NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 19 SEPTEMBER 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
A.\ e;nini 25X1
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
19 September 1987
25X1
-Top-Secret_
CPAS NID 87-219JX
sepremper Iva/
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Contents
25X1
Persian Gulf: Situation Report
Arab League: Foreign Ministers To Meet
Philippines: Effect of Cabinet Changes
1
3
4
25X6
25X1
25X1
25X1
Central America: Verification Talks Begin
Notes
6
Saudi Arabia: Tank Competition Concluded
7
Uganda: Government Losing Ground in East
9
In Brief
10
Special Analyses
Costa Rica: Political Agenda of President Arias
12
TM] Sprrat
19 September 1987
25X1
\--; Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Top Secret
Iran-Iraq Developments, 18 September 1987
Turkey
\
\ -Soviet Union--
--,
\ Iranian
air attack
/ \-1
.Karkak
Caspian
Sea
I ?
Soviet Union
BAGHDAD
,fratA
istan
Iranian
Al Basrah. artillery
-....? shelling
1
Iraq-Saudi Arabia umm ow. shelling
Neutral Zone
/ ' -,- Bahragan Sar oilfield
o \
,------,..?V
KU4Arail
______Iraqi air
"wAITArdeshir \.-ljettackS--,,
oiffield Khark
Islanct\--..5--..,_Alleged
'-----. Iraqi
e- ---' airstrike .13anar-e 'Abbas
/-`,./Kfiliestak
. -
Saudi , Persian
Lava,'-----,,--'1:-.,".---Y-
,*Bahrain
' MANAMA Island ' besihm,".o czi14?N.,
Island
,t.,?
?
ArabiaQatar Gulf
' r!;'?
1\1-*DOHA
yi .
290 Kilometers ABU DHABI -* Gulf of Oman
/ gr
200 Miles
OD .
not necessarily authoritative. Unite
7-d:J''''d 0 m a n
Boundary representation is
ChM
Behar
Pakistan
Arabian
Sea
711334 (544499) 9-87
TOD Secret
19 September 1987
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9 z
TOD Secret
25X1
PERSIAN GULF:
Situation Report
Iranian Political gR-talits-with-UN-SecrataTTG"eTteral-F'srerte-ettefiar7-fran--a 0 0 d-a
Maneuvering .oieaf-r-ejeetien-of4tIN-Secl:trRy-Gotmcil-Resototion-598rrantl-the-ro4o=ae.
ovicileFree-T-enfares-position-has-ehangat3The-frania__n-sy_tbay...will.
agree to a comprehensive cease=fire,-but-only-alter the UN identifies
Iraq as responsible the war in 1980X0an-offered-to-
4- - - -4e-a-delactoselfire*during-suon-a-proces4
Iraq's Response
25X1
25X1
?)cy1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Comment: Iran hopesosprne Security Council members will see
establishing respsnsibility for the_waraa' a way.to.Meletoward a
negotiated igment. Iranian-ptiblic statemeThs, however, indicate
that Thch views these-proceedin efntrmerely as a forum to
dekrmine blarne,btif as the e ul. alent of "Nurembsgotti s" in which
Iraq-palticUlarly Presi en Saddam Husayn-.e:would be tried and
punish-6'a as the a ssor.K1S-officiairteriort-traffs
-84:(44ogy_app.eacs_to.bo-having-same-inftiel-sumess-anit-willatakejt..
nief-a-etiffietnimta-oiytain-luiltmtift.sanotionstagainstaa144 25X1
25X1
Baghdad regards Iran's proposal as a rejection of the, cease-fire
resolutionbause to implemeflgtion
,o,tithgentice4e-solution?Tor-tratjf-diplomatran'Te-stailing-
poogts.157-while.fano-to-bull'doze.the.Gouncil intoJabeling Irackas_the..
