WORLDWIDE ACTIVE MEASURES AND PROPAGANDA ALERT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00986R000100040002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
and Propaganda Alert
Worldwide Active Measures
DI WAMPA 87-004
November 1987
copy 845
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Directorate of Secret
Worldwide Active Measures
and Propaganda Alert
This paper was prepared by and coordinated within
Rererse Plank Secret
DI WAMPA 87-004
November 1987
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1 Perspective
1 Financial Constraints to Active Measures: How Serious Are They?
Over the past year,) 25X1
some elements of Moscow's active measures apparatus- 25X1
notably front groups-are experiencing financial woes. In our view, they
stem in particular from Moscow's growing dissatisfaction with the poor
performance of traditional front organizations and a reordering of its
political influence priorities toward greater use of public diplomacy and
open "dialogue" with the West. We believe, however, financial constraints
have not yet had a significant adverse impact on Moscow's active measures
agenda. 25X1
3 Worldwide Campaigns
3 AIDS Disinformation: Changing Directions
4 Nicaragua: Selling Peace
7 Regional Activities
7 Western Europe: Soviet Political Influence Activities
in the Post-INF Era
8 Africa: Everyone's Target
11 Latin America: Soviet-Cuban Cooperation on the Rise
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Secret
13 Middle East: Trying To Establish a Foothold
14 South Asia: No Letup in Pakistan and India
16 East Asia and the Pacific: Soviet Setbacks
21 The Decline of the Peace Movement in West Germany: Implications for
Soviet Active Measures in Western Europe
The prospective INF agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union will accelerate the decline of the West European peace movement-
whose cohesion and influence have deteriorated steadily since INF deploy-
ments began in 1983-and further diminish its utility to Moscow as a
vehicle to shape public opinion on arms control.
25 Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88
Secret iv
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This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely updates of ongoing active
measures and propaganda campaigns by the USSR and its allies. This issue covers
the period 15 August 1987 to 15 November 1987. It is also designed to provide
warning of future campaigns. The quarterly is composed of four parts:
? A perspective, which provides a look at recent trends in active measures.
? Brief overviews of both worldwide and regional campaigns.
? Articles containing detailed analyses of trends in the entire political influence
arena-active measures, propaganda, and public diplomacy-and speculation on
future developments.
? An annotated calendar of key events that we anticipate will figure prominently
in campaigns by the Soviets and their allies. 25X1
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Perspective
How Serious Are They?
Moscow's active measures apparatus-notably front
groups-are experiencing financial woes. In our view,
they stem in particular from Moscow's growing dis-
satisfaction with the poor performance of traditional
front organizations such as the World Peace Council
(WPC) and a reordering of its political influence
priorities toward greater use of public diplomacy and
open "dialogue" with the West. We believe, however,
financial constraints have not yet had a significant
adverse impact on Moscow's active measures agenda.
Moreover, the Soviets almost certainly would contin-
ue to provide the necessary funds for campaigns
targeting key issues such as arms control.
several
Soviet-controlled front groups reportedly have had to
pare down their programs, seek alternative sources of
funding, and even cancel or postpone major confer-
ences. Likewise, Soviet friendship societies and pro-
Soviet Communist parties have been hit by financial
problems as well,
shortages of operating funds, travel cutbacks, and
increased fund-raising efforts.
In some cases, at least, the Soviets themselves have
directly or indirectly brought financial pressures to
bear on certain organizations responsible for active
measures:
the WPC at
a meeting last year in Sofia set up a working group
solely for the purpose of discussing "ways and
means to promote fund-raising activities of the
WPC and national movements."
issued a plea to its national affiliates to pay their
past-due accounts, labeling such dues as "political
obligations,"
In the United States,
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2 ici
Communist Party of the USA and the US-Soviet
Friendship Society are resorting to unusual fund-
raising tactics-such as consulting with professional
fund raisers and securing pledges in the form of living
wills-and implementing austerity measures in an
effort to counter reductions in Soviet funding.
External factors also have had an impact. The Finnish
Government, for example, rescinded the tax-exempt
status of staff employees at the WPC's headquarters
in Helsinki for the years 1986-87. As a result of this
hard currency tax burden-which Moscow refused to
cover-the WPC last spring was forced to cut ex-
penses, particularly those earmarked for international
travel and conferences,
ing fewer trips with smaller delegations.
While there is little doubt that these financial con-
straints are real, we believe their impact on Moscow's
overall active measures program thus far has been
minimal. Any Soviet concern over the performance of
the fronts has not yet translated into a decision to
scale back their activities significantly. For example,
the World Federations of Trade Unions (WFTU)-
Moscow's labor front-has financed four major con-
ferences during the past 15 months. And the cost to
Moscow has not been insignificant, given that three of
those events were held outside the Bloc.
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Even more notable has been the tremendous growth
over the past year and a half of activities of the Soviet
Peace Committee (SPC)-the USSR's official peace 25X1
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propaganda arm.
the SPC has been particularly active in cultivating
Western groups and individuals during its frequent
trips abroad and its hosting of numerous delegations
to the USSR. While future growth in the SPC's
dealings with the West is likely to slow markedly-
judging by FBI reporting it too is faced with acute
funding and budget problems-we doubt Moscow will
impose any reduction in these contacts because of the
success the SPC has had in organizing joint activities
with foreign peace groups.
The Soviets also have compensated for apparent
limitations on funding of front activities by staging
more propaganda extravaganzas in Moscow itself,
where Soviet hard currency expenditures are negligi-
ble. Since the beginning of the year, the US Embassy
has noted that Moscow hosted an international peace
forum in February, the seventh Congress of Interna-
tional Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
in May, and the World Congress of Women in June.
Furthermore, some Soviet organizations responsible
for active measures apparently have remained im-
mune to funding difficulties.
The Soviets are also having some success in their
efforts to secure alternative sources of funding. For
example, they are now requiring US front groups to
pay in-country travel expenses plus room and board
for visiting Soviet delegations, according to FBI re-
porting. We suspect Moscow has also levied similar
requirements on front organizations in other
countries.
These developments suggest that Moscow's political
influence apparatus is in little danger of losing signifi-
cant momentum in the near term as a result of
financial constraints. We believe they also demon-
strate that, while funding issues are likely to persist,
the active measures bureaucracy will manage to cope
with them, by either implementing new tactics or
getting others to foot the bill. Relying too heavily on
the second option, however, may entail some costs for
Moscow. As the Soviets shift the funding burden to
the Libyans and others, the fronts necessarily become
more receptive to political agendas that may at times
conflict with Moscow's priorities. This in turn almost
certainly would hinder the USSR's ability to maintain
the high degree of resource coordination that has long
characterized its active measures operations. Thus, we
believe the Soviets would not hesitate to underwrite
the total cost-no matter how high-of any campaign
that targets high priority issues such as arms control.
