DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00799R000100300002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 7, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
PFCOECT NUMBER /1. 3 '041
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Developments in Afghanistan
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The Afghan regime's military position has slipped since Kabul's unilateral cease-
fire-recently extended through mid-January 1988-went into effect in January
1987, and the measure has had the unintended effect of boosting insurgent morale.
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Military Results
Developments in Afghanistan
1 Perspective-Afghanistan-USSR: Regime Cease-Fire Yields Unsettling
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Afghan leader Najib has accelerated the pace of Kabul's national reconciliation
program since June, probably in an attempt to convince international opinion that
Kabul and its Soviet masters have made a legitimate attempt to craft a political
settlement of the war. Moscow may believe that this ultimately could help justify
increased military pressure on the resistance should it decide that is needed.F25X1
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measures.
Mine warfare has had a significant impact on military operations in Afghanistan.
Advances in mine technology and more sophisticated emplacement techniques
have substantially increased the difficulties of developing adequate counter-
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and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor, F--~ 25X1
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Developments in Afghanistan
Perspective Afghanistan-USSR: Regime Cease-Fire Yields Unsettling Military Results
The Afghan regime's military position has slipped since Kabul's unilateral cease-
fire-recently extended through mid-January 1988-went into effect last January.
The regime has lost ground in some areas, and the morale of the Afghan military
has edged even lower because of the difficulties that regime forces have had on the
battlefield. Resistance morale has been buoyed by the outcome of recent fighting
in Qandahar and Paktia Provinces.
Big Offensives, Small Results
The resistance's determination to discredit the regime's cease-fire and national
reconciliation program has kept fighting at comparatively high levels over the past
six months:
? Within two weeks of the start of the cease-fire, insurgent activity prompted the
Soviets and Afghan Government to mount a counterinsurgent operation near 25X1
Qandahar that lasted until early March.
against insurgent forces that threaten the city
? More recently, Soviet and Afghan forces pulled back from the Paghman and
Kowt-e `Ashrow area on the outskirts of Kabul after several weeks of operations
In an interview with the Soviet press in mid-June, General Imammuddin, chief of
the Operation Division of the Afghan Army's General Staff, gave a candid
summation of the military situation since the cease-fire. Commenting that the
situation remained "tense" in southern Afghanistan and a number of central
areas, he also admitted that the resistance had been conducting combat actions
"practically along the length of the entire Afghan-Pakistani border.
overlooking the city.
His remarks reflect the short-lived deterrent effect that Soviet and Afghan regime
counterinsurgent operations have had on resistance activity during the cease-fire.
Soon after returning to garrison following five weeks of fighting in the Qandahar
area, Soviet and Afghan forces were called out to deal with resurgent guerrilla ac-
tivity. According to the US Embassy in Kabul, the operations on the periphery of
the capital did not succeed in routing the insurgents from the high ground
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Explaining the Results
We believe that a more cautious use of airpower has been an important cause of
the poor results for the regime in fighting this year. Concerns about the insurgents'
increased air defense capabilities have caused some pilots to release aircraft
ordnance from altitudes that degrade the accuracy and effectiveness of airstrikes.
he resistance said the presence of Stinger air de-
fense missiles had a strong inhibiting effect on Soviet bombing runs during the
Paktia operations in June, thereby giving the guerrillas more tactical flexibility.
the fear of shootdowns by the missile had made
the Soviets more reluctant to conduct heliborne assaults during the offensive.
Morale also appears to have had a significant impact on the outcome of the
fighting since January. Because of heavy casualties during some of the operations,
already understrength Afghan military units have been further weakened. More-
over, there are indications that the series of combat operations has spurred an
increase in desertions from the Afghan Army. more
than 500 government troops deserted during the offensive in Paktia, and
the Afghan Army suffered a large number of desertions
during the fighting in Qandahar. By contrast, the insurgents' morale appears to
have been boosted by the perception that they are able to inflict serious losses on
Soviet and regime forces.
