
Tab G Recovery
Tab H Control
Tab I Vulnerability
Tab J Analysis of DMQ-1
Tab K Discussion of DMQ-2
Tab L Information Services
Tab M Statistics
Tab N Analysis of Ballasting Performance
Tab 0 Materiel
Tab P Finance
Tab Q Personnel
Tab R Mission Analysis
Part I Meteorological Planning for Operation
Part II Guidance for Operation of Launch Control
Center Weather Facility
Part III Guidance for Operation of Recovery Control
Center Weather Facility
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Part IV Requirement for Weather Support
Part V Weather Support for Balloon Launching
Operation
Part VI Comparison of Climatological Estimate of Launch
Site Weather and Favorable Initial Trajectories
Part VII Losses of Vehicles due to Unfavorable Trajectories
Part VIII Accuracy of Climatological Estimate of Launch
Site Weather Conditions
Part IX Evaluation of Weather Conditions in Recovery Area
Part X Forecastability and Reliability of Current
Trajectory Launch Criteria
CHAPTER V - BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
C
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A. General: This is the Final Report of Project 119L
conducted by Strategic Air Command through the lst Air Division
(Meteorological Survey). This r--port is intended to cover the
primary mission for which Weapons System 119L was designed, plus
related pre and post mission P::,ivities. In the event a more
complete analysis of the project, is contemplated, reference must
be made to those documents listed in Chapter V plus data
available to Air Force Cambridge Research Center, ARDC. Weapons
System 119L is described in Tabs "A" and "B", Chapter III. (C)
B. Mission: To obtain photographic and electronic reconnais-
sance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites
using Weapons System 119L. (TS)
C. sf spent of Mission: Weapons System 119L was developed
by Air Force agencies and civilian institutions for the purpose
of conducting pioneer reconnaissance by use of high altitude balloons.
Headquarters USAF monitored this project during the initial planning
and development stages by direct coordination with individual
commands. It became apparent that a single command was required to
further develop, coordinate and conduct the operation. The
Strategic Air Command was assigned this responsibility in USAF
letter, Subject: "Assignment of Additional Mission to Strategic
Air Command", dated 21 March 1955. (TS)
D. Activation of 1st Air Division: To accomplish the mission,
Strategic Air Command activated the 1st Air Division at Offutt Air
Force Base :i.n SAC General Order Number 26, dated 15 April 1955.
The Mission of 1st Air Division was established in SAC Regulation
Number 23-7, dated 15 June 1955. (U)
E. Concept of Operations: The basic concept was to accomplish
launches from Western Europe. Balloons were expected to transit
the target area in seven to ten days and then be tracked and
recovered within the Far East a..'. Alaskan areas. (TS)
1. Initial Schedule of Actions: The most favorable period
for launch was determined to be 1 November through 1 May during
which period the prevailing were predicted to be West to East
at all altitudes. This was therefore established as the period
during which the operation would be conducted. Based on this period
of favorable winds it was planned to conduct Zone of Interior
Operational Suitability Testing and Training during the period May
1955 through September 1955. There would then remain sufficient
time for the units involved to deploy to forward bases and prepare
such bases prior to the implementation date, 1 November 1955. (S)
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2. Organizations
a. 1st Air Division was assigned operational control
of the 456th Troop Carrier Wing (TAC), equipped w-,.th C-119
aircraft for recovery operations; 1110th Air Support Group (HEDCOM),
the balloon launching organization; and the 6926ti Radio-Squadron
(Mobile) (USAFSS), to perform the tracking function. Because of
the peculiar nature of the mission, responsibil?_t:'for operational
control of the launch and recovery units was almost immediately
expanded to include responsibility for training units and crews.
This expansion of responsibility was a.r mplished by mutual agreement,
between the Commander, lst Air Division, and the Commanders of the
parent commands. Also, because of the tremendous quantities of
material involved which required shipment overseas to meet deadline
dates, it became apparent that lst Air Division should be given the
responsibility of monitoring procurement, development, shipping,
etc. Accordingly, these logistical responsibilities were also
transferred by mutual consent of commanders concerned. (TS)
b. 1st Air Division established Detachment 1, 1st Air
Division,[at High Wycombe, England,7as a forward command post for the
purpose of coordinating launch, support and public information
requirements and effecting necessary liaison with supporting
agencies. This detachment was activated 9 June 1955. Its mission
was later expanded to include the requirement to exercise operational
control of all European area launches. Headquarters 1110th Air
Support Group,[.lso established at High Wycombe.3 directed the
activities of the five launch detachments. (S)
c. Headquarters 456th Troop Carrier Wing was
established atLShiroi AB, Japan and functioned as a forward command
post for the purpose of coordinating tracking, recovery and public
information requirements and effecting necessary liaison with
supporting agencies in the Far East. The 456th Troop Carrier Wing
exercised operational control over tracking and recovery activities.
(g)
d. A graphic presentation of commE nc, relationship is
contained on the following page. (U)
3. Selection of Operational Sitess
a. Prior to assignment of Project 119L to Strategic
Air Command, it was considered that all balloons. should be launched
from Scotland. A further study of meteorological data indicated
that more complete coverage could be obtained if sites were widely
dispersed in Western Europe; besides, surface weather [in Scotland)
was expected to be unsuitable for launch activities a large part
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of the time. In addition, the distance from the area of interest
resulted in a day or so of balloon travel before the photographic
mission could be started, an important factor when the criticality
of balloon life expectancy is considered. Based on studies of
trajectory and surface weather, general areas for the location of
launch detachments were selected. [They were Eastern Norway, West
Germany, and Turkey. It was also decided to retain one site in
Scotland as a matter of political expediency] After selection of
the general areas, USAF directed that specific locations be selected
by CINCUSAFE. This permitted consideration of logistical feasibility,
physical adequacy, and other pertinent information pertaining to the
theater and known to USAFE Headquarters. Criteria for physical
adequacy to support balloon operations were stated by 1st Air Division.
[Final selections were Evanton' Scotland; Gardermoen' Nor--.ay;
Giebelstadt and Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany; and Adana, Turkey. An
alternate site was selected at Buckeburg, Germany, for use in event
that operations were denied at one of the primary locations (use of
this site did not become necessary)] In June 1955, the Commander,
1st Air Division, and members of his staff visited each of the primary
sites with a view toward inspecting the physical facilities available
and stating specific requirement for site preparation. [During this
visit to Europe, the lst Air Division Commander, with representatives
from USAF and USAFE coordinated the balloon launching mission with
high officials in each of the four countries concerned. (TS)]
b. The three squadrons of the 456th Troop Carrier
Ving were divided into detachments comprised of eight C-119 aircraft
each and placed at recovery sites believed to be compatible with
the predicted upper air trajectories. L~hese sites were Kadena AB,
Okinawa; Adak NAS, Alaska; Kodiak NAS, Alaska; Itazuke AB, Japan;
Misawa AB, Japan; and Johnson AB, Japan. In addition to these
primary locations, Clark AFB, P. I., and Midway NAS were designated
as alternate recovery bases to be used as required. Central AB,
Iwo Jima was initially planned as a primary location, however, due
to extensive typhoon damage to air base facilities, Itazuke AB, Japan
was selected as a replacement base. (Sfl
c. Location of tracking sites was predicated upon
the forecasted flow f balloons into the recovery area and the require-
ment to obtain adequate "cuts" of lines of position (bearings) to
establish fixes. Cracking detachments were located at Shiroi AB,
Japan; Northwest Field, Guam; Wake Island; Clark AFB, P. I.9 Yontan
AB, Okinawa; Pyongtaek AB, Korea; Chitose, Japan; Midway Island;
Shemya and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska.] At termination of the project an
additional. site had been activated at Nome, Alaska, due to a require-
ment based on experience gained during actual operations, and Formosa
was being surveyed to determine the feasibility of locating a site
on that island. (S)
4. Communicationss
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a. The lst Air Division communications network was
composed of commercially leased and allocated military teletype
circuits. The network was parallel to command control charaelsy
i.e., from the launch sites to the Launch Control Center (High
Wycombe from the recovery base to the Recovery Control enter
~(Shiroi s an( from Headquarters lst Air Division to both.the Launch
and Recovery Control Centers. Che network was equipped with on-
line encry?.,tu.on devices and all messages transmitted via the
network were classified a minimum of Confidential and encrypted
during transmission, for the purpose of maintaining communications
security. (CJ
5. Cover Plano Meteorological Research was established
as the basis for the primary mission cover plan and for this purpose
the suffix "Meteorological Survey", was added to the 1st Air
Division designator. This cover plan explained the mission as
being in consonance with ,thee USAF high altitudes meteorological
balloon projects, some of which had received considerably publicity,
e.g., Project Moby Dick. The responsibility for development,
publication and monitoring of the cover plan was vested initially
in Headquarters 1st Air Division and was contained inlst Air
Division Operations Plan Project (C) (codeword), dated 10 June 1955.
This plan emphasized that no voluntary press releases would be made.
When questioned directly, unit personnel would divulge only, but
freely, the unclassified meteorological aspect of the mission. (TS)
II. TRAINING PHASE-.
The training phase for ZI units was originally scheduled for
the period 10 May to 1 September 1955, leaving a month for deploy-
ment and a month for shakedown overseas. However, due to the fact
that equipment non-availability resulted in very little activity
during the month of July and the fact that equipment deficiencies
dictated further testing prior to beginning operations, decision
was made by Headquarters USAF that the operational date would be
postponed 30 days (from 1 November to 1 December 1955). [This
decision was further influenced by a request for 30 day postpone-
ment from tr.; British in order to avoid commencement of operations
prior to ^nrletion of certain diplomatic negotiations which were
This decision and other considerations made it possible
under way.
to extend the training phase until, mid-October. (TS)
A. Moby Dick Hi-. Limited information was available concerning
balloon operations, therefore lst Air Division conducted Moby Dick
Hi operations in The Zone of Interior during the period 10 May 1955
through 16 October 1955 for the purpose of testing operational
suitability, developing procedures and tactics, resolving deficien-
cies, determining capabilities and accomplishing on-the-jo.b
training. Originally, only twenty-five 'balloon systems were to be
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provided for this project; howE.~..r, 1st Air Division estimated
that a minimum of 150 would be needed if the testing and training
were to be accomplished on an acceptable basis. A requirement
for this number of systems was established, and later was slightly
increased. The final report or this operation is contained in
lst Air Division TOP SECRET docnient entitled "Final Report of
Operational Suitability Test Project 119L". (S)
1. Training: With '.il.J tial guidance. from AFCRC and
General Mills (balloon manufacturer), the training and suitability
testing of the system was conducted in the Zone of Interior in
accordance with 1st Air Division Operations Order 201-55. (C)
a. Launch: During project Moby Dick Hi the 1110th
Air Support Group launched 162 119L systems. These launchings
provided the only opportunity for development of procedures and
the accomplishment of initial and final training prior to actual
operations. (C)
b. Hydrogen Generation: It was anticipated that
the hydrogen gas required for Moby Dick Hi would be produced by
primary mission generators at Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyoming.
