LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00552R000400100002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 148
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 25, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Cy to Mr. Boos, House Committee
14 May 75 - AHS 75-710
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
of the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PIATIONAL SECURIT ;' ACT OF 1947
.Prepared by
OFFICE O.t' LEGISL-1,-TIVE COUNSEL
25 July 1967
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................... ......................... .
CHAPTER I: .EXECUTIVE DEVELOP.LENT...... ....................
1nntiative ............... .... ................... 5
Coordinator of Information ..................... 6
Office of Strategic Services ........................... 7
OSS Authoritie s........ . . .? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S
Central Intelligence Group ........................ 11
Background "P.rinciples........... ............:..... 12
"Plan". ... ....................... 13
Joint Chiefs' Consideration.. , .. , ..... . . . . ......... . . 14
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy Consideration..... .. 16
Secretary of Navy .............................. .... 16
Secretary of War ............... r........................ 17
Secretary of State... ............................. 17
Recommendations to the President ..................... 18
Presidential Directive ......................... . ..... 19
Achievement through Executive Action ................... 22
CHAPTER II: LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS - EXECUTIVE I31Z..fANCII? .. --23
CIG Consideration ................................... 23
Presidential Recommendation to Congress ............. 30
NAT'IQ TAL SECURITY ACT. OF '_947..... 33
.33
Background ........................................
Legislative Processing .... ........................ . . 36
Legislative Record an CIA ................... ...... 37
CHAPTER III: CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF TIE
CHAPTER IV: NEED FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE :.............. 40
Senate Armed Services Committee.... ............... 41
House Comr-aittee .................................... 45
Committee Reports ............. ................... . 46
Floor Discussion ....................... 47
CHAPTER V: POSITION WITHIN EXECUTIVE BRANCH .............. 52
NSC Relationship .................................... 53
Relationship with Intelligence Community .............. 58
DCI Relationship with NSC ........................... 63
Summary.. ..... . ......... ..:............. 65
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CHAPTER VI: FUNCTIONS .......................................... 67
Senate.. .... ....................................... 68
House C ommittcc .... ... . 69
Surrimary .......................... .. ............ 73
CHAPTER VIE. COLLECTION....... ................................
Background ......... '.' .......... ........... .
... 75
House Corizmi.ttee ............ .
Summary ............. ....................... 81
CHAPTER VIII: CIVILIAN STATUS OF DCI ...................... . .. 82
Background .................................... 82
Senate .............
........ 84
house Committee ........................... 85
House Floor .............. ............. ........ 91
Conference Committee .... _ .... ................. 99
Summary ...................... ................ 101
CHAPTER IX: INTERNAL SECUIRIT Y.................... ........ 103
House Committee Executive Session .......... .......- 104
House Published Hearings ..... ....... . 113
House Floor ............. ... ? _ I15
The Federal Bureau of Invest;igat.ion:.....::.:. , ... 116
Conferees ........... .
.... ........................ 122
Summary.. ......... ........................... 123
C If1 TER X: NATIONAL SECURITY ACT of 1947 ........... 124
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This legislative history of the Central Intelligence Agency has
been compiled in the interest of providiti'; a better understanding of
the structure and functions of the Central Intelligence Agency)
INTRODUCTION
As a function of Government, foreign intelligence lies within
the province of both the Legislative and Executive Branches. Not only
does Congress possess the power of tine purse but it has the power and
responsibility to pro-ride "... for the common Defense and general Wel-
fare of the United. States.. .
,,2
Roots of relationship are even found in
.the power to declare war since ". . . the surest means of avoiding war
is to be prepared for it in peace:.. "3
Equally cleaj- is the responsibility of the Chief Executive to take
executive action, not barred by the Constitution or other valid law of
the land, which he deerns necessary for the protection of the nation's
security.
As a matter of fact, the Central Intelligence Agency ency is a. product
of both Executive and Legislative action. This partnership of action
is st' in the major evolutionary stages that occured during the period
194.11 through- 1949:
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.11 June 1941
Forerunner of national intelligence service established by
Presidential Order (6 Fed. Reg. 3422). (Key Elements:
Office of Coordinator' of Information; Government-vide
collection of information bearing on national security; direct
reporting to the President; inter-departmental committee
systemr )
23 July 1941
Coordinator of Information authorized to expend funds for
certain limited purposes by :Presidential letter.
"13 June"19424
Office of Coordinator of Information redesignated as Office
.of Strategic Services and its functions (exclusive of certain
foreign information activities transferred to Office of War
Information) transferred to Office of Strategic Services
(16 Fed. Rc 3^-22). (Key Elements: Joint Chiefs of Staff
jurisdiction; Director of Strategic Services appointed by the
President.)
1 September 1942
Certain contracting latitude " .. without regard to provisions
of law..." granted to Director, Office of Strategic Services
(Executive Order 924).
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lPirst Government-wide foreign intelligence service estab-
lished by Presidential directive. (Key Elements: National
Intelligence Authority at Secretai y-of-Department level;
participation by personal representative of the President;
the office of the Director of Central Intelligence (appointed
by the President) Central Intelligence Group; within limits
of appropriations available to Secretaries. of State, War,
Navy; precursor of Central Intelligence responsibilities
and authorities later enacted into law. )
Le,gislative Action
28 June 1944
First independent appropriations for Office of Strategic
Services (National War Agency Appropriations Act of 1945).
(Key Elements: Appropriations in Title I covering the Executive
office of the President; expenditures "for objects of a
confidential nature;" certain accounting by certificate of
Director of Strategic Services.
26 July 19 r7
Statutory basis for centralized foreign intelligence service
prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947. (Key
Elements: National Security Council., Office of"the Director
of Central Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency; foreign
intelligence service on a Government-wvicle basis.)
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Statutory basis for the administration of the CIA prescribed
by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. (Key Elements:
Enabling authorities for the acln inistration of the CIA on an
independent basis.)
E.,.ccutive correspondence and orders and Congressional material,
including hearings and reports and Congressional Record reporting
of floor discussions on bills specifically relating to CIA are the primary
sources of material used for this paper. Secondary source material
and other comment are used for continuity and completeness.
Iii connection with past and on-going efforts to coipmit the
gency's history to writing, this paper provides a chronology and
bibliography of legislative actions affecting the Agency, and collects the
issues concerning central intelligence which were put before Congress
them; and the reasons or rationale for the choices or Compromises
Congress ultimately approved.
for resolution;-the alternatives considered by Congress in resolving
in connection with this work.
It is recommended that the existing CIA publication on statutes
specifically relating to CIA (in text and explanation form) be reviewed
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Interest in the structure of the nation's foreign intelligence
was of primary interest to the Executive Branch during the 1941 to 1946
period, In response to the pre--war, war and post-war events spanning
this period, the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations mini saw the establish-
ment of the Coordinator of Information, the Strategic Services, and
finally the Central Intelligence Group. Each served as a building block
for its successor organization,
Initiative
The deteriorating international situation in the late 1930's sur-
faced a number of problems outside of the responsibilities of any-one
department. Yet, it was becorrdng increasingly urgent that the' Presi -
of these problems. 4 Under it, the Executive Office of the President was
dent receive coordinated information.
The Reorganization Act of 1939 provided a basis for handling both
The Executive Office, as a central staff, was organized into six
established. 5
principal divisions. One was reserved for emergency management
".. , in the event of a national emergency or threat of a national emer-
gency. 116 This was in September of 1939. Eight months later and under
a "threatened national emergency, " the Office of Emergency Management
(OEM) was established.
OEM was concerned with clearing information and securing
clearing
maximum "utilization and coordination of agencies and facilities. u7
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the discharge of extraordinary responsibilities imposed upon him by
an emergency arising out of war, the threat of war, (or) imminence
8
of war... the functions of OEM were further refined in January
of 194. Clearly, the events?which foretold the advent of the Second
World War were also propelling the organization of foreign intelli-.
gence on a Government-wide basis.
Coordinator of Information
the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) was added to the Execu-
The responsibilities of a Government-wide informational
channel to the President became more, explicit on 11 July 1941 when
five. Office. Colonel William J. Donovan was named to the pdsition.
las duties of the Central Intelligence Agency were quite similar:
The functions prescribed for the COI and those eventually enacted
the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate
the securing of information important for national security
not now available to the Government. "9
upon national security; to correlate such information and
data, and to make such information and data available to the
President and to such departments and agencies as the Presi-
dent may determine and to carry out, when requested by
"Collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear
Authority to fulfill this commission included the right of access
to information and data within various departments and agencies as
long as the duties and responsibilities of the President's regular. rnili-
terry and naval advisers were not impaired. 10 The COI was also
enlpo\vered to obtain assistance through the appointment of various
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 . cZepartmental corn- ttees. While no conipensatior attached to the
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office, transportation, subsistence, and other incidental expenses
were authorized. 11 Operating expenses were funded out of the Presi-
dent's Emergency Fund. Under this sirnple but broad mandate, ?
Colonel Donovan began building a foreign intelligence service.
Office of Straic Services
Following the Declarations of War against the AXIS powers,
Congress enacted the First War Powers Act, 1941, (P. L. 77-354) and
conferred upon the President the authority it... urgently needed in order
to put the Government of the United States on an immediate war footing, r~12
Title I of the Act authorized redistribution of the functions of the
various agencies to. facilitate.the prosecution of the vvar.effort.
With the nation on a "war footing, " it was clearly desirable to
provide a closer link between the tested and. developing capabilities of
COI and the Armed Forces. On 13 June 1942 the President, as Commander
in Chief, issued a military order re-designating the COI as the Office
of Strategic Services (O.SS) under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs. 13
(Foreign information activities of COI were transferred to the newly
created Office of War Information, 14) The charge for OSS was 'to:
it. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be
required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff,
"b. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed
by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The President appointed Colonel Donovan as Director of Strategic
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Si rvices "... unders.c direction and supervision o'Khe United States
OSS Authorities
OSS was forced to adjust to a n.iuaiber of problems which had not
faced COI. COI had received secure support. in the form, of funding,
contracting and other services from the Executive Office. This arrange
-
meat could not be continued indefinitely.. Consequently, OSS needed
and was granted certain specific authority.
The President extended to OSS the same privilege to enter into
contracts ".. without regard to the provisions of law relating to the
marking, performance, amendmen-,., or modification of contracts.
?.s .had been earlier granted to the War Depar Lent, the Navy Department,
and the United States Maritime Commission under the First War Powers
Act of 1941. 15
1 ...
During the first Fiscal year of operation (l9,12--43), OSS was
supported out of allocations from the President's.Emergency Fund.
~ign.ific:antly, and to the extent determined by the President, these Funds
could be expended "... without regard to the provisions of law regarding
the expenditure of Government funds or the employment of persons in
the Government service... " In addition, the President could authorize
certain expenditures "... for objects of a confidential nature and in any
such case the certificate of the expending agency as to the amount of the
expenclit:ure and that it is deterrniiiclect inadvisable to specify the nature
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 thereof shall be de' ~aecl a sufficient voucher for tf sunz tl r 'in
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expressed to have been expended. x i6
OSS became independent of the President's Emergency Fund during
the second fiscal year of its operationi'(1943-44). The National War
Agencies Appropriation Act of 1944, 1 l as it pertained to OSS, read as
follows:
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
? Salaries and expenses: For all" expenses necessary
to enable the Office of Strategic Services to carry out its functions
and activities, including salaries of a Director at $10, 000 per
annum, one assistant director and one deputy director at $9, 000
per annum each; utilization of i,oluntary and uncompensated
services; procurement of necessary services, supplies and
equipment without regard to section 3709, Revised S tat.utes;
travel expenses, including (1) expenses of attendance at meeti
ngs
of organizations concerned with the work of the Office of ......,
Strate
ic Se
i
2
g
rv
ces, (
) actual transportation and other neces-
sary expenses and not to exceed $10.per diem in lieu of sub-
sistence of persons serving, while away from their homes without
other compensation from the United States in an advisory capa-
city, and (3) expenses outside the United States without regard to
sistence Expense Act of 1926, as amended (5 U. S. C. 821-833),
and section 901 of the Act of June 29, 1936 (46 U. S. C. 1241);
preparation and transportation of the remains of officers and
employees who die abroad or in transit, while in the dispatch of
their official duties, to their former hozaies in this country or
to a place not more distant for interment, and for the ordinar
y
expenses of such interment; purchase and exchange of lavrboo:s
and books of reference; rental of news-reporting services; pur-
chase or rental and operation of photographic, reproduction,
duplicating and pri.-ating machines, equipment, and devices and
radio- receiving and radio-sending equipment and devices;
maintenance, operation, repair, and hire of motor-propelled
or horse-drawn passenger- carrying vehicles and vessels of
all kinds; printing and binding; payment of living and quarters
allowances to employees with official headquarters located
abroad in accordance with :regulations approved by the President
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on December 30, 1942; exchange of funds without regard to
section 3651. Revised Statutes (31 U. S. C. 543); purchase and
free distribution of firearms, guard uniforms' special clothing,
and other. personal equipment; the usc'of and payment for
compartments or other superior accommodations considered
necessary by. the Director of Strategic Services or his desig-
nated representatives for security reasons or the protection
of highly technical and valuable equipment; $35, 000, 000 of
which amount such sums as may be authorized by the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget may be transferred to other depart-
ments or agencies of the Government, either as advance pay-
ment or reimbursement of appropriation, for the performance
of any of the functions or activities for which this appropriation
is made: Provided, That $23, 000, 000 of this appropriation may
be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regula-
tions relating to the expenditure of Government funds or the
employment of persons in the Government service, and $21, 000, 000
of such $23, 000, 000 may be expended for objects of a confiden-
tial nature, such expenditures to he accounted for solely on the
certificate of the Director of the Office of Strategic. Services
. and every such certificate shall be deemed.a sufficient voucher for
the amount therein certified.
