THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY QUARTERLY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
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February 1987
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DI PIQ 87-001
February 1987
copy 762
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Political Instability Quarterly
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
suggestions are welcome
Kerenc Blank Secret
DI PIQ R7-OOI
Februan,1987
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Preface
Summary: Levels of Concern
Part 1. Countries of Special Interest
Haiti: One Year After Duvalier
El Salvador: Duarte Under Political Fire
v
viii
Indonesia: The Economic Slide Continues I I
Part 2. Developments and Trends
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The Political Instability Quarterly 25X1
The main objective of this quarterly is to provide timely warning of
significant instability in countries of importance to the United States by
monitoring changes in key elements affecting their stability.
Significant instability, in our definition, may include any one or a
combination of the following irregular regime change, coup d'etat,
breakdown of order, major civil war, revolutionary upheaval, or major
policy reorientation toward a radical anti-US stance.
A select group of 30 countries is covered regularly in the quarterly. The
countries have been selected because they are key US friends or allies,
located near strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors,
geographically close to the United States, or especially salient or influential
in the Third World. Periodically we include countries that are not part of
this group of 30, but which are nonetheless important to US interests. (See
the part I assessment on Haiti.)
The time frame: This issue of the quarterly is based on an analysis of issues
and developments in the fourth quarter---for our purposes this is the
November-December-January time frame and it projects our concerns
about the prospects for instability in the forthcoming first quarter----
February- March-Aprilas well. In addition, we include projections of our
general levels of concern over the medium and longer term for the select
group of 30 countries.
This issue of the Political Instability Quarterly includes three parts:
? Part 1: Special essays on selected countries in which there have been
developments of particular interest. Each assessment ends with specula-
tive, forward-looking, "Most Likely" and "Alternative" scenarios, and
lists of indicators to be watched with reference to those scenarios.
? Part 2: Brief assessments of the 30 selected countries, including the
prospects for instability in the basic set of countries, levels of concern
regarding a list of 24 instability indicators, and country-specific tables
tracing significant political and economic changes during the past two
years. 25X1
Secret
I)1 PIQ 7-001
Februar 14.1'7
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Status of Key Indicators
Current Assessment
and Prospects
Legend Serious concern
Substantial concern
Moderate concern
Low concern
0 Negligible concern
? Concern has increased since last quarter
? Concern has decreased since last quarter
Current
Current Assessment Prospects
Argentina
Brazil
anama
Peru
Venezuela
Greece
Spain
Turkey
C~V e~ Concern for
Significant
C'a ~~`` a p Instability
During next:
4; ?o OQgo 4 , ~~ s Qa
6 mos. 6-24 mos.
O 0--1--
- 1
Iam Asia Indonesia
Philippines
0
O
0
0
0.
0 _ 0
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The Political Instability Quarterly
Summary: The summary chart on the facing page highlights the countries where our
Levels of Concern concerns about political instability are the greatest.
lglormutinrt available
"` of February iv`y' The intensified round of fighting in the Iran-Iraq war is probably the most
... ..... J
.L,. _____
in
to increase.
dramatic event this quarter. As we go to press, the outcome of the latest
Iranian offensive remains undecided, but pressure on Iraq will remain
strong whatever the outcome. At the same time, unless Iran continues to
make significant military progress, domestic antiwar sentiments are likely
Prospects for stability in Haiti, one year after the Duvalier government
was ousted, remain uncertain. The current regime's reticent political style
and failure to remove some Duvalierists from positions of power have cost
it much of the public confidence and good will it initially enjoyed. The rul-
ing council does, however, appear to be adhering to the transition schedule
it set for itself in June (see part I essay).
We expect instability will grow in several countries that already are of high
concern. Tensions in Chile are likely to intensify as the summer season
ends and political activity picks up. In El Salvador, the Duarte government
is efficiently managing the earthquake recovery efforts, but public discon-
tent over the deteriorating economy has grown and is revitalizing the
opposition. In South Korea human rights abuses have emerged as a focus
for antigovernment protests, at least temporarily bogging down President
Chun's efforts to amend the Constitution.
Other countries remaining at high levels of concern include South Africa
and Nigeria. With South African elections scheduled for 6 May, Pretoria
will take whatever steps necessary to contain violence, effectively eliminat-
ing any threat to the regime. Nigerian President Babangida's position
temporarily has improved, but we expect pressures on his regime to
increase unless there is a significant rebound in world oil prices. Our
concern for stability in Sudan and Pakistan also remains high.
The deteriorating economies of Brazil and Indonesia also bear watching.
Brazilian confidence in President Sarney's leadership has waned, and we
vii Secret
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expect he will have to contend with heightened labor unrest and criticism
from the left. In addition, we anticipate more incidents of unrest in
Indonesia as economic troubles lead to higher unemployment and cutbacks
in social services (see part I essay).
The long term prospects for the Philippines and Peru have improved.
Despite well-publicized incidents of unrest prior to the plebiscite, we
believe the Aquino government's legitimacy has been enhanced by the
voters' approval of the constitution. Moreover, we expect the government
will be able to contain the disloyal elements within the ranks of the
military. The Peruvian Government has been unable to check a rise in the
already high level of terrorism by Sendero Luminoso insurgents. However,
we expect the strong showing by President Garcia's ruling party in the
November election will weaken the opposition and improve the govern-
ment's position.
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Part 1. Countries
of Special Interest
Haiti:
One Year After
North
Atlantic ocean
Duvalier
? Haiti has experienced sporadic antigovernment pro-
tests and violence since military officers led by Lt.
Gen. Henri Namphy ousted Jean-Claude Duvalier
last February. Uneven progress toward democracy
and scant economic growth are likely to lead to
more unrest, which we believe political groups on
the left and right will try to exploit.