Initially these generators proved incapable of providing the
required quantities and quality of hydrogen. Major revisions in
procedures and ad ptions of mechanical aids rendered the system
serviceable. (C)
c. Tracking: Moby Dick Hi, balloons were tracked by
USAFSS, FCC, and AACS. No training was accomplished by the 6926
Radio Squadron (Mobile) (primary mission tracking unit), since it
was manned at overseas stations during and subsequent to the Moby
Dick Hi operation. (See paragraph IIB below.) (C)
d. Recovery: Recovery operations were conducted by
the 456th Troop Carrier Vs-fig operating from their home base at
Charleston AFB, South Carolina. Air-to-air and air-to-surface
recovery techniques were without precedent and the first SOP's for
such were developed during the Moby Dick Hi operation. Air-to-air
recovery action was succes:2fvily accomplished on twelve of the
thirty-nine systems on which attempted recoveries were possible.
As of completion of Moby Dick Hi, the air-to--water recovery tactic
had not proven successful di'e.to water station deficiencies. (S)
2. Operational Suitability Test: During Moby Dick Hi,
techniques of varying balloon initial floating altitudes were
investigated and developed into SOP. Also it was found that ascent
rates and hydrogen purity were less critical than previously
believed. It was also determined that the basic equipment for
primary mission operations was adequate with the following major
exceptions: (C)
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a. The 128TT balloon was determined to be marginally
serviceable. The unacceptably high failure rate of this balloon
type (approximately 50%) which was experienced through the.month
of August, led to a decision that the contract for this type should
be terminated at the midpoint and the 66CT balloon substituted for
the remainder. Although not fully tested at the time, the 6(--T was
the only other balloon in the inventory capable of doing the job
and had been developed expressly for this project. Becaus,,?cf its
cylindrical design it was thought to be stronger structurally and
less apt to fail under stresses of ascent. It had similar life
expectancy, but flew at lower maximum altitudes (45,000 ? 60,000
as compared to 75,000 m 85,000) than the 128TT. At the lower alti-
tudes it picked up faster winds and, as a result, doubled the
expected rate of arrival in the recovery area. A disadvantage was
the possibility of increased vulnerability; however, ADC was unable
to demonstrate that the increase would be greater than sli ht in
attempting to locate and intercept the small number (15-20) of
these balloons launched in the Z I. As a result of the decision to
convert the contract from the large balloon to the smaller one,
there were approximately 19300 of the 128TT type and 1,500 of the
66CT type available for accomplishment of the primary mission. (TS)
b. Minor mechanical innovations and a major revamping
of procedures were required to render the gas generation system
serviceable. (U)
c. The degree of success to be expected from air-to-
air and air-to-water tactics remained in doubt. (S)
d. Launch Devices The forklift launch vehicle was
determined to be inadequate and unsafe due to size,, weight, limited
visibility and limited mobility. The forklift was replaced with
the Fisher Launcher,, which was a 22 ton 6X6 truck with a super-
imposed structure from which the gondola was suspended and released.
U)
3. Vulnerability Tests During Moby Dick Hi, a test was
conducted to determine the vulnerability of the 119L system:,; To
accomplish this test Air Defense Command instructed suboi_.1._.',e
units to attempt detection and termination of Moby Dick Hi balloons
to maximum degree :short of interference with the ADC primary
mission. During the test ADC was advised of launch times.. '_-x'~ected
trajectories, and balloon fixes as they became available. Results
indicated a limited capability to track balloons using either radar
or ground observers. It was demonstrated that balloons at altitudes
attainable by fighter aircraft could be destroyed by fighter action
if located. It was concluded that the degree of vulnerability to
be.expected would be directly proportional to enemy capability to
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locate and track the balloons. Although inconclusive insofar as
Russian radars were concerned, test results did not indicate radar
tracking capability to be good, (See Tab I. Chapter III),.and it
was estimated that the balloon system was not unacceptably
vulnerable. .(TS)
B. Moby Dick Far East: The Moby Dick Far East program (1st
Air Division Operations Order 20255) was established primarily
to provide training for, and to obtain factual information on the
capabilities and limitations of, the 6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile).
This was done by simulating primary mission operations in the Far
East and Alaska areas during the period 7 September 1955 to 27
December 1955. A total of 211 Moby Dick [Far Eass balloons were
launched by two launch teams from sites in 1kinawa, Japan, and
Kore . All pha -,s of the tracking functions were exercised during
this period. After 23 November 195x: the balloons carried VHF
transceivers, which made it possible for recovery crews to fly
realistic training missions actually intercepting and homing on
balloon signals. Additional benefits derived from this project
were: (S)
1. Provided information on frequency propagation
characteristics. (U)
2. Provided additional trajectory information. (U)
3. Served to add considerably to the cover plan. (C)
C. Command Post Exercises: Commencing in late October 1955,
Command Post Exercises involving the primary mission communications
network were conducted almost continuously to provide maximum
training for all personnel and test the adequacy of the system.
Each exercise was approximately 5 days duration with a short break
of 2 to 3 days to evaluate results. These exercises were planned
to simulate balloon launching, tracking, fixing and recovery
operations. Wherever possible command functions and procedures
were employed to add realism. Applicable reports required by 1st
Air Division Manual 55-8 were submitted and Air Weather Service
support capability and other facets of the operation were exercised.
(S)
A. The deployment schedule of launch and recovery unit
personnel and equipment was finally predicated upon the designated
date for commencement of operations and the requirement to attain
operational proficiency prior to deployment. Also it was desired
to have all operational units in place as far in advance of the
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implementation date as possible to assure time for base "shake=
down" and mission preparation. As previously stated, the target
date for commencement of operations was advanced from 1 November
to 1 December 1955. See Part .1, Chapter II. (C)
10 6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile)s Deployment responsi
bility for tracking units was retained by USAFSS, since personnel.
were to be obtained from USAF-wide resources and USAFSS intention
was to reassign such personnel and equipment-within the Far East
upon termination of the project. Deployment of personnel and
equipment was commenced in June 1955 and was completed in August
1955. 725 personnel and 1,280,000 pounds of equipment were involved
in this deployment. (C)
2. 1110th Air Support Groups Deployment of the main body
of the 1110th. Air Support Group commenced on 10 October and was
completed on 1 November 1955. A total of 743 personnel and 477,500
pounds of equipment were involved. (U)
3. 456th Troop Carrier Wings Deployment of the main body
of the 456th Troop Carrier Wing commenced on 5 October and was
completed on 20 November 1955. A total of 1,763 personnel, 2,751.,290
pounds of cargo and 50 C-119 aircraft were involved. (U)
B. There were 27,000,000 pounds of special equipment (Grand
Union) shipped in support of this operation in addition to the
previously mentioned equipment. This, plus other commitments,
equaled an approximate overall total of 3,231 personnel and 32,000,
000 pounds of carL.c., (S)
IV. PREOPERATIONAL DECISIONS-,
A. Ground Cut=dDown Stations- The original plan of operations
called for high altitude operation (80,000 ft) of the 128TT balloon
where winds were expected to be of moderate speeds posing a reason-
able problem for intercepting Cm119 aircraft. As a result, electroniz
balloon termination equipment was installed in project aircraft and
no other means of termination was provided. The decision made during
Moby Dick Hi to emp/`,y 66CT balloons (which fly at lower altitudes)
in approximately eqG-al numbers -to the 128TT required a re-evaluation
of termination and recovery plans. It was indicated that at the
lower altitudes, wind speeds encountered would be such as to nearly
double the expected rate of arrivals in the recovery area. Also,
proximity to jet stream altitudes on arrival would result in rapid
transit of the recovery area such that balloons might arrive during
night and adverse weather, transit the area, and pass far beyond
before aircraft could intercept them. It was known that under these
conditions the balloon would travel at such speeds as to render
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overtaking by 0-119 aircraft impossible. It was immediately
apparent that a requirement existed for a means to terminate
balloons from the ground. From spare airborne electronic-equipment
available, ground cut-down stations were established at\Shiroi Air
B pejand at each of the recovery squadron bases except Johnson
Air Base. T- improve performance a specially constructed Yagi
antenna was used. The range of these stations was such that un-
broken grruL.-1 cut-down coverage was provided from the northern
tip of Formosa to the northern tip of Hokkaidt, around Adak, and
around Kodiak. During the o eration, an additional station was
established at [Niigata, Japan. The concept of employment of these
ground cut-down stations con emplated that at night, during adverse
weather, or in the absence of aircraft for the purpose, balloons
would be terminated by the ground stations [so as to fall in the
Japanese Sea as close to the West shore of Japan as possible, or
fall on Japan._] It was thought, and later confirmed, that there
would be little possibility of recovering gondolas from the open
Pacific. In addition to requiring ground cut-down stations, the
increased speed of the balloons required that the exposure rate
of the duplex camera be changed from 122 minutes to 64 minutes, to
assure overlapping coverage. (TS)
B. Surface Recovery Supports With the expected increase in
arrival rate and the installation of ground termination equipment,
it was anticipated that many gondolas would fall on land with no
opportunity for recovery by the C-119 aircraft, or in water where
the aircraft recovery effectiv_t y would depend upon state of the
sea and proper functioning of the unproven water station. Based
on these considerations a decision was made that supplementary
recovery support was required. Through FEAF and AAC arrangements
were made with CINCAL, CINCFE, and CINCPAC for recovery assistance
from all United States forces operating within their theaters.
News releases in the theaters solicited the cooperation of civilians
by offering a reward for returned gondolas. Plans made were
complete and detailed, and later proved to be most effective. (S)
C. Preparations for Launchs In anticipation of'starting the
operation o_, 1 December 1955, action was taken to be prepared to
launch f i,i'.::ach site. at the maximum rate, from the first day.
These preparations included the generation and storage of hydrogen,
and stockpiling of prepared systems in the mechanical and, electrical,
configure"--,,.1 required. (S)
D. Stipulations by Higher Headquarters
1. Cover Plan Launches. USAF directed that cover plan
balloon launchings be conducted in the Pacific area. concurrently
with the conduct of the primary mission. This operation was nicknamed!.
White Cloud and was implementated by 1st Air Division Operations
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Order 207?56; it provided for the launching of ten 124A type
balloons each at'Okinaw], Hawaii, and Alaska during the period
9 January 19`'5 to July 9560 The first of these balloons was
launched on 9 January 1956 with complete press coverage. This
was one day prior to commencement of primary mission operations
as had been requested by the State Departmei'. (TS)
2. Placards. At the direction r,L ,TJSAF, a cartoon placard.,
multilanguage placard and Russian language placard were affixed to
that part of the gondola housing the cameras. The placards
indicated that a monetary reward would be given if the package were
turned over to the proper authorities. Due to delayed delivery,
the Russian language placard was affixed first on 23 January 1956,
13 days after the operation began. (S)
3. Launch Limitations: For the first seven days of
operation, launchings were restricted by Headquarters USAF to a
total of ten effective balloons per each 24 hour:,period with an
altitude ceiling restriction of 55,000 feet. (Notes An effective
balloon is one which has been successfully launched, reaches planned
altitude, and-can be assumed to penetrate the area of interest.) (S)
4. 2G-BO (Auxiliary Safety Unit): Safety measures against,
free fall of the equipment in the event of balloon failure during
and after ascent were provided the 119L system by a safety chute and
by the electronic package control unit. To give back=up protection
against free fall, in addition to the above, USAF determined that
an auxiliary safety unit, the 2G-BO, would be included in the system..
