NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 30 NOVEMBER 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T01422R000100230009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 30, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
Monday
30 November 1987
?reirrteefet?
CPAS NID 87-277JX
30 November 1987
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Contents
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Haiti: Elections Called Off
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Western Europe: Criticizing USSR's Persian Gulf Role
Notes
3
Persian Gulf: Iranian Warnings, Iraqi Attacks
4
Turkey: National Assembly Election Results
6
Bangladesh: Ershad Confronts 72-Hour Strike
7
In Brief
8
Special Analyses
Afghanistan: Insurgents and a Political Settlement
9
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Lebanon-Arab States: PLO Ties to Lebanon's Hizballah
14
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30 November 1987
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HAITI: Elections Called Off
The ruling council has dissolved the electoral commission
following the commission's postponement of yesterday's
presidential and legislative elections, a move that portends
further violence and that will seriously complicate any attempt to
put the transition to civilian rule back on track.
The council's announcement disbanding the commission gave no
details of any plan to salvage the current election process. Earlier
yesterday, the commission had suspended voting because of
widespread violence led by rightists, but it apparently intended to
reschedule the election for another date, according to US officials.
Bands of armed men attacked voters before the polling was halted,
and at least 27 people were killed. The commission on Saturday had
called off balloting in several outlying areas because of violence or the
failure of voting materials to arrive on time.
The Army apparently has done little so far to apprehend armed
attackers or to control the escalating violence. US officials
report troops from outlying areas have been ordered to return to
Port-au-Prince, but few soldiers were on the streets of the capital
yesterday afternoon. The military's presence in the provincial city of
Gonaives also has been strengthened. the
Army seized ballots and closed polling places in that city?the site of
major violence over the weekend?before the commission postponed
the voting.
Comment: The council's action will be seen by many Haitians as an
attempt by the military to scuttle the election process altogether.
Further violence between factions favoring and opposing the process
could well prevent elections any time soon and severely test the
military's ability to establish order. If the security situation continues
to deteriorate, indiscriminate violence by rightists and vigilantes will
place the lives of US nationals and other foreigners in Haiti at greater
risk.
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WESTERN EUROPE: Criticizing USSR's Persian Gulf Role
The major West European governments blame Moscow for
blocking implementation of the UN Security Council's
Resolution 598 on a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war but are divided
over whether to take steps to compel the Soviets to cooperate.
most West European leaders believe
Moscow is stalling on the UN cease-fire resolution in an effort to
cultivate influence with Iran and will continue its delaying tactics
unless compelled to cooperate by external pressure. They do not,
however, agree on how to change this situation.
The British want to build broad international support for an arms
embargo to force Moscow to cooperate or face diplomatic isolation.
The French argue that the US and the UK are not exerting enough
direct pressure on the Soviets and should not waste time encouraging
Arab pressure on Moscow.
Foreign Minister Andreotti claims he told the Soviet Ambassador in
Rome that Italy will push for enforcement of a cease-fire if Tehran
continues to stall, according to the US Embassy.
The Embassy reports that the West
Germans favor drafting a cease-fire enforcement resolution, but not
an arms embargo, as a means of putting Moscow on the spot when it
assumes chairmanship of the Security Council tomorrow.
Comment: Differences among themselves make it unlikely that the
West Europeans will collectively press Moscow on implementing
Resolution 598. The West Germans and Italians remain reluctant to
bring the issue to a head, while London fears that the French may be
less cooperative in the Security Council if Paris resolves its Embassy
dispute with Iran
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PERSIAN GULF: Iranian Warnings, Iraqi Attacks
The Iranian press reports that, in a speech to war volunteers on
Saturday, President Khamenei warned that, in order to confront the
US in the Persian Gulf, Tehran will not wait for the US to strike first.
Khamenei asserted the US naval presence is not primarily intended to
escort ships but "to gain a foothold in the region" and to strike at
Iran. He declared that, if Iran believes the US is continuing its
"provocative acts" in the Gulf or "endangering" Iranian interests
there, Tehran will "certainly strike." Meanwhile, Iraq claimed its
aircraft attacked at least four tankers off the Iranian coast this
weekend. Baghdad asserted Iraqi aircraft also bombed Iranian
hydroelectric plants at two dams in the southwest and strafed Iranian
troop positions along the northern front yesterday.