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 . Ap irb9 d Fri' s
relating to the expenditure of Government monies. One permitted
latitude concerning the purpose for which funds could be expended.
The other protected against the unauthori'zecl disclosure of the pur-
pose and details of certain expenditures. ,The Director of OSS enjoyed
the confidence of Congress in the exercise of this broad grant of
authority and this confidence in hint was sustained in subsequent
appropriation acts. l8
Central Intelligence Group
.Office
While the Office of the Coordinator of Information and the
of Strategic Services were' forerunners of a Gavernm'ent-
wide foreign intelligence
service, the Presidential Directive of 22
January 1946 was the capstone of Executive action. It established
the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group,
and the position of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Nearly two years. of study and discussion preceded the issu-
anco of the Directive. While a number of different approaches were
advocated, the need for a fully coordinated intelligence system was
never questioned.
The influence of the Presidential Directive of 22 January 1946
on what was eventually enacted in the foreign. intelligence section of
the National Security Act of 1947 cannot be overemphasized.
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 .Baclcr;z.ound "Princ:i?1c S"
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In October of 1944 Donovan, by now. a General, presented
President Roosevelt with a document entitled "The }oasis for a
Permanent United States Foreign Intelligence Service. " The need,'
as seen by General Donovan, was an organization "which will procure
intelligence both by overt and covert rnethocls and will at the same
time provide intelligence guidance, determine national intelligence
objectives, and correlate the intelligence material collected by all
Government agencies. "19 General Donovan formulated ten governing
principles in this presentation:
"That there should be a central, overall Foreign
Intelligence Service which (except for specialized intelli.-
gence pertinent to the operations of the armed sere; rr-?c
and certain other Government .gencies) could serve
volectzvely and impartially the needs of the diplomatic,
military, economic,, and propaganda service of the
Government.
"That such a Service should not operate rlaT~~r4_
n
i
t
l
i
.o
e
n
e
L
genC ( within the United States.
"That it should have no policy function and should
not be identified with any law-enforcing agency either at
home or abroad. .
"That the operations of such a Service should be
primarily the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence on the policy or strategy level.
"That such a Service should be under a highly
qualified Director, appointed by the President, and be
administered under Presidential direction.
"That, subject to the approval of the President,
the policy of such a Service should be determined by the
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App(Wp4 QFiA 5,,Rj/; :Sq1A RDP819 OO R `~61i021~
a e any io rme Iervices
(a) Secret intelligence
(b) Counter-espionage
(c) Crypto-analysis
(d) Clandestine subversive operations
! with a comment that an adviser had informed the President that a
w. _
better and cheaper intelligence system was possible. However,
there was also an accompanying request that General Donovan con-
tinue his work on a post-war intelligence organization,
"It is not necessary to create a now agency The
should be represented.
"That such a Service, charged with collecting
intelligence affecting national interests and defense,
should have its own means of communication and should
be responsible for all secret activities, such as:
"That such a Service be operated on both vouchered
a.nd unvouchered funds.
functional competence to evaluate. incoming intelligence,
to make special reports, and to provide guidance for the
professionally trained in analysis of intelligence and
possessing a high degree of linguistic, regional, or
"That such a Service have a staff of specialists,
collecting branches of the Agency.
Office of Strategic Services. "
nucleus of such an organization already exists in the
1 The document was returned to Gonieral .Donor: an on 31 October 1944
"Plan?
In keeping v.,itli the :President's request, General Donovan
submitted a more detailed plan to the President. In transn-zittal,
Donovan recornmendcct that ", .. intelligence control be returned to
t}z~lla;jL i
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 the supervision of t' President (with a) central au' ?rity reporting
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directly to you (the President), with responsibility to frame intelli-
gencc. objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence
material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying
out national policy and strategy. "?-0
The plan took the form of a draft directive and incorporated
the principles General Donovan had earlier prescribed and several.
additional functions and duties including: "Coon' din ition of the functions
of all intelligence agencies of the Government... ; collection, either
directly or through existing Government departments and agencies,
of pertinent information... ; procurement, training, and supervision
of its intelligence personnel; subversive operations abroad, and
determination of policies for and coordination of facilities essential
to the collection of information." ? 1
Certain administrative authorities were also included in the
Donovan Plan, "to employ necessary personnel and snake provision
for necessary supplies, facilities, and services' (and) to provide for
the (Agency's) internal organization and management... in such man-
ner as its Director may determine. 22
Joint Chiefs' Consideration
The Donovan plan of 18 November 1944 was distributed to
various Cabinet officials and the Joint Chiefs. On 24 January 1945,
the Donovan plan and an alternate proposal by the Joint Intelligence
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 .Corn ittcc were coN?^red in a report. of the joint St, 'tegic Survey
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Committee to the Joint Chiefs.
Approximately a month after the. war had ended, the recom-
mendations in that report were incorporated into a Joint Chiefs of
Staff report. 24
The Joint Chiefs disagreed with Donovan's concept that the
centralized service should exist under the direct supervision of the
President. They felt that this would "over centralize the National
Intelligence Service and place it at such a level that it would control
the operation of departmental intelligence agencies without responsi-
bility, either individually or collectively to the ?-leads of departments
concerned. 1125
The structure recommended by the Joint Chiefs included a
National Intelligence Authority (NIA) composed of the Secretaries of
.I
State, War, and Navy and a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Authority was to be responsible for overall intelligence planning
and development as well as the inspection and coordination of all
la ederal intelligence activities. It was to assure the most effective
accomplishment of the intelligence mission as it relates to national
security. A Central Intelligence Agency with a Director appointed by
the President was to be responsible to the NIA. and assist in its mission.
An Intelligence Advisory Board m.aclc tip of the heads of the principal
military and civilian agencies having functions related to the national
security was to advise the Director of Central Intel.li;ence.
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 With one c ~eption, aLn independen .budget z the National
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Intelligence Authority, the substance of the Joint Chiefs' report
.was to be eventually recommended to the President by the Secretaries
of State, War, and Navy.
Secretaries of State, War, and Ilavy C;or sideratiozx
To General Donovan the task of central intelligence was to'
assure that "... the formulation of national policy both in its political
and military aspects is influenced and determined by knowledge (or
ignorance) of the aims, capabilities, intentions, and policies of
other nations. "26 Consideration by the customers, the Secretaries
of State, War, and Navy, was needed before further pror,ress could
be made.
, cretary of Navy
Following the: release of the Joint Chiefs' report, Secretary of
the Navy, James Forrestal, in a memorandum to the Secretary of War,
dated 13 October 1945, commented upon subjects of mutual interest
inclu.ditng : "Joint Intellj. flee. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as you kno,v,
made a recommendation to the :President for a national intelligence
organization, the general outline of which provides for intelligence
supervision by the War, State, and Navy Departments, with a director
charged with the working responsibility functioning under these incli-
vidual.s as a group. I think this is a subject which should have our close
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 atte ~~bvedLl r R~ .2iID f/~14a2St IG~--Ii3~~3~ B P O ~~l y con-
. ceived and, if you agree, I think we should push it vigorously at the
White House. "
Secrctar_y of War
Assistant Secretary Robert Lovett was placed in charge of a
committee in the War Department to study the matter. After consider-
ing the opinions of a number of people experienced in wartime intelli--
gence, 27 the Lovett Committee submitted a re-port28 to the Secretary
of War for a centralized national intelligence organization similar
to that which had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs -six weeks
.I Secretary o.fState
As a parallel development and in keeping with his preeminence
-L.-4y Late. was directed by
z y Late was directed by
the President to "talk the lead in developing the 'comprehcnsive and
coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies
concerned with that type of activity... through the creation of an inter-
in the field of foreign affairs the Sec
departmental group, which would formulate plans for (the President's)
approval. 1129 The Secretary of State . submitted his plan to the. Secretaries
of War and Navy on 10 December 1945. 30
The State plan provided for a National Intelligence Authority
consisting of the Secretary of State (Chairman) and the Secretaries of
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 W a z AVOYo (6W o r 1`4414*!4 2O 51b14= cl .l > 9~@O~fi2 l ktk~0.0?x31 d. be
subject to call to participate in matters of special interest to them.
While the State plan did not preclude "centralized intelligence
operations" its primary emphasis was on interdepartmental committees
and organization. It did not envisage an,independent agency with a
separate budget. This approach was advanced as one which would
him 1 esponsible for the effective conduct of the operation. Operational
support would be shared with ". , . personnel (including the Executive),
funds and facilities... provided by the departments and agencies par-
ticipating, in the operation, in amounts and proportions agreed by
tion was necessary the Authority would appoint an executive and hold
The State plan fitted a group, not an agency, concept. Under
.it, if the Authority determined that a centralized intelligence opera-
... avoid publicity and... reduce competition among the central agency
and the intelligence organizations of existing departments and agencies."31
them and approved by the
sibilities and capabilities
i
I
Authority, based upon the relative respon-
of the participating departments and agencies. 32
Re commendations to the President
On 7 January 1946 the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy
jointly recorrimended that the President establish a National Intelligence
Authority and a Central Intelligence Group. 33. The rccomh-iendation
was identical to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee report which had
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 bee-* bvedtFod iz010000 one .
Major exception: the Secretaries did not ~'ecorrzmend an independent
budget. While an independent budget had been basic to the proposals
advocated by the Secretary of War and Navy, the apprehensions
advanced by the Department of State pre -ailed. and "it seefned to be
the consensus... of the three Secretaries that an independent budget
should be avoided for security reasons. "34 Funds for the National
Intelligence Authority were to be provided by the participating
departments in amounts and proportion agreed upon by the members
of the Authority. Within the limits of funds made available, the
Director of Central I;.itelligence was to "employ necessary personnel
and make provisions for necessary supplies, facilities and services, 1,35
Presidential Directive
The National Intelligence Authority, the office of the Director
of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group were
established by Presidential Directive on 22 January 1946. The Direc-
tive was substantially similar to the Secretaries' proposal although
Sit contained no specific reference to the collecti_ort of intelligence by
,the Director. It has been suggested that this function was omitted
solely to avoid mention of, intelligence collection in a published docu-
rn ent. 36
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 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON January 22, 194"
COPY
To The Secretary of State,
The Secretary of V,'ar, and
The Secretary of the Navy.