Delivery of the 2G-B0 to launch detachment was subsequent to term.ina'
tion of the primary mission, therefore it was never actively
employed. (C)
5, Locator Beacons In May 1955 a requirement was stated
for a locator beacon which, attached to the gondola, would send
signals from a downed position to direct searchers to the location.
Without such a beacon it was considered that downed gondolas would
be difficult to find on land and practically impossible to find in
water. For technical. reasons, development is limited to a beacon
which would work in water but not on la?',~'It was designed with a.
salt water activated battery to transmit a UHF signal for 48 hours
to a range of 100 150 nautical miles. Recovery aircraft and the
Air Rescue aircraft were capable of homi:. a these signals using
the AN/ARC-27 with the AN/ARA-25 homing adapter. Early attempts to
test prototype and first production models of the beacon were in.
conclusive, and considerable delay was experienced in getting first
article approval. However, because the beacons were known to be
capable of functioning, 501 were accepted and shipped to launch sites
for use prior to receipt of first article approval. This approval
was received on 4 January 1956. A beacon was to be attached to each
system launched. (S)
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E. Planned Configurations The configuration of balloon
gondola assemblies planned for the beginning of operation wab in
consonance with other operational decisions and was standardized
for all launches regardless of balloon type. Principal features
were: (C)
1. Basic configuration was normal,. consisting of balloon,
load straps, rotator, bar assembly, parachute,-luster, water-..statior.
DMQ-1, thermal package for electronic gear, and two ballast boxes.(C~
2. A 24 foot emergency parachute was rigged between the
gondola and the balloon to prevent free fall of any portion of the
vehicle in the event of balloon failure during ascent. (U)
3. Four packages of chaff were attached to the bar assembly
and rigged in such a manner as to be automatically dispersed on bar
separation. The purpose was to provide positive fixing of termina-
tion position by radar. (C)
4. A radiosonde unit was attached to the system to provide
information on level-off altitude if the ascent were successful, or
to give a positive indication if failure occurred within approxi-
mately two hours of launch. (S)
F. Tactics: Because of the relatively inflexible nature of
the the balloon system and the fact that maximum altitude had been
prescribed, few t.:ctical decisions were necessary. Those found
necessary are described briefly below: (S)
1. Based on meteorology, radio transmitter turn on 'times
were established to insure that regardless of wind speed encountered
(within reasonable limits) the transmission would begin prior to
arrival of the balloon in the recovery area. (S)
2. Camera turn on times were -to be delayed long enough in
each case to avoid the possibility of photographing friendly
territory. (S)
3, The 66CT balloons were to be launched from t`- t'ro
German sites so as to penetrate the border during hours of darkness.
The 128TT was not restricted as to hours of darkness, nor was the
66CT when launched from the other three sites. (S)
4. To obtain sufficient balloon life expectancy (7-8 days)
and stay within the prescribed altitude ceiling, the 66CT balloons
were prepared for a planned initial altitude of approximately
46,500 feet and a ballasting altitude of 40,000 feet; 128TT balloons
were prepared for an initial altitude of 50,000 feet and a ballast-
ing altitude of 45,000 feet. (S)
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V. OPERATIONAL PHASE, PRIMARY MISSION:
A. General: By 1 December 1955, the established date for
commencement of operation, all units were in place and operationally
ready. Pending receipt of an execution order command post exercises,
Moby Dick Far East, and other training in mission accomplishment
continued. Also advantage was taken of this period to continue the
distribution of additional production material to the overseas
locations. (C)
1. The mission was ordered executed on 10 January 19560
Eight effective balloons were launched on that date. (S)
B. Launching:
1. Subsequently, balloons were launched daily at rates
consistent with the directed limitations except as further limited
by political considerations .^nd surface weather. Launch teams of
the 1110th Air Support Group turned in exceptional performances,
demonstrating on some occasions capability to exceed the maximum
launch rate proErarnmed. (S)
2. The limitation to 10 effective launches per day
continued in effect until 17 January when it was increased to 20
per day. On 25 January it was increased to 30 per day; and to 40
per day on 28 January. (S)
3. Although experiencing their worst winter weather for
several years at the launch sites, pre-mission predictions of
percentage of weather favorable for launch were found to be quite
accurate. As expected, from standpoint of surface weather,CEvantonJ
was the poorest site and [Adanj the best. The original concept in
regard to weather was that balloons could not be launched in the
presence of any precipitation, fog, or icing. Because such restric-
tion would have an adverse effect on capability to meet daily quotas,
it was decided to test feasibility of launching under these condi-
tions. From these tests it was concluded that balloons can be
successfully launched during periods of fog and light precipitation
in the absence of severe icing conditions. Weather criteria for
launch were changed accordingly. (TS)
4. LDue to reasons unknown to 1st Air Division, the Br.iti,;h
administration had failed to notify the Air Ministry that operations
at Evanton were authorized. For this reason, no launches from
Evanton could be made until late on 11 January 1956, when approval
to launch was granted. Again, on 4 February 1956, the British
Government, through the Air Ministry, requested that launches at
Evanton be restricted to only those which would not overfly East
Germany. It was estimated that this restriction would prevent launch
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approximately 25% of the time, which, when coupled with unfavorable
ground weather and unfavorable upper air trajectory, practically
eliminated Evanton as a productive launch site. (TSU
5. [operations from the two launch detachments in Germany
were suspended for 36 hours on 23 January 1956, due to a formal
protest to ICAO by Czechoslovakian CAA claiming that the lcool
program constituted a hazard to air navigation and as a consequence
had grounded all night flights of Czech airlines. CINCUSAFE,
through the German ATC notified Czechoslovakia that balloon
operations from Germany would be suspended for 36 hours pending
Czech presentation by documented evidence that the balloons were
in fact flying at altitudes where they constituted a hazard to air
navigation. Launchings from the two German sites were resumed after
a 36 hour stand-down. (C2J
6. Balloon launchings at Gardermoen, Norway, were suspended
at the request of the Norwegian government on 18 January 1956. This
request was based on (1) Swedish protest of balloons constituting
a hazard to air navigation, (2) "free falling objects" reported from
the vicinity of the launch site, (3) the injury of a Norwegian boy
by the explosion of a squib on a downed gondola. Approval to resume
operations at Gardermoen was granted on 31 January 1956 after lengthy
investigations into failure cause factors] Launches were permitted
only under conditions most favorable to successful ascent and flight.
Launch operations were resumed on 3 February when the required
conditions existed. (Because of poor trajectories and surface weather
at Gardermoen during he first week of operation, and the requirement
to stand down for two weeks for political reasons, only a token
number of balloons were launched from that site. (TS2
C. Tracking: Tracking detachments obtained 22,867 bea'T'ngs
which were used in plotting balloon positions during the operation.
This does not include the many singe bearings which were obtained
on transmissions from balloons which were heard at least one time,
since such bearings could not be used for position fixing. Often
only an initial transmission would be received, after which the
balloon was not heard from again; further, some of the initial trans-
missions were termination signals which indicated loss, either by a
system failure or unfriendly countermeasures. A deficiency was noted
in the tracking capability over the Bering Sea and Northwestern
Alaskan area. To offset the deficiency, a detachment was formed
from in place resources and located at Nome. The detachment became
operational after termination of the operations; as a result, it did
not contribute to the mission. \In addition, a survey of Formosa was
conducted with a view to determining feasibility of`operating a
tracking detachment from that location should it be required. (TS)
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D. Recovery,. Recovery activity functioned smoothly and
effectively. With few known exceptions balloons were tracked
prior to arrival and were terminated. As expected, arrivals
occurred at night and during adverse as well as good weather.
The average speed of trar,el in the recovery area was close to
100K. The requirement fc'* ground cut-down stations was fully
justified under these conditions because it was necessary to
terminate 14 balloon n skits by this method. Thirty seven were
terminated by aircraft, several expired normally in the recovery
area, and one was terminated by a friendly fighter. Due to weather
and other operational considerations, the C-119 aircraft had an
opportunity to recover only 19 gondolas from the air and were
successful in 16 attempts. (TS)
1. Surface recovery support in the FEAF area was a
source of great satisfaction. The 3d Air Rescue Group did a fine
job in both locating and recovering downed packages. To date a
total of 28 packages have been recovered through all agencies
participating in the surface recovery support plan. (TS),
2. Procedures established for the return of recovered
gondolas to the ZI via MATS after collection and processing b FEAF
were very effective. The average time required for delivery from
]to the 15th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron at March Air
Tokyo
Force Base was 75 hours. (C)
E. Major Problems,.
1. The UHF locator beacon failed to operate on the first
few systems which terminated in the sea in the recovery area. This
led to a series of tests, both by the manufacturer on recovered
beacons, and at launch sites by launch personnel to determine cause
factors. Those returned to the manufacturer from the recovery area
were found to work unless too badly damaged. Aside from occasional
equipment breakage in launch, no reason for beacon failure could be
determined, and it was concluded that the fault was in the floating
attitude of the gondola to which it was attached. Unless it
floated so that the battt,.y was under water, the battery would not
be activated. Action-.'-,s taken to correct the floating position to
insure best chances for beacon operation. (S)
2. The water ^'~c, ti.on, although it had never 'been fully
tested and proven, was rigged for operation on all of the initial
flights; however, since the locator beacon did not function on the
first few gondolas which went down in the water, these gondolas were
not located by project aircraft and there was no opportunity to use
the water station. On those which were picked up by boat there was
no indication that the water station had erected. Soon after
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commencement of operations, a friendly national was injured while
tampering with the water station activation squib found on the
gondola of a balloon which had failed in the launch area. Sub-
sequently, the squib was removed as a hazard, and this rendered
the water station incapable of operation. However, it was necessary
to continue attaching it to the gondola be ..use it's weight was
needed to cause the gondola to float with the beacon battery under
water. Development of a means to insure.p_?oper floating attitude
without this piece of equipment was initiated-immediately since
it was thought that complete removal of the water station would
reduce radar sighting capability. At time of suspension of operations
a suitable method had been devised and tested, but it was never
used. (S)
3. An analysis of balloon profiles taken from date-'
recorded by recovered gondolas disclosed two significant factors.
First, balloons were not approximating their estimated life expectancy.
