LIMITED WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00552R000100040004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 2, 1960
• Content Type: STUDY

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*NSC Review Completed*
STATINTL
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM-10.101
I AUG 54 (01 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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L I M I T E D W A R
PART I
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD ... .........:........ .
CONCLUSIONS ............................................... 4
RECOMMENDATIONS....... ................................ .
I. THE CHARACTER OF LIMITED WAR ................ 14
II. LIMITED WAR RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE
U. S. GOVERNMENT ............................. 20
DISCUSSION.......... .....................................
III. TRENDS IN MILITARY THINKING ON LIMITED
WAR .............................................. 22
IV. TRENDS IN LIMITED WAR THINKING IN CIA......... 29
V. THE REQUIREMENT FOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL
COOPERATION .................................... 32
A. The Development of Indigenous Forces to
Combat Communist-backed Armed Actions ........ 32
B. Need for a Joint Defense/CIA Mechanism for
an Adequate U. S. CDLW Capability............ 37
VI. THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL ESTIMATES ON THE
LIKELIHOOD AND CHARACTER OF LIMITED WARS
AND BETTER LIMITED WAR PLANNING ............. 42
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VII.
THE ROLE OF CIA IN UNDERDEVELOPED
COUNTRIES THREATENED BY COMMUNIST
AGGRESSION ......................................
48
VIII.
LIMITED WAR MISSIONS OF CIA ......................
51
A. Intelligence .....................................
51
B. Covert Political Action Operations ................
54
C. The Problem of Countering Communist
Covert Actions .................................
56
D. Propaganda ...................................
59
E. Paramilitary Operations ....... .............. .
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FOREWORD
The CIA Reserve Panel's study of the role of CIA in general
war, "Nuclear War, " published on 1 January 1958, was based on an
assumption of a massive exchange of nuclear attacks --- a global
nuclear war. During the period when we were preparing that paper,
we were also aware of rising official and public interest in limited
war as well. Moreover, many criticized our nuclear war paper,
despite its. stated general war assumption, for the lack of attention
given to the CIA role in less than general nuclear war. As a logical
consequence, the Panel initiated a study of our role in limited conflicts.
In our initial study we had concluded that the outcome of a
general war would be essentially decided by the advanced weapons
systems manned by the military. Any CIA role, particularly in the
areas of intensive nuclear exchange, was likely to be extremely difficult
to carry out, and probably insignificant; the Agency's role in areas not
subject to nuclear exchange -.-- "tactical and strategic islands" ---
and in the period after this exchange could be relatively more
important.
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We also concluded that the U. S. was more likely to become
involved in further limited wars than in all-out conflict. The nuclear
stalemate has established a deterrent balance with respect to the
latter. Paradoxically, however, by reducing the likelihood that
either side would risk such an all-out conflict, it may have made
limited wars seem less risky to the Bloc in many parts of the world ---
especially in the underdeveloped areas. In the NATO-Warsaw Pact
area, where the risks of local aggression becoming general war are
so great, the Bloc seems unlikely to attempt to achieve its aim
through the use of armed force.
In the underdeveloped areas the East-West deterrent balance
is more fragile. The Communist Bloc is concentrating more and more
effort on those areas which are in a state of rapid and at times violent
political, economic, and social change which renders them vulnerable
to Communist "indirect aggression. " The Communist offensive in
these areas emphasizes economic aid, technical assistance, propaganda
using mass front organizations, subversion through the Communist
Party apparatus, and Khrushchev's personal diplomacy; at the same
time they continue to rely heavily on the force of arms, whether in the
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hands of indigenous rebel forces and guerrillas, pro-Communist
elements of the police and military forces, imported "volunteers"
or --- as in Korea --- national armed forces. This phase of
Communist expansion significantly has provided a more.active role
for the Chinese Communists, particularly in the Afro-Asia under-
developed countries, with increased emphasis on Mao's tactical
doctrine. This, in turn,, increases the likelihood of "proletarian"
military struggle.
25X1A
2 December 1960
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CONCLUSIONS
1. As the U. S. and the USSR enter a period in which their
general nuclear war capabilities are roughly comparable, the likeli-
hood of deliberate initiation of general war is decreasing. Paradoxi-
cally, however, the very reluctance of both sides to engage in
general war may make local war seem a less dangerous proposition.
Z. Moreover, in the 1960s the major thrust of World Communism
is into the underdeveloped areas where the Communists believe the
Western position is vulnerable to gradual erosion by active subversion,
armed internal rebellion, and even limited aggression. There may
also be conflicts not initiated by the Communists in which U. S. interests
might require the U. S. to play a military role.
3. For the above reasons, the U. S. Government, including
CIA, must devote much greater attention to the problem of an adequate
limited war posture. The spectrum of limited war is extremely wide,
ranging from small paramilitary operations in which the nationality of
the force employed is concealed to major military operations involving
overt forces of several nations. For the purposes of this study, how-
ever, it can be conveniently divided into three categories. At the
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lower end of the spectrum we place the covert paramilitary action
which in CIA has been termed covert denied limited war (CDLW).
At the top of the spectrum is the large overt conflict such as that
fought in Korea, in which major national forces are involved. In
the middle of the spectrum is a third category which contains
elements of both of the others; it can start as CDLW and develop
into overt limited war.
4. In all types of limited war the role of the CIA is proportion-
ately far more significant than the role considered possible in a
general nuclear war. CIA CDLW operations may, in some circum-
stances, constitute the major means of carrying out short range U. S.
policy.
5. The U. S. is gradually doing more toward the development
of a limited war capability. U. S. military commands throughout the
world are giving increased attention to contingency planning for
numerous limited war situations; but this planning concentrates on the
right of the spectrum, i. e. , major limited war situations involving
the overt commitment of U. S. forces.
6. Moreover, the U. S. is not likely to commit itself overtly
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to limited war in any area in the absence of an attack on U. S. forces
or Communist aggression which has reached a point where U. S.
national security is seriously jeopardized. Even then, a decision to
involve the U. S. in limited war requiring the commitment of U. S.
forces will be carefully weighed against anticipated reaction of
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friendly and neutral nations, and the risks of escalation into general
war. And the enemy will seek to avoid presenting us with clear-cut
a
cases of overt aggression which would justify an overt response.
7. Thus the most likely type of limited wax with which the U. S.
will have to cope falls in the middle or lower end of the spectrum where
the U.' S. is both least prepared and least likely to intervene openly.
8. Perhaps the chief contribution which the U. S. could make
toward developing adequate Free World capabilities to meet middle
and lower-end-of-the-spectrum limited aggression, will be through
reorienting U. S. military assistance and police-type programs more
toward meeting these types of limited war threats. Above all, U. S.
aid programs in underdeveloped nations must produce indigenous forces
capable of dealing with the methods of subversion and unconventional
warfare employed by the Communists.
9. While the Military Assistance and Advisory Groups are
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showing increased interest in police, security, intelligence and PM
activities, this process has to date fallen far short of the need.
The deployment of both Special Forces and military intelligence
teams to underdeveloped areas during 1959-60 also demonstrates a
growing awareness of the importance of clandestine operations and
UW techniques in meeting the Communist threat in these areas.
The total commitment of military intelligence and Special Forces
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personnel has thus far, however, been insignificant when compared
to the strength which remains committed to general war missions.
10. CIA
has in the past two years given
increased attention to improving its capability for this type of operation.