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of active measures activities in which the KGB plays a
major role-particularly disinformation campaigns-
continue unabated, with a steady stream of known or
suspected Soviet forgeries surfacing around the globe
and covert press placements running at high speed in
well-established outlets such as India.
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Worldwide Campaigns
Moscow has begun to disassociate itself-at least
publicly-from the successful two-year campaign it
has orchestrated accusing the United States of manu-
facturing the AIDS virus. Since August, we have
noticed a marked decline in AIDS disinformation
attributable to Soviet sources. In addition, disclaimers
have begun to appear in Soviet Bloc and Third World
media citing "scientific conclusions" that AIDS is
naturally occurring. For example:
? In September, an East German scientist publicly
disavowed the conclusions of the "Segal Report," an
East German study purporting to prove that the
United States manufactured AIDS. The report has
been a central part of the Soviet campaign.
? In mid-October, Ghana's pro-Soviet newspaper The
Echo-a notorious purveyor of AIDS disinforma-
tion in the past---ran an article acknowledging that
the United States did not invent AIDS.
? Izvestiva reported on 30 October that two Soviet
scientists criticized as irresponsible stories in the
Soviet media accusing the United States of creating
AIDS. Zambian and other Third World newspapers
have replayed the story.
We believe Moscow's change of direction stems pri-
marily from the worsening AIDS problem in the
USSR, and the US refusal to engage in joint research
on the virus as long as the Soviets continue the
campaign.
The Soviets probably also feel that the story has
circulated so widely that it has reached the point of
diminishing returns. We estimate that over the past
two years AIDS disinformation has appeared in 80
countries; 200 magazines, newspapers, and radio
broadcasts; and 25 languages. ' Continuing the accu-
sations could even backfire on Moscow because
AIDS-afflicted countries are now more concerned
with finding international assistance than in disputes
over the disease's origins.
Moreover, Moscow can rely on its clients and other
leftist groups to keep alive the alleged association
between the United States and the spread of AIDS.
For example:
? North Korea continues to broadcast a steady stream
of AIDS-related accusations against the US mili-
tary presence in South Korea.
? Antinuclear groups in Australia and New Zealand
have made AIDS part of their campaigns to block
US naval visits to their countries.
While the Soviets have pared back on their accusa-
tions that the United States manufactured AIDS,
they probably will continue to exploit the issue in a
less provocative manner. We expect, for instance, an
acceleration of propaganda disparaging US research
efforts and priorities. Recent examples of such activi-
ty include:
? Cuban accusations this summer that the United
States is delaying AIDS research to allow more
Africans and Asians to die of the disease-and
keeping the cost of AIDS treatment high so that
Third World countries cannot afford it.
? A report last March in the Czechoslovakian media
calling for the United States to stop funding the
Strategic Defense Initiative and divert the money
into AIDS research.
In addition, Moscow is likely to step up its claims of
making dramatic breakthroughs against AIDS. Over
the past year, the Soviets have said they can retard
the development of the disease and, in one broadcast,
that all Soviet AIDS victims have been cured. If
Moscow participates in joint research with the West,
Soviet propaganda probably will claim that any pro-
gress derives at least in part from Soviet work.
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Worldwide Campaigns
We also expect the Soviets to compensate for the
slowdown in AIDS disinformation by intensifying
other campaigns with racial overtones such as the one
accusing the United States of developing a biological
weapon designed to kill individuals selectively on the
basis of race. The great success of the AIDS cam-
paign undoubtedly has convinced Moscow that end-
less repetition of crude, sensationalist disinformation
Nicaragua: Selling Peace
During the past quarter, Sandinista influence activi-
ties have focused on the Central American peace plan
sponsored by Costa Rican President Arias. Since
signing the accord in August, Nicaragua has tried
through both overt and covert means to underscore
US opposition to the plan and tout its compliance with
some of the agreement's terms. The Sandinistas have
emphasized the reopening of the independent newspa-
per La Prensa and the appointment of Cardinal
Obando y Bravo, a leading Sandinista critic, to the
National Reconciliation Commission charged with
verifying Managua's compliance with the accord.
can be highly effective in the Third World.
Nicaragua's covert efforts appear designed to under-
cut criticism, particularly in Central America, that it
failed to comply with the peace plan:
Sandinista officials have mounted a full-blown public
diplomacy campaign to influence foreign perceptions
of the plan. For example:
? President Ortega touted Nicaragua's compliance
with the accord in appearances before the UN
General Assembly and the Organization of Ameri-
can States, as well as during a visit to Mexico.
? Vice President Ramirez traveled to Canada in
October to meet with Canadian nongovernmental
organizations that are sympathetic to the Sandinis-
tas, according to US Embassy reporting.
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Since the five Central American presidents agreed to the Arias
plan last August in Guatemala, the Sandinistas have waged an
influence campaign to portray themselves as in compliance with the
? Culture Minister Ernesto Cardenal traveled to Aus-
tria in October to stir up sentiment against US
Central American policy, according to US Embassy
reporting. He appeared with former Austrian Chan-
cellor Kreisky at a Nicaraguan rally that was
attended by more than 1,000 people.
? National Directorate member Jaime Wheelock al-
most certainly mentioned Sandinista compliance
during his visits this November to Italy, the Vati-
can, and Spain.
In the coming weeks, Managua probably will intensi-
fy its activities as a means of softening any interna-
tional criticism over how it is complying with key
provisions of the accord. Nicaragua is also likely to
try to capitalize on its announced intention to open
indirect cease-fire negotiations with the Contras. In
considering active measures outlets, the Sandinistas'
options include:
? Mobilizing Nicaraguan solidarity groups in West-
ern Europe and Latin America.
? Using their front group, the Anti-Imperialist Tribu-
nal of Our America (TANA), to sponsor conferences
and solidarity rallies in Latin America.
? Using ANN's 10 overseas bureaus, five in the West
and five in Latin America, to disseminate pro-
Sandinista stories.
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Worldwide Campaigns
The exact outlets used, as well as the degree of effort
exerted, will depend in no small measure on how well
Sandinista moves play in the international press.
Managua probably will use its active measures appa-
ratus to prop up weak points and reinforce the most
important facets of its compliance campaign. While
funding of activities in Western Europe could prove
expensive to a cash-tight Managua, we believe the
Soviets would be willing to cover key expenses in
getting the Sandinista story out to US allies.