1. It is my desire, and I hereby direct, that all Federal foreign
intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated so as to
assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission
related to the national security. I hereby designate you, together witi,
another person to be named by me as my personal representative, as
the National Intelligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.
o the National Intelligence Authority, and sha'.l sit as a non-voting
2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall each
from time to time assign persons and facilities from your respective
Departments, which persons shall collectively form a Central Intelli-
gence Group and shall, under the direction of a Director of Central
Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence Authority. The Director
of Central Intelligence shall be designated by me, shall be responsible
gence shall:
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3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and control
1 'of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of Central Intelli-
a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of
intelligence relating to the national security, and the
appropriate dissemination within the Government of the
resulting, strategic and national policy intelligence. In
so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facilities
of the intelligence agencies of your Depart_m ents.
b. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities
of the intelligence agencies of your Departments as relate
to the national security and recommend to the National
Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over--all
policies and objectives as will assure the most -Effective
accomplishment of the national intelligence mission.
c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence
agencies, such services of common concern as the National
Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally.
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 d. P form such oi:h r t'ti ated
Ap B s -iR a2005/04/22t CIA-~L pona security as S O Ff t 002 si
(lent and the National Intelligence Authority may from time
to tin -it-, direct.
4. No police, larq enforcement or internal security functions
shall be exercised under;1his directive.
5. Such intelligence-received by the intelligence agencies of
your Departments as may be designated b,y the National Intelligence
Authority shall be freely available to the Director of Central Intelli-
? encc for correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent
approved by the National Intelligelic4 Authority, the operations of
said intelligence agencies shall be open to inspection by the Director
of Central Intelligence in connection with planning functions.
6. The existing intelligence agencies of your Departments
shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate depart-
mental intelligence.
7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by
an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their
representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence
agencies of the Government having functions re-ated to national
security, as determined by the National Intelligence. Authority.
8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential direc-
tives, other departments and agencies of the executive branch of
the Federal Government shall furnish such intelligence information
relating to the national security as is in their possession, and as
the Director of Central Intelligence may from time to time request
pursuant to regulations of the National intelligence Authority.
9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making
of investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and
its possessions, except as provided by law and Presidential directives.
10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence
Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible
for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Harry Truman
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The 22 Jalnuazy 1946 Directive was a major breakthrough for
the concept of a Government-wicle foreign ilitellicyence system
sibility for national intelligence had bean clearly fixed on the office
of the Director of Central Intelligence. It provided for. direction and
control from the President's chief advisers in international and mili-
other needs affecting national intelligence. Clearly, central intelli-
gence as an entity now existed.
tary affairs. It provided a focal point for the, correlation of foreign
intelligence, its proper coordination and dissemination., and for all
fledgling organization was deprived of certain attributes of independence,
i. e. independent budget and authori y to hire personnel, its charter-
The Directive was a compromise of diverse vie-,vs which had
been articulated for two years \'itllin the Executive branch. -. While the
was sufficiently flexible to permit it to "feel its evolutionary way and
handle obstacles only in such order as it deemed best. 1137 The details
of the organization were to be worked out in the first instance: by the
officials responsible for its perCorm.ance. 38
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CHAPTER II. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS - EXECIJTLVI BRANCH
As early as 19x4, legislation for a permanent post-war intelligence
. organization was seen as desirable. 39',. In 192x6 the Secretaries of State,
War, and Navy believed that the preparation of organizational plans to
"include drafts of all necessary legislation ,40 should be the first order
of business following the establishment of central intelligence by E.,ecutive
action.
GIG Consideration.
Vandenberg, USAAF, then the Director of Central Intelligence, in trans-
mitting a revision of the draft to Mr. Clifford, wrote. that__1;he "current
tion for a proposed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). General Hoyt S.
Six months following the Presidential directive, Clark M. Clifford,
Special Assistant. to the President, was reviewing draft enabling legisla-
draft has been expanded in the light of the experiences of the last ten
months and the administrative facilities available. However, it does not
materially change interdeparfrnental relationships conceived in the original
Presidential letter of January 22, 1946. "41 .
The CIG's comprehensive legislation proposal contained a st 'J i w t.
Appdhved?Or19k)0@{,DZ
The proposed draft was fully representative of a permanent authoriza.- -
Energy Act of 1946. (At the time the Department of
Justice was also reviewing a proposal to revise the
espionage laws as recommended by the War and Navy
notwithstanding the provisions of other law, terminate
the employment of personnel. in the interest of the United
State...'' (The latter was in .keeping with a similar
provision in the Department of State- Appropriation Act
of 1947, also 50 USC 1156., 1940, Secretaries of War and
Navy, P. L. 79-470.)
e., control of information in line with Section 10 of the Atomic
:-Departments and the -FBI. }
f. appropriations authority.
tion for a Central Intelligence Agency. As events transpired, provisions
relating to CIA's functional responsibility as well as its structural
relationship within the Executive Branch would be enacted in 1917, while
aclnnini.strative authorities,. for the most part, would be enacted in
1949.
Comprehensive enabling legislation for a Central Intelligence
Agency was subordinated in early 19,17 to the more pressing need of
obtaining unification of the military departments. Unification legislation
was accorded the highest priority within the Executive Branch.
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 App?@dW g041~21n?11~i~DR6~B0{i in the
unification proposals, however. President Truman's second plan for
military unification envisioned a single defense establislin-ment served
by a number of coordinating agencies, some for inter-military
departmental coordination and others for ,military--civilian coordination. 43
A team for drafting the National Security Act of 1947 was
assembled within the White House. It included Mr. Clark M. Clifford
The existing. National Intelligence Authority was seen as the mechanism
for linking military and foreign policy and it followed that its subordi-
nate agency, CIG, would serve as mechanism for coordinating civilian-
military intelligence.
(Special Counsel to the President), Mr. Charles S. Murphy(Adminis-
trative Assistant to the President), Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman
(Deputy Chief for Naval Operations). and Major ,cnr-ra1 r.a,,,-;C
Staff). The team'.s'prime objective was unification. While there was
support for proscribing the Central Intelligence Agency in the National
!,Security Act, it was felt the administrative authorities for the Agency
should be dealt with in separate legislation.
The second White House draft of the proposed National Security
Act of. 1947, dated 25 January 1947, covered the CIA as follows:
"SEC. 302 (a) There is hereby established under the
National. Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency with a
Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head thereof,
to be appointed from civilian or military life by the President,
Norstad (Director of Plans and Operations, ' War Department General
CIA
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Director slims receive compensation at the F1tc of
$15, 000 per annum.
(b) Subject to existing law, and to the direction
and control of the National Security Council, the Central
Intelligence Agency shall perforx i foreign intelligence
44
functions related to the national security,
(c) Effective when the Director first appointed
under subsection (a) has taken office -
(1) The functions of the National Intelligence
Authority- (established by Directive of the President,
dated January 22, 1946) are transferred to the
National Security Council, and such Authority shall
cease to exist.
(2) The functions of the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the fu.rjctions, personnel, property,
and records of the Central Intelligence Group,
established under such directive are transferred to
the Director of Central Intelligence appointed under
this Act and to the Central Intelligence Agency, and
such Group shall cease to exist. Any unexpended.
balances of appropriations, allocations, or other
funds available or authorized to be made available
in like manner for expenditure by the Agency. "
In a 28 January 1947 memorandum to Mr. Clark M. Clifford,
General Vandenberg summarized earlier exchanges of views on
language for CIA in the National Security Act as "(a) setting forth a
working basis for a Central Intelligence Agency to the merger; and
(b) eliminating from the proposed National Security Act any and all.
controversial material insofar as it referred to central intelligence
which might in any way hamper the successful passage of the Act."
While deferring to the higher priority of military unification,
General Vandenberg urged the incorporation of three additional
provisions in the final draft. First, "... the DCI shall serve as the
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adviser to the Cou`!~il on all matters pertaining to national intelligence
and in this capacity, will attend meetings of the Council at its discretion
but shall take no part in the decisions,thcreof. `r (It is recalled that
the 22 January 1946 Directive provided that the Director sit as a
non-voting member of the National Intelligence .Authority.) Second,
rather than merely transferring the functions of the DCI and CIG under
the Presidential Directive to the DCI and CIA under the proposed
legislation through incorporation by reference, General Vandenberg
recommended making at least a specific statement on CIA's functions
such as: !'... the CIA shall coordinate the Nations foreign intelligence:
functions which can be efficiently performed centrally. " An earlier
draft had included a provision that CIA ".. , subject to existing law.
shall perform foreign intelligence functions related to the national
security." However, this provision was dropped because of the
confusion surrounding the meaning of the introductory qualification
"subject to existing law. "
.Chird, General Vandenberg Nvanted a Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence to be appointed from civilian or military life by the
President and with the advice and consent of the Senate " .. to provide
continuity of action in the absence of the Director or should there be a
vacancy in. that office. The Deputy Director should be a man of such
caliber and stature as adequately to serve as operations deputy to
the Director.
"
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While General Vandenberg's recommendations were not included
in the proposed "National Security Act cif 1947, " the points were
discussed. Excerpts follow from a meznorandum45 covering the
discussion at the time:
DCI as Intelligence Adviser
In a CIG conference preceding the first meeting
with the White House drafters--
making body, and it had long been agreed that central
intelligence should not be involved in policy making.
.,no part in the decisions of the Council as this was a policy-
the Council. It was agreed that the Director should take -
the Council on National Defense (later changed to National
Security Council) on matters pertaining to intelligence,
and that in this capacity he would attend all meetings of
"... the Director also indicated his desire to have
included a provision that he would serve as the adviser to
At the White House meeting with the drafters---
" .. General Vandenberg stated that he was strongly
opposed to the Central Intelligence Agency or its director
participating in policy decisions on any matter. However,
he felt that he should be present at meeting s of the Council.
To this General Norstad voiced serious exceptions, as he
felt that the Council was already too bi.g. He thought that
the ]Director should not even be present as an observer,
as this had proven to be cumbersome and unworkable at.
meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Sherman
suggested, however, that the Director should normally
be present at meetings of the Council, in its discretion.
General Vandenberg concurred in this, as did General
Norstad, and it was accepted with the additional proviso
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also attend meetings
at the discretion of the Council. " r
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Furth er-? -?
"... the Army-Navy conferees felt that the position
of the Director as the Ingelligonce Adviser was inherent
in the position itself, and that it would, not be proper?to
provide by law that the head of an "agency under the Council
should sit on the Council."
Specific Statement of I~ unctions of CIA
the Agency to ask- continual approval from the Council. "
to time, desire to direct. It would not be necessary for
"... General Vandenberg indicated the difficulties
which he had had in having to go to the N. I. A. on so many
problems. He felt that the difficulties of his position would
be xrultiplied, as he would have to ask policy guidance and
direction from the Council on National Defense, which
consists of n-iany more members than the N. I. A. He was
assured that the intent of the at was that the CIA would
operate independently and come under the Council only
on such specific measures as the Council may, from time
National Defense. As Gene--a]. Vandenberg indicated it would
be necessary to report somewhere; that neither the
President nor he was anxious to have another agency
"free wheeling" around the Government. However it was
.It was the final sense of the meeting that the Director
of Central Intelligence should report to the Council on
thought that the agency should have sufficient power to
perform its own functions without it being necessary to
have specific approval from the Council on each action. "
Presidential Recommendation to Gonress
On ''ebruary 26, 1947, President Truman submitted to the
Congress a draft entitled "National Security Act of 1947." Under
Title II - coordination for National Security as it pertained to CIA
it read as follows:
"SEC. 202. (a) There is here]) establi.sl,cd under the National
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Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency, with as
Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be the head
thereof, to be appointed by the President. The D i
shall receive compensation at the rate of $14, 000 a year.
(b) Any con-imissioncd officer of the United States
Army, the United States Navy, or the United States Air
Force may be appointed to the office of Director; and his
appointment to, acceptance of, and service in, such office
shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade
he may occupy or hold in the United States Army, the
United States Navy, or the United States Air Force, or
any emolument, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit
incident to or arising out of any such status, office, rank,
or grade. Any such commissioned officer on the active
list shall, while serving in the office of Director, receive
the military pay and allowances payable to a commissioned
officer of his grade and length of service and shall be paid,
from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency,
annual e
zn
pensatzon at a rate equal to the amount by.which
$14, 000 exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and
allowances.
(c) Effective when the Director first appointed under
subsection (a) has taken office-
(1) The functions of the National Intelligence
Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February 5, 1946)
are transferred to the National Security Council, and
such Authority shall cease to exist.
(2) The functions of the Director of Central
Intelligence and the functions, personnel, property,
and records of the Central Intelligence Group are
transferred to the Director of Central Intelligence
appointed under this Act and to the Central Intelli
enc
g
e
Agency respectively, and such Group shall cease to
exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations,
allocations, or other funds available are authorized
to be made available in like manner for expenditure
by the Agency.
