CIA LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR 1985-1990

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 5, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA LONG-RANGE PLANNING 1,'OV, 1985--1090
PHASE 2 -- COVERT ACTION GOALS
5 MAY 1982
DRAFT
1. Covert Action in Perspective
Covert action consists of actions which. are not
attributable to the United States and which are designed to
influence foreign governments, or_gar. J; at iOns, Person's, or
events in support of US foreign policy. Covert action. as a
tool of foreign policy has been well c.:-Itablished in the US
political firmament since 1947, when the National
Security Act, which chartered the Central Intelligence
Agency, authorized CIA too "Per o~-l"I such other: functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national
security as the National Security Council may from time to
time direct." Driven by growing ozwt e7:n in the late 1940s
about the threat to Western interests posed by the Soviet
Union and its communist allies, US policymakers set the
Agency on a course that saw the rapid development and use of
a wide variety of action cap abi.l it se
Throughout the 1950s and 1960;;6 these capabilities were
employed on a broad scale. Whe.tha:Y? offensive or defensive,
programs of that period almost inv~irial;,ly had as their ulti-
mate objective the countering of communist activities.
International organizations with participation were
established, worldwide media capabilities were created,
political action and paramilitary ,;kills and mechanisms were
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developed and kept at the ready, and major at_tent_iort T;=Ps
devoted to the recruitment: and trc_inirug of staff per.?sora-iel
and field agents needed to implrtemont: the programs. .During
this period, the Agency intervened covertly in numerous
countries around the globe in response to policy direction
to shape elections, support the czcrri.ocr-atic center, Oppose
extremism (especially from the and counter the
efforts of countries and forces perceived to be ,irri.:rr~ cal to.
US and Western security interest-, ., Not unt i .1 Tate,,--, In the
1970s, would issue: such as inter:nnational
t:cr_r-c~rFi rtr.r
narcotics, nuclear proliferation, and technology t'.r_?arrsf e-r
among others, emerge as problemmms. r egui,r-incf c overi rc t,_;.on
attention.
By the early 197.0s, public Fat:t it ude:~ about: the _ ppro-
priate role for the US in world affairs had begun to shift
as a result of the adverse turn of events in Vi.etnaa-i}.. Com-
pounding the problem, the nation a.1 trauma of Watergate led
to a period of introspection and caution in foreign affairs,
which found declining use for covert action as an instrument
of policy. With this decline, the Agency's covert action
capabilities atrophied.
Not until the ..ate 1.970s ell-i"(7, ITS poi.icymaker-sr faced
with the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, the Sandi-
nista victory in Nicaragua, and t(--e Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan, among other problexan, begin turning once again
to the Agency for covert suppo-t to policy iii5tiat jves.,
Since then, the rapid increase in tasking has stretcl;)e4 the
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Agency's action capabilities to the lira .R and made necessary
the development of a program to rebuild certain capax.
bilitiesa
As we assess its future role, covert action should play
a narrower, more selective role throughout the 1980s than
was the case in the 1950s and 19GCH. In contrast with the
international organ i zat7.ons, political party operations, and
large-scale paramilitary programs of that era , we foresee
program actions that are more tightly . focused, more hi-
lateral than multilateral in ncop ? e,~rrf with an increased
capability for unilateral action. Ittl will be important for-
Agency management to ensure that (:% programs are des igned to
support clearly defined policy ob.j eet.ives, and not employed
as a substitute for cue, licy. Nor, except h rare cireuru-
stances, should CA programs be allowed to become more than
subordinate elements in the overall policy mechanisms for
dealing with foreign problems. Keeping CA within such a re-
stricted framework will be difficult at times, but the
Agency's central responsibility for program design and
implementation will require that policymakers be sensitized
to and respectful of the limits of covert action.
To prepare for --asking in the latter half of this
decade, the Agency will require the capability to mount and
sustain propaganda, political action, and special opera-_
tions/paramilitary programs. The recruitment and training
of staff personnel to manage they pr oc;r am will be among our
highest priorities of the next two f i?}cal years as we seek
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to recreate a cadre of "triple-threat" case officers who can
handle CA as well as FI and CI responsibilities. Our
parallel objective is to have on-line by 1985 a variety of
infrastructural capabilities for program support into the
1990s.
