ADCI TALKING POINTS NSC MEETING ON SOUTH AMERICA DEMOCRACY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000501830001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 12, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

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SECRET I uscant
THE DIRECT
CENTRAL INTEL
National Intelligence Council
NOTE FOR: ADCI
12 March 1987
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
NIO/LA
Attached are proposed Talking Points
with three attachments relating to the
debt Situation and the Gorbachev visit,
along with a map of Gorbachev's proposed
itinerary. By oob, 13 March we will have
copies of the attached map and a briefing
board for your use.
Attachments:
as stated
Robert D. Vickers
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NIO/LA
12 March 1987
ADCI TALKING POINTS
NSC MEETING ON SOUTH AMERICA DEMOCRACY
The recent decision by Brazil to suspend payments on its foreign debt is
a reminder that one of the most serious problems facing democratic
governments in South America is the debt issue.
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In many cases, such as in Brazil and Argentina, the massive foreign
debts of these countries were incurred under previous military
regimes.
As a result, the general public is often unwilling to accept harsh
economic austerity measures to meet debt payments, and the
democratically elected governments are increasingly reluctant to
impose them.
Thus, these and other governments are advocating economic growth
rather than austerity as the best prescription to promote long-term
prosperity and meet their foreign debt obligations.
Furthermore, they see the debt issue as a political as much as an
economic problem, and they are looking to the US and Western Europe
for a political solution to the problem in the long run.
Major Latin American debtors are watching the Brazilian situation
closely to see how it is resolved, and while several have expressed support
for Brazil's actions, none except Cuba have pushed for joint action or a
debtors cartel.
Nevertheless, the long term environment for substantial debt
repayment by most South American debtors shows little sign of
improvement.
As a result of poor export performance, the current account balance
of the major Latin American debtors deteriorated dramatically last
year.
Their collective financial position was further weakened by the
increasing reluctance of foreign commercial banks to make large new
loan commitments. .
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With little prospect of substantial improvement over the next few
years, we believe there is an escalating risk of serious
confrontations between the region's governments and their
international creditors.
In addition to the debt issue, another major problem threatening many
South American governments is increased terrorist activity by leftist
subversive and insurgent groups.
^ The threat is most evident in four Andean countries: Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Chile.
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In many cases, particularly in the case of Chile, the Soviet Union,
Cuba and Nicaragua are providing relatively extensive external
support to various subversive groups.
? In some instances, especially in Colombia, we have strong evidence
of collusion between insurgent groups and major drug traffickers.
The military and security forces in most Andean countries are poorly
organized, trained, and equipped to confront a growing challenge from both
terrorist groups and drug traffickers.
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The armed forces traditionally have been trained and equipped to
fight a conventional war rather than conduct a counterinsurgency or
counterterrorist campaign, and the police forces often are woefully
unprepared to fill the gap.
This is an area where relatively little additional foreign
assistance in counterterrorism training would go a long way to
improving the capabilities of the various South American
governments.
Another trend that is evident in South American democracies is a growing
sense of nationalism and a desire to demonstrate independent non-aligned
foreign policies.
The Soviet Union is working vigorously to take advantage of this
trend by expanding its political as well as its commerical,
cultural, and military ties with most South American democracies.
??,M,
We have good evidence from a wide variety of sources that Soviet
Secretary Gorbachev is planning an unprecedented visit to South
America within the next year.
The Soviet leader may attempt to link the visit with a potential US
summit meeting later this year, and then go on to Mexico, Peru,
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, with possible stops in Nicaragua and
Cuba as well.
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Alternatively, rather than such an ambitious itinerary, he may want
to break the visit down into separate North and South American
segments.
Among the benefits of the visit, Gorbachev would likely seek to:
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Demonstrate the legitimacy of a Soviet role in Western Hemispheric
affairs, including support for a Central American peace agreement.
Increase trade and cultural links with the new South American
democracies.
Confront the US with a growing Soviet challenge in our own backyard
and thus further the assault on the Monroe Doctrine.
The US Intelligence Community plans to monitor preparations for the
Gorbachev visit closely to better determine his precise schedule and
itinerary.
Although the visit may not result in any dramatic breakthrough in
Soviet trade or political links with Latin America, it will
certainly demonstrate the strong activist role that Gorbachev
intends to play in challenging the US across a broad spectrum of
issues and over a wider area of the globe.