In retrospect, it is recalled that the White House drafting
committee's prime concern was the unification aspects of the legislation.
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In this connection',""'ihere was a general feeling that any unnecessary
enlargement of the CIA provision would lead to controversy47nc1
would affect the legislative processing of the National Security Act
of 1947. In addition, it was believed that detailed administrative
provisions for CIA could not be adequately presented as part of the
National Security Act of 1947, simply because of the lack of time.
As events transpired, however, Congress was to delve into
the CIA provisions at some length. In fact, during the floor discussion
of the bill in the House. chamber, Mr. Carter Manasco, (D. , Alabama),
a member of the House Committee which marked up the bill, said:
"This section on central irAtelligence was given more study by our
Subcommittee and the Full Committee than any other section of the bill. ='48
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CHAPTER III. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF TF-IE
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Background
On 26 February 1947 the President transmitted a, draft bill
entitled "National Security Act of 1947" to the President of the Senate pro
te:npore and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and. recon-tmended
its enactment by the 80th Congress. Prior to this date consideration
had been given. in both Houses to the need for a Government-vide
foreign intelligence service and the structure it should take.
House: During the 79th Congress, the House Committee on
Military Affairs had issued "A report on the System. Currently Employed
in the'Collection,, Evaluation, and Dissemination of Intelligence
Affecting -the- War Potential-of the United States. "4 The report
recognized the need for strong-intelligence as the "~7ation's fin 1 line
of defense, " and made nine very specific recommendations:
Recom.nenda.tion. 1: That the National Intelligence Authority,
established on January 2Z, 1946, by Presidential directive,
be authorized by act of Congress.
Recommendation 2: That the National Intelligence Authority
shall consist of the Secretaries of State, War, and the-Navy,
or deputies for intelligence.
Recommendation 3: That the Central Intelligence Group receive
its appropriations direct from. the Congress.
Recommendation 4: That the Central Intelligence Group has
complete control over its own personnel.
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 JLvt1l.,.I
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Intelligence Group be a civilian appointed for a preliminary
term of two years and a permanent term of. 10 years,
at a salary of at least $12, 000 a year.
Recommendation 6: That the Director of the Central
Intelligence Group be appointed by the President, by
and with the consent pf the Senate.
Recommendation 7: That the Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall (1) accomplish the correlation and evaluation
of intelligence relating to the national security, and the
appropriate dissemination within the Government of the
resulting strategic and national policy intelligence, and
in so doing making full use of the staff and facilities of
the intelligence agencies already existing in the various
Government departments; (2) plan for the coordination
of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of
the various Government departments as relate to the
national security and recommend to the National Intelli-
gence Authority the establishment of such over-all
policies and objectives as will assure the'most effective
(3) perform, for the benefit of said intelligence a
encies
,
g
such services of cornir~on concern related directly to
coordination, cor. relation, evaluation, and dissemination as
the National Intelligence:,.Autho.rity shall deter mine can
be more efficiently accomplished centrally; '(4) peifox=r.
such other similar functions and.duties related to intelli-
gence affecting the national security as the Congress
and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to
time direct. It i.s specifically understood that the Director
of Central Intelligence shall nest undertake operations for
h
t
e collection of intelligence. (Emphasis added) Recommendation 8: That Paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
and 10 of the Presidential directive of January 22, 1.946,
relating to the establishment of a National Intcll.ige.nce
Authority be enacted into law, with such revisions in
wording as may seem necessary.
Recommendation 9: That the Army be requested sympa-
thetically to examine further the question of the establish--
ment of an Intelligence Corps for the training, deve.loprnent,
and assignment of especially qualified officers.
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 Approved For F ela"e 2005/104/22i~C1A-RDP89B00552R08"0011000h2-379tlr Congress,
-the Senate got further than the House. The Senate Committee on Military
Affairs reported out a bill proposing a National Security Council outside
of the national defense establishment and a Central Intelligence Agency
for the purpose of coordinating -nilitary and civilian programs, policies,
50
and plans in the foreign intelligence field. This bill was introduced as
S. 2044 by Senators Lister Hill (D. , Ala. ), Elbert D. Thomas (D. , Utah
and Warren R. Austin (P\.., Vt.) on 9 April 1946, pursuant to President
Truman's unification message of 19 December 1915.
The need for "national intelligence" was underscored by General.
George C. Marshall in hearings before the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs:
"Intelli.gence relates to purpose as well as to military
capacity to carry out that purpose. The point, I think, is we
should know as much as we possibly can of the possible. intent
and the capability of any other country in the world... Prior
to entering the war we had little more than what a. military
attache could learn at a dinner, more or less, over the coffee
cups... Today I think we see clearly we must know what the
other fellow is planning to do, in our own defense. , The
important point is that the necessity applies equally outside
of the aimed forces. It includes the State Department and
other functions of the Government, and it should therefore be
correlated on that level. ,51
While S. 2044 was favorably acted upon by the Senate Military
Affairs 'Committee, the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, which had
concurrent jurisdiction, did not report it out.
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Thus, the crucible for central intelligence was carried over
.to the first session of the 80th Congress in the Presidential draft of
the National Security Act of 1947, Title I of,the draft concerned the
"National Defense Establishment. " Title II, entitled "Coordination
for National Security, " provided for the National Security Council and
the Central Intelligence Agency. 52
Legislative Processing
Paced with a complicated and vital legislative task related to
the nation's future security, Congress. deliberated on the National.
Security Act of 1947 for nearly five months.
Senate; introduction of a bill incorporating the President's
draft was temporarily delayed while the Senate determined which
standing co;rimittee would have jurisdiction over the bill. The Co=nmjttee
on Expenditures in the Executive Departments (now the Committee on
Government Operations) questioned the decision of the President pro
tempore, Arthur Vandenburg (R. , Mich.) in refer-ring the measure
to the Armed Services Conim.ittee. 53 The Senate upheld the President
pro tempore's ruling on 3 March 1947 and Senator Chan Gurney (R, . S. D.
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, then introduced
the measure as S. 758. The Senate Armed Services Committee held
hearings for ten weeks, went into executive session on 20 May, and
reported out an amended version of S. 758 on 5 June. 54 The bill was
considered by the Senate on 7 and 9 July and was approved by voice vote.
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House: The measure eventually reported to the House was
introduced on 28 February 19A7 as H. R. 4214 by Chairman Clare
Hoffman (R. , Mich.) of the Committee on Expenditures in the Execu-
tive Departments (now the Committee on Government Operations).
This bill was the subject of hearings whi'ch commenced on 2 April
1947 and concluded on 1 July. A favorable report was issued on 16
July. On 19 July H. R. 4214 was considered by the House, amended
and passed by a voice vote. Immediately following this action, the
I--Iouse passed S. 758 after substituting the provisions of its own
Conference: S. 758 emerged from. Conference Committee on
24 July 1947. The Senate accepted the Conference Report the same
day by a voice vote and the House followed suit on the 25th of July.
LeL i s1~.tive It co It on CIA
The legislative record on CIA in the National Security Act of
1947 consists of testimony before committees, committee reports,
.floor discussions, amendments proposed and the provisions "which
were ultimately adopted. Overall, this record identifies the issues
raised, the alternatives considered, and the reasons or explanations
for the choices or compromises ultiznzately approved.
Of the many factors having a bearing on the type of legislative
record made on CIA, two seem especially deserving of mention. First,
security inhibited the full development of the public legislative record
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37
 -JEwtai',L
on Apirov&id'~i'IQe~~0D4/~jzIr~LRQP81.4E30~,~R4QQ1QQs2e3,lx.
onsz ex ing all of these factors, a fairly extensive public
Manasco (D. , Ala.) underscored this handicap by revealing that
"Many witnesses appeared before our Corninittee. We were sworn
to secrecy, and I hesitate to even discuss this section, because I
am afraid that Imay say something, because the Corgre.ssio;al
Record is a public record, and divulge something here that we
received in that committee that would give aid and comfort to any
potential enemy we have.
,55
Second, CIA was.only one aspect of a complicated and contro-
versial legislative proposal dealing primarily with military unification.
The: controversy surrounding the "National Military Establishzx-zent"
however, is not meant to imply the absence of independent reserva-
also engulfed other provisions of the Act, including CIA. Thi
tions concerning the CIA.
record was made on the CIA section. Further, the reasons and
rationale for CIA related legislative action is, for the most part,
readily identifiable in the public record.
The White House drafting team was correct in estimating that
the CIA section had the potentiality for being controversial but it was
wrong in assuming that extensive deliberation could be avoided by
reducing the CIA section clown to "inini.mal provisions. " Congressional
interest in providing fora CIA was clearly underestimated. Probably
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the.most striking aspect of the Congressional interest in CIA was the
averwheln-ling support for institutionalizing the Agency in statute as a
positive step towards providing for the nation's future security.
With this introduction the legislative record on the CIA section
in the National Security Act of 1947 is developed and organized according
to the five dominant legislative themes which evolved:
(1) Need for a Central Intelligence A.ge-ncy;
(2) Position of CIA within the Executive Branch;
(3) Statutory specification of functions for CIA;
(4) Civilian status of the Director of Central Intelligence; and
(5) Relationship to internal security.
- 4_1
6L JI
\L 3
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CHAPTER IV. NEED FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGI~NCE
The need for institutionalizing central intelligence was estal)lished
in certain committee findings during the 79th Congress and was to be
stressed again during the 80th Congress.
In anticipation of hearings on S. 758, Senator Thomas56 made a
major address to the Senate on the "President's" bill and emphasized
the need for a Central Intelligence Agency, 57.
"Neither the War Department nor the Navy Departrnent?
had an intelligence service adequate to our needs when the war
broke out. The intelligence agencies in each Department
operated separately for the most part, except for the exchange
of routine military and naval attache reports. There was-no
real integ~ratiori of intelligence at the operating level, and no
s
C t bI? h
of intelligence activities. In spite of these and other changes,
however, much unnecessary duplication existed in the intelli-
gence services of the State, War, and Navy Departments.
The significance of the collection, analysis, and evaluation of
information concerning foreign countries is no less great now than
it was during the war. The effective conduct of both forcian
policy and military policy is dependent on the possession of full,
accurate, and skillfully analyzed information concerning foreign
countries. With our present world--wide sphere of international
responsibility and our position among the world powers, we
need the most efficient intelligence system that can be devised.
Organization, of course, is not the whole story. We do know,
however, that there is no returning to the prewar. system,
vilxere the War, Navy and State Departments ,vent their respec-
tive wzLys. We have now a central intelligence agency estab-
lished by executive action. Provision for such an agency should
a zs e.. lraison with the State Department. Though funds
were inadequate, there was much duplication of effort by the
services.
"The ,war brought substantial appropriations and
drastic reorganization. The Office of Strategic Services was
finally set up under the' jurisdi.c.tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and acted as the central coordinating agency in intelligence
matters. Later, the Joint ICommittee and its
Intelligence
subcommittees made further provision for the coordination
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-%W I . mow
be made in permanent legislation. It seems entirely logical
that such an agency should be placed in the framework of any
agency that might be set. up to coordinate military and foreign
policies.
Senate Armed Services Committee
The theme so strongly stated by Senator Thomas was reiterated
and amplified before the Senate Armed Services Committee dur.ing the
hearing on S. 75S; (Excerpts follow)
Vice Ad_niral Forrest Sherman (me nbex of the White House
drafting team and detailed by the Secretary of Navy to work
with the Military Affairs Corn.tnittee on the Common Defense
Act of 1946): "1 consider the Central Intelligence Agency to
be a vital necessity under present world conditions. Its
necessity will increase with our greater international respon-
sibilities as' the power of sudden attack is amplified by further
developments in long range weapons and weapons of mass
destruction. ?58
leadership in world affairs. The oceans have shrunk until
today both Europe and Asia border the United States almost as
do Canada and Mexico. The interests, intentions, and capabili-
ties of the various nations on these land masses must be fully
known to our national policy make;. s. 'We must have this
intelligence if we are to be forewarned against possible acts of
egression, and if we are to be art-tied a;inst disaster in
an era of atomic warfare...