However, it has not substantially changed the scope and magnitude of
the effort. Actions to increase the U. S. capability for carrying out
expanded CDLW operations are being taken ad hoc to meet specific
critical situations which exist today. There has been no decision made.
and no action taken to expand permanently CIA's limited war capabili-
ties. Nor has CIA evolved techniques for estimating the likelihood
and character of limited war situations which may require CIA operational
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efforts or systematic planning procedures for developing an organic
CIA capability to deal with them.
11. The middle-of-the-spectrum limited war, which involves
capabilities and competence extending beyond those of either CIA or
the Defense Department acting independently, is generally recognized
as the type of operation for which the U. S. is least prepared.
12. Although there is increasing awareness among military
and CIA planners of the necessity for extending contingency planning
to take into consideration the implication of CDLW operations initiated
under Special Group approval and carried out by CIA, there is a lack
of continuing arrangements between Defense and CIA for joint planning
and the development of a U. S. capability to fight the middle of the
spectrum type of limited war.
13. The cooperation between CIA and elements of the Defense
establishment directly concerned with military support of CDLW
(Office of Special Operations in Defense, Special Forces, STRAC,
the Marine Corps, the Tactical Air Force, etc.) has improved in the
past year, but present arrangements are not. considered adequate to
meet the complex problems inherent in this type of support.
14. While the President has recognized the need for a mechanism
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to make policy decisions involving covert actions and has establish-
ed the Special Group to determine when and where such actions
should be taken, there is no equally effective mechanism to determine
how interdepartmental actions should be carried out in cases where
their scope extends from the outset beyond the limited capabilities
of CIA. The Department'of Defense, though capable of complementing
CIA efforts, is preoccupied with all aspects of national defense in the
age of ICBMs and nuclear weapons. Even the proponents of a greater
limited war force within the military establishment are concerned
primarily with the problem of maintaining U. S. forces capable of.
waging overt limited war.
15. Thus there is an acute need for an efficient joint mechanism
for dealing with the middle of the spectrum type of limited war which
the U. S. may face in Africa, the Near East, Southeast Asia, or Latin
America in the 1960s. To meet these will require both a major CIA
effort and substantial support from the U. S. military establishment
under conditions which do not permit overt U. S. intervention. The
possibility that operations which begin on such a denied basis may
subsequently involve the U. S. in overt military actions also makes it
essential that CIA and Defense planning and operations be coordinated
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and be related to the overt limited war contingency planning done by ,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the major commands.
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1. CIA should initiate a thorough appraisal of the likelihood,
problems of and requirements for meeting small scale conflicts at
the lower and middle ends of the limited war spectrum. For practical
reasons, this appraisal should be made initially by CIA and then
discussed on an interdepartmental basis.
2. This appraisal should include a thorough study of Communist
techniques in underdeveloped countries for political/military action
below the threshold of overt armed aggression.
3. Following the above appraisal, CIA should press for such
steps as seem indicated to ensure reorientation of coordinated U. S.
aid, technical assistance and other programs to provide greater capa-
bilities for coping with lower and middle-of-the-spectrum limited
wars. These programs should ensure:
a. The development in free underdeveloped countries of
an indigenous capability to deal with the most likely forms of
Communist aggression.
b. The development of an adequate U. S. capability for
conducting nonattributable U. S. military operations in support
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of friendly indigenous forces in countries threatened by
Communist aggression.
c. The development of political action operations, related
to our limited war capability, for coping with Communist
softening-up techniques which inevitably precede resort to
arms.
4. As part of the appraisal recommended above, CIA should
review its own potential role in limited wars in order to determine the
character and magnitude of the effort which it should devote to these
purposes during the 1960s. In the panel's view, CIA should retain
responsibility for planning and conducting those operations which are
required to be wholly deniable in character and should develop the
doctrine and organization required to discharge this responsibility
securely and efficiently.
5. On the other hand, CIA should not itself attempt to develop
a major CDLW capability for dealing with larger scale middle-of-the-
spectrum limited wars. Instead, CIA should attempt to meet this
need via cooperative development of a joint capability with the Depart-
ment of Defense. Specifically, CIA and Defense should establish joint
mechanisms for more effectively developing U. S. capabilities and
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 conducting limited war operations along the lines discussed in this
report.
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6. As part of a continuing CIA effort to keep abreast of
limited war contingencies, estimates on the character and likeli-
hood of limited wars should be prepared annually by the Deputy
Director (Plans) in concert with the Deputy Director (Intelligence)
and used as a basis for planning within CIA.
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I. THE CHARACTER OF LIMITED WAR
1. Common usage of the label "Limited War" has extended the
definition to the employment of armed force ranging from guerrilla
action up to a major Korea-type war --- not excluding even the use
of tactical atomic weapons. The types of limited war have been
defined, categorized and subdivided in many ways. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the responsible body in the Government for defining "Limited
War, " has thus far not produced a precise and fully agreed definition.
Although we find it unnecessary for our purpose to attempt a precise
definition, we have found it convenient to identify three categories,
each of which poses a basically different problem for CIA ---
Category A.
A limited military or paramilitary operation in which the
U. S. role would be covert and deniable --- usually carried
out unilaterally by CIA with its own assets.
This category could include fairly large scale indigenous
forces in which the U. S. role is limited and confined to the
type of support CIA would provide alone. This operation would
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be a responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence,
subject to prior approval of the Special Group and usually
the President.
Category U.
A limited military or paramilitary operation in which
the U. S. role would be more substantial but still at least
quasi-covert.
It could involve substantial U. S. technical assistance,
political and material support but no U. S. forces overtly
committed in combat. The key characteristic of this middle-
of-the-spectrum type of conflict from the Agency point of
view would be that it would involve U. S. support exceeding
that which could be provided by CIA alone. The responsibility
for the operation itself would rest with the DCI, subject to
Special Group and always to Presidential approval.
Category C.
A limited war in which U. S. combat forces could be
directly and overtly involved.
In this type of war, the CIA role would be governed by
the command relationship agreement; CIA assets involved in
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the area of conflict would be under the immediate command
of the senior U. S. military commander. The responsibility
for this operation would rest with the Joint Chiefs, subject
to Presidential approval.
2. Because the course --- and thus the magnitude and character
of a limited war operation --- can change rapidly, planning and prepa-
ration must provide for a smooth transition from one category of
limited war operation into another. In the planning and conduct of a
minor, lower end of the spectrum or Category A operation, the risk of
rapid expansion of the magnitude of U. S. support must be considered.
Likewise, U. S. involvement of a substantial nature, though unofficial
and quasi-covert (Category B), involves the obvious risk of further
extension of the conflict into one overtly involving U. S. armed forces.
3. The fact that Pentagon and CIA planners have concurrently
been engaged in an active appraisal of the limited war problem has
tended to complicate the task of producing either original or unique
work in this field. Much of our work in 1958 and early 1959 turned out
to be essentially a duplication of official views produced by individuals
directly concerned with developing policies, concepts and plans for
fighting localized wars in which U. S. interests are at stake. By early
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1959 it was clear to us that, on the one hand, CIA itself was engaged
in an intense examination of the problems of carrying out deniable
limited war operations within its own existing capabilities (Category A
above), while within the Department of Defense and in Congress there
continued to be extremely active debate about U. S. capabilities to
fight a. limited war (Category C).