? The ruling council is trying to improve its security
capabilities by depoliticizing and reorganizing the
armed forces. Segments of the military oppose these
efforts, however, and officers also are unhappy that
the Army has to carry out police functions.
? The Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH)
is well funded and organized, and it and other
leftists have had considerable success attracting
protestors to antigovernment demonstrations. How-
ever, the left so far appears unable to maintain the
momentum of protests beyond several days, and the
evidence suggests the groups lack a coherent plan to
overthrow Namphy's government.
? Old-guard Duvalierists and other rightwing ele-
ments remain key political players opposed to the
Namphy regime. We judge that a blatant effort to
reassert their power would further polarize the
country, risk open conflict with the left, and jeopar-
dize the transition to democracy scheduled for
February 1988.
? On balance, we believe the ruling council has an
even chance of meeting its transition schedule pro-
vided it takes a more visible role promoting democ-
racy and encouraging greater popular participation
in steps toward that goal.
Gone
de /a
Gon ive
PORT-
AU-PRINCE*
c: ,refan,Sca
Military department 0 50 Kiiomctn,s
50 Miles
25X1
Haiti's ruling council has made uneven progress in
building democratic institutions and fostering stabil-
ity over the past year. On the one hand, the council
has adhered to the transition schedule it set for itself
in June, largely eliminated human rights abuses, and
allowed complete press freedom. However, the
government's reticent political style and failure to
remove Duvalierists from positions of power have cost
it much of the public confidence and good will it
initially enjoyed. 25X1
President Namphy, buoyed by the positive reaction
home to his US visit in November, has since moved
take a more active political role in the transition.
Previously, Namphy had been criticized by local
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Haiti:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
Prospects for major instability
During next six months
During next six months to two years
Negligible concern Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
1986 1987 _
Fourth Quarter First Quarter
Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Repression /brutality
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
Security capabilities
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politicians as being aloof, and the US Embassy
reported that Namphy generally regarded them with
disdain. In early December, however, Namphy met
with several prominent political moderates and react-
ed favorably to their proposal to establish an indepen-
dent electoral commission.
the political leaders were surprised and pleased by
their warm reception and deemed their discussions
fruitful. By meeting with leading moderates, and
implicitly conferring prestige on the political center,
Namphy took the first step in helping to prune the
field of some 200 presidential contenders.
The economy is improving slowly, but unemployment
hovers at about 50 percent and remains a major
source of dissatisfaction. In a conversation with US
officials in December, Finance Minister Delatour
expressed optimism on the longer term employment
picture, but a prominent Haitian businessman be-
lieves at least 10 years of massive foreign subsidies
and investment are needed to revitalize the economy.
Meanwhile, most Haitians continue to expect quick
improvement, and are
skeptical that a new constitution and a presidential
election will improve their standard of living.
Civil-military relations are increasingly strained and
could adversely affect the regime's ability to quell
unrest. Members of the 7,700-man military-the
government's only arm for maintaining order-re-
portedly are unhappy over scant resources, the need to
see as the regime's slow pace in responding to unrest.
shoulder the burden of police duties, and what they 25X1
The military also is resisting the government's effor25X1
to develop an independent police force and an effec-
tive intelligence apparatus, apparently fearing that si
rival force similar to the now-defunct Ton Ton 25X1
Macoutes-would result. Implementation of a recent
French proposal to train a new police force was
opposed by some in the military, and~~
avoided the training, placing the program in jeopar25X1
and straining Haitian-French relations.
25X1
Discontent already has reached the point that the
regime is concerned about the loyalty of its forces:
25X1
? 25X1
have stalled be
cause Namphy fears strong resistance from_ the
unit's officers.
? The commander of the Air Corps also is resisting a
ruling council directive to relocate his 250-man unit,
25X1
We believe Namphy will avoid sweeping changes to
the armed forces to reduce the chances of an ope25X1
military rebellion or coup. Unless he is able to
enhance police and intelligence capabilities, however,
the risk that popular unrest will escalate out of control
will grow. 25X1
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Anti-US sentiment, virtually nonexistent prior
to last February. has increased partly because
of the widespread perceptions among Haitians
that the t'S facilitated Duvalier'.s departure but
/ailed to Jo/loss' up with substantial aid to im-
Ptantu/Le Monde/
Paris
Leftist groups continue to muster their forces and
plan strategies aimed at manipulatin or subverting
Haiti's moves toward democracy.
... The Duvalierist Right ...
Public outcry and other pressures forced the Duvalier-
ists to dissolve their two-week-old party in November,
Party has kept a low profile during bouts of civil
unrest in order to project a relatively responsible
image.
Ironically, the party is not expected to
run a candidate for president in November because
the leadership doubts any party nominee would win.
As with the left the far right is factionalized and
divided by personal jealousies. We believe neither
they nor the radical left could gain power in this
year's election unless they can organize and use front
groups effectively.
Many Haitian officials and observers, including
Namphy, periodically have expressed fear that spo-
radic disturbances could degenerate into civil war
between the far right and increasingly militant left-
ists. We believe that Duvalierists and other members
of the Haitian elite are prepared to resist strongly any
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Echruarv7 March 1987
March 1987
Mac 1987
July 1987
September 1987
l\oventher 1987
December 1987
Januart 1988
7 Eehruart' 1988
Referendum for ratification o1' constitution.
Proclamation of constitution.
Decree on elections.
Election campaign begins in rural areas and municipalities.
Election ofrural sections and communal councils.
Start of legislative and presidential campaigns.
Legislative and presidential elections.
Official proclamation of election results.
Validation of powers of legislative body.
Elected president takes oath of office.
substantial increase in Communist or leftist influence
and that the Army would be hard pressed to prevent
violence from spiralling out of control.