,aesejresse.T. --25X1
_Aratuaekt&If Iraq perceives that efforts to impose san?...-----ctions are
flagging, it will probably increase its attacks against Iranian oil ,
shipiDing. Baghdad continues to see such attacks as its trump card to
,ofotain international support for efforts to end theswar. 25X1
continued
To ? Secret
1 eptem er
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1,,
z I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
The Soviet Stance
0-X-4
Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovskiy told a press conference at the UN
T-144r-sisle4t that efforts to bring about peace in the Iran-Iraq war had
a new stage" and that there should be no hasty moves
toward an arms embargo resolution.
t-A-Ernimketw-of ? erb Vie Arab League delegation
visi ing Moscow ast week rebuked the Soviets for their recent
actions.C_. VI. ??; -elign-hkinister
Sheyardnadze-thatrin-the-absence-atresponsibie-Soviet-actions-in
the-tiN-Security CouncirKuwaitwoutd-be-forced4o-depenthentirely-
efrrttre-tlettl:fran'ettre t1S--avcess-toltiwatti*militarsrfaellitiW
Comment: Moscow is attempting to take advantage of the UN
Security Council's lack of consensus on the Iranian response to
continue to make gains with Iran without damage to its relations with
Iraq. However, the Soviets' positive assessments of Tehran's
response to the Secretary General and their actions to stall a
sanctions resolution will add to the Arab perception of a tilt toward
Iran by the USSR. Petrovskiy's remarks indicate Moscow probably
has calculated it can weather the current tensions in its relations with
the Gulf Arabs, despite Kuwaiti and Iraqi warnings. Kuwait is seeking
Soviet support for increased UN pressure on Iran but almost certainly
would not carry out the threat to permit the US blanket access to
Kuwaiti military facilities.
Top Secret
2 19 September 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
ARAB LEAGUE: Foreign Ministers To Meet
To ? Secret
The Arab League Foreign Ministers, meeting tomorrow in Tunis,
probably will issue no more than a strongly worded
condemnation of Iran's refusal to accept UN Resolution 598 but
will lay the groundwork for an Arab summit later this year that
would consider further action against Tehran.
The agenda for the meeting includes setting a date for an emergency
or regular Arab summit and a discussion of relations with Tehran,
according to a senior Jordanian official. The adviser to Arab League
Secretary General Klibi told a US diplomat this week that the meeting
will last for only one day, and he predicted that there will be no
opposition to the proposed summit.
The Foreign Ministers are likely to discuss the recent closing of the
Palestinian Information Office in Washington. According to the
Secretary General's adviser, the closinq has created "a very bad
impression" within League circles
Comment: At their meeting late last month, the Foreign Ministers
threatened to consider a break in relations with Iran at their next
session if Tehran rejected Resolution 598. A League consensus to
sever relations does not exist, however, partly because Iran has not
formally rejected the resolution. The Foreign Ministers probably will
instead reiterate criticism of Iran's intransigence in the war, call for
continued international pressure on Iran to stop the fighting, and
condemn ler-rithe recent Silkworm missile attacks against Kuwait.
Saudi Arabia, the principal advocate of a break in relations with
Tehran, probably is willing to postpone discussion of the subject if a
summit can be convened in the next month or two. Riyadh might, at
that time, soften its stance if Iran refrains from attacks on Gulf
Cooperation Council states.
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan probably will try to avoid discussion
of issues that would deflect attention from the Iran-Iraq war. Libya,
which would rather avoid the Iranian question, may try to raise such
other issues as Chad's military incursions. Some members reportedly
will push for a condemnation of the US over closing the Palestinian
Information Office.
Too Secret
3 19 September 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
PHILIPPINES:
To Secre
Effect of Cabinet Changes
President Aquino's dismissal of her most controversial aides was
a major concession to the military, but the threat to her
government from disgruntled soldiers will remain at least until
she replaces armed forces chief Ramos and takes steps to
undermine Vice President Laurel's efforts to exploit military
discontent.
Sources of the US Embassy report that former Executive Secretary
Arroyo will leave the government and return to his law firm. Former
presidential counselor Locsin, although out of the Cabinet, will remain
as a consultant and speechwriter for Aquino. The military is probably
pleased with the appointment of retired General Yan as acting foreign
minister and retired General Mison as customs commissioner. Ramos
had intended to announce his retirement during a press conference
on Thursday, but Aquino told him she
needed more time to find another position and a suitable replacement
for him
Laurel is strengthening his
ties to military officers, has approached opposition Senator Enrile,
and may be trying to ally his UNIDO party to Enrile's Grand Alliance
for Democracy. Laurel also plans to travel around the country to
"present his case," highlighting the seriousness of the Communist
threat, the alleged deterioration of law and order, and Aquino's
inability to handle either problem.
