ESCALATION OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY SUPPORT OF NICARAGUA: WHY NOW?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000100110030-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: November 29, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Douglas J. MacEachin
Director of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT: Escalation of Soviet Involvement in
Military Support of Nicaragua: Why Now?
1. The Soviets may not have anticipated that the US would accuse them of
attempting to deliver Mig-21's to the Sandinistas, but we believe they must
have considered it likely that the US would view the first direct shipment of
combat equipment to Nicaragua on a Soviet ship to be an escalation of Moscow's
involvement in support of the Managua regime. Previously the Soviets had been
careful to avoid direct involvement in military deliveries to Nicaragua.
Earlier shipments of Soviet military equipment were carried in either Algerian
or Bulgarian ships. Many Soviet merchant ships have called at Nicaraguan
ports, but their cargos have all been dual-use items (such as trucks and MI-18
transport helicopters) ostensibly consigned by Soviet civilian export
organizations.
2. The decision to use a Soviet ship was a clear change from Moscow's
previous policy of avoiding direct arms shipments on Soviet vessels. Such a
departure from past policy would have required a conscious decision at the
highest level. The Soviets would have had to consider the possibility that
their more open and direct involvement in arms shipments could result in the
restoration of US aid to the Contras and greater direct US military assistance
throughout the region. Of at least equal importance, Moscow would have had to
weigh the potential impact of its move on US-Soviet relations and particularly
on the prospects for resuming the arms control dialogue.
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SUBJECT: Escalation of Soviet Involvement in Military Support of
Nicaragua: Why Now?
3. Lacking direct evidence, we can only speculate as to Soviet
motivations for undertaking such a move at this time.
-- Military Considerations. The Sandanistas had been pressing Moscow
for more sophisticated weapons, and during his summer visit to the
USSR, Ortega may have argued that such equipment would enable him to.
defeat the insurgency. Castro too, may have been pressing Moscow on
this score. The Soviets probably promised Ortega that they would
provide more advanced equipment, including the MI-24 helicopter gun
ships which were delivered by the Bakuriani.
-- The Contadora Treaty Talks. Managua has approved a draft Contadora
treaty which would ban the introduction of "advanced weapons," and
Moscow has expressed support for the Contadora effort. Although the
treaty has an uncertain future, both the Sandinistas and the Soviets
may be trying to accelerate the delivery of weapons--such as MI-24's
and possibly even air defense missiles--that might be affected by it.
-- Probing the US "Line". Moscow, which heretofore has shown that it
recognizes US sensitivity about Soviet relations with Nicaragua, may
have sought to establish the principle that, so long as it respects
in a literal sense the US ban on MiG fighters, provision of other
major weapons systems is legitimate. Support for the view that the
Soviets meant to probe the US definition of "not acceptable" is
suggested by the fact that Czechoslovak Prime Minister Strougal--
presumably at Moscow's prompting--stated publicly (after the Western
news stories about possible MiG-21 deliveries had appeared) that
Czechoslovakia "is delivering" L-39 "training" aircraft. (See
attached 16 November memo on this subject).
4. We think all of these factors contributed to the Soviet decision, but
all three could have been satisfied without using a Soviet vessel. Just one
week earlier, in fact, about 7 MI-24's had been delivered to the east coast
port of El Bluff in a Bulgarian freighter.
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SUBJECT: Escalation of Soviet Involvement in Military Support of Nicaragua:
Why Now?
5. Consequently, we believe the decision to use a Soviet vessel and the
timing of the shipment probably was driven in the final analysis by a desire
to send a political signal. The decision probably was made sometime between
Ortega's visit in June and mid-September, in the same time period when the
Soviet leadership was deliberating on such matters as the Gromyko visit to
Washington, the future course in arms control, and US-Soviet relations in
general. It is likely that some in the leadership wanted to make clear that
efforts to revive the arms control dialogue and to improve US-Soviet trade
would not inhibit the USSR's freedom of action on other fronts; in effect, to
reaffirm Moscow's "no linkage" policy of the 1970's. A demonstration of
resolve in this regard may also have been needed to reassure Soviet leaders
who might question the wisdom of opening up arms control discussion again.