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Western Europe Soviet Political Influence Activities in the Post-INF Era
The prospect of a US-Soviet treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)
and the accompanying improvement in East-West relations presents Soviet active
measures planners with a number of opportunities to expand Moscow's influence
in Western Europe, a high-priority target. These developments also pose new
challenges to Moscow in explaining its large commitment to conventional forces.
INF has been the centerpiece of Soviet efforts to influence public debate on arms
control issues in Western Europe for the past several months. While we believe an
INF accord would accelerate the decline of the peace movement-a Soviet active
measures tool-we doubt that it would have a significant adverse impact on
Moscow's overall influence program on arms control. ' Recent Soviet actions
suggest that Moscow's commitment to its arms control program is undiminished.
For example, General Secretary Gorbachev broached a number of security
proposals aimed at the Nordic countries-including a reiteration of Soviet support
for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone-in a speech in Murmansk on 1 October.
Moscow subsequently mounted a public relations campaign to garner support for
the proposals by dispatching envoys to Sweden and Denmark, lobbying visiting
Finnish President Koivisto, and publicizing them in the 14 October edition of
Soviet News, a publication of the Soviet Embassy in London.
In addition to pushing longstanding arms control themes, Moscow almost certainly
would try to exploit the disarmament momentum generated by an INF accord
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divisions between the United States and its allies. In our view, Moscow's
opportunities include:
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? Influencing what is shaping up to be a heated debate in the INF basing
countries-Belgium, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Great Brit-
ain-over future uses of the INF bases. The Soviets almost certainly will mount
a major public diplomacy campaign to intensify growing local opposition to
continuation of the sites. In pushing for the "demilitarization" of the bases,
Soviet diplomats and propagandists probably would portray any NATO decision
to assign new military missions-particularly nuclear ones-to the bases as a
contravention of the spirit of the INF treaty.
? Taking advantage of Gorbachev's growing popularity to drive wedges between
the United States and NATO. In West Germany, where an October poll showed
that 76 percent of those interviewed believed they could trust Gorbachev-up
from 52 percent in May-the Soviets already have begun intensif in their
rhetoric on the concept of a "Euronean house "
serious obstacle to deep cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals.
priority to marketing the view that the US commitment to SDI is the only
? Enhancing its image as a peacemaker while disparaging that of the United
States. We expect to see more Soviet arms control moves that can both signal
new substantive positions and be exploited for public relations gains. Recent
examples of such efforts include the USSR's invitations this fall to Westerners to
visit the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shikhany and the phased-array
radar at Krasnoyarsk. At the same time, Moscow probably will reassign top
Despite these opportunities, the Soviet political influence apparatus will also face
new challenges in the post-INF period. In our view, the Soviets will have to work
particularly hard at allaying growing European anxiety over the Warsaw Pact's
superiority in conventional arms. Erich Honecker's visit to West Germany in
September may have signaled the opening of a major public diplomacy campaign
by the Bloc on conventional arms.
Everyone's Target
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During the past few months, the Soviets expanded their "peace" campaign in
Africa through dialogue with veterans organizations. At the same time, the Soviet
Bloc and Libya were actively trying to undermine US interests in the region by
placing disinformation in the press and pushing for greater cultural and intelli-
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As part of its global disarmament agenda, Moscow has stepped up contacts with
foreign veterans' groups over the past two years. While this effort is aimed
principally at Western veterans of World War II, the Soviets recently targeted
Africa, presumably hoping to garner support from veterans of colonial wars as
well:
? In August, the Sierra Leone Ex-Servicemen's Association and local Red Cross
commemorated Hiroshima with a "Blood for Peace" program and a seminar on
nuclear-free zones. According to the US Embassy in Freetown, the Secretary of
the Association is a member of the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council.
? A delegation of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans visited Bamako in
September to meet with Malian veterans, the Mali-USSR Friendship Associa-
tion, the Malian Peace Movement, and the Malian affiliate of the Soviet-
directed Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization. According to press report-
ing, the discussion focussed on "strengthening relations of peace-loving peoples."
? A Soviet veterans' group visited Guinea-Bissau, according to a September US
Embassy report.
In Uganda, Moscow and its clients appear to be increasing political influence
operations. In our view, they have been particularly encouraged by the apparent
ease with which anti-US disinformation can be placed in the Ugandan press:
? In July, Libyan-backed and other radical newspapers began a campaign to block
the visit of US citizen Stephan Landrigan by misidentifying him as a "CIA
strategist for the invasion of Grenada." According to the US Embassy in
Kampala, the Uganda Journalist Association had invited Landrigan to partici-
pate in a September seminar on news reporting. The Embassy believes that the
Ugandan Government denied Landrigan a visa because of Soviet, Libyan,
Cuban, and North Korean pressures on the radical faction of the leadership.
? In what we suspect was a Soviet placement, the 2 September issue of the leftist
Weekly Topic ran a story on foreign spy networks that recounted alleged USIS
efforts to build up teams of "house agents" in every African country. This charge
is a favorite Soviet theme throughout Africa, and the Weekly Topic is a known
conduit for Soviet disinformation.
? We believe Libya was behind a report in the August edition of the Economy--a
Ugandan monthly-claiming that the CIA was attempting to destabilize
Uganda through its alleged involvement in the expulsion that month of Ugandan
refugees from southern Sudan. Libya frequently uses press placements to exploit
border tensions between Uganda and its neighbors.
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In addition to surfacing anti-US disinformation, the Soviets and their allies are
continuing to build long-term influence through intelligence and cultural channels
throughout Africa. For example:
attempting to obtain land in Kampala on which to build a "House of Friendship"
for the Uganda-Soviet Friendship and Cultural Society. The Society is also
expanding into the countryside with a branch opened in Hoima District in June,
according to a press report.
? Moscow and the Kenyan Government signed a new cultural and scientific
cooperation plan in early November, according to press reports, that will provide
study grants for Kenyan students, and improve Soviet ties to Kenyan youth and
women's groups and trade unions.
? A Zimbabwe-Cuba Friendship Association has just been established, according
to a 30 October broadcast on Harare Radio.
? In Mali, the new Cuban
ambassador, Alberto Suarez, is according high priority to reviving Cuban
influence there. Working through Cuban-Mali friendship and cultural organiza-
tions, Suarez is pushing for the creation of a society of former Malian students
who have studied in Cuba.