Comment: Khamenei's warning that Iran may strike first at the US
marks an escalation in Tehran's recent public threats and suggests
that the Iranian leadership now is more willing to confront US forces
in the Gulf. Previous threats by Tehran's leaders have generally been
explained as part of Iran's determination to defend itself should the
US strike first. Iran is likely to retaliate for any successful Iraqi
attacks with additional strikes of its own against Gulf shipping
DIA Comment: DIA believes that Khamenei's speech was designed
primarily for mobilization week efforts and, additionally, expresses
Tehran's continuing concern over US intentions in the Gulf. Rather
than an escalation, this speech lacks the vociferous threats of earlier
statements while qualifying Iran's intentions as dependent on US
actions against Iranian interests.
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TURKEY: National Assembly Election Results
Early returns point to a victory for Prime Minister Ozal's Motherland
Party in Turkey's national election yesterday. With most of the votes
counted, Motherland was holding steady at slightly over 36 percent of
the ballots cast, while its chief competitor on the right, the Correct
Way Party of former Prime Minister Demirel, had just under
20 percent. The Social Democratic Populist Party was polling
24.7 percent of the votes, comfortably ahead of its principal rival on
the left, the Democratic Left Party of former Prime Minister Bulent
Ecevit. The latter had only about 8.5 percent of the votes. Minor
parties split the remaining votes
Comment: If these results hold, they should be enough to secure
another majority in the National Assembly for Ozal. He will probably
face a much stronger parliamentary opposition, however, particularly
from the Social Democratic Populists. Their strong finish in the
campaign's final weeks is likely to strengthen the hand of party
Chairman Inonu and possibly unite most of the left under his party's
banner. Indeed, a failure by Ecevit's party to pass the 10-percent
barrier could lead to the gradual dissolution of his party and even to
the eclipse of his political career.
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BANGLADESH: Ershad Confronts 72-Hour Strike
The first day of a 72-hour general strike scheduled to begin yesterday
was less successful than anticipated by the opposition because of the
state of emergency imposed Friday by President Ershad. According
to the US Embassy, there was little violence amid heavy rickshaw and
pedestrian traffic as 40 to 50 percent of the stores in Dhaka were
open for business. This relative calm returned after Ershad ordered
the crackdown on opposition activity, including large-scale arrests of
leaders, a ban on demonstrations and strikes, and daily curfews in
five cities. The Embassy reports that Ershad?after meeting with
military leaders?also made a nationally broadcast speech to
reiterate his refusal to resign, but he held out the possibilities of
midterm elections and a change to a parliamentary form of
government.
Comment: The President's drastic measures to break the strike
and end the opposition's stranglehold on the government and the
economy seem to be working. Ershad retains the support of the
military, but any failure by police and paramilitary units to enforce the
state of emergency could provoke military intervention and Ershad's
downfall. The President is gambling that many of the opposition
leaders?also tired of the dislocation?will be ready to negotiate once
order is restored. These talks are unlikely, however, unless he
releases Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina and the leader of the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Begum Zia.
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In Brief
East Asia
Europe
Americas
Oceania
?
? Vietnamese resistance fighters captured in Laos to stand trial in
Vietnam this week, according to US diplomats ... will be tried as
Vietnamese citizens despite foreign passports... accusations
against US will probably be limited.
? Philippine armed forces chief Ramos ordering expanded
operations against Communist rebels who raided US company's
plantations on Mindanao recently, according to press ... com an
threatening to leave ... initial military response meager.
? Poland's referendum on political and economic reforms marked by
scattered, largely peaceful protests yesterday... 68 percent
turnout low, but enough to make outcome binding ... confusing
ballot a arently part of regime's effort to manipulate results.
? Death of student in police custody triggered new rioting in Merida,
western Venezuela, on Thursday, according to US Embassy ...
protests expected throughout country this week, but security
forces will contain further violence.
? Australian Prime Minister Hawke in USSR this week to sign trade
agreement ... wants to preserve share of Soviet grain market,
says US Embassy in Canberra ... Australia's huge trade surplus
will continue despite Soviet displeasure
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Special Analysis
AFGHANISTAN: Insurgents and a Political Settlement
Most Afghan insurgent leaders believe they are on the way to a
military victory and have little interest in the type of negotiated
peace Moscow has suggested as face saving?one that would
include a substantial role for the current Kabul regime, a
leadership post for former King Zahir Shah, and a UN
peacekeeping force. Reports that Moscow is ready to shorten its
withdrawal timetable and might accede to an interim coalition
regime not dominated by the Afghan Communists have not
budged the insurgent leadership from its hard line.
