CIA, NSA, AND THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89-01114R000300090054-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: March 26, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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OGC Has Reviewed ems' Approved For ReleaseQ002/11/18: CIA-RDP89-01114R000300,Q$0054-6 a2_Lu~~
OGC 79-02827
26 March 1979
Office of Legislative Counsel
FROM .
utfice of General Counsel
STATINTL
STATINTL
SUBJECT CIA, NSA, and the Senior Executive Service
1. The Senior Executive Service, which was created by
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, was designed to
provide increased compensation and benefits to senior
managers of the federal government coupled with decreased
rights of tenure. Further, the entire government-wide SES
program was made subject to the strict oversight and control
of the office of Personnel Management. The inclusion of the
CIA personnel system within the SES program was vigorously
fought against by this Agency because it would have impaired
the unique personnel authorities of the Director of Central
Intelligence, it would have hampered the DCI's flexibility
in staffing the Agency to meet the ever-shifting exicrencies
of foreign affairs, and it would have interfered with the
DCI's statutory responsibility to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Weaker
variations of these arguments were made by NSA and the
Foreign Service to support their exemption from SES as well.
2. Since the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act,
NSA and the Foreign Service have both launched legislative
initiatives designed to secure for their senior management
increases in compensation and benefits which unabashedly
parallel the compensation and benefits of SES personnel.
The Foreign Service has wisely launched its initiative
within the context of legislation restructuring the Foreign
Service personnel system, while NSA has chosen to go forward
with a proposal that would simply establish a carbon copy of
the SES in NSA for its senior managerial personnel.
3. In my opinion, NSA's proposal to create a Senior
Cryptologic Executive Service will surely be viewed as a
straightforward, virtually undisguised raid upon the U.S.
Treasury. As written, the proposal would allow the Director
of NSA to roam the SES provisions of title 5 of the United
States Code at will and to administratively adopt whatever
compensation and benefits for senior NSA personnel as he
sees. fit. Though NSA argues that the adoption of the
provisions governing SES would be a useful administrative
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*Me Iwo,
tool in the management of its senior positions, in fact, the
adoption of such provisions would only marginally increase
the management prerogatives of NSA, and it could decrease
those prerogatives substantially depending upon which SES
provisions were administratively adopted. Any increase in
the broad personnel authorities of NSA would actually be
miniscule, thus the only advantage in establishing the SCES
would be to give senior NSA personnel compensation and
benefits they would not otherwise have. Moreover, NSA seeks;
to administer its version of the SES without the oversight
or control of OPM.
4. The opportunity for increased compensation, au-
thorization. of sabbaticals, the abolition of the leave
accumulation limitation, and the provision for early retire-
ment with a less than fully successful SES performance are
all inducements calculated to convince senior managers of
the federal government to elect to join the government-wide
SES program and accept a lessening-of their rights of
tenure. However, these inducements are unjustifiable in the
case of NSA because the NSA proposal does not give senior
managers the option of electing not to join the SCES and it
would no more than marginally increase the managerial
control of NSA over its senior personnel. The NSA proposal
for a SCES is, in short, all carrot and no stick.
5. In addition to this grotesque attempt by NSA to
superimpose an SES type program over the NSA personnel.
system, NSA is also proposing a merit pay system for middle-
level managers that would mimic the merit pay system of the
Civil Service Reform Act. To my mind, the merit pay system
is one of the most ill-conceived aspects of that Act. As
established, the merit pay system would strip a middle
manager of his step increases and up to 50% of his com-
parability pay adjustments. Working under this system, it
is likely that some managers will actually be making less
than the employees they supervise. I believe that this
system is harsh and inherently inequitable, and that it will
ultimately lower the morale of middle management wherever it
goes into effect.
6. While I agree with the unstated premise of NSA that
intelligence agencies exempted from the provisions of the
Civil Service Reform Act must be able to offer increased
compensation and benefits to their senior personnel to
remain competitive with the rest of the Government, the NSA
legislative package is instructive, I think, on how not to
go about achieving that objective. The NSA legislative
package will probably look considerably different when, if
ever, it is enacted into law. Before the package is introduced
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in Congress, OPM will surely get a crack at it. Then, after
the package is introduced in Congress, it will almost.
certainly be reviewed by the Congressional committees with
responsibility for civil service matters, in addition to the
intelligence committees. The Office of General Counsel of
NSA has indicated that it feels the referral of the NSA
package to other than intelligence committees of Congress is
unavoidable because the NSA package will probably be perceived
as a part of civil service reform, and, in any case, NSA
personnel statutes have been referred to such committees in
the past. Apparently, since the compensation of NSA senior
personnel is connected by statute to the supergrades of the
General. Schedule, it was felt by NSA that something had to
be done immediately. I have been informed by the Office of
General Counsel of NSA that a conscious decision was made to
go forward with a proposal for the outright adoption of an
SES type program, rather than trying to modify the entire
NSA personnel system, because it was felt that a proposal
for outright adoption would probably be enacted faster.
7. Nevertheless, I anticipate that NSA is in. for a
pounding by Congress, particularly the House Post Office
and Civil Service Committee, because it will probably view
the NSA proposal for an SCES as a sham solely designed to
get increased compensation and benefits for senior NSA
personnel. Moreover, it is conceivable that Congress may
conclude that NSA presently has enough management tools with
which to--efficiently manage its senior positions. Finally,
there is the clear danger that Congress may impose the
oversight of a non-intelligence committee, like the House
Post Office and Civil Service Committee, over the NSA.
personnel system as a price for passage of the proposed
legislation.
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FOIAB5
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DDA: DiWortman: leg (29 May. 79)
Distribution:
Crrig LC (by hand) w/Legislative Highlight Book
DDA Subj w/cy of Subj item (28 May-1 Jun).
1 - DDV Chrono
Re SES Proposal
"To Fred Hitz
"Fred: Who is pushing idea at paperclip (under-
lined). That causes excessive nervousness in
intelligence community-Turner doesn't need it.
We ought cPFaIFe~hekl~1 '1/TlW-li4-1 JWJ-~1114R000300090054-6
is pushing it. s on
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SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE PROPOSAL(S) As reported earlier, we commented to 0MB on NSA."s proposed:
Senior Cryptologic Executive Service to the effect that while we
did not object to it per se, we wanted it to be clearly understood
that our concurrence did not preclude the DC1 from later inst tM.uti:i
a similar service for the CIA or, more imrtantl spraposrc
a Community-wide Senior Intelligence Service. (IUO)
0MB has now informed us that it has redrafted the NSA
proposal so as to provide for Senior Services within DIA and
CIA, as well as NSA. The proposal, not completed as of. 25 May,
would establish three separate servicbs, each having autonomy
and being under the direction of the respective Agency head. (1110)
According to the terms of the proposal, transfers between
participating intelligence agencies could not be ordered by the
DCI, but could only be made with the concurrence of the heads of
all transferring agencies. We have notified 0MB orally that, whirl
we will reserve official comment until we have carefully reviewed
the proposal, we would clearly oppose any legislation which,
even impliedly, ddtradted from the DCI's statutory personnel
authorities. We should have the 0MB proposal in hand early'this"
week.. (IUO)
ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT AMENDMENTS
The Senate last week passed H.R. 2805, making technical
changes to the financial disclosure provisions o:f the Act.
'The: House, with some amendments, passed the more important
Administration-requested modifications to the Act.ts
st-employment restrictions (S..869). (U)
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