In our view, these efforts are likely to meet with mixed success in the months
ahead. While there is little doubt that the Soviets will continue pushing their
disarmament campaign in Africa, we believe they will find local veterans groups a
largely unreceptive target because of the lack of common historical experiences
and because arms control is predominantly an East-West issue. Nonetheless,
efforts in this area will help Moscow establish ties to organizations having links to
national military forces, even if somewhat tenuous. In other areas, we believe some
of the Bloc's longer term active measures operations stand a better chance of
succeeding.
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Panama.
In Latin America, the Soviet Union recently activated its front apparatus to assist
Cuban efforts to promote liberation theology, a radical Christian doctrine that
advocates a restructuring of society using the Marxist concept of class struggle. In
other activities, Moscow used public diplomacy to try to give impetus to Cuba's
campaign to exploit the debt issue, 2 while Havana tried to support Panamanian
President Noriega by spreading disinformation about alleged US meddling in
Working through their traditional religious front, the Prague-based Christian
Peace Conference (CPC), the Soviets joined Cuba's recent campaign to build
influence with Latin American Christians, especially proponents of liberation
theology:
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to join the CPC-under the auspices of the newly formed Revolutionary
Christians Coordinator after probable CPC lobbying at a liberation theology
conference held last summer in Brazil. At the same conference, Esteban Silva, a
radical leader in the Chilean Christian Left party-which the Cubans have been
targeting-claimed that a CPC office probably would be set up soon in Chile.
legitimacy for its tenets
conference on liberation theology in late August at a Baptist seminary in
Havana. The conference selected representatives from Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
and Peru to try to persuade politically moderate bishops in their countries to
refrain from criticizing liberation theology in the hopes of gaining more
the CPC's Latin American affiliate sponsored a
other opposition groups in Chile.
We believe that Soviet involvement in the campaign through its front organization
indicates that Moscow is willing to experiment with liberation theology as a tool
for building influence in Latin America. Although liberation theology is espoused
throughout the region, it is now an effective force for social change only in Brazil.
If the CPC does open an office in Chile, we believe it would:
? Help promote the growth of liberation theology there, probably by organizing
conferences on the subject.
? Provide another means of expanding Communist ties to Chilean followers.
? Possibly serve as a channel for Soviet and Cuban funding to radical religious and
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As part of its campaign to in-
fluence li~llowers of liberation
theology, Havana has promot-
ed a compilation of interviews
between Castro and a Brazilian
liberation theologian.
In an effort to bolster the momentum of Cuba's campaign to exploit the debt issue,
the Soviets used the occasion of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Uruguay
in October to demonstrate publicly their concern over the debt crisis in Latin
America. In a speech just several days before the Communist- and leftist-
sponsored week of continental activities to publicize the debt problem, Shevard-
nadze said that interest payments on the debt should not exceed a certain level of a
country's export earnings, according to the US Embassy in Montevideo. Nonethe-
less, the week of antidebt events fizzled. The US Embassy in Mexico City
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demonstrators who participated in a similar protest in 1986.
reported, for example, that a march through the city on 15 October drew only
about 3,000 to 5,000 people, down sharply from the estimated 50,000 to 100,000
Calendar of Key Events for details.)
Although undoubtedly discouraged by the outcome of the week of antidebt
activities, Moscow and Havana have shown no signs of retreating on the issue. As
such, we expect them to try to exploit the events planned over the next six months
by Communist-influenced labor groups in Latin America. These include a labor
union seminar that is scheduled to take place in Colombia in May 1988. (See
Havana also spread disinformation alleging that the United States is maneuvering
to oust Panamanian leader Noriega in order to extend its military presence in
Panama beyond the year 2000, the expiration date of bilateral treaties governing
US basing rights:
? On 24 September the Uruguayan Communist Party daily La Hora replayed a
Cuban story alleging that the main Panamanian opposition group, the National
Civil Crusade, had agreed to rent four military bases to the United States after
the year 2000 in exchange for US support to destabilize the Noriega regime.
US troop presence in the Panama Canal area past the year 2000.
? We suspect that the Cubans were responsible for the appearance in the
1 October edition of a Caracas weekly of a forged State Department letter
allegedly sent to Senator Helms last March indicating that "steps should be
taken to bring about the resignation" of Noriega.' The forged document also
claimed that the State Department "shared" Helms' view on the need to extend
American guerrilla groups.
Because Havana currently enjoys excellent access in Panama, we expect it to
continue supporting Noriega with similar disinformation tactics in the near term.
Cuba has considerable commercial interests in the country with as many as 60
front companies based there-and uses Panama as a place to meet numerous Latin
' While we cannot discount the possibility that the forgery is of Panamanian origin, several factors
suggest that it is Cuban: its allegations mirror recent Cuban propaganda and disinformation themes; its
quality suggests the involvement of a major intelligence service, such as the DG I; in addition, the way it
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and television cooperation.
In Egypt, the Soviets are trying to rebuild an influence infrastructure decimated
by 15 years of badly strained relations. Following a major improvement in ties last
March, when Moscow acceded to surprisingly conciliatory terms for repayment of
Egypt's longstanding debt, the Soviets have engaged in a flurry of activity with a
variety of Egyptian groups. For example:
? A delegation of Egyptian lawyers visited Moscow in August to attend a legal
seminar sponsored by the Soviet-Egyptian Friendsip Society.
? An Egyptian youth delegation visited Moscow in September to meet with
members of the Komsomol to promote future youth exchange visits.
? In a September visit to Cairo, the head of a Soviet writers delegation announced
that the USSR would pay hard currency for the rights to the publications of
Egyptian writers and that a cooperative agreement between the Soviet and
Egyptian writers federations would be signed early next year.
? Soviet and Egyptian officials signed a bilateral agreement in October on radio
develop.
We believe the Soviets are a long way from exerting significant influence in Egypt.
Moscow is still laying the groundwork for an active measures infrastructure and
the government is both aware and leery of Soviet influence activities. Nonetheless,
the Soviets will remain active in the hope that a better political climate will
toward the superpowers.