The loyal military is on alert for a possible coup attempt during anti-
and pro-government demonstrations expected this weekend and on
Monday, the anniversary of the declaration of martial law in 1972.
Comment: The dismissal of Arroyo?Aquino's closest and most loyal
adviser?was a political and personal watershed for the President
that increases the chances that she can defuse civil-military tensions.
Aquino now apparently concedes that Ramos must also be replaced if
she is to improve relations with the armed forces.
If Aquino fails to follow through on the removal of Ramos or on her
other promises to the military, the rebel soldiers who remain at large
after last month's mutiny may attempt another coup. Moreover,
Laurel may have increasing success exploiting the military's
outstanding grievances as well as fear in some business circles that
the Cabinet changes will not improve policymaking or policy
implementation. Even Aquino's political and business supporters are
urging her to address the military's concerns to preempt destabilizina
actions and to relieve political tensions.
Top Secret
4 19 September 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
R
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Top Secret
25X1
Nicaragua's Verification Proposal
Political Committees
? To be formed in each Central American country to verify compliance with peace accord
provisions on dialogue, amnesty, and democratization.
? Will be made up of representatives of the diplomatic missions of all members of the
international verification commission (the Contadora group, the Contadora support group,
the Central American countries, and representatives of the UN and OAS Secretaries
General).
? Will consult reports of the national reconciliation commissions to verify the accord, but will
not make its own investigations.
Security Affairs
? Committee to be formed by members of the international verification commission who wish
to participate.
? Four-member executive group, consisting of representatives from the Contadora
mediators, the Contadora support group, the OAS Secretary General, and the UN
Secretary General, whose representative will preside.
? Executive group will coordinate a permanent group of advisers in security and defense
affairs; the Central American countries may suggest where they may be permanently
stationed in the region.
? Subcommittees to be installed 1 October, with headquarters in San Jose, Costa Rica; work
will begin immediately.
? Subcommittees and advisers to have full access to all government and private facilities; no
limitations on on-site inspection.
? Central American countries may present accusations of violations to the executive group
or the international verification commission, beginning 5 November.
? International verification commission may request extraregional countries to permit
testimony on compliance; may bring continued violations by extraregional countries to the
UN Security Council.
25X1
To Secret
25X1
19 September 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
-to Secret
CENTRAL
AMERICA:
Verification Talks Begin
Nicaragua's strategy for the meeting of the international
verification commission in Managua this weekend focuses on
ensuring that external aid to insurgent groups is halted, but the
democracies do not have a united position of their own.
eicaragua-will.propose-that4Ile-46-paenaber-verificatba.conamis_sion
sgeate-seniniittees-en-political-anisksectifity.affairs
-Th.e.ao.ouciLtees.for-pfpaalitication..
would not be empowered to make their 9,1,46moi estigations but would
rely on the reports of national reconcilraion commissions. The
Contadora countries ancl_the'101-Secretary General would be given
the primary role.rinwering security provisions, and the work of the
corritalitiou d4DegingimtwoVeekg
[Otficiets-ef-tlie.Glenaocractey=cUlethey-wouldbaetwallaw
the Contadora countries and the UN..toAorninate verification and
would propose giving,the.,OASVWier role. Ettraterriele.a.a41Costa
r,Illtmliaitwpfed.wor*.iag.docurnents.onwerification.that-ar?e.not-as
eletei4e?1.as.N icaragtratiareposar
Meanwhile, even though Costa Rica does not have to contend with an
insurgency, it has announced that it will form a national reconciliation
commission because it says the peace accord does not allow
exceptions.&S-Effislaassy-xepods-indicat_ESan Joserproposed
previously that the verification commission decide if some countries
do not need to appoint a commission.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25)0
25X1
25X1
Comment: Nicaragua's detailed proposal probably will appeal to the
Contadora countries, and the democracies' failure to coordinate their
own strategy will put them at a disadvantage. The democracies have
proposed that the national reconciliation commissions should report
directly to the Central American Foreign Ministers on questions of
political compliance, but they are likely to argue that the international
verification commission be granted investigative powers as well. They
probably will oppose formation of an executive commission on
security matters from which they are excluded
El Salvador and Guatemala have previously supported Costa Rica's
interpretation that all the Central Americans should form
reconciliation commissions because they wish to deprive Nicaragua of
one potential excuse for noncompliance. Nevertheless, Costa Rica's
unilateral action will likely force Honduras to reverse its opposition to
naming its own commission, introducing new tensions in Core Four
relations.
