NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00963R000100210001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 25, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/31 : CIA-RDP88T00963R000100210001-5
uirector OT I up --avurie4?
e?' Central
Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
25 July 1987
e) er-et_
CPAS NID 87-172JX
25 July 1987
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/31 : CIA-RDP88T00963R000100210001-5
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/31 : CIA-RDP88T00963R000100210001-5
Contents
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Persian Gulf: Sea Mine Incident
1
Afghanistan: No Letup in Resistance Activity
2
Lebanon: Christian Militants Gaining Strength
3
Pakistan: Political Fallout From Bombings
4
Notes
Israel-Egypt: Results of Abdel Meguid Visit
5
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Libya-Brazil: Possible Missile Agreement
7
Brazil-Iraq: Tank Sale
7
USSR: Commission To Study Tatar Demands
8
Bulgaria: Ethnic Turks Incident
8
In Brief
9
Special Analyses
Western Europe: Limited Persian Gulf Involvement
10
Hungary: Communist Party in the Doldrums
12
Nicaragua: Insurgent Strategy and Tactics
14
Top Secret
25 July 1987
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Contact mine
Persian Gulf Developments, 24 July 1987
Farsi Island
Saudi
Arabia
\
MANAMA,
Bahtain
Tanker escort
?-`Oatar route
lawman
100 Nautical mauls
Boundary representation Is
not neoessarity authoritative
Ize Line
13011A
ABU DHABI
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4")
U.A.E.
SOW+, as
Satan,.
_
Tehran has made contingency plans and trained personnel for mining
operations in the Persian Gulf since early in the Iran-Iraq war. It
probably has between 500 and 1,000 moored contact mines?each filled
with more than 250 pounds of explosive?and some smaller
limpet mines that are attached to ships by frogmen. The contact mines
could be dropped from helicopters, warships, or by speedboats and
fishing dhows. The small boats could secretly mine the channel the
Bridgeton was following and the Mina al Ahmadi channel near Kuwait
where at least nine mines were found last month.
USCAT
Top Secret
25 July 1987
710887 (A03209) 7-87
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/31 : CIA-RDP88T00963R000100210001-5
PERSIAN GULF: Sea Mine Incident
The mine atftcIrn the reflagged tyjk.erBridgeton will rel
lran'sPavfction that it can f!Jisffite the US escort
ually drive the US o f the Persian G
Iran has not directly claimed responsibility for the mine attack, but
Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani's announcement of the mine incident to
a large group of Iranians generated thunderous applause, according
to Iranian press reports. Iranian Prime Minister Musavi-Khamenei
asserted that "it was not the Kuwaiti tanker which hit a mine toda
but rather US credibility has been damaged by the explosion.'
Rafsanjani added that Iran will now attack economic targets of the
Arab states of the Gulf allied with Baghdad in retaliation for Iraqi
attacks on Iranian economic targets.
Comment.
ran probably
t is unlikel
end the US pre
intended t
confli
p .ram.
s a limited US response to t
e deterred from continuin
ce in the Gulf. The Iranian I
crease the fears of Gulf s
nd fan concern
ivities to
rs' statements are
about an expanded
out the wisdom of the escort
The success of the mine attack will encourage Iran to lay more mines
randomly along shipping lanes to harass convoys. Mine-clearing
operations may slow the progress of the convoys and make them
more vulnerable to attack by small boats. The depth of the moored
contact mine struck by the Bridgeton?about 24 feet (7.5 meters)?
suggests Iran may be targeting the tankers.kr3teatl-ef-US-escoc4s,
4#44161'1"1""1""ttel"1"eiewer-dfatii
Too Secret
1 25 July 1987
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N.4
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AFGHANISTAN:
No Letup in Resistance Activity
The Afghan resistance, despite four major Soviet-Afghan
operations in the last two months to interdict insurgent logistic
routes and clear guerrilla-dominated areasi is maintaining heavy
military pressure throughout the country?Including areas in
which traditionally there is little activity.
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The major Soviet-Afghan sweep operations in Paktia and Vardak
Provinces, which ended in mid-June and mid-July, respectively, did
little to reduce insurgent activity in the east 25X1
1eeateel-el2acj.tiag.K.abui4alaiebevi.reet
Comment: The resistance traditionally takes the initiative in late
spring or early summer. Therefore, the recent insurgent activity
almost certainly means that Soviet and Afghan forces were
unsuccessful in significantly reducing the flow of men and materiel
into Afghanistan.