Rey Indicators To Watch
Most Likely Scenario: Haiti's military leaders suc-
ceed in turning power over to a responsible, moderate
civilian president on 7 February 1988:
? Namphv takes a more visible role promoting the
steps toward democracy, encourages popular partic-
ipation, and accepts foreign expertise in preparing
for the legislative and presidential elections.
? The ruling council meets with leading centrist
politicians.
? The government does not crack down on dissidents
throughout the transition period.
? Military officers support the regime's creation of an
independent police force in exchange for Namphy's
shelving other plans to reorganize the armed forces.
? The unemployment rate falls and the government
secures more foreign aid, eliminating rallying points
for the opposition.
r:, ,,' Blank 5
Alternative Scenario: The Namphy government col-
lapses and is succeeded by an even weaker military
administration:
? Popular dissatisfaction with the ruling council's
overall performance grows among all sectors of
society and the government's credibility vanishes.
? The left is able to incite and sustain prolonged
antigovernment activity in Port-au-Prince and the
provinces.
? Renewed attempts at reorganization cause greater
military discontent, polarization grows between con-
servative and reformist officers, and the Army's
ability to maintain order is undermined.
? Armed conflict, raising the threat of civil war,
breaks out between Duvalierists and ex-militiamen
on one side, and militant leftist factions on the
other.
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El Salvador:
Duarte Under
Political Fire
? Public discontent over deteriorating economic con-
ditions has grown and the economy is drawing
popular attention away from the war. The earth-
quake last October exacerbated El Salvador's eco-
nomic problems, but the government so far has
managed recovery efforts efficiently and honestly.
? Political opponents on the right and left are trying
to take advantage of the worsening economy to
incite popular opposition to the government. So far,
however, both groups are hampered by factionalism
and a lack of broad support.
? President Duarte remains in control and continues
to have the strong backing of the armed forces,
which recognize that their interests are best served
by sticking with him. Military leaders are con-
cerned, however, that the country's economic de-
cline will benefit the guerrillas and that the costs of
reconstruction in San Salvador will lead to cutbacks
in rural development programs.
? The Army's counterinsurgency campaign has forced
the rebels to adopt a protracted war strategy, but
the insurgents still are able to capitalize on govern-
ment weaknesses and mount occasional large-scale
attacks against major targets.
The earthquake, which caused about $1.3 billion in
damages, has exacerbated El Salvador's financial
problems and has contributed to the country's 30-
percent annual inflation rate. The budget deficit -
more than $150 million in 1986-will be likely to
increase as damaged government facilities need to be
replaced while maintaining essential public services.
The need for significant additional imports to facili-
tate reconstruction will swell the trade deficit and put
additional pressure on El Salvador's already over-
valued exchange rate. The US Embassy reports that
North
Pa, ific 0 o ro
the government is relying on foreign assistance to help
cover a $900 million shortfall in reconstruction costs.
Despite substantial foreign assistance, the govern-
ment's unwillingness to enact sound economic policies
for political reasons is thwarting economic growth and
compounding Duarte's political problems. The Presi-
dent is reluctant to implement measures--such as a
currency devaluation or reductions in price subsi-
dies-because he fears they would alienate his tradi-
tional constituencies among workers and peasants and
provide a rallying point for guerrilla-backed labor
groups. Ironically, the President's failure to make
adjustments is slowly undermining his popularity as
well as contributing to the economic difficulties facing
El Salvador. 25X1
The President's efforts to address the budget problems
have drawn strong criticism from both labor and
business leaders. The US Embassy reports that demo-
cratic labor leaders, who believe workers' standard of
living has declined under Duarte, have warned him
against taking any belt-tightening measures. Mean-
while, businessmen are calling the government's new
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The flagging economy and disruption caused by the
earthquake similarly have provided new opportunities
for guerrilla-backed groups to destabilize the govern-
ment. Insurgent propaganda focuses on Duarte's fail-
ure to alleviate unemployment, inflation, and other
problems of concern to the lower classes, Insurgent-
backed groups have depicted the administration as
corrupt and inefficient in its handling of foreign relief
aid.
tax package including higher personal and corporate
income taxes and increased levies on net worth,
inheritances, and some luxury items -unconstitution-
al and antibusiness. Thcy also assailed the govern-
ment's one-time surcharge on net worth to cover
increased military expenses in 1986. Embassy report-
ing indicates that the new taxes, while helping address
1::1 Salvador's budget and inflation problems, will
contribute to a further loss of private-sector conti-
dence and poor growth prospects.
The controversy surrounding the tax package has
reinvigorated Duarte's rightwing opponents, who are
trying to take advantage of his problems to improve
their own political standing. Roberto D'Aubuisson,
President-For-Life of the Nationalist Republican Al-
liance (ARENA), the leading rightwing party, has
called for Duarte's resignation, a referendum, and a
boycott of the tax laws and other new statutes. Two
smaller rightwing parties have joined ARENA in a
National Assembly strike, where together they hold
2( of the 60 seats and could paralyze legislation
requiring a two-thirds majority. The Embassy reports
that a newly formed front group composed of
rightwing extremists from ARENA and the private
sector is truing to unseat Duarte by mounting
su-ikcs and demonstrations. They even are trying to
co-opt the support of guerrilla-backed labor organiza-
tions to participate in a general strike
/The rebels probably hope that
increasing violence would alienate Duarte's support-
ers, or provoke a coup and military crackdown.
Neither the political right-hardline private-sector alli-
ance nor the rebel-backed leftist groups have the unity
or popular backing to pose a major challenge to the
government at this time. Past efforts by either side to
mobilize public protests or establish broad opposition
to Duarte have failed because of these weaknesses.