During the past several months, the Soviets maintained their intensive efforts to
influence the formulation of Pakistani and Indian foreign policy. In Pakistan, both
Moscow and Kabul continued trying to orchestrate domestic opposition to
Islamabad's support for the Afghan resistance and its close ties to the United
States. In India, the Soviets capitalized on an increasingly favorable political
climate for anti-US disinformation operations. In our view, they are now poised to
exploit Prime Minister Gandhi's increased vulnerability to the leftist and pro-
Soviet wing of his party, despite his recent efforts to strike a more balanced policy
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as well as Soviet propaganda alleging that the
United States is preventing Islamabad from negotiating a settlement in Afghani-
stan. In our view, these activities are fueling opposition to the government's
support for the Afghan resistance and exacerbating resentment toward the
refugees. For example, we believe they were factors in promoting intense debates
in the National Assembly this September on restricting the movement of refugees
outside the camps. Moreover, the bombings and the propaganda almost certainly
are contributing to discontent in the military.
mid-level officers view US-Pakistani ties as very good, but are increasingly
resentful about the perceived US pressure on the government to continue
supporting the Afghan resistance, particularly given the high number of Pakistani
lives lost as a result of the bombings.
the Soviets are trying to
unify leftist parties probably to create a pro-Soviet lobby in Pakistan to pressure
Islamabad into accepting Soviet terms for an Afghan reconciliation government.
Soviet and Afghan officials are cultivating opposition leaders and have enticed
several prominent ones to visit Moscow or Kabul. They include Maulana Kausar
Niazi, a prominent senator; Fakhar Imam, former speaker of the National
Assembly and currently the head of the Parliamentary Opposition Group; and
retired A' rsh 1 As har Khan, the leader of the small opposition party Tehrik-
i-Istiglal.
Retired Air Marshall Asghar
Khan, the leader of a snudl
Pakistani opposition party,
traveled to Kabul in August at
the invitation of the Soviets and
the Afghans. When A han sub-
sequcntly made some pro-
Soviet remarks, there was a
strong negative reaction irons
The trips have yielded mixed propaganda results for Moscow and Kabul. On the
positive side, for example, Khan publicly asserted upon his return from Kabul that
his party could resolve the Afghan problem through direct talks with the Afghan
regime. Within a few weeks, however, Khan's trip provoked a strong negative
reaction in Pakistan. In the Punjab, Pakistan's most influential province, Tehrik
party officeholders and activists began leaving the party in large numbers,
according to the US Consulate in Lahore. Moreover, Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's
leading opposition figure, told the US Ambassador in late October that she had no
intention of accepting an Afghan invitation to visit Kabul.
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Islamabad's Afghan policy and periodically carries Soviet disinformation.
The Soviets have also been targeting Pakistani journalists. For example, local
TASS correspondent Y. N. Aleksandrov has established a close relationship with
the management of the The Muslim, a daily newspaper that frequently criticizes
Aleksandrov has used the paper to develop
Soviets plan to invite prominent Pakistani journalists to Moscow.
friendships with Pakistani journalists.
In India, the Soviets launched a propaganda offensive during August and
September depicting the United States as having dangerous designs toward India
and the rest of the world One of the more
successful campaigns targeted Indo-US efforts to improve technological coopera-
tion. Soviet-placed stories charged that a new Indo-US vaccine program to combat
communicable diseases would put India at risk by providing US scientists and
intelligence officials with sensitive immunological data on the Indian population.
Despite Indian Government denial of the charges and support for the effort, the
vaccine program and the US motives for it have become domestic political issues.
and induced senior Indian officials to address the meeting.
In another major propaganda success, the Soviets also organized a conference this
August in New Delhi on "Nonalignment and World Peace" that was extremely
critical of US policies in the Third World. The Soviets provided financial and
material assistance, attracted substantial Indian Government funds and support,
the Soviets prepared many of the 30 or so aca emic papers
rate the conference, an event that received widespread publicity.
presented under Indian authorship and distributed to attendees. Through their
Indian contacts, the Soviets also arranged for Prime Minister Gandhi to inaugu-
Party to resist more than modestly Soviet influence efforts.
In the coming months we expect few if any Pakistani opposition leaders to travel to
Kabul because of the adverse reaction to Asghar Khan's visit. There has been no
similar reaction to trips to Moscow, however, and we believe that, while opposition
politicians may think twice about accepting Soviet invitations, some will still do so.
In India, the high level of Soviet active measures and propaganda activities is
likely to persist because Soviet successes and US policy toward Pakistan have
raised anti-US sentiment to a very high level. During the next few months, Gandhi
almost certainly will have little political maneuvering room within his Congress-I
Moscow's active measures program in East Asia experienced significant setbacks
during the past quarter. In Japan, the leading leftist labor federation decided to
merge with moderate unions and leave behind its pro-Soviet faction. Meanwhile, a
major_front group meeting in the Philippines misfired and the Thai Government
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launched a successful covert press campaign against the Soviets. Nonetheless, we
believe Moscow stands a good chance of buying some influence in the Philippines
by establishing an aid relationship with the country's most radical labor
federation.
Moscow will soon lose one of its chief influence conduits in Japan, the General
Council of Trade Unions (SOHYO). The US Embassy in Tokyo reports that
SOHYO, which embraces most of the country's leftist public-sector unions, will
oust its pro-Soviet faction in the coming months and merge by 1990 with the
moderate Confederation of Private Sector Unions. The pro-Soviet faction, led by
longtime Soviet surrogate Akira Iwai, appears ready to join with independent
Communist unions and establish a separate labor federation. The Embassy
predicts that such a federation will be at most a marginal player in domestic labor
affairs.
In the Philippines, Moscow was unable to stir up sentiment against the US
military bases with a conference this August in Manila sponsored by the Asian
Oceania Trade Union Coordinating Committee (AOTUCC), an affiliate of the
Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Despite representa-
tion from 16 countries and sizable Soviet financial and logistic support,' the
conference was a propaganda failure:
? The Philippine press virtually ignored the meeting, prompting some delegates to
complain they had wasted their time
? The US Embassy in Manila reports that Philippine delegates blocked passage of
a resolution condemning the US bases in the country because they considered
the issue a domestic matter.
? Senior Philippine officials, including Speaker of the House Mitra and Labor
Secretary Drilon, refused invitations to address the conference
Moreover, the conference did little to help Moscow draw closer to the May First
Movement (KMU), a Communist-dominated labor federation that is trying to
destabilize the Philippine economy and eliminate the US military bases.
KMU Chairman Crispin Beltran wants to
affiliate with WFTU, and, with senior KMU officials attending the meetin
Moscow probably hoped for substantial progress on the issue.
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Despite extensive preparations,
the WFTU-connected Asian
Oceania Trade Union Coordi-
nating Committee failed to gen-
erate significant anti-US propa-
ganda at its meeting last
the Soviets were operating freely in the country and
Gorbachev's glasnost policy was gathering public support. The government
subsequently provided the press with off-the-record briefings on Soviet intelligence
activities and deported a Briton and a West German for working as Soviet agents.