"I think it can be said without successful challenge that
before Pearl Harbor we did not have an intelligence service
in this country cone-parable to that of Great Britain or France
or Russia or Germany or Japan. We did not hive one because
the people of ' the United States would not accept it. It was felt
that there was so?ocsthing an-A arican about espionage and
even aI.)out intelligence generally, There was a feeling that
Lt. General Hoyt S.. Vandenberg (Director of Central Intelli-
gence):'9 I sincerely urge adoption of the intelligence provisions
of this bill. Section- 202 will enable us to do our share in main-.
taining the national security. It will form a firm basis on which
we can construct the fi.nest intelligence service in the world.
"In my opinion, a strong intelligence system is equally
if not more essential in peace than in var. Upon us has fallen
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AppZPlvgg,fpK. Je 0s5a wCiIAn-RaDwP8a9rB-OiOf5t5h2eRrOe 0w00e0r2e 3to be
another war-was an ability to shoot straight. One of the
great prewar fallacies was the common misconceptioiz that,
if the Japanese should challenge us in the Pacific, our
armed services would be able to handle the problem in a
matter of a few months at most.
"A11 intelligence is not sinister, not is it an invidious
type of Work. But before the Second World War, our
intelligence services had left largely untapped the great
open sources of information upon which roughly 80 percent
of intelligence should normally be based. I mean such
things as books, magazines, technical and scientific sur-
veys, photographs, commercial analyses, newspapers, and
radio broadcasts, and general information from people with
a knowledge of affairs abroad. What weakened our position
further was that those of our intelligence services which did
dabble in any of these sources failed to coordinate their
results with each other.
The Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate
the Pearl Harbor Attack reached many pertinent conclusions
A
re(Y ar 1 rr t}
e,e
others, perhaps more serious, which went to the very struc-
ture of our intelligence organizations. I am talking now of the
failure to exploit obvious sources; the failure to coordinate
the collection and dissemination of intelligence; the failure
to centralize intelligence functions of common concern to more
than one department of the. Government, which could more
efficiently be performed centrally.
"In the testimony which has preceded mine in support
of this bill- by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, General
Eisenhower, Admiral. Nimitz, and General Spaatz, among
others- there has been shown an awareness of the need for
coordination between the State Department and our foreign
political policies one one hand and our National Defense
Establishment and its policies on the other. Similarly with
intelligence, there must be coordination and some central-
ization, so that no future congressional committee can
possibly ask the question asked by the Pearl Harbor Coxninittee.
.field commanders. But,' over and above these failures
ne cu,nmzttee showed that some very significant
information had not been correctly evaluated. It found that
some of the evaluated information was not passed on to th
p
en .
We are incorporating many of these into our present t1 inking.. .
rrT1
zn ne shortcomf illi
bings o ourntegence system and
made some very sound recommendations for its izrz
rovem t
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'Why, wi some of the finest intelligencavailable in our
history -.tiviiy was it possible. for a Pearl Ilarbor to occur?
"The committee rccorr-irnencled that intelligence work
have centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of
responsibility. It found specific: fault with the system of
dissemination of intelligence to those who had vital need of
it. It stated that '.. , the security of the Nation can he insured
only through continuity of service and Centralization of
responsibility in those charged with handling intelligence.
"It found that there is no substitute for imagination and
resourcefulness on the part of intelligence personnel, and
that part of the failure in this respect was '... the failure
to accord to intelligence work the important and significant
role which it deserves. '.
"The committee declared that '... efficient intelli-
gence services are just as essential in. time of peace as in
war. '
"All. of these findings acid recommendations have my
hearty concurrence. In the Central Intelligence Group, and
in its successor. which this bill creates, must be found the
answer to the prevention of another Pearl Harbor.
"As the United States found itself suddenly projected
into a global war, immense gaps in our knowledge became
readily apparent. The word 'intelligence' quickly took a
fashionable connotation. Each new wartime agency as well
as many of the older departments - soon blossomed out with
intelligence staffs of their own, each producing a mass of
largely uncoordinated information. The resultant competi -
tion for funds and specialized personnel was a monumental
example of waste.
"The War and Navy Departments developed full
political and economic intelligence -staffs,. as di.d the. Research
and Analysis Division of the OSS. The Board of Economic
Warfare and its successor, the ]Foreign Economic Adrexinis-
tration, also delved deeply into fields of economic intelli-
gence. Not content with staffs in Washington, they established
subsidiary staffs in London and then followed these up -with
other units on the Continent. .
"When, during the war, for ex-ample, officials requested
a report on the steel industry in Japan or the economic conditions
in 'the Netherlands East Indies, they had the reports of the
Board of Economic WYar.fare, G-2, ONI, and the OSS from which
to choose. Because these agencies had competed to secure the
best personnel, it was necessary for each of them to back up
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00
its experty asserting that its particular reports were the
best available, and that the others might well be disregarded.
"As General Marshall stated in testifying on the uni-
fication bill before the Senate Military Affairs Committee
last year, Prior to entering the, war, we had little more
than what a military attache could learn at a dinner, more
or less over the coffee cups.
"From this- start, we suddenly had intelligence
springing up everywhere. But nowhere was its collection,
production, or dissemination fully coordinated- not even in
the armed forces. General Marshall pointed this out in his
testimony when he mentioned ' ... the difficulty we had in even
developing a Joint Intelligence Committee. That would seem
to be a very simple thing to do, but it was not at all.
"There are great masses of information available to
us in peace as in war. With our wartime experience behind us,
we know now where to look for.rnaterial, as well as for what
to look.
"The transition from war to peace .does not change
the necessity for coordination of the collection, production,
and dissemination of the increasingly vast quantities of
foreign-intelligence information that are becoming available.
-'This- coordination the Central Intelligence Agency will supply.. .
"President Roosevelt established the Office of
-Strategic Services for the purpose of gathering together men
of exceptional background and ability who could operate in
the field of national, rather than departmental, intelligence. -
In weighing the merits of the OSS, one should remember that
it came late into the field. It was a stopgap. Overnight, it
was given a function to perform. that the British, for instance,
had been developing since the clays of Queen Elizabeth. When
one considers these facts, the work of the OSS was quite remark-
able and its known failures must be weighed against its successes.
Moreover, it marked a crucial turning point in the development
of United States intelligence. We are now attempting to profit
by their experiences and mistakes.
"Having attained its present international position of
importance and power in an unstable world, the United States
should not, in my opinion, find itself again confronted with the
necessity of developing its plans and policies on the basis of
intelligence collected, compiled, and interpreted by some for-
eign government. It is common knowledge that we found our-
selves in just that position at the beginning of World War II...
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 duplicate services in carrying out these functions."
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Awe
"For months we had to rely blindly and trustingly
on the superior intelligence system of t?"ie British, Our successes
prove that this trust was generally. we).). placed. However, in
matters so vital to a Nation having the responsibilities of a
,world power, the United State`s should never again have to go
hat in hand, begging any foreign'?governmcnt for the eyes-
the foreign intelligence - with which to see. We should be
self-sufficient. The interests of,othcrs may not be oar
interests. . "The need for our own coordinated intelligence pro-
gran-i has been recognized in most quarters. The Pearl Harbor
disaster dramatized that need and stopgap measures were
adopted. As the war drew to a close, the President directed
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study the problem and draft recorn-
mendations for the future.
"By the assignment of primary fields of intelligence
responsibilities, we are - iii the fields of collection,. production,
and dissemination - preventing overlapping functions - that is,
eliminating duplicate roles and missions, and eliminating
Testi-nony before the House Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departn-ients provided additional insights into the need for
I structuring foreign intelligence functions on a Goverxunent-wide basis.
General Carl Spaatz, Comrimandin; General, Army Air Force:
"The bill provides the basic elements of security of which we
may mention five... Fourth, correct intelligence, The bill
provides for enlarger-lent of our capacity to know the capabili-
ties of our possible enemies, how they can attack us, and
with what. Each service will retain its own technical intelli-
gence with its own trained attaches abroad. The CIA will
coordinate information from all the services, as well as
from other branches of the Government. "6/~v
Intelligence Agency with the responsibility for collection of
information from all available sources, evaluation of that
information and dissemination thereof. This Agency is
intended to secure complete coverage of the wide field of
intelligence and should nini:zYi.re duplication. The bill recog-
nizes that military intelligence is a composit of authenticated
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and evaluated information covering not only the armed forces
establishment of a possible enemy but also his industrial
capacity, racial traits, religious beliefs, and other related
aspects. 1161
Secretary James V. Forrestal?(Secreta.ry of the Nav.y;62 listed
the CIA second among the essentials of the bill, after the
National Security Council): "Thy need for that (CIA) should be
obvious to all of us, "63
Rep. W. J. Dorn (D. , S. C. ): "With regard to the Central
Intelligence Agency - I may be wrong, but I have always felt
that if Admiral Kimmel had had proper.iintelli;ence from
Washington the attack on Pearl Harbor would not have occurred,
or at least we would have been able to meet it better. From
your experience; do you think that this Central Intelligence
Agency -alone would warrant passage of this bill?"
46
Vice Admiral Arthur Radford: Of coi-.rse, I think it is most
important. Actually it is in existence now. It is already functioning
Committee Reports
The Senate Committee report on S. 758 concluded; "To meet
the future with confidence, we must make ce;rta in... that a Central
Intelligence Agency collects and analyzes that mass of information
Without which the Government cannot either maintain peace or wage
war successfully. "65
The House Committee report on H. R. 4214 was equally clear
and succinct in its conclusion: "The testimony received by your corn-
committee discloses an urgent need for a continuous program of close
coordination between our domestic, foreign and military policies so
that we may always be able to appraise our commitments as a Nation
in the light of our resources and capabilities. This, your committee
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feels, can. be ac'nplished by the Central Intelligence Agency...
In order that the Council (National Security Council), in its delibera.--
tions and advice to the President, may have available adequate infor-
mation, there is provided a permanent organization under the Council,
66,
which will furnish that information.
Floor Discussion
Senate: The Senate Armed Service Committee findings and
report were re-echoed in floor statements during the Senate's dis-
cussion of S. 758:
Senator Chan Gix neyy(R. , S. D.) (Chairman of the Armed
Services Corrirnittee): "As an important adjunct to the;-' ational
Security Council there is a provision for a Central Intelligence
Agency, which fills.a. long recognized demand for accurate
information upon which important decig4ons, relating Co
fordtgn military policy can be based.
_Senator Raymond Baldwin (R. , Conn. ): Under the Cou-i.cil
there is establisher) a central intelligence agency to provide
coordinated, adequate intelligence for all Government agencies
concerned with national security. When one reads the record
of the past war in regard to that field it is found that there
was much to be. desired in the way intelligence was covered, and
there was great conflict about it. I say nothing here in depr--
cation of the men who were engaged in the intelligence service,
because some remarkable and extremely courageous things
were done. Nevertheless, we demonstrated from our experience
the need of a central intelligence agency... _
Senator I_Aster 1-Ii.ll (D. , Ala. ): It would (S. 758) provide
security measures at all times, rather than only when hostili-
ties threaten. It creates... a central intelligence agenc:y
which is so essential for the Government to mzt.ntain peace
and without which the. Government cannot .gage war success-
fully. 1,69
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House The need for centralizing national intelligence drew
wide support froni many members of the House during the floor
discussiotz of ft. R. 4214:
Rep. Jaynes Wadsworth (R. N. Y. : "This I
(. R.
421-1 an., the instru-
mentalities it establishes) links the military policy with foreign
policy, all measured by our resources and the potentialities
of other people.,,70
Rep. Fred Bushey (R. , Ill.) (although troubled with certain
features of the CIA section): "I am not opposed to a central intelli
gence agency. ... You remember Pearl Harbor. They had intelli-
gence, but it was not correlated and evaluated correctly.'"71
Rep. Walter Andrews (R. , N. Y. ): "On the next level above the
. National 1VIilitary :stablishr ent there is provided the National
Security Council with the President as chairman, which will
effectively coordinate our domestic and foreign policies in the
light of sound information furnished by the Central Intelligence
A envy 'r72
Rep.. Robert Sikes (D. Fla. : "During } the intervening years
bet'weert xvars we have never had a proper balance between our
foreign and military policies... We have never been fully informed
of the capabilities, potentA.al or intent of likely_enernies This
is another time when we can well say, 'Remember Pearl Harbor. ' "7
Rep. Dewey Short (R. , Mo. ): "Mr. Chairman, on every score
and by every count we should vote adequate funds for... our
Central Intelligence - v hich has been lamentably weak
These (including Central Intelligence) are the things above all
others which will guarantee our security. ,74
Rep. W. J. Bryan Dorn (D. , S. C.