Moreover, although the right and left share an intense
dislike of Duarte, they mistrust each other and proba-
bly would not be able to agree on a specific agenda
against the government. Nevertheless, we believe
increasing popular discontent provoked by continuing
economic decline could eventually play into the hands
of leftwing or rightwing extremists trying to unseat
Duarte. If these groups could overcome their prob-
lems and mount massive antigovernment protests,
they might be able to cripple the government's efTec-
tiveness and provoke the military to take repressive
steps.
The Military: Supportive but Concerned
In our view, mounting opposition to Duarte's handling
of the economy is not likely to jeopardize his backing
in the military unless antigovernment demonstrations
and street violence get out of hand. Military leaders
recognize that support for the democratically elected
government is essential to ensure critical US assis-
tance. For his part, Duarte has been careful not to
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infringe on the military's institutional prerogatives
and remains committed to sustaining an aggressive
Key Indicators To Watch
25X1
counterinsurgency campaign.
While Duarte's sensitivity to military concerns has
helped him build good relations with senior officers,
some midlevel officers are increasingly critical about
the weak performance of the civilian government in
rural communities, especially in repairing schools,
clinics, and infrastructure damaged by the war.
that they also fear that the
massive costs of rebuilding earthquake-damaged ar-
eas in the capital will inevitably lead to delays and
cutbacks in rural programs despite Duarte's pledges
to the contrary. Although the officers' concerns have
not yet seriously hurt government-military relations,
the ineffective performance of the civilian ministries
has undermined popular support for the government
and slowed progress in restoring stability in the
countryside.
The armed forces' success in maintaining the battle-
field initiative and sustaining pressure on the insur-
gents has limited the rebels' ability to score major
military gains. The Army's more aggressive posture
has disrupted guerrilla logistics, reduced the insurgent
presence in some traditional strongholds, and com-
pounded rebel problems of disunity, low morale, and
desertions.
Nonetheless, we believe a decisive defeat of the
insurgents during the next two years is unlikely, and
the war will continue to be costly for the government.
Although the guerrillas tend to focus on tactics such
as mining, ambushes, and economic sabotage, they
remain capable of mounting occasional large-scale
attacks against major targets.
Moreover, the rebels
will continue to exploit government vulnerabilities
such as poor performance by some Army units under
tire and lax security practices-to inflict losses on the
armed forces.
Most Likely Scenario: Duarte does not take political-
ly risky measures needed to correct weaknesses in the
economy and is able to weather the current political
storm:
? Duarte continues to rely on foreign assistance to
bolster the economy.
? Hampered by a lack of broad popular support,
factionalism, and weak urban infrastructures, guc25X1
rilla-backed groups and the right are unable to 25X1
sustain large-scale strikes and demonstrations.
? Military officers advise Duarte to deal forcefully
with opposition leaders.
? Duarte tries to bolster military confidence by pledg-
ing to press ahead with rural development programs,
but continues to use restraint when confronting
strikes and demonstrations. 25X1
Alternative Scenario: Duarte's limited economic rn'.'
sures and foreign aid fail to stem a rapid economic
decline and the general population becomes increas-
ingly restive and critical of the government:
? Democratic labor unions withdraw their support for
Duarte and join leftist labor fronts.
? Insurgent-backed groups or rightwing extremists
overcome factionalism and funding shortages and
are able to expand their support.
? Strikes and demonstrations turn out increasingly
large crowds, become violent, and ultimately engen-
der widespread unrest.
? The armed forces respond harshly to the opposition
and force Duarte to implement repressive measures
to restore order. 25X1
? Rightwing extremists try to initiate a coup, or
military leaders take over temporarily until new
elections are held.
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Indonesia:
The Economic Slide
Continues
? President Soeharto remains in control of the govern-
ment with the full support of the armed forces-
Indonesia's predominant political institution. The
government's political party is preparing for a par-
lianmentary election in April, which it almost cer-
tainly again will dominate, setting the stage for
Soeharto's pro forma reelection next year to another
hve-year term.
? Nevertheless, Jarkarta's continuing economic
slide- the result of depressed energy prices-poses
the most serious challenge for Soeharto's New
Order since he came to power more than 20 years
ago. Economic growth stalled last year and may
reach only 1 percent in 1987--well below the 5 to
6 percent needed to provide jobs for the 2 million
new workers entering the labor force each year.
? Despite some pragmatic countermeasures, such as
budget austerity and devaluation, Jakarta's balance
of payments continues to deteriorate. Without a
significant and sustained increase in world energy
prices, the government is likely this year to resched-
ule payments on some of its $40 billion in foreign
debt.
? Jakarta has announced its fourth consecutive aus-
terity budget that cuts most heavily into such social
services as education and housing. Moreover, ex-
tending budget cutting to military pay and allow-
ances threatens to further erode morale among the
troops and could foster rifts between the regime and
elements within the military.
? Criticism of Jakarta's protectionist economic poli-
cies, favoritism, and corruption-
h-is increasing
among parliamentarians, bureaucrats, the officer
corps, and the general populace.
Br
ne
MaIaysiaa
., '~Sngayori~
800847 (A04806) 28'
25X1
Indonesia's current economic slide, largely the result
of reduced energy revenues, could trigger the most
extensive opposition to President Soeharto in two
decades:
? In 1986, Indonesia's economy failed to grow and
may even have contracted ----a dramatic change from
the 3- to 4-percent annual growth rates achieved
during 1982-85 and the 8-percent levels common
between 1973 and 1981- dashing expectations and
leading to increased unemployment.
? Despite a recent devaluation, we believe Jakarta's
$5 billion current account deficit is likely to result in
the implementation of additional austerity measure"
Indonesia,
Papua
New Guinea
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urban areas is approaching 40 percent in addition to
substantial underemployment. The growing frustra-
tion of the urban poor increases the likelihood of
outbreaks of localized violence. As in the past, such
incidents are likely to be aimed at the widely resented
Chinese business community. On occasion previous
outbreaks of violence have escalated before the mili-
tary could contain them and spread to cities through-
out Java, the most populous and politically significant
island. While Muslim fringe elements have been
relatively quiet recently, we expect their activities will
increase as they seek to exploit urban frustrations.
