USSR REVIEW
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88T00799R000200070003-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
49
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 20, 2012
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 1, 1985
Content Type:
REPORT
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Directorate of Sea et
Intelligence
USSR Review
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SOV UR 85-006X
December 1985
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Intelligence 25X1
USSR Review
The USSR Review is published by the Office of
Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries regarding the
articles are welcome.
Secret
SOV UR 85-006X
December 1985
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Soviet Theater Forces
in Central Europe:
Readiness for War
Contents
Page
1
Selected elements of Soviet forces in Central Europe-especially
tank battalions, air combat squadrons, and air defense and surface-
to-surface missile units-are kept in a relatively high state of
readiness and could fight effectively on short notice. The bulk of the
forces are kept at reduced strength and would need several weeks to
bring in additional manpower and make other preparations needed
to prosecute large-scale offensive operations. This posture reflects
peacetime economic and manpower constraints, but also recognizes
that NATO too would require weeks of preparation to reach a war
footing. It is a posture suited to Soviet political and strategic needs:
it helps to ensure the conformity of the East European satellites; it
presents a continuing, strong military threat to NATO; and it helps
to sustain a military strategy of keeping the likely arena of any
future East-West conflict as far as possible from Soviet territory.
Basis and Evolution
Soviet strategy for war against NATO stresses the military principle
of mass. To achieve mass, the Soviets maintain a very large force
structure, most of which is at reduced manning, backed by a
mobilization system designed to flesh out the structure quickly when
war is imminent. The Soviets' current force concentrations, logistic
preparations, and command and control systems indicate that they
consider protracted conventional operations more likely than the
brief conventional prelude to nuclear war that they formerly
anticipated. Nevertheless, their deployments also provide a hedge
against nuclear warfare or unreliability on the part of their Warsaw
iii Secret
SOV UR 85-006X
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Soviet military planners expect hostilities with NATO to be preced-
ed by a period of tension that would allow sufficient time for a
deliberate, phased preparation of forces. Consequently, they have
adopted a concept of readiness that permits them to keep their
ground forces in Central Europe manned well below intended
wartime strength. The equipment holdings of these forces and the
well-stocked Soviet logistic base in the region would ensure the
immediate availability of major weapons and stocks, but at least two
weeks would be needed to bring in the additional 100,000 soldiers
required to begin a large-scale offensive.
The Soviets maintain large air forces in Central Europe that, even in
peacetime, are equipped, trained, and positioned to mount a sub-
stantial defense within hours. To bring these forces to a wartime
posture would require adding at least 18,000 men to the peacetime
assigned strength of some 47,000 men.
Gorbachev's Antialcohol Program 0
The antialcohol campaign is sharply reducing alcohol sales and public
drinking. Although almost everyone favors eliminating the worst
alcohol abuses, many reportedly believe the campaign is moving too
far too fast. If the campaign succeeds, it will benefit the economy and
strengthen General Secretary Gorbachev politically; failure could
damage his reputation for tough and effective leadership
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aecrei
The Soviet Computer Literacy Program: Industrial Constraints I I31 25X1
In March 1985, the Politburo endorsed a program to provide up to 10
million personal computers to secondary and vocational schools over
the next decade. The decision is part of an overall plan to increase
computer literacy and thereby accelerate scientific and technical
progress and spur development of high-technology industries. Although
technical and political problems are likely to frustrate the program for
the first few years, the long-term promise for the development and
while tightening the screws on overt dissidents.
After 30 years, the assessment of Joseph Stalin's historical role
remains a controversial and highly charged political issue with the
Soviet leadership and other elites attempting to manipulate the Stalin
symbol for their own purposes. Gorbachev has adopted a differentiat-
ed approach to the matter-praising Stalin's highly centralized and
disciplined economic system while resisting any broader rehabilita-
tion. There are some signs he may favor a limited relaxation of
Stalinist strictures on cultural life and on intraparty policy discussions
pricing, central planning, and large-scale party intervention.
Any analysis of changes in the Soviet economy must distinguish
between genuine economic reform and mere tinkering that does not
involve fundamental systemic change. In the author's view, true
economic reform would require abandoning or drastically modifying
the three basic elements of the economic system-administrative
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Obstacles to Objective Analysis
Analyses of prospects for Soviet economic change may be weakened
by definitional problems, value judgments, and faulty comparisons.
Unclear or careless use of the word reform sometimes encourages
discussion of false issues. Similarly, using efficiency as the criterion
for assessing economic systems promotes one-sided analysis that
ignores political and social goals. Furthermore, comparing an
operating planned economy with an abstract idealization of a
market system may cloud insight on where the Soviet economy is
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Central Europe:
Readiness for War
Soviet Theater Forces in
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operation against NATO forces.
Soviet forces in Central Europe are manned in peacetime at considerably
less than full strength and would have to be filled out by a substantial num-
ber of men to be fully capable of offensive operations. In determining the
organization and manning of these forces, the Soviets have carefully
tailored their readiness to fulfill three needs:
? To guard against a sudden attack.
? To ensure that order and obedience are maintained in Eastern Europe.
? To provide the core of the forces that would be required for an offensive
The Soviets approach readiness from the viewpoint of a continental power
that throughout its history has defeated its enemies by mobilizing numeri-
cally superior forces and by outlasting its opponents. From the experiences
of World War II came a resolve that any future war would be fought on
enemy-not Soviet-territory. Victory in that war gave the Soviets a
buffer zone-Eastern Europe-between their homeland and their most
powerful opponent, NATO. This buffer zone enables the Soviets to take an
economical approach to readiness without incurring what they would
regard as undue risks to the security of the USSR. Moreover, their
organization and strategy are focused on the offensive. In the event of war,
they would-once their forces were fully mobilized-launch an all-out
offensive operation designed to achieve a decisive defeat of NATO forces.
Because the Soviets view mass as the most important of the principles of
war, they must provide for large ground forces. They could not, however,
maintain at full strength in peacetime the forces that they evidently believe
would be necessary to fight NATO. To do so would place an unacceptable
burden on their economy, consuming far too large a portion of their
Secret
SOV UR 85-006X
December 1985
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11. -
available manpower. They have chosen, therefore, to maintain and equip a
very large force structure that provides a framework for rapid mobilization,
but they limit its cost by keeping much of it at reduced manning.
The Soviets classify their divisions as "ready" or "not ready." Ready
divisions (about 40 percent of the force) have more than 50 percent of the
personnel required for wartime and have full sets of equipment. Most of the
ready divisions are opposite the Central Region of NATO's Allied
Command Europe and China. The highest manning levels are in their 26
divisions in Central Europe, which have about 80 to 85 percent of the
personnel that would be required for full mobilization. Not-ready divisions
are manned at less than 50 percent of full strength and often have
shortages of support equipment and armored personnel carriers.
Soviet training is designed for economic support of a large force structure
that would be brought to full strength on mobilization. The semiannual
conscription of about a million 18-year-olds, who serve two years (three
years in the Navy), provides a large pool of reservists. Training for
conscripts, however, is narrowly focused on the specific duties of their
positions, and most reservists are called up for training only infrequently.
The training programs conducted in the divisions vary with the manning
level. Ready divisions conduct a relatively full training program including
field exercises up to division level, but training in not-ready divisions is
rarely conducted above battalion or company level.
The Soviets follow maintenance practices that conform to their general
approach to readiness. Their units operate under strict limitations on usage
of vehicles and equipment and on fuel consumption. Many vehicles are kept
in storage, and much small-scale training is conducted with separate sets of
equipment to reduce wear and tear on units' combat equipment. These
practices are designed to reduce overall maintenance costs as well as to
prolong the service life of most of the equipment and keep it ready to use
upon mobilization. Units of ready divisions use their combat equipment
occasionally for large-scale training and exercises but return much of it to
short-term storage when it is not in use. Not-ready divisions keep most of
their equipment in storage.
The two-tiered readiness system effectively creates two armies: a well-
trained and well-equipped force ready for early commitment and a much
larger reserve force not immediately ready to fight but providing massive
combat potential in the event of prolonged hostilities. Ready units are
expected to be able to mount at least emergency defensive operations at
any time. Tank battalions, tactical nuclear missile units, and air defense
units are kept at relatively high manning levels and are more capable than
most other units of immediate combat action. To prepare all Soviet forces
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in Central Europe thoroughly for offensive operations, however, would
require several weeks. According to analysis of Soviet mobilization exer-
cises and emigre statements, not-ready units in the western USSR are
considered by Soviet planners to be incapable of offensive operations
without longer periods of preparation-including mobilization and post-
mobilization training-that could extend to a month or more.
As with the ground forces, the Soviets cannot afford to keep their entire air
forces at peak readiness. Combat regiments in Central Europe are well
manned with trained pilots. Defensive air units could respond immediately
to an attack, but offensive operations would require mobilization of at least
18,000 men. Logistic and command and control preparations that would be
needed for a major offensive air operation against NATO could take about
two weeks.
The Soviets' "economy of force" approach to readiness is based on a
longstanding assessment that war would most likely occur only after a
period of increasing political tensions that would give the USSR ample
time to mobilize its forces. In their view, their potential enemies-
including NATO-are not on a war footing and would require substantial
time to mobilize forces for an attack against the USSR and its allies. Thus,
in Eastern Europe, the Soviets evidently are content to keep their forces at
readiness levels that they believe guard against a surprise move by
unreinforced NATO forces. (They follow the same approach with their
strategic offensive forces, guarding against a surprise attack with their
Strategic Rocket Forces while keeping their SSBN and intercontinental
bomber forces at lower readiness.)
The East European forces follow the Soviet model but are generally less
well equipped and-except for the East German forces-are less well
trained and kept at lower readiness than the Soviet forces in Central
Europe. The Combined Command of the Combined Armed Forces of the
Warsaw Pact-headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov-
provides an official alliance structure through which the Soviets set
standards for organization, equipment, training, and maintenance and
monitor their allies' performance.
The readiness of the theater nuclear forces opposite NATO follows the
same pattern observed for the general purpose forces. Until recently no
nuclear forces in Eastern Europe were kept on alert, even though US forces
opposite them have kept some missiles and aircraft on quick-reaction alert
for years. The Soviets evidently relied on their SS-20 IRBMs (and, earlier,
a portion of their SS-11 ICBMs) to fill this role. In a declared response to
the arrival of the US Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in
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Western Europe, however, the Soviets moved three brigades of SS-12
Scaleboard missiles to Central Europe, and apparently now keep a portion
of them on alert.
Among Soviet forces in Central Europe, the general trend of the past
several years-a gradual increase in force structure accompanied by a
decrease in readiness of combat and support units-is likely to continue
through the 1980s. To improve their capability to conduct prolonged
conventional operations, the Soviets have been increasing the size of some
units, adding others, and making large increases in their forward stocks of
fuel and ammunition. This expansion in structure and stocks, however, has
not been accompanied by an increase in personnel; and, as a consequence,
the overall level of manning-and readiness for offensive operations-has
gradually declined. The Soviets are attempting to compensate somewhat
for this with an improved training program designed to lessen the large sea-
sonal fluctuation in overall readiness that results from their semiannual
troop rotation.
The increase in force structure and logistic support for a campaign in
Central Europe has been accompanied by improvements in the command
structure. Soviet military writers-most notably Marshal Ogarkov-have
stressed the need to think and plan at the theater level. Probably in
response to this need and to a longstanding requirement to have all levels of
the wartime command structure operational in peacetime, the Soviets in
1984 activated theater-level commands for their forces opposite the
Central and Southern Regions of Allied Command Europe. These com-
mands would also control the East European forces operating against
NATO in wartime. Creation of these theater-level commands puts into
place the commanders and staffs who would plan and direct the mobiliza-
tion, deployment, and operations of forces opposite NATO.
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Soviet Strategy for War Against
NATO: Basis and Evolution
Serious innovations in military affairs, playing the
decisive role they do in the fortunes of a state, must
be introduced with extreme caution.
objective.
Warsaw Pact strategy for war against NATO relies
on the Soviet principle of "mass," the application of
overwhelming numbers, as it has evolved in reaction
to Soviet experience in World War II, the advent of
nuclear weapons, and current Soviet perceptions of
the threat from NATO. While the fundamental pur-
pose served by the strategy is to ensure the defense of
the homeland, the Soviets have consistently empha-
sized offensive operations as the means to achieve that
dangerous adversary.
Military Doctrine
Soviet writings and the structure of the USSR's
armed forces clearly show that the Soviets continue to
view themselves as primarily a land power encircled
by hostile peoples. Situated between Europe and Asia,
part of both yet belonging to neither, the Russians
have sought expansion in both directions. Their histo-
ry of invasion and counterinvasion over centuries has
ingrained a sense of encirclement in the psychology of
the Russian people and the Soviet state. That para-
noia, combined with an offensive military philosophy
and powerful nuclear-armed forces, has produced a
The absence of natural defensive barriers has forced
the Russians to emphasize the principle of mass as the
foundation of their military doctrine. The most mili-
tarily significant attribute of the Russian topography
was its expanse, on which the Russians capitalized to
provide strategic depth. They complemented that
depth with another natural resource available to
them-a huge population capable of sustaining a
large field army. The size of the Russian Army has
been a historically consistent threat to weaker neigh-
bors. Denied access to the sea and, therefore, to their
enemies' flanks, the Russians concentrated on using
large numbers of men directly against their oppo-
nents. The advent of such technological developments
as the increased firepower of World War I, the
mechanization of World War II, and now the poten-
tially decisive use of nuclear weapons has changed the
ways in which mass may be applied. The Soviets'
reaction has been to adjust their tactical and opera-
tional concepts but not to abandon their basic strate-
gic principle.
