THE CIA REPORT THE PRESIDENT DOESN'T WANT YOU TO READ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00552R000800090008-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 16, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

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The Pike Papers: An Introduction by Aaron Latham
"... Inadequate controls, even
less auditing, and an over-
abundance of secrecy ..."
Page 72
"... [The Tet offensive]
flatly challenged the reassuring
picture intelligence in Saigon
and Washington had helped
present to the American
people . . ." Page 76
... The entire system had
malfunctioned. Massive
amounts of data had proven
indigestible by analysts ..
Page 78
rOnTUGAL
"... [T]he U.S. intelligence
community had not even been
tasked to probe deeply into
Portugal in the waning
months of the Caetano
dictatorship ..." Page 79
"... Intelligence clearly failed
to provide adequate warning
of the coup, and it performed
indifferently once the crisis
begun ..." Page 80
10 El: F E S 'T 1,1
... The three individual
branches of the military resist
any organization which might
curb their authority ..."
Page 82
T
'COVE RW101
... The Committee ... has
considerable evidence that
[covert action operations]
are iregularly approved,
sloppily implemented, and at
times have been forced on A
reluctant CIA by the President
and his National Security
Advisor . . ." Page 83.
AGE
.., Apparently at the direc-
tion of National Security
Council aides, the task force
recommendation [against
military intervention] was
removed from the report and
presented to NSC members as
merely one policy,option ..."
Page 85
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ntTaroduction t
BY AARON LATIIAM
These are not the Pentagon Papers,
but there are points, of similarity. For,
once again, an American president has
set himself against the publication of a
government study of dangerous govern-
mental adventures. Once again the
White House is seeking to protect the
American people from a reading of a
part of their own history.
The history in this case was written
by the House Select Committee on In-
telligence, which is chaired by New
York Congressman Otis Pike. The com-
mittee's report was finished on January
19, 1976, but ten days later the House of
Representatives voted not to release it
until it is censored by the executive
branch. Since the report details at great
length all the obstacles which the execu-
tive branch put in the way of the Pike
committee from the beginning of its
work to the end, the White House would
not seem the ideal, unbiased expurgator.
If the executive branch "sanitized"
the' report the way it sanitized many of
the documents it turned over to the corn-
mittee, little would remain. For, accord-
ing to the report, "sanitized" quite often
turned out to be "merely a euphemism
for blank sheets of paper with a few
scattered words left in, often illegible,
sometimes misleading, and usually in-
conclusive. One page was blank except
for the following: "3/ND/DOLL-VNM/
T-0144.6SG TRANSLATED DECRYPT
UNJAC/VN NR I Y 30/300G FM IJB
TO CQ INFO BBM STOP CNMB
30119 5610M Tol: 30JA68/10/22 300."
Another page was blank except for the
"TOP SECRET" stamp.
At the moment, the White House and
The House are stalemated. Perhaps this
unofficial publication of the Pike Papers
will moot that stalemate. The reports are
now in the custody of Carl Albert, the
Speaker of the House, who must decide
what the House's next move will be.
One Congressional source says that Al-
bert plans simply to sit on the report
until the press prints it. Then he will be
able to move to make it public officially.
The Pike committee report is divided
into three sections: (1) "The Select
Committee's Oversight Experience" .. .
(Ii) "The Select Committee's Investiga-
tive Record" . and (iiI) "Recom-
mendations." In the text which follows
this introduction, we are printing only
the second section and even here some
of the footnotes have had to be trimmed
for space reasons. (As a result, the foot-
notes are not numbered consecutively;
we have followed the committee report's
numbering throughout.) We chose to omit
the first section because it is primarily a
record of the committee's frustrations
rather than its findings. We had no
choice but to leave out the third section,
the recommendations section, since, as
we went to press, these had not yet been
written.
The first section of the report, missing
here, begins with this sentence: "if the
Committee's recent experience is any
test, intelligence agencies that are to be
controlled by Congressional lawmaking
are, today, beyond lawmaker's scrutiny."
The document then goes on to present
an 81-page catalog of obstruction which
begins but does not end with the "sani-
tizing" of papers.
For example, one Pike committee wit-
ness was harassed. A man named Martin
Kaiser, who manufactures wiretap equip-
ment, testified that the FBI bought eaves-
dropping devices from him through a
middleman, the U.S. Recording Coin-
.ca.,.`:iG..?--.
It is disturbing that the consequences of iniclli-
gencc activities are sometimes apparently given scant
consideration by policy makers. Even more troubling
are indications that this insensitivity continues when
clangers reveal themselves.
1. Covert Action
The Commitice has examined CIA covert action
operations and has considerable evidence that they
are irregularly approved, sloppily implemented, and
at times have been forced of it reluctant CIA by the
President and his National Security Advisor,
"Covert action" may be defined as clandestine ac-
tivity other than purely information-gathering, which
is directed at producing a particular political, eco-
nomic, or military result.
Successive administrations have cited Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947 as the legal justi-
fication for covert action 43t During the course of this
investigation, the Special Counsel to the Director of
Central intelligence. has argued that the President, in
his conduct of foreign relations, has an inherent Con-
stitutional mandate to authorize these activities 432
On the other hand, in recent years, commentators
have maintained that in establishing the CIA, Con-
gress had no specific intention that covert operations
apart from intelligence-gathering missions be con-
ducted. Witnesses before the Committee likewise dis-
puled any inherent Constitutional power to conduct
covert actions. In any event, Congress has implicitly
acquiesced in covert action through the oversight
process.
It may be argued that there has been explicit ap-
proval as well. Just as the War Powers Act acknow-
ledges the authority of the President to conduct overt
military hostilities, albeit for a limited period, without
a Congressional declaration of war, the Ryan-Hughes
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974434
formally acknowledges the existence and legality of
covert action.
The Committee has surveyed all Forty Committee
approvals since 1965, and has delved deeply into
three recent covert action projects. It is believed that
the Committee's review of ten years of covert action
is without precedent in the Congress or the executive
branch.
a. Ten Year Survey
Our primary Purpose was to determine whether
the Forty Committee and its predecessors had been
exercising their oversight and control responsibilities
from 1965 to date 435 To do this, it was necessary to
trace the process from proposal to final approval.
Like other aspects of covert action, fixing respon-
sibility for the initiation of various covert action
projects was a difficult task. As recorded in Forty
Committee records, the vast majority of projects was
submitted by the CIA, 88 percent of the total projects
since 1965. The high number of covert action pro-
posals represents a general activism within the for-
eign affairs bureaucracy, especially within CIA.
The overall picture, however, does not support the
contention that covert action has been used in fur-
therance of any particular principle, form of govern-
ment, or identifiable national interest. Instead, the
record indicates a gencrail lack of a long-term direc-
tion in U.S. foreign policy. Covert actions, as the
means for implementing a policy, reflected this band-
aid approach, substituting short-term remedies for
problems which required long-term cures.