? In addition,) lin light
of its financial difficulties, increasing capital flight,
and eroding credit rating, some of Indonesia's for-
eign commercial bankers are reluctant to lend it
more money, further increasing the pressures on the
Soeharto regime.
In January, Jakarta reacted to its economic crisis by
announcing its fourth consecutive austerity budget
based on estimates of a 30-percent decline in oil and
gas tax receipts, the government's primary revenue
source. In our view, however, Jakarta is overly opti-
mistic about its ability to raise funds elsewhere and,
thus, we believe even more budget cuts are likely.
Given the economic outlook, in our judgment, the
regime is likely to reschedule some of its foreign debt
soon after the April parliamentary election to allow
time for public concerns over its inability to manage
the economy to dissipate prior to Socharto's reelection
in March 1988.
The impact of the declining economy on the popula-
tion significantly raises the risk of urban unrest.
Jakarta's latest austerity budget reduces development
expenditures especially education and housing--
most heavily, and we believe additional cuts are likely.
Moreover, unless world energy prices increase signifi-
cantl\ or Jakarta implements sweeping economic
reforms, Indonesia will not generate the level of
economic growth necessary to stem rising unemploy-
ment. According to our estimates, unemployment in
We believe the unemployed as yet pose no direct
threat to the regime. Soeharto retains the full backing
of the military which would not hesitate to move
forcefully against any civil disturbances. But the
armed forces also have been hit by austerity. Some
living allowances have been cut, salaries have been
frozen under the new budget, and we anticipate
further pay cuts for military personnel. We believe
these measures will erode morale in the armed forces
further and, over the long term, could impede their
ability to control civil unrest. In addition, we believe
military support for the regime eventually could dwin-
dle if the officer corps comes to believe that the public
holds it responsible for the economic decline.
Although Soeharto's health is good and he intends to
be reelected next year to another five-year term, a
protracted economic crisis could complicate the even-
tual succession process. We expect that he will seek to
hand power over to a successor who would continue
his basic policies of economic development coupled
with domestic stability and who also would protect the
extensive financial interests of the Soeharto family.
Should he die unexpectedly, however, several contend-
ers within the military leadership might well vie for
supremacy. In such a situation, a contender might
appeal for popular support by championing economic
reforms and moving against corruption and financial
privilege.
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Most Likely Scenario: As the economy continues to
founder, Jakarta moves to reschedule part of its
foreign debt, while keeping a tight lid on domestic
critics:
? Additional cuts in government spending further
slow the economy and exacerbate already severe
unemployment.
? Increased capital flight compels the government to
impose foreign exchange controls.
? Shorter loan maturities and significant drawdowns
in international reserves and commercial credit lines
precede a call for debt rescheduling.
? Jakarta makes only superficial economic reforms,
protects business interests of the First Family, and
maintains protection of the domestic economy.
? Incidents of urban unrest grow.
? The regime clamps down on increasingly open criti-
cism of its policies and First Family corruption.
Alternative Scenario: The economy improves, easing
pressure on the Soeharto regime:
? World energy prices increase substantially, relieving
pressure on Jakarta's current accounts and forestall-
ing debt rescheduling.
? The regime moves ahead in earnest to deregulate
the state-dominated economy, halts favored treat-
ment for those with close ties to the palace, and
takes effective measures to attract foreign investors.
? Economic growth and job creation keep pace with
the growth of the labor force, and social services are
restored to previous levels.
? The regime lifts the freeze on military pay.
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Part 2.
Developments and Trends
The six categories of indicators used in the following
charts focus on a broad array of issues that may
impact on stability:
? The social change/conflict indicators examine de-
velopnments such as labor or religious unrest that
could undermine the regime's legitimacy and ability
to rule effectively.
? The economic factors link various dimensions of
economic performance to potential instability.
? The opposition activities indicators assess whether
the opposition can mobilize effective antiregime
activity or carry out acts that undermine public
security.
? The military attitude/activities category addresses
the military's degree of dissatisfaction with regime
policies, involvement in coup plotting, and behavior
relevant to the political process.
? The external factors category looks at foreign influ-
ences that could affect internal stability.
? Finally, the regime capabilities/actions category
focuses on what the government is doing that could
lessen popular support, otherwise undermine its
authority, and affect its ability to govern efficiently.
(s yr)
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Argentina:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
some officers to trial.
President Alfonsin's position remains secure, but he faces growing
opposition from labor and the reorganized Peronist party and
continues to shirk many of the basic reforms needed to revitalize the
economy. He is likely to continue the tight money policy-that has
lowered inflation-through early 1987, then loosen up to bolster his
party's prospects in elections next November. Recent legislation to
end trials of officers for human rights abuses has not significantly
improved civil-military relations since loopholes could still bring
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
C Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1985
1986
1987
I
II
III
IV
I II III IV
I 11
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
C)
O
1
)
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
C
O
C-
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
C
C>
C?
Food/energy shortages
0
C
C?
!`
t
Inflation
I
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
O
C
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
)
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
0
C
C)
C
Military attitudes/activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
C
')
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
C
G
C
C,)
External factors
External support for government
C
)
;
External support for opposition
C,
;)
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions, capabilities
Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
t
~
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
311650 1.87
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Brazil:
Selected Instability Indicators
Public confidence in President Sarney's leadership was shaken when
consumer prices were hiked within days of the ruling party's
landslide victory in elections last November. Violent protests forced
Sarney to allow a return to indexation measures to help maintain
living standards. A looming slowdown in growth in early 1987
probably will provoke additional labor unrest and criticism from the
left, but we believe that Sarney's determined leadership and contin-
ued support from the military will prevent a political crisis in the
near term. 25X1
ILLEGIB
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Chile:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
vering the moderates.