Douglas J. MacEachin
Attachment:
As Stated
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Douglas J. MacEachin
Director of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT: The L-39 Issue: Possible Soviet Motivations
1. Czech Premier Strougal stated in Mexico City at an 8 November news
conference that Czechoslovakia is delivering L-39 aircraft to Nicaragua.
Strougal's statement was carried in the official Czech party daily, Rude
Pravo, on 10 November. Rude Pravo reported that, in response to a question by
an unidentified journalist, Strougal "rejected as misinformation the US
government's claim that the CSSR is delivering combat (sic) aircraft to
Nicaragua." The paper then quotes Strougal directly as stating, "We are
merely delivering training (sic) aircraft--the L-39 --there."
2. It is highly unlikely that Strougal would have volunteered this
statement without clearing it with the Soviets first. Neither the Soviets nor
their allies are accustomed to volunteering information on their arms
deliveries to the third world. Even if Strougal felt it necessary to respond
in some fashion to the question put to him he could have generalized about
Czech delivery of "defensive equipment" to Nicaragua or simply denied any such
shipments at all. His specific reference to L-39 shipments is thus striking
and unusual both because of its specifity'and because it gratuitously signals
Czech intentions to proceed with the delivery of jet aircraft to Nicaragua
(albeit "trainers") in the midst of a US-Soviet dispute over this issue. If
his reference was inadvertent, then Rude Pravo would almost certainly not.have
replayed it.
3. The circumstantial evidence thus suggests that the Soviets prompted
Strougal to specifically mention the delivery of L-39s to Nicaragua.
4. If the Soviets did prompt Strougal to*raise the L-39 issue, it is
still possible that the Soviet are simply exploiting publicized US concern
over the issue of arms deliveries to Nicaragua to further polarize political
opinion in the US over the Administration's Central American policy. Given
the limited utility of such a gesture, however, its seems more likely that the
Strougal announcement is a reflection of more pragmatic considerations in
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Moscow related directly to the issue of jet aircraft deliveries to
Nicaragua. Several possibilities exist.
-- The Soviets have already delivered L-39s to Nicaragua
and the Strougal announcement is intended to lay the
groundwork for regional acceptance of this fact, and
to justify it as not transgressing the stipulated US
limits on delivery of MiG-21s. Over the longer term,
the Soviets may anticipate that even more advanced
aircraft or weaponry could be shipped to Nicaragua
once the precedent is established of limited weapons
deliveries, not only including L-39s but possibly MiG
variants less capable than the MiG-21.
-- The Soviet have tentatively decided to ship L-39s to
Nicargua but actual shipment has not yet occurred.
Conceivably, therefore, the US reaction to the
Strougal statement could influence Moscow's decision
to proceed with actual shipments.
-- The decision to send L-39s to Nicaragua is still
under consideration in Moscow and the Strougal
announcement is intended to test the limits of US
resolve on the jet fighter issue; in effect taking
advantage of US statements that the delivery of MiG-
21s is the fault line of US tolerance, and thus
seeking to establish Moscow's (or its surrogates')
right to deliver to the Sandinistas jet aircraft that
.fall below the threshold stipulated by Washington
itself.
5. If Moscow is in fact testing the limits of US resolve, Kremlin
leaders may calculate that direct US military action against Nicaragua can be
avoided by seeking to appeal to regional sentiments against US military
intervention and perhaps by supplementing this effort with diplomatic
overtures to Washington raising the possibility of resumed arms talks. Such a
tactic by Moscow could be motivated by the perception professed by some Soviet
spokesmen of significant divisions within the US administration over arms
control and relations with Moscow, and of similar divisions between the
Administration and congressional opponents of its Central American policy.
Although unlikely, the Soviets may view their Nicaragua gambit as an attempt
to exacerbate these divisions -- possibly leading to greater constraints on
the Administration's latitude to continue to pursue assertive policies either
in Central American or toward Moscow--while forcing US acceptance of Moscow's
legitimate" assistance to the Managua regime. Under this scenario, even if
the US resorts to punitive military action against Nicaragua, the Kremlin
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might calculate that its tactic of having declared in advance that it did not
intend to challenge US prohibitions will have created the atmosphere for
political backlash both at home and from abroad that would undermine the
political basis of the administration's policies in Central America.
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