The expulsions generated considerable anti-Soviet press coverage. For example,
the Bangkok Post, the largest English language daily, editorialized that the
incidents damaged Gorbachev's credibility and underscored the Kremlin's unreli-
ability and insincerity.
Looking ahead, we expect Moscow's active measures apparatus in Japan, which
has been quite effective, to suffer considerable damage from the split in SOHYO
and the federation's eventual demise. The Soviets have used SOHYO to influence
Japan's mainstream unionists and through them the country's antinuclear move-
ment. A fringe Communist federation will be a poor substitute.
Moscow is also likely to encounter increased resistance to its ongoing efforts to
penetrate Thai labor groups and political parties. The success of the covert press
campaign probably will make Bangkok more inclined to use countermeasures in
the future. Thai national security officials apparently have a fairly low threshold
for recommending such action since we believe they exaggerated Soviet activities
in the country to prompt Prime Minister Prem into approving the press campaign.
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In the Philippines, on the other hand, we believe there is a good chance Moscow
will help underwrite KMU activities against the Aquino government and the US
bases. According to the US Embassy in Manila, a KMU-Soviet aid relationship al-
ready has begun to crystallize and we believe each side has an incentive to expand
it. The KMU almost certainly is tempted by the prospect of Soviet financial aid.
With no dues structure, the KMU relies heavily on foreign contributions, which
have been increasingly difficult to attract since President Aquino replaced Marcos
in February 1986. The Soviets probably are eager to acquire an influence channel
in the Philippines as negotiations on the US military bases draw near. Moscow's
current surrogates in the country-a weak Moscow-line Communist party and
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Major West European Peace Groups
1
500 Miles
^ Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
^ Campaign for European Nuclear
Disarmament
^ World Disarmament Council
North
AN,inlic
()rt'10
^ Interchurch Peace Council
^ Joint Committee-Stop the Neutron Bomb/
Stop the Arms Race
^ Pax Christi Netherlands
^ Belgian Union for the Defense of Peace
^ Concertation Center for Peace
^ Pax Christi Belgium
^ German Peace Union
^ German Peace Society/United
Conscientious Objectors
^ Committee for Peace, Disarmament,
and Cooperation
^ Union of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime/
Association of Antifascists
^ Action Sign of Atonement/Peace Services
^ Action Society Service for Peace
Algeria
the moor anon or Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not mcsssarily authoritative.
^ Italian Communist Party
^ Italian Socialist Party
^ Organizations influenced by
Pro-Soviet Communist parties
^ Independent organizations
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The Decline of the Peace Movement
in West Germany: Implications for
Soviet Active Measures in Western Europe
The prospective agreement between the United States
and Soviet Union to eliminate intermediate-range
nuclear forces (INF), while providing Moscow with
new influence opportunities in Western Europe,' will
also accelerate the decline of the West European
peace movement---an active measures vehicle the
Soviets previously used extensively and with consider-
able success in shaping public opinion on arms control
issues. While Moscow has compensated somewhat for
this loss by adopting new and increasingly sophisticat-
ed influence tactics, 2 prospects for the peace move-
ment-whose cohesion and influence have deteriorat-
ed steadily since INF deployments began in 1983-
are less bright. With no strong unifying issue such as
INF likely to emerge in Western Europe any time
soon, we believe factionalism within the peace move-
ment- -already a serious problem-will intensify.
Nonetheless, Moscow and the West European Com-
munist parties have shown that they can still mobilize
sizable anti-US demonstrations on issues of direct
concern to West Europeans, such as the US bombing
of Libya in April 1986. This is particularly true in
West Germany, where the German Communist Party
(DKP) and the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
(SEW) penetrated the peace movement more thor-
oughly than their comrades in other countries
The Peace Movement: A Key Soviet Target
During the INF Debate
During the early 1980s, the primary goal of Soviet
active measures in Western Europe was to prevent
planned deployment of Pershing II and cruise mis-
siles. To that end, Moscow directed its front groups
and West European Communist parties to engage in a
During the past few years, but particularly since (jeneral ecre-
tan Gorbachev's rise to power, the Soviets have dramatically
increased their use of public diplomacy, renewed ties to indepen-
dent Communist parties in Western Europe, and initiated direct
''dialogue" with Western professional groups and noncommunist
European peace activists, demonstrating here
against a US military base in West Germany,
have steadily lost influence since INF deploy-
wide variety of covert and overt activities designed to
exploit indigenous opposition to INF, which coalesced
in the peace movement. In our view, the Soviets
recognized that, even if the peace movement itself was
unable to keep the new US missiles out of the basing
countries-West Germany, the United Kingdom, Ita-
ly, Belgium, and the Netherlands-it could prove to
be an important instrument of political influence
nonetheless. In the Soviet view, the peace movement
provided a means for spreading favorable views of
Soviet policy and forced Western governments to
rethink their attitude toward the USSR. Moreover,
Soviet organizational and financial support for peace
demonstrations enlarged the scope of protest activi-
ties, making it more difficult for West European
governments to accept the new US missiles. While
ultimately unsuccessful in blocking INF deployment,
Moscow's penetration of the peace movement enabled
it to partially deflect public attention away from
Soviet deployment of hundreds of SS-20s.
Communist Penetration of the West German
Peace Movement
Moscow's influence over the West European peace
movement varied from country to country, but a
review of US Embassy reporting
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shows it was particu-
larly successful in penetrating peace groups in West
Germany. Although West German opposition to INF
comprised a coalition of diverse religious, political,
and environmental organizations, the pro-Moscow
DKP and SEW exercised disproportionate influence
within the peace movement and exploited it to pro-
mote Soviet views. Indeed, although members of these
parties did not constitute a majority of anti-INF
activists, they achieved substantial success in pene-
trating the movement's loosely organized structure
because:
? On instructions from Moscow and East Berlin, they
based their cooperation with other peace groups on
the principle of minimal consensus; that is, solely on
opposition to the stationing of US missiles, setting
aside potentially divisive issues and compromising
whenever necessary in order to preserve unity,F_
Moscow and the West German Communists have
tried hard to find a new cause to revitalize the anti-
INF alliance. the
Soviets have repeatedly urged the SEW to revive the
peace movement in West Berlin by publicizing opposi-
tion to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and,
since early 1986, support for Gorbachev's series of
disarmament initiatives. The SEW obliged by:
? Circulating a petition to make West Berlin a nucle-
ar-free zone and presenting it to the US and Soviet
negotiating teams at Geneva in February 1986.
? Proposing a series of seminars emphasizing the
"social costs of the nuclear arms race" in fall 1986.