): "Mr. Chairman, one of the
most important features of this bill is the Central Intelligence
Agency. I would like for you to turn back with me this afternoon
to the most terrible period preceding World War II. Why, you had
most of the newspapers and people in this country thinking that
Adolf Hitler was a comic character, that a war, in Europe could
not last through the winter - I remember those editorials quite
well - that Germany would not last through the winter of 1939.
I remetnber officers of the Navy corning back frona observation
posts in the Pacific and sa. ying that the Japanese could not
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last 3 weeks in a war with America. The Government in
Washington was stunned and shocked beyond belief when it
suddenly realized that Paris and France would fall.
"An important Member. pf the other body, who is
still servin in that body, said that a few bombs on Tokyo
would knock them out of the war. ' ;That a woeful lack of
intelligence as to the potential power of our enemies.
People were saying that Mussolini would not attack; that
lie was only bluffing,. Around the world there was a total
lack of knowledge of those forces that were marshalling
to destroy American democracy. I tell you gentlemen of
the committee that your central intelligence agency is a
very important part of this bill. "75
a basis adequ-ttel.y designed to acquaint each of them with
the operations of the other; which was necessary to their
joint security, and to exchange fully all significant intelli
genre, and they also failed to appreciate and evaluate the
significance of, the intelligence and other information available
to them. ' ?76
by them and the principal command by mutual cooperations.
(B) They failed to integrate and coordinate their facilities
for defense, to alert properly the Array and Navy Estab-
lishrizents in Hawaii, particularly in the line of warning
and intellig pence available to them during the period Novem-
ber 27 to D cernber 7, 1941. They failed to effect liaison on
recezved from v ashmngton,. and other information possessed
Rep. Chet Holifield (D. , Calif. ): "I want to read to you some
of the conclusions of the Pearl Harbor Committee, as follotrs.
Their conclusions were: 'That' the Hawaiian Command failed
to discharge their responsibility in the light of the warnings
a
Rep. Robert A. Harness (R., Ind.): "Now a word about the
Central Intelligence Fi;ency. When such an organization was
first proposed I confess I had some fear and doubt about it.
Along with other members of the Committee, I insisted
that the scope and authority of this Agency be carefully
defined and limited. Please bear in mind that this is a
bold departure from American tradition. This country has.
never before officially resorted to the collection of secret
and strategic information in time of peace as an announced
and fixed policy. Now, however, I am convinced that such
an Agency as PVC are. now considering is e semi l to our
national security. u,77
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49
 A ve lF4 sF F 05/0 (2 ,. IA-,RDP819B005_I?tR0 0011000( -3
ei auc~i ion, uric er ze
Council there would be another element which is to advise
the Council, subject to regulations made by the Council,
in the field of Intelligence, in the foreign field; and there is
established a central intelligence agency subject to the
Council headed by a director. The function of that agency is
to constitute itself as a gathering t,oint for information Com-
ing from all over the world through all kinds of channels
concerning the potential strength of other nations and their
political intentions. There is nothing secret about that.
Every nation in the world is doing the same thing, But it
must be remembered that the Central Intelligence Agency is
subject to the Council and does not act independently. It
is the agency for the collecting and dissemination of informa-
tion which will help the President and the Council to adopt
wisp and effective policies. So with the information of that
sort concerning other nations and information coming in
with respect to our own resources, both of which are available
to the Council and President, we will have for the first time
in our history a piece of machinery that should work and it
is high time that we have it. We have never had it before.
During this last war all sorts of devices were resorted to,
obviously in great haste, to accomplish a thing like this."
You may remember the huge number of special committees,
organizations and agencies set up by Executive Order in an
attempt to catch up with the target. We have learned as a
nation, and that is the one proposed in this bill.
Rep. Manasco (D. , Ala. ): "If we had had a strong central
intelligence organization, in all probability we would never
had had the attack on Pearl Harbor; there might not have
been a World War II... I hope the committee will support
the provision in the bill, because the future security of our
country in a large measure depends upon the intelligence we
get, Most of it can be gathered without clandestine intelli-
gence, but some of it must be of necessity clandestine
intelligence. The things we say here today, the language we
change, might endanger the lives of some American citizens
in the future, e,79
Thus, there was a consensus of agreement, almost reaching to
unanimous proportions, that the concept of central intelligence should
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be ratified and embodied into statute. I-Ioweti,er, beyond this point
of almost total accord, differences of opinion would arise as more
specific consideration relating to CIA was undertaken.
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CHAPTER V. POSITION War ITHIN EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The position that should be prescribed for the CIA within the
Executive Branch was understandably of 'donside cable interest. This
was the very .- arrow.of the central intelligence concept and an antece-
dent to its disposition was an appreciation of the "s"upra--departmental"
nature of the relationships which had been established within the
"intelligence cot cnunity" under the National Intelligence Authority.
It is recalled that the 22 January 1946 Presidential Di rective80
placed the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence
Group under the control of the President's chief advisors in international
and military affairs, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navyr, and the
personal representative of the President. The DCI was a non-voting
faember of the NIA.
I
Following this pattern, the proposed National Security'.Act of
!1947 sirnply established "... under the National Security Council a
Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence,
who shall be the head thereof..." and transferred "... the functions
of the National Intelligence Authority... to the National Security Council. "81
These functions were to plan, develop, and coordinate all Federal
foreign intelligence activities "... to assuxe the -i-lost effective accomplish-
ment of the intelligence zission related to the national security.
The functions of the DCI and the GIG under the NIA were transferred
also to the DCI and the CIA Act,
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In pursuing the meaning of these relationships three major
questions were considered. First, could central intelligence operate
effectively by reporting to a group (National Security Council) rather
than to an individual? Second, would satisfactory relationships be
maintained between CIA and the departments and their intelligence
agencies.? Third, what relationship should exist between the DCI
and the NSC?
NSC Y, elation ship
House. During Committee hearings in the I-louse, Representa_.
tive 'Walter Judd (R. , Minn.) pursued the respective merits of the CIA
reporting to the NSC or to an individual:
agency which will weaken our intelligence rather than
strengthen it.
ance it deserves... it seems to be a joint and hydra-headed
Rep- Judd: "I have concern as to whether the intelligence
agency provided in the bill is given anywhere near the impor-
t
Dr. Vannevar Bush (Director of the Office of Emergency
Management, Scientific Research and Development): "... The
Central Intelligence Agency provided for (in the bill) links
the military establishment and the State Department, and
hence cannot logically be placed under the Secretary of
National Defense. It is a joint matter. It might be reporting.
directly to the President... "
Judd: "I have never seen a hydra-headed organization
which functions as well as one headed by a single man. If we
were caught flat-footed without proper intelligence at the out-
break of another v/ar, it might be disastrous. "83
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klep Judd: "Regarding the CIA, do you think that it ought
to be under the National Security Council, or directly under
the Secretary of National Defense, on a par With the National
Security Resources Board, the Joint'Research and Develop--
rnent Board, the National Security Resources Board. The
CIA is put under the National Security Council so that it
has a dozen heads. It seems to me that this is so important
that it ought to be on a par with those other agencies.
"
Vice Admiral Radford: "I feel that the CIA should be under
the National Security Council. "
Rep. Judd: "You don't think that its reports will make the
rounds and never get any action?"
Vice Admiral Radford: "I hardly think so. I think its handling
of reports g.n be controlled by, the Director. I am sure it
would be." r
Senate. In a statement before the Senate Committee,. Mr.
Allen W. Dulles, who made extraordinary contributions to the success
of the OSS and who eventually was to become the first civilian to be
appointed Director of Central Intelligence, questioned the desirability
of the Director reporting to a large National Security Council:85
"... this (National Security) Council will have at least
six members, and possibly more, subject to Presidential
appointments. From its co reposition. it will be la.rgely
military although the Secretary of State will be a member,
If precedent is any guide, it seems unlikely, in view of the.
burden of work upon all the i-nembers of this Council, that it
will prove to be an effective working body which will meet
frequently, or which could give much supervisory attention
to a central intelligence agency. It would seem preferable
that the Chief of Central Intelligence should report, as at
present, to a smaller body, of which the Secretary of State
would be the chairman, and which would include the Secretary
of National Defense, and a representative of the President,
with the right reserved to the Secretaries of State and of
National Defense to be represented on this small board by
D_ i-
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deputies, who should have at least the rank of Assistant
Secretary. And this board must really meet and assume
the responsibility for advising and counseling the Direc-
tor of Intelligenci:, and assure ,the proper liaison between
the Agency and these two Departments and the Executive.
However, under no circumstances did Mr. Dulles want CIA
to be organized under an individual policy maker: 86
"The State Department, irrespective of the form, in
which the Central Intelligence Agency is cast, will collect
and process its own information as a basis for the day-by-
day conduct of its wort:., The armed services intelligence
agencies will do likewise. -But for the proper judging of the
situation in any foreign country it is important that informa-
tion should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to
weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts,
without having either the f.icts or the conclusions warped
by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose
determined a policy, are. too likely to be blind to any facts
which might tend to prove the policy to he faulty. The
Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with
policy, It should try to get at the hard facts on which others
must determine policy. . J: he =warnings which might well have
pointed to the attack on Pearl harbor were largely discounted
by those who had. already concluded that the Japanese must
inevitably strike elsewhere. The warnings which reportedly
came to Hitler of our invasion of North Africa were laughed
aside. Hitler thought he knew we didn't have the ships to do
it. It is impossible to provide any system which will be_
proof against the human frailty of intellectual stubbornness.
Every individual suffers from that. All we can do is to see
that vie have created the best possible mechanism to get the
unvarnished facts before the policy makers, and to get it
there in time. "
Chairman Gurney of the Senate Armed Services Committee
became particularly interested in whether the CIA. should report to
the National Security Council. or to an individual, particularly the
Secretary of National Defense. In line with this interest he arranged
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for Mr. Charles S. Cheston, a former Assistant Director of the
Office of Strategic Services, to meet with Admiral Roscoe. Hillen-
koetter, who succeeded General Vandenberg as DCI on 1 May 1947.
Mr. Cheston's viewpoint was subsequently made a. 'matter
of record in the Senate hearings: 87
"... It has been amply demonstrated that problems of
peace and war in modern times require total intelligence.
Each of the principal departments and agencies of Govern-
ment requires informatioYi for the determination of-basic
questions of policy, the collection and analysis of which
are entirely outside the scope of its own operations. It
does not solve the problem to create a kind of clearing house
for information gathered in the' ordinary operations of the
several departments. tVh:.it is, needed is an effective,
integrated, single agency with clearly defined duties and
authority to analyze and correlate information from all
sources and, wherever necessary, to supplement existing
methods. of collection of information, Such an agency must
serve--all principal departments of the Government and also
bring together the full and comprehensive information upon
which national policy must be based. It should not supplant
existing intelligence units within the several departinen.t. .
Every effort should be made to improve and strengthen these
units wherever possible. The problem is national and not
departmental. And it will not be solved by having the policies
and operations of such an agency determined by a committee
of Cabinet members, whose primary duty is to discharge
the full-time responsibilities of their own offices. "
1'ollowing a meeting with Mr. Cheston in Philadelphia on
Memorial Day, Admiral IIillenkoetter wrote a letter to Senator Gurney,
from which the following is excerpted:
"The third point (advocated by Mr. Cheston) is that the.
Director should report to an individual rather than a con iiittee.
As I previously stated before the Senate Appropriations
Corrnnittce, I feel that this is a matter to be determined by
the Congress rather than by rne. On purely theoretical
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grounds, it would, of course, be best.to report;to one inch-
vidual rather thati a group. However, I can work with a
Council equally well, and sec no great difference in either
solution that Congress may determine. There may be some
question as to the tivisclozn of having the ,Director of Central
Intelligence report to the Secretar.)r of National Defense.
This, in effect, might: be considered as placing the Agency
within the military establishment, tivhich would not, in all
probability, he satisfactory to the State Department. They
have a great interest in the operations of the Agency, and
their contributions in the intelligence field are particularly
important in time of peace, when the Foreign Service can
operate throughout the world.