4. In both CIA and in Defense the problem of the middle-of-
the-spectrum type of limited war had been identified but not subjected
to intensive study. We concluded early in 1959 that this somewhat
neglected area of the problem was most urgently in need of our concen-
trated attention and should be emphasized in this study. We have also
explored and set aside for separate study a number of specific limited
war problems including the role of "volunteer forces, " the implications
of using nuclear weapons in limited war, and finally the role of CIA in
a major limited war where U. S. forces are involved and a "CIA
force" is part of a major U. S. military command. We have found this
latter problem particularly interesting and are currently preparing a
separate study dealing with some of the detailed aspects of it.
5. Even a cursory analysis of the daily intelligence bulletin
that is placed on the desk of the President and senior officials concerned
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with foreign policy and our national security reveals that the items
selected for their attention fall for the most part into two categories.
In the first, one can place the proportionately few items which relate
in some way to the capability and possible intentions of the Soviet
Union either to launch a global nuclear war or to challenge directly
the Western Alliance on issues so vital to the security of the two
major powers that a major risk of war is involved. The second cate-
gory consists of the more numerous daily items describing the
recurring crises in the many areas of the world which are often de-
scribed as the "underdeveloped areas. " These areas have in the last
decade become the increasingly active flank positions to the central
areas, such as Europe, where the Soviet Union and the Western Allies
are essentially stalemated in a balance of nuclear and political power.
It is primarily in these underdeveloped areas that the problem of
limited war has become acute.
6. In a general nuclear war, as we have pointed out, the
decisive element is likely to be the nuclear exchange. The compara-
tively gentle adjustments of force or gray shadings of less than all-out
actions will not apply. The character of all-out nuclear warfare
stands in sharp contrast to the comparatively delicate. filigree which
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is the substance of the limited war problem --- with its intermingling
and interdependence of political, economic, psychological, sociolog-
ical and military influences. The beginning and even the existence of
a limited war is not always easily discernible. ' U. S. entry into
limited conflicts in the period following World War II.has not once
taken the form of a formal declaration of war; even the Korean conflict
was initiated as a "police action" carried out on behalf of the United
Nations. It is likely that U. S. military historians will have difficulty
both in identifying these wars and in pinpointing the precise moment
or action by which the U. S. was in any one of these conflicts "at war. "
Indeed, it is probable that there will be no suggestion that the U. S.
"fought" in the armed conflicts in such places as Guatemala and
Indonesia in the 1950s.
7. On the basic character of limited warfare and on the vital
importance of this type of conflict as, an integral element of the pattern
of Communist aggression, there is surprisingly little disagreement
among individuals or agencies officially or unofficially interested in
the subject of limited war. We were, in fact, struck by the emerging
unanimity of views in Defense and within CIA on the nature of the
problem, on the vital importance of developing a U. S. capability and
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on what we might call the principles of limited war. This does not
mean that the CIA and the Defense Department are in the advanced
stages of developing a modus operandi for waging limited war ---
particularly one involving extensive cooperation or a joint effort.
On the contrary, the existing accomplishments in this field appear to
be quite inadequate in terms of what can and must be accomplished
if we are to meet the Bloc challenge.
II. LIMITED WAR RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE U. S. GOVERN-
MENT
8. If we are to achieve a preparedness to respond effectively
to a policy decision to commit the U. S. to limited armed action in
response to Communist aggression, we must more fully analyze the
character of Communist "proletarian military science"; we must
determine the proper division of responsibility between Defense and
CIA vis-a-vis the various aspects of overt and covert limited warfare;
we must find solutions to the problems involved in combining Defense
and CIA capabilities to fight the middle-of-the-spectrum limited war.
Our solutions must allow for the possibility that any covert effort by
the U. S. will expand further into a major, though localized, war
involving the overt commitment of U. S. forces and a readjustment in
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command relationships in the field and between the DCI and the JCS.
Clearly, responsibility for planning and conducting'a limited war in
which U. S. forces are overtly committed rests. with the- military,
i. e. , the Joint Chiefs. Equally clear is the responsibility of the DCI
for planning and conducting CDLW. The decision to commit the U. S.
in any type of limited war rests clearly and solely with the President
who calls upon either the Joint Chiefs or the DCI, depending whether
the U. S. role is to be overt or covert and deniable. The President
has established the Special Group as a mechanism to insure State
and Defense participation in making decisions that relate to covert
actions to be carried out by CIA. The Special Group does not normally
concern itself with advising the President on matters related to the
commitment of U. S. forces overtly in a limited war operation. A
decision of this magnitude would obviously involve the Secretaries of
State and Defense as well as the National Security Council. In fact
it appears that the Special Group, in making or recommending decisions-
to commit the U. S. to limited war operations, limits its own role as
much by the magnitude of the operation as by the covert character of
the proposed operation. Thus, it appears that the mechanism for
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making decisions at the highest level to commit the U. S. in limited
war exists, is clear, and workable. It is in the planning and prepara-
tion, often on a contingency basis, of limited war operations on the
lower end or in the middle of the spectrum of limited war where we
encounter the most serious problems. We have not developed satis-
factory solutions to the problems of estimating the likelihood and
character of limited war requirements and identifying the assets and
capabilities in Defense and CIA to meet these requirements. Also,
in the past we have failed, until forced with specific critical situations,
to take concrete steps to achieve a degree of "combat readiness" by
combining CIA and Defense assets, to an appropriate degree, into a
limited war force.
III. TRENDS IN MILITARY THINKING ON LIMITED WAR
9. Because the role of CIA in any limited war will be directly
affected by the attitudes and capabilities of the U. S. military
establishment, these factors are vitally important to CIA. The
adequacy of the U. S. limited war forces has, of course, been publicly
and officially debated at length during recent years. Those who
advocate strengthening our conventional forces have been confronted
with the immediate problem of competing for a bigger slice of the
defense budget with the obvious overriding requirements for the
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weapons systems of general nuclear war. And even within military
circles devoted to a policy of increasing our limited war capabilities
there remain fundamental controversies concerning advanced limited
war weapons systems, the character and balance of ground forces
and the political and psychological implications of using atomic
weapons in limited war.
10. The U. S. policy of extending aid and assistance to those
nations prepared to join us in containing Communism was clearly
enunciated by President Truman on 12 March 1947; the military "teeth"
in this policy were provided by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of
1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951. Under these acts the U. S.
provided during the first half of the '50s twenty billion dollars worth
{
of military equipment and assistance to countries of the free world
committed to containing the spread of Communism. The organization,
training, arms and tactical doctrine of the indigenous forces developed
under these programs were modeled closely after U. S. World War II
forces, designed to meet the needs of conventional war.
11. By 1956 the supply of WW II weapons with which we had
equipped the indigenous forces of a number of underdeveloped countries,
as well as some of our allies in NATO, had been largely depleted; wear
and the unavailability of replacement parts would result in many of
these weapons becoming unusable early in the period 1959-65. A U. S.
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production program to replace and maintain these WW II weapons
systems would involve a long-term outlay in excess of fifty billion
and an immediate annual expense of more than two billion dollars.
The more sophisticated and advanced weapons systems with which
the U. S. forces were being equipped were not suitable, for.a
number of reasons, for the indigenous forces of most underdeveloped
areas to which the Communists, faced with a stalemate in Europe,
Korea and the Taiwan Straits, were diverting the mainstream of the
Communist offensive.
