THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: TAKING STOCK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000401590011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
The War in Afghanistan:
Taking Stock (u)
e ruary
?py 3 i 7
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NI IIA 87-10002C
THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN:
TAKING STOCK
Information available as of 13 February 1987 was used in the
preparation of this Assessment.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION :.......................... . ............................................................ 9
The Course of the War .................................................................... 9
Soviet Military Developments .......................................................... 9
Setbacks to the Political Strategy ................................................. 9
Trends in Resistance Effectiveness .............................................. 10
Soviet Diplomatic Activity ............................................................... 10
Sweetening the Diplomatic Pot ................................................... 10
Evaluating Soviet Seriousness ....................................................... 11
The Regional Players-Likely Responses ....................................... 14
Pakistan ......................................................................................... 14
The Afghan Resistance ................................................................. 15
Iran ........................ . ........................................................................ 17
India ............................................................................................... 17
China ............................................................................................. 17
Implications for the United States ................................................... 17
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SCOPE NOTE
This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the
National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia in order
to prepare for a US policy review on Afghanistan initiated by the
National Security Council. It is aimed at preparing US policymakers to
respond to signs of recent shifts in Soviet-Afghan strategy. It evaluates
the present course of the war and the comparative effectiveness of the
Soviet and Afghan military and the Mujahideen, the seriousness of
recent Soviet peace feelers, the willingness and ability of Pakistan to
continue support to the Mujahideen, and the position of other key states
in the area (Iran, China, and India). Consequently, this Assessment has a
relatively short-six- to 12-month-time horizon. It has been coordinat-
ed at the working level by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence agencies of the services. Information as of
13 February 1987 was used in the preparation of this report.
the last assessment on this issue, was completed in
January 1986 and, like the current assessment was written in response to
a specific set of policy questions rather than as a general assessment.
The Estimate concluded that Soviet hints of an increased interest in a
political solution for Afghanistan were not authentic indications of
Soviet interest in a political solution short of securing aCommunist-
controlled regime. The Estimate also fudged that the Soviets would
continue to make incremental increases in their military effectiveness
and work to build a stronger regime in Afghanistan. These judgments
have proved sound. While talks in Geneva have produced some
compromise, the Soviets have not yielded on the basic timetable issue.
Throughout 1986 the Soviets experimented with their tactics and slowly
but steadily improved the firepower of their forces in Afghanistan.
They also replaced Afghan leader Babrak Karmal with Najib, a choice
clearly aimed at invigorating regime-building efforts and widening the
regimes appeal.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Although both the Soviets and the Mu~ahideen have made significant
improvements in their military capabilities, neither side has come close
to pushing the war onto a winning track. Soviet improvements in
firepower and tactics have not been matched by progress in strengthen-
ing the grip of the DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) regime.
Similarly, the Mu~ahideen dramatically demonstrated enhanced capa-
bilities in the last half of 1986 (by capturing three regime garrisons and
effectively using antiair missiles) and they have raised the costs of the
war for the Soviets, though clearly not to an unacceptable level.
Without either a comprehensive political solution to the war or a
dramatic Soviet escalation, both of which we consider unlikely, we
believe the war will continue indecisively, not only through the time
frame of this assessment but r bly for a significant period beyond.
General Secretary Gorbachev's bolder handling of the Afghan issue
over the past year indicates a much more sophisticated and dynamic ap-
proach and an increased desire to break the stalemate. We believe,
however, that despite the latest initiatives, which go further than
anything offered before, Moscow is still~nwilling to leave Afghanistan
under anything less than aCommunist-dominated regime in Kabul. We
believe that, given the current poor state of the Afghan army and
regime, Moscow cannot make meaningful concessions to Pakistan or the
insurgents without risking destabilization of its clients in Kabul. Nor can
Moscow withdraw-certainly not within 18 months-without precipat-
ing the swift collapse of the regime. Although Gorbachev referred to
Afghanistan as a "bleeding wound" in his February speech to the
Communist Party congress, we believe that the Soviets do not yet see
the military situation inside Afghanistan or domestic and international
pressures as compelling enough to change dramat;~ally their approach
to the conflict.