Instead of expending ballast equal to 7% of gross load per day, the
average expenditure was about reducing life expectancy from 7-8
days to 4-5. It appeared that atmospheric dist~,`)ances caused
variations in floating altitude that resulted in two, and sometimes
three, ballasting periods during 24 hours rather than the one
ballasting period expected. The necessarily narrow spread (5-6000
ft) between initial altitude and ballasting altitude is thought to
be contributory to this phenomenon. Secondly, it was found that
balloons spent considerably more time at the ballasting altitude
than was anticipated. It was thought that with sunrise the balloon
would make a fairly rapid ascent to its maximum altitude, and that
it would remain there until late afternoon when it would descend
because of cooling. Thus, for most of the day it would be high
enough to reduce vulnerability to a minimum. Periods of greatest
vulnerability would be early morning and late afternoon. This was
found not to be the case. Although'it rose rapidly in early morning,
it began to cool and descend very shortly after noon; arriving at
ballasting altitude with several hours of daylight left; and of
course was mc:,;vulnerable during that time. Undoubtedly, there is
a close relationship between this phenomenon and the, one previously
discussed in regard to over-ballasting. :.th factors significantly
reduced the chances of any balloon to irssfully make the trip to
the recovery area, either because of reduced normal life or increased
vulnerability. Both were, however, operationally inescapable within.
the range of altitude to which flight w. .a united by directive. (TS)
4. As previously stated, at the start of operations lst Air
Division had approximately 1300 128TT balloons and 1500 of the 66CT
type. To get an early indication of which type would be most effective
operationally, both types were launched in approximately equal numbers
at the beginning of operations. Moby Dick Hi results had indicated
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that the 128TT ascent success rate to be expected would vary from
about 80% success with higher serial numbers, to 50% with lower
serial numbers; the break point being at or near serial number
1000. In order to pin down within the number of 128TT balloons
available a point below which the failure rate would be excessive,
it was decided to launch in serial number blocks of 100, starting
from the highest numbered balloons and launching in numerical
progression downward at each site, except thatCaat Evanton and
Giebelstadtl a test quantity of low serial numbered balloons would
be launche to determine if failure rate confirmed the Moby Dick
Hi findings. After several days of operation, the ascent success
rate of the lower serial numbers was found to be 47% as compared
to 83% for the higher serial numbers. A decision was then made
that all 128TT balloons with serial numbers lower than 950 would.
be set aside and not used. This resulted in a reduction of the
useable balloon inventory by approximately 700 balloons and left
a deficit of 500 which would be required if the mission objective
of launching 2500 was to be achieved. To eliminate this deficit,
a requirement was stated for delivery by 1 March of balloons of
a new type which would combine the strength of the 66CT and
approach the altitude capabilities of the 128TT, at the same time
providing more operational flexibility. Such a balloon was designed
(the 83CT) and a few were test flown by AFCRC. Procurement was on
schedule for delivery in March 1956, but was halted when operations
were suspended and none were ever delivered. (S)
5. Since the decision to set aside the low numbered 128TT
balloons left only a limited number in the inventory, it was decided
to conserve these for a later period when their use might be manda-
tory to avoid attrition by flying at higher altitudes. (The 66CT
was not capable of use at higher altitudes without drastic reduction
in life expectancy). Accordingly, only 66CT balloons were launched
beginning 22 January 1956. (TS)
6. By 3 February 1956 it became apparent that attrition
was unacceptably high at the lower altitudes and 128TT launchings
were resumed using slightly higher altitudes than previously (5.4,000
ft initial floating altitudes; 50,000 ft ballasting altitude). This
was maximum possible altitude under the existing directives, and
Headquarters USAF was asked to raise the ceiling to a minimum of
60,000 It, or to el.'.minate it entirely. (TS)
F. Suspension of Operations On 6 February stand-down of all
launches was directed. (C)
1. An appraisal of the situation at this time indicated
that one of two courses of action should be followed in the event
resumption of operations was authorized. One was to launch all
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usable balloons (including the supplementary 83CTts) at maximum rate
possible and at maximum altitude. The objective would be to saturate
or avoid defenses and end the mission on the earliest date possible.
Capability to complete entire mission by mid April existed if
operations were resumed prior to'15 February. The alternative was
to continue only with the remaining 400 high serial number 128TT
balloons which could possibly be flown above defenses. ?Tq-:increase
the difficulty of detection, water stations would be removed and the
maximum altitude would be flown. Through these measures it was
thought that the operation might attract less -attention and thus be
acceptable. These proposals were made to Headquarters USAF on 9
February 1956. (TS)
2. Headquarters USAF favored the alternate proposal
(launch only the 400 128TT balloons) if operations were to be resumed,
but removed altitude restrictions entirely for only 10% of the number.
The re, ining 90% were limited to a maximum of 58,000 ft. On 24
February, Headquarters USAF advised that a proposal for resumption
of operations under these ground rules at the earliest possible date
had been sent to the Secretary of the Air Force. (TS)
'~? Termination of Operational Phase:
1. Informally on 29 February and by message on 1 March
1956, USAF directed termination of the operational phase of the
project, except that search for and recovery of unaccounted for
gondolas would continue. (S)
2. By Headquarters USAF directive, 1st Air Division.and
Strategic Air Command relinquished operational control of operational,
units to parent commanders on 26 March 1956. (Redeployment of these
units and disposition of surplus materiel became a responsibility
of the parent commands and Air Materiel Command.) (C)
VI RESULTS:
A. During the operational period, 516 balloon systems were
launched. Of these systems 399 were considered to be operational;
there were 117 known failures, and 12 of those considered operational
were later recovered from friendly areas without having entered the
target area. Of the remaining 387 operational balloons, 144 were
later heard to transmit, of which 123 were tracked, and 21 were
termination signals heard as the first transmission; 243 were never
heard from after launch. Of the 123 which were tracked, only 67
entered the recovery area. 57 of these were terminated and 44 of them
had been returned as of 5 March 1956. Of the 13 which were terminated
but not recovered, 4 have terminal positions on land, 9 in the sea (7
Pacific, 2 in Sea of Japan). The 10 which arrived but were nottermi-
nated are presumed to be down in the Pacific or in the Polar regions.
Although termination was attempted on 6 of these, all attempts were un..
%successful, presumably because of failure of balloon electronic gear to
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respond. Four entered the recovery area only by definition,. since
they were too far to the north for interception. (TS)
t. Fifty-eight balloons heard to transmit, were tracked,
but never arrived. These were functioning systems and from all
indicu?ions most of them should have been blown into the recovery
area. However, the vast majority of them ceased their trans-
misLiron prior to their seventh day of life. One cluster of
eighteen balloons was being tracked across the North China area
heading directly for Japan, - only three actually arrived and
nothing more was heard from the remainder. There are several
possible causes. Electronic malfunction could have resulted in
cessation of transmissions; over-ballasting, as previously discussed,
could have resulted in premature flight termination behind the lines;
they could have been terminated by enemy action; o,. their trajectories
may have been such as to carry them beyond listering range. (TS)
C. Two hundred forty three balloons were never heard from after
launch. This means that they were either travelling in the wrong
direction completely; they experienced complete failure of the HF
transmitter; or they failed to live until their programmed turn on
time. Since many of these balloons were launched close in time to
balloons which later arrived, trajectory is thought to be responsible
for only a small percentage. From Moby Dick Hi statistics it was
reasonable to assume that 85% of the transmitters would function
properly. This leaves the vast majority in the category of not
having lived long enough to transmit. It is reasonable to assume
that some launches which were considered successes, in actuality
were not. Perhaps the launch personnel were unable to monitor the
flight long enough to observe failure; perhaps minute holes were in
the balloon allowing the gas to leak out over a period of hours;
perhaps the ballasting mechanism failed and caused the balloon to
descend to the ground. Although over-ballasting is known to have
shortened balloon life to a degree, this degree was not such that
a large number would expire for this reason prior to turn-on time.
Although no exact values can be placed on any of the above factors;
even in combination, it is considered unreasonable that they could
have oxen responsible for early termination of such a large number
of u..`loons. It is concluded, then, that the major contributing
factor to loss of these balloons was attrition by enemy action.
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, enjoying the
ele:er:, of surprise, balloons launched prior to 26 January were
fairly successful; however, of 184 balloons successfully launched
on and after 26 January only 28 were heard to transmit and only two
were recovered. This indicates that after two weeks in which to
react, the USSR had come up with an exceptionally effective defense.
Contrary.to the radar tracking capability demonstrated in the Z I
during Moby Dick Hi, 12th Air Force radars were able to track balloons
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up to 150 miles across the line; it is assumed, therefore, that
Russian radars were similarly capable. The length of the metal
cross-bars and the metal water station increased radar vulnera-
bility. It was known b?,forehand that Russian fighters were
capable of attaining the altitudes to which the balloon flights
were restricted (55,000 ft). Vulnerability was certainly-affected
by balloon behavior, P,, previously discussed, in descending to
ballasting altitude (4C9000 to 45,000 ft) shortly after noon. (TS)
1. As the effect of attrition became noticeable, such
steps as were possible were taken to minimize the vulnerability,
Altitude was increased to the limit possible within the directed
ceiling and radio turn-on times were delayed to deny use of these
signals as an aid to the enemy. Plans were made to remove the
water station entirely, in order to minimize radar detection;
removal or raising of altitude restrictions was recommended to
USAF; balloon transmitters were not to be turned on until the
very last day of programmed life. Operations were suspended before
all of these measures could be placed into effect. (TS)
D. All systems launched carried the DMQ-1 (photographic)
gondola. No DMQ-2 (electronic ferret) packages were launched since
this type of equipment was not perfected in time. (TS)
E. A summary of photographic accomplishments processed b'?
the Aeronautical Chart and Information Service as of 30 March
1956, is as follows:
1. Total number of missions from which photography was
obtained - 40. (TS)
2. Total number of usable exposures - 13,813. (S)
3. Gross statute miles of charting photography -
1,984,173. (S)
4. Net statu+- miles of charting photography - 1,661,869.
(equal to approximat 3 y'51% of the Continental United States) (S)
5. Gross square statute miles of charting photography
for Sino-Soviet area - J,388,745. (TS)
6. Net square statute miles of charting photography for
Sino-Soviet area - 1,116,449 - (equal to 37% of the Continental
United States, or approximately 8% of Sino-Soviet area). (TS)
7. Cost per square mile (net) $48.49. (U)
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I. CONCLUSIONS: It is concluded that:
A. Weapons System 119L was a reasonably effective means of
obtaining pioneer reconnaissance at comparatively small
cost. (TS)
B. The predicted upper air trajectories over the USSR and
its satellites was as accurate as could be expected. (TS)
C. The delay in commencing the operation (from 1 December
1955 to 10 January 1956) compressed the project, time-
wise, to within a very short period of favorable winds.