World War II and Immediate Postwar Influences
Soviet faith in the principle of mass was confirmed in
World War II, when over 400 divisions were needed
to defeat Nazi Germany. Other principles, especially
surprise, gained more attention after the Soviets
suffered nearly total defeat when surprised by the
initial German onslaught. The Soviets also found that
they were unable to exert fully their manpower
advantage because the qualitative gap between them
and their opponent was too large. What high-quality
equipment they had was not available in sufficient
numbers.
At the end of the war, the Soviets retained a large
active army deployed deep into Europe. The garrison-
ing of Eastern Europe provided a physical buffer to
bear the brunt of future wars and mitigate the impact
of another, potentially more destructive, surprise at-
tack. Soviet troops could meet an attacker well to the
west of Soviet borders. More important, the large
Soviet force was in a position to threaten Western
Europe directly. No longer separated behind the
unpredictable and often hostile nations of Eastern
Europe, the Soviets stood in mass directly on the
border, astride the routes to the West. Even in
peacetime, this presence provides benefits from the
Soviet perspective. Intimidation of Western Europe is
intended to advance the Soviets' policy interests and
to validate their self-perception as the major Europe-
an power.
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Nuclear Weapons
The advent of nuclear weapons added new dimensions
to the problems of war at the theater level, threaten-
ing the basic Soviet military principle of mass. La-
beled "weapons of mass destruction" by the Soviets,
nuclear weapons fielded in Europe by the United
States negated the huge Soviet manpower advantage.
They heightened concerns about surprise and readi-
ness because war could begin quickly, with little or no
warning, and initial operations could be both decisive
and targeted on the Soviet Union proper. During the
1950s, as the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons of
their own, their focus shifted. The Strategic Rocket
Forces were created and gained ascendancy in Soviet
perceptions of war with the West. Conventional forces
were assigned the theater-level role of consolidating
the victories ensured by the massive use of nuclear
weapons. Since that time the Soviets have, in their
own perception, at least matched the West's nuclear
capabilities and thereby canceled the West's nuclear
advantage
Checking the nuclear element returns the theater
equation in the Soviet view to its traditional emphasis
on conventional forces. In a recent book, Col. Gen. M.
A..Gareyev illustrates the Soviet thinking behind the
renewed emphasis on conventional war. Referring to
Marshal Sokolovskiy's authoritative Military Strate-
gy, Gareyev writes:
In the 1960s and 1970s the authors of this and
many other books above all drew their conclusions
from the fact that war, in all circumstances, would
be waged with nuclear weapons, and military
operations employing solely conventional means of
destruction were envisaged only as a short episode
at the beginning of the war. However, the perfect-
ing and accumulating of nuclear missiles reached
such proportions that the massive use of this
weaponry in war could have catastrophic conse-
quences for both sides. Added to this, in the
armies of the NA TO countries a furious program
to improve conventional weapons is under way.
The main thrust of this is on the development of
highly accurate guided weapons approaching low-
yield nuclear weapons in effectiveness. Under these
conditions, according to Western statements, the
possibility is growing of a comparatively protract-
ed war with conventional weapons, above all with
weapons of high accuracy. Also the prospect of a
nuclear war unleashed by the "imperialists" is not
excluded.
Despite the deterrent effect of nuclear parity, the
Soviets recognize that their success in a nonnuclear
offensive could provoke a nuclear response by NATO.
Their doctrine prescribes a preemptive nuclear strike
if they learn of NATO intentions to use nuclear
weapons. Concurrently, they proclaim an apparently
contradictory "no-first-strike" policy. They rational-
ize this seeming paradox by defining the nuclear
period of war as beginning when the enemy decides to
employ nuclear weapons rather than when the first
one detonates.
Current Strategic Concepts and Options
The Soviets currently maintain a large force of 30
divisions and 10,600 tanks in Eastern Europe, backed
by significant reserves in the western USSR. In
addition, they have encouraged the development of
sizable East European forces-currently 55 divisions.
Of these, 60 divisions-26 Soviet and 34 East Europe-
an-are arrayed opposite NATO's Central Region.
While the numbers are impressive, the Soviets also
recognize that the effective application of mass is
dependent on adequate quality.
Soviet commanders and staffs continue to seek ways
to assure high rates of advance and more responsive
and effective integrated fire support. Reacting to
NATO advances in ground and airborne antitank
capabilities, the Soviets are reorganizing their ground
forces units to protect and complement the tank.
Their combat divisions are being restructured to
provide commanders an array of mobile weapons with
which to defeat NATO antiarmor forces.
The overall quality of Soviet conventional forces, both
ground and air, has improved markedly over the last
decade. New weapons deployed include tanks, artil-
lery, helicopters, and ground attack aircraft. The
operational effectiveness of even high-quality equip-
ment, however, is largely determined by the level and
quality of training offered to the soldiers who employ
it. The introduction of increasingly sophisticated
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weapons has resulted in novel Soviet training pro-
grams designed to allow crews to use their more
capable weapons in a greater variety of complex
tactical situations.
Soviet manning levels, however, are below authorized
wartime strengths. Almost 50,000 additional men
would be required to reach intended wartime manning
levels in the 26 Soviet divisions in Central Europe. In
peacetime these divisions have about 270,000 men.
Nondivisional units, which currently total 135,000,
would require an additional 80,000 to 85,000 men,
and possibly more. The East European armies that
make up the remainder of the first strategic echelon
are at generally lower readiness levels and would need
to mobilize at least a half million men to ready for
war. The Soviet forces in the western USSR that form
the second strategic echelon currently number
300,000 men with 37 maneuver divisions. They would
require an additional 500,000 men to mobilize. To-
gether, nearly 1,130,000 men would have to be mobi-
lized to bring the Western Theater to its authorized
wartime strength.
Strategic Surprise
The Soviets' only experience with a major transition
to war occurred as a result of the German attack in
1941-and that was a disaster. Since that time they
have relied on their manpower advantage, bolstered
by their East European buffer, and a broad nuclear
strike capability to deter or defeat an enemy attack.
Protection against surprise implies great costs, and
these the Soviets have largely endured at the expense
of their civilian sector.
Confident that their nuclear forces are an effective
deterrent against a NATO "bolt from the blue"
attack, the Soviets probably believe that standing
NATO forces are too small to mount a conventional
attack of decisive proportions. They would, therefore,
expect a period of observable NATO preparations to
provide warning of an attack. They probably believe
that the reduced manning levels of their forces in
Eastern Europe are adequate to ensure an effective
defensive posture, as long as reserves can muster and
deploy quickly enough to maintain a desired correla-
tion of forces in the face of a NATO buildup.
Readiness
In a 1979 article on Soviet military strategy, Col.
Gen. V. N. Karpov wrote that "one of the principles
of Soviet military strategy is the timely creation of
strategic reserves as well as stocks of armament and
other supplies, and their maintenance at the required
level." In fact, the Soviets have enough combat
supplies in East Germany to support more than twice
their current force there in the initial phase of a
campaign against NATO. This is the result of a
substantial expansion of the Soviet logistic structure
in Central Europe since the mid-1970s.
The buildup widens the range of options and contin-
gencies open to Soviet planners. One clear use for the
additional stocks is to support forces reinforcing the
forward area from the western military districts of the
Soviet Union-the second strategic echelon. Having
the supplies already forward greatly reduces the effort
and time required to deploy the echelon forward, thus
mitigating what the Soviets claim are NATO and US
advantages in preparing rapidly for war. The Soviets
would also have significantly greater reserves of mate-
rial immediately available in the forward area in the
event the second echelon was cut off or delayed, or
losses by the first echelon exceeded expectations.
Stocks in place in Eastern Europe would also be less
vulnerable to NATO "deep strike" attacks than
would stocks in transit. The Soviets' major supply
bases in East Germany lie under the extensive air
defense umbrella protecting Soviet forces in the for-
ward area. Materiel in transit across Poland could not
be protected to a similar degree. Additionally, prior to
use, stocks already in the forward area could be
dispersed within the relative security of East Germa-
ny. The lines of communication across Poland, on the
other hand, would be relatively dense and targetable,
thus subject to significant disruption-particularly in
the early phases of war.
The stocks remaining with the forces in the western
military districts apparently have not been diminished
to support the forward-deployed supply base; thus
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they add yet another degree of flexibility to Soviet
planning. Should the second echelon reach its forward
supplies relatively unimpeded and find them intact,
the logistic infrastructure of the western military
districts could support the establishment and deploy-
ment of yet another strategic echelon.
Command and Control
The Soviets have placed a great deal of emphasis on
the establishment of wartime control authorities in
peacetime. In a 1985 article, Army Gen. A. M.
Mayorov wrote:
The course and outcome of the initial period of the
last war demonstrated a pressing need for actually
establishing appropriate organs of a scientifically
substantiated system of strategic leadership in
peacetime and for maintaining these in a condition
to ensure constant management of the troops and
the fleet from the outset of military actions with-
out substantive changes in moving from the state of
peace to a state of war /Mayorov's own emphasis].
The positive solution of this problem today is
dictated by the fact that the main thrust of the
military preparations of the "imperialist " states,
and above all the entire aggressive NA TO bloc, is
the preparation for a surprise attack making use of
all the very latest means of combined combat. The
experience of the activities of high commands of
strategic axes on the Soviet-German front and
particularly of the Commander in Chief and his
staff in the Far East have quite plainly demon-
strated the necessity of establishing, in certain
circumstances, intermediate and very important
links of strategic command on major axes.
The Soviets have established just such commands,
first for the Far East and subsequently for the
Western, Southwestern, and Southern Theaters.F
As with the logistic preparations, these commands
give Soviet planners considerable flexibility. Marsnal
N. V. Ogarkov, currently the commander in chief of
forces in the Western Theater, wrote in 1982 that the
fundamentals of modern military operations must be
reappraised:
Obviously they should no longer be based on the
frontal system but on a wider scale of action-the
strategic operation in a theater of military opera-
tions. In the course of such an operation each front
(or fleet) would be brought into action in sequence,
either with short pauses between engagements or
with two or more frontal operations conducted
simultaneouslv.FI
Soviet writings and training activities indicate that in
wartime the Warsaw Pact would organize its forces in
the Western Theater of Military Operations-which
is located opposite NATO's Center Region-in two
strategic echelons (see map and table). The first
echelon, made up of Soviet and East European forces
now in Central Europe and organized into three
fronts, would have the mission of stopping a NATO
attack and launching a counteroffensive into West
Germany. Reinforcements from the USSR in two or
more fronts would be brought up as quickly as they
could be mobilized and moved forward to form a
second echelon tasked to continue an offensive into
NATO territory.
Soviet Allies
Following World War II, the Soviets created East
European military establishments that could assist
them in policing their hegemony and absorb a per-
centage of any NATO attack. The size and quality of
many of these forces now make them useful comple-
ments and, in some cases, substitutes for standing
Soviet forces. Economic pressures, however, have
limited efforts by East European military leaders to
maintain qualitative parity with the modernizing So-
viet forces, and political and societal realities have
raised serious questions about reliability and military
effectiveness in a protracted conflict.
The Soviets have taken specific notice of their need
for East European participation. In 1985, Army Gen.
A. M. Mayorov wrote:
Since modern wars are waged by coalitions of
states, the problem of organizing a reliable system
for the control of coalition armed forces is becom-
ing increasingly important in strategic manage-
ment. Of particular importance are such tasks as
ensuring the coordinated actions of the joint com-
mand, the achieving of national unity of planning
for the operations of international formations, and
the organization of strategic coordination among
allied armies and groupings of coalition forces.
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Western Theater of Military Operations
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Front t
.Soviet-
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Soviet-
echoslovak
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Sea
Adriatic
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Black Sea
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Warsaw Pact Forces in the
Western Theater of Military Operations
Soviet East Total
European
Ground forces
Ready divisions
34
22
56
Motorized rifle
15
11
26
Tank
17
10
27
Airborne
2
I
3
Not-ready divisions
29
17
46
Motorized rifle
15
14
29
Tank
14
3
17
New-type army corps
1
(ready)
Medium tanks
19,000
9,000
28,000
Air forces
Tactical air regiments
Fighter-interceptor
25
24
49
Ground attack
27
12
39
Reconnaissance and
10
3
13
electronic warfare
Helicopter regiments
Attack
12
6
18
Transport and special
4
7
11
purpose
Combat aircraft
Fighter-interceptor
915
985
1,900
Ground attack
500
460
960
electronic warfare
Attack helicopter
1,015
1,425
purpose helicopters
Amphibious forces
Sea landing division
0
1
Naval infantry brigade
1
0
23
0
0
ness of the East European forces.