12. In analyzing the "spectrum of activity" employed by the
Communist Bloc in its aggression against the underdeveloped area,
U. S. military planners observed that conventional military forces,
and particularly one bearing a "made in U.S.A. " stamp, did not
offer an entirely effective response to even all of the various Communist
techniques for employing force of arms. Communist political and
psychological subversion, subtly exploiting the growing appeal of
military neutrality, had tended to erode the political base of the
military establishment in underdeveloped countries before such forces
had ever been committed to support the strongly anti-Communist
regimes that have been backed by the U. S. since 1947. In other areas
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when the anti-Communist regime and the Army had attempted to deal
with Communist-backed guerrilla warfare carried out from border
areas, the conventional indigenous forces, trained and organized for
conventional warfare, had proven unable to cope with guerrilla tactics.
13. Faced with these facts and circumstances, a limited
number of military planners turned their attention from the concept
of large indigenous conventional forces to an analysis of the pattern of
Communist armed subversion. The critical moment to successfully
oppose Communist forces was, they recognized, when the forces
involved --- small groups of armed men rather than large organized
armed forces --- could be most effectively handled by security forces
or local politically indoctrinated gendarmerie. They also noted that
"people and their organization and behavior assume a significance which
may frequently overshadow the importance of weapons systems developed
and employed to defeat Communist aggression. "
14. As an alternative to a large and expensive production
program to perpetuate conventional indigenous forces at the achieved
or planned Military Assistance Program force goal levels these planners
concluded that our Military Assistance and Advisory Groups in these
areas should "promote the development of indigenous Special Forces
systems for the command and control of paramilitary forces capable
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of performing security missions in peace time and guerrilla operations
in war. " The concept was further expanded to emphasize the
importance of "police type intelligence in the early stage of Communist
aggression at the lower levels of politico-military activity.
15. Recognizing the limitations of the average U. S. officer
for carrying out effectively such activities within the MAAG frame-
work, certain planners recommended that the U. S. Special Forces
should be expanded to train more officers in UW techniques, that
research and development of techniques and weapons for security
operations and UW be intensified and, once our own competence in
these specialized areas had been established, that we develop (through
the mechanism of modified MAAGs) indigenous Special Forces.
16. It is apparent that there is a general feeling in military
circles that guerrilla operations are increasingly important and that
we must increase our abilities both in establishing such forces and
devising counter-measures to deal with the guerrilla forces of the
enemy. The recognition of the need for intelligence techniques that
ensure the availability of timely information on Communist-backed
guerrilla activities --- mainly through the development of clandestine
and "police-type intelligence in the early stage of Communist
aggression" --- is reflected in the increased interest in the Army for
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military intelligence representation in underdeveloped countries.
17. Thus, by late 1956 and looking ahead to the period 1959
to 1965, a significant shift in thinking on the type and use of indigenous
forces in limited war became apparent in some military *circles. How-
ever, the consequences of this change are not yet fully apparent and,
within CIA at least, not generally understood. Moreover, this think-
ing has as yet had little impact on the Military Assistance Program.
Indeed, because these potential changes in limited war concepts are
so closely related to broader issues of how the U. S. should prepare
itself to fight limited war, and of military versus economic aid as
an answer to Communist imperialism in the underdeveloped areas,
their implementation is largely dependent on highest level policy
decisions. There have been only minor readjustments in the Military
Assistance Program to implement the recommendation that U. S.
military advisors exert their influence to establish local Special Farces
type units which in turn would work closely with if not control local
security, police and anti-Communist guerrilla forces. There exists
serious disagreement within the Pentagon on the wisdom of such a
concept, and the immediately insurmountable problem of staffing
MAAGs with officers trained and linguistically capable of this kind of
training and prepared to remain in "hardship" posts for extended tours
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has not been resolved. Turning theory into practice has been compli-
cated by the local political and jurisdictional problems existing in
almost every country in which the Communist threat is acute. Finally,
the unresolved problem of defining, within the U. S. "Country Team, "
the mission of the U. S. military in the gray area between military
and police-intelligence-security affairs, along with the inertia inherent
in our large and complex military establishment, have tended thus far
to minimize the impact of the 1956 staff recommendations relating to
limited war capabilities of most of our friends in the underdeveloped
areas.
18. The Army has, understandably, been more aggressive than
the Air Force and Navy in acting on the limited war problem, including
the field of unconventional warfare. It has produced a paper containing
a "U. S. Concept for Guerrilla Warfare. " It has developed ideas, if
not plans, calling for a "joint UW task force" built around the Special
Forces with air and navy support. In limited numbers, Special Forces
teams have been committed in training missions in Southeast Asia..
However, as the fifties came to an end, the 10th Special Forces were
still stationed in Germany training for missions related mainly to a
big war; the 1st Special Forces remained concentrated in Okinawa; the
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77th Group, the only other Special Forces unit, remained at the school
at Fort Bragg where the curriculum for the basic courses as late as
the summer of 1959 seemed to reflect little of the changing thought on
limited war.
.19. There is evidence in several of the more significant staff
documents on limited war that the Army has weighed the relative merits
of Army as opposed to CIA developed GW assets. It was noted that the
GW concept in the '50s had been oriented toward "enemy held
territory" and that "in the past, guerrilla assets have been established
largely through the efforts of the CIA. " In considering the policy
question of whether the Army should mount this type of operation in
underdeveloped areas it was noted that "there are no official policy
restrictions to prevent the military from taking steps to establish assets
by overt means in undenied areas. This would not conflict with CIA. "
IV. TRENDS IN LIMITED WAR THINKING IN CIA
20. Those skills and techniques described in CIA jargon as
"PM tradecraft" have not always in CIA's history enjoyed the high
regard that they do as we begin the '60s with limited war situations
confronting us on every side. That a nucleus of PM experience has
survived the intermittent periods of uncertainty that have characterized
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the history of CIA paramilitary activities can be attributed more to
the recurring crises requiring CIA paramilitary operations than to
any CIA policy of developing and maintaining a CDLW capability.
In general, CIA has approached its limited war responsibilities on
the basis of crash estimates, desultory and short term planning and
ad hoc organizational solutions.
21. Within the existing, framework and under pressure of
developments in Cuba, Tibet, Vietnam, Laos, Iraq and elsewhere in
the underdeveloped areas of Africa, the Near East, Southeast Asia
and Latin America, there have been noteworthy advances made during
the past year or two in strengthening CIA's limited war capability.
These can be summarized as follows:
a. Training and operational activities in both foreign areas
and the U. S. have been intensified; CIA's unilateral CDLW
capability has been emphasized.
b. Arrangements for handling Defense support of CDLW
operations have been improved and are increasingly concentrated
in CIA contacts with the Office of Special Operations.
c. Direct liaison with Special Forces, STRAC, the Marine
Corps and the Tactical Air Force is being established;
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cooperation in training, material research and development
and in the exchange of information affecting CDLW doctrines
and concepts is developing.
d. Some of the major U. S. military commanders in
foreign areas are taking CIA's role in'various types of limited
war into consideration in contingency planning.
e. Internal CIA organizational changes, particularly those
within the Clandestine Services, have resulted in some increase
in Agency efficiency in dealing with limited war problems.