However, the operation could have been completed (2500
launches) by 1 May 1956, if project had been permitted
to continue. (S)
D. The element of surprise contributed appreciably to the
successful results obtained during the initial days of
the operation. (C)
E. Vulnerability to unfriendly countermeasures and over-
ballasting were the two factors contributing most to failure
to transit the target area. (TS)
F. Ground termination stations are a mandatory back-up
for other recovery techniques. (S)
G. Deficient polyethelyne and manufacturing defects caused
a deficit of approximately 700 balloons in the operation-
al inventory. (C)
H. The type of photography obtained affords an excellent
source for pioneer reconnaissance, but due to limiting
factors, detailed analysis of new intelligence is
difficult. (See Tab "J", Chapter III) (S)
I. The findings of the Moby Dick Hi vulnerability tests,
involving the Air Defense Command, were misleading,
Since 12th Air Force radars (MSQ-2) were capable of
tracking balloons at high altitude and at ranges up to
150 nautical miles, it is concluded that Soviet rada:?s
have similar capability; therefore, in design of any
future system for this purpose, care should be taken to
minimize radar reflective surfaces and materials. (TS)
J. More specific knowledge of balloon performance must be
obtained, and design influenced thereby, in order to
obtain every-thing possible from this weapons system. (C)
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K. The C-119 aircraft:
1. Is useful to perform air-to-air electronic cut-down,
however, this could'be accomplished by several other
aircraft types. (S)-
2. Is too slow to overtake the balloon due to approxi-
mately equal groundspeeds of the balloon and aircraft
under certain jet stream conditions. Success was
assured only when the aircraft could assume a position
ahead of the balloon. (C)
3. Air-to-air recovery capability was dependent upon the
existence of daylight and VFR conditions. (S)
L. Surface recovery of all packages should be planned as the
primary method of recovery with a suitable and fc,)l-proof
method of locating the package, such as a beacon capable
of operating on land and water. (S)
M. Due to excessive ballast rates, duration was marginal.
The reconstructed profiles indicate that the life expec-
tancy is somewhat shorter than the theoretical average of 7
and 8 days for the 66CT and 128TT respectively. See
Tab "Na, Chapter III. (C)
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I. DEPLOYMENT: This part is subdivided into three major
paragraphs for presentation of information pertaining to the
deployment of 1st Air Division subordinate units. Paragraph
A contains comments applicable to the overall deployment,
paragraph B contains information pertinent to each subordinate
unit and paragraph C contains general supporting infL,:Lmation
(See Inclosure 1 this Part for graphic presentation of de-
ployment) (C)
1. Operational units of 1st Air Division were deployed
to three major geographical areas. Detachment 1, 1st Air
Division and the 1110th Air Support Group, providing the launch
capability, were deployed to the European area. Units of the
6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile) and 456th Troop Carrier Wing (M),
providing the tracking and recovery capability, were deployed
to two areas: the Far East and Alaska. (See paragraph C for
Force Distribution.) (S)
2. Initially, planning to transport personnel and
equipment for the 1 November 1955 implementation date dictated
the need for airlift of all personnel of the 1110th Air Support
Group and the 456th Troop Carrier Wing, and the majority of the
456th Troop Carrier Wing equipment, which was required in the
Zone of Interior to complete operational training. This posed
a major problem in that, during the scheduled deployment period,
the Air Force was supporting Army world wide troop movements,,
such as Sage Brush, and airlift was not available for the timely
deployment for an operation of this magnitude. The problem
was primarily resolved by the non-operational status of the
119L Weapons System which delayed the project "go-date" to
1 December 1955. This interim period was used to continue
operational training for applicable units to the extent that
certain equipment and personnel could be released for surface
shipment to forward locations. 'With this added time, a revised
deployment program, including transportation requirements, was
finalized in Headquarters United States Air Force c,_)nference
on 9 August 1955. Detachment 1, 1st Air Divisio.:, b;;ing a
small force of 10 officers and 3 airmen, activated from Head-
quarters 1st Air Division, were transported to their forward
location by 1st Air Division aircraft on 30 June 195'. De-
ployment of the 6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile) was handled on a
PCS basis by United States Air Force Security Service through
routine shipping channels and offered no particular problem, (S)
3. The final stage of unit deployment was effected
with United States Air Forces in Europe, Far East and Alaskan
Theater Air Commanders as applicable. This stage provided for
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the transport of personnel and equipment from ports of debark-
ation to the operational sites. The wide-spread operation
within each geographical area and the close schedule for in-
place dates of units required theater airlift in many instances.
This mammoth task was readily and efficiently accomplished in
all theaters. Evaluation of this basic deployment of personnel
and equipment revealed that no operational delays were ex-
perienced through lack of transportation supporting the deploy-
ment. (U)
4. A recovery unit was originally scheduled for Iwo
Jima; however, typhoon "Louise" destroyed all operational
facilities on Iwo Jima and the decision was made to move the
recovery unit to Itazuke, Japan. The base at Itazuke was pre-
pared in a minimum length of time and no delay in the operational
capability was experienced. (S)
B. Detailed Deployment Information:
1. Detachment 1 - 1st Air Divisions This unit,
consisting of 10 officers and 3 airmen, was activated through
Strategic Air Command resources on an as required basis. Initial
increment of Detachment 1 personnel departed for the European
area on 30 June 1955 with a 1st Air Division Survey Team. Purpose
of this survey visit was for United States Air Forces in Europe,
1st Air Division and Detachment 1, 1st Air Division to conduct
on the spot coordination of launch sites and promote a thorough
understanding of requirements and anticipated problem areas.
After completing the survey, Detachment 1, 1st Air Division
personnel established a command post at High Wycombe, England,
on 28 July 1955. (S)
2. 1110th Air Support Group:
a. Authority for deployment of the 1110th Air
Support Group, was contained in Headquarters Command Movement
Order, 1110th Air Support Group, 23 June 1955, as supplemented
by 1st Air Division Operations Order 227-55, 31 August 1955.
b. In planning the deployment of the 1110th Air
Support Group, consideration was given to providing the maximum
training time possible in the Zone of Interior, yet insure that
the organization was in place at operating locations 30 days
prior to the project implementation date. Establishing 1
November 1955 as the in-place date, a phased deployment of
personnel and equipment was programmed. By deploying shall
increments of selected personnel and certain equipment to
each site at an early date it was possible to retain the main
body of the 1110th Air Support Group in the Zone of Interior
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for a longer period of operational training than originally.
anticipated. In support of this plan the phased deployment of
personnel.: and equipment was accomplished as follows: (C)
Phase
I.
II.
III.
(1) Personnel:
Identifi-
Number
Depart
Arrive
Operating
cation
Personnel
Cargo
Z.I._
Mode
Area
Preparatory
5 Officer
30 Jun
A/L
28 July 1955
Echelon
4 Airmen
1955
Advanced
4 Officer
18 Aug
A/L
23-30 Aug 1955
Echelon
88 Airmen
93,000#
1955
Main Body
43 Officers 384,000# 5 Oct
Sur-
1 Nov 1955
and UME
569 Airmen 1955
face
30 Civilians
Note 1: Representatives for each launch site were included in
each phase.
Note 2: Cargo for Phase II includes 67,000 pounds for advanced
echelon plus special test and teletypewriter equipment
of 25,800 pounds.
Note 3: Civilians indicated were Technical Representatives.
Note 4: Preparatory echelon accompanied 1st Air Division staff
on site survey and returned to High Wycombe, England, to
establish an 1110th Air Support Group Command Post
adjacent to Detachment 1, 1st Air Division. (C)
(2) Equipment:
Identifi- Arrive
Phase cation Amount Depart ZI Mode Destination
I. Grand 27,000,000# 1 Aug 55 Sur- 15 Oct 55
Union face
II. Homing 75,000# 1 Dec 55 A/L 3 Dec 55
Beacons
Note 1: Grand Union equipment was shipped by Air Materiel Command.
Note 2: Homing Beacons were procured late in the program and
shipped by 1st Air Division as separate items. (0)
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C. Intra-theater deployment of launch units to.
operational sites was accomplished as scheduled with exception
of Detachment 3. Due to political implications certain restrict-
ions were imposed by Norwegian officials. It was determined
:,hat: (1) total Unites States Air Force military and civilian
errsonnel ibould iot exceed 100 (2) that a roster, indicating
individual names, would be provided three weeks prior to arrival
of the unit a: (3) -for security purposes, Detachment 3 would
be deployed to Norway on 3d Air Force Headquarters orders. The
problem onco untered; due to Norwegian restrictions, was the
reduction of .atachment strength from 128 to 100. Negotiations
provided for a ; ;orkable solution by (4) Norway providing qualified
civilian replacements for the 28 personnel reduction or (5) if
qualified civilian replacements would not be provided then United
States Air Force total personnel complement could be increased
as applicable for operational support. Coordination for re-
solving these restrictions delayed the intra-theater deployment
for Detachment 3 for approximately two weeks. However, Det-
achment 3 arrived in time to meet a 1 December 1955 operational
ready status. During conduct of the operation the lack of
certain qualified Norwegian civilians raised the United States
Air Force personnel total to lCv,. (TS)
d. In total, the 1110th Air Support Group deployed
743 personnel and 477,000 pounds of equipment with an additional
27,075,000 pounds of equipment being deployed by Air Nhteriel
Command. The personnel total consisted of 52 officers, 661
airmen and 30 civilian Technical Representatives. (U)
3. 456th Troop Carrier Wing (M):
a. Authority for deployment of the 456th Troop
Carrier Wing (M) was contained in 18th Air Force Movement
Order 456th Troop Carrier Wing, 23 June 1955, as supplemented
by 1st Air Division Operations Order 226-55, 1 September 1955
and 456th Troop Carrier Wing Operations Order 1-55, 22 August
1955. (C)
As indicated for the 1110th Air Support Group,
operational training time in the Zone of Interior -;as at a
premium. To provide maximum training; time it Tans decided to
waive the req ir~ment for recovery units to be in place 30
days prior to implementation date of the project. This
decision was influenced by: (C)
(1)
Completing training in the Zone of Interior
and standing down for aircraft maintenance,
the 456th Troop Carrier Wing would be. oper
ational on arrival at forward location. (U)
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(2) Operational activities would not commence
until "go-date" plus travel time of the
balloons to recovery area. (C)
(3)
Less problems were anticipated in shake
down period Ater unit arrival. (U)
With above in mind, 20 Novembe' '.1 955 was established as the
in-place date to become operationally ready, In support of
this date, a phased deployment of personnel and equipment was
accomplished as follows: (U)
(1) Personnel:
Identifi- Number of Number of Depart
Phase cation Personnel Unit Aft Cargo ZI Mode "rive
I Advanced 143 1 88,147,/ 2-10 Aug A/L 3, -22
Echelon Aug
II lain Body 1217 320,2501 5 Oct to Sur- 12 Oct
12 Nov 55 face to 20
Nov 55
III Tactical 349 49 0
Acft and
Crews
IV Rear 49
Echelon
1--15 Nov A/L 4 to
20 Nov-
26, OOO1 20 Nov A/L 1 Dec
1955
Note 1: A period of days shown for departure or arrival indicates
first and last day personnel of that phase departed or
arrived. (C)
(2) Equipments
Identifi-
Phase cation Amount Depart ZI Node Destination
I i{lyaway c.s 733,910 15 Sep 55 Surface 1 Nov 55
II Power Packs 342,OO0;` 1 Sep 55
III Propellers 72,000# 1 Sep 55
IV ME 1,168,371 15 Sep 55
Surface 2 per no
Surf a c e 1 Nov 55
Surface 1 Nov 55 (U)
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TOp 111IFY
c. In planning for :aointenance support tactical aircraft movement, the main body of the 45( top tL,
h Tr-?ap
Carrier Wing was subdivided into three increments. 4.