Outlook
An upswing in the regime's military position is unlikely in the near term. Kabul
probably will have difficulty compensating for the casualties incurred in the
extensive military operations this year, both in terms of rounding up enough
replacements and offsetting losses of experienced personnel. The poor results of
fighting since the cease-fire began probably will increase misgivings of military
personnel opposed to it, thereby exacerbating already serious factionalism within
the armed forces.
An improvement in the Afghan regime's military fortunes will now depend even
more on Soviet assistance. The Soviets may consider deploying additional field
artillery to increase the ground forces' fire support. Greater use of ground-based
firepower, however, would be likely to bring few gains in the counterinsurgency
and could not adequately substitute for aggressive combat air support. Reduced air
support could also result in increased combat casualties for both Soviet and regime
forces.
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Soviet and Afghan forces undertook large-scale operations in June and July aimed
at curbing insurgent infiltration into Afghanistan's urban areas,
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US Embassy, failed to regain control over the road west from Qandahar.
By early July, the Soviets had deployed two multiple rocket launcher battalions
and an artillery battalion west of Qandahar airfield 25X1
Soviet troops positioned an additional fire base northeast of their bivouac, while 25X1
the Afghan Army deployed an artillery battalion northwest of the Soviet fire base.
These units shelled insurgent camps in the Malajat region, but, according to the
Stiff insurgent resistance caused Soviet ground forces units to reinforce 25X1
the Afghan units, according to the US Embassy 25X1
by late June the Soviets had deployed a forward command post with a 40th 25X1
Army Operations Group and major elements of a motorized rifle regiment
southwest of Kabul, and an artillery fire base northeast of Band-e Qarghah.
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Embassy reports that the resistance blocked efforts to take Jalez and Sanglakh,
important rear support area regime and Soviet 25X1
forces began to return to Kabul by the second week of July. 25X1
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i op necre[
Afghanistan
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Afghan party chief Najib visited Moscow during 19-21 July without prior
announcement and held discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev and other
high-level Soviet officials. According to TASS and Kabul's news service, Gorba-
chev and Najib agreed to take political, military, and economic steps "in the
interests of a speedier normalization" of the Afghan problem. The official media
reports also made it clear that Soviet troops would not be withdrawn from
Afghanistan until "national reconciliation" has been achieved. Gorbachev also
officially invited Najib to return to Moscow to participate in the October
Revolution celebrations s for Afghan participation in a future
Soviet space flight.
Najib probably was again instructed by the Soviets, as he was during a visit last
December, to reduce the chronic factionalism of the Afghan Communist Party. He
almost certainly was also told to strive to improve the effectiveness of the Afghan
armed forces after their dismal performance this spring. Najib and Gorbachev
may also have discussed the much-rumored five-party conference comprising the
USSR, Kabul, the insurgents, Pakistan, and the United States-and further offers
of power-sharing arrangements to the insurgents as the next stages of the Soviet-
Afghan peace offensive. The official media's postvisit description of national
reconciliation and the troop withdrawal as being "organically and dialectically
linked" almost certainly indicates that the Soviets do not intend to leave
Afghanistan until they can arrange for a Communist-dominated regime in Kabul.
Official Afghan trade statistics for 1986 show that the Soviet Union accounts for
over 70 percent of Afghanistan's total trade, up from about one-third of Kabul's
exports and imports in 1979. Despite Kabul's claims of expanding economic
relations with East European nations, only Czechoslovakia is one of Afghanistan's
top-10 trade partners. Trade with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary
continues to be overshadowed by commerce with Western countries, including the
United States
With few exceptions, most of Kabul's trading partners maintain favorable trade
balances with Afghanistan. In particular, Kabul imports a substantial volume of
manufactured goods from industrialized countries for reexport to Pakistan. This
"reexport trade" accounts for the Afghan regime's heavy t r a d e countries such as Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong
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Kabul Still Pushing National
Reconciliation
Afghan party chief Najib has accelerated the pace of
Kabul's national reconciliation program since the
plenum in June of the Central Committee of the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
Najib has created a new Ministry of Returnees'
Affairs to address the problems of refugees expected
to come home from Iran and Pakistan, issued a draft
constitution for "national" debate, and promulgated a
new law legalizing political parties other than the
PDPA. Kabul is also using the alleged accomplish-
ments of national reconciliation-including, accord-
ing to Najib, 92,000 returned refugees and 23,000
insurgents defecting to the government-as a basis for
seeking increased international recognition for Kabul.