? Playing up Gorbachev's arms control proposals at
local demonstrations, such as those held last Janu-
ary to commemorate the 1919 murder of German
Communists Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxem-
burg.
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? They possessed superior organizational skills. For
example, the Krefeld Appeal, a DKP-backed peti-
tion calling on the West German Government to
withdraw support for INF deployment, drew over 2
million signatures,A
similar petition sponsore y e ocia Democratic
Party (SPD) paled in comparison with only 100,000
signatures.
INF Deployment Undermines the Peace Movement
The 1983 decision by the Bundestag to accept deploy-
ment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in West
Germany eliminated the basis for cooperation within
the peace movement there. Since then, its cohesion
and influence have deteriorated steadily, substantially
reducing its value to Moscow as an active measures
tool. in 1984, only
about 800 people participated in an SEW-sponsored
demonstration on "Liberation Day" (V-E Day), com-
pared with 60,000 participants on the same date two
years earlier. The SEW leadership attributed the
fiasco to the party's diminished ability to cooperate
with other leftwin roups in West Berlin.
These issues have met with little response, however,
and the DKP and SEW are finding it increasingly
difficult to take advantage of new opportunities, as
illustrated by the debate surrounding President Rea-
gan's visit to West Berlin last June. )
the SEW sought to exploit the anti-
US demonstrations sponsored by a coalition of left-
wing groups to display West Berlin's opposition to
SDI and US disarmament policies. Cooperation
among the various peace organizations, however,
failed to materialize for several reasons:
? The possibility of rioting by apolitical rowdies over-
shadowed planning for the events to the point where
SEW leaders reminded party members to partici-
pate only in peaceful demonstrations and to leave
immediately if disruption occurred
is Party (SPD) in West Berlin to withdraw its
support from the most important of the demonstra-
tions-to the annoyance of the SEW, which
had counted on SPD
participation to swell the ranks of the demonstrators
and confer legitimacy on the event.
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? In the week prior to the President's visit, an editorial
in the leftwing newspaper die tageszeitung triggered
an intense debate by asking whether it was appro-
priate to demonstrate against him at all; the news-
paper pointed out that Reagan had responded more
fully to Gorbachev's disarmament proposals than
West German Chancellor Kohl. The primary dem-
onstration actually focused very little on Reagan
administration policies; participants distributed fly-
ers on a range of issues from Nicaragua to the West
German census.
The Impact of an INF Agreement
The prospect of an INF agreement has further dam-
aged the fragile cohesion of the West German peace
movement. Defense attache reporting indicates that
activists believe that implementation of the so-called
global double zero option will cripple their coalition
by completely eliminating its raison d'etre. Such fear
probably contributed to a dispute this summer be-
tween the peace movement's Coordinating Committee
and the SPD and Greens. Press reports indicate that
the Committee-which, according to military report-
ing, is communist influenced-urged the two parties
to introduce resolutions in the Bundestag calling for
the revocation of the 1983 deployment decision. The
SPD refused; the Greens agreed, but only after
bitterly debating whether such a step was appropriate
when major reductions in both East and West ap-
peared imminent. Subsequently, several members of
the Coordinating Committee argued in an open letter
to die tageszeitung that nothing could be more dan-
gerous than the illusion that implementation of the
double zero option would end the arms race in
Europe.
Outlook
We believe that reservations about the future of the
peace movement are justified not only for West
Germany, but also for all of Western Europe. The
pending INF accord will indeed remove the last
vestige of its rallying cry, and no issue-not even
SDI-has emerged to replace it. Despite a concerted
campaign against the program for the past few years,
the Soviets have been unable to translate widespread
anti-SDI sentiment in Western Europe into an active
protest movement because SDI is neither well under-
stood nor a matter of popular concern. We do not
foresee any change in this situation at least until SDI
or some comparable defense system is deployed.
Without a strong unifying cause, we expect factional-
ism within the peace movement to intensify and the
groups that compose it to continue to drift apart.
Moreover, some organizations have adopted goals that
run counter to Soviet interests in Western Europe. In
the Netherlands, for example, the Interchurch Peace
Council has begun to focus on improving contacts
with Eastern Europe while Pax Christi made Afghan-
istan its top priority, according to diplomatic report-
ing. In addition,
=Belgian peace activists have tormed a new orga-
nization intended to attract disaffected members of
the Belgian Union for the Defense of Peace-an
affiliate of the Soviet-controlled World Peace
Council.
At the same time, the original anti-INF coalition will
remain susceptible to Soviet and Communist Party
manipulation, particularly on issues and events that
directly affect West European interests. US Embassy
reporting indicates, for example, that the SEW and
DKP organized large anti-US demonstrations on
short notice after the US bombing of Libya in April
1986. Although the response to the incident was
quickly overshadowed by the Chernobyl' disaster, it
showed that the Communist parties retain the capa-
bility to generate public outcries against US foreign
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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88
Anti-US Human Rights Organizations
Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America
(CODEHUCA). CODEHUCA is a Honduras-based organization managed by a
former member of the Honduran Communist Party with ties to the revolutionary
left in El Salvador, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The US Embassy in Honduras reports
that it has a strong, anti-US bias and criticizes human rights abuses in
democratic governments in Latin America while ignoring abuses in Cuba and
Nicaragua.
Defense for Children International (DCI). DCI is a Geneva-based organization
that has consultative status in the UN. An August 1987 Izvestiya article cited
statements from DCI staff members as lending credence to allegations that the
United States purchases children from Third World countries to sell their organs.
The US Embassy in Geneva reports that the organization refuses to disassociate
itself from the story despite three US protests. DCI's Secretary General-Per
Tegmo-claims that the group is considering publishing reports from its Latin
American offices that US servicemen sexually abuse minors in the countries
where they are stationed.
International Institute for Humanitarian Law (IIHL). In June, this group
presented Soviet leader Gorbachev with a human rights award for his "outstand-
ing contribution to strengthening peace and ensuring human rights. " IIHL is
based in San Remo, Italy, and has consultative status in the UN.