'1.70 of
these increments comprised the maintenance capability. This
maintenance unit accomplished the _= equired inspection for air-
craft deployment during the firs- part of October 1955. On
26 October 1955, one increment of the maintenance unit deplcys_l.
by surface to Adak and Kodiak, Alaska, to provide enroute main;;
enance for tactical aircraft as required. The remaining increment
performed maintenance support at the home station until all
to_cal aircraft departed. This unit was deployed with tho rear
aahelon by Tactical Air Command C-124 aircraft. The remaining
increment comprising a majority of the main body deployed by
surface shipment departing Zone of Interior home station on or
about 5 October 1955. (C)
d. In total, the 456th Troop Carrier Uing deployed
1763 personnel and 2,751,290 pounds of equipment. The personnel
total consisted of 239 officers, 1459 airmen and 15 civilian
Technical Representatives. (C)
4. 6926th Radio Squadron Mobile:
a. United States Air Force Security Service retained
responsibility for deployment of the 6926th Radio Squadron Obbil
Their purpose was to deploy personnel on PC3 status with she
vi_n inte,?J ?:nt.in.a personnel in United States Air Force Security
Service orIanisations, as applicable, on completion of the operation.
Specialized equipment was also handled by Security Service. Head-
quarters 1st Air Division assisted United States Air Force Security
Service -:There possible in the deploy en-t of personnel and, equip-
ment. (0)
b. Deployment of personnel and equipment ~.r s
accomplished as scheduled with the exception of 35 commun_i.c^ti.~ns
specialists. 15 of these 35 specialists were provided on 15
August ann the remainder on 1 September 1955. In addition,
certain items of equipment scheduled for in-place date of 20
July 1955 did not arrive until 1 September 1955. (U)
c. Overall, the delay of specialist personnel an-n
items of equipment did not preclude United States Air Force
Security Service from attaining an operational ready status
as scheduled on 1 September 1955, although some D/F sites were
on'a limited operational capability until arrival of personnel
and equipment. (C)
d. In total, United States Air Force Security
'
Service deployed ed 725 personnel and 1,280,000 pound;, of equip,
ment. The personnel total consisted of 30 officers, 685 airmen.
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and 10 civilian Technical `presentatiaes. (U)
C. Force Distribution:
Orznnizat.ion AutStrength i Location
Officers Airmen Civilians No Acft
1. Hq 1AD 'HS
40 62 6 3 Offutt AFB,
Naar. (U)
Det 1, lAD (143" *10 3 1 tt4cl High '.Iyco::ib- ,
RU' Statior,
England. (C)
Only six (6) officers and three (3) airmen were assigned for
initial operation. The other positions ,,ere `filled on an as
required basis.
**C-47 aircraft based on Bovintcn, England.
3.
Hq
.,1110th ASG
17
63
2
High
RAF, En-land
Det 1
7
119
6
Ober; feff n--
hofen, Germany
Det 2
7
119
6
Adana Air Base,
Turkey
Det 3
7
i16
5
;~-Gardermoen
RNAF Sta,
Norway
Det 4
7
119
5
Evanton RAF
Sta, Scotland
Det 5
5
1.20
6
Giebelstadt,
-
Germany
Total
52
661
30
*3 *Buc .e burg,
Germany
C-47 aircraft based at Bovington, England. (U)
sf~ 100 United States perso.Lmel ceiling imposed by Norway. (95
United States military personnel and 5 civilian technical
representatives, which was ultimately raised to 106 total
because of mission requirements.) Remaining 22 United States
Air Force milit,a.ry personnel of Detachment 3 were assigned
within .1110 th Air 3' ipport Group units. (TS)
***Alternate launch site. (U)
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4. Recovery:
Officers Civilians
Iiq - 456th TC'. 20 59 55
74''tll 7U0S 209 ',5
745th TCS 44 267 '``5
746 ~.h I'C'S 44 267 5 2 0 iiot.~ l NAS;
1 r ,S
:a.4--1 1Y.~,~ 44 20"-) 2 0 lt,:I ZJ:..lpa'.
745-1 TCJ 44 209 'S
7 2C^ 41 209
.:~ r ~ - , ~ ., 2
~ moo.... ,o. 'LB,
Total 2`',`9 1429 50 .. ... -? ,. - , :1
?E it men I0 to 456th r1 oop Car:'ior tt :.tc
n 7
Co_ (C)
:ircral bra:;ad a , Joh~nr,on Air _...,., , J~ an. (U)
***ilternnite Recovery Bases. (C)
5. Trac'.king:
Hq .- 6 926th i~~.'.. 10 160 Shia of .....
e 14 2 2 5 1. r. r . i.
"hi.?oi
JLl : r
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Organization Auth Strength Location
Officers Airmen Civilians No. Acft
Det 5 2 54 1 Yontan AB,
Okinawa
Det 6 2 54 1 _ Pyongtaek,
Korea
Det 7 2 54 1 Chitose X13,
Japan
Det 8 2 50 1
Midway Island
Det 9 2 55 1 Shemya AIM,
Alaska
Det 10 2 51 1 *Elmendorf
AFB, Ala ska
Total 30 635 10
# 1 officer and 19 airmen withdratirn for activation of the
HF/DF site at Nome, Alaska. (C)
(C)
D. Conclusion:
1. The controlled utilization of Military Air Transport-
Service overseas airlift capability precluded aerial deployment
of the major portion of personnel. The result was that Zone of
Interior training and preparation was compressed time ,wise to
meet surface port calls. Early expression of airlift requirements
apparently no effect on the long range projection of airlift
utilization (th requirement was stated in May for deployment
in October). The situation was further complicated ~., ^ delay
in designation of the means of deployment trans por L%-tior
resulting in e:,:traord.inary efforts by support and
units to _Jeodline dates. (U)
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.h1,9S7tz,-.2 SC/,lEDULE
MO>3Y DICK-Al TRN&
DEPLOY
GO e-
PEKS
CARGO
,~~~
GEP
oq
NOV
DEC
ADVANCED
148
88,147
2
--^
ECHELON
S 931
S 134,250
MAIN
S 114
S 62000
BODY
A 172
A 124;000
II 2?
4
TACTICAL
349
0
5
AIRCRAFT
ro
WNG 8: S
49
26, 000
25
~t
REAR ECH
_ y
-_
FLYAWAY
0
733,916
ED
, , ? .;
T
KITS
rr,.
"%"'lf
G
POWER
0
3422000-
PACKS
PROPELLERS
0
72,000
U M E
0
121632997
15
ADVANCED ECH
92
67, 700
FT.
20
& EQUIP
TEST EQUIP &
0
V
25 , 362
TELETYPEWRITERS
ll~:
O
MAIN BODY
642
384 000
10
qu
GRAND UNION (t
A
o
include test
0
27,000,000
'
equip)
~
--
MARKER BEACON
0
75,000
'
G92.6
PERSONNEL
725
11280,000
E ADINES
?
RSM
& EQUIP
DATE. ISE
U
TEAMS
S 9
2
TEST PERS
8
4, 000
5
& EQUIP
FOLLOW ON
o
A 30,000
1 /,
5
PEN
S 170.000
RETURN TEST PE
8
42000
I5
20
M
& EQUIPMENT
REDEPLOY TEST
5
42000
10
-1
5
PERS & EQUIP
F-
RETURN LAUNCH
18
71,000
26~
TEAMS
E
EPLOY LAUNCH
RED
11
0
TEAMS
LAUNCH
CO
'
N s~
- -
- --
-- -
T RACKING
and
COi~f' 'ET. $Y'',
'15 AtlG
CONTROL CENTER
RECOVERY
'fr ^ ETLi13Y% j
I sE?
TR/~NSPORTA7IOt4 5UMMCRY
d preparatory echelon 1110th :S'i deployed_30 Jun 550
and
7 Go P SUP
IN PLACE
PRZOGZA MM E Q
TOT A .
TYPE
PERS~_.~_. CARGO
PERS tA O
PERS CARGO
AIR
507 728 147#
694 35 5 2
1201 . 1, 0` 4, 709
SURFACE
677,000
372
1576 30,142.1
19 30 1,18
NOTE: Det 1, lAD
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A. The Moby Dick Far East program provided tracking training
for the 6926th Radio Squadron Mobile and 456th Troop Carrier Wing.
Two launch teams and required equipment were deployed by 1st Air
Division Operations Order 225-55 dated 2 August 1955. One team
was placed at Chitose, Japan, and the other at Kadena, Okinawa.
Each team consisted of 13 personnel and 138,000 pounds of materiel.
Five of these personnel plus 19,000 pounds of-materiel were
deployed by surface transport and the remaining personnel were
airlifted by Military Air Transport Service (MATS). This initial
deployment provided a capability to commence launches at each site
on or about.7 September 1955 and continue until approximately
100,000 pounds of equipment per site was received by follow-up
surface transportation. (S)
B. After a representative number of launches had been made
from Chitose it was determined that more realistic trajectories,
therefore better DF training, could be obtained by moving the launeh
operation to K-6, Korea. This generated surface and air transport
requirements which were met within resources available to Far East
Air Forces (FEAF). (C)
C. The Moby Dick Far East system consisted of a 37.1+ foot
diameter polyethylene balloon to which was suspended either a
Moby Dick package or a modified 119L gondola. (:3ee inclosures
contained in this part). On the first 25 flights launched by each
team, the Moby Dick packages were used. An abnormally high number
of electronic failures occurred. These were attributed primarily
to metallic corrosion of the electro-mechanical control equipment.
This corrosion apparently resulted from the humid conditions at the
two original launch sites and from inadequate waterproofing of these
packages for surface vessel shipment and the subsequent short
storage time. Corrosion on the 119L electronic equipment was
negligible. The first 25 flights made had the duct of the balloon
cut-off so as to lower the altitude to approximately 30,000 feet,
Since a high rate of failure was encountered during ascent, the
duct was not modified on late Lllghts. With a load of 350 pounds,
the system then floated at 39,000 feet. The first launched used the
vertical launch method. All remaining launches were accomplished
with the "covered wagon" inflation method. The covered wagon
appeared to be the most suitable method due to the consistently high
surface winds in that area. (See inclosures 2 and 3, this tab). (C)
D. The following is a break-down of equipment which comprised
the Moby Dick Far East system: (C)
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1. 124A balloon inflated with 6,000 cubic feet of hydrogen.
2. 24 foot safety chute which doubled as a load strap.
3. Sub-bar from 119L Moby Dick Hi system.
4. Ballast hopper from 119L Moby Dick Hi system.'
5. Electronic package from 119L Moby-Dick Hi system.
6. 120 pounds of 119L ballast.
7. Hydrogen trailers or individual bottles for hydrogen
storage.
8. Launch cart and covered wagon locally manufactured at
Lowry AFB, Colorado.