The creation of theater commands is a direct response
to these concerns. The commands also provide the
Soviets with a sanctioned reason for more closely
monitoring and influencing the training and prepared-
The Poles probably represent the single greatest stra-
tegic problem for Soviet planners. Their 15-division
force is large enough, and of sufficient quality, to
merit a planned frontal operation of its own. Yet, a
grossly ineffective performance or, worse, a withdraw-
al or refusal to participate would leave a significant
gap in the Soviets' theater operation. Moreover, the
Soviets' own lines of supply to the forward area run
directly through Poland
Questions about the reliability and effectiveness of
East European forces most likely have caused the
Soviets to plan operational and logistic alternatives.
Nevertheless, an all-out rebellion in Eastern Europe,
particularly by any of the states bordering NATO in
the Central Region, would affect Soviet capabilities to
conduct and sustain operations sufficiently to pre-
clude a concurrent decision to attack the West.
Polish cooperation.
The forward location of the Soviets' second-echelon
logistic base in the relative security of East Germany
probably serves to lessen the severity of such prob-
lems. In the event of war, their standing forces in East
Germany could be rapidly brought up to full strength
by air and would not require the transport of huge
quantities of materiel through a state in rebellion.
Should operations against Poland be called for, the
Soviets would be in a position to use the forward-
based supplies of the second echelon to support opera-
tions into Poland from East Germany, supplementing
forces from the USSR. This would allow the Soviets
to avoid seriously depleting the stocks of the first
echelon, most of which would likely be alerted to
defend against a potential NATO attack. Forward
stockage of material for the second echelon is also a
hedge against disruption of the Polish lines of commu-
nication from confusion or delay imposed by grudging
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Ground Forces
in Central Europe
Soviet military writings indicate that it is not neces-
sary or economically feasible to maintain forces at full
readiness in peacetime. The Soviets are aware that
NATO's military forces are not kept at full readiness
for war. Furthermore, they believe that war in Europe
probably would be preceded by a period of gradually
escalating political and military tension, which should
provide some degree of warning. This period of ten-
sion would allow them systematically to bring their
forces to full combat readiness prior to the outbreak
of hostilities. They intend to make the transition to a
wartime posture by readying their forces according to
a series of readiness or alert stages (see inset). F_
We infer from their military writings and training
practices that the Soviets have identified two general
approaches to bringing Warsaw Pact forces to full
combat readiness:
Constant combat readiness: The normal peacetime
readiness status of the Soviet armed forces. Routine
training and activity take place. Leaves and passes
may be granted at the commanders' discretion.
Increased combat readiness: Unit personnel are re-
called from leave or TDY, and division subunits
conducting field training return to garrison. Mobili-
zation and contingency plans are reviewed and updat-
ed by staffs. Unit personnel remove equipment from
storage and begin to prepare reception points for
reservists. The division's field command post (CP) is
partially manned and deployed to a dispersal area.
Staffing of the garrison command center is increased.
? In a slowly developing crisis-one where the sudden
outbreak of war is not deemed likely-they might
feel to some extent in control over the timing of
events and probably would follow a deliberate,
phased approach to preparing their forces.
? If they believed war was imminent, their prepara-
tions would be compressed. These preparations
would be intended by the Soviets to ensure an
effective defense but probably would not be consid-
ered sufficient to launch a general offensive. None-
theless, they would significantly increase the So-
viets' immediate combat potential and, thus, would
Threat-of-war combat readiness: Units deploy from
garrison to dispersal areas. The control of the divi-
sion is transferred from the garrison command center
to the field CP. Selected reservists with specialized
skills may join the unit.
Full combat readiness: Full mobilization takes place
and reservists join their units. If required, equipment
mobilized for the units also arrives. Units establish
their wartime command, control, and communica-
tions structure. At this point, the alert, dispersal, and
mobilization process is complete.
represent an increased threat to NATO.
To launch a large-scale general offensive in Central
Europe, which Warsaw Pact strategy envisages as the
only realistic way to defeat NATO, Soviet doctrine
prescribes large, combat-ready forces in the main
battle areas, backed by fully prepared follow-on and
reserve forces. The Soviets recognize that the prepara-
tions, coordination, and maneuvers required to pre-
pare such an offensive are extremely complicated,
would demand the commitment of immense resources,
and would severely test the abilities of Soviet com-
manders. Therefore, they would prefer to move to a
wartime footing in a deliberate manner.
In this article, we examine how key factors such as
manpower, training, equipment, and logistics would
influence Soviet preparations of ground forces in
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Central Europe for war. Preparation of the forces of
the East Europeans, and of potential reinforcements
from the western USSR-although an essential part
of a Warsaw Pact buildup for war in Europe-is
beyond the scope of this assessment.
Readiness System
The Soviet readiness system divides units into "ready"
and "not-ready" categories. A combat unit is consid-
ered ready if it has a full set of combat equipment, at
least half of its total authorized wartime manning,
and sufficient personnel to commit about 70 percent
of its crew-served weapons to battle. Ready units,
therefore, are those that are at least minimally pre-
pared for combat operations in peacetime.
Ground forces are maintained at varying degrees of
readiness, depending on Soviet threat perceptions,
because of the resource costs of maintaining forces at
high readiness levels in peacetime. In the Western
Theater of Military Operations, 33 of the 63 Soviet
motorized rifle, tank, and airborne divisions are at
least minimally ready for combat operations. A well-
prepared force of 26 Soviet maneuver divisions is
maintained in Central Europe, where Soviet interests
are critical and where an indigenous Soviet population
is not readily available for mobilization. Tank units
are more fully manned than the other maneuver units.
The most ready parts of Soviet ground forces in this
region are the surface-to-surface missile (SSM) and
surface-to-air missile forces. They are typically
manned in peacetime near full wartime levels. Fur-
thermore, at least part of the SSM force is kept
sufficiently ready to respond within minutes to a
launch order from higher authority.
Europe (and Soviet combat units in general) are
manned in peacetime at levels lower than previously
estimated. This analysis leads to the conclusion that
motorized rifle divisions are maintained in peacetime
at about 80 percent of intended wartime strength and
that tank divisions are manned at about 85 percent.
Previously, they were estimated to be at 95 to 100
percent of intended wartime strength.
Figure 1
Manpower Levels of Soviet
Ground Forces in Central Europe
The evidence of lower peacetime manning levels in
these maneuver units, as well as in combat support
and service support units in Central Europe, indicates
that the Soviets have a substantial need for personnel
augmentation before the start of hostilities (see figure
1). We estimate that the 26 Soviet maneuver divisions
would require almost 50,000 additional men to reach
intended wartime levels. At least an additional 80,000
men would be needed to fill out nondivisional combat,
combat support, and service support units (figure 2).
There are three primary sources of personnel augmen-
tation available to Soviet forces in Central Europe in
preparing forces for war:
? Soviet civilians employed by the Soviet groups of
forces in Central Europe. These civilians could be
quickly mobilized and incorporated into in-place
forces.
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Figure 2
Augmentation Requirement of Soviet
Ground Forces in Central Europe
Combat- 53,000
40%
The Soviets have attempted to minimize the impact of
reduced peacetime manning on unit integrity and
proficiency by restricting vacancies largely to posi-
tions they consider unskilled or not critical to the
peacetime function of the unit. Nonetheless, the mag-
nitude of reduced manning in peacetime does have a
pronounced effect on the integrity and proficiency of
some types of units.' Motorized rifle companies rou-
tinely train with only 50 to 65 percent of their full
wartime complements. Therefore, when brought to
full wartime strength, between one-third and one-half
of the company will not have had recent training in
individual skills and small-unit tactical operations.
Training
The Soviets' training programs do not bring their
ground forces units to full readiness in peacetime. The
standard training program, which emphasizes repeti-
tive individual drills and small-unit tactics, is designed
to permit the Soviets to integrate large numbers of
conscripts into their ground forces every six months,
while maintaining at least minimal levels of unit
readiness. Ground forces conscripts are obligated to
? Soldiers assigned to Soviet units and facilities in
Central Europe that are active in peacetime but
could be reduced in size or disbanded in wartime.
These troops could simply be transferred to active
wartime units.
? Reservists or troops in the western region of the
USSR who could be mobilized or transferred to
Soviet units in Central Europe.
We lack sufficient information to estimate with confi-
dence the number of personnel that would be drawn
from each of these possible sources of personnel
augmentation. Nevertheless, we believe it unlikely
that the number would exceed 20,000 to 30,000 men.
We expect, therefore, that preparation of Soviet
ground forces for war would include the mobilization
and movement of at least 100,000 men from the
USSR.
serve a two-year term of service. This leads to the
rotation of about one-quarter of the conscripts every
six months. This turnover, coupled with the standard
practice of evenly distributing new conscripts
throughout ground forces units, has led to a training
system that focuses on the development of basic skills,
chiefly at the individual and small-unit levels.
This approach to training serves to retard Soviet
preparedness. It fails to develop individual initiative,
retains training practices that do not fully exploit the
capabilities of the more sophisticated weapons, and
inadequately prepares junior officers for conducting
complex combined-arms operations.
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Some senior Soviet military officers are aware of
these deficiencies and have criticized the system
repeatedly since the late 1970s. They believe the
current training program lacks realism, fails to devel-
op sufficient proficiency in individual skills, and usu-
ally results in junior NCOs having an inadequate
grasp of small-unit tactics. Recently, there have been
a number of attempts to correct some of the pro-
gram's shortcomings. Articles in the Soviet military
press over the past two years contain a number of
references to more demanding unit evaluations. This
would suggest that, at a minimum, Soviet military
leaders are taking steps to attempt to ensure that units
meet readiness standards.
the Soviets
have begun to modify their rotation system and
associated training practices. Whereas the established
system called for a piecemeal rotation of conscripts
across the force, the new scheme is designed to rotate
troops on a subunit basis. This would permit con-
scripts joining a particular subunit to serve and train
together for their entire two-year term of service. This
change allows conscripts in each six-month training
cycle to concentrate on different stages of training
rather than simply repeat the same training program
every six months. Moreover, the focus of training
during the second year permits greater emphasis on
company-level and small-unit tactical training-es-
sential for mastering concepts and skills associated
with using increasingly sophisticated weapons in
combined-arms units. This new personnel rotation
practice, however, has been identified only in motor-
ized rifle, tank, and artillery subunits of six to seven
Soviet divisions and one Soviet nondivisional artillery
unit in East Germany.
As this new system becomes more fully adopted, it
increases the likelihood that conscripts in Soviet
ground forces in Central Europe will assimilate the
complex skills associated with modern combined-arms
warfare. Futhermore, these improvements in individ-
ual and unit combat proficiency should minimize the
extent to which soldiers would require substantial
additional training when proceeding to a wartime
posture. Under the new system, a Soviet unit of
battalion size or larger will always have one subunit in
individual and crew training, another in crew and
small-unit tactical training, and a third in small-unit
and combined-arms training. It is unlikely, however,
that the Soviets would consider subunits trained only
in individual and crew skills to be adequately pre-
pared to engage in offensive operations.
Equipment
Soviet ground forces in Central Europe are equipped
in peacetime with many of the most modern weapons
and vehicles in the Soviet inventory. Equipment for
combat forces in the area is estimated to be at
intended wartime levels; therefore, the transition pro-
cess is not expected to require any equipment aug-
mentation.
Historically, Soviet equipment has been simple to
maintain and operate, and proven older equipment
types are kept in service as illustrated by the continu-
ing use of such weapon systems as the T-62 medium
tank and the towed 122-mm howitzer (D-30). Al-
though the Soviets attempt to maintain homogeneity
in equipment throughout their forces, the size of the
forces requires an incremental approach to modern-
ization. This results in a mix of equipment in units,
particularly in not-ready units, and complicates main-
tenance and the problem of providing spares and
ammunition. Figure 3 illustrates the impact of recent
modernization programs on Soviet capabilities to
maintain weapon homogeneity. This lack of homoge-
neity would not prevent ground forces in Central
Europe from making a rapid transition to a wartime
footing, but it would impair their ability to sustain
themselves over an extended period of time in a
campaign against NATO.
Logistics
Soviet logistic levels in Central Europe are much
greater than had been earlier estimated. The Soviets
have substantially expanded their military logistic
structure in the area since the mid-1970s and proba-
bly could support 120 to 180 days of combat by the
Soviet forces presently in Central Europe. They ap-
pear to have enough combat supplies in East Germany
to support more than twice their current in-place
forces for two to three months during the initial phase
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Figure 3
Soviet Tank Inventory Trends in
Central Europe
of a campaign against NATO. These levels are such
that logistics should not be a constraint to the forces'
rapid transition to war. The Soviets, however, still
would need to move a substantial number of troops
from the USSR to fill out service support units in
Central Europe.
During the past decade in East Germany, the Soviets
have:
? Built seven front-level fuel depots and expanded 34
others, providing a storage capacity of 600,000
metric tons.
? Constructed seven front-level ammunition depots
and expanded nine others for an estimated storage
capacity of 700,000 metric tons.
