LETTER TO WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR. FROM ROBERT M. GATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000200120040-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: December 18, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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Central Intelligence Agency
The Honorable William Schneider, Jr.
Under Secretary of State for
Security Assistance, Science
and Technology
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Thank you very much for your letter of 10 December. I am glad
that you found the paper on Cuba and COCOM useful. Our analysts have
reviewed the proposed downgraded version and have made only a few
modifications. A copy of the revised version is enclosed. Again,
thank you for your interest and please contact me if you have any
additional requirements on this subject.
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Distribution:
Orig. -- Addressee
1 -- DDI
1 -- DDI Registry
1 -- C/LA/COG/RR
1 - - OSWR/TTAC
2 -- D/ALA
3 -- MCD
DDI/ALA/MCD
Robert M. Wes
Deputy JYirector for` ntelligence
(w/enclosure)
(17 Dec 84)
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Designation of Cuba as a Proscribed Destination
The United States recommends that Cuba be designated a
proscribed destination because it is an extension of Soviet
military power.
Background
Under Castro, Cuba has been turned into a garrison state
possessing a military force which has been significantly
modernized over the last ten years. This modernization has
included more sophisticated training--including some joint
exercises with Soviet units--and significant improvements in
equipment. In the last four years, the level of Soviet military
equipment deliveries to Cuba has been the highest since the Cuban
missile crisis. This modern equipment has included MIG-23's, a
long-range IL-76 jet transport aircraft and other transports,
improved missile-armed patrol boats, and Polnocny class landing
ships. As a result of the improvements to date, Cuba has by far
the largest, best-equipped and most capable armed force in the
Caribbean, barring that of the United States.
We have every reason to believe that these deliveries of
sophisticated Soviet military equipment will continue,
concentrating on heavy weapons and transportation assets. These
will most likely include more submarines and amphibious landing
ships and better interceptors, perhaps including the MIG-25. We
also expect the Cubans to receive two or three additional IL-76
heavy jet transports.
Further, Cuba has developed the ability independently to
deploy overseas and support a force of up to 10,000 soldiers.
This is a clearly offensive capability which none of Cuba's Latin
American neighbors can match, and which is a threat to them.
Nothing in the last decade has shown more clearly the degree
of Cuban willingness to support Soviet political-military
objectives than Cuba's program of stationing significant numbers
of its military forces abroad. As many as 40,000 Cuban soldiers
are now deployed overseas, mostly in Africa, far from the
traditional areas of Cuba's regional interests. Through these
deployments, Cuba has put at the disposal of the Soviets a
trained military force which the Soviets can plausibly deny they
control.
The Soviet Union's military relationship with Cuba differs
from its treatment of both its Warsaw Pact allies and its other
Third World client states. For example, in Ethiopia in the
1970s, the Soviets themselves assumed control over Cuban combat
operations in the Ogaden. Also, in contrast to all other
recipients of Soviet military assistance anywhere, Cuba is not
required to pay for the military equipment it receives. However,
it is obvious that the Soviets are not motivated by altruism in
their upgrading of Cuba's military forces, and that their
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"payment" comes in the form of the uses to which they can put
Cuban forces and Cuban facilities.
The Soviets make substantial use of military bases in
Cuba. In this way, the Soviets have greatly improved their
collection of intelligence about the U.S., have extended the
amount of time Soviet surface warships can stay on station in the
Caribbean, and have been able to conduct naval air reconnaissance
over the North Atlantic and the west coast of Africa.
In 1972, Cuba entered CEMA, the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance, but its integration into that Soviet-dominated
economic organization has accelerated in recent years. This
increased integration into CEMA has resulted primarily from
Soviet efforts to redistribute the increasing cost of providing
economic assistance to Cuba.
Traditionally, the Soviet Union has delegated to Cuba
through CEMA the role of producing agricultural products and raw
materials. At the Moscow CEMA Summit in June 1984, member
countries agreed again to cooperate in the production of
microprocessors and advanced technologies and production
Besides CEMA, the soviets exercise control over Cuban
economic policy through the operation of the Cuban-Soviet
Commission of Economic, Scientific and Technical Collaboration,
formed in 1970. Recently, the two countries concluded a long-
term economic cooperation accord for the period 1986-2000. One
of the priority areas identified in that accord is electronics,
including work related to computer display equipment.
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The fact that Cuba is not proscribed is an anomaly. It is
no less in the pocket of the Soviets than Bulgaria, or Viet Nam
and Mongolia (the only other two non-Warsaw Pact members of
CEMA). Cuba is a much more willing and active helper of the
Soviets than, for example, Romania. That Cuba is not proscribed
is probably an historical accident, since Castro took power after
the initial formulation of the proscribed destinations list.
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