22. In contrast'to the developments in the Pentagon where many
of the results of a vast program of research and staff analysis in the
years 1956-58 are only now evident in the field, the history of limited
war operations in CIA reveals almost no preoccupation in the mid 1S0s
with theory and concept. Under the pressure of events thrusting
limited war responsibilities upon it, CIA developed a modus operandi
by the process of trial and error. The lessons from Guatemala,
25X1C Indonesia, and Tibet are gradually being dis-
tilled into a CIA "concept" for CDLW.
23. While there is much that is refreshing and commendable
in the Agency's streamlined approach to the conduct of limited war
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operations, there does appear to be a critical need for both systematic,
across-the-board estimates on the character and likelihood of limited
wars and policy decisions regarding the character and magnitude of the
CIA effort. In particular, there appears to be a need for decisions on
the two major items on which the future of our CDLW program hinges:
a. Determining the priority and magnitude of the CDLW
program during the period 1961-65.
b. Achieving an efficient and mutually acceptable arrange-
ment regarding Department of Defense and CIA respective
functions and responsibilities for developing capabilities to
carry out any type of limited war operation.
V. THE REQUIREMENT FOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION
A. The Development of Indigenous Forces to Combat Communist-
backed Armed Actions.
24. Because the U. S. is not directly involved in most of the
armed conflicts which occur in critical areas of the world, neither the
JCS nor the DCI has an immediate responsibility for the U. S. actions
in these countries to aid indigenous forces in dealing with Communist-
backed armed intervention in internal affairs. The ability of the U. S.
to strengthen what has been described too narrowly as the "counter-
guerrilla" capability of indigenous forces depends in .these circumstances
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on the effectiveness of aid and technical assistance programs to
local police, security and military forces within the framework of
U. S. programs authorized by Congress and carried out through
U. S. missions in foreign countries.
25. It is not unusual to find three elements of a U. S. mission
(MAAG, ICA and CIA) routinely carrying out separate aid and
technical assistance programs which can and should contribute direct-
ly to the development of local indigenous forces capable of dealing
with some form of Communist-supported armed intervention. Develop-
ing this capability in indigenous forces should, we believe, be the
primary purpose of all such programs.
26. Because circumstances vary greatly from country to
country, U. S. mission chiefs are given great authority and flexibility
in determining the local arrangements and procedures for administer-
ing this kind of aid and technical assistance. In working out a local
modus operandi the U. S. Chief of Mission, normally the Ambassador,
will be influenced by local politics, native custom, the general political-
and psychological environment of the country, the character of existing
contacts with the host government and by the abilities and personalities
of key officials in his own mission. The personality, convictions and
ability of the Chief of Mission are obviously very important factors in
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this situation. In the absence of strong leadership in a mission,
the effectiveness of the U. S. effort depends greatly on the voluntary
cooperation among the representatives of other departments and
agencies in the mission and, in turn, on the guidance each receives
from Washington.
27. The centrifugal forces at work within U. S. missions
have historically detracted from the effectiveness of ourI programs
which, directed more toward that common end, could have developed
local police, security and military forces more capable of dealing
with the kind of Communist-armed intervention which confronts them.
It can be argued that this end may be neither understood nor achieved
by a U. S. mission in which the MAAG chief is preoccupied with build-
ing conventional battalions and regiments, the ICA 1290-D representa-
tive with improving traffic control and homocide investigation and the
CIA station chief with a wide range of other activities unrelated to this
problem.
28. Whether the policy guidance going out to U. S. missions
has, with respect to this problem, been clear and emphatic remains
a question. Because there has been, and probably continues to be, a
variety of opinions on the nature and importance of the Communist-
backed armed threat to the underdeveloped countries, it seems likely
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that policy guidance to mission chiefs and to departmental and agency
representatives abroad has lacked both clarity and emphasis. The
recent expressions of concern in Washington about the need for
countering Communist guerrilla forces on a world-wide basis may
ultimately influence the administration of our aid and technical assist-
ance programs.
29. As we have noted elsewhere in this paper, there are
encouraging indications of an appreciation in the State Department, in
Defense and in CIA of the magnitude and significance of the phenomena
of a world-wide coordinated Communist-armed offensive. Recently
the Secretary of State alerted the Government to the increased militancy
of the Communist movement and urged that U. S. contingency plans for
dealing with Communist-armed aggression at any point in the world be
reviewed. The current efforts of ICA to place in the field officers with
some UW experience suggest a growing awareness of the potential of
the OISP (1290-D) as a program for training indigenous police counter-
guerrilla and counter-subversion techniques; however, the lack of
adequate provision for equipment for police forces trained by ICA will
continue to limit their effectiveness. CIA's role in the 1290-D program
also appears in need of a critical review. If ICA has been guilty of,
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over-emphasis of conventional police training, CIA may have taken
an equally narrow approach in utilizing the program primarily to
achieve limited counterintelligence objectives.
30. The conclusion that the U. S. is now energetically moving
into an effective program cannot be drawn from these scattered pieces
of encouraging evidence. The problem and the nature of Communist-
armed aggression are still not fully understood by all of our senior
officials; nor do we have, as we move into the 1960s, an adequate
U. S. policy and program to deal with it. The full impact of U. S.
aid and technical assistance on the ability of a country to deal with
this type of aggression will not be achieved until each senior U. S.
official concerned with these programs understands the full implica-
tion of Communist "proletarian military science, " the characteristics
of the full spectrum of limited war as the Communists wage it and the
need for using the appropriate U. S. programs to develop indigenous
forces capable of dealing with this form of the world Communist
offensive.
31. It appears to us that the problem of Communist-armed
intervention in the underdeveloped countries is assuming proportions
which give urgency to action at the highest level of the U. S. Govern-
ment. There appears to be a need for a comprehensive estimate of
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25X1 C
the Communist-armed threat, an enunciation of the high priority the
U. S. accords to Free World efforts to counter it and, finally, clear
and forceful instructions to our U. S. senior officials who have
responsibilities for aid and assistance to friendly nations.
B. Need for a Joint Defense/CIA Mechanism for an Adequate
U. S. CDLW Capability.
32. The functions and responsibilities, the physical assets and
the professional skills related to CDLW operations are concentrated
primarily in the Defense establishment and in CIA. The State Depart-
ment has, of course, a continuing and undivided political responsibility,
33. The problems of developing an adequate and flexible U. S.
limited war capability covering the entire spectrum of limited war are
those that exist within either Defense or CIA, or those which they
share. Those which deal with CDLW, including middle-of-the-spectrum
limited war, can in some instances be resolved by CIA alone; more
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often a solution involving a joint effort by Defense and CIA will be
required. As an example, the maintenance in CIA of an adequate
number of paramilitary specialists whose skills are essentially those
found in the Armed Forces (weaponry, demolitions, small marine
craft operations, airborne cargo and personnel operations, etc.) is
impracticable for many reasons. On the other hand, the military
services are not as well equipped as is CIA for developing the environ-
ment for indoctrinating, training and utilizing American citizens
effectively and securely in CDLW roles. The crux of the problem lies
in developing a modus operandi for bringing together the components
of an efficient force, trained together and, in terms of administration,
security and operational efficiency, organized to conduct CDLW
operations.
34. Because the Special Group is the body in which decisions
to commit the U. S. to CDLW are deliberated, we first examined, and
quickly set aside as undesirable, the possibility of extending its function
from policy deliberation and decision into the area of operations, i. e. ,
the implementation of its decisions. To extend its function would
confuse and erode the responsibility of the DCI for CDLW operations
which is now clear and should remain so.