Covert action proposals came from a variety. of
interest areas: a foreign head of state, the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Department of State. an Ambas-
sador, CIA, the Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs, a cabinet member, or the
President himself.
Proposals involving a large expenditure of funds
or classified as "politically sensitive." required re-
view and approval of the Forty Committee. Unfortu-
nately, the executive branch does not have a clear
definition of what constitutes a large or politically
sensitive operation. Projects of less sensitivity are ap-
proved within the CIA, usually at the level of the
Deputy Director for Operations, with the determina-
tion of "political sensitivity" being left to the Director
of Central Intelligence..
The Forty Committee is chaired by the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs and in-
cludes the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under-
secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Chairman
of the joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. Theoretically, a detailed proposal
is presented to this group. The members are then
allurded an opportunity for a full discussion of file
merits and a reporting of their views to the President.
In practice, the Potty Committee has often been little
more [hall a rubber slant p.
The procedures for approval of covert action have
changed with administrations, political conditions and
personalities. At various times, the approval process
has been relatively informal, extraordinarily secretive,
and pro-forma.
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While on occasion some projects havcibycn; fot11-,I.t t C. Media and Pro,[ tg~M?c}a 1,
,
sidercd in depth, at Committee meetings which id- -,: -- -- -- - - - - --t-r -
eluded the approval or disapproval by formal votes,
several informal procedures have frequently been
used. These informal procedures, such as telephonic
votes, do not allow each member to benefit from the
views of his colleagues. At times, members have been
given only the barest of details, and instead of formal
votes have simply been.allowed the opportunity to
acknowledge the project's existence.
The Forty Committee has only one full-time pro-
fessional staff member. Because of the high degree
of compartmentation attending these projects, com-
mittee members-wbo are among the busiest officials
in government-are frequently in the. position of
evaluating it complex proposal without adequate stall
support. The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs and the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, having the incentive and the resources to cope
with Forty Committee business, clearly dominate the
process.
The origin of many covert action projects is murky
Some 29 percent of Forty Committee-approved co-
vert actions were for media and propaganda projects.
This number is probably not representative. Staff has
determined the existence of a large number of CIA
internally-approved operations of this type, apparent-
ly deemed not politically sensitive. It is believed that
if the correct number of all media and propaganda
projects could be determined, it would exceed Elec-
tion Support as the largest single category of covert
action projects undertaken by the CIA.
Activities have included support of friendly media,
major propaganda efforts, insertion of articles into the
local press, and distribution of books and leaflets. By
far the largest single recipient has been a European
publishing house funded since 1951. There are a num-
her of similar operations in the region. About 25 per-
cent of the program has been directed at the Soviet
Bloc, in the publication and clandestine import and
export of Western and Soviet dissident literature.
at best.
The CIA, as the prospective implementation arm, d. Paramilitary/Arms Transfers
is often directed to produce proposals for covert Sc- ------
tion and is, therefore, incorrectly seen as a plan's The 23 percent approvals in this category from 1965
original proponent. It is clear that on several occa- to 1975 have taken one of cscntially four forms: secret
sions involving highly sensitive projects, CIA was armies, financial support to groups engaged in hostili-
summarily ordered by the President or his National
Security advisor to carry out a covert action program.
It is further clear that CIA has been ordered to engage
in covert action over the Agency's strong prior
objections.
All evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far
from being out of control, has been utterly respon-
sive to the instructions of the President and the As-
sistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
It must be remembered, however, that the CIA Di-
rector determines which CIA-initiated covert action
projects are sufficiently "politically sensitive" to re-
quire Presidential attention.
From 1965 to 1972, a majority of approvals oc-
curred subsequent to a formal committee meeting; al-
though many telephonic approvals also took place dur-
ing this period. In 1972, the process became quite infor-
mal, often involving mere notification to members
that an operation had already been set in motion by
the President. The Forty Committee, as the review
and approval mechanism for covert action, fell into
virtual disuse, with telephonic approvals being the
rule and formal meetings the exception. One formal
meeting was held in 1972, none in 1973 and 1974,
This process did not begin to reverse itself until 1975.
b. Election Support
From 1965 to elate, 32 percent of Forty Committee
approved covert action projects were for providing
some form of financial election support to foreign
parties and individuals. Such support could be nega-
tive as well as positive. This is the largest covert ac-
tion category, and its funding has occurred in large
part in the developing countries. With few exceptions,
financial support has been given to incumbent moder-
ate party leaders and heads of State.
Certain projects have had a long life. One Third
World leader received some $960,000 over a 14-year
period. Others were financially supported for over a
dCCad6.
ties; paramilitary training and advisers; and shipment
of arms, ammunition and other military equipment.
Military ordnance is typically supplied by CIA out of
its large inventory of U.S. weaponry and captured
foreign weapons.
The Committee scrutinized these projects careful-
ly, since this category is the most expensive and rep-
resents the greatest potential for escalating hostilities
and deepening American involvement. By far the most
interesting, and important, fact to emerge was the
recognition that the great majority of these covert ac-
tion projects were proposed by parties outside CIA.
Many of these programs were summarily ordered, over
CIA objections. CIA misgivings, however, were at
times weakly expressed, as CIA is afflicted with a "can
do" attitude.
At times, CIA has been used as a conduit for arms
transfers in order to bypass Congressional scrutiny.
A State Department-proposed project which could
have been accomplished under the Military Assistance
Program was tasked on CIA because the Department
of Defense did not desire to return to Congress for
additional funds and approval.
e. Organizational Support
A plethora of foreign, civic, religious, professional,
and labor organizations have received CIA funding,
There has been no real geographical concentration,
although the Third World was again well represented.
For example, one labor confederation in a developing
country received an annual subsidy of $30,000 in
three successive years.
f. Trends
Since 1965, [here has been a general decline in the
number of covert action projects approved by the
Forty Committee. -[here are indications that the low
figure represents the Director of Central In tell igence's
'dctcrlnimui'on tlirlf'ntot as' ntdny pfojects-rhoiYld be,
considered "politically sensitive" and' Cakcn-fo the
Forty Committee for approval. This, inn fifrn~titay
reflect his recognition that the Forty Committee had
fallen into disuse and their approvals pro-forma.