"As General Donovan stated in his memorandum to
you of 7 May 1947, intelligence 'must serve the diplomatic
as well as the military and naval arms. ' ` This can be best
done outside the military establishment. As General Donovan
stated further, '. Since the nature of its work requires it to
have status, it should be independent of any Department of
the Government (since it is obliged to serve all and muse be
free of the natural bias on operating Departments).' "
When this matter cane to the Senate floor. Senator Robertson
of the Senate Armed Services Committee proposed an amendment
Elevating the Secretary of National Security (Secretary of Defens;,) to
a, position "...where he will be over the National Security Council,
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources
Board, and over the entire military establishment as well. Pigs The
emphasis behind this amendment, however, was to make the Secretary
of Defense the coordinator of national security and immediately under
the President. It was only collaterally related to central intelligence.
Senator Gurney, in opposing the arriendment, said, "We do not believe
that the (Secretary of Defense) should in any way control, by means of
a superior position, the conclusions which emanate from the Security
Council.... "89 The arnondna.ent was defeated.
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Relationship with Iiite.llh once Community
While the C:i\ was established under the National Security Coun-.
ci.l as proposed by Adzninistration, Congressional consideration helped
to m ate the stt~iz a-depaz tn~ ental nature of the Agency's function
as much as it did to ratify earlier Executive Branch action.
The second concern relating to the establishment of the CIA
under the National Security Council was whether' this arrangement
would support satisfactory relationships between the CIA and the depart-
ments and their inteltig ence agencies.: This concern was brought out
in the following col'oquy, during the Senate Committee hea.rings:-
Senator Tyclita4;s (D. , Md. ): " .. when you get down to the
Central Intelligence Agency, which certainly is one of the
most import:tait of all the functions set foxth in the bill, I
notice-that it reports -directly to the President and does not
seem to have any line running to the War D ,p- .rtment, or the
Navy Department, or to the Secretary for Air. And I was
wondering if that rather excluded position, you might say,
was a wholesome thing. It seems to me that Central I.nitelli-
gence Agency ought to have more direct contact with the
Army and the Navy and the Air Force; and as I see it on the
chart here, it. is pretty well set aside and goes only to the
President. What is the reason for that?"
Admiral Sherman: "Well, sir, this diagram shows the pri-
mary control of the Central Intelligence Agency through the
National Security Council which, of course; is responsible
to the President. But, of course, the Central intelligence
Agency, by its detailed directive, takes information in from
the military services and also supplies them with information.
"In other words, it is a. staff agency and controlled
through the National Security Council, which is supported by
the military services, and in turn, supports them.
Senator Ty;lii "It i eenls to xne that of course they would
diffuse StichIn Oran as a matter of orderly pr procedure
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to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as they collected the
information and as they deemed it pertinent. But I would
feel a little more secure about it if there were a line
running from that agency to the War Department, the. Navy
Department, and the Air Force, rather than have it go up
through the President and back again. Because the. Presi-
dent is a rather busy man, and while he has control over
it, one of its functions, it seems tome, ought to be to
have a closer tie-in with the three services than the chart
indicates."
Admiral Sherman: "Well, sir, that is the trouble with the
diagram. Actually, the Security Council, placed directly
under it, has members of the three departx ents, the
Secretary of National Defense, the Central Intelligence.
Agency, who collaborates very closely with Military and
Naval Intelligence, and there are a good many other cross-
relationships. "
Senator Tydings: ."I realize that, but even so, I think..intelli.
Bence is about as important a part of running a war as there
is, as I know you will agree. And it is rather set off there
by itself, and is only under the President; which is all right
for general direction purposes, but I do not feel satisfied
in having it over there without some lines running to the War
Department, the Navy Department,. and the Air Force, even
though that might follow and they might do it. anylhow. `
Admiral Sherman: "Well, in a further development of this
chart, we might show a line of collaboration and service and
so on, extending from the Central Intelligence Agency to the
three departments, and to those others."
Senator Tydings : "To the Joint Chiefs of Staff anyway. "
Admiral Sherman: "They serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
a matter of fact. We have a Central Intelligence (man) in
the Policy Council of the Research and Development Board at
the present time. "
Senator T_ cli_nj;s: "If you ever do another chart, will you clo
me the favor of connecting that up with those three departments
and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Because it looks like it is
set up in that way to advise the President, more than to advise
the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; which, of course,
is not the intention of it at all, in my opinion. "
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SECRET
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Ildmiral Merman: e t''I C. C., IT1 .II s p. lrtIC U.-ar C ar 1 o
show only the primary line of control, with the exception
of the dotted line from- the President to the Joint Chid's of
Staff, which is there for constitution.--.l reasons.
Senator T ydin:,s: ' Well, I hope that Iny comments will
cause its to find sot,-le \vay that we c .,,n make- sure that
someone will offer an amendment from the 1,Y ar- Dcpa..'tnient
or the Navy Department that the Intelligence Agency- is to
have direct tic-in with the Joint Chiefs and the Army,
Navy, and Air For. ce. Otherwise, we may have another
Pearl Harbor controversy, with the question arisil g,
Who got the information? And the reply, It was not
transmitted.' That is one thin; that should not happen
again. And as this is set up, it would lend the layman
the opinion that it was more or less detached, rather than
an integral part of the three services."
.Senator `ri'dings: "Admiral, that Is an awfully short bit
of explanation, under the caption "Central Inte.l.ligence
Agency, " t1- c wa.v it is set up her c, separately, to be
appointed by the President, and superseding the services
now run by the 1-'army and the Navy, I respectfully submit
to you and to General Norstad 1:11:?t it might be wise to put
an amend n-nt in there, in order to n'I:lke certain that the
thing is understood; that this Central Intelligence Agency
shall service the Three departments and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and have some tic-in with the tlhrc-e departments,
~-uL,.~, tn . a n_ ~~ _
rather than to leave it h gg'na up t .cre on, II.'r.'c) all off
by itself. I do not think that would change anything m ate-
,
rial.ly, but it would clarify it, and make it plain that we are,
setting up Som et 1;Tlg for the purpose's for which \Ct'. conceive
it to be set up.
AcinI1h'Al Slherman: I'hrell, sir, I wealPP like to make a col- 1-nent
on the language as to the Central Intelligence Agency. At
one time in the. drafting v e considered completely covering
the Central Intelligence. Agency in the manner that it should
be covered by law. 1'
-l, my point is si,yipl;r this: that
Senator T'dir. s: ' Arimill.)
llncler the \vol-oing as to the Ccllth-eA Infeliitgellce Agency ,vhichh
!)n..`J~il 1
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begins on p Doc. 41-9795,
~,p robed f~ea ?g05/~OQ/22 ; CIlb 1P g, X00 4010008? -07
and . ;Y euexv x r eptem ex 1cJ . , CC 1Ze~
16. 56 Slat. 704.
17. 57 Stat. 526.
18. National War Agencies Appropriation Act of 1945 (58 Stat. 533),
and National War Agencies Appropriation Act of 1946 (59 Shit. 483).
Also see OGC regarding internal requirements to
assure the full satisfaction of this high trust.
20. Memo for the President from William J. Donovan, Director, OSS,
dated 18 November 1944, with attached directive "Substantive
Authority Necessary in Establishment of a Central Intelligence
Service. "
21. Ibid. 20.
22. Ibid. 20.
23. Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, "Proposed
Establishment of a Central Intelligence Service. " (24 January 1945).
24. J. C. S. 1181/5 (19. September 19=15).
25. Ibid. 23. (Ibid. 24?)
26. Letter from Director, OSS, to Director, BOB, dated 25 August 1945.
27. Including an extensive "Report on Intelligence Matters" from
Brig. Gen. John Magruder, Director, Strategic Services Unit
.(26 October 1945).
28. Memorandum for the Secretary of War, "Preliminary Report of
Committee Appointed to Study War Department Intelligence
Activities" (3 November 1945).
29. Letter from President to Secretary of State, dated 20 September 1945.
30. Memorandum for the Secretary of V ar, Secretary'- of Navy, from
Secretary of State, Subject: National Intelligence Authority.
31, Letter from Secretary of State to Secretaries of War and Navy,
National Intelligence Authority, 10 December 1945.
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 ? "p~lr~s~i~?Illa2~t~11iQ~~A,4~0o4Q~~-rent to
10 December 1945 tt cmorandurn from Secretary of State to
Secretaries of War and Navy, Subject:. National Intelligence
Authority.
33.. Letter to President from Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
dated 7 January 1946.
34. Memo from Special Assistant for the Secretary of State to the
Secretaries of War and Navy, NIA,' 15 December 1945.
35. Draft "Directive Regarding the Coordination of Intelligence
Activities, " Paragraph 8.
36. S. B. L. Penrose, Jr. , Collection of Background Papers on
Development of CIA, dated 15 May 1947.
37. Memorandum to General Mag ruder from Commander Donovan,
General Counsel, OSS (23 January 1946).
38. Letter to the President from Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
dated 7 .T-ini,a r,- I OA(,
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CHAPTER. II.
39. Memo for the President from Wi`lliarn J. Donovan, Director, OSS,
dated 18 November 1944, tivitii attached directive, "Substantive
Authority Necessary in Establishment of the Central Intelligence
Service. "
40. Ibid. 38
Memo for Clark M. Clifford, dated 2 December 19-16, Subject:
Proposed Enabling Legislation for the Establishment of a CIA.
42. Authority to hire personnel directly and independent budget were
needed most. Fortunately BOB GAO, State, War, Navy, and
Treasury recognized the problems and made arrangements which
enable CIG to operate. See 1 OGC 117 regards working fund for
D CI.
43. Letter from President Truman to Senator Thomas Walsh, Repre-
sentatives May and Vinson. 15 June 1946.
This section was deleted from final draft. CIG had urged that
phrase "subject to existing law" be eliminated as it adds nothing
and many of the functions and authorities of this Agency are
excepted from existing law." (Letter to Charles Murphy, 27
January 1947.) While Admiral Leahy, the President's personal
representative to the NIA, agreed, Mr. Murphy suggested that the
entire clause be omitted and CIG agreed. (Page 4, Proposed
legislation for CIG, Chief, Legislative Liaison Division Memo-
randum for the Record.)
Memorandum for the Record, Proposed Legislation for CIG, Chief,
Legislative Liaison Division, CIG.
46. The salary was lowered from $15, 000 to $14, 000 by the -White House
drafters on basis that incumbent would be a military or naval
officer whose salary should not be greatly in excess of that of
Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations, and it was established
at the same level as that of Director, Military Applications of AEC.
(Proposed CIG Legislation Meinorandura for the Record, Chief,
Legislative Liaison Division.)
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47. Proposed CIG Legislation Menzoi:andurn for the Record, Chief,
Legislative Liaison Division, undated.
48. Congressional Record, p. 9606, 19'July 1947.
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CHAPTER III.
49.
House Report 2734, 79th Congress, Second Session (1946).
50.
Senate Report 1327, 79th Congress,, Second Session.
51.
New York Times, 19 October 19 45, p. 3, col. 1.
52.
See Page 30 supra for the wording of the CIA section.
Title II
was changed to Title I since it provides ".. , on the highest
level, under the immediate'supervision of the President, the
establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the
departments, agencies and functions of the Government rela-
ting to National Security... (S. Report 239, 80th Congress,
First Session). Further, Coordination for National Security
".. , was outside, separate and apart, from the Defense r stab-
lishment (and) in an effort to bring a realization to the
members- of the Committee that we were seeking a national
security organization ant' not a national military establishment,
I was able to have the Committee amend the bill... thus at
least placing first things first. " (Senator Robertson, Congress-
ional.Record, p. 8475, 7 July.)
The Legislative Reorganizaticn Plan of 1946 combined the Com-
mittee for Naval Affairs and the Committee for Military Affairs.
54, On 1 May 1947, the DCI, Genera]. Hoyt Vandenberg, was succeeded
by Admiral Roscoe I-Iillenkoetter.
55. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9605.
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49.
House Report 2734, 79th Congress, Second Session (1946).
50.
Senate Report 1327, 79th Congress,, Second Session.
51.
i\ew York Times, 19 October 1945, p. 3, col. 1.
52.
See Page 30 supra for the wording of the CIA section.