Most recently, Najib has requested that the Organi-
zation of Islamic Conference (OIC) reactivate Kabul's
membership and has applied for membership in the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC).
for Najib's regime
Najib's efforts almost certainly are aimed at convinc-
ing the international community that Kabul and its
Soviet masters have made a legitimate attempt to
craft a political settlement of the war. Although
national reconciliation has had almost no success,
some of the domestic events staged by Kabul-such
as refugees purportedly returning through checkpoints
along the Pakistani border and regime-orchestrated
meetings of tribal elders that issue "unanimous"
proclamations supporting reconciliation- provide
propaganda for worldwide distribution. Kabul's recent
announcement of a new constitution and its introduc-
tion of a "multiparty" political system are also ideally
suited to appeal to an international audience eager to
believe that Gorbachev is sincerely attempting to
resolve the Afghan war by political rather than
military means. Despite pressures resulting from sev-
eral recent military reversals, Kabul and Moscow are
likely to keep pressing national reconciliation at least
through yearend to increase international legitimacy
Manufacturing a "New Look" Regime
Attempts to make the regime presentable internation-
ally have virtually no connection with realities inside
Afghanistan. In late June Najib appointed Dr. Mo-
hammad Hasan Sharq as Minister of Returnees'
Affairs to coordinate the resettlement of a flood of
refugees that has not and almost certainly will not
materialize. Afghan authorities are also continuing to
construct and display to the media facilities for
processing and sheltering the nowhere-to-be-found
returnees.
In early July, Najib also sought to refurbish and
"Westernize" the regime's international image by
publicly presenting the draft of a new constitution,
announcing the adoption of a law legalizing political
parties other than the PDPA, and declaring-in a
press statement by Minister of Tribal Affairs Solay-
man Laeq-that Kabul would welcome former Af-
ghan King Zahir Shah's participation in the national
reconciliation process. The constitution is to be pre-
sented to all Afghans through the domestic and
international media, and Kabul claims that it will
elicit opinions from both its supporters and its oppo-
nents. The regime will subsequently convene a "na-
tional assembly" to amend the draft and ratify a
completed document. The law on political parties also
encourages the regime's opponents to return home
and set up and register political parties and contest
elections. Finally, during an early July visit to New
Delhi, Minister Laeq told the media that if Zahir's
return would aid a political settlement of the war,
Kabul would "not spare any effort to accept him."
Najib's reconciliation efforts have not brought a
peaceful settlement of the war any closer. He has not
found anyone among the insurgents, the refugees, or
prominent Afghan exiles who is willing to sign on to a
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Behind the Serene Facade
Despite the confident tone of Kabul's national recon-
ciliation announcements, the unraveling of the PDPA
regime appears to continue. The US Embassy in
Kabul reports that cadre nervousness over the possi-
bility of Soviet withdrawal, as well as armed squab-
bles between the party's Khalq and Parcham factions,
continues unabated. Najib himself probably added to
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officials in New Delhi that Kabul controlled only 10
of the 48 major towns and villages and two of 29
provinces in Afghanistan
fully control any of these places at night.