There is no indication that the passage of the Ryan-
Hughes Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1974, requiring Presidential certification and brief-
ings of Congressional oversight committees, has had
it significant impact on the national covert action
program. As the events of 1975 have shown, those
who had warned that the Amendment and the Con-
gressional probes into the U.S. intelligence commun-
ity would make covert action impossible, have not
seen their fears realized.
g. Three Projects
The three projects examined in depth were selected
from major recent operations, apart from the An7eri-
can experience in Indochina, and involved different
types of covert activity. One was election funding of
pro-U.S. elements in an allied country. The second
was Presidentially-directed arms support of an in-
surgency movement at the behest of the foreign head
of a third country. The last involved a mix of politi-
cal action, military training, and assistance to pro-
Western forces in Angola. The last project was also
initiated in part at the request of a third party.
The Committee became aware of each of these
operations through other parts of its investigation
and through information provided to staff by sources
outside the intelligence community. For example, a
study of CIA arms inventories and shipments led to
the major Agency para-military support operations.
The case studies are not representative of all covert
action since 1965. The Committee does believe that
they are not atypical of most major programs of this
type. CIA has indicated its agreement with the com-
pleteness and factual accuracy of the staff's analysis,
though not necessarily with the conclusions.
Case 1: Election Support
The U.S., perhaps needlessly, expended some 510-
million in contributions to political parties, affiliated
organizations, and 21 individual candidates in a recent
parlimentary election [1972-editor's note] held in
an allied country447 [Italy-editor's note].
The program was initiated by our Ambassador
[Graham Martin-editor's note], who later persuaded
the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs [Remy Kissinger-editor's note] to authorize
him, rather than CIA, to select funding recipients
and otherwise control the program's implementation.
The results of the aid were mixed, and short-lived.
With national assembly elections less than two
years away, the U. S. country team concluded from
a CIA-contracted survey that the pro-U.S. elements,
which had governed the country since the post-war
period, were being seriously challenged by the Com-
munists: The opposition, apparently heavily financed
by Moscow, had scored gains in regional elections
and trailed the incumbents by only a few points in
the opinion polls.
Pro-West parties and affiliates had received sub-
stantial funding in the past. CIA reports total U.S.
election financing over a previous 20-year period at
some $65 milllon448 Despite this massive aid, the
beneficiaries had suffered repeated electoral setbacks.
American observers apparently concluded that an-
other "quick fix" was necessary to see our clients
through the next vote.
Anxious to gain control of the covert program, and
fearing that inter-agency consideration would be in-
hibiting, the Ambassador has originally sought the
President's personal approval of this proposed politi-
cal action 449
This course would avoid the Forty Comntittce and,
with it, the inevitable role of CIA in implementing
the program. The Ambassador was rebuffed. boar=
cally, the Assistant to the President then requested
that CIA draft a proposal without the knowledge of
the Ambassador or the Department of State 450
It is known that during this period the President
was indirectly approached by prominent international
businessmen, who were former nationals of the allied
county. '[heir communications to the ]'resident were
not available to the Contmittee.451
The Forty Committee subsequently approved the
CIA proposal, but with unusual implementation. De-
spite the usual near-automatic control of covert action
by CIA, the Ambassador, by all accounts a man of
unusual force, successfully extracted fr,n) the As-
sistant to the President the commitment that he would
have total control of the "mix and implementation"
of the project 452 Thus, the Ambassador, who had
been in the country less than two years and did not
speak the language, would determine which individ-
uals' aniloi-gsidzaticSns'thaultl'rL' ivc .U.b, funds: The
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CIA station would be reduced to couriers. The Agency
expressed concern that a high profile by the Ambas-
sador would needlessly compromise the program;
their complaints fell on deaf cars, despite the agree-
ment of all that exposure would bring down the pro-
West government.
A major political party received $3.4 million; a
political organization created and supported by CIA,
$3.4 million; other organizations and parties, a total
of $1.3 million. Substantial funds were provided to
several incumbents whose seats did not appear in
jeopardy. Of a total of $11.8 million approved by
the Forty Committee, only $9.9 million was actually
spent. The reserve was held to be spent in the fol-
lowing year.
CIA concurred in most of the recipients chosen
by the Ambassador, although differences were ex-
pressed on precise amounts. There were serious dis=
agreements over some recipients. One of these was it
high local intelligence official to whom the Ambassador
wanted to give over $800,000, to conduct a propa-
ganda effort. The Ambassador was unmoved by CIA
warnings that the man was clearly linked to anti-
democratic elements of the right, and went ahead with
the fnnding456
Embassy control of the funds was poor. Participants
in the program testified before the Committee that
little effort was made to earmark grants or, failing
that, at least seek assurances that the money was
spent as intended by the Forty Committee. The
Ambassador resisted most CIA control suggestions,
insisting that such monitoring would insult the re-
cipients. Thus, there was almost no accounting or
control of the expenditures.457 There is no indication
that the Ambassador began to encounter interference
from Washington at this point.
The fruits of this U.S. investment are difficult to
assess. The pro-U.S. elements retained control of the
government by a small plurality, and most of the
incumbents supported were returned to office. On the
other hand, the ruling coalition quickly lost public
support and suffered severe reverses in subsequent
local elections.
ment of ?Stt l; ' hich had consistently opposed such
ventures in the region, be kept in the dark.464
Perhaps more than the President's disregard of the
Forty Committee, the apparent "no win" policy of
the U.S. and its ally deeply disturbed this Committee.
Documents in the Committee's possession clearly show
that the President, Dr. Kissinger and the foreign head
of state hoped that our clients would not prevail465
They preferred instead that the insurgents simply con-
tinue a level of hostilities sufficient to sap the re-
sources of our ally's neighboring country.466 This
policy was not imparted to our clients, who were
encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context
of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise.
It is particularly ironic that, despite President
Nixon's and Dr. Kissinger's encouragement of hostili-
ties to keep the target country off-balance, the United
States personally restrained the insurgents from an
all-out offensive on one occasion when such an attack
might have been successful because other events were
occupying the neighboring country.467
All U.S. aid was channeled through our colla-
borator, without whose logistical help direct assist-
ance would have been impossible. Our national
interest had thus become effectively meshed with his.
Accordingly, when our ally reached an agreement with
the target country and abruptly ended hisown aid to
the insurgents, the U.S. had no choice but to acqui-
esce. The extent of our ally's leverage over U.S. policy
was such that he apparently made no effort to notify
his junior American partners that the program's end
was near.
The insurgents were clearly taken by surprise as
well. Their adversaries, knowing of the impending
aid cut-off, launched an all-out search-and-destroy
campaign the day after the agreement was signed 469
The autonomy movement was over and our former
clients scattered before the central government's su-
perior forces 470
The cynicism of the U.S. and its ally had not yet
completely run its course, however. Despite direct
pleas from the insurgent leader and the CIA station
chief in the area to the President and Dr. Kissinger,
the U.S. refused to extend humanitarian asistance to
the thousands of refugees created by the. abrupt ter-
mination of military aid. As the Committee staff was
reminded by a high U.S. official, "covert action should
not be confused with missionary work."47t
thsf U:S. aid should not be given solely to Roberto,
but instead, divided between him and UNITA's Jonas
Savimbi.
