SOVIET LEADERSHIP DISORDER: POSSIBLE INCREASED DANGER OF UNINTENDED PROVOCATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 15, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/04/17: CIA-RDP89B00423R000300350010-4
SECRET)
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
C 1A) I C Ulw
NIC # 06490-84
15 November 1984
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council''
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR
Soviet Leadership Disorder: Possible Increased Danger of
Unintended Provocation
1. We typically include in our bag of images of the Soviet Union a
belief that notable Soviet actions reflect specific Politburo decisions or
the policy guidelines of a cohesive leadership. Since Andropov became
seriously ill and particularly since his death and Chernenko's succession, a
growing body of reporting suggests a different reality -- one of a Politburo
suffering weak leadership and some disarray, whose major foreign policies,
having run into dead-ends, have fallen victim to inertia and stagnation.
2. The absence of strong direction by a single individual compounded
by lessened cohesion among the key oligarchs would seem likely to evoke more
independent activities, rivalry, and intrigue, not only among Politburo
members, but even more so and less subtly among apparatchiks in the party
and state machines. And, indeed, we have some reporting directly to this
effect. More than this, though, a number of events suggest or can readily
be interpreted as indicative of increased leeway and political private
enterprise by lower level Soviet officialdom.
o Berlin -- The long string of Soviet actions affecting our access
to er -- the reservations of air corridors, expanded PRAs,
dispute over bridge repairs, etc. -- is at least as likely the
result of the Soviet military and Berlin authorities being on a
longer leash -- than it is a carefully crafted response to the
decline in East-West relations, US INF deployments, or other
foreign developments. While Gromyko, Ustinov, and the Politburo at
large have by now considered these developments and probably issued
general guidance, much or all of this activity may reflect the long
time goals, planning, training and other considerations of Soviet
leaders in East Germany now able to exercise greater initiative.
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o The KGB -- In recent months KGB elements may have played a role in
the Teadership sweepstakes by spreading stories that could be
interpreted as helpful or harmful to Chernenko and Gorbachev.
Romanov -- who we believe oversees the KGB for the Secretariat --
may be playing a particular role in this. It is also plausible
that zealous KGB operatives close to Polish hardliners, and
operating independently of Politburo direction, assisted or
conspired in the kidnapping and murder of Father Popieluzsko.
o Solidarity with British coal miners -- Of further significance is
t e announcement -- thereafter retracted and all but denounced --
by a lower level official that the Soviet Union was embargoing
energy supplies to the United Kingdom in sympathy with the ongoing
strike by British coal miners.
3. A danger of possible lessened central control of the military and
the KGB is that a greater likglihood of an unintended Soviet provocation may
currently exist. The military and KGB may now be more inclined and able to
adopt procedures and undertake actions that could have serious unintended
political repercussions. These organizations -- with their security
concerns and instinct to try to improve their far flung operational
positions and support their friends and assets -- may be able, in the
current Soviet domestic climate, to exercise greater initiative where there
are not clear guidelines or proscriptions. Responsiveness to a single
Politburo member acting on his own, in arenas where in the past he would not
have dared, may simply manifest foolish or incautious behavior lacking the
council of critical review.
4. The implications of such a perspective for the US are not good. We
cannot simply excuse or ignore pugnacious and coincidental Soviet behavior.
If we respond too cautiously or quizzically, we run the risk of reinforcing
the belief that we can be had at all levels in the Soviet regime. At the
same time, tough responses may take Soviet leaders by surprise and be
perceived as provocative, both in Moscow and elsewhere. Even if Soviet
leaders do recognize the decline in their own cohesion, they probably cannot
do much about it owing to their definition of their own critical political
interests.
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