? Doubled the equipment available to form mobile
equipment-repair units.
? Increased their mobile field hospitals from 37 to 65.
? Modernized motor transport units with new trucks
built with Western technology and established a
reserve of as many as 12,000 older trucks.
This systematic investment in service support facilities
and stocks would reduce the Soviets' need to burden
their lines of communication before hostilities began
with large quantities of bulky supplies, vulnerable to
NATO interdiction. This would facilitate the fairly
rapid movement to Central Europe of combat and
combat support units from the USSR that may be
intended to participate in the initial campaign of a
war against NATO.
Implications
The Soviets' overall readiness philosophy is to main-
tain sufficient forces in readiness to deter attack; to
protect perceived interests, including containment of
nations in their sphere of influence; and to defend
home territories. This concept of readiness does not
require that Soviet forces in Central Europe be fully
prepared to immediately assume offensive missions.
Instead, it stresses the deliberate, phased preparation
of forces for war.
We estimate the Soviets would need at least two
weeks to bring their forces to a wartime footing and
move some 100,000 troops from the western USSR to
Central Europe. This estimate is based on the lift
capacities manifest during the semiannual rotation of
Soviet troops to the region. Also, upon arrival, these
augmentees probably would be given some refresher
training, which could involve up to an additional
week. Although the Soviets would attempt to maxi-
mize surprise when preparing their forces for war in
Central Europe, it is highly unlikely, given their
doctrinal requirements and the steps needed to fully
prepare these forces, that they would opt for an
approach that would radically compress the time
allocated for force readiness.
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in Central Europe
For nearly a decade Soviet writings on the preparation
and employment of Warsaw Pact air forces for a
general war with NATO have focused on a massive
offensive-the initial air operation. These writings
also define three important missions for tactical air-
craft during the initial phase of an offensive
campaign:
? Elimination of NATO's theater nuclear delivery
capabilities.
? Establishment of theater air superiority.
? Fire support for ground forces.
To accomplish these missions, the Soviets must first
move from their normal peacetime posture to one that
can support the extensive demands of wartime opera-
tions. Soviet pilots, for example, would shift from
flying about three training sorties a week to conduct-
ing two or three combat missions a day for a week or
so.
The transition to a war footing involves preparing
both the wartime command structure and the forces.
A major benefit of the reorganization of Soviet air
and'air defense forces in 1980-81 was the restructur-
ing of the peacetime command of Soviet air forces in
Europe to serve as the framework for wartime com-
mand and control of theater air forces. This eases the
transition to war by ensuring that preparations are
coordinated through a chain of command already in
place. Preparations include ensuring that critical air-
craft systems and support equipment are functioning
properly and that changes (for example, new radio
frequencies) necessary to operate in wartime are
accomplished. Once aircraft and their support equip-
ment have been readied, they must be positioned so
that they can be targeted against a variety of chang-
ing objectives in sufficient numbers. To meet doctrin-
ally specified requirements, peacetime assigned man-
power must be brought as close to wartime authorized
strength as time permits. Aircrews and support per-
sonnel away on leave or TDY must be recalled, and
manpower reserves mobilized. Aircraft repair capabil-
ities must be augmented so that damaged aircraft can
be returned rapidly to operational status. Logistic
pipelines must be readied to support higher demands
for consumables for both aircraft and personnel over
increasing distances.
Rebasing and Dispersal
Soviet tactical air doctrine requires extensive rebasing
and dispersal of tactical aircraft to accomplish the
missions assigned to them in a theater war with
NATO. Plans call for establishing theaterwide air
superiority by achieving local superiority within a
number of sectors throughout the theater. Soviet
tactical air regiments in Europe do not have adequate
range to accomplish this objective from their peace-
time airbases, given the depth of the battlefield and
the mobility of many critical targets. Rebasing is
designed to move tactical air regiments closer to their
sectors of operation to project airpower into enemy
airspace and allow the Soviets to concentrate airpower
as required by the air battle.
Dispersal of a regiment's squadrons to alternate air-
fields or highway landing strips located 5 to 15
kilometers from the main operating field provides
tactical air regiments with both offensive and defen-
sive advantages. It makes the regiment more difficult
to target and improves its survivability. Dispersal also
yields multiple departure and recovery points, allow-
ing the Soviets to launch large numbers of aircraft
more quickly and minimizing recovery tieups. Air-
craft that would be held back as part of a nuclear
reserve strike force probably would be positioned at
dispersal areas to ensure their survivability and allow
them to react quickly
Peacetime Preparedness
The preparedness of Soviet tactical air units in Europe
to conduct offensive operations against NATO is a
function of four main factors:
? Aircraft and equipment availability.
? Maintenance and battle damage repair capabilities.
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? Logistic support capabilities.
? Sufficient manpower.
The relative importance of each of these factors in
turn depends on the readiness of forces in place and
on the time that would be available for mobilization
and reinforcement prior to war.
Aircraft Availability and Maintenance. Since the
mid-1970s, forward-deployed Soviet tactical air regi-
ments have consistently maintained an aircraft opera-
tional readiness rate suggesting
these regiments would have enough aircraft for opera-
tional requirements on very short notice. The regi-
ments are normally equipped with their full wartime
complement of 40 to 45 aircraft. Moreover, the
maintenance practices in these units are generally
well suited for keeping a high level of aircraft combat
ready by limiting maintenance to simple replacement
of parts and equipment on a scheduled basis.
Forward-deployed units also are likely to have first
priority in building up sufficient stocks of key parts
and supplies
These peacetime maintenance practices and proce-
dures allow the Soviets to maintain high levels of
operationally ready aircraft, but the lack of a capabil-
ity at the regimental level to repair battle damage is
likely to reduce significantly the number of operation-
ally available aircraft during wartime.' In exercises
the Soviets have projected an "attrition rate" of about
25 percent over the first five days of air operations.
(We interpret this to mean the percentage of aircraft
shot down.) This projection appears low in view of the
strength of NATO defenses, but, in any case, when
combined with aircraft losses resulting from battle
damage, suggests a substantial erosion of tactical
Figure 1
Sortie-Generation Potential of a Soviet
Fighter Regiment in Central Europe
Constant daily aircraft-sortie requirement of 2
Variable daily aircraft-sortie requirement:
3 sorties on days 1-2,
2 sorties on days 3-5,
I sortie on days 6-7
airpower in less than a week (see figure 1).
Logistics. Initial wartime operations, particularly if
war began with little prior warning, would rely almost
exclusively on stockpiles of ammunition, POL, and
other expendables already in place in Central Europe.
' Data on USAF F-4 losses in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam
war show that the ratio of aircraft suffering battle damage to
aircraft lost was 4:1 for air-to-ground missions and 1:1 for air-to-air
missions. About half of those damaged were repaired in 24 hours,
but some 20 percent required extensive work requiring over 10
? Attrition tin terms of aircraft shot down) is 25
percent over first five days 10 percent on day I. 7
percent on day 2,4 percent on day 3. 3 percent on
this 4, and I percent on days 5-7
? No hattie-damaged aircraft are regenerated.
? Ratio of aircralt damaged to aircraft shot down
is I I
? Thirty-six aircratt are ready for combat at beginning
of hostilities Operational readiness declines to 90
percent on days I and 2. to 85 percent on days 3-5.
and to 8)) percent on days 6 and T
~vidence on supplies in East Germany indi-
cates they are sufficient to support at least three
weeks of intense combat operations by forward-de-
ployed tactical air regiments. Moreover, most Soviet
tactical air regiments probably stockpile enough POL
and ordnance at their main operating bases to sustain
three to seven days of combat operations independent-
r, %I I
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Although sufficient quantities of material apparently
are available at the front level to sustain combat
operations for several weeks, the peacetime logistics
system could not move supplies from depots to main
operating bases at a rate necessary to support wartime
operations without a substantial augmentation of
manpower. Logistic units responsible for moving these
supplies are manned in peacetime at only 30 to 40
percent of their wartime levels,
The distribution problem will be
further compounded during wartime by the expansion
in supply links necessary to meet rebasing and dis-
persal requirements.
Manning. Peacetime assigned manning in forward-
deployed Soviet fighter and fighter-bomber regiments
is approximately 70 to 80 percent of wartime autho-
rized strength (see figure 2). The regimental elements
that are manned at the lowest levels in peacetime are
the headquarters unit, the aviation engineering ser-
vices unit (TECh), and individual squadron mainte-
nance sections. Squadron aircrews appear to be
manned at or very near wartime authorized levels.
Peacetime assigned manpower in key units that sup-
port the tactical regiments, however, falls far short of
the numbers required to sustain wartime operations.
Peacetime manning levels of aircrews appear ade-
quate to meet wartime requirements. Soviet tactical
air regiments in the forward area generally maintain
an aircrew-to-aircraft ratio of 1.5 to 1 during peace-
time, which appears sufficient to ensure adequate
aircrew availability to allow for personnel on leave
and TDY
Peacetime manning deficiencies are significant in the
signals and radiotechnical battalion (OBSRTO) and
the airfield technical battalion (OBATO). The
OBSRTO provides communications and navigational
support to regimental aircraft during flight opera-
tions, and the OBATO maintains runways, provides
airbase logistic support to flight operations, and car-
ries out routine airfield maintenance. These units
provide support to the combat operations of the
regiments but are administratively subordinate to
other authorities. During peacetime both probably are
manned at about 50 percent of their authorized
wartime strength. In the case of the OBATO, only
about two-thirds of those assigned during peacetime
serve in functions that directly support regimental
flight operations.
Manning deficiencies in these units have limited
impact on peacetime training operations. During war-
time, however, these deficiencies would become criti-
cal, partly because of the significantly increased
tempo of airbase operations required to sustain war-
time sortie rates,' but, more important, because of
additional strains imposed by the rebasing and dis-
persal of tactical air regiments.
Soviet doctrine stresses that during air unit rebasing it
is necesary to maintain a minimum of two-thirds of
the assigned forces in a status that allows them to
conduct maximum-range operations. Because of the
extensive demands of supporting regimental opera-
tions at alternate airfields and highway landing strips
and the increased demands of wartime operations, the
workload of in-place manpower would be considerably
higher at the outset of a war that began with little or
no warning than during either normal peacetime
operations or after wartime mobilization
Sortie Generation
Forward-deployed Soviet fighter and fighter-bomber
regiments in Europe generally fly only three days per
week and conduct aircraft maintenance on alternate
z A sortie is a single flight by a single aircraft. Sortie rates represent
the number of sorties flown in a given time period (generally one
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Figure 2
Manning Levels of Soviet Fighter and Fighter-Bomber Regiments
in Central Europe
Regimental
Commander
Headquarters
Staff
Aviation SQDN I SQDN 2
Engineering
Services
Unit
11 I fighter regiments h;nc hetween Jill and -0 men,
depending on tine type of lighter assigned (units with
newer generation uirertl) generally hire higher
manning Iball those with older models) l ighter-
homber regiments have hetween 500 and S51) men.
-------------
Airfield Signals and
Technical Radio-
Battalion technical
Battalion
days. This amounts to a peacetime sortie rate of
approximately 1.5 sorties per aircraft per flying day.'
Soviet doctrinal writings indicate that
during the first few days of a war tactical air regi-
ments may be required to generate two to three sorties
per aircraft per day, and in some cases, more. This
increase in the daily aircraft sortie rate, combined
' These figures are derived from Soviet fighter regiments operating
in the forward area and are based on a regimental strength of 36
operational aircraft and 60 aircrews with 140 sorties per aircrew
with the wartime requirement to fly at least six
consecutive days, would result in a regimental sortie
generation requirement two to three times that of the
peacetime rate.' Without any reinforcement of as-
signed squadron and TECh maintenance manpower,
These calculations discuss sortie "requirement" and assume a
constant two sorties per aircraft per day. They do not account for
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the workload on each assigned maintenance man to
generate wartime sortie rates would increase by at
least the same factor
Extensive hard use of tactical aircraft would be likely
to raise the ratio of maintenance hours to flight hours.
Aircraft losses would effectively increase the ratio of
maintenance personnel to remaining aircraft, but this
increase would probably be more than offset by the
increase in the number of maintenance hours required
to prepare remaining aircraft for combat after extend-
ed periods of operation relying on limited turnaround
maintenance.' Additional strains would be placed on
maintenance crews by the wartime requirement to
support flight operations out of one or more alternate
airfields or highway landing strips.
Implications
Soviet tactical air regiments in Central Europe are
capable of generating a substantial defense from their
peacetime posture within a matter of hours. They
maintain high peacetime operational readiness rates,
near-wartime manning levels among squadron air-
crews, and airbase stockpiles of aircraft munitions
and fuel sufficient to immediately support defensive
operations for a short period. The Soviets are not
nearly so well prepared, however, to mount and
sustain sizable offensive operations using in-place
forces. Such operations would require substantial
preparation and manpower reinforcement, which
To bring Soviet air forces in Central Europe to
wartime strength would require augmenting the
peacetime assigned strength of some 47,000 men with
at least 18,000 men. The most significant shortfalls
are in the OBATOs (7,700 men), tactical air regi-
ments (5,000 men), and the OBSRTOs (5,500 men).