The Committee has learned that a task force com-
posed of high U.S. experts on Africa477 strongly op-
posed military intervention; instead, last April they
called for diplomatic efforts to encourage a political
settlement among the three factions to avert blood-
shed. Apparently at the direction of National Security
Council aides, the task force recommendation was
removed from the report and presented to NSC mem-
bers as merely one policy option. The other two
alternatives were a hands-off policy or substantial
military intervention.
Of CIA's $31 million figure, said to represent ex-
penditures to the end of 1975, about half is attributed
to supply of light arms, mortars, ammunition, vehicles,
boats, and communication equipment. The balance,
includes shipping expenses and cash payments. The
Committee has reason to question the accuracy of
CIA's valuation of military equipment sent to Angola.
A staff accountant on loan from the General Ac-
counting Office has determined that CIA "costing"
procedures and the use of surplus equipment 'have
resulted in a substantial understatement of the' value
of U.S. aid. Examples include .45 caliber automatic
weapons "valued" by CIA at $5.00 each and .30
caliber semi-automatic carbines at $7.55. Based on a
sampling of ordnance cost figures and a comparison
with Department of Defense procedures, staff advises
that the CIA's ordnance figure should at least be
doubled.
Dr. Kissinger has indicated that U.S. military in-
tervention in Angola is based on three factors: Soviet
support of the MPLA and the USSR's increased
presence in Africa, U.S. policy to encourage moderate
independence groups in southern Africa, and the U.S.
interest in promoting the stability of Mobutu and
other leadership figures in the area. Past support to
-Mobutu, along with his responsiveness to some of the
United States recent diplomatic needs for Third
World support, make it equally likely that the para-
mount factor in the U.S. involvement is Dr. Kissin-
ger's desire to reward and protect African leaders in
the area. The U.S.'s expressed opposition to the
MPLA is puzzling in view of Director's Colby's state-
ment to the Committee that there are scant ideological
differences among the three factions, all of whom are
nationalists above all else481
Control of resources may be a factor. Angola has
significant oil deposits and two American multina-
tionals, Gulf and Texaco, operate in the off-shore
area. Gulf had deposited some $100 million in con-
cession fees in a national bank now under MPLA
control. At the suggestion of the U.S. government, the
company suspended further payments.
Until recently, the U.S-backed National Front was
supported by the People's Republic of China, which
had provided about 100 military advisors. Moboutu
has provided a staging area for U.S. arms shipments
and has periodically sent Zairois troops, trained by
the Republic of North Korea, into Angola to support
Roberto's operations. Small numbers of South African
forces have been in the country and are known to
have been in contact with Savimbi's UNITA troops.
Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1974, the President has found that the Angola
action program is "important to the national secur-
ity." As directed by the Act, CIA has briefed the
Congressional oversight committees as to the Forty
Committee approvals of increased amounts of military
aid.
CIA officials have testified to the Committee that
there appears to be little hope of an outright MPLA
military defeat. Instead, U.S. efforts are now aimed at
promoting a stalemate, and in turn. the ceasefire and
the coalition government urged by the long-forgotten
NSC task force.
-Case 2: Arms Support
[At this point in the committee report one manuscript
page was missing. It is clear from the context that the
missing material opened a discussion of a U.S. scheme,
involving the Shah of Iran, to channel secret aid to
the Kurds in their rebellion against the government
of Iraq.]459
The program, ultimately to involve some $16-
million, was apparently endorsed by the President
after a private meeting with the foreign head of state
and Dr. Kissinger.
There was no Forty Committee meeting at which.
a formal proposal paper containing both pros and
cons could be discussed and voted on. Instead,
members were simply directed to acknowledge receipt
of a sparse, one-paragraph description of the operation.
In a setting of almost unprecedented secrecy within
the U.S. government, John B. Connally, the former
Treasury Secretary, about to assume a major role in
the President's re-election campaign, personally ad-
vised the head of state that the U.S. would cooper-
ate46t
The recipients of U.S. arms and cash were an in-
surgent ethnic group fighting for autonomy in a
country bordering our ally. The bordering county and
our ally had long been bitter enemies. They differed
substantially in ideological orientation and in their
relations with the U.S.
Evidence collected by the Committee suggests that
the project was initiated primarily as a favor to our
ally, who had cooperated with U.S. intelligence agen-
cies, and who had come to feel menaced by his
neighbor.
As our ally's aid dwarfed the U.S. aid package, our
assistance can be seen as largely symbolic. Documents
made available to the Committee indicate that the
U.S. acted in effect as a guarantor that the insurgent
group would not he summarily dropped by, the foreign
head of state.4 2 Notwithstanding these implicit as-
surances, the insurgents were abruptly cut off by our
ally, three years, thousands of deaths, and 16 million
U.S. dollars later463
It appears that, had the U.S. not reinforced our
ally's prodding, the insurgents may have reached an
accommodation with the central government, thus
gaining at least a measure of autonomy while avoiding
further bloodshed. Instead. our clients fought on, sus-
taining thousands of casualties and 200,000 refugees.
There is little doubt (fiat the highly unusual security
precautions and the circumvention of the Forty Com-
mittee were the product of fears by the President and
Dr. Kissinger that details of the project would other-
wise leak-a result which by all accounts would have
mightily displeased,qulr..ally,, ,11 is also,clc'ag thpt. tic,
secrecy was motivated by a desire that the Depart-
Case 3: Angola
For reasons not altogether clear, and despite the
opposition of senior government officials, the U.S. has
been heavily involved in the current civil war in
Angola.
The CIA has informed the Committee that since
January 1975, it had expended over $31 million in
military hardware, transportation costs, and cash pay-
merits by the end of 1975. The Committee has reason
to believe that the actual U.S. investment is much
higher. Information supplied to the Committee also
suggests that the military intervention of the Soviet
Union and Cuba is in large part a reaction to U.S.
efforts to break a political stalemate, in favor of its
clients.
The beneficiaries of U.S. aid are two of the three
contesting factions: the National Front for the Inde-
pendence of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The
third faction contesting for control of the government,
following independence on November 11, 1975, is the
Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA). CIA estimates that the fighting
had claimed several thousand casualties by the end
of 1975.
The main U.S. client is the National Front, headed
by Holden Roberto, a longtime associate and relative
of President Mobutu Sese Scko of neighboring Zaire.
Subsequent to President Mobutu's request last winter
to Dr. Kissinger, as independence for Angola became
a certainty and liberation groups began to jockey for
position, the Forty Committee approved furnishing
Roberto $300,000 for various political action activi-
ties474 restricted to non-military objectives.