Although we do not believe the Soviets are prepared to walk away
from their commitments in Afghanistan, we believe there is significance
in recent Soviet moves. The flurry of activity is aimed mainly at wooing
Pakistan but also at sowing suspicion and dissension within the resis-
tance, between the resistance and Pakistan, and between Pakistan and
the United States. The Soviets are probably also trying to influence
international opinion, especially in the nonaligned and Islamic world.
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Even if the Soviets do not succeed, they may hope to put themselves
into a position to blame the United States, Pakistan, and the resistance
for obstructing a political settlement. The Soviets may be using the
negotiations process to probe f or a political solution that they have yet
to define precisely, even for themselves. We cannot rule out the
possibility that, in addition to wooing Pakistan, the recent Soviet
initiatives reflect a willingness to alter past policies significantly: We
believe Moscow's minimum condition for withdrawal would be confi-
dence that Afghanistan would remain "friendly" to the USSR-which
they define as influenced, if not controlled, by the Soviets.
Moscow can point to some military successes. Better perimeter
security has made it harder for the insurgents to infiltrate men and
supplies into Kabul and, to a much lesser extent, into other large cities.
In addition, pressure against insurgent logistic routes has made it more
difficult and expensive for the resistance to resupply its fighters and
provide services to its beleaguered civilian supporters.
Soviet efforts have not noticeably improved Kabul's control of
territory, however, or brought Moscow any closer to creating a client
state strong enough to survive of ter a Soviet withdrawal. The size,
effectiveness, and reliability of the 50,000- to 55,000-man Afghan army
has not significantly improved, the provision of sophisticated air defense
weapons has complicated the use o iet and Af han airpower, and
overall urban security remains poor.
One of the most significant problems facing the Soviets is the
continued deterioration of the Afghan regime. Moscow underestimated
the breadth of support for Babrak Karmal within the ruling party, and
his replacement as President and Party General Secretary created new
fissures and heightened infighting in the leadership and the Armed
Forces. In this context, concern that the Soviets are serious about
withdrawing has created pronounced uneasiness in Kabul, and we
believe the risk of the regime's unraveling will be an important
constraint on Soviet behavior.
The resistance retains broad support among the Afghan population
and, despite continued political differences among resistance leaders,
many guerrilla groups inside Afghanistan regularly cooperate to achieve
specific tactical goals. We believe this support, and the increasing
military capability of the Mu~ahideen, will allow them to continue to
deny the Soviets success in consolidating the Kabul regime. In addition,
the Peshawar alliance has recently displayed increased unity and
political savvy in its response to the Soviet-DRA cease-fire and national
reconciliation campaign
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The resistance still suffers from serious shortcomings that prevent it
from achieving more decisive results against the regime. Some resis-
tance groups are still poorly equipped, lack effective training, are
unskilled in tactics, and have trouble moving supplies. In some areas,
the increased toll of the war on civilians is eroding economic support
and, to a lesser extent, the intelligence they receive from Afghans inside
the country. Outside the country, the resistance alliance has had only a
marginal impact in international forums and has not done all it could to
press its case internationally.
Pakistan's President Zia and Foreign Minister Yaqub continue to
believe that a policy of military and diplomatic pressure combined with
a firm stand at the UN Geneva negotiations is the best way to pursue a
satisfactory settlement. While Zia and Yaqub remain skeptical about
Soviet sincerity and were disappointed with Moscow's positions during
Yaqub's early February visit to Moscow, the recent Soviet-DRA recon-
ciliation proposals encourage them to believe that their policy is
working.