Setbacks on the battlefield almost certainly also are
hurting regime stability. The high casualties during
the recent offensives in Qandahar probably added to
reconciliation process that-Kabul's protestations
notwithstanding-will maintain the dominance of the
PDPA. Nonetheless, some Western and Third World
media have been treating the national reconciliation
proposals-with their calls for popular elections, pro-
liferation of political parties, and constitutionally
entrenched political rights-as if they were reliable
indicators of Soviet-Afghan intentions for a liberal-
ized governing process. Some Western media ac-
counts even favorably contrast the regime's "progres-
sive" attitude toward female suffrage and access to
education with the "reactionary" position of the Is-
lamic leaders of the resistance alliance.
the uneasiness and low morale in the capital.
Kabul's intensifying national reconciliation cam-
paign-with its implicit promise of a near-term Soviet
withdrawal-almost certainly has made it more diffi-
cult for Najib to cope with the negative repercussions
of party factionalism and military setbacks.
Najib was reluctant to extend
the cease-fire, probably because of the destabilizing
impact on the regime. There are also some indications
that it was Minister of Tribal Affairs Laeq rather
than the PDPA General Secretary who seconded
Moscow's positions on the cease-fire and the King
that Najib and the Soviets were at odds over the
continuation of the initiative.
Moreover, Soviet media announced on several occa-
sions that Zahir was welcome to return to Kabul and
join the reconciliation process, but the official Afghan
media have been silent on the possibility of a promi-
nent role for Zahir. It probably is significant-and
perhaps a sign of Moscow's frustration with Najib-
Kabul's "openness" probably will allow Soviet and
Afghan diplomats to argue effectively in international
forums that they have gone the extra mile in seeking
an equitable political settlement but have been sty-
mied by the intransigence of the resistance and its
external backers. Officials in Islamabad and several
West European capitals, according to US diplomatic
reporting, are worried that the Soviet-Afghan peace
offensive could result in a reduced number of nations
voting for Pakistan's resolution on Afghanistan at this
fall's UN General Assembly. Moscow probably also
anticipates success in reducing the anti-Afghan vote
count at the UN and is likely to keep the peace
initiative in high gear through yearend to allow Kabul
to plead its case at the SAARC summit in November
and at the OIC's foreign ministers conference in
December.
he extremely limited
span of the regime's physical control of the country
was also underlined in July when Kawiani, the secre-
tary of the PDPA Central Committee, told Indian
during a recent official visit to New Delhi.
Outlook
Moscow and Kabul almost certainly are pleased with
the degree of international success of the peace
initiative to date and probably will continue it through
the remainder of the year. They may even believe that
they have scored enough international success not
only to ensure fewer anti-Kabul votes at the UN but
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also to allow Soviet and Afghan forces scope for
increasing military pressure on the resistance. Mos-
cow probably believes that it could justify such an
increase by citing the insurgents' failure to respond to
Kabul's "reasonable" peace offers. Moscow may be
preparing to cite the increase in the quantity and
quality of US military aid to the resistance as another
justification for increasing Soviet-Afghan military
pressure on the guerrillas.
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Takes a Toll
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molded rubber cap that acts as a counter-
countermeasure.
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duction of new mines and more sophisticated em-
placement techniques-that development of reliable
countermeasures has been increasingly difficult
Mine warfare has had a significant impact on military
operations in Afghanistan. The extensive use of mines
by Soviet, Afghan regime, and insurgent forces has
caused high military and civilian casualties. Over the
past few years, mine warfare in Afghanistan has
become so varied and complex-because of the intro-
Dramatic Impact of Mine Warfare
Resistance minelaying has been costly for Soviet and
Afghan regime forces. Widespread mining around
Herat over the past year, in particular, has resulted in
numerous casualties, including Mohammad Ali Sa- tance forces.
mem, the PDPA's Provincial Committee Secretary,
and three Army commanders. Elsewhere
the mere threat of landmines has
slowed movement of Soviet and regime forces and
supply convoys and forced groups to be preceded by a
minesweeper. The mine threat has turned a three-
hour trip from Kabul to Jalalabad into a 12-hour
journey. According to US Embassy sources, Soviet
convoys moving between Qandahar and Herat often
go off the road because of heavy mining and the
threat of insurgent attacks on the main road.