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35. An examination of the most serious recurring difficulties
that CIA faces in implementing Special Group and Presidential
decisions to commit the U. S. in CDLW operations clearly identifies
the area of -CIA and Defense cooperation as the major problem. There
is a need for some mechanism to develop and maintain a CDLW capa-
bility, including that for larger operations, in which both CIA and
Defense are represented. Because of the DCI's responsibility for
conducting CDLW operations, such a mechanism must be organizationally
subordinate to the DCI and adequately integrated with the CDLW
operational arm of the DCI --- the Clandestine Service. Such a
mechanism could, through the DCI, periodically report to the Special
Group on the status of U. S. CDLW capability to permit the Special Group
to act more effectively in its policy and decision making role.
36. The effectiveness of this mechanism would depend from
the outset on the acceptance of this concept by the DCI, the Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs. The DCI, selecting the individual to
head it, should take these relationships into consideration. At the time-
the mechanism is established, the head of it should be identified and
accredited not only to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
JCS, but also to military commanders of U. S. limited war forces
including STRAC, the Special Forces, the Tactical Air Force and other
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military organizations with which close cooperation can be rewarding
in the development of the over-all U. S. limited war capability.
37. The functions of this mechanism could include but not be
limited to the following:
a. To assume primary responsibility for the development
of CIA and Defense joint capabilities to wage limited war,
including CDLW and middle-of-the-spectrum limited war.
b. To ensure that CIA and Defense research and develop-
ment projects that relate specifically to CDLW concepts,
techniques and equipment, as well as research in the physical
and social sciences that is generally applicable to CDLW
problems, are coordinated and the results of such projects
are given full exchange.
c. To act as a channel for CIA requirements on Defense
for support of CDLW operations,
d. To coordinate the use of training facilities, training
materials and training instructors related to the special skills
and techniques required for CDLW operations.
e. To coordinate the efforts of CIA and Defense to develop
indigenous forces in foreign countries capable of countering
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Communist-backed armed intervention.
f. To arrange joint CIA/Defense training and training
exercises for U. S. CDLW forces in which both CIA and
Defense have components.
g. To study the requirements for joint CIA/Defense
CDLW forces and to submit recommendations to the DCI and
the Secretary of Defense concerning the need for such forces,
and the manner in which they shall be organized and trained.
h. To take whatever actions are necessary at the govern-
mental level, particularly with respect to planning, communica-
tions and liaison, to ensure the orderly transition in the U. S.
command structure and the exercise of command in the event
a U. S. CDLW operation expands into overt limited war in
which a U. S. military force is committed.
i. To take whatever actions are necessary at the govern-
mental level to ensure that U. S. CDLW plans and operations
are related to limited war contingency planning by U. S. major
commands.
38. The mechanism would not have an immediate responsibility
for either the actual conduct of CDLW operations abroad or the conduct
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of CIA limited war planning with major U. S. commands overseas.
The responsibilities for those should be an integral element of the
command responsibility within CIA and carried out through CIA command
channels. Its function in organizing and training CDLW assets within
the U. S. could be compared with that of the military commands
within the continental U. S. A. which organize and train units that
are sent overseas to duty under major overseas commands.
VI. THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL ESTIMATES ON THE LIKELI-
HOOD AND CHARACTER OF LIMITED WARS AND BETTER LIMITED
WAR PLANNING
39. One of the most urgent needs within the Agency is to
systematize and codify the existing policies and principles which apply
to CIA's role in limited war. These should be consolidated in a basic
CIA policy and planning document. Such a document should include
some authoritative statement of the relative importance of this activity
to our other CIA missions. It should describe the nature of our
relationships with other major elements of the U. S. Government which
are directly concerned. Finally, it should define the responsibilities
of the Deputy Directors with respect to policy, planning, supporting
and carrying out clandestine limited war operations.
40. The following functions and responsibilities might be
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included in specific delegations to the Deputy Directors:
Deputy Director (Plans) responsibilities:
a. Initiating an annual operational estimate of the likeli-
hood and character of limited war operations requiring
Clandestine Service action. Each area division of the Clan-
destine Service to prepare an annual operational estimate on
the likelihood and character of limited war in the division
area; these would be consolidated in the DD/P's operational
estimate.
b. Ensuring that the area division's planning and program-
ing reflect (1) the division's estimate of its own organic
capability for meeting its own requirements, and (2) a state-
ment of support requirements in terms of personnel, funds
and equipment which would be required to supplement the
organic capabilities of the division under specific contingencies.
c. Consolidating division contingency requirements (i.e.,
in excess of the division organic capabilities) and determining
on the basis of a calculated risk factor the level of support to
be centrally developed within CIA against all contingency plans.
It is obvious that the difficulty in precisely estimating the time,
scope and character of any single limited war plus the
possibility that more than a single limited war may confront
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the U. S. at any time, dictates that planning be flexible and
imaginative.
d. Coordinating with the Deputy Director (Intelligence),
for concurrence of the Office of National Estimates, and with
the Deputy Director (Support), for information and planning
purposes, the DD/P's operational estimate of the likelihood
and character of limited wars in which CIA may be;'required
to carry out operations.,
e. Coordinating with the DD/S the estimated support
requirements arrived at by the actions described in paragraphs
b. and c. above.
f. Coordinating with other U. S. departments and
agencies concerning CIA's limited war operational capabilities
and support requirements.
g. Developing plans and achieving a capability for implement-
ing the Command Relationships Agreement and the CIA component
concept in any limited war theater of operation in which a major
U. S. command is overtly involved. This must specifically
include the capability for providing the U. S. Commander with
information related to the security of the U. S. forces and
intelligence information required by the U. S. Commander in
carrying out his mission.
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h. Submitting policy questions and recommendations
related to limited war planning and operations to the DCI for
policy approval. This action will, in case of specific
operations, normally involve Special Group clearance.
i. Advising the subordinate elements of the Clandestine
Service of actions taken on plans and programs submitted.
j. Carrying out all limited war operations abroad in
which CIA is involved.
Deputy Director (Support) responsibilities:
a. Providing personnel and material support to the area
divisions at a level consistent with approved division programs
to develop and maintain an organic division capability in the
limited war field.
b. Providing the DD/P personnel and material support at
a level consistent with the DD/P approved contingency program.
c. Conducting training at a level required to support the
CIA effort to carry out limited war missions.
d. Stockpiling and. maintaining appropriate clothing and
equipment.
Deputy Director (Intelligence) responsibilities:
a. Assisting the DD./P in preparation of the operational
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estimate of the likelihood and character of limited war opera-
tions in which CIA would play a role.
b. Providing finished intelligence studies to U. S.
military commands established to conduct limited war, opera-
tions in areas in which U. S. forces have not been stationed
prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
c. Providing all-source current intelligence support to
the U. S. forces involved in limited war operations.
d. Providing personnel support to the DD/P as required.
41. There also appears to be a need for better planning at the
interdepartmental level. The decision to commit the U. S. either
overtly or covertly in operations involving force of arms is made by
the President with the assistance of the NSC. The more limited covert
operations are approved by the Special Group. The actions of the
Special Group appear to be taken ad hoc and are limited to the policy
question of taking certain actions; there does not appear to be a
comparable planning function which is carried out by a joint effort of
the agencies involved. The established liaison between the Office of
Special Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Agency on the one hand and that between CIA and the Office of Policy
Coordination in State on the other does not appear to be adequate for
this purpose.