Pakistan's negotiators are likely to continue pressing fora settle-
ment that accomplishes their fundamental objectives: (1) the removal of
Soviet combat troops from Afghanistan and (2) the establishment of a
government that would allow the large refugee population-now almost
3 million-to return home. Local frustration over the refugees has
steadily increased, exacerbated by Soviet-DRA cross-border and terror-
ist attacks and stirred up by left-wing Pakistani politicians. Concerns in
the military establishment that Pakistan's support for the Mujahideen
could provoke Soviet military retaliation have been further heightened
by fears that Pakistan could not defend two borders in the event of an
Indian attack. These domestic and military concerns are not likely to
override Islamabad's fundamental objectives durinr~ the time frame of
the assessment.
We expect Pakistani negotiators at Geneva to continue to push for
as short a withdrawal timetable as possible. The new Soviet-Afghan
proposals have encouraged Islamabad to believe there may be an
opportunity to arrive at a solution based on having a neutral figure-
possibly former King Zahir Shah-organize and head a transitional
government. If such a solution should materialize, Pakistan would be
more flexible about a withdrawal time frame.
We believe Pakistan would bargain hard for a timetable of under a
year but could give a bit on timing if it got concessions from the Soviets
on a government of national reconciliation and/or neutrality. We
believe Pakistani officials may agree to a timetable of as much as 15
months, if some concessions are made.
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All analysts believe that the US reaction and the possible loss of US
aid would have a very strong affect on Pakistani calculations and that
the Pakistanis would not surprise us by signing a settlement that had not
previously been discussed with the United States. We are also confident
that we would have warning if Pakistan's position were shifting
significantly. The Community believes that while Pakistan will take
into account the views of both the United States and the resistance it
will allow neither a veto over a settlement it believed was in Pakistan's
interest.
The Afghan insurgents have consistently ref used to deal with the
regime in Kabul and reiected the Soviet-Afghan reconciliation proposals
as a sham. They have publicly stated their opposition to a Geneva-type
settlement, which they believe favors the Kabul side by cutting off
support for the resistance immediately while allowing a phased Soviet
withdrawal. They see Kabul's proposal as a trap designed to weaken the
insurgency and obtain military and diplomatic advantages for Moscow.
Resistance leaders are worried that the Pakistanis will sign an agree-
ment over their heads, and that false hopes of an imminent peace will
have a demoralizing impact on the insurgency.
Iran has grudgingly acquiesced in Pakistan's pursuit of a political
settlement at Geneva but is suspicious that the talks will lead to a sellout
of the resistance, and has warned Pakistan that it would oppose any
such solution. Iran is frequently mentioned by the Soviets as a potential
obstacle to a settlement because of its refusal to guarantee, or even
recognize publicly, the legitimacy of negotiations that exclude the
Afghan insurgents.
New Delhi views the recent Soviet-Afghan initiative as evidence
that Moscow is looking for aface-saving way out of the conflict. It
would view a political settlement favorably because it believes ending
the Afghanistan war would remove a major justification for the US
military and economic aid program with Pakistan.
Bening will continue to insist on a Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan as one of the three security concerns that Moscow must
address before bilateral relations can be normalized. In the final
analysis, China would live with any settlement Pakistan accepts.
Pakistan's probes for US views on the negotiations will provide us
an opportunity to try to formulate a coordinated response to the Soviet
overtures. Islamabad will continue to solicit US views on how best to test
Soviet sincerity and to determine US willingness to endorse a neutrality
agreement for Afghanistan. A major challenge to the United States in
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the near term will be to prevent Moscow's negotiating initiatives from
dividing the resistance from Pakistan and from straining US-Pakistani
The United States would encounter significant and opposing
pressures in the event Pakistan obtained an agreement it considered
acceptable at Geneva:
- US failure to support and ultimately guarantee such an agree-
ment would severely strain US-Pakistani relations.
- Open differences between Pakistan and the United States would
allow Moscow to blame the United States for obstructing a
settlement, a charge that would find resonance in international
forums.
- The resistance and its supporters will be pressing the United
States not to "sell them out" by acquiescing to a Pakistani deal
to which they objected.
There is virtually no chance of a complete breakdown in the peace
negotiations. Should an impasse be reached at Geneva, the parties will
almost certainly find some way to continue the dialogue, probably with
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