WORLDWIDE ACTIVE MEASURES AND PROPAGANDA ALERT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00986R000100030002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Worldwide Active Measures
and Propaganda Alert
D/ WAMPA 87-003
August 1987
ropy 6 5 0
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Directorate of
~~ Intelligence
and Propaganda Alert
Worldwide Active Measures
are welcome
This paper was prepared by and coordinated within
the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries
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D/ WAMPA 87-003
August l 987
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vii Preface
1 Perspective
1 The Debt Issue: Can Moscow and Havana Exploit It? 25X1
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Soviet efforts to finance and guide Cuba's ongoing campaign calling for repudia-
tion of Third World, especially Latin American, debt pose several risks to Moscow.
Nevertheless, we believe the campaign is likely to provide some payoffs, including
the opportunity to make contact with a broader range of Latin American groups--
especially labor organizations and leftist political parties revive Soviet labor
front activities in that region, and score propaganda points in the United Nations
and the Nonaligned Movement. 25)(1
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6 The World Women's Congress: Is That All There Is? 25)(1
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8 The Fall UN General Assembly: Soviet Gains?~ 25)(1
9 Western Europe: Public Diplomacy Dominates But Clandestine Activities on the
Rise 25X1
11 Africa: A Full Continent Press
1 1 Latin America: The Quest for Hearts and Minds
15 Middle East and South Asia: India and Afghanistan on the Front Burner
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19 East Asia and the Pacific: Spreading Disinformation on the Fiji Coup, Aiding the
Philippine Communists
23 Soviet Active Measures Targeting US Foreign Basing and Access Rights
The Soviet Union has an aggressive propaganda and active measures campaign
targeting the US military presence overseas. Using a variety of tools-including
worldwide disinformation campaigns, manipulation of local communist parties,
orchestration of front group activities, and public diplomacy-Moscow has worked
hard to heighten opposition to US bases around the world.
31 Soviet Active Measures in India: A Major Success
Exploiting its close ties to New Delhi and Indian concerns about US policies in
South Asia, the Soviet Union has built up substantial influence capabilities in
India. Although Moscow encountered a less receptive political environment during
Rajiv Gandhi's first two years in office than existed during his mother's rule, the
Soviets have regained their influence in the Congress (I) Party over the past six
months and are drawing heavily on their active measures machinery in the
country.
35 New Leadership for Key Soviet Front Organizations: Sweeping Clean With Old
The senior Soviet propaganda leadership has been grappling with the question of
what role Moscow's traditional front group network should play in the Gorbachev
era. Moscow has recently tried to improve the fronts' image by installing leaders
more adept at espousing glasnost in several of the front coordinating organizations.
The intelligence and propaganda backgrounds of these leaders suggest that the
fronts' substantive missions will remain unchanged.
41 Disinformation on US Chemical and Biological Weapons 1975-87
Contractor Study, OGL
The study documented the disinformation campaigns that the Soviet Union and its
allies have waged over the past 12 years against US Chemical and Biological
Weapons (CBW) programs. It found that a major Soviet motive for these efforts
was to deflect attention from and refute allegations about its own CBW use, and
that changes in CBW disinformation under Gorbachev have been less substantial
than those that occurred in 1980 in the wake of the breakdown of US-Soviet CBW
talks and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
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This quarterly publication is designed to provide timely updates of ongoing active
measures and propaganda campaigns by the USSR and its allies. This issue covers
the period 15 May 1987 to 15 August 1987. It is also designed to provide warning
of future campaigns. The quarterly is composed of four parts:
? A perspective, which provides a look at recent trends in active measures.
? Brief overviews of both worldwide and regional campaigns.
? Articles containing detailed analyses of trends in the entire political influence
arena-active measures, propaganda, and public diplomacy-and speculation on
future developments.
? An annotated calendar of key events that we anticipate will figure prominently
in campaigns by the Soviets and their allies~~ 25X1
vii Secret
DI WAMPA 87-003
August ! 987
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Xlth WORLD TRADE UNION CONGRESS
MOUNTING DEBT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The debt stems their growth, aggravates poverty and perpetuates ills such as famine,
illiteracy and endemic diseases.
70 75 80 85
The increasing disproportion between capital invested in the developing countries and
that repatriated by the transnationals is one reason why the debt crisis is getting worse.
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Perspective
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The Debt Issue: Can Moscow
and Havana Exploit It?
propagandizing on the debt issue.
Soviet Objectives
We believe the Soviets view actions such as Peru's
limitation of debt payments to 10 percent of its export
earnings and Brazil's decision in February to suspend
interest payments on its debt to foreign commercial
banks as indicating a favorable political climate for
Probable Payoffs
Barring a sharp downturn in Latin America's capaci-
ty to service its debt, most regional governments will
remain wary of supporting even Cuban or W FTU
rhetoric on the debt issue, for fear of affecting their
relationships with Western creditors. Nonetheless, we
believe that Soviet efforts to increase opposition to the
debt are likely to have some payoffs. The antidebt
campaign gives Moscow the opportunity to:
? Make contact with a broader range of groups than
might otherwise be receptive to Soviet overtures
because the problem of foreign debt transcends
political ideologies. The debt conference in Brazil,
for instance, attracted some moderates as well as
leftists and Communists.
? Revive the Latin American operations of W FTLJ,
which some Latin affiliates have criticized as out of
touch with the problems confronting workers there.
Regardless of whether the Soviets actually
believe default could have such far-reaching strategic
consequences, we have no doubt that Moscow sees the
debt campaign as yet another way to build influence
25X1 in Latin America, especially with regional labor orga-
nizations and leftist political parties.