Political activity is likely to intensify by early March as the
moderate opposition promotes a campaign for free elections, selects
a consensus presidential candidate, and continues talks with mem-
bers of the junta on a formula for an orderly transition. The
Communists, although more isolated politically, are planning in-
creased violence, possibly including a second assassination attempt
against President Pinochet. Pinochet probably will have difficulty in
the coming months reining in his critics on the junta and outmaneu-
Prospects for major instability
During next six months
During next six months to two tears
Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1985
1986
1 987
II III IV
I
1 11 III IV
I ll
Social change conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
_ Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
) C) C) O
O
Food/energy shortages
)) Q C) (D
0
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
0 0
Q
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
,
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
311652 1 8/
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Colombia:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
President Barco is likely to try to sustain his antinarcotics campaign
in an attempt to bolster public resolve against intimidation by the
powerful drug mafia. He also may intensify efforts to improve
Colombia's limited counterinsurgency capabilities and to protect oil
facilities, particularly as the government's nominal truce with the
largest insurgent group appears to be unraveling. Talks between
major guerrilla groups already have produced a fledgling alliance
and could foster a more serious move toward unity.
Prospects for major in.stabilitt'
During new six months
During next six months to two tzars
Substantial concern
Serious concern
Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
1985
1986
1987
I II III IV
I II III IV
I II
Social change conflict
Ethnic 'religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots. strikes
Economic f actors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes activities
Threat to corporate military interests, dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action' policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External I actors
External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions 'capabilities
Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
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El Salvador:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
Army is maintaining pressure on the guerrillas.
A controversial new tax package has led to rightwing political
efforts to stymie President Duarte's economic policies, and right-
wing extremists and guerrilla-backed groups are trying to incite civil
unrest. Some mid-level military officers have become concerned
about Duarte's ability to handle the deteriorating economy and
public discontent, but the President retains the support of key senior
officers. Despite increased insurgent activity since November, the
Prospects for major instability
During next six months
During next six months to two wane
Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1985
1986
1 ;87
1 11 III IV
1 11 III IV
I II
Social change, conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
ho,nomic f actors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
1
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
311655 1 8/
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Guatemala:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
Growing economic discontent, labor disturbances, continued de-
mands for land reform, and an increasingly organized political
opposition could undermine President Cerezo's popularity in his
second year in office. Relations with the military remain generally
good, although the high command may press Cerezo to be more
critical of Managua. Keenly aware of the military's opposition to
dialogue with leftist guerrillas, Cerezo probably will maintain his
public position that the rebels must lay down their arms before tollrs
can be held. 25X1
Prospects for major instability
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
O Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1985
1986
1987
I
II
III IV
I 11 III IV
I 11
Social change conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
O
C)
0 0
O 0 C) 0
O
Demonstrations. riots, strikes
Cj
O
Economic factors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Fcwd/energy shortages
C)
Inflation
C)
O
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
0
0
C)
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
C)
0
C) 0
C) 0 O 0
O
Military attitudes activities
Threat to corporate military interests/ dignity
C')
0
C)
Discontent over career loss, pay. or benefits

0
O
0
O
Insurgent armed attacks
/i
C
O
0
C)
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
Military attitudes activities
Ehreat to corporate military interests dignity
O
C
0
0
O
0
O
0
Discontent over career loss. pay. or benefits
C)
C
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Discontent over government action/policies
C)
O
C
Reportsrumors of coup plotting
O
0
0
0
O
0
O
0
O
External factors
External support for government
0
0
0
0
O
0
O
0
0
External support for opposition
C)
O
0
0
O
0
0
0
O
I hreat of' military conflict
O
C
0
0
0
O
0
0
J
Regime actions capabilities
Repression /brutality
O
0
0
0
O
0
C)
Security capabilities
C~
O
0
0
O
0
O
0
C)
Political disunity/loss of confidence
C)
0
Loss of legitimacy
C
0
C,)
0
(r)
0
i)
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Panama:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
1985
1986
1987
I
11
III IV
I II III IV
I II
Social changeconflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
~~
O
1
Capital flight
C)
C 0
C=>
Unpopular changes in economic policies
)
0
C, C)
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
C)
0 ~
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
C)
t';
(t
C) i
(;
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
1
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
;
Military attitudes activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
C;;
Discontent over career loss, pay. or benefits
O
)
~~
Discontent over government action/policies
J
C>
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
Q
O
External factors
External support for government
(}
'"1
External support for opposition
~)
t)
C:
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
}
)
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
311669 1 87
tions were not announced in December.
Pressured by international creditors to reform social security and
public-sector spending, President Delvalle got a reprieve in Decem-
ber when the World Bank disbursed one-half of a $ 100 million loan.
Discontent will rise when the legislature takes up the sensitive
reform issues in March, but organized opposition will remain weak.
Moreover, Defense Chief Noriega appears committed to the mea-
sures and should continue to back Delvalle. Noriega remains in firm
control of the military, despite grumbling that anticipated promo-
Prospects for major instability
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
i) Negligible concern Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
Projected
V
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Peru:
Selected Instability Indicators
25X1 and stem the rapid decline in foreign exchange reserves.
The strong showing of President Garcia's ruling party in Novem-
ber's municipal elections, including an upset victory in Lima,
underscores Garcia's popularity and should dampen political opposi-
tion. Attacks by Sendero Luminoso insurgents continue unabated,
however, and military pressure on Garcia to act more forcefully may
intensify. Garcia is likely only to tinker with his economic policies,
but he has offered tax incentives to encourage capital repatriation
Indicators Legend
During next six months
During next six months to tn,o wars
Negligible concern
Loki concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1985
1986
1987
Social change Conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports /rumors of coup plotting
External factors
External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
25X1 t,
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Venezuela:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
repayments.