While these figures are modest when compared with
the manning requirements of Soviet ground forces in
Central Europe, they represent 25 percent of the total
wartime authorization for in-place tactical air regi-
ments and 50 percent of that for the OBSRTO and
Soviet tactical air forces in Central Europe would be
prepared for war at the same time as the ground
forces. The far greater and competing demands of the
ground forces would limit the capacity of transporta-
tion resources to move personnel to fill out air units.
Thus, the preparation time for the air forces is likely
to be about the same as that for the ground forces-
approximately two weeks.
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could take weeks to accomplish.
' USAF studies have shown that the three most important factors
influencing sortie generation rates are battle damage repair capa-
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3ecrei
Gorbachev's Antialcohol
Program
The antialcohol campaign, launched in May and
given further impetus by subsequent measures, is
sharply reducing alcohol sales and public drinking.
Although a core of concerned citizens strongly sup-
ports the program in toto and almost everyone claims
to favor eliminating the worst alcohol abuses, many
reportedly believe the campaign is moving too far too
fast. General Secretary Gorbachev is pushing the
campaign for its potential economic and social bene-
fits. He is also signaling that he intends to force the
pace of change. The campaign will test Gorbachev's
leadership. Success would strengthen him politically;
failure could damage his reputation for tough and
effective leadership.
The extent of the Soviet alcohol problem is indicated
by the following statistics:
? Drinking on the job has become widespread; one
Soviet estimate published in Komsomol'skaya
Pravda indicated 30 percent of the workers drink at
the workplace.
? The rate of alcohol poisonings from impurities in
industrial alcohol products and home brew-is by
far the largest in the world and has quadrupled
since 1960.
Genesis of the Campaign
Over the last 30 years, an apparent doubling of per
capita consumption of alcohol has aggravated a wide
range of social and economic problems (see inset). Past
leaderships tried to deal with the problem with three
noisy but unsuccessful antialcohol campaigns. Previ-
ous efforts were weakened by a conflict of interest
because the regime valued spirits as a means of
diverting demand from other consumer goods, as a
large source of tax revenue, and as an escape valve for
frustrations. In recent years, however, the leadership's
concern about alcohol abuse has grown. Disturbing
studies of the negative effects of Soviet alcohol abuse
have become increasingly prevalent in the Soviet
popular and scholarly press in recent years, indicating
a growing sense of alarm among the elite.
Several factors probably account for Gorbachev's
decision to move boldly against the alcohol problem.
He probably believed:
? The campaign would demonstrate his personal pow-
er and the regime's capacity for vigorous action to
effect change, without involving a major commit-
ment of resources.
? Alcoholism is a major factor contributing to the
rapidly rising Soviet divorce rate. Women note it as
a contributing cause in over one-half of their di-
vorce petitions.
? According to Minister of Internal Affairs Fedor-
chuk, 70 to 80 percent of all public misbehavior and
vandalism is committed by people under the influ-
ence of alcohol. Drunk people commit 67 percent of
violent crimes that result in convictions.
? Alcohol abuse was probably a major cause of
adverse trends in Soviet mortality figures in the
1970s. The Soviet Union is the only industrialized
country in which male life expectancy fell (from age
67 in 1964 to age 62 in 1980) and infant mortality
rose (from 22.9 per 1,000 in 1970 to 31.1 per 1,000
in 1975).
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? The political environment was propitious. New
elites beholden to him had been put into key
positions, and the law enforcement apparatus had
been purged of some of its most corrupt elements
and its powers enhanced since Brezhnev's death.
? The campaign was compatible with-and perhaps
necessary to-his effort to tighten social discipline
and spur economic growth, and it complements his
announced plans to improve consumer welfare.
Apparent Objectives
The antialcohol program has two objectives: the short-
run, limited goal of curtailing the worst excesses of
alcohol abuse largely through punitive actions; and
the more ambitious, long-run objective of bringing
about a fundamental change in the people's attitudes
toward and habits of alcohol use-through education,
medical treatment, and alternatives for consumers.
These objectives are not mutually exclusive, but there
is some tension between them; the Soviet leadership
itself has probably not decided which approach it
intends to emphasize.
Gorbachev, for example, reportedly is chiefly interest-
ed in eliminating drinking on the job, which he sees as
a major obstacle to improving labor productivity. He
has publicly ruled out passing a "dry law," however,
saying that "this approach has not justified itself in
any country." Yet, the campaign is being implement-
ed in the typically Soviet fashion of attempting to
Program Specifics
The alcohol control initiative was approved at the
4 April 1985 Politburo meeting, at which "overcom-
ing the monstrous phenomenon of alcoholism" was
labeled a top national priority. On 17 May a Central
Committee decree called for all party and government
organs to "intensify the struggle against alcoholism."
Simultaneously, a Council of Ministers decree set
forth 28 orders to this end. The Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet enacted a statute stiffening parts of
the legal code dealing with alcohol consumption, sale,
and production. Since these initial steps, other imple-
menting measures have been taken. These measures
restrict sales and production of alcohol, increase
penalties for alcohol abusers and illegal suppliers,
punish supervisers who tolerate drinking on the job,
raise the drinking age, expand treatment facilities,
improve recreational alternatives, intensify antialco-
hol propaganda, and establish a mass temperance
society (see inset).
Implementation and Impact
Because of energetic enforcement, the campaign has
touched most Soviet citizens, especially in Slavic
areas where heavy drinking is most severe. The
regime has sharply cut back the availability of alco-
holic beverages, and alcohol sales are reported by the
Central Statistical Administration to have fallen by a
third. The regime has also sought to make illegal
production of alcoholic beverages riskier, by stepping
up police raids on stills and stiffening penalties for
trade violators (see inset).
nates' behavior.
Gorbachev has put managers and officials on notice
that they will be held responsible for their subordi-
is said to have become a prerequisite for party
membership, and a number of middle-level officials
have lost their jobs or received reprimands. The
widespread belief that Grigoriy Romanov's drinking
was a factor in his removal from the Politburo has
probably also had a sobering effect on senior officials.
The campaign has visibly affected public order. Pub-
lic drunkenness has largely disappeared in most big
cities. In his 6 November Revolution Day speech,
KGB chief Chebrikov credited the campaign with a
decline in the crime rate and an improvement in
family life. drinking
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The main provisions of Gorbachev's antialcohol pro-
gram are:
? Law enforcement crackdown: Police are directed to
aggressively pursue violators on the streets, in
public places, and homes; the Procuracy is directed
to prosecute all possible criminal cases; and the
judiciary is directed to sentence severely. Party
organs and control commissions are to seek out
administrative violations and managerial laxness.
? Reduction in availability of alcohol: The opportuni-
ty to purchase alcohol is sharply curtailed. Sale
hours are reduced by four hours to 1400 to 1900 on
weekdays; liquor outlets are to be closed near
workplaces, schools, transportation, health facili-
ties, public recreation, and most other areas of
general congregation. Curtailment of alcohol pro-
duction is to begin gradually in 1986.
? Curtailing teenage drinking: The legal drinking age
is raised from 18 to 21. Parents or others who
contribute to a minor's drunkenness can be fined or
imprisoned.
? Increasing penalties for alcohol violations: Fines and
sentences have in general been doubled. Drinking in
public or on the job is now punishable by fines
equivalent to one to two weeks' pay. Repeat offend-
ers receive pay cuts and lose perquisites. Incorrigi-
ble alcoholics are likely to be sentenced to involun-
tary treatment (involving dangerous antabuse
therapy) or sentenced to two years of hard labor in
an expanded network of "treatment-labor camps. "
The campaign may have con-
quarter slump this year
the campaign was initially wel-
comed by many citizens and still enjoys substantial
support. For example, many industrious workers be-
lieve that alcoholism was completely out of control
and are grateful to Gorbachev for doing something
? Curtailing home brew production and sales: Penal-
ties for making, selling, and purchasing home brew
are increased. An aggressive law enforcement cam-
paign against illegal distillers is mandated.
? Holding managers and officials responsible: Public
and managerial officials must eliminate drinking
by subordinates or face public reprimands and
potential dismissal.
? Changing social attitudes and habits: Propaganda
and education are to be intensified and revitalized.
Voluntary participation of citizens in the antialco-
hol campaign is to be encouraged through an all-
union temperance society and sobriety clubs for
reformed alcoholics.
? Providing alternatives to alcohol: Construction of
community facilities and production of home re-
pair, gardening, and hobby goods are to be acceler-
ated so that the masses will have better ways to use
their leisure. Production of nonalcoholic beverages
is to increase sharply.
? Expanding the treatment of individual alcoholics: A
nationwide system of treatment facilities is to be
completed, building on the existing "narcological"
centers. To be expanded are treatment hospitals,
voluntary counseling for early-stage alcohol abus-
ers, production of medicines, and training of person-
nel.
about it. Women also strongly support the campaign
for helping control the drinking of their husbands.
Even before Gorbachev initiated the campaign, tem-
perance societies had been organized in several cities;
in July one of these publicly protested that Gorba-
chev's program did not go far enough. The regime has
endeavored to capitalize on this public support by
enlisting volunteers to help with enforcement, includ-
ing informing on violators.
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Vigorous enforcement of the antialcohol measures,
however, is encountering significant resistance from
the public.
Long lines at liquor stores are reportedly
filled with sullen, angry workers, defiantly absent
from their jobs. When stocks have run out or service
has been slow, the crowds have become unruly and
people have been hurt. Disturbances related to the
antialcohol campaign have been reported in four
Soviet cities.
Many moderate drinkers are reportedly irritated by
the inconveniences the antialcohol measures have
caused them. They believe the campaign should be
limited to attacking excessive rather than moderate
drinking.
The measures may also have increased opportunities
for black-marketeers and corrupt officials. According
to the Leningrad Consulate, the black-market price of
vodka has nearly doubled. Moreover, Pravda reported
in August that consumption of dangerous substitutes,
such as perfume and industrial alcohol, had led to a
sharp rise in alcohol poisonings.
US Embassy officers this
summer observed that in many areas of Ukraine,
Georgia, and Armenia the regulations appeared to be
loosely enforced, if at all.
Outlook
The regime's performance in implementing the cam-
paign so far clearly indicates that Gorbachev is
strongly committed to eliminating the more conspicu-
ous forms of alcohol abuse that are most damaging to
the society and the economy-such as public drunk-
enness and drinking at the workplace-as well as to
significantly reducing overall alcohol consumption. If
he achieves these objectives, the effect on labor
productivity, mortality rates, and crime could be
significant. The regime, however, cannot monitor and
completely control private consumption of home brew,
which constitutes an estimated 20 percent of alcohol
consumption. Illegal distilling and distribution on the
black market, which has not yet had time to expand
its supply networks, will to some extent make up for
Attitudes of the Elite
Some officials are concerned that the program is being
implemented with too much haste and without adequate
measures to prevent worker unrest. Others are said to
have privately criticized the program for attacking the
symptoms rather than the underlying causes of the
problem. Although the attack on alcohol abuse has been
accompanied by measures to upgrade the production of
consumer goods, provide more recreational facilities,
and increase production of nonalcoholic beverages, these
decrees have not yet had a significant effect.
some Soviet officials be-
lieve it was a mistake to move strongly against alcohol
consumption in the absence of other outlets for workers'
frustrations.
Some officials are also said to feel vulnerable to accusa-
tions that they have committed drinking offenses. They
fear anonymous informers and malicious denunciations
by grudge-bearing colleagues. Others have expressed
concern that the cutback in alcohol production and sales
might produce economic problems, because alcohol has
been a major source of state revenue-about 10 percent
of the state budget
decreased availability of liquor in state stores.
The sustainability of the campaign will be tested by
rising tensions in society. These may be alleviated
somewhat over time if the regime is able to make
substantial progress in improving consumer welfare
and in providing recreational alternatives to drinking.
But, in the short run, a real threat of spontaneous
protest activity and violence will exist. This threat
may intensify if Gorbachev moves to adopt other
policy changes that jeopardize the workers' sense of
security-such as increasing wage inequality and
giving more authority to managers to fire undisci-
plined or surplus workers
Thus, the stakes are high for Gorbachev. Success in
managing the campaign would benefit the economy
while enhancing his reputation and the regime's im-
age. Failure would tarnish his image as a strong and
effective leader]
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The Soviet Computer
Literacy Program:
Industrial Constraints
In March 1985, the Politburo endorsed a program to
provide up to 10 million personal computers (PCs) to
secondary and vocational schools over the next de-
cade. The decision is part of an overall plan to
increase computer literacy and thereby accelerate
scientific and technical progress and spur develop-
ment of high-technology industries. Although techni-
cal and political problems are likely to frustrate the
program for the first few years, the long-term promise
for the development and modernization of Soviet
industry is considerable. The Soviets will have to rely
on Western computers in the early years of the
program, but they hope to substantially increase the
output of domestic PCs by the late 1980s. A deal for a
Western turnkey PC plant is the favored solution, but
COCOM restrictions are a major obstacle.