The level of fighting in central Afghanistan?which usually sees little
activity?indicates that the insurgents are well armed and supplied
and that the chronic intra-Shia factionalism may be declinina.
Resistance activity almost certainly will remain
high throughout the summer and early fall.
To Secret
2 25 July 1987
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LEBANON:
;
ovicati
Top Secret
Christian Militants Gaining Strength
Samir Jaja, leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces militia, is
expanding his influence in the Christian enclave and threatening
to move against President Gemayel.
ark-stRiggle-4e?ewey-the-beleinee-ef-pewer-i&
Lebanese Armed Forces' Christian units. Th orces militia
is increasing its efforts to rscsuit-Chr ian Army officers either to
work directly with the Militia or to remain neutral in the event of a
seeNiety The Lebanese Forces are
planning to oust Gemayel if he negotiates with Syria, possibly in
September, accordin s reports.
The Lebanese Forces ave success u y portrayed Jaja as the most
dynamic leader in the Christian communitw,geeeKting-te-the-US
Embeesy. Little has been done to dispel the widespread opinion that
the Lebanese Forces were responsible for the assassination of the
late Prime Minister Karami. ghe-Embesey-Fefaer-QChristian
militia-controlled media are emphasizing the militia's growin
involvement in public .dministration of the Christian enclave.
In recent weeks, Jaja has s eppe allenges to the
government. Press reports indicate clashes between Jaja and
_Gel-navel supporters erupted,yestazday northeast of Beirut. Jaja has
also publicly called foTa government independent of Syrian dictates.
greeerelingte-the-Embeseg be is strong-arming parliamentary support
for a government more sympathetic to the militant Christian
viewpoint.
Comment: Until recently, Gemayel and Jaja have had a partnership of
convenience against Syrian influence, but Jaja now seems
determined to achieve preeminence in the Christian community. The
timing of this challenge is closely linked to the 1988 presidential
campaign and to the efforts of Christian hardliners to deal from a
position of strength. Jja-picebably-aise-laelieves-he-needs-te-4eke
elfeetie-initiatives43efere-his,iviany-enemiesiTteive-te-aeseseitiete
The Lebanese Armed Forces have played a critical role in maintaining
a balance between the competing Christian forces. Although
Commander Aoun is likely to continue supporting the President, the
militant rhetoric of the Lebanese Forces appears to be gaining favor
among the lower ranks; and their support in a confrontation is
questionable.
TOD Secret
3 25 July 1987
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Teri Secret
Major Sabotage Incidents, 1987
Pakistan: Casualties From
Sabotage Incidents, 1985-87
1,000
800
600
400
200
0 1985 86
.Data through 14 July 1987.
Wounded
Killed
313587 7-87
Arabian Sea
-- Province boundary
0 200 Kilometers
200 Miles
Tnn Adarriat
25 July 1987
710882 (A02447) 7-87
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PAKISTAN: Political Fallout From Bombin s
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Despite calling up the Army and imposing a curfew this week,
unrest broke out aged yesterday in Karachi. KHAD, the Afghan 25X1
intelligence service, is likely to continue its terrorist campaign
that has sparked the Pakistani unrest.
Rioting erupted againyeeter414 in 'Karachiaving 15 dead and more
(
than 55 wounded. Earlier, protests over tkfd bombings on 14 July,
which killed 73 people, quickly turned into ethnic clashes and
antigovernment riots. The Army was ordered into troubled
neighborhoods and a 24-hour curfew was imposed We?1474eaclay in
response to charaes that the government could not maintain law and
order.
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Islamabad has ordered all 'foreigners and landlords with foreign
tenants to register with the police, &eeFeling-t.e-the-146-Genewlete-ip-
orar5 Requirements for obtaining national identification cardsMave
been tightened, and the government may try to move all refugee
outsidethe city.
Well-trained KHAD agents have been infiltrating
Pakistan for at least two years and presumably are well equipped.
Islamabadjhas set up new training programs for the police, created
special tribunals to try terrorism cases quickly, and sought to raise
security awareness.
Comment: The bombings are likely to continue. gelieeirrtahere
packed-voi4ii-explesimes.4