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officials see the us maministration as we Keueu uy .re Iran-Contra
controversy, and they see Gorbachev as the first Soviet leader in
recent memory capable of grasping such opportunities and taking
advantage of them.
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2 March 1987
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Proposed Visit to Latin America
Under General Secretary Gorbachev's leadership Soviet
diplomacy has been increasingly active throughout the Third
World. Moscow has become as attentive to Latin America as to
the Middle East--an area that clearly overshadowed it in
importance in the past. Gorbachev's proposed visit to the
region--in late 1986 or early 1987--confirms this trend and
follows an unprecedented series of exchanges between high level
Soviet and Latin American officials in the past 18 months.
O Argentine President Aflonsin visited Moscow in late 1986
and Presidents Sanguinetti of Uruguay and de la Madrid of
Mexico are on the agenda this year.
O In the last year and a half the Foreign Ministers of
Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina visited the USSR.
O Mexico's Foreign Minister Sepulveda
scheduled to go in April andL
is reportedly
Peruvian Foreign Minister Wagner will
also make the journey to the Soviet Union this spring.
O Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov has made two
swings through the region, visiting Peru, Venezuela, and
Cuba last summer and returning in February 1987 to visit
Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico.
O Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Mexico last October
and is reportedly scheduled to visit Brasilia, Montevideo,
and possibly Lima this fall.
These moves fit a pattern of careful Soviet preparations for
important bilateral meetings and signal that Moscow is
conscientiously laying the groundwork to reap maximum benefit
from Gorbachev's visit to Latin America.
Gorbachev probably contemplates significant political
payoffs--both regional and international--for a small expenditure
in expanding contact with Latin America. He is attempting to
increase anti-Americanism and neutralize US political clout in
-the area. Moreover, he is hoping to use his presence to gain
greater political access and better trade terms from the Latin
Americans. Among other gains he probably seeks are:
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o Acknowleging the legitimacy of the USSR as an actor in
Western Hemispheric affairs; furthering the assault on the
Monroe Doctrine.
o Drawing US attention away from areas, such as the Middle
East, of more importance to the USSR, and possibly
recalling increasing US military and economic resources
back to this hemisphere.
o Aiding the consolidation of the Sandinista regime by
playing on regional concerns about US military support for
the Nicaraguan insurgents and portraying himself as
supportive of regional peace initiatives in order to gain
a reputation as a peacemaker in the hemisphere.
o Hoping to project this image into international fora and
increase his support in groups such as the UN or the
NAM. Gorbachev also hopes to enlist regional suppor f
Soviet positions on disarmament issues such as SDI.
Although Moscow will be more interested in political gain in
its competition with the United States, the Latins hope the visit
will foster long-term trade expansion with the USSR. They are
likely, however, to be disappointed. The Latin Americans will
probably continue to find standard Soviet trade terms--
countertrade or barter and insistence on greater balance--
unattractive and the Soviet trade bureaucracy unresponsive. For
example, although the Soviets signed a long term grain agreement
with Argentina in January 1986, they angered Buenos Aires by
waiting until early this year to begin fulfilling their
commitments. In February Foreign Minister Komplektov
disappointed the Uruguayans by refusing to increase Soviet
purchases of Uruguayan goods.
Other than their hopes for trade expansion, the Latin
American countries, in our view, expect few concrete results from
Gorbachev's visit. Area governments regard the visit as
affirmation of their independence from the United States and
increasing-international stature. They will avoid involvement in
East-West tensions and will be careful in discussing issues such
as Central America that would pose a direct risk to their
relations with Washington. Individual leaders hope Gorbachev's
visit will strengthen their domestic political positions.
particularly against leftist oppositions.
Our information on this is not firm, but we believe that the
Gorbachev visit will take place and the results will be mixed.
The final communiques may emphasize only areas of generalized
political agreement--such as consensus on some events in Central
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America, on the Delhi Six or the South Atlantic Zone of Peace--
and list a scattering of low level cultural, economic, or sports
agreements. Small advances such as these lay the groundwork for
influence gains in the future.
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POTENTIAL STOPS ON GORBACHEV'S LATIN AMERICAN TOUR
indicates that
Moscow anticipates that it can
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combine all its desired stops
in one excursion through Latin
America. If scheduling problems remain, however, Gorbachev may
contemplate two trips; one, for instance, in the fall 1987 that
would combine a visit to Mexico City with a trip to the United
States for a summit with President Reagan. At some later point,
perhaps early
1988, Gorbachev
might return for a swing through
South America.