Background
The long leadtime for the program-the main part of
the program is to be implemented in 1991-2000-
reflects the current state of affairs in the Soviet
computer industry. According to Intelligence Com-
munity estimates, computer hardware lags that of the
West by four to 10 years. The software industry has
virtually no experience in developing software for
PCs, and a lack of technical services and spare parts
continues to frustrate users.
The most serious obstacle to the computer literacy
program remains the shortage of PC hardware and
required peripherals such as disk drives, floppy disks,
and printers. Domestic production of PCs did not
begin until 1983, and technical problems probably
will limit production runs and reliability for the next
several years.
Announced Objectives
In January 1985, the Politburo approved a program
for the development, production, and use of computer
technology and automated systems up to the year
2000. The goal of this program is to reequip the Soviet
economy on the basis of computer technology and
microelectronics, thereby increasing labor productivi-
ty, raising product quality, and improving manage-
ment and decisionmaking. The first area to be target-
ed is the machine-building sector, where Gorbachev
has given a high priority to further automating the
manufacture of such complex goods as automobiles,
tanks, aircraft, and electronic systems.
The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Coun-
cil of Ministers also passed a resolution ' in early 1985
to foster widespread use of computers in Soviet
education. While envisioning improvements in the
teaching process for many subjects, the resolution is
aimed mainly at familiarizing students with computer
technology, programing, and applications-thereby
supporting the modernization program. According to
a variety of Soviet statements, the program's overall
objectives are to:
? Provide the domestic computer industry with a
large, steady market for PCs and related equipment.
? Help ease the critical shortage of skilled
programers.
? Break down some of the resistance to computer use
on the part of industrial workers and managers.
Soviet interest in computerization appears to stem
from the belief that the USSR is forgoing many of the
educational, industrial, and scientific advantages that
are apparent in the Western "computer revolution."
The literacy program will contribute to the computer-
ization effort by fostering a greater acceptance and
general knowledge of computers and their uses. It
should also help alleviate the serious shortage of
skilled programers and computer users by creating a
pool of people who can more readily benefit from
advanced training and by identifying talented stu-
dents for accelerated teaching programs.
' "On Further Improvements in General Secondary Education for
Young People and Better Operation of General Education
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Industrial Capabilities
The biggest obstacle to the implementation of the
computer literacy program is supplying and maintain-
ing the necessary computer equipment. According to
the Academy of Sciences' Andrey Yershov, more than
50,000 computer labs equipped with a million PCs
will be needed just to implement the first, or prepara-
tory, level of the program. To give an indication of the
immensity of the task, a recent Trud article reported
that the Soviet computer industry is scheduled to
deliver about 1,300 PCs to schools this school year
and that 200 classrooms equipped with foreign-made
computers for ninth-grade students were to open in
the fall. During PC purchase negotiations with the
Japanese and Australians, the Soviets indicated that
they plan to equip each school with a single module of
16 to 20 computers. According to this scenario,
approximately 265 schools (or less than 1 percent of
all secondary schools in the USSR) will have their
own computers this school year.
the USSR is about eight years behind the West
in the development of computer technology. The
Soviets have particular difficulty producing personal
computers. The primary Soviet-produced PC-a copy
of the Apple-has been plagued with performance
and production problems and is unlikely to meet the
needs of the computer literacy program, either quanti-
tatively or qualitatively, for at least the first phase. A
computer expert who operated the machine,
known as the Agat, described the inside as a "night-
marish wiring maze," indicating that the printed
circuit boards and other components had been con-
nected by obsolete and unreliable point-to-point hard-
wire methods. This construction technique is prohibi-
tively labor intensive and not readily adaptable to
more than 1,000 PCs will be
produced during this school year, this number is
dwarfed in the West by IBM alone, which sold 1.5
million of its PCs and PCjrs in 1984.
PCs.
The Soviet computer industry also has been unable to
provide its customers with adequate maintenance
support. According to recent articles in the Soviet
open press, industrial and economic enterprises are
having trouble obtaining reliable technical service for
their computers. Problems cited included a lack of
spare parts, a shortage of trained personnel, and an
incentive system that actually encourages shoddy
repairs. The head of the Soviet institute responsible
for purchasing foreign-made PCs for the literacy
program, academician Boris Naumov, admitted that
servicing computers is currently beyond the power of
most schools. He said that allocation decisions in the
early stages of the program will be based on the
ability of the schools to provide maintenance for the
Acquiring Western Computers
The most attractive vehicle for meeting long-term
program objectives, while simultaneously improving
domestic production capabilities, probably is the pur-
chase of a Western-built turnkey computer plant.
Such a plant could be operational within two to three
years of a signed agreement and would prove an
effective mechanism to transfer Western production
technology and know-how. The Soviets have already
started negotiations with several Western companies
to build a PC plant in the USSR. A British journal
reported that, during Gorbachev's visit to England in
December 1984, Soviet officials met with representa-
tives of a British computer firm to discuss the con-
struction of a turnkey PC plant that could cost up to
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mass production
Yevgeniy P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR
Academy of Sciences and head of the Academy's
recently formed Department of Information Sciences,
Technology, and Automation, stated in a recent jour-
nal article that the Soviet Union produces only "do-
zens" of PCs per year. In addition, a recent Soviet
newspaper article pointed out that the Soviet comput-
er industry meets only 5 percent of the country's
purchase is questionable, however, because such a
plant would include the capability to make high-speed
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microprocessors, which have weapons applications.
The US Government has embargoed the sale of
computer plants to the USSR since 1979, and CO-
COM requires the unanimous approval of all member
nations.
Soviet interest in a Western-built turnkey plant has
centered primarily on a facility to manufacture so-
phisticated 16-bit machines of the IBM PCXT class.
This is the area where the Soviets need the most help,
and the acquisition of an entire plant would be an
attractive method of quickly obtaining an indigenous
capability. The Soviets also recognize the importance
of the more powerful PCs for industrial and economic
management applications and are eager to make them
more widely available as part of the industrial mod-
ernization effort. They are probably less interested in
a plant to build the smaller, eight-bit PCs-although
they would probably settle for this if necessary-both
because they can buy this type of computer more
readily from the West and because their own industry
is capable of producing eight-bit PCs in limited
numbers and may be capable of mass-producing them
in the near future with only limited Western assis-
tance.
To satisfy the immediate requirement for computers,
the USSR, spurred by recently relaxed COCOM
trade controls on certain PCs,' initiated negotiations
with several Western and Japanese firms to buy PCs
and related equipment. Several press reports indicated
in July that a Japanese trading company had outbid
26 computer firms from around the world (including
the US firm Apple) to win a contract to export 4,000
eight-bit personal computers and an undisclosed num-
ber of printers to the USSR. This is the first known
contract that the Soviets have signed with a Western
or Japanese firm for the purchase of PCs for their
literacy program.
2 Under new rules set by COCOM, Western companies are allowed
to sell low-powered, eight-bit microcomputers to the Soviets with-
out a license. These machines process data eight bits at a time,
rather than at the 16- or 32-bit rates of more powerful business
computers. They have fairly small memories and would be sold in
the West for $100 to $500 each as home computers. Sales of more
The Soviets have also been actively seeking more
powerful PCs to train advanced programers in techni-
cal schools and universities and to take advantage of
their data base and graphics capabilities to increase
the productivity of research and design work. In
December 1984 the Academy of Sciences placed an
initial order for 50 IBM PCXT computers, declaring
that it intended to purchase a total of 10,000 during
We believe the Soviets will focus their PC purchases
on a relatively small number of suppliers to ensure
that the incoming computers are compatible, both
with each other and with Soviet-produced models, and
to reduce the complexity of the arrangements for
maintenance and replacement. The Soviets will have
to work closely with Western suppliers to establish a
network for providing spare parts and installing and
servicing these machines. The Soviet record in ensur-
ing follow-on support to considerably less ambitious
Western-supported projects-such as major industrial
complexes-has been spotty at best. These support
activities also could drain resources from indigenous
Soviet development programs and could lead to a
dependence on Western equipment.
Despite the approaches being made to Western com-
puter firms, the USSR probably will limit PC pur-
chases to 4,000 to 5,000 machines for this school year.
The scale of such imports will be limited by the need
to preserve hard currency, the problem of providing
service and spare parts for the PCs, and the desire to
develop a domestic PC production capability as quick-
ly as possible.
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Outlook for the Program
The ultimate success, both of the literacy program
and of the computerization effort in general, will
depend on the Soviets' ability to manufacture and
service at least hundreds of thousands of reliable PCs
to overcome user resistance at the enterprise level.
Also, the concerns of party and economic planning
authorities over the impact of computerization must
be allayed (see inset).
Upgrading the performance of the computer industry
will require significant Western assistance, at least in
the short term, in the form of a turnkey plant or the
direct sale of computers and related equipment. We
believe the Soviets will be able to mass-produce the
less powerful eight-bit PCs needed for the school
program in the near term, but the production of the
more sophisticated 16-bit business computers, which
will be needed for industrial applications, will contin-
ue to be a problem for the foreseeable future. Produc-
tion difficulties in this area, unless the Soviets can
obtain a turnkey plant, will hinder efforts to automate
industrial facilities.
Hard currency limits and the concern that depen-
dence on foreign sources of technology may stifle
domestic development programs are likely to prevent
imports of large numbers of PCs and peripherals from
the West as a short-term solution. Moscow may put
pressure on its suppliers in Eastern Europe to increase
the quantity and improve the quality of peripherals
exported to the Soviet Union. However, both the
performance and availability of East European PC-
related peripherals are likely to fall short of Soviet
needs.
The most serious threat to US interests posed by the
literacy program is the potential transfer of a turnkey
plant that would provide the Soviet computer industry
with much-needed Western production know-how and
equipment. A turnkey facility for even eight-bit PCs
could significantly enhance Soviet production capabil-
ities. Since COCOM restrictions on eight-bit comput-
ers were relaxed in January 1985, the Soviets have
intensified their efforts to acquire a vertically inte-
grated plant capable of producing the entire range of
microelectronic devices and peripheral units-such as
microprocessors, disk drives, and printers-that make
up a personal computer. Experience in producing
these subsystems would benefit the computer industry
There is some opposition to the current approach to
the computer literacy program on political, economic,
scientific, social, and ideological grounds:
? Soviet industrialists and scientists argue that the
USSR can produce the needed high-quality circuits
and PCs, and that plans to import Western PCs will
stifle domestic development.
? Party and police officials probably view widespread
use of computers as a threat to the traditional state
monopoly of information in the USSR. In a society
that tightly controls access to duplicating equip-
ment, the prospect of millions of personal comput-
ers-each a printing press when coupled with a
printer and word processing software-alarms the
political leadership.
? Central authorities probably fear that, if computer-
ization leads to replacing paper records with elec-
tronic recordkeeping, embezzlement or report pad-
ding by managers skilled in computer manipulation
will become nearly impossible to detect. Falsifica-
tion of data by factory managers is already a
serious problem, and a major increase would fur-
ther erode the integrity of statistical data upon
which central authorities base their planning and
management decisions.
? Party officials also evidently fear the social conse-
quences of computerization. These include:forma-
tion of "utilitarian rational" values that would
undermine party ideology, greater social inequality,
computer-created unemployment, and development
of "computer fetishism" among officials who view
computerization as a cure-all for economic and
organizational problems.
generally. The transfer of an eight-bit PC plant could
also provide an opening wedge for later acquisition of
technology to produce the more sophisticated 16-bit
PCs required for many military and industrial appli-
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Stalin's Ghost in Contemporary
Soviet Politics
Despite the passage of more than 30 years, treatment
of Joseph Stalin and his policies remains a highly
charged political issue. The images conjured up by
references to Stalin are both internally contradictory
and inconsistent in their impact on various elements
of the Soviet populace. This presents both a problem
and an opportunity for the regime. Soviet domestic
propaganda attempts to exploit broad public nostalgia
for such "positive" aspects of Stalin's rule as national
unity and social order, economic progress and effi-
ciency, and strong leadership-as a means of shoring
up regime legitimacy at home and marshaling support
for the USSR's international role-while avoiding
endorsement of the "negative" aspects of his leader-
ship that frighten important segments of the public.
At the same time, the Stalin symbol is employed in
intraelite politics to promote or oppose various policies
associated with his name. As with the general public,
however, elite political sensitivities about Stalin are so
powerful that use of his image as a political weapon
can backfire unless great care is exercised. Indiscrimi-
nate praise of Stalin would antagonize key elites, such
as the military and the more liberal elements of the
intelligentsia, who suffered greatly during the purge
years. A blanket condemnation of him, however,
would alienate those rightwing intellectual and mana-
gerial elites who see Stalin as a symbol of the
established order and who might fear that renewing
the attack on him would undermine regime legitima-
Evolution of Treatment of Stalin
From His Death Until 1979. The dominant desire of
most of the Soviet elite and general population in the
years immediately following Stalin's death was for a
relaxation of Stalinist internal controls. Khrushchev
attempted to exploit this yearning for political ends by
moving toward a limited "de-Stalinization." He asso-
ciated himself with the exposure of Stalin's abuses of
power, ended political terror, rehabilitated many
purge victims, and permitted a "thaw" in cultural and
intellectual life. Equally as important, Khrushchev
capitalized on the Stalin issue to purge the KGB and
to move against rivals within the leadership closely
identified with Stalin.
clear-cut "line" on the Stalin issue emerged.