II. Setting the Stage: Infrastructure Development 1981-1985
In the summer of 1981, the Agency decided on the nature
of CA infrastructural capabilities needed for the 1980's.
Supplementing the primary need for improved human resources,
both staff and agent, a multi-point development program was
initiated to provide by 1985 a skeletal capability to respond
to a variety of covert action requirements. This development
effort is guided by several principles:
-- The CA mechanisms must be secret and show no
affiliation with the US.
-- The mechanisms should be small and easily
disposable. The large counter-front organizations
appropriate to the 50s and 60s will not be appro-
priate to the 80s and 90s.
-- The new infrastructure should allow the,
Agency to carry out its CA mission entirely
unilaterally if desired. The leak problem will
not go away. The new capability must accept this
reality and be built in such a way that leak. damage
can be minimized.
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--The 3.n rastrucJure must on .s , _ ady for
rapid use. Because of time required to build., we
cannot wait for the need to be clearly defined. The
skeleton capability will allow the Agency to surge
resources to meet specific demands.
-- The Agency must once again aggressively ex-
plore new ways to use state-of-art developments in
covert action.
With these principles, the reestablished infrastructure, will
enable the Agency to:
-- respond to two insurgency/counterinsurgency
situations simultaneously--at least one entirely
unilaterally;
A list of specific projects is provided as attachment
This then is the mechanism we hope to see in place as
we enter the second half of this decade. The major resource
commitment should be completed by FY 86. After that, we will
face primarily maintenance expenses both with our human and
equipment resources. If maintained, the Agency should have a
covert action capability able to meet the demands of the 1980's
and beyond.
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III. The World Environment: 1985-
The latter half of the 1980s w }.3_l'. find TIS continuing
to confront risks to its national security interests. The
Soviet Union will remain the principiA. adversary. Although
anticipated leadership changes in Moscow will probably result
in some policy shifts, the Soviet Union will continue its
efforts to undermine the US position wherever possible, Some
percent, of our total covert action effort i il.l be denoted
directly or indirectly to dealing with. the
let thre'at'
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Provided at Tab B are the key a.rrd.xgC~? of the DDI IRS,
sessment of probable international problems of the late
1980s which will require policy attention. The DO shares
these perceptions. What are the irtaplicat1ons for covert
action?
IV. Imp1 icat ions for Covert Action
A. Geographic Issues.
Given the outlook for US national security interests in
the 1985-1990 time frame, US will contiiine
to consider covert action a valuable foreign policy
instrument. We cannot . et.imate tha over-all program size by
the latter half of the decade.
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Our planning assumptionn, ho; rv ,c'r ,. i_h.at_ covert et: on
should not continue on a course of c~}ac y, c r,ded growth,
Resource requirements should begin to level off by " 6.
To guide the process of rebuff.) 3ata.g capabilities, we
should focus on countries or regionsi of relatively perna_nent
US foreign policy interest, and on issues that seem destined
to require policy attention throughout the decade.
Because the Soviet Union wil:? x c~;~r c. en the great,-.,es
threat to tUS interests for the fops E eea.b1 e f uzt-u.re F ? M 1
effort will be required to counter soviet initiatives
inimical. to US interests worldwide, FI hj_ fs w i13 require inter alia, strengthenLng and some redirection of currant CA
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TO (Officer designation, room number, and
building )
ROUTING AND REC01',T) SHEET
CIA Long-Range Planning for 1985-'1990
OFFiCU 5
INITIALS
5 May 1982
COMMENTS (Nun..ber each comment to show Proem whom
k, whom. Draw a line across columr: after each comment.)
I)'v iew of 'last wee-k's
drubbing and in the nteres
of avoiidi ng same next. week,
I would be appreciative r f
you would read the attached
draft for the tern year plan
(revised)
If you have any problems wit'
it please let me know,'' If
I don't hear anyth E-ig by
close of business -hur?sday;,
6 May we will formally
circulate it for considera-
tion at the 7 May EXCOM
meeting.
TAT
3TAT