Divisions within the ruling Democratic Action party continue to
worsen over the party nomination for the presidential election in
1988. President Lusinchi and moderates in control of the party
machinery will continue to oppose the candidacy of populist former
president Carlos Andres Perez. Meanwhile, the US Embassy reports
that economic growth will slow and that inflation is expected to
reach 20 percent this year. Debt negotiations remain stalled, and
public opinion supports the regime's refusal to make any principal
Prospects for major instability
O During next six months
0 During next six months to two tears
O Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1985
1986
1987
I
II
III
IV
1
II
111
IV
I II
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors
General deterioration
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in economic policies
0
0
0
0
O
O
O
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military attitudes/ activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
311679 1.87
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Greece:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
The Papandreou government's image of invincibility was severely
shaken by the Socialist party's unexpected defeat in the October
municipal elections and subsequent revelations of financial scandals
involving members of the administration. In our view, Papandreou
still remains in control of his party, however, and generally commit-
ted to his economic austerity program and improved US relations.
Tensions continue between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the
Aegean although both capitals were quick to keep a recent b2-5X1
I'_
During nest six months
During nest or months to two leans
Low concern
Moderate concern
1985
1986
1()87
I II III IV
I II III IV
I II
Social change conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
i
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
t
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
3,1656 ,-12
5X1
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
Secret
Spain:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
1985
1986
1987
I
11
III
IV
1
II
111
IV
I II
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors
General detenoration
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
}
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in economic policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
0 1
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
O
O
O
0
O
O
O
O
0
Public support
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Military att i tudes/activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0 1
0
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
0
O
O
} O
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government action/policies
0
O
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Fxternal factors
External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
0
0
1 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
0
0
0 1
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
O
0
10
0 r
0
0
0
0
311676 1.87
leadership.
Basque terrorists are likely to step up violence in the near term,
especially against French interests in northern Spain, in retaliation
for Spanish and French collaboration in counterterrorism opera-
tions. Meanwhile, the resignation of Manuel Fraga as head of the
conservative Popular Alliance Party has fragmented the center and
right parties. Unless these parties resolve their differences before
municipal and regional elections this spring, Socialist Prime Minis-
ter Gonzalez is unlikely to face any serious challenge to his
Prospects for major instability
0 During next six months
0 During next six months to two tears
0 Negligible concern Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
Projected
V
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
Secret
Turkey:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
Prime Minister Ozal's position remains secure, but he will continue
to face demands from the resurgent right to lift restrictions on
politicians ousted in the military coup in 1980. We expect the
military would oppose such a move. We believe the armed forces
also would be wary as maneuvering over the economy and religious
fundamentalism intensifies in anticipation of the 1988 election. The
Kurdish insurgency continues to fester but will not threaten the
regime in the near term.l 25X1
Prospects for major instability
During next six months
During next six months to two tears
Negligible concern Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
1985
1986
1987
I
11
III
IV
I
11
III
IV
1 II
Social change conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
G
O
O
0
O
0
0
C
O
Economic factors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
)
0
C
0
0
G
0
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
O
0 I
0
0
O
O
C:)
0
O
Inflation
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
G
Opposition conspiracy/planning
G
O
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
C)
O
0
0
O
0
Military attitudes, activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
I)
G
G
0
O
C)
C
0
C
Discontent over career loss, pay. or benefits
C;
C)
C)
C)
O
0
C
0
(_.
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
O
0
C)
0
O
0
0
0
Cl
External factors
External support for government
C)
0
0
0
C)
0
0
0
C
External support for opposition
O 1
C)
O
0
O
0
~, C)
0
O
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression /brutality
Security capabilities
O
C)
C)
0
G
0
C)
0
C
Political disunity/loss of confidence
I
0
Loss of legitimacy
C%
C)
C)
0
O
C
C}
O
Projected
V
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
Secret
Egypt:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
unrest.
President Mubarak has made some progress in convincing Egypt's
creditors to provide debt relief and persuading the IMF to agree to
softer terms for a standby arrangement. In addition, Egypt's
participation in the upcoming Islamic summit might encourage the
Gulf states to offer some aid to help alleviate Cairo's cash crunch
until this spring-the earliest a standby could take effect. However,
the price for an IMF program almost certainly will be unpopular
austerity measures that we expect will cause at least some civil
Prospects for major instability
During next six months
During next six months to two tears
Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1985
1986
1987
11 III IV
1
I II III IV
1 11
Social changeconflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
C~
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
t'~ ~)
}
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
r j
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
C) j
External factors External support for government
)
External support for opposition
1
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities , .
Political disunity/loss of confidence 1 1
Loss of legitimacy
311654 187
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
Secret
India:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
Ethnic and opposition-inspired violence continues including terror-
ism by Sikh militants, activity by tribal insurgents in northeastern
Assam and Tripura states, and sabotage in the southern state of
Tamil Nadu. We expect violence will intensify as state-level elec-
tions scheduled for early spring approach. Frictions with Pakistan
also may flare up as the Indian military continues its largest-ever
exercises along the border. 25X1
During next sir months
During next six months to two sear.s
0 Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1985
1986
1487
1
11
III
IV
I
II
III
IV
I II
Social change conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
FxonomiC I actors
General deterioration
C)
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
O
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
O
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
0
Unpopular changes in economic policies
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
Inflation
0
0
0
0
t
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
C)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
C)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
C)
0
0
0
0
0
O
Public support
C)
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
Miliiarv attitudes activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
C)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
0
External support for opposition
O
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
O
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions capabilities
Repression/ brutality
C)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
C)
Security capabilities
Political disunity/ loss of confidence
C)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
C)
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
Secret
Iran:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
1985
1986
1987
111 IV
1 II
I 11 111 IV
1 11
Social change/conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factor, General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
t
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
1
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
I
Threat of military conflict
i
Regime actions/capabilities Repression /brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
311662 1 R7
probably will have to fend off stiff challenges from his rivals.