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42. Because the type of limited war which may be fought
can vary so greatly from one part of the world to that in another,
and because the existing situations, out of which limited wars will
emerge, differ greatly from one area to another, the major responsi-
bility for contingency planning for limited wars must rest primarily
with the component of CIA most familiar with the circumstances in
the area, i. e. , the area division. Although there will be many
.
elements common to the planning carried out by CIA for limited wars
in all areas, the area division's estimate on the likelihood and
characters of limited war(s) in its area will decisively influence the
type of contingency or limited war plans prepared.
43. In the Far East, Near East, Africa and Latin America
growing political instability constitutes an open invitation to Communist
aggressiveness. The great differences in the political, economic and
social characteristics of these vast areas result in a corresponding
variation in the willingness and ability of both the USSR and the Western
Allies to resort to armed force to achieve political ends. For this
reason we have emphasized the role of the area division in both
estimating the likelihood and character of limited war and in the
planning and carrying out of limited war operations.
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VII. THE ROLE OF CIA IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
THREATENED BY COMMUNIST AGGRESSION
44. The U. S. and her Allies are arming to fight a nuclear
World War III that may never be fought while they are losing a
World War III that is being fought in a series of battles far below
the nuclear threshold. Some of these armed conflicts or limited
wars are in fact the military campaigns planned, ordered and
commanded by the general staff of the World Communist Movement
and tactically conducted according to Mao Tse Tung's "proletarian
military science. "
45. Others, although started without Communist instigation,
may be utilized to serve Communist ends --- Bloc capabilities for
the conduct of covert limited war are considerably greater than ours;
so too are their opportunities. Although no fire fight occurs and the
enemy's supply trains are rarely ever harassed, the movement through
Suez of 800 Kurdish repatriates from the USSR, the shipment of Czech
and Soviet arms from European ports to Guinea, Algeria and Cuba
and the travel of Indonesian pilots to Prague for training are simply
the logistics of the world-wide military offensive of World Communism
under Soviet hegemony. The foreign military bases are the Communist
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parties, re-enforced where possible by national military establish-
ments under the control of Communist regimes.
46. Of course, not all limited wars, revolutions and coups of
the past decade have been Communist engineered or controlled.
Corrupt and inadequate pro-Western and neutral governments have
been overthrown by internal forces as anti-Communist. as the regimes
they attack. Unfortunately a change of regime by violence, inevitably
followed by economic and political instability, too often contributes
to the weakening of the resistance to Communism. The conditions in
Iraq in 1958 and in South Korea and Turkey in 1960 were not favorable
for Communist-armed intervention. These were not Communist
revolutions but only the initial revolt by anti-regime forces which must
be observed for vulnerabilities to other milder forms of Communist
aggression to be used before the weight of Communist arms can be
committed at the place and time of their choice with reasonable
expectation of victory.
47. The limited war missions of CIA must be examined against
this background and against the assumption that a decision to commit
the U. S. to a limited war operation will come only in response to an
attack against us or as a reaction to flagrant Communist aggression
affecting our national security and the solidarity of our vital alliances.
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A decision to conduct even a CDLW operation is unlikely to come
at the stage where the threat of a Communist aggression can still
be countered through assistance and aid to a viable friendly anti-
Communist regime; it is more likely to occur at the later phase in
which the Communists have moved in and established de facto control
of the government, creating a threat to U. S. interests that is in-
compatible with our security. Thus, U. S. efforts to counter
Communist-armed aggression against friendly or neutral nations at
an early stage will more often be in the form of aid and assistance
than in direct U. S. -armed intervention --- even in the form. of CDLW
operations. It follows from this that CIA limited war missions in
most areas threatened by Communist-armed intervention will empha-
size (a) collecting intelligence on Communist limited war (including
CDLW) capabilities and intentions, (b) contributing to indigenous
force capabilities through technical assistance, and (c) preparing CIA
contingency plans for U. S. intervention in the form of either CIA
CDLW operations or overt limited warfare involving U. S. forces.
Additionally, CIA will conduct action operations in the political and
economic fields which will strengthen the cause of the anti-Communist
forces and weaken those of the Communists.
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VIII. LIMITED WAR MISSIONS OF CIA
A. Intelligence
48. A large though still limited military conflict is probably
today the only type of limited war in which intentions are. most likely
to be detected by traditional intelligence methods. Particularly in
the larger and more conventional type of limited war, such as the
1956 attack on Suez and the Korean War, military intelligence assumes
its classical historical importance. Even in limited war situations
in which the U. S. is not directly involved, intelligence on the military
situation of opposing forces may well be the decisive element in U. S.
decisions to take diplomatic actions, to take measures concerning the
safety of U. S. citizens in the area, to extend additional U. S. aid or,
finally, to commit the U. S. overtly or covertly to armed interventions.
49. Conventional military intelligence coverage of airfields,
transportation networks and military units remains a reliable method
for providing early warning of a large scale limited war. On the other
hand, the methodology for satisfying intelligence requirements with
respect to an enemy's intentions and capabilities to wage conventional
warfare involving large military units and sophisticated weapons systems
simply does not apply to limited war operations at the lower end of the
spectrum including guerrilla warfare, civil disorder or rebellion and
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and coup d'etat. "Early warning" of these is not likely to be achieved
by conventional military intelligence coverage; intelligence on these
can be obtained only by penetration of such elusive targets as a small
group of colonels plotting at the officers' club or students con?piring
in the university quarters.
50. Fortunately, the Communists' resort to limited armed
force, whether overt or clandestine, tends to occur within the framework
of an established pattern of Communist aggression. The actual use
of armed force normally comes in an advanced phase of their program
to take over an underdeveloped country. Propaganda, diplomatic and
economic pressures, and particularly an intensification of local
Communist Party activity, almost invariably are employed to pave the
way for armed intervention, including covert guerrilla actions.
51. Thus, the earliest intelligence information presaging armed
conflict in an area may come from a variety of sources in no way
directly associated with the. local activities of the armed groups or
forces to be employed. The shipment of arms from industrialized
countries of Eastern Europe and the training of military technicians
in the USSR and its European satellites have until now provided reliable
indicators of future trouble spots in the underdeveloped areas. Less
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tangible but equally significant are the political activities and propa-
ganda lines of the CPSU and CPC available largely from overt
sources. Probably the most reliable "early warning" intelligence
52. The analysis required to convert intelligence from these
varied sources into timely and reliable estimates must obviously be
centralized in Washington., Unfortunately the organization in CIA .
for collating and analyzing this information is not particularly well
suited to the need for operational limited war estimates. Each area
division performs a continuing though limited, unsystematic and
informal estimative function vis-a-vis the likelihood of a limited war
crisis in its particular area. Under the direction of the DD/I both
ONE and OCI continuously scan the troubled areas of the world for
signs of crisis. Both the DD/P and the DD/I maintain small research
staffs exclusively concerned with the problem of International Communism.