Later events have suggested that this infusion of
U.S. aid unprecedented475 and massive in the under-
developed colony, may have panicked the Soviets into
arming their MPLA clients, whom they had backed
for over a decade and who were now in clanger of
being eclipsed by the National Front. Events in Angola
took a bellicose turn as the U.S. was requested by
['resident Mobutu to make a serious military invest-
nuent:
In early June, 1975. CIA prepared it proposal paper
for military aid to pro-U.S. elements in Angola. the
cost of which was set at S6 million. A revised pro-
pram, costing $14 pillion, was approved by the Forty
Committee and by President Ford in filly. This was
increased ty. $25 nillion,in,Augusl. and tp,glmtrt S32
pillion in November. By mid-sunnier, it was decided
Footnotes:
431Section 102 (d) (5) calls on CIA, tinder Na-
tional Security Council direction, "to perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence af-
fecling the national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct."
412Mitchell Rogovin, Counsel to the DCi, argued
that "before there was a 1947 Act there was a United
States and a United States with a President with the
authority to conduct foreign affairs and lie conducted
such affairs over the history of the nation which in-
volved activity which we now know as covert activ-
ity. Now the 1947 Act did not give the President a
power lie did not have before. The 1947 Act merely
came upon the scene as it was and it set up the Na-
tional Security Council. The Council itself subse-
quently took its authority and devised a 40 Committee
Its an iinplemcniing system for getting information
with respect to covert activity. So [hilt the activity in
1972 grew from two seperate legal authorities for the
President to pursue."
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434Section 32 of Public Law 93-559 (The Foreign I
Assistance Act Amendments of 1974) slates in part:
"No funds appropriated under the authority of this
or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of
the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in
foreign countries, other than activities intended solely
for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until
the President of the United States finds that each
such operation is important to the national security
of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion,
a description and scope of such operation to the ap-
propriate committees of the Congress, including the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
United States Ilouse of Representatives." The remain-
ing four committees are the Armed Services and Ap-
propriations Committees of the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate.
435Subsequcnt to a subpoena issued by the Committee
on Nov. 6, 1975, two staff members reviewed all
records of the Forty Committee reflecting approvals
for Covert Action from 1965 to 1975. All information
and statistics used in the section entitled "Ten Year
Survey" are drawn from the staff review of those
documents. The staff presented their findings to the
full Committee in Executive Session testimony on
Dec. 9, 1975. During that session, Mr. Colby had an
opportunity to express his views on the staff report
and while he had reservations about the conclusions,
he raised no substantial disagreement with the facts.
44711 appears clear that this expenditure was made
despite the fact that money was "not the problem."
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters in Washington 3 March
"Ambassador continues to cogitate on nature, amount
and channel for financial assistance an dtelling Sta-
tion very little. He is aware of Station view that
money is not the problem, [deleted] has plenty and
any amount we contribue to [deleted] will have in-
significant effect on electoral showing. If we could
months of the project that he would go directly to
the President for his approval, and that he would
exclude the CIA from whatever plans lie would pro-
pose.
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD 14 JULY
Cable from Chief of Station
To Ileadquartcrs 13 March
"Ambassador [deleted] case (which he hopes present
to President [deleted] and [National Security Ad-
visor]), and not to State Department or 40 Commit-
tee . Imperative keep these observations as priv-
ileged within CIA owing Ambassador [deleted]
explicit admonitions to Chief of Station to effect lie
does not repeat not wish inform anyone in Washing-
ton his views until he personally sees President
[deleted]."
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 14 October
"Concur that Ambassador [deleted] will raise the
need for political action in [deleted] in the future
A key to his thinking is his strong conviction
that any political action program in [deleted] which
requires 'interagency approval' is not likely to get
off the ground."
Cable from Headquarters
To Chief of Station 15 October
. Keep in mind that Ambassador [deleted]
previous proposal re support of [projects in other
countries] . . . floundered in large measure because it
was not submitted through proper channels and thus
was not injected into interagency mechanism until too
]ate."
Nonetheless, the Ambassador stated to the Commit-
tee that lie had not really attempted to bypass the
Forty Committee.
reduce the pernicious eff
and get party to pull in
financial support. We do
ect of interparty squabbling
unison this would be worth
not exclude possibility Am-
Comm. Hearings
"CHAIRMAN PIKE. But was not an effort made to
have your plan approved by the President without
basador [deleted] will
strictly as a demonstratio
want to give some money
n of 'solidarity
' and a case
going through the Forty Committee route?
AMBASSADOR [deleted]. No sir, it would never
might be made for this,
worth." (Emphasis suppl
,
but not two million dollars
ied)
have occurred to me that this was even possible."
455The initial Forty Committee approval paper
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Central inielli-
which was drafted by the CIA stated
ViA:
Deputy Director of Plans
,
"4. Coordination.
SUBJECT:
Forty Committee Approval
"At the request of [National Security Advisor]
For Political Action Pro-
,
this program has not yet been coordinated with Am-
"Costs
gram 18 February
bassador or with the Bureau of [deleted] of the
De
t
f S
t
"
This program will cost $1.050,000 the first year and
par
ment o
ta
e.
The CIA, while waiting for the President to re-
$2,465,000 the second ,
."
spond to 'the Ambassador's proposal
did not believe
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Central Intelli-
,
that the CIA could wait indefinitely for that answer
gence
.
SUBJECT:
Ambassador [deleted]
Cable from Headquarters
Proposed [deleted] Elec.
tion Program 7 March
To CIA Chief of Station
"Costs
Of the $10,000,000, the $1,790,000 for the [deleted]
is to come from the budget approved on March 10 by
the 40 Committee ...$8,300,000 in new funds will
be required."
448MEMORANDUM FOR: The Forty Commitee
SUBJECT: Political Action Pro-
gram for [deleted] to
Arrest the Growing
Power of the Commu-
nists 10 March
"1. History of CIA Supported Political Action in [de-
leted]. The United States government was concerned
in 1948 that the Communists would emerge from the
national elections sufficiently strong to enter the gov-
ernment as a major if not dominant force. As a coun-
ter, it was decided that CIA should give $1,000,000
to the center parties for this election with the bulk
going to [deleted].
"Between 1948 and 1964 funds provided to [de-
leted] totaled approximately $5,450, 000. Between
1948 and 1963 additional support to [deleted] in
eight national and regional elections amounted to
$11,800,000, Between 1958 and 1968, the [deleted]
received about $26,000,000 to support its opposition
to the Communist dorninatecl labor confederation.
[deleted] received some $11,350,000 during this pe-
riod.
"Between 1948 and 1968 other organizations re-
ceived about $10,550,000 of CIA assistance. This sup-
port was given to the following political parties as-
sociated with center or center-left governments . .