E. Moby Dick Far East was scheduled to terminate on 1 December
1955 so as not to interfere with the primary mission 119L systems
that were scheduled to be launched on that date. Due to the delay
in the execution of the primary mission, several of the Moby Dick
Far Jast vehicles were held in reserve and provided a continuous,
though sporadic, balloon launch capability and training capability
in the area until actual execution of the primary mission. 211 of
the scheduled 230 Moby Dick Far East vehicles were actually launched
with a 98.4 percent launch success rate and average flight duration
of 40 hours. An average of 27 position fixes per 24 hour period
were obtained on these balloons. Recovery aircraft interceptions
were successfully accomplished on 11 of these flights. The final
Moby Dick Far mast launching took place on 27 December 1955. The
remaining Moby Dick Far mast balloons handily met the short notice
requirement to commence launching additional balloons for the
purpose of providing cover for the primary mission. These cover
launchings, nicknamed White Cloud, commenced on 9 January 1956
using the Moby Dick Far East equipment remaining. (TS)
F. For the conduct of operations during Moby Dick Far East
the following weather service was required and was provided as
indicated below: (U)
1. The 1st Weather Wing operating location at Shiroi
provided forecasts of surface weather and balloon trajectories
to the Recovery Control Center as required for control purposes. (S)
2. The base weather stations at Chitose AB, Kadena AB,
and at Pyongtaek (K-6) provided the required forecasts of surface
weather conditions for plannin and conducting balloon launching
operations at those sites. (U)
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3. When the various squadrons and detachments of the 456th
Troop Carrier Wing were in place and began practicing intercepts on
Moby Dick Far East balloons, forecasts were required for these
missions. Weather liaison officers were deployed from the 7th
Weather Group for service with the recovery units at Adak and
Kodiak where the weather si,.,i,ort was provided by U. S. Navy
aerological units. Weather liaison officers for recovery bases
in the Far East area were-;."assigned from among the weather personnel
of the Air Weather Service Detachments at those bases. ?upplemental
weather support as required at the recovery bases was provided over
project communication facilities by the 1st Weather Wing operating
l.-)cation at Shiroi. (S)
G. A Recovery Control Center (RCC) was established at Shiroi
AB, Japan to direct, monitor and control all simulated recovery
operations. Balloon fixes were passed to the Recovery Control
Center where the current position, track and forecast trajectory
of each balloon was maintained. The control center staff, based on
all known information, directed missions and dispatched recovery
crews for intercept. Crews were standing by on 30 minute alert
or participating in realistic patrol, intercept and simulated
recovery missions. (S)
1. Recovery crews began Moby Dick Far past training on or
about 14 Novermber 1955. As each recovery unit arrived at a
forward base, they were dispatched on training missions. Units at
Kadena, Adak and Kodiak were unable to accomplish desired training
on Moby Dick Far East balloons, since the majority of these
trajectories were over the northern part of Japan. This was overcome
by placing the same 4X equipment in a recovery aircraft as was
carried aloft by Moby Dick Far East balloons. The "balloon, aircraft"
flew a designated route and recovery crews were scrambled on patrol,
intercept and simulated recovery missions in the same manner as on
Moby Dick Far East balloons. (S)
2. To safeguard recovery aircraft operating on 119L
missions in area adjacent to Communist territory, a line was
established beyond which r~:overy aircraft would not operate.
This geographical restr'^--Ifrn was established at sufficient distance
from Communist held territory to avoid "incidents" or inadvertent
violation of such territory and, at the same time, did not unduly
restrict recovery operat'.,)n :;hepter III Tab G, par I,H.
3. Each recovery unit, through the local air traffic
control agency in conjunction with adjacent air defense facilities,
developed expedited departure routes to be used by recovery aircaft
scrambled on recovery missions. Also, procedures were developed
whereby recovery aircraft operating on recovery missions in critical
areas close to Communist territory, would be kept under continuous
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radar surveillance and advised of current pc::.tion and track.
While operating within these areas, the aircraft commander was
required to maintain voice contact with designated Air Defense
Radar facilities. (S)
4. Moby Dick Far East training period was used to finalize
detailed operating procedures to be used during the primary mission
for notifying and monitoring the activiti- of supporting recovery
forces. This was accomplished through tL_'~ }d Air Rescue Group, which
had been appointed executive agent of Far East Air Forces for this
purpose. Although this system was partially exercised by simulations
during Moby Dick Far East, the Japanese were not involved for security
reasons. (S)
5. Moby Dick Far East statistics are contained on the
following page. (U)
H. Cost for the continuous TDY of the Moby Dick Far East
personnel was estimated at ;88,100 e funds were provided by Headquarters
Command. The cost to Headquarters Command for transportation of 2
hydrogen trailers to the Far East was $510.00; the transportation for
the other 4 hydrogen trailers was provided by Al,11C. Funding for
commercial hydrogen and normal base support was provided by Far
East Air Forces. The unit cost of the 124A type balloon was ?;180.00.
47 D-582
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H agc are
mounted the HF and VHF radio antennas, with the Viii ,!',Dole antenna
underneath and HF antenna reel on a b?acket attache' to the package
side. Note figure below. (U)
E A~tTEI i ?
VHF k1ATEt~11~-A
DIMLIUSIOIUS -24x18 'x 37"
W GT. - 175
83
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7 a P 3 E Ir-*,, R, E T
a? ".ci,le this ,? t , ,_
:ac :ec1. the atte ,y box tl), tY rater-bottle box (2), and the
tray (3) with the iJ..,,,.__ _C?I:LT':l,CG:Ln; cable rUr?:ir:,
inside corners, Note d 4f iY~ below a?.1 '
b? The batter box ,ontains four zinc? ilv::- peroxide
bo tt ,ries .filled with potc,ssioia hydroxide -,n,-! j< !]
riate bottles. jf1{.t.l -Che e,.? ~_.-uc_t,-'t~. , ..,0.
r,~ ~.;
%
all pci'i'.r:.L is furnished troth this batteery box. (U
3
iti.E:S and c ,i :'~li '
IICISTRUW NT,TRr 4
COwTtt4%- UMnT
t .QT-- qG VHf TRNWSWITE
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85
H, E
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'?__. ?0 1h-J diai_l-LicL"'?r .,2i? ' __. ... ; *IIn- r,
._--
1titl:Lde 0,7c-rated s ifety' device YThich ,:t 2-
;:?.i:'e~.'rliltree-- -, L. Of the
'ale
G'%udOla without parachutes shocad balloon failure occ coo11. after
rr?ined 'i
launch and abo''e a pre-d t,e 4ltitude? ~ It accor^?~Jlish
by ('isj'csini of the contents of the ballast hoppers and by
se, par_ ating the bars in the suspension system to pe- -it the para-
chute;' to the electronic and miss ion equipment. dc'wi sdfely
lowers. the rupiui-d ball.:-_, -1:..r bar
t31r1
ballast hoppers. unit includes a
tl c , 1-t " tUd::-
r -ti,+.ited (:one: ?
1?'~ Lhc Circuits
) a tulle-ur i_ay for SW1?;^-:^:I.?"tC
t'i d f ' r iode to prevrer1'; h launch ..: fro
o ^ -'
l _riggs i.l~ this
device, The 2G-P0 safety unit is moui:"tad on the undo S-idC Ot' ?~,:`_ ,
r:'_ '..:n bar of the 119L system., ne r the rub-bar at ";r.':nt and at
. O
v.'(1,_. 1-)11 pack ace. Power is provided from the electronic pa^.t:ca e
battery Pack., but otherwise the unit operates independently of the
est of 're 119L sys~ em? Aneroids are adjustable for altitsde d
are set b-,11- hazed with simple., gau e-type tools. The
,s di?ae. nsicllh.
are X 34s1 x ,it and it wr:Ag1i;3 a total of 11 :;ou11d;- m P .,
:'
functions i i 3ii0 i'Ti1 in 'tom: f Co - t t? -lit -
s.ecy ..."i`1 r~.?, on ah a t
1 (.on :Lneo J.
this Tab; how-;ever, it was never flown in actual opJsration due to
ecesaticn of operations :riot r
to rvCJ~1?~ t in '12i? ?.1~:.1.,_. tC%
Unit, 1113-E57
, _.rovides cGt__.'o? of a
the 1.19L y stem t1!.C'ouLh a Tee ;,l?1i?1'i; Of
itc has, odometer-operated micrr, j-t an
fi l t
ero
cvcl--'.~ by me ac Hof
0 L!?1.
3. 25 January through 27 January 1956 - 30 Balloons.
4. 20 January to termin.a:.ton - 40 Balloons.
D. In general, the weapon;, system, d.eva3.oped throu`'_ tho
Operational Suitability Test 11i`4ob;y Dick Hill was similar to tha
flown during the primary mission. Deficiencies were encountered
prior -to launch operations and resolved by system modifications
as noted. in previous parts of this report. In addition, the
actual operation revealed the necessity for other changes
detailed below. (3)
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1. It was originally planned to utilize a 251 foot load
strap connecting the balloon to the gondola. Upon testing, it
was determined that the end of the 128 TT balloon would be 10
inches from the cradle of the Fisher Launcher and could possible
sustain fabric damage during cross wind launches, A 25 foot
extension, consisting of 10,000 pound test nylon coreless.cord-
ing, was attached between the standard load strap and the gondola.
This made it possible to maintain the balloon train on as near
as possible a horizontal plane to insure accurate scale readi z-,
and facilitate launch release. Since the smaller 660T balloon
had b.-en added to the weapons system as an alternate vahi:- it
as also necessary to increase its train by the addition of a
75 foot, 10,000 pound test nylon coreless cording, extension. \
This extension was connected in the same manner described above. ( )
2. The proper leveling of the fiberglass box prior to
flight and the assurance that any out of level conditions durin
flight is at a minima,: are very critical. The mounting and
installation of the water station and locator beacon .Tith
battery on the original harness and cable suspension system of
the fiberglass box unbalanced the assembly to such a degree as
to eliminate the possibility of re-balancing the leveling. To
overcome this difficulty and to allow for further adjustnent to
balance for true level, three turnbuckle barrels on the original
assembly were replaced with three new turnbuckle barrels which
were 1 3/4 inches longer and allowed greater adjustment. The
turnbuckle barrels replaced were those three which were .keeled
on the side of the harness or box farthest away from that aide
upon which the water station and locator beacon power pack were
mounted. (C)
3. During tests conducted by Air Force Cambridge
Research Center, there was an indication that during inactive
storage the probability existed of partial activation of the
XCRC-lA delay battery used to cause erection of the water
station. Partial activation of these batteries would affect
their ofc ciency in electrical urrent output during use. It
was therelule deciuea to cu., l 2 XCRC-lA batteries in
parallel. `Leas satisfactorily indicated that this system
would produce more than sufficient electrical current needed
to fire the S--63 squib. Immediate procurement action was
initiated to obtain a new improved water activated battery
that would perform the necessary function. (C)
4. Exposure time of system cameras was changed from
the originally established 1.2-4- minutes to 6- minutes to provide
z;' 4
continuous overlapping photo coverage when operating at lower
altitudes and higher ground speeds. (S)
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5. Operation of the cameras was changed from the original
24 hour continuous system to a daylight only system, since results
obtained from night operation during the Moby Dick Hi Operational
Suitability Test were nil. This provided a greater yield in terms
if footage of film expended and useable frames obtained, and also
provided additional film sup ly for increased rate of film comsumption.