Under the guidance of the U. S. Intelligence Board, various groups ---
notably the Watch Committee --- give concentrated attention to the
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problem of imminence of hostilities. None of these are, however,
focused on the particular problem of limited war in its more subtle
forms at the lower end and middle of the spectrum. Also, our
diplomatic missions abroad have not been and are not likely to be
particularly successful in providing "early warning" of either the
scope or significance of potential trouble of this type. Because it
is the diplomat's function to deal with the government that is "in,
he is unlikely to have sufficient contacts to be informed of the
developments in political elements that are "out. " Thus there is
left to the Clandestine Services the primary responsibility for making
operational estimates against which to perform its own limited war
planning. That these should be projected against appropriate NIEs
and reflect the continuing efforts of OCI has been discussed elsewhere
in this report.
B. Covert Political Action Operations
53. Once a war has begun political action can, under some
circumstances, be as important in determining the course of the war
as limited military action or even action involving relatively large
forces and conventional weapons systems. It is characteristic of
limited war that political factors play a proportionately more
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significant role than they would in a general war. Thus, CIA's
interest in identifying the political elements in a limited war area is
twofold. Before the outbreak of limited war it will, as we have
suggested, often be largely from non-military intelligence that we
learn of the approaching crisis which leads to armed conflict.
Secondly, timely information about and an understanding of the
political actions of both our friends and their enemies is a prerequisite
to the determination of U. S. action --- whether diplomatic or
military. It is difficult to visualize what degree of influence any
individual group, regardless of its power, position, or prestige at
the outbreak of nuclear war, will have in a society that emerges from
the holocaust of an all-out nuclear exchange. On the other hand, the
elements of power in the position of an individual or group in a
particular country may be expected to remain a factor of calculable
importance, during and at the conclusion of a limited war. The
technique of clandestinely controlling and influencing the actions of
political forces through the recruitment and control of individuals and
small groups who themselves have positions of power and influence
within a country --- in government, political parties, industry,
religious groups and public information media --- is probably one of
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the fields in which we and our Allies, by comparison with the Soviets,
are least effective. At the same time, recent history contains
abundant evidence of the effectiveness of this technique in those very
areas in which limited wars continue to occur. Thus, covert political
action operations deserve a prominent position in CIA's arsenal of
weapons and may be one of the most effective means of achieving U. S.
objectives in some limited war situations.
C. The Problem of Countering Communist Covert Actions
54. Covert action, coupled with an effective use of economic
and military aid, constitutes the main thrust of Soviet and CHICOM
"indirect aggression" into the underdeveloped areas of the world. The
panel believes that Communist covert action operations, including the
training of local Communists in Moscow and Peiping, constitute a vastly
greater danger to the Free World than do the classical espionage
operations of the Soviet /Satellite intelligence services; this is particu-
larly true with respect to Bloc efforts against the underdeveloped
countries. It is almost certain that covert action will play a major role
in any limited war situation in which the Soviets or CHICOMS have a
stake. In fact, it is precisely the problem of Communist covert action
aimed at overthrow of existing regimes that confronts the U. S. with
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a substantial risk of limited wars in the 1960s.
55. In this light it is a peculiar fact of our Western intelli-
gence history that we have developed the most elaborate, sophisticated
theories and practices for dealing with the enemy's espionage operations
(the devotees of which consider themselves --- with considerable
justification --- the elite.of our trade) and have not devised comparable
methods for dealing with Soviet clandestine action. If we can pride
ourselves on having achieved considerable sophistication in countering
Soviet espionage, we have not begun to develop and apply techniques of
what might be called counter-covert action, applying many of the same
techniques developed in the field of counter-espionage. The files of
CIA are filled with millions of documents containing the details of the
personalities, organization, methods of operating and current operations
of the espionage efforts of the Communist countries. CIA by NSC
directive has an explicit responsibility for counter-espionage. If
Communist-controlled covert action is an equal if not ultimately a
greater threat to our national security than is hostile espionage, then
should we not make an effort to identify and analyze it that is comparable
to our CE effort?
56. It is, we believe, relevant to recall that CIA, in the period
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of rapid expansion in Europe in the early '50s rapidly developed
substantial espionage and covert action operations, many employing
refugees from the target countries. Because we had not yet developed
an adequate CE capability directed against the Soviets and the Eastern
European satellites and neglected security in mounting these operations,
many of them were penetrated if not wholly controlled from the outset
by the hostile services. In the atmosphere of urgency that surrounds
our own CDLW preparations are we giving enough attention to what the
enemy is doing in the same area?
Since the purpose of these operations in all countries is ultimately the
establishment of a Communist regime, employing force of arms at the
time of their choice, this counter-covert action task is closely related
to the problems of limited war.
57. In review, covert action operations by the Soviets, Chinese
Communists and the Satellites pose one of the most serious threats to
the stability of the emerging underdeveloped countries. To meet this
threat CIA stations in such areas must, give high priority to the problems
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of. counter-covert action to blunt the Soviet effort.
D. Propaganda
58. Propaganda operations, whether overt or clandestine,
obviously constitute a major element of the total U. S. effort that can
be marshalled in support of the U. S. position in any limited war.
Because the techniques and problems of propaganda operations vary
but little when related to limited war from those related to the general
use of propaganda, we decided to deal only summarily in this report
with this limited war mission of CIA. The fact that propaganda
operations can normally be carried out in any CDLW situation with
CIA's own assets and are not part of the problem of CIA and Defense
cooperation also contributed to this decision.
59. The targets of a U. S. propaganda effort in a limited war
could obviously range from a minor element of one of the belligerents
to large segments of world opinion including the increasingly sensitive
United Nations Organization. Frequently our propaganda effort would
be our first and sometimes our only action taken in support of a
combatant element in a limited war to which we either cannot or will
not provide more direct support.
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E. Paramilitary Operations
60. While obviously CIA must have a capability to conduct
PM operations in CDLW situations, a variety of highly practical
consideration limits the manpower commitment that CIA can make
to purely PM skills. No one seriously argues that CIA should not
maintain a small nucleus of specialists and everyone agrees that
basic familiarity with PM operations is desirable in a CIA station
chief in an area of the world in which the course of events may be
influenced by PM forces.
61. The UW training of CIA agents for either a "hot" or
"cold war" reserve and most of the UW training given foreign
officials by CIA in either the U.S.A. or foreign countries seems to
lie within the existing capabilities of CIA. The CIA cadre of PM
specialists is and should be capable of carrying out a continuing
research and development program. Finally, it has been and should
continue to be possible to divert enough of the limited PM cadre to
specific CDLW projects to ensure that CIA procedures, concepts and
practices are extended into a task force for a larger CDLW which
has been re-enforced by trained military specialists from the services.
62. However, we do not believe that CIA should attempt a
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major program to recruit, train and maintain as PM specialists young
civilian staff officers. Its present cadre, largely comprised of
officers with World War II military training and PM experience could
and should be augmented by selected military officers with Special
Forces, Marine or comparable UW training in the Armed Services,
permanently transferred to CIA. We strongly advocate basic PM
training for JOTs but do not believe that a JOT should specialize in
the PM field.
63. Beyond this, military specialists to meet short term
requirements in the fields of airborne cargo and personnel dispatch,
boat and aircraft operations, weaponry, and demolitions should be
provided by the military services; if necessary, military communicators
could also be drawn upon to meet the need. The administrative and
jurisdictional problems that are entailed in this solution have been
briefly discussed in the section of this paper dealing with interdepart-
mental cooperation. The manpower aspect of the CDLW problem is in
fact the single problem requiring most detailed attention.
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