The improving combat effectiveness of the insurgents and the
growing evidence of the Kabul regime's decline have decreased the
already limited interest the resistance had in a negotiated peace.
Alliance leader Khalis, in recent statements at the UN and in
discussions with US officials, indicated the insurgents were thinking
only in terms of military victory. Khalis almost certainly represented
the prevailing attitude of the insurgents?especially that of the field
commanders?when he indicated that they alone would determine
the future political shape of Afghanistan.
Political Power of the Commanders Growing
The statements by Khalis reflect his views and a realization that a
peace settlement must satisfy the increasingly influential and hardline
field commanders. The major political development in the Afghan
insurgency in recent years has been the efforts that the major regional
commanders?Masood in the north, Ismail Khan in the west, and, to a
lesser extent, commanders loyal to Khalis in the south?have taken to
build independent political organizations largely beyond the control of
alliance leaders in Peshawar. Their efforts have been spurred by
disgust with the party chiefs' failure to build a united political front
and by a belief that alliance disunity promotes insurgent divisiveness
and military inefficiency inside Afghanistan.
Insisting on a Voice in Any Peace Settlement
Most commanders, reject
the notion of a peace settlement reached without their participation.
They would not tolerate a substantial role for the Kabul regime and a
leadership role for Zahir Shah in an interim government?each a
condition that most reporting indicates is essential to Moscow's
definition of a face-saving withdrawal. The commanders harbor a
deep distrust of the UN-sponsored Geneva talks and would also balk
continued
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at the notion of a UN peacekeeping force to oversee the Soviets'
departure. Insurgent attacks on such a force probably would not be
uncommon.
The field commanders' growing political influence means that party
leaders in Pakistan probably cannot guarantee that their
commanders will abide by a peace settlement designed to provide the
Soviets a graceful departure. The Pakistanis might coerce several of
the party leaders to support arrangements for such a withdrawal, but
those leaders would forfeit their standing with the commanders and
would lose influence over events inside Afghanistan. Indeed, party
chiefs who defied Pakistani pressure to cooperate would ensure their
survival as respected. if not necessarily powerful, political leaders.
Evading Pakistan's Leverage
The commanders probably believe they can cope with any Pakistani
attempts to force their acquiescence in a peace settlement. The
insurgents are aware that Islamabad is betting that military pressure
will persuade the Soviets to withdraw and probably believe that the
Pakistanis will not limit the supplies sustaining that military pressure.
Moreover, the regional commanders previously have demonstrated
they are capable of fending for themselves. They no doubt estimate
that the stockpiling they have already done, along with the large
amounts of weaponry they would capture from regime forces in the
chaos following a Soviet withdrawal announcement, would keep their
forces militarily viable.
Outlook
Although a settlement imposed on the Afghan insurgents probably
would lead some commanders to sit tight and conserve supplies for
the inevitable postwar power struggle, most commanders probably
would continue harassing attacks on the Soviets as they withdrew.
The attacks would increase in intensity if the departing Soviets
conducted air or ground operations against the resistance. Because
of their distrust of Moscow, their need to maintain credibility among
their followers, and the population's thirst for revenge, most
commanders probably would not abide by a political settlement that
was not an obvious defeat for Moscow and its Afghan clients.
INR Comment: INR agrees that virtually no Afghan currently in
opposition will accept a settlement that leaves the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan in actual control of the country.
continued
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Many elements of the resistance, however, are likely to accede to the
establishment of a transitional regime, with a subsidiary participation
by the PDPA, or a role for Zahir Shah.
It will be almost impossible for major commanders to oppose an
agreement that would get rid of the Soviets in a relatively short time
frame and, ultimately the PDPA, although some insurgents would
certainly attack retreating Soviet forces. Any such settlement will
prove irresistible to the civilians, who have suffered most in the war?
and whose wishes the guerrillas will find it hard to oppose
Resistance hardliners would probably refuse to participate in such an
arrangement, and their rejection could well keep more flexible
elements of the resistance out of a coalition. The insurgents probably
would agree with the Intelligence Community assessment that the
Kabul regime will not survive absent Soviet troo s (withdrawing under
no more than a one-year timetable).