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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88I 25X1
4-6 December 1987 Tenth National Congress of the Greek Committee for International Detente and
Peace (EEDYE), Athens. one of the workshops at 25X1
this meeting will focus on the elimination of US bases in Greece, reflecting the pri-
ority that the EEDYE-the peace front of the Moscow-line Greek Communist
Party (KKE)--places on this issue. EEDYE's 25X1
secretary general has asked local committees throughout Greece to promote
antibase demonstrations to create the impression that the activities are initiated
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10 December 1987 United Nations Human Rights Day. As part of its campaign to defend the Bloc re-
cord on human rights and reshape the debate on what constitutes human rights vi-
olations, Moscow probably will make a significant effort to influence this year's
commemoration. The US Embassy in Moscow reports, for example, that a newly
formed Moscow-based group-the Glasnost Press Club-is planning to host an
international seminar on human rights problems for nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and private individuals, probably to coincide with Human Rights
Day. Agenda items for this meeting include the problems of the homeless, the right
to work, and regional conflicts. In addition to internationally respected organiza-
tions like the Helsinki Watch, Moscow probably will invite groups with pro-Soviet
or anti-US biases such as the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in
Central America, Defense for Children International, and the International
Institute for Humanitarian Law (see inset).
December 1987 Executive Committee Meeting of the World Federation of Democratic Youth
(WFDY), Pyongyang, North Korea. Although this Soviet front undoubtedly will
follow Soviet policies, friction is developing
between supporters of or ac ev s re orm policies and conservatives who fear an
ideological softening. A similar controversy developed in a meeting preparatory to
the November 1987 congress of the International Union of Students, when Arab
and African radicals criticized Soviet-supported draft resolutions for being too
moderate.
21-22 January 1988 Third Group of Six Summit, Stockholm. 25X1
the Group of Six-the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, 25X1
Tanzania, and Sweden-will continue to encourage superpower arms control
agreements, especially on a nuclear test ban and preventing the militarization of
outer space. The Group's agenda is tilted toward Soviet positions, and Moscow has
won propaganda benefits by expressing general agreement with the Group's
proposals. the Soviets are eager to use the 25X1
Six to influence world public opinion, and we expect them to exploit their close ties
to India to manipulate the summit. 25X1
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Secret
Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88
18-21 February 1988 Twelfth Congress of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), Spain. Despite genera-
tional conflict within the PCE the main theme of this
congress will be reunification of the splintered Spanish Communist movement.
the Soviets and their East Bloc allies may fund some of the
over Spanish Communists.
PCE's multimillion dollar deficit on the condition that reunification efforts are
speeded up. We believe Moscow hopes reunification will consolidate its influence
March 1988 Fifth Consultative Meeting of the All-European Youth and Student Cooperation.
This conference is sponsored by the International Union of Socialist Youth
(IUSY), the student affiliate of the Socialist International (SI). Although the SI is
dominated by Western socialist parties, IUSY pursues policies closely identified
with the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth. We expect the
meeting to mirror Soviet positions on issues such as nuclear and chemical free
zones in Europe.
similar debt conferences last May in Brazil.
Seminar of Latin American Labor Organizations to Discuss the Foreign Debt,
Colombia. various Communist-
influenced labor groups are behind this meeting, which is part of the Soviet and
Cuban campaign to exploit the debt issue. While the Communist-dominated
Colombian Unitary Central of Workers probably will officially sponsor the event,
we expect seminar organizers to use financial incentives to induce non-Commu-
nists to participate. Communist unions successfully employed such tactics at
August 1988 Nonaligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers' Conference, Cyprus. Moscow's
keen interest in influencing the NAM ' almost certainly will benefit from warming
diplomatic relations with Nicosia, which will play a key role in preparing the
meeting's agenda and communique. Moscow probably has two primary objectives
for the conference: obtaining NAM endorsement for its arms control proposals and
weakening members' support for the resolution calling for the "withdrawal of
foreign troops" from Afghanistan. The Soviets will also closely monitor the
selection of the 1989 NAM chairman. With Argentina, Indonesia, Nicaragua and
Peru the leading contenders, Moscow
favors Peru probably in the expectation that the chairmanship would prompt Lima
into adopting increasingly anti-US policies.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88
The Soviets have paid increas-
ing attention to the Third
Iforld debt issue. Thar are in-
volved in a labor union .seminar
on Latin .1american debt sched-
uled lirr nest Mar and a confer-
en cc on . Urican debt, sponsored
hr the 0.1TUU, that will prob-
ahlt' he held nest tear.
For Human Rights -
No to Foreign Debt!
24-26 October 1988 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the Christian Peace Conference (CPC).
Although the Soviet-controlled CPC has traditionally maintained a low profile to
avoid identification with Moscow, the Soviets may decide to use it more
aggressively next year as part of its elaborate celebration of the millienium of
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Calendar of Key Events, 1987-88
Christianity in Russia. We expect the CPC to become much more active in
disseminating propaganda on religious freedom in the USSR and in advocating a
larger role for the Russian Orthodox Church in the World Council of Churches.
To Be Announced Seventh Congress of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO),
Libya. At the quadrennial meeting of Moscow's major propaganda voice in the
Third World, AAPSO will present its agenda for the coming year. We believe the
Congress-AAPSO's highest organ-will accord highest priority to promoting
Soviet positions on Middle East peace initiatives and Third World debt. It also will
look for new ways to contribute to Moscow's longstanding campaign of exploiting
apartheid. For its part, Libya-which we suspect will partly finance the event-
undoubtedly will use the meeting as a forum to attack US policies in the Middle
To Be Announced Organization of African Trade Union Unity (OATUU) Conference on African
Debt, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Secretary General
Hassan Sunmonu has acknowledged that this meeting of the labor wing of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) will be sponsored by the Soviet-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Sunmonu wants to bill the confer-
ence as an OATUU-WFTU event but is running into resistance from OATUU
moderates. The conference is likely to produce a major factional dispute between
radicals led by Sunmonu and a moderate coalition that became increasingly
concerned several months ago when Sunmonu ignored a proposal to invite the IMF
and World Bank to address the meeting.
To Be Announced UN Meeting on an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP), Colombo. Sri Lanka is
pressing Western members of the UN Indian Ocean Ad Hoc Committee to agree
on a meeting date. The Soviet IOZP campaign calls for creation of a nuclear-free
zone in the region, removal of the US military base on Diego Garcia, and the clos-
ing of Voice of America and West German broadcast facilities in Sri Lanka.
To Be Announced Scheduled Deployment of Cruise Missiles, the Netherlands. If the United States
and the Soviet Union sign an INF accord in 1987, the Dutch Government will be
under intense domestic pressure to cancel deployment of ground-launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs) in 1988, even temporarily while the treaty is being ratified. In
addition, The Hague may decide not to resume the NATO nuclear tasks it
dropped in exchange for agreeing to base GLCMs. The Soviets almost certainly
will attempt to influence the outcome of any debate over these issues.
Secret 28
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Secret
Secret
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