"in sum, excluding the initial $1,000,000 spent in
the 1948 campaign, CIA gave [deleted] and its re-
lated organizations $54.600,000 as well as $10,550,000
to the other non-Communist parties and affiliates for
a grand total of $65,150,000 over approximately
twenty years, starting in 1948 .
4-44The Ambassador had decided during the first
"At this juncture, Ambassador [deleted] should not
repeat not be apprised of this draft paper's prepara-
tion. CIA is preparing this draft paper ... for internal
purposes and it will not repent not be discussed with
State at this time."
45tThe CIA, alluded to other approaches to the
President by private individuals.
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 10 February
"2. An important factor in Ambassador [deleted]
desire to present an action program is his problem
of how to cope with the many American and [de-
leted] channels to ('resident [deleted] office which
now exist. Ambassador [deleted] has bcconse aware
of this special character of [deletedl-U.S. relations
and is trying to get a handle on this problem rather
than having to react to the advice and influence of-
fered by others."
Cable from Chief of Station
To I-leadquarters 1I February
"B. Ambassador [deleted] insists that unless he pro-
ceeds quickly 'certain people' will push the White
House into a 'disastrous program.' The name of [art
international businessman who contacted the White
house] finally emerged, 'If you think the [right-wing
foreign -intelligence officer's] program is bad, you
should see the kind of stuff [international business-
man] is trying to sell.' In the Ambassador's view
'[international businessman] is further to the right
than [right-wing politician].'"
-Sfate Depaahiidrt offidiais'ite talks W4th-the Agency
also expressed reservations in dealing with these
channels to the White House.
"2. [State Department official] said that one of the
problems that he had in dealing with [deleted] af-
fairs is that people like [international businessman]
had excellent access to higher echelons of our gov-
ernment, and there was no way of knowing their
information input. He said that [international busi-
nessman] had very good relations with [deleted] of
the White House. (The international businessman
conducted foreign fund-raising activities for a U.S.
political party.)"
452Testimony given to the Committee by the CIA
Deputy Director for Operations states that " . .
The Forty Committee approval stated that Ambassa-
dor [deleted) would 'control the mix and implemen-
tation ...' of the program and would be expected to
'forward recommendations' for additional overt ac-
tivities which might be undertaken in support of U.S.
objectives in [deleted]." Comm. Hearings .. .
The Agency was uncomfortable with this unaccus-
tomed turn of events. In cables from the Station, it
was reiterated that the Ambassador was to be the one
calling the shots.
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters June
"I. Morning 4 June I delivered to Ambassador, a
sterile copy of your message. After reading it he com-
mented that They still do not understand that the
program as approved by 40 Committee and the Presi-
dent is only an illustrative one leaving to Ambassador
[deleted] the authority to decide what should be
done.'
"4. Headquarters is in error if it really believes fric-
tion with Ambassador [dcletcd] can be avoided if
Ambassador understands CIA views better. Ile under-
stands them only too well. It is this 'understanding'
that causes the friction and it will continue..."
The Agency and the Ambassador had frequent dis-
agreements over the "mix and implementation" of the
project and its developments.
Comm. Hearings at
"AMBASSADOR. One of the people who was here
this morning, the Acting Chief of Station, couldn't
get away from the fact that the Agency had tradition-
ally run all this and [thought that] the Agency knew
better what needed to be done and [couldn't accept]
what the 40 Committee had said and the President
had approved, that the authority and the mix and im-
plementation would be mine. He felt that if he dis-
agreed with something, that therefore they could veto
it and send it back; you see, for whatever. Yes. 1 did
object to this."
The Ambassador felt so strongly about his differ-
ences of opinion with the Acting Chief of Station that
he mentioned their disagreements nine times during
his testimony before the Committee.
The Ambassador reacted vigorously even when his
authority was questioned by [the National Security
adviser] and reviewed by the Forty Committee. When
[the National Security adviser] decided that the CIA
should submit a separate progress report of the proj-
ect to the Forty Committee, the Ambassador was
aroused.
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 28 February
"I. You should be aware that Ambassador [deleted]
reaction to (memo) was negative in the extreme. Ile
considers it offensive to him personally that the CIA
would submit annual report. Says it is not true that
[National Security adviser] 'ruled' that CIA submit
report. It was CIA that suggested that idea to hint ..."
At the annual 40 Committee review of the project,
reservations were expressed by the members on por-
tions of the operation, particularly the funding of a
moribund [political action group]. The Ambassador
was annoyed at this interference from Washington
and he apparently resorted to subterfuge. -
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 16 March
"I. Ambassador intensely annoyed by outcome of 40
Committee meeting.
"2. You will note that Ambassador's message states
he has committed additional [amount of money] to
[affiliated political action group] effort. This is not
repeat repeat not true. Ile was urged not to make this
statement because it: (A) not accurate and (13) still
not determined that [affiliated political action group]
could effectively use or auhsorb+tin s additional.amomit,
Ambassador said he insisted on reporting that funds
`committed for tactical reasons'.. .
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456T]to Ambassador and the CIA had sharp disagree-
ments about the funding of this [right-wing, senior
intelligence officer] and his propaganda program. In-
itially, the Chief of Station expressed his reservations
about the project to the Ambassador.
Cable from Chief of Station
To Headquarters 10 February
,.3. In response to Chief of Station's question, 'Do
you really care if [foreign intelligence officer] propa-
ganda efforts are successful or not,' Ambassador (dc-
leted] replied, 'Yes, I do, but not a helluva lot. Impor-
tant thing is to demonstrate solidarity fos the long
pull.' "
When the Chief of Station continued to resist fur-
ther on the funding, the Ambassador became very
annoyed .
Cable from Chief of Station
To Ieadquarters 11 February
"3. Ambassador [deleted] said Headquarters abso-
lutely wrong. Said he had discussed in Washington
(did not say with whom) and all agreed this was legit-
imate , . Chief of Station expressed the view that
Ambassador [deleted] should first clarify this point in
personal exchange with CIA . lie [Ambassador]
thereupon accused Chief of Station of dragging his
feet in contacting [foreign intelligence officer], and
said if this continued beyond today he would 'Instruct
Marine guards not to let you in this building and put
you on the airplane.' "Chief of Station said he thought
this a bit extreme and expressed view that Ambassa-
dor [deleted] could hardly object to what appeared
legitimate Headquarters question. lie did object and
with vigor."
The CIA headquarters shared the same concerns as
the Station Chief and warned the Ambassador in con-
ciliatory terms against funding, especially on a no-
strings-attached. . . .
457... Control over funding was so loose that there
was no way of checking to see if funds were being ex-
pended for the purposes for which they said the were
to be used. The Ambassador said before the Commit-
tee, "... I think as it turned out that we did get our
full money's worth.