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Growing Shia and Fatah Presence in Lebanon
Mediterranean
Sea
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x Palestinian refugee camp
with dominant PLO/Eatah
presence.
20 Kilometers
20 Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Special Analysis
LEBANON- PLO Ties to Lebanon's Hizballah
ARAB STATES:
The pro-Arafat Fatah element of the PLO has developed an
extensive tactical alliance with the Iranian-backed Hizballah
movement in Lebanon over the past several years. This may give
Hizballah access to Fatah's well-established international
networks, facilitating efforts by fundamentalist Shias to establish
their own terrorist network outside the Middle East.
The links between Fatah and Hizballah stem from personal
relationships formed in the 1970s, before the Hizballah movement
emerged as a force in Lebanon, and have remained one of the most
durable alliances in Lebanon. Several Lebanese Shias who later
became prominent Hizballah leaders were at that time either
members of Fatah or had ties to senior Fatah officials, including
Arafat. Prominent Hizballah terrorist leaders lmad Mughniyah and
Mustafa Shihadi reportedly were once members of Force 17, Fatah's
elite security force. In addition, Hizballah spiritual leader Shaykh
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah has allegedly maintained a personal
relationship with Arafat since the early 1970s.
Organizational Links
The Fatah-Hizballah relationship has grown substantially since
1983 but is still largely tactical and primarily focused on common
objectives in Lebanon. Fatah has provided money, weapons, and
materiel to Hizballah in exchange for help in reinfiltrating Palestinian
guerrillas and rebuilding a power base in Lebanon. Hizballah has also
supplied logistic support to Fatah fighters to help defend against
Amal attacks on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.
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This cooperation serves the interests of both groups in countering
Amal and Syrian intervention while also obstructing Israel's efforts to
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have cooperated in attacks against Syrian forces in Beirut as well as
Israeli targets in southern Lebanon. In addition, the two groups
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In the past two years, Fatah officials have used their ties to Hizballah
to help arrange the release of at least one, and possibly two, foreign
hostages held by the fundamentalists. Arafat recognizes the political
continued
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benefits the PLO can derive from successful intercession and
probably hopes it will help to win Western recognition. Fatah's
influence over Hizballah on hostage matters is very limited, however,
and to date has been effective only with hostages of secondary
importance to Hizballah.
Implications
The infusion of several thousand Syrian troops into West Beirut,
which began in February, is likely to encourage more active
cooperation between Hizballah and Fatah units, particularly if Syrian
forces move against the Palestinian refugee camps or take on the
Hizballah forces in Beirut's southern suburbs. Such moves by the
Syrians would undoubtedly provoke Fatah and Hizballah to join forces
against the Syrians in Lebanon and could lead to joint operations
inside Syria or against Syrian targets outside the Middle East.
The Fatah-Hizballah relationship presents a serious threat to Israeli
interests. Their cooperation in southern Lebanon probably will result
in more sophisticated, effective attacks against Israeli troops and the
Army of South Lebanon.
The alliance could spill over into Western Europe as well, although
Fatah is less likely to cooperate with Hizballah in conducting terrorist
operations there. Hizballah has been trying to extend its terrorist
operations to Western Europe since at least January, when three
Hizballah terrorists, including suspected hijacker Muhammad
Hammadi, were arrested trying to smuggle explosives through
Frankfurt, West Germany, and Milan, Italy. Hizballah apparently has
had little success in establishing an operational base in Western
Europe, however, and may try to gain access to Fatah's extensive
logistic network to support its own operations. Any increased
Hizballah capability to conduct operations presents a serious threat
to US interests abroad, but any joint Fatah-Hizballah operations
outside Lebanon would probably?at Fatah's behest?be limited to
Syrian or Israeli targets.
Whatever their current mutual interests, Fatah and Hizballah have
divergent, long-term objectives in Lebanon, and these differences are
likely to strain their relationship if the situation in Lebanon stabilizes.
Palestinian efforts to reestablish a presence in Lebanon as a base for
confronting Israel will conflict with Hizballah's desires to assume
political control and establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic.
Advances in the Middle East peace process, particularly if there were
any evidence of Fatah negotiations with Israel, would almost certainly
sharply curtail Hizballah's ties to Fatah and might lead Hizballah to
add its current ally to its list of terrorist targets.
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