6
Tnn Carrat
19 September 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
SAUDI ARABIA: Tank Competition Concluded
25X1 ,
25X1
25X1
X25X1
The US M1A1 and the Brazilian Osorio main battle tanks finished first
and a close second in trials completed recently in
rating improved as a result of the gunnery tests, while the British
Challenger and French AMX-40 performed relatively poorly in both
the mobility and gunnery exercises.
although
the US tank demonstrated superior fire-on-the-move capability.
Comment: The overall performance of the Osorio?particularly in
gunnery tests?was better than expected, but senior Saudi officers
are still concerned about Brazil's dependence on foreign suppliers for
key components for that tank.
resulted from the US team's use of training
ammunition; the competition fired combat rounds. The Saudis
probably will not make their $500 million- to $1 billion-purchase
decision for several months.
7
25X1
25X1
25X1 1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
R
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Too Secr
UGANDA: Government Losing Ground in East
Insurgent strength in eastern Uganda is growing, a d President
Museveni is convinced that Kenya is providing sanctuary for rebel
assassins. MtteeveiaLtaki
the-I4S-Glaor14?-471444.44anclay-tbaS ever recent months, insurgents had
killed 27 senior local officials in the east; the government imposed a z
dusk-to-dawn curfew in Busia on 'finettey,after three more officials 1.5
were assassinated T25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Comment: Museveni is gradually losing control over eastern Uganda
to supporters of former President Obote, but neither side is likely to
gain a decisive edge soon. More rebel assassinations and ambushes
in the east are probable. The northern Army offensive is not likely to
regain the initiative and may further weaken the government in the
east if its forces there are diverted northward. Uganda's relations with
Kenya probably will deteriorate further because of Museveni's
unsubstantiated conviction that Nairobi is assistina rebel assassins.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
9
Top Secret
19 September 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
USSR
In Brief
? USSR apologized to Norway yesterday over collision of Soviet
fighter with Norwegian P-3 reconnaissance aircraft over Barents
Sea last Sunday. ... claim both pilots followed "incorrect
procedure" ... both governments consider matter closed.
itYL/iSetet
? TASSIes4er-eley announced meeting of Supreme Soviet for
19 October on 1988 economic plan and budget ... will probably
be preceded by Soviet Central Committee plenum
- Soviet Politburo member told Western diplomat individual Tatars
will be allowed to resettle in the Crimea... other officials said
small Tatar autonomous region being considered ... moves may
be effort to split moderates from militants.
25X1
25X1
25X1
9X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Africa
25X1
25X1
25X1
Zaire to train 250 Chadian presidential guards, according to
defense attache... Kinshasa has trained at least three battalions X
since 1983 ... hard-pressed Zairian military likely to seek US,
French equipment for program. 25X1
25X1
continued
TOD Secret
10 19 September 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Asia
? South Korea announced new guidance allowing substantive
contacts with North Korean diplomats ... echoes similar US policy
... part of Seoul's effort to appear flexible while deflecting
P'yongyang's calls for high-level talks
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
China announced branch of official news agency will open in
Macau ... probably will serve as Beijing's de facto representation
as Hong Kong branch does ... will facilitate efforts to mani ulate
affairs before Macau reverts to China in 1999.
25X1
LOA I
Thailand's unpopular Crown Prince promoted to major general,
.. may increase meddling in
Army operations, internal politics .. Commander Chavalit faces
difficulties keeping both Army, palace happy.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Europe
Oceania
? Turkey's Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement with US
automatically extended for another year ... Ankara not likely to
ratify agreement for five-year renewal until bilateral irritants
resolved and November election behind it.