Title II
was changed to Title I since it provides `1. . . on the highest
level, under the immediate supervision of the President, the
establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the
departments, agencies and funct.ions of the Government rela-
ting to National Security... (S. Report 239, 80th Congress,
First Session). Further, Coordination for National Security
".. , was outside, separate and apart, from the Defense r~stab-
lishment (and) in an effort to bring a realization to the
members of the Committee that we were seeking a national
security organization and not a national military establishment,
I was able to have the Committee amend the bill... thus at
least placing first things first. (Senator Robertson, Gonr.,ress-_
ional Record, p. 8475, 7 July. )
53, The Legislative Reorganization Plan of 1946 combined the Com-
mittee for Naval Affairs and the Committee for Military Affairs.
54. On 1 May 1947, the DCI, General. Hoyt Vandenberg, was succeeded
by Admiral Roscoe 1-lillenkoetter,
55. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9605.
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CHAPTER IV.
56. Senator Thomas had worked on t:lie Common Defense Act of 1946
which was reported out of the MMfilita.ry Affairs Committee but
which died in the Naval Affairs Committee.
57. Congressional Record, 14 March 1947, p. 2139.
58. Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 and 2
April 1947.
59. Testimony before Senate Armed Services..Conunittee, 29 April 1947.
60. Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
De
art
t
p
men
s on H. R. 2139, 13 May 1947.
61. Ibid. , 15 May 1947.
62. Secretary Forrestal was to be appointed the first Secretary of
Defense.
63. Ibid. , 10 June 1947.
64. -Ibid. , 26 June 1947.
65. Senate Report 239, p. 2, 80th Congress, First Session, 5 June 1947.
66. House Report 961, p. 3, 80th Cori gress, First Session, 16 July 1947.
67. Congressional Record, 7 July 19.17, p. 8466..
68. Congressional Record, 9 July 1947, p. 8677.
69. Congressional Record, 9 July 19-17, p. 8671.
70. Congressional Record 19 July 1947, p. 9565.
71. Congressional. Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9569.
72. Congressional Record, 19 July 19.17, p. 9573.
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73. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9579.
74. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9581,
75. Congressional Record, 19 July 19.1' F, p. 9582.
76. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9590.
77. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9576.
78. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p.
79. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p.
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CHAPTER V.
80. Page 20 supra.
81. Pape 31 supra.
82. Pape 20 supra.
83. Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H. R. 2.139, 24 June 1947.
84. Ibid. , 26 June 1947.
85. Hearings before Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758, p. 526.
86. Ibid. , p. 669.
87. Ibid. , p. 527.
88. Congressional Record, 9 July 19,17, p. 8688,
89. Ibid..
90. 1Iearins before Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758,
pp. 173-176.
91. Ibid. p. 497.
92. House Report 961, 80th Congress, First Session.
94. Page 29 supra.
93. Conrressional Record, 19 July 1947, p,
95. Hearings before House Con mittee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H. R. 2139 (1947).
96. Public Papers of tlic-Presidents of the. United States, John F. Kelinedy,
1961, Item 485. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States,
Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Item 209 (Note), Letter from the President
of the United States to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated
September 24, 1965.
97. P. L. 80-253, Section 102(a).
98. Ibid. , Section 102(d).
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Chapter VI.
99. P. 20 supra, 100. P. 38 supra.
101. Hearings before Senate Committee gn Arr.ned Services on S. 758,
80th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 176 (1947).
102. Congressional Record, 7 July 1947, p. 8456.
103. H. Rep. 961, 80th Gong., 1st Sess., p. 3 (1947).
104. Hearings before House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H. R. 2139, 80th Con-. , 1st Sess., p. 120 (1947).
105. Ibid., p. 125.
106. Ibid., p. 170.
107. Statement of Lt. Gen. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelli genZce,
before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments (1 May 1947),and Hearings before Senate Armed
Services Committee on S. 758, 80th. Cong., 1st Sess.
108. -Hearings before Senate Committee on Armed Services on S. 758,
80th Cong.., 1st Sess., p. 496 (.1947).
109. P. 67 supra.
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Chapter VII.
110. Zi ootnote 49 supra.
111. P. 34 supra.
112. lZeaxin gs bcfo`re the House Committee on Expenditures in the Excccu-
tive Departments on H. R. 2319, Unpublished classified transcript,
27 June 1947.
113. Penrose Papers.
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Ciiapter VIII.
114. P. 30 supra.
115. Hearings before House Committee' on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H.R. 2139, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 439 (1947).
116. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9604.
117. Congressional Record, 25 July 1947, p. 10271.
118. Fixed term appointment of up to 10 years. had been suggested.
119. Rep. Robert A. Harness (R., Ind. ).
120. 10 U. S. C. 576; R. S. sec. 1222; 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 200.
121. As reported out of Senate Committee, the salary of the position
was reduced from $14, 000 to $12, 000 per annum in line with an
across the board reduction for certain positions under the National
Security Act of 1947.
122. Congressional Record, 7 July 1947, p. 8458. Admiral Sherman sug-
gested before the Senate Committee that addition of the phrase "from
military or civilian life" or vice versa would clarify the intent
that a civilian could be appoi.n`ed Director.
123. P. 26 supra..
124. S. Rep. 239, 80th Gong., 1st Sess., p. 10 (1947).
125. Congressional Record, 7 July 1947, p. 8486.
126. Congressional Record, 9 July 1947, p. 8664.
M. Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments on H. R. 2319, 80th Cond. , 1st Sess. , Unpublished
classified transcript, 27 June 1947.
128. The Mouse Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments
set a salary of $14, 000 for the DCI, $2, 000 more than approved in
S. 758, The salary of the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board was set at the same level. (See footnote 46 supra.) The salaries.
of the Service Secretaries were set at $14, 500, Cabinet members at
the time received $15, 000 per annum.
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129. Con~ressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9576.
130. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, pp. 9605 - 9607.
131. 11. Rep. 1051, 80th Conk;., 1st Sess., National Security Act of 1947,
pp. 3 - 4.
133. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 10272.
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132. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 10271.
 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552iiO00400100002-3
Chapter IX.
134. P. 12 supra.
ti
135. Statemelxt of Lt. Gen. Vandenberg ;before Senate Committee on
Armed Services. Hearings in the Both Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 758,
p. 497 (1947).
136.
Additional views of Chairman Hoffman on H. R. 961, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 11 (1947).
137.
Hearings before Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments, H. R. 2319, 27 June 1947, p. 15.
138.
Ibid. , p. 28.
139.
Ibid., p. 32.
140.
Ibid., pp. 57
-- 58.
141.
Ibid., pp. 59
- 60.
142.
Ibid., pp. 61
- 62.
143.
Ibid., pp. 65
- 66.
144.
'Ibid., pp. 149
- 154.
145.
Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in Executive
Departments in the House, 80th Con., 1st Sess. , H. R. 2319,
g
National Security Act of 1947, pp. 127 - 128 (1947).
1.46.. Ibid., p. 172.
147.
Ibid., p. 559.
148.
H. R. 4214, Sec. 105 (d)
(3).
149.
Congressional Record, 19 July 1947
p. 9591
,
.
150.
P. 21 supra.
151.
Presidential Directive,
22 January 1946, para. 3B (see p. 20 supra).
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP89B005528000400100002-3.
152. Congressional Record, 19 July 1947, p. 9601.
153. Congressional Record, 19 July 19-17, p. 9601.
154. H. R. 1051, 80th Cong. , 1st Sess. , National Security Act of 1947,
Sec. 102 (E),1947. ,
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/22 CIA-RDP89B005520000400100002-3
NAME INDEX
Andrews, Rep. Walter G.
Austin, Sen. Warren R.
Baldwin, Sen. Raymond
Bender, Rep. George H.
Boggs, Rep. Hale
Brown, Rep. Clarence J.
Busbey, Rep. Fred E.
Bush, Dr. Vannevar
Chenoweth, Rep. J. Edgar
Ch,~ston, Charles S.
Clifford, Clark M.
Donovan, Colonel William J.
t1Donovan:s.10 Principles" _
Dorn, Rep. W.J. Bryan
Dulles, Allen W.
Eisenhower, General Dwight D.
Forrestal, James
Gurney, Sen. Chan
Hardy, Rep. Porter
Harness, Rep. Robert A.
Hill, Sen. Lister
Ilillenkoetter, Admiral Roscoe Henry
Hoffman, Rep. Clare
Holifield, Rep. Chet
Hoover, J. Edgar
Inglis, Rear Admiral Thomas
1::)a go s
48
35
47
107
64, 65, 105
70, 71, 72, 78, 79, 93, 97, 98,
99, 105, 108, 113, 114
48, 69, 70, 96, 97, 106
53
1.11, 112
56
23, 26, 27
6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 57
67
46, 48
54, 55, 80, 88, 89, 90, 105, 106,
107, 108
16, 46, 64, 65, 87, 113, 114, 69,
70, 71, 72
36, 47, 55, 56, 57, 61
96, 109, 110, ill, 112
49, 73, 91, 94, 95
35, 47
56, 82, 83, 86, 87, 96
37, 76, 86, 95, 100, 101
49, 96, 97, 105
93, 98
80, 81, 89, 90, 91, 108, 109, 110,
ill, 112 .
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 Approved For,,Belease 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000400100002-3
Judd, Rep. Walter 53,
54,
87,
'..'95,
96,
98,
Kersten, Rep. Charles J. 62
Lovett, Robert
Manasco, Rep. Carter 32,
38,
50
Marshall, General George C. 35,
44
Murphy, Charles S. 26
McCormack, Rep. John 80,
89,
97,
Niniitz, Admiral Chester W. 42,
45
Norstad, General Lauris 26,
72
'Robertson, Sen. Edward V. 57,
69,
85
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 44
Sharman, Vice Admiral Forrest P. 26,
41,
58,
Short, Rep. Dewey 48
!Sikes, Rep. Robert L. F. 48
42,
45
Thomas,
Sen. Elbert D. 35,
40,
41
Truman,
Harry S. 21,
26,
30,
Tydings,
Sen. Millard E. 58,
59,
60,
Vandenberg, General Hoyt E. 23,
27,
28,
70,
73,
74,
86,
87,
103,
Wadsworth, Rep. James W. 48,
50,
63,
Wilson, Rep. Earl 106
Wilson, Rep. J. Franklin 106
1
90, 91, 92, 93, 94,
99, 108, 110
101
59, 60, 61, 72, 73, 114
72
61, 68
29, 30, 41, 56, 61, 63,
77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 85,
104, 105
77, 108
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 Approved For.$elease 20O/Q41 CqP1-ftg1 B005 8000400100002-3
Subject P
c
i
Central Intelligence Group 5, 11, 18, 19, 20, 23,
24, 26, 27, 29, 33,
43, 62, 68, 69, 72,
76, 79, 80, 86, 103,
104, 107, 109, 110, 111,
112, 114, 119
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 28
Director of Central Intelligence 11,
15, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23,
24,
25, 26, 27, 28,
29,
30,
31, 34, 39, 52,
53,
54,
56, 57, 62, 63,
64,
65,
66, 67, 68, 71,
73,
75,
77, 82, 83, 84,
85,.
89,
90, 91, 92, 93,
101,
104,
116, 117, 118,
119,
120,
122, 124
Executive Office of the President
5,
6
Firs': War Powers Act, 1941
7,
8
Intelligence Advisory Board
National Intelligence Authority
3,
11, 15,
16,
17,
18,
19,
20,
. 21, 24, 26,
27,
28,
30,
31, 33, 34,
52,
63,
65,
71, 75, 76,
77,
104,
116
National Intelligence Service 15
National Security Act of 1947 11, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32,
33, 37, 39, 52, 65,
68, 69, 101, 104, 124
National Security Council 3, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34,
36, 47, 48, 53, 54, 55,
57, 58, 59, 61, 63, 64,
65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71,
74, 76, 81, 94, 99, 116,
120, 122
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 Approved Fo elease 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP89B00562R000400100002-3
National War Agencies Appropriation Act
of 1944
Office of Coordinator of Information (COI)
Office of Emergency Management
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
President's Emergency Fund
Reorganization Act of 1939
2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 67
5, 6
43, 63, 77, 78, 107
2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11,
40, 43, 44, 54, 56,
67, 87
7, 8, 10
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