LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 24, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Directorate of .12C.FeL
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
Latin America
Review
24 April 1987
tigoaL
ALA LAR 87-010
24 April 1987
'PP 431
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
Latin America
Review
24 April 1987
25X1
Page
Articles Brazil: Signs of Potential Political Instability
A worsening economy, falling public confidence, increased strike
activity, and heightened military concern about civilian government
point to the possibility of a political crisis for President Sarney's
government in the coming months.
7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X6
Latin America: Developments and Trends
in Terrorism 11
25X1
and Insurgency
25X1
Briefs
Uruguay: Effort To Overturn Military
17
25X1
Amnesty
Nicaragua: New Human Rights Campaign
17
25X1
Argentina's New Labor Minister: A Peace Offering? 18
25X1
Bolivia: Labor Strife Intensifies
19
25X1
25X1
Cuban Chronology
21
25X1
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication
Production Staff, Office of African and
may be directed
Latin American Analysis,
to the Chief
gyi
25X1
Reverse Blank
Secret
ALA LAR 87-010
24 April 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
Latin America
Review
Articles
25X1
Brazil: Signs of Potential
Political Instability
The decline in political support for the Sarney
government in the wake of a sharp economic slide has
heightened our concern about the potential for
instability in Brazil in the months ahead. Indeed,
academic research on Brazil indicates a worsening
economy, falling public confidence, increased strike
activity, and heightened military concern about
civilian government?as manifest over the last four
months?generally precede periods of political crisis.
We judge that President Sarney still retains a working
majority in the legislature, and the support of the high
command, factors that have tended to stabilize
Brazilian civilian governments in the past.
Sarney
will probably remain in office with reduced power and
effectiveness, but there is an even chance that he will
eventually be removed from office by the Constituent
Assembly, in our view.
Political Breakdown in Brazil
Since 1950, according to historical studies, civilian
rule has broken down in Brazil on several occasions.
For example, the military overthrew the elected
President in 1955, staged an abortive coup attempt in
1961, and assumed power directly in 1964. Although
these studies indicate that military intervention into
politics is the end result of a complex process, we have
identified four distinct trends that have invariably
preceded the breakdown of civilian government.
These include:
? Declining confidence in the ability of civilian
leaders to deliver economic improvement and
political reform.
? A steady deterioration in economic conditions that
foment social unrest, especially violent
demonstrations and labor strife.
1
? A popular perception that the President is weak and
indecisive.
? A consensus among civilian and military elites that
the government no longer possesses the political
wherewithal to prevent social chaos or fulfill
popular aspirations for economic progress
Recent economic and political trends suggest to us
that a domestic crisis is in the offing. The set of
indicators we use to track the country's evolving
political situation graphically depict Brazil's
worsening economic performance since November
1986: falling public confidence in the government,
increased strike activity, and heightened military
concern with Sarney's indecisiveness.
A Budding Political Crisis
Opinion polls indicated that public confidence in
Sarney's leadership was shaken when the Cruzado II
economic adjustment plan was decreed within days of
the landslide victory of the Brazilian Democratic
Movement Party (PMDB) in congressional and
gubernatorial elections last November. Voters felt a
deep sense of betrayal when the government reversed
its pledge on price controls, according to press reports,
and Sarney's stock fell dramatically.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Secret
ALA LAR 87-010
24 April 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
CONFIDENCE IN SARNEY:
Poll on Sarney Government's Performance
Dec 16
1986-87
Source: Periodic polls in a Sao Paulo newspaper.
Secret
2
Good/Excellent
eemnim
Poor/Extremely Poor
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
secret
Sarney has been unable to heal the rift with the
electorate, according to subsequent opinion polls.
Surveys show that a growing segment of the public?
now over 40 percent?view the government's
performance as poor or extremely poor, while those
who view the administration's performance as good or
excellent?currently less than 20 percent?has
steeply fallen since December. Another recent poll
indicates that even Sarney's declaration of a
unilateral debt moratorium on 20 February?a move
encouraged by the ruling party?failed to restore
public confidence
We interpret this report card as indicative of growing
public frustration over the government's inability to
articulate a clear economic strategy to deal with the
current crisis. The economy deteriorated rapidly
during the past several months as the Cruzado Plan
collapsed and the economic team remained divided on
what steps to take to restore order. Inflationary
expectations surged, pushing monthly inflation from
3 percent in November to a record high 16.8 percent
in January, and another 14 percent in February.
According to the US Embassy, the resurgence of
inflation has outpaced wage increases, eroding
consumer purchasing power and causing a slowdown
in growth.
On the external front, Brazil's trade surplus has
averaged only $150 million per month since
November?far lower than surpluses recorded in the
same period last year. Meanwhile, Brasilia continues
its steadfast refusal to implement an economic
stabilization plan, even though its commercial
creditors have informed it that such a plan is
necessary to begin negotiations for raising the new
money needed to lift its payments suspension.
Labor protests and a general strike in December
forced Sarney to allow a return to indexation
measures to help maintain living standards.
Nevertheless, the slowdown in economic growth in
early 1987, coupled with rapidly rising inflation,
provoked a wave of strikes.
the number of strikes in the first
two months of 1987 was higher than during the same
period last year?a time when Sarney's popularity
was also very low and inflation was resurging. A
maritime strike paralyzed the major ports for the
3
entire month of March, while bankworkers shut down
the financial system in early April. Sarney called on
the military to occupy the ports and oil facilities to
preempt further labor unrest
Regime Stabilizers Faltering
Instead of exercising decisive leadership, Sarney has
vacillated on the direction of government policy?a
development that has proved to be a fatal flaw for
civilian rule in the past. He has, for example, proposed
and then abruptly withdrawn a large income tax hike
after loud protests by the middle class, according to
press reports. a President
who has reversed his own decisions on implementing a
maximum devaluation and undertaking economic
stabilization measures. Moreover, Sarney remains
uncertain of his ability to forge a working legislative
majority in the Constituent Assembly, despite the
favorable results of the procedural voting in February
when the Assembly was organizing itself.
The US Embassy reports that,
unless Sarney regains the legislative initiative soon, he
could end up a caretaker President under a new
parliamentary system of government when the
Assembly finalizes the new constitution later this
year. Opinion polls indicate that a majority of
delegates in the Assembly favor shortening Sarney's
term of office, now slated to expire in 1991.
Academic research indicates that military backing in
a crisis has historically been essential to the survival
of civilian re imes in Brazil. 25X1
2f.25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
25)0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
February 2
February 2
February 2
February 12
February i8
February 25
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT:
Scorecard on Key Condressional/
Constituent Assembly Votes
Key issue
Dutcdme
Impact on Sa
Leftist motion to
exclude conservative
Senate incumbents
from the Assembly
Defeated
Vote could have set
precedent ifOT