Native Fijians continuing violence against Indian businesses ...
bipartisan negotiations on makeup of caretaker government
stalemated ... deposed Prime Minister Bavadra su. .estin
separate government for Indian-populated regions
Top Secret
11 19 September 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9 25X1
To ? Secret
25X1
Special Analysis
COSTA RICA:
Political Agenda of President Arias
Costa Rican President Arias, who will visit Washington on
-.Tuesday, regards the Central American peace plan as his
crowning achievement and opposes actions that might cause it
to unravel. Arias has urged publicly that the US not seek renewed
funding for the Nicaraguan insurgents until at least 7 November,
the deadline for many requirements of the peace accord. He is
reluctant now to take a hard line toward the Sandinistas because
he does not want to undermine the peace accord or diminish his
acclaim as a peacemaker. Having achieved his primary foreign
policy goal of demonstrating Costa Rican neutrality, Arias
probably will turn his attention to domestic problem h
provoking increasing criticism of his administration.
Arias has long opposed aid to the insurgents. He is convinced the
guerrillas cannot oust the Sandinistas militarily and believes the
fighting provides a justification for continued Nicaraguan repression
and poses a long-term threat to Costa Rica itself
The President is openly skeptical about Sandinista intentions to
comply with the accord's provisions for democratic reform but, other
than publicly raising the issue, has done little to press Managua to
negotiate with the rebels.althotigHie-hes-agfee4449-aesept-
N4eopaguaa-poisehereid-by.the-iwAAragents/1
25X1
25X1
9X1
..9,has played down his meetings with anti-Sandinista 25X1
leaders and refuses to meet with the most prominent of them, Adolfo
Calero. In contrast, Arias has held highly publicized talks with
Salvadoran guerrilla leaders and is trying to promote a dialogue
between insurgents and the government in El Salvador
This guarded approach by Arias is an effort to protect political gains
flowing from the peace agreement. Besides enhancing his stature as a
statesman, the accord demonstrated San Jose's neutrality and
prompted Nicaragua to withdraw its World Court case against Costa
Rica. Although no friend of the Sandinistas, Arias is evidently
reluctant at this point to risk damage to improving relations with
Nicaragua.Elie=ErnimesrFepeiste-theSSan Jose oseentlyiigned a
border trade agreement with Managua and delayed protesting a
border incident as a gesture of good faith
continued
Top Secret
12 19 September 1987
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
Turning to Domestic Issues
New-thaf414?64aearre-falan-ie-signedrArias-ptarrs-to-attdress-pmsssing
eleFfteeMe-eenee12R97 Although his
role of peacemaker has improved his popularity at home, 14s4ack of
attention to social programs such as housing and land reform has
drawn criticism from his own party and the opposition.
gT-he-masLpcilitical4y-exf4esive4ssue-Ar-ias-f.aees-is-hie-pfei3e
peek-agerwhieltt-inekteles-mferfft-ef-ineeme.and-pfgpep axes,--T-he-
tifverratar-ffleastoes,,have-languislaed-in-thegl4riature-for-more-than-
eisht-marcling-to-the-Etatassr-antl Arias is now having to
resort to controversial legislative maneuvers to get passage within
tax issue, wh' s also provoked dissension within the ruling party.
30 days. To attack ? s politically, the opposition has seized on the
The President, however, believes he must hold firm to meet IMF
rs.g.yiroments
25X1
25X1
25X1
Outlook
Arias is unlikely to speak out aggressively against the Sandinistas
before the November deadline. Doubting the US has fully supported
the peace accords, he would be reluctant to accuse the Sandinistas of
violations.
Flies2s1areblem
-his-elemestic-potiele_E Although the increased
international stature he has gained through his peace efforts probably
will help him maintain his domestic popularity for awhile, his support
may erode quickly if he proves unable to marshal enouah backina for
his domestic agenda.
13
TOP Secret
19 September 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
R
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9
1 Up QPW%.I GI
25X1
25X1
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/11: CIA-RDP88T01079R000300170001-9