Khrushchev's condemnation of the worst abuses of
Stalin alarmed many other leaders, who were con-
cerned that going too far toward de-Stalinization
might prove politically destabilizing and who feared
being implicated in Stalin's crimes. Immediately after
Khrushchev's removal in October 1964, the official
denigration of Stalin was halted, and a period of
uneasy official silence about the dictator settled in.
During this period Soviet leaders occasionally com-
mented favorably on Stalin's wartime role or dispar-
aged his violations of "Soviet legality." Generally, 25X1
however, references to Stalin were avoided and no
Since 1979. By the late 1970s several developments
impelled many citizens and lower level elites to move
toward a more positive appraisal of Stalin:
? Economic growth rates declined and class lines
hardened, causing many Soviets to recall with nos-
talgia the "good old days" under Stalin, when rapid
industrialization created vast opportunities for up-
ward social mobility.
? The memory of Stalin's repressions ebbed, official
ideology grew stale, and popular cynicism about
regime propaganda increased.
? Society became less orderly and disciplined, and
social pathologies such as crime and corruption
grew.
? Many citizens unfavorably contrasted the drift of
policy under Brezhnev with the tough leadership
associated with Stalin.
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since the late 1970s
many Soviet citizens from various walks of life
have become increasingly attracted to the Stalin
symbol.
Stalin as a positive and heroic figure. A recent USIA
poll of Westerners who have had extensive contact
with Soviet elites suggested that about 85 percent of
senior Soviet officials and 67 percent of middle-level
officials felt that the Soviet people need a strong
leader, although many of them preferred a leader
more tolerant and "sophisticated" than Stalin was.
As a consequence of these phenomena, in 1979, on the
100th anniversary of Stalin's birth, the regime articu-
lated an official policy on the public portrayal of
Stalin's historical role designed to exploit the Stalin
"myth"-and, in particular, the World War II
years-to legitimize the system and strengthen patrio-
tism. The new party line portrayed the dictator as a
"complicated" leader who deserves credit for his
contributions-particularly his wartime leadership of
the country-but whose "errors and blunders" and
"gross violations" of law cannot be ignored. A 1979
article in the authoritative party journal Kommunist
took the same tack, calling Stalin "neither an angel
nor a demon," and this view of Stalin became stan-
dard.
By maintaining that each aspect of Stalin's activity
must be considered discretely in its own particular
historical context, the regime ruled out an overall
evaluation of Stalin and attempted to ward off infer-
ences that Stalin's personal "excesses" were in any
way endemic to the Soviet system or that other Soviet
leaders could be linked to his deeds-notions that
have been anathema to the regime since Khrushchev
first exposed Stalin's crimes in 1956. In actual prac-
tice, however, the official line-by providing for both
positive and negative portrayals-has encouraged a
continued veiled debate about Stalin in the Soviet
media
Current Debate Over Stalin. Brezhnev's death and the
ensuing leadership review of internal policy in a
succession environment have given impetus to the
debate within the Soviet elite over how to deal with
the Stalin issue. Some Soviet commentators have
pushed harder to extend the selective rehabilitation of
Stalin as war leader to more sensitive areas of his rule,
while others have voiced criticism of his policies.
ship.
Stalin's wartime role remains a controversial issue.
Over the past year and a half, propagandists have
unleashed a flood of new films and printed materials
in celebration of the 40th anniversary of victory over
Nazi Germany. Much of this propaganda provides
extensive and positive treatment of Stalin's leader-
But recent media references to Stalin have not been
uniformly positive. In two major World War II
documentaries-a film on Marshal Zhukov's life re-
leased in December 1984 and a March 1985 television
film-Stalin was shown ignoring or rejecting the
advice of military leaders to prepare for war. A
previously unpublished section of the memoirs of
former Politburo member and close Stalin associate
Anastas Mikoyan that appeared in a recent issue of
an important historical journal also presents a nega-
tive picture of Stalin. He is depicted as rejecting
warnings of other leaders on the eve of the war and
failing to give strong leadership after the Nazi attack.
A selection from Zhukov's reminiscences published in
Izvestiya in May 1985 and a tribute to former
Defense Minister Ustinov in a March 1985 issue of
Sovetskaya Rossiya portrayed Stalin as highhanded
and unfair in his treatment of subordinates.
Aside from continued ambivalence about Stalin's
behavior as a wartime leader, there have been new
signs of controversy over his general reputation. Some
elites have pushed for a broader rehabilitation of
Stalin:
? An authority on Lenin described Stalin in a Novem-
ber 1984 Sovetskaya Rossiya article as a vital
supporter of Lenin in 1917 and one of a new "finely
honed type of professional revolutionary."
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? A May 1985 Sovetskaya Rossiya literary review
article tried to exonerate Stalin from persecution of
peasants during collectivization and to present him
as the voice of moderation and mercy during the
"tragic events" of 1933.
? In 1983 a novel by Ivan Stadnyuk, which portrayed
Stalin as a basically sympathetic figure and was
attacked in the media in 1974 for historical inaccu-
racies, was pulled out of obscurity and awarded the
State Prize for Literature. The Komsomol's literary
journal Molodaya Gvardiya recently serialized an-
other Stadnyuk novel, which praises Stalin not only
as a wartime strategist but also as a compassionate
person.
? A historical World War II novel by the conservative
editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta, Aleksandr Cha-
kovsky, serialized in 1983-84, showed Stalin as a
wise and firm diplomat who outshone Roosevelt.F_
At the same time, critical media references to Stalin
continue to appear:
? A January 1984 Izvestiya article stated that Stalin's
erroneous nationalities policy was "refuted" by Le-
nin during his last days. Last year, articles by two
Central Committee officials in the journal Voprosy
Filosojii repudiated Stalin's theory that the class
struggle intensifies as socialism develops-which he
used to justify repression of ethnic and social
groups.
? The reformist economist Yevgeniy Ambartsumov in
a 1984 Molodoy Kommunist article criticized Sta-
lin's adherence to only the repressive aspects of
Lenin's teachings.
? Literaturnaya Gazeta in April 1985 and Izvestiya
in May 1985 implicitly condemned Stalin's purges.
? The prominent poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko-whose
poem published in Pravda in 1962 was one of the
most famous public attacks on Stalin in the
Khrushchev period-has again publicly derided
him. A new Yevtushenko poem in the 9 September
Pravda indirectly maligned Stalin (without naming
him) by mocking Trofim Lysenko-the pseudogene-
ticist who was a favorite of Stalin. The poem also
criticized Stalin's refusal to allow the USSR to
enter the computer age and his repression of Bulga-
kov's innovative novel Master and Margarita.
The proliferation of both positive and negative refer-
ences to Stalin suggests heightened debate over
whether to move toward greater reform or greater
repression in various areas-including economic, cul-
tural, and nationalities policies.
Gorbachev's Position
Like his immediate predecessors, Gorbachev appears
to have adopted a differentiated approach toward the
Stalin issue. A self-described friend from their stu-
dent days at Moscow State University law school-
the emigre former Czechoslovak Communist Party
secretary Zdenek Mlynar-has written that in 1952
Gorbachev confided his distaste for Stalin's arrests of
political opponents. Also, there are some indications
that he has resisted the efforts of leaders who want to
go further in rehabilitating Stalin. On the other hand,
he clearly sees a political value in evoking Stalin's
name to gain support for some of the policies he is
promoting
In his 8 May 1985 speech commemorating the 40th
anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, Gorba-
chev referred to Stalin as head of the State Defense
Committee, which, together with the Central Com-
mittee, guided the party's "gigantic" war effort.
Gorbachev praised the "efficiency" of Stalin's cen-
tralized war economy, which was guaranteed by the
"immutable authority" of the state plan, "discipline
and strict responsibility," "initiative" of workers and
scientists, and the "organizing abilities" of industrial
managers. This statement could be read as Gorba-
chev's own prescription for economic success and as
an appeal for support for his discipline and order
campaigns. Gorbachev probably was also sensitive to
the need to allay fears that he would institute radical
liberalizing changes and to rally support among the
military and conservative elements in the bureaucracy
and population. Gorbachev balanced these positive
remarks, however, by listing "miscalculations on our
side" as one of the factors that contributed to the
early wartime defeats.
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The remarks offered by Gorbachev on this occasion
appear to have been carefully calibrated to present a
modulated picture of Stalin as a complex figure
worthy of both praise and blame for specifically
identified actions. This approach is consistent with
Gorbachev's insistence that official spokesmen must
discuss problems more openly so as to enhance the
credibility of regime propaganda. Thus, in his speech
to the December 1984 party ideological conference,
Gorbachev recommended a more realistic portrayal of
Soviet history, stating that, although the USSR has
achieved "great victories," it has experienced "errors,
failures, and mistakes" as well. A Pravda editorial of
17 January 1985 elaborated this theme, arguing that
history must be examined in all its complexity and not
"rewritten or erased." Matter-of-fact media refer-
ences to some other controversial Soviet historical
figures, such as Khrushchev, have increased over the
past year or two.
suggests that Gorbachev
is not in favor of any general rehabilitation of Stalin.
He reportedly opposed a proposal made in the spring
of 1985 to change the name of Volgograd-site of the
USSR's greatest wartime victory-back to Stalingrad
before the World War II anniversary celebrations.
Politburo member Grigoriy Romanov strongly
supported renaming Volgograd, and his clash with
Gorbachev over this issue became part of an ongoing
political battle between the two men, leading to a
"very serious" situation prior to Romanov's ouster
from the Politburo. According to dissident Soviet
historian Roy Medvedev, Chernenko had approved a
decree changing the city's name, which Gorbachev
canceled shortly after his accession. Gorbachev may
have opposed restoration of the city's old name be-
cause he believed such a move would be seen to signal
the complete rehabilitation of Stalin and a drastic
policy swing toward extremely repressive internal
policies.
Despite Gorbachev's efforts to tighten discipline and
strengthen social order, there are straws in the wind
suggesting that he might be inclined to move in the
direction of limited relaxation of strictures in some
areas of Soviet life:
? Yevtushenko, in a bold mid-December speech to the
Russian Republic Writers Union leaked to Western
journalists, insisted that Soviet writers must con-
front politically sensitive topics that have long been
taboo. He called for honest accounts of Stalin's
purges and the collectivization of agriculture and
frank treatment of current corruption among privi-
leged Soviet officials.
? According to Medvedev, Gorbachev has specifically
refused appointment requests by several pro-Stalin-
ist literary figures, such as Aleksandr Chakovsky.
? The new draft of the CPSU program published in
October includes a negative reference to the "per-
sonality cult"-a codeword for Stalin's abuse of
power.
It is possible that Gorbachev-although probably an
admirer of Stalin's centralized economic organization
and tight management of society-is also more in-
clined than some leaders to permit expanded internal
party discussion of policy options. Yevtushenko's
speech, the publication of his anti-Stalinist poem, and
the appearance of a few other literary works by
relatively liberal writers, suggest that Gorbachev may
be seeking ways of making cultural life more appeal-
ing to Soviet intellectuals, even as he tightens the
screws on overt dissidents.
Prospects
The Stalin issue will remain a political "hot potato"
and a bellwether of regime priorities as Gorbachev
fleshes out his programs in the coming months. The
regime may find it easier to deal with the issue of
Stalin's crimes in a few years, after Stalin's few
remaining lieutenants have left the scene.' But the
Vyacheslav Molotov-Stalin's Foreign Minister and Premier
was readmitted to the party in March 1984, on his 94th birthday,
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party formula of selective rehabilitation harbors fun-
damental contradictions. The regime's desire to create
a more neutral and believable historical record con-
flicts with its determination to convey the impression
that Stalin was an aberration in an otherwise flawless
system. The attempt to exploit the Stalin symbol as a
source of legitimacy conflicts with the goal of avoid-
ing association of the leadership with the negative
aspects of his rule. Moreover, if Gorbachev moves
very far to expand the bounds of permissible discus-
sion of the Stalin period, the process could prove
difficult to control. As happened during the cultural
"thaw" under Khrushchev, a limited relaxation of
strictures encourages pressure from intellectuals for
further liberalization. This, in turn, tends to generate
conservative counterpressures within the elite that
could reverse the process. These dilemmas will not be
easily resolved.
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Viewpoint
The views expressed in the following articles are the authors'; they do not
necessarily represent a CIA consensus.
Economic Reform?
Gertrude Shroeder coined the phrase "a treadmill of
reforms" to describe the historical Soviet tendency to
tinker with parts of the economic mechanism but to
maintain its underlying structure. Tinkering, by and
large, has not prevented a secular decline in Soviet
economic growth rates; thus we have no a priori
reasons to expect a surge in growth to result from
future tinkering.
Genuine reform would be more likely to have a major
effect on economic growth. Economic predictions are
heavily laced with the ceteris paribus clause-that is,
they are valid only if prior relationships hold. Eco-
nomic reform, by its very nature, seeks to change past
relationships. The key question, then, is how can we
discern between real reforms and tinkering camou-
flaged as reform?