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MEXICO
Mexico
is a high priority stop. Soviet MFA spokesman Gennadiy
Gerasimov acknowleged the coming visit during a press conference
last December but said that no dates had been determined.
Clandestine reporting from Mexico makes the point that Moscow
would like to link Gorbachev's
stop in Mexico City with a summit
meeting with Reagan in the United
States.
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Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister
an August-October timeframe for
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Komplektov offered de la Madrid
the visit. De la Madrid reportedly accepted
these dates even if
Gorbachev did not go to the United States.
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URUGUAY
Gorbachev and
Uruguayan President Sanguinetti have officially
agreed to exchange visits and Komplektov apparently worked to
formalize the dates. In February Sanguinetti's Special Assistant
informed the US Embassy in Montevideo
that Gorbachev's visit was
tentatively scheduled for next
November.
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indicates that Uruguay was only
recently added to Gorbachev's
proposed itinerary. We believe that Moscow may be using
Sanguinetti's compliance as a lure to gain the agreement of the
more reluctant
--but more important
--states of Argentina and
Brazil.
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BRAZIL
Brasilia
appears reluctant to commit itself to a visit by
Gorbachev.
Komplektov told
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Brazilian
President Sarney tnat boroacnev wanted to visit this
year but Sarney wants to delay the visit until 1988. There have
been no
official statements in
Moscow or Brasilia confirming the
visit.
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. _ _
ARGENTINA
President Alfonsin officially invited Gorbachev to Buenos Aires
during his visit to Moscow late last year. Gorbachev accepted,
and, according to the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, the Argentine
MFA has confirmed that the only question pendina rPcolutinn ic
the exact date of the visit. Nevertheless,
implied that there was a special problem
scheduling the visit to Argentina. According to the US Embassy
In Moscow, Argentine diplomatic officials there claim that
Alfonsin will be tied up with local elections during fall 1987
and a visit by Gorbachev would be impossible then.
in
PERU
Until recently, little effort had bPPn madp tn inrnrnnrata Pan
into Gorbachev's itinerary;
indicated that by mid-February Lima and Moscow had begun
discussing dates and security arrangements for a Gorbachev visit.
Despite Moscow's economic and military ties to Lima, the
terrorist problem and the direct targeting of Soviet interests
Peru may discourage a visit by the General Secretary.
CUBA
in
We have no reporting that indicates that Cuba is on Gorbachev's
agenda, but it would be a breach of protocol for Gorbachev to
exclude Havana from his itinerary. In addition, Gorbachev's
plane would almost definitely stopover in Havana for refueling.
No Soviet leader has been to Cuba since Brezhnev visited in 1974.
NICARAGUA
Nicaraguan media has speculated that Managua will be a stopover
for Gorbachev but Moscow has aivpn nn indication that Nicaragua
will be included, has made clear that
Gorbachev knows that such a visit would be highly provocative to
the US and also that several other Latin American states might
rpfusp to hP part of an itinerary that included Nicaragua.
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Possible Gorbachev Itinerary
180 Bering
Sea
150
SO" ARCTIC
OCEAN
r,r9
Beau fort
Sea
Greenland
Ban
Bay Men.)
Davis
Strait
60
3 n NORTH
PACIFIC '
OCEAN
30
rjr
' \ ICELAND
Denmark
!" Strait
CANADA. :Hudson
Bay
30 7
UNITED ST1ATES NORTH
Washington
Equator
MEXIC
Mexico City* ?
GUAT
EL
Belize
HONDURA
ALA
LVADOR * NICARAGUA
ManagUll
COSTA
RICkt
T.ANZMA
p
_DOMINICAN
. E
I REPUBLIC
Caribbean
Sea
Expected route
'ATLANTIC
OCEAN
TRINIDAD
Find TOBAGO
EZUELA -4-GUYANA
- _SURINAM
,Ftench Guiana
Ir.)
RAZIL
SOUTH PACIFIC
OCEAN
*Brasilia
Buenos Air
ARGENTINA
I
2000 Miles
1 2 0
2000 Kilometers
Cape Hom
60
30
(
SOUTH
ATLANTIC
-30
OCEAN
30
502451 1-76 (641176)
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