;wee paragraph 4 above). (S
6. An additional power source was added to the DMQ-1 package.
This was to insure that in case of continuous camera cycling, due to
either a malfunction or film supply expenditure, the resultant power
drain would not be from the 119L system electrical power source.
This modification was not made to packages flying Bill Jack cameras
as a difference in camera design made it unnecessary. (S)
E. Initially all balloons were launched with a recommended
7% free lift so as to preclude underinflation. Actual free lift
was ascertained from the lowest reading of the scale located on the
launch platform. Other operational criteria for initial launch
operation were as follows: (C)
1. 66CT:
a. Evanton - Initial floating altitude, 45,300 feet with
a night floating altitude of 40,000 feet and ballast for 7 days. (S)
. b. Oberpfaffenhofen, Giebelstadt and Gardermoen -
Initial floating altitude of 46,400 feet with a ni ht floating
altitude of 40,000 feet and ballast for 7 days. (TS)
c. Adana - Initial altitude of 46,400 feet with night
floating altittc': of 40,000 feet and ballast for 7 days. (TS)
a. All launch sites - Initial floating altitude of
50,000 feet with a ni ht. floating altitude of 45,000 feet and
ballast for 8 days. (S)
3. A cartoon placard, multi-language placard and Russian
language placard were affixed to the camera package. The Russian
language placard was affixed on 23 January 1956, 13 days subsequent
t) mission execution. (TS)
4. The top half of each of the wide sides of the camera
package were painted with international orange paint. (U)
5. The line numbers used to identify the instrumentation of
the individual package (see 1st Air Division Manual 55-9)
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were painted on the upper half and lower half of the camera
package. (C)
6. Camera turn-on time was determined by the Launch
Control Center, High Wycombe, En?=and, based on forecasted..
penetration. However, every reasonable effort was extended to
avoid photographing friendly ar:ezs. In no case was the camera
turn-on time to be such as to photograph the immediate launch
area and permit identification of the launch site. (TS)
7. Balloon launches were not scheduled when forecast
trajectories indicated a return to the European area or excessive
flight time prior to penetration of the target area. It was
directed that launches would be accomplished if forecast
trajectories indicated penetration of meridian 45E within the
time periods indicated for sites as follows: (TS)
a,
b,
c.
d.
e.
Oberpfaffenhofen -
Adana -
Gardermoen -
Evanton -
Giebelstadt -
60 hours
24 hours
48 hours
72 hours
60 hours
(TS)
8. HF and VHF radio-on time specified for each launch
was as follows: (TS)
a. Standard Setting:
(1)
Germany sites -
80 hours
(2)
Adana -
50 hours
(3)
Gardermoe'.. -
84 hours
(4)
Evanton -
90 hours
(TS)
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9. Balloons which failed during ascent oar at altitude
and descended within friendly borders were recovered by United
States Air Force in Europe units under instructions contained
in the United States Air Force Stray Recovery Plan. (S)
10. Balloon ascent and flight at floating altitude
was monitored by MSQ-2 radar, radiosonde, theodolite and visual
means. (S)
11. The two German sites and Gardermoen were located
in close proximity to unfriendly borders. 66CT balloons were
launched from these sites so as to penetrate the target area
during hours of darkness (or in daylight if above 48,000 feet),
since the initial altitude of this balloon was approximately
46,000 feet. (TS)
12. Based on expected success rates due to trajectories,
priority for launching by site was established as follows: (TS)
a. Priority 1 - Gardermoen
b. Priority 2 - Giebelstadt and Oberpfaffenhofen
c. Priority 3 - Adana
d. Priority 4 - Evanton (TS)
F. After the start of the operation, it became evident that,
to accomplish our primary mission, an intensive program of
system refinement was necessary. The many problems that arose
through restrictions to launch operations from the standpoint
of weather, civil reactions and system malfunctions necessitated
field test, (which are discussed in detail under Tab "C"), and
changes to our original launch criteria. A brief summary of
these actions are as follows: (S)
1. With a late start in actual operations, it was
readily discerned that immediate advantage would have to be
taken of any favorable trajectories. It was decided to waive
the previous policy of restricting launches wneiiever unfavorable
surface conditions were prevalent, therefore balloons were
launched successfully during ground fog or light icing conditions,
but not heavy precipitation. Due to the civil situation
existing in Norway, a special set of launch restrictions was
placed on the Gardermoen detachment. (S)
2. In consonance with Moby Dick Hi findings and after
an adequate sampling had been obtained during the primary
mission, it was. determined that balloons with serial numbers of
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949 and below would produce an unacceptably high failure rate.
Therefore, it was directed that only 128TT balloons with serial
numbers of 950 and above would be launched. All 128TT's with
serial numbers of 949 and below were set aside. (S)
3. After 21 days of operation, it was believed that
excessive losses were attributable in part to the capability
of unfriendly'forces to track the balloons through their
HF transmissions. Consequently, on 31 January 1956, twelve
hours were added, and on 3 February 1956, eighteen hours more
were added to the radio turn on times for all sites, except
Adana. (See paragraph IC3 Tab F, Chapter III) As of the stand-
down date of 6 February 1956, radio turn-on times were as
follows: (TS)
a.
Germany sites
11.0 hours
b.
Adana
50 hours
c.
Gardermoen
114 hours
d.
Evanton
120 hours
To deny tracking of balloons by unfriendly forces, a few balloons
were launched from Adana with the HF transmitter silent. VHF
turn on was bessd on the established time settings outlined above.
Results were inconclusive, however, if operations were renewed,
it was desired to fly all systems with silent hW until the finai
day of expected life (i.e., 5, 7, 72, or 8 days).
4. Reports arriving from the recovery area. indi. a..F:d
that the water stations and locator beacons were not functioning
as anticipated. The failure of the water station, coupled with
a report of personnel injury by the explosion of a portion of
one of the downed gondolas, resulted in the :immediate de-
activation of all water stations. Since the water station was
deactivated, a test program was immediately initiated to
determine If the water station could be removed without influencing
the water floating position of the DMQ-1 package. In the interim
period, the water station was left attached to all, gondolas but
was deactivated and had the squib, deployment bag, and pickup
rope deleted from the system. (S)
5. Subsequently, as a result of specific 'testing in
the field, it was determined that some of our previous launch
criteria would have to be amended as follows: (U)
a. 128TT - Free lift, formerly 7%, was changed to
a minimum of 5% and a maximum of 10%. Desired free lift 7 percent. This insured that balloons would ascend under adverse
weather conditions, cover personnel computation errors and still.
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not endanger the balloon. (C)
b. 66CT - Free lift, formerly 7%, was changed to a
minimum of 7% and a maximum of 15%. Desired free lift was 10%.
This insured same advantage as for 128TT's. (C)
c. Adana - Initial altitude of 49,000 feet with
night floating altitude of 44,000 feet and ballast for 5 days. (TS)
d. 128TT: All Launch Sites - The initial altitude
was changed to 54,000 feet and the night floating altitude to
50,000 feet. If operations were renewed after launches were
terminated by directive on the 6th of February 1956, it was
desired that these balloons be flown with initial altitudes of
60,000 and 76,000 feet with a night floatin altitude of 55,000
feet. (See Chapter I, paragraph V F2.) (S)
G. Inclosures 1 through 5 contained in this Tab depict the
locations where the balloons that failed upon ascent or soon
after attaining floating altitude were recovered. Inclosure 6
this Tab, depicts the locations where the balloons that accom-
plished successful flight without known penetration of the target
area were recovered. (S)
H. Conclusions:
1. The delay in commencing the operation (from 1
December 1955 to 10 January 1956) compressed the project, time-
wise, to within a very short period of favorable winds. This,
together with a restricted launch rate may have precluded launch
of the total 2,500 systems during conditions of most favorable
winds if the project had been continued. (S)
2. Deficient polyethelyne and manufacturing defects
caused a deficit of approximately 700 balloons in the operational
inventory. (C)
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LOCATION WHERE KNOWN FAILURES WERE RECOV 2ED
(Format for 8x10 1/2 paper.)
119
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(Format for 8x10 1/2 paper.)
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Lo ires
~~.. i~PGy~ ~'Y? Ili=.~ ~L~E c:.~. U;; i;.~:.c.at ,.
7-slaSt?'.ai7
C 1~'. )l E'i,. ce 1t5.r 6 `_ act ro )o 1~ ...11~3t..~-.~. '.'!c!L' _ _a1
172 D-582
up ~E?RE
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 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0
F. Ths mod if:.~.cation to limit 'sy; te^Y cpr u..ic- : c
C /'1_Z~1t hours c!+.~lked 1t1 ii '_ t~='L1 j~. C l 1r c_~: _a _._ IJ Y'?
recovered which had boc:Y. nodifi ed to "trcvide a scaara tc LL~-l
power soure These systems o erated roi?^.c,11y. (C)
G. Condensation of moisture on the. inside the dal -&-'.
recorder !,az: 1 Port obsc',_:rcd do '"i 1 jr, `,C'' of the total hazel film 1roeessed, Inecaciusi~io c' 7:
h ne
ixL!icate that this condensation may not occur tr ;.n ..,_c:os ivc
degree when '1-'he desiccant has boon pi7 ctuo t. his 1
{:~~;~.tt;iC Lb i1:l.tic.Ut;e: .:ii,,,C'ilt ~i1G y).PL J?.e"Va \- /
e._ ...r':. ....:~
-a. C:
Fi. Al]. photo cc: ;;e~ra~e rer:eivec. by '_c~rcl: -.~t
...~r' 5 n.
I::I1~_.?.:..a.tlfi:! Center as, of 1 ?'w,.h l9:J-) 1'lci.o :.::`.'.ti ;.,~:Cu`_'1?..t.J J
lotto'. The following is quoted from a report, on an ova11;; 'ton
of the eographic positions computed by :;erenau ice.l Chart and
Information Center from hazel data: (S )
111. Computed hazel coorc inates were to f i_.a1
hole i r1e: eu coordjnates and differences of
position recorded. Results were grouped as io'_l,
C.'11E'1CR I Cc.-m-) uta.tions with lees Phan ~'Ylls ~ ` _: e%
error.
CATE_'UZY II Cr,^.:,,_. :iJYl with 1a_- i1 1a..
/ .,l , e ti rnn r . l,l l ) .
Cfi"''D-.C?Y III _1:?--?-
de reel e ro (iclu,I'._
T j 7 ) .
C.:! r'.EC CRY IV C.. with less ",'-all e "7:'Dr (ineJ_J(:il_v C_L_.T?i. TLE T, TI _.nd
III) .
1. t`a tat
T? 8 ?ULET
c ? , , , tM1 ,fit, { .,
CIi AECC Y III 9 `'
C.''.TrGC''Y IV 9
Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0
173 D-582
 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0
VOp ?EIET
The acc);r? cy of hazel computations dopee c c?a `he
1Cy to ~.~ d e. the ..,: z y 9s ~!.a,- nui J '.'.
ability e~.ii~ _i.. ~,.,, :1?'.?.~i.t:c:, ~. ~~.