The Soviet economic model, as I see it, has three key
characteristics that constitute its underlying struc-
ture. They are long-term centralized price formation,
central planning, and party intervention. In my view,
if these are changed we have a reform and thus a real
possibility of major positive or negative changes in
long-term growth prospects. If these three character-
istics are unchanged, we have tinkering, disguised as
reform.
Prices
In market economies, prices (including those in fu-
tures markets) result from allocating scarce resources
among different preferences. When an economy
grows, both relative scarcities and preferences change.
Economies are at their most efficient when prices can
change quickly to reflect new information regarding
changed scarcities and preferences. In market econo- 25X1
mies, when prices are sticky, inefficiencies such as
inventory buildup, spot shortages, or unemployment
can result (other reasons, such as poor judgment, can
cause these same phenomena, but sticky prices exac-
erbate the effects).
The Soviet economic model sets prices by administra-
tive fiat. Prices are usually based on the long-term
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ous period, plus a profit markup. Major price changes
occur infrequently, at intervals of six to 10 years. This
method of price formation ensures that prices exist
mainly for accounting purposes. They do not incorpo-
rate current information on either relative scarcities
or preferences. This inflexible price structure makes it
impossible for individuals, managers, and planners to
make optimal allocations of current resources, or to
make optimal preparations for the future. Even if
prices were adjusted annually and were based on the
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principle of marginal-as opposed to average-costs,
they could be, after a short time, inadequate signals
for rational decisionmaking.
Soviet economists occasionally propose permitting
bankruptcies as a reform. In the absence of prices that
reflect real scarcities, it is not clear that this would be
real reform. Just because a Soviet firm incurs losses
under administered prices does not mean it would
suffer losses under market prices. Permitting bank-
ruptcies without changing the price system could, at
least theoretically, eliminate those enterprises that
would make the most efficient use of resources if
prices reflected scarcities.
is poor, too many trucks will stand idle in the fields
when they could have been used elsewhere to advan-
tage. (These problems also exist in market economies,
but price signals and expected profits tend to motivate
individual entrepreneurs to correct temporary, unfore-
seen fluctuations in the economy.) Even if the weather
is perfect, Soviet planners make next year's plans on
the basis of last year's (or earlier) information, and
production relationships will have changed. Because
prices do not change in response to changes in produc-
tion possibilities, Soviet planners must wait for infor-
mation about changes to filter up through the hierar-
chy before they can reallocate resources. The
reallocation process causes further disruptions, as
enterprises or consumers with low priorities find that
their expected inputs have been delivered
Because Soviet prices do not contain the information
inherent in market-based, flexible prices, the Soviets
use an alternate method, central planning, which
attempts to allocate resources both to fulfill current
production goals and to generate future production
possibilities.
Central Planning
Soviet central planners seek to deliver the correct
inputs at the proper time and place so that a produc-
tion process can add labor and capital to generate the
outputs the central planners desire. Central planning
has two principal characteristics. Because of informa-
tion overload and span-of-control problems, it is hier-
archical. Thus the national-level planners allocate
tons of steel, a lower level planner allocates steel
types, and a still lower level planner allocates specific
lengths and diameters of steel pipes. There are too
many inputs and outputs in a modern economy for all
of them to be allocated in a specific and timely
manner by the center. Changing the number of levels
in a planning process is tinkering, not reform. Reduc-
ing levels will increase both the amount of informa-
tion to be processed and the number of decisions to be
made at every level. Increasing levels can hinder the
timeliness of information and decisions as they pass
up and down the hierarchy.
The other characteristic of central planning is that it
is always, to a degree, incorrect. Weather, for exam-
ple, is unpredictable. If a harvest is larger than
expected, central planners will find too few trucks in
the fields, and part of the crop will rot. If the weather
elsewhere.
Soviet central planners also allocate investment-the
wherewithal to produce goods in the future. If plan-
ners were omniscient, the capital goods produced each
year would be added to the next year's capital stock
and would be allocated perfectly so as to be capable of
producing the next year's desired assortment of goods.
However, if the plan is inconsistent, or not fulfilled, or
natural resource conditions deteriorate, or the plan-
ner's preferences change, investment will be allocated
inefficiently.
Faulty prices and the inevitable constraints on plan-
ning ensure that plans will be inconsistent and the
investment will be misallocated. Central planners will
react slowly to these distortions because information
about bottlenecks or surpluses will not get back to
them with the speed market pricing provides. They
will, however, learn of some of the distortions because
of the third characteristic of the Soviet economic
system-party intervention.
Party Intervention
The Communist Party reserves for itself the right
both to set long-term economic goals, by long-range
plans or by party congress resolutions, and to adjust
for the continual microfailures during a current plan
period. Thus, if in September of a given year a
temporary gasoline shortage occurs, it will be the
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party leadership that ultimately decides which "prior-
ity" project (the agro-industrial complex, the consum-
er program, the energy program, or the economic
experiment) will bear the brunt of the shortage.
Scarce resources will be allocated through a political
process, in part because the information required to
make economically rational decisions among compet-
ing claimants is lacking.
The political allocation of resources is rarely economi-
cally efficient. The Soviet system uses political inter-
vention to correct and compensate for some of the
more obvious or politically important errors that
result from the interaction of imperfect prices and
imperfect planning. This political intervention, while
ensuring the relative success of certain sectors, has its
own costs. It tends to increase uncertainty for most
actors in the system and to undermine what little
information on scarcity and preference is contained in
Soviet prices. Transferring resources away from rela-
tively productive sectors into troubled but politically
important sectors is not a prescription for efficient
economic growth
These characteristics of the Soviet system ensure that
there will be both current inefficiencies and future
possibilities to correct them. Thus, real reforms could
make significant contributions to future Soviet
growth. Conversely, tinkering, disguised as reform,
could exacerbate the problems of the system by
increasing the speed of the treadmill. How can we tell
the difference? I use the rules in the following
tabulation. '
Conclusions
Economic reform means that previous relationships no
longer hold. There can be economic changes, such as
lengthening the workday, that increase output per
year but do not change output per man-hour. We
must distinguish between such changes as permitting
people to make better decisions in their workdays
' It should be noted that elimination of administrative price forma-
tion, central planning, and large-scale party intervention-though
treated separately here for anaytical purposes-are interrelated.
Effective reform would almost certainly require simultaneous ac-
tion on all three fronts. Indeed, piecemeal or partial action could
make things worse. For example, curtailing party intervention
without also changing the rigid price structure could deprive the
USSR of a means of mitigating the misallocation of resources that
Prices
Reform Prices can be changed quickly, in response to chang-
ing conditions, and goods can be acquired at these
prices.
No reform Prices still change infrequently, or change by prede-
termined mechanical formulas.
Planning
Reform Hierarchical planning is abandoned, or supplemented 25X1
by some mechanism by which producers can bid
effectively for scarce resources.
No reform Central planning continues. Goals are set by the
center, and resources believed sufficient to achieve
these goals are allocated by the center on the basis of
a prior period's set of input-output relationships.
Restructuring the composition of investment or the
intersectoral, interregional, or intertemporal pattern
of investment is not a reform. This reflects a change
in planners' preference-a policy change, not a
change from central planning.
Administrative decentralization-reducing the power
of ministries relative to enterprises-is not a reform.
It is continued central planning with a different span
of control unless the enterprises simultaneously are
freed from Goskomtsen, Gosnab, and the party-
representing central pricing, central materials supply,
and central allocation of labor and capital.
Party intervention
Reform Party intervention is limited in scope and context.
When it occurs, it is tempered by economic opportu-
nity costs and based on realistic prices.
No reform Party intervention continually occurs when politically
important economic goals get more resources. These
interventions are conducted without reference to real,
(intensive growth) and changes that require longer
workdays (extensive growth). We should beware the
temptation to call a change a reform if it merely
increases output. The Soviets are well aware of the
difference between intensive and extensive growth.
They are trying to achieve the former, but their track
record indicates that they have achieved extensive
growth, even if the changes that produced it were
cloaked in the rhetoric of intensification. We should
be alert to the differences between tinkering and
reform so that we do not get caught up on a treadmill
of our own and lose sight of the true dynamics of the
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Assessing Soviet Economic Change:
Obstacles to Objective Analysis
nomic performance
Western analysts frequently use the word reform as a
kind of shorthand to describe attempts to improve the
Soviet economic system, applying it to specific mea-
sures that are far below the threshold of systemic
change. There are problems in using reform in this
way without careful definition. For example, others
may take the term more literally, read in interpreta-
tions and impressions that were not intended, and
make flawed comparisons that result in poor analysis.
Although careless use of the word lends itself to the
creation of interesting topics for debate, it may also
lead to discussion of false issues that can provide little,
if any, illumination on possibilities for economic
change in the USSR and their implications for eco-
leadership would likely be the last to admit it
An additional danger of describing proposals and
measures as reformist is that it attributes false mo-
tives to Soviet actions. The analyst labels Soviet
measures reforms, concludes after more thorough
study that the measures are not reforms but mere
tinkering within the system, and then blames the
Soviets for trying to disguise tinkering as reform!
However, the Soviets seldom use the word reform-
especially when describing specific measures taken to
improve economic performance-and would be more
likely, for political reasons, to try to disguise serious
proposals for "real reform," that is, changes in the
economic system, as merely tinkering. If continuous
tinkering should result in real reform, the Soviet
Too much attention to defining reform and identify-
ing measures as reformist or not can obscure less
theoretical, but essential questions such as how much
and what type of change is feasible and/or likely and
what are the most likely effects. In short, concern
about labels does not provide the best insight on where
the Soviet economy is going. Furthermore, it may
encourage tunnel vision and failure to examine alter-
native possibilities. This happens when the word
reform becomes a value judgment based on two
questionable assumptions: reform is the best method
for improving Soviet economic growth prospects, and
efficiency is the highest goal of an economic system
and the most important criterion for evaluating Soviet
economic performance.
In regard to the first assumption, we cannot totally
rule out possible "learning curve" effects; more effec-
tive tinkering may bring some improvement. While it
is true that piecemeal change may exacerbate prob-
lems, the opposite is also a possibility. Similarly, real
reform might promote growth or create disruption
that would undermine growth and, if severe, the
regime itself. Real reform may be both economically
and politically unacceptable and, therefore, virtually
impossible in the Soviet context.
The second assumption is closely related to the first.
Optimal efficiency is an artificial construct that ig-
nores the tradeoffs necessary in the real world be-
tween political expediency, social goals, and economic
efficiency. It is largely a value judgment to argue that
resources are "misallocated" according to market
preferences for highest efficiency and to ignore the
priority the Soviet leadership gives to political and
social considerations in allocation decisions. The same
type of value judgment appears in discussions of party
intervention in economic decisions. In conditions of
limited supplies, is allocation by the political leader-
ship necessarily worse than if market prices did the
allocating? Some situations are best managed by
political control, such as rationing in the United
States during World War II.
There is a tendency to blame all Soviet economic
shortcomings on the economic system and to ignore
other factors. Yet study of specific situations does not
demonstrate that all problems can be surmounted by
the economist's ideal solution of optimally efficient
allocation through supply-demand pricing. There is a
related tendency to compare the Soviet system in
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action with an idealized abstraction of a market
system-a scientifically questionable procedure that
could produce poor analysis. Although it is valid to
compare a market system in operation with a central-
ly planned economy, it is perhaps even more insightful
to examine how the Soviet economy in operation
diverges from the conception of a centrally planned
system.
For example, a comparison of US and Soviet agricul-
ture is often used to demonstrate the benefits of a free
market system over central planning. Agriculture is a
particularly poor example for such a comparison.
Aside from climatic advantages and the benefits of a
technologically more advanced society in the United
States, it ignores US price supports, the land bank,
and other intervention in the market. Furthermore,
while Soviet planners are not omniscient, make mis-
takes about investment decisions, are subject to un-
foreseen events, and respond only after a timelag,
private entrepreneurs face similar limitations. The
weather is unpredictable also in unplanned economies,
and the private farmer cannot respond to price signals
from the market before the next growing season.
Perhaps a million small mistakes are simply more
politically and socially acceptable in a democratic
system than one big mistake-or perhaps mistakes
have less severe repercussions in a more abundant
economy.
Obviously, there are in actuality many exceptions to
the ideal market-type economy. We estimate US
prospects for growth on how the economy actually
operates-not on how an ideal market economy might
perform. Prospects for the Soviet economy need to be
estimated in similar fashion. It is insufficient, for
example, to say that Soviet prices are centrally
planned and are, therefore, inefficient. Periodic price
changes bring temporary improvements. Which prices
are most inefficient, are they becoming more or less
so, and what political or social goals are served
thereby? What is the extent and impact of decentral-
ized setting of supplements and reductions to whole-
sale prices according to quality?
Search for the most appropriate label does not obviate
the need for careful and detailed analysis. Applying
terms such as market, centrally planned, reform, or
tinkering will not tell us where the Soviet economy is
headed. For better insight, we might do well to put
aside the eye-catching issue of general reforms and set
to work examining specific attempts to tinker and the
results they are most likely to have.
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