"Now on the question of the possibility of a rip-
off, that is quite true. The possibility exists ..."
459[The beginning of this footnote was not available
-editor's note.] ... we do not wish to become in-
volved, even indirectly, in operations which would
have the effect of prolonging the insurgency, thereby
encouraging separatist aspirations and possibly pro-
viding to the Soviet Union an opportunity to create
difficulties for [two other U.S, allies]." A CIA cable
from the COS in the area to the DCI contains the
U.S. Ambassador's views on the proposal: "My re-
action is against giving financial support to this op-
eration unless there are important policy considera-
tions to the contrary of which I am not aware - . .
Furtherniorc,.the road is open-ended and if we begin
.and then decide to withdraw there might be unfor-
tunate misinterpretations of our reasons which could
adversely affect our relations with [our ally]." A
secgnd proposal was turned down in August of 1971
and again in March of 1972. On the latter occasion,
Dr. Kissinger conferred with a high State Depart-
ment official in-depth on the proposal and agreed that
it should be disapproved. - . .
461The Secretary of the 40 Committee hand-carried
a brief one paragraph synopsis of the project to the
members for them to initial, The conclusion that the
procedure was simply pro-forma is indicated by the
fact that John Connally had already informed our ally
that the U.S. world provide support to the insurgents.
In addition, even the pros and cons contained in the
CIA proposal paper prepared for Dr. Kissinger were
foregone conclusions. Responding to it question by
staff concerning why CIA's negative views of the
project were not put more forcefully, it CIA official
responded that "the Committee must realize that CIA
was told to prepare a paper on 'how' the project
could be done, not 'whether' the project should be
done." . . .
462011 numerous occasions the leader of the ethnic
group expressed his distrust of our allies' intentions.
lie did, however, trust the United States as indicated
by his frequent statements that "he trusted no other
major power" and asserted that if his cause were suc-
cessful he was "ready to become the 51st state." (See
COS cable to DCI of January 16, 1975, for one ex-
ample.) In addition, his admiration [or Dr. Kissinger
was expressed on two occasions when lie sent a gift of
three rugs and later on the occasion of Dr. Kissinger's
marriage, a gold and pearl necklace, A May 20, 1974,
Memorandum to Brent Scoweroft explains the neces-
sity of keeping the gifts secret: "As you are aware,
the ielationship between the United States Govern-
ment and the (ethnic group) remains cxtientely sen-
sit.ive. Knowledge. ofits' existence has' been saverely
restricted; therefore, the fact that Dr. Kissinger has
received this gift should be similarly restricted."
463'I'he cut-off of aid to the ethnic group came as a
severe shock to its leadership. A CIA cable from the
COS to the DCI on March 15, 1975, describes the
method used by our ally to inform the ethnic group's
leadership. Oil March 5, a representative of our ally's
intelligence service visited the headquarters of the
ethnic group and "told [them] in bluntest imaginable
terms that a) the border was being closed to all re-
peat all movement, b) . could expect no more
assistance from [our ally], c) ... should settle with
our [ally's enemy] on whatever terms he could get,
and (1) his military units would be allowed to take
refuge in [our ally's country] only in small groups
"and only if they surrendered their arras to [our
ally's) army."
464Elaborate measures were taken to insure that
the Department of State did not gain knowledge of
the project. Documents suggest that it may have orig-
inally been planned to keep the project so severely
restricted that not even the Ambassador to the coun-
try involved was to be told....
In addition, evidence in the Committee files is con-
flicting on whether Secretary of State William P.
Rogers was ever informed of the project. Officials
of Kissinger's staff and CIA officials assumed that he
1' c"It'.
had bets briefed since U. Alexis Johnson was a mcm-
bar of the Forty Committee. And, in all interview with
staff, Mr. Rogers stated that he felt certain that lie had
been tlinfornted. Nevertheless, a cable from Secretary
Rogers almost a year after the project began suggests
that lie did not have knowledge, as of June 22, 1973.
The cable states that "in view of continued U.S.
policy not repeat not give encouragement to the
[ethnic group's] hopes for U.S. assistance or recogni-
tion, we would intend keel) contacts at country di-
rectorate level." Interview with William P. Rogers,
by Aaron Donner, Oct. 20, 1975, copy on file with Sel.
Conan, on fntell.
465'I'he progressively deteriorating position of the
ethnic group reflected the fact that none of the nations
who were aiding them seriously desired that they re-
alize their objective of an autonomous state. A CIA
memo of March 22, 1974 states our ally's and the
United States' position clearly: "We would think that
[our ally] would not look with favor on the establish-
ment of a formalized autonomous government. [Our
ally) like ourselves, has seen benefit in a stalemate
situation ... in which tour ally's enemy] is intrinsi-
cally weakened by [the ethnic group's] refusal to
relinquish its semi-autonomy. Neither four ally] nor
ourselves wish to see the matter resolved one way
or the other."
466The? CIA had early information which suggested
that our ally would abandon the ethnic group the
minute he ca rue to an agreement with his enemy over
border disputes. Two months after initiating the proj-
ect it CIA memo of Oct. 17, 1972 states: "[Our ally]
has apparently used [another government's] Foreign
Minister to pass word to [nis enemy] that he would
be willing to allow peace to prevail [in the area] if
ibis enemy] would publicly agree to abrogate [a pre-
vious treaty concerning their respective borders]." lit
adidtion, CIA memos and cables characterize our
tallys views of the ethnic group as "a card to play"
in his dispute with his neighbor, And a CIA memo
of March 22, 1974. characterizes tha ethnic group. as
which will avoid giving the [ethnic group] the impres-
sion that we are abandoning them they are likely to
go public. [Our ally's] action has not only shattered
their political hopes; it endangers lives of thousands."
'Fite COS proceeded to make suggestions for what the
USG could do to help and ended with the remark "it
would be the decent thing for USG to do."
47OAlso on March 10, 1975 the following letter ar-
rived from the leader of the ethnic group to Secretary
of State, Henry Kissinger: "Your Excellency, Having
always believed in the peaceful solution of disputes
including those between [your ally and his enemy]
we are pleased to see that their two-countries have
conic to some agreement . However, our hearts
bleed to see that an immediate by product of their
agreement is the destruction of our defenseless people
in an unprecedented mariner as [your ally] closed its
border and stopped help to us completely and while
[his enemy] began the biggest offensive they have
ever launched and which is now being continued. Our
movement and people are being destroyed in an un-
believable way with silence from everyone. We feel
your Excellency that the United States has a moral
and political responsibility towards our people who
have committed themselves to your country's policy.