Iran's recent military success against Iraq will stem at least
temporarily popular digruntlement over the war and the declining
economy. The regime could face a substantial upsurge in antiwar
sentiment and popular unrest over economic hardships over the
longer term, however, unless it continues to make gains in the
fighting. Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani has emerged as the clear
front-runner to wield effective power after Khomeini dies, but
Prospects for major instability
During next six months
During next six months to two years
Negligible concern Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
Projected
V
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
Secret
Iraq:
Selected Instability Indicators
Iraq turned back two fiercely fought Iranian offensives in midwinter
to maintain the stalemate in the war. Whatever the outcome of the
battle for Al Basrah, Iranian pressure on the Iraqis will remain high.
If Iran does not score a major breakthrough by spring, Iraq's
position militarily and psychologically-will be enhanced. Mean-
while, increased cooperation between opposition Kurdish groups- -
supported by Tehran---to date has not forced Baghdad to divert
resources from its war effort. 25X1
During next six months
During next six months to two tears
Indicators Legend
1985
1986
1987
1 II III IV
I 11 III IV
Social change conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
I I
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay. or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/ capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
Negligible concern Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
Pr ojectcd
V
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
Secret
Morocco:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
to deal with immediate demographic problems.
Moroccan stability has improved as the terrorist threat from Libya
appears to have abated. King Hassan has strengthened ties to his
main allies France and the United States and the government
reached agreement with the IMF and foreign creditors that partially
will relieve debt pressures. The longer term economic outlook
remains bleak, however, and will leave the King with few resources
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
0 Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1985
1986
1987
I
11
III
IV
I
11
III
IV
I 11
Social change, conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors
General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
Terrorism and sabotage
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Public support
0
0
0
Military attitudes/activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
0
0
0
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
0
0
0
Regime actions/capabilities
Repression/brutality
0
0
0
Security capabilities
0 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Political disunity/loss of confidence
1
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
311666 18/
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
Pakistan:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
Prime Minister Junejo ended the first year of civilian rule in a
strong position. The opposition now is reorganizing, but we expect it
will step up activity as Pakistan prepares for district elections in
September. Tensions will remain high among the various ethnic and
religious groups, periodically sparking clashes that will require
Army assistance to suppress. India's continuing military exercises
along the border and the continuing Soviet/Afghan cross-border
airstrikes heighten the potential for a clash between Pakistan and its
neighbors. 25X1
Prospects for major instability
During next six months
During next six months to two wars
Negligible concern Substantial concern
Low concern Serious concern
Moderate concern
1985
1986
1987
1 11 111 IV
I II 111 IV
1 If
Social change Conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes/ activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
Security capabilities
t
Political disunity/loss of confidence
i
Loss of legitimacy
V
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
Secret
Sudan:
Selected Instability Indicators
Indicators Legend
The refusal of bureaucrats, businessmen, and laborers to join
student protests in Khartoum last November showed the civilians'
remarkable patience with Prime Minister Sadiq's ineffective admin-
istration. However, popular disenchantment will grow if the ruling
parties continue to bicker and economic stagnation deepens in the
absence of reform. Top military leaders support Sadiq's hard line
toward the southern insurgents and their Ethiopian backers but still
withhold personal loyalty to Sadiq. 25X1
Prospects for major instability
During next vex months
During next six months to two wars
Negligible concern
Low concern
Moderate concern
Substantial concern
Serious concern
1985
1986
1987
11 111 IV
I 11 111 IV
1 II
Social change, conflict Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
Economic factors General deterioration
Decreased access to foreign funds
Capital flight
Unpopular changes in economic policies
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
Opposition conspiracy/planning
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
Public support
Military attitudes activities Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
Discontent over career loss, pay, or benefits
aY?
Discontent over government action/policies
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
External factors External support for government
External support for opposition
Threat of military conflict
Regime actions/capabilities Repression/brutality
!
Security capabilities
Political disunity/loss of confidence
Loss of legitimacy
o1e
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/11: CIA-RDP88T00986R000100060001-7
secret
Kenya:
Selected Instability Indicators
long term.
President Moi enters 1987 with enhanced control over government
appointments, parliament, and KANU, the sole political party.
Kenya's relative prosperity in 1986-the economy's best year since
1978-will help Moi in the near term to deflect grumbling by
Kikuyu tribesmen, Christian clerics, and others over his increasingly
authoritarian methods. Meanwhile, Moi's government is not taking
effective action to reduce Kenya's population growth rate-the
world's highest-thereby auguring stronger social pressures over the
During next six months
During next six months to two R,arc
Legend
1985
1986
1987
I
11
III
IV
1 II III IV
I II
Social change/conflict
Ethnic/religious discontent
Demonstrations, riots, strikes
C)
C)
0
Economic factors
General deterioration
t
;
Decreased access to foreign funds
C
)
I
Capital flight
C)
0
Unpopular changes in economic policies
`0
C)
C)
;~
Food/energy shortages
Inflation
0
0
C>
U
i
Opposition activities
Organizational capabilities
C)
0
C)
O
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
Ci
f
fi
Terrorism and sabotage
Insurgent armed attacks
I C)
C
Public support
Military attitudes /activities
Threat to corporate military interests/dignity
O
'C
C)
C
Discontent over career loss, pay. or benefits
O
_,
)
Discontent over government action/policies
C?
t
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
C)
C)