? Intensify its efforts to portray Third World econom-
ic problems as the result of US debt practices and
those of Western financial institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). We expect the
Soviets to score propaganda points in international
forums such as the United Nations and the Non-
aligned Movement.
Complications Along the Way
Soviet involvement in the antidebt effort poses several
risks to Moscow, particularly if its role becomes 25)(1
widely known. Developing countries, long displeased
with Moscow's low levels of aid, may resent covert
pressure to repudiate debt unmatched by offers of
greater Soviet economic assistance. Moreover, public
exposure of Soviet participation in the antidebt cam-
paign could lead developing countries indebted to
Moscow which owe more than $40 billionto ask
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for more liberal terms. Knowledge of Soviet involve-
ment in attempts to generate support for debt repudi-
ation could also hinder Moscow's efforts to improve
diplomatic and economic relations with Latin Ameri-
can countries, which probably would perceive the
Soviet campaign as interference in their internal
affairs.
Even if Soviet participation in Castro's drive for debt
repudiation remains hidden, the campaign could com-
plicate Moscow's efforts to build influence in the
region. The debt repudiation issue has tremendous
appeal to Latin America's ultraleftist parties that
typically are the major competitors of local pro-Soviet
Communist parties. If, as is likely, the ultraleftist
parties seize on the debt repudiation issue, the Com-
munists will risk losing support if they fail to do the
same. Yet many of the local Communist parties
hesitate to push the civilian governments too hard,
fearing-as does Moscow-possible military take-
overs. Thus, if they believe the campaign to be
destabilizing, local Communists might decide not to
support it.
A Clash of Wills?
One factor likely to determine the effectiveness of the
antidebt campaign is the degree to which Soviet and
Cuban operations mesh. Disagreements on tactics for
building Communist influence in the region have been
recurrent in the Soviet-Cuban relationship. Castro-
who has a deep personal interest in the debt issue and
has often been more aggressive than the Soviets would
like within the region-may push the issue too indis-
criminately for Moscow's taste.
Secret 2
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Worldwide Campaigns
25X1 Arms Control: Pushing a Broad Agenda
Moscow's worldwide campaign to influence public
debate on arms control issues continued unabated
during the past quarter. While giving particular atten-
tion to garnering support for their position on interme-
diate-range nuclear forces (INF), the Soviets also
maintained their longstanding attack against the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and lobbied hard
for the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones
(N W FZ) around the globe. In pushing its arms con-
trol agenda, Moscow, with assistance from its Bloc
allies, employed well-established influence tactics,
namely, public diplomacy, backchannel communica-
tions, front group activity, and "dialogue" with West-
ern professional groups. The Soviets focused their
efforts primarily in the West, but also targeted the
United Nations, the Nonaligned Movement (NAM),
and the Group of Six z as conduits to the Third World.
Moscow continued to make heavy use of diplomatic
visits as an influence channel. Since mid-May, the
USSR has dispatched envoys to Cyprus, Portugal,
and Burma and hosted talks in Moscow with senior
government officials from West Germany, the United
Kingdom, and Zambia. Moscow's Bloc allies were
quite active as well. East German leader Honecker
met with visiting West German Social Democratic
Party Chairman Vogel in May and traveled to the
Netherlands in June. In July, Polish head of state
Jaruzelski met in Warsaw with West German Social
Democrat Bahr while Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov
held discussions in Sofia with Greek Prime Minister
25X1 Papandreou.
The Group of Six is comprised of the leaders of Argentina,
Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania. Since its founding
in 1984, the Group has sought to facilitate arms control dialogue
between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly on the
issue of verification, by offering to monitor a comprehensive test
The results of these efforts were mixed, however. For
example, Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers rejected
Honecker's proposal for anuclear-free corridor in
Central Europe, according to the US Embassy at The
Hague. In contrast, the public communique of the
Honecker-Vogel meetine endorsed the Soviet INF
proposal.
In other public relations schemes:
? General Secretary Gorbachev unveiled a major shift
in Soviet INF policy-namely, a willingness to
eliminate all INF missiles, including the 100 SS-20
warheads Moscow insisted on retaining in Asia--
during a 22 July interview with an Indonesian
newspaper. The next day the Soviets made their
formal announcement in Geneva and staged a press
conference in Moscow to publicize the move.
? East Germany and Czechoslovakia circulated as
official UN documents their mid-June proposals for
an NWFZ in Central Europe, according to the US
Mission to the United Nations in New York.
? Gorbachev exploited the Group of Six's call in May
for the rapid conclusion of an INF treaty by
circulating as an official UN document the text of
his reply, in which he reiterated the Soviet position
on IN F and called for greater US responsiveness at
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The Soviets also engaged in open "dialogue" sessions
with the West, continuing a trend of the glasnost era.
For example, the Soviet Committee for the Defense of
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Worldwide Campaigns
SCRAP THE EUROMISSILES
Ono of the mayor goals of the
peace movement is close to being
r~~ahred. the US and Soviet Euromis-
s~los may be scrapped by agreement
between the two powers.
Tho proposal for the removal 01
medium-range missiles from Europe,
advanced by the Soviet Union 28
February, envisages:
~ the elimination of all US and
Soviet medium-range missiles within
the next five years,
? the reduction of Soviet medium-
range missiles in the Asian part of
the USSR to 100 warheads,
? the mainiainence of the same
number of medium-range systems m
Ih