In consideration of this situation we beg your Excel-
lency to take action as immediately as possible on the
following issues: 1) Stopping the .. offensive and
opening the way for talks between us ... to arrive at
a solution for our people which will at ]cast be face
saving. 2) Using whatever influence you have with
[your ally] to help our people in this historically
tragic and sad moment and at least in such it way that
our people and [array] could maintain some liveli-
hood and perform at least partisan activity in [our
area] until Our problem is also solved within the
framework of an [overall] agreement. Mr. Secretary,
we are anxiously awaiting your quick response and
action and we are certain that the United States will
not remain indifferent during these critical and trying
times., "
"a uniquely useful tool for weakening [our ally's
enemy's] potential for international adventurism."
467A White House memorandum of October 16,
1973, from Dr. Kissinger to the DCI states: "The
President concurs in your judgment in paragraph 3
of your memorandum of October 15 on the above
subject. You should therefore send the following reply
immediately to [the ethnic group]-We do not repeat
not consider it advisable for you to undertake the
offensive military action that [another government]
has suggested to you.-For your information, we have
consulted with [our ally] through the Ambassador
and they have both made the same recottuuendation."
469'I'he attack launched the day after the agreement
was signed caught the ethnic group by surprise. A
message from their headquarters to CIA on 10 March,
1975 react as follows: "There is confusion and dismay
among our people and forces. Our people's fate in un-
precedented danger. Complete destruction hanging
over our head. No explanation for all this. We appeal
you and USG intervene according to your promises
and not letting down ally, to save [ethnic leader's]
life and dignity of our families, to find honorable solu-
tion to [our] problem." On that same day the Chief
of Station sent the following cable to the DCI: "Is
headquarters in touch with Kissinger's office on this;
if USG does not handle this situation deftly in a way
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A CIA cable from the COS to the Director. out 22
March 1975 states: "No reply has been received from
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the message
from [the ethnic leader] ... The two additional mes-
sages received by radio from [his] headquarters are
forwarded this morning . . . and underscore the seri-
ousness of [their] situation, the acute anxiety of their
leaders and their emotional appeal that the USG use
its influence with [our al,jy,;] to get an extension of the
cease fire. This would permit the peaceful passage of
... refugees to asylum ... [fence, if the USG intends
to take steps to avert a massacre it must intercede with
[our ally] promptly." Interview with CIA official, by
1. Boos, Oct. 18, 1975, copy on file with Sel. Comm.
on Intell.
471 Over 200,000 refugees managed to escape into our
ally's county. Once there, however, neither the United
States nor our ally extended adequate humanitarian
assistance. In fact, our ally was later to forcibly return
over 40,000 of the refugees and the United States gov-
ernment refused to admit even one refugee into the
United States by way of political asylum even though
they qualified for such admittance.. .
474The political action program included the dis-
tribution of 50,000 campaign-type buttons identifying
the wearer as a supporter of Roberto's FNLA.
47tThc United States has found itself in similar situ-
ations on other occasions. Having supported colonial
power policies in previous years, they are constrained
from developing a rapport with indigenous indepen-
dence movements. The Soviets, however, are not simi-
larly inhibited. Once the colonial power relinquishes
control, the well-organized, well-financed, Soviet
backed group is ready to step into the breach. The
United States is forced at that point to scurry around
looking for a rival faction or leader to support. The
U.S. has often chosen leaders who had a prior rela-
tionship with the colonial power and whose national-
ist credentials are thus somewhat suspect, or leaders
who have spent most of their time outside the coun-
try waiting for the colonial power to depart. The
point is that many of the U.S.-backed groups begin
with a variety of factors working to their disad-
vantage.
477The task force was composed of African experts
within the Department of State, DoD officials, CIA
officials, and others. Officials from the Department of
State have told this Committee that the majority of
that task force recommended diplomatic efforts to
encourage a political settlement rather than interven-
tion. After they had prepared their report for the Sec-
retary of State containing this recommendation, they
were informed by National Security Council aides
that it was improper for them to make a recommenda-
tion on policy. Instead, they were instructed to sim-
ply list diplomatic efforts as one option among many
in their final report. Thus, the African experts who
made up the task force were not allowed to place
their recommendations on paper to be reviewed by
the Forty Committee.
48t'I'he Committee attempted to determine the differ-
ence between the three contesting factions in Angola.
Mr. Colby responded to questions of ill 'at nature:
"They are all independents. They are all for black
Africa. They are all for sonic fuzzy kind of social sys-
tem, you know, without really much articulation, but
sonic sort of let's not be exploited by the capitalist
nations." The Committee also attempted to discern
why certain nations were supporting different groups
if they were all similar in outlook:
"MR. ASPIN. And why are the Chinese backing
the moderate group?
"MR. COLBY. Because the Soviets are backing
the MPLA is the simplest answer.
"MR. ASPIN. It sounds like that is why we are
doing it.
"MR. COLBY. It is."
2. Intelligence Collection
Human and diplomatic risks are not confined to
covert action. Certain methods of intelligence-gathering
invite the saute danger of war and infringement of
the Constitutional rights of Americans.
The Committee has examined both technical and
non-technical intelligence-gathering programs and has
concluded that the risks accompanying them arc often
unacceptably great; that information obtained often
does not justify the risk; the policy-makers have been
insensitive to dangers, especially of the violation of
U.S. citizens' rights;, and, that there are inadequate
policy-level mechanisms for the regular review of risk
assessment.
a. Submarines
A highly technical U.S. Navy submarine reconnais-
sance program, often operating within unfriendly
waters, has experienced at least 9 collisions with
hostile vessels in the last ten years, over 110 possible
detections, and at least three press exposures. Most
of the submarines carry nuclear weapons.
The program clearly produces useful information
on our adversaries' training exercises, weapons test-
ing, and general naval capabilities. It is also clear,
however, that the program is inherently risky. Coin-
mittee staff's review of the program suggests if both
Congress and the Department of the Navy were suffi-
ciently motivated to provide the funds, technical
capabilities could be developedwhich would make
possible the acquisition of the saute data through less
hazardous means.
The Navy's own justification of the program as a
"low risk" venture is inaccurate, and has, therefore,
not met or resolved the Committee's misgivings.487
Documents provided the Committer. by the Defense
Department indicate that, while risk assessments are
made prior to operations, they are ritualistic and pro
forma. In fact, their mission risk assessments do not
vary despite constant changes in political conditions,
information sought, distance from enemy shores and
hostile forces, and our adversaries' ability to detect the
presence of U.S. submarines. During the hundreds of
missions these submarines have conducted, the Navy
has never assessed military risk as anything but "low."
The committee is, therefore, troubled by the com-
pletely pro forma nature of the mission risk assess-
ment as it is presently accomplished.
Just as the Navy's assurances that the program is
secure are inconsistent with the collisions, apparent
detections, and press stories, their claims that the
sensitive missions are closely monitored are belied by
the scant tactical guidance given continat>