Soviet and Regime Forces' Improvements
The Soviets have significantly upgraded their mine
warfare capabilities in Afghanistan with the develop-
ment of new mine types and delivery systems. Most of
these new models are more lethal and designed to
thwart insurgent disarming and countermeasure
techniques:
he Soviets began 25X1
using seismic mines in 1985. 25X1
the mines can be detonated selectively 25X1
insurgent command-
ers are increasingly worried about the effectiveness of
Soviet mine warfare and characterize it as a very
serious problem.
mine-induced casualties, by tar the most frequent,
the Soviets have
successfully used mines to cut off resistance escape
routes and to force the insurgents to use secondary
infiltration and resupply routes-causing higher
transportation costs and delays in delivery time.
activated, blast-type antipersonnel mine.
the mine I is more-shock
7 August 1987 --"
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Top Secret
developed a family of scatterable mines designed to
be delivered by different means-such as helicop-
ters, fixed-wing aircraft, and multiple rocket
launcher systems-to maximize tactical flexibility
and logistical simplicity.
the Soviets have
? The Soviets are using a new family of fuzes for
conventional landmines. The new fuzes
probably are being used to
surgent countermeasures.
air- and artillery-
delivered antipersonnel and antitank mines have been
used extensively in route and area denial operations,
especially in where access is difficult for echa-
nized forces. at
least 2 million mines had been strewn along Afghanis-
tan's border with Pakistan by 1985.
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convert standard landmines to complicated delayed-
detonating or antidisturbance munitions to foil in-
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tallic, and homemade mines.
Resistance Forces' Improvements
The insurgents employ a variety of tripwired, pres-
sure-detonated or electrically detonated plastic, me-
nication, and urban areas.
The Soviets and Afghans have made extensive use of
mines to protect defensive perimeters, lines of commu-
the insurgents have a healthy respect for t e mine-
fields that encircle most Soviet garrisons, airfields,
traps, and multiple mine types used.
and field positions because of the tripwires, booby-
Soviet and Afghan
voys. Heavily mined defensive perimeters around Ka-
bul, Qandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif have made
it increasingly difficult, although not impossible, for
guerrilla forces to move in and out of the cities.
sapper units have planted t ousands of conventional
antipersonnel mines in potential ambush sites and
along primary highways to forestall attacks on con-
most of these mines are of Soviet,
British, Italian, and Czech manufacture. Most of the
Soviet models have been seized during combat opera-
tions. Many insurgent groups also build their own
mines by using unexploded Soviet aerial ordnance and
explosives,
Mines are among the more popular weapons for the
resistance because they offer a relatively cheap, low-
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risk, and efficient means to inflict casualties on Soviet
and regime troops. Panjsher Valley insurgents consid-
er them to be among the most effective weapons in
their inventory, 25X1
2bAl
The guerrillas use mines primarily against Soviet and
Afghan supply convoys and troop movements, as well
as along avenues of approach to insurgent positions.
some guerril- 25X1
las mine roads and shoulders to destroy vehicles that
attempt to attack insurgent ambush positions. 25X1
_________________________-Iizbi Islami (Khalil) insur- 25X1
gents in the Qan char area have become adept at
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destroying enemy armored vehicles by using intercon-
nected antipersonnel mines to trigger antitank mines
by a connecting detonator cord. In some areas-such
as Herat, Baghlan, and the Panjsher Valley-insur-
gents also mine roads, hillsides, and primary eleva-
Countermeasures Inadequate To Deal
With the Threat
The Soviets and Afghans have had difficulty over-
coming the insurgent mine threat because of inade-
quate training, insufficient manpower, and effective
insurgent countermeasures. The neutralization of
large quantities of insurgent landmines creates a
constant drain on Soviet and Afghan engineering
The Soviets have used a variety of equipment and
techniques for mine clearing. Soviet magnetic mine
detectors, mounted on trucks or armored vehicles,
were used effectively during the initial months of the
war but were obsolete by mid-1980 when the insur-
gents introduced nonmetallic mines
Soviet and regime forces have since
relied heavily on the Soviet tank-mounted KMT-5
mine plow and roller, even though the plow is unable
to negotiate steep grades, tears up roads to a depth of
approximately 12 inches, and slows convoys to a speed
of approximately 2 to 3 kilometers per hour. The
insurgents have also devised one counter to the KMT-
5 by laying mines on hilltops, because the vehicle
must roll over the crest with its plow raised before
making contact with the ground.
attach mine-clearing fixtures to a tank.
The Soviets have deployed a new mine roller and plow
that is designed to defeat pressure-detonated mines
and to emit a magnetic signal that detonates magneti-
cally fuzed mines. In addition
the Soviets are testing a new mine-clearing vehicle
consisting of a T-55 tank chassis with a permanently
mounted KMT-5 device. The prototype vehicle,
observed at Jalalabad in mid-April, may represent a
shift in Soviet combat engineer vehicle development;
previous Soviet practice has been to temporarily
Specially trained dogs are detailed for some mine-
clearing operations. The dogs are able to find non-
metallic mines that electronic detectors miss but will
ignore shards of metal that the detectors sense. The
insurgents attempt to counter the dogs by shooting
them or by dispersing red pepper or small pieces of
explosives around mined areas to confuse the animals.
The insurgents' countermeasure techniques are com-
paratively rudimentary. Their methods-based on
lessons learned from combat and word-of-mouth-are
generally slow and extremely dangerous.
he guerrillas' most significant coun-
termine pro em is dealing with perimeter mine belts
during attacks on Soviet and Afghan positions.
Masood recently indicated
he and many other commanders in
northern Afghanistan are often prevented from over-
running regime and Soviet outposts because of an
inability to neutralize the minefields surrounding
several tactics.
one of the more effective mine-clearing tech-
niques is a hand-held rake. The rake is used by an
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insurgent to clear a path through a minefield. The
rake scoops up shallow buried mines; the ones that are
not tripwired or boobytrapped are picked up by hand.
Exploding boobytrapped mines destroy the rake but
usually not the operator. In other areas, the insurgents
drop ladders in a series across a minefield, exploding
any mines under the rails, and then use the ladder's
rungs as a bridge. Some insurgents have also used
animals or prisoners to clear paths through mine-
fields after the fall of
a resistance base near Qandahar in late 1985, the
insurgents lost over 1,500 goats and sheep in efforts to
clear the minefields left by the Soviets.
hand-held electronic
25X1 mine detectors have not been highly effective in
Afghanistan because most of the areas where mines
are encountered have been subjected to repeated air
and artillery bombardment that has left metal splin-
ters that distract the detectors. In other cases, the
insurgents have been unable to properly operate the
hand-held equipment because of inadequate instruc-
tions.
Outlook
Mine warfare in Afganistan is likely to become more
complex, and casualties are likely to increase, as
Soviet, regime, and insurgent forces continue to
improve their mining capabilities with new mine
types, delivery systems, and minelaying techniques.
The Soviets and the Afghan Army are likely to use
increasingly lethal mines that are difficult to detect
and defuze, both along infiltration and escape routes
and for defense around bases. Resistance command-
ers, in turn, are increasingly worried about the effec-
tiveness of Soviet mine warfare and probably will
attempt to acquire improved training and more
sophisticated equipment with which to counter the
Soviet-Afghan mine threat
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/30: CIA-RDP88T00799R000100300002-7
25X1
25X1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/30: CIA-RDP88T00799R000100300002-7
lop secret
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/30: CIA-RDP88T00799R000100300002-7