CUBANS IN NICARAGUA: NEW ESTIMATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000300250003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
25 January 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Chairman, National Intelligence Coun
FROM: John Horton
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Cubans in Nicaragua: New Estimate
1. Spurred by the comments you made to the Latin American "Junta" on
16 January, Intelligence Community analysts were convened on 24 January to
reassess the validity of our estimate of Cuban civilian and military personnel
in Nicaragua. The Intelligence Community had been carrying an estimate of
7,000 to 8,000 Cubans, of whom 1,500 to 2,000 were military and security
personnel, but as we noted on ry there was growing uncertainty as to
the accuracy of this figure.
2. As a result of our deliberations, the Intelligence Community now
estimates that there are 7,000 to 10,000 Cubans in Nicaragua of whom, 2,500
to 3,500 are military and security personnel. These new figures are based
largely on a draft study recently completed by DIA (see attached table).
Although we still lack any hard evidence to back up these figures, the
Intelligence Collection Community appears to be sufficiently mobilized on this
issue, and we do not believe that additional tasking would produce any useful
informati
n
th
b
o
on
e su
ject
.
3. We increased our estimate of Cuban military and security personnel
mostly on the grounds that the significant expansion of Nicaragua's military
structure over the past year and the arrival of more sophisticated military
equipment would require more Cuban advisory personnel in Nicaragua. Other
factors suggesting that the Cuban military presence has grown are the
heightened level of flight activity between Cuba and Nicaragua since last
September; reports last year that Cuban reservists and militia members were
being called up and receivin g prior to deployment overseas--possibly
to Nicaragua; and a report that a large group of officers
error
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in the Cuban Territorial Militias were to go to Nicaragua to advise the
Sandinistas in the formation of their militia. Considering the size of
Nicaragua's regular, reserve, and militia forces and its need for assistance
in training such a large force as well as in organizing an effective
counterinsurgency effort, it is possible that the number of military advisers
may exceed 3,500, but better evidence is needed to justify raising our
estimate further.
4. The range in our estimate of Cuban civilians in Nicaragua was
expanded from 5,500-6,000 to 4,500-6,500 largely because of uncertainty as to
how many teachers will return to Nicaragua in February. Sandinista leader
Tomas Borge told Senator Kasten in December that 1,200 of the 2,000 Cuban
teachers in Nicaragua who left last November would not return, but other
reporting suggests that more than 800 will do so. On the other hand, we have
good information that the number of Cuban medical personnel has increased
5. More important, we believe that there has been a shift in the type
of civilian advisers now serving in Nicaragua. It appears that dependents,
women, and older civilians have been evacuated, and most--if not all--civilian
advisers now being assigned to Nicaragua must have a certificate indicating
they have had some type of military training or are members of the reserves or
militia. While their fighting skills would be lower than those found in the
regular armed forces, most civilian advisers probably would have access to
weapons and could assume military or paramilitary duties in the event of an
emergency.
6. With your concurrence, we plan to distribute the above findings in
memorandum format to key members of the Latin American intelligence and policy
communities and to request that DDI/ALA draft a short NID feature on the same
subject.
J.
Horton
Attachment:
Cubans in Nicaragua, January 1984
Director of Cen a Intelligence Date
SECRET
3 1 JAN 198-
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? SECRET
SUBJECT: Cubans in Nicaragua: New Estimate
DISTRIBUTION:
Copy No. 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - EXDIR
4 - SA/DCI
5 - ER
6 - C/NIC
7 - D/ALA
8 - ALA/MCD/
9 - ALA/MCD/
10 - VC/NIC
11 - NIO/LA file
12 - NIO/LA chrono
NIO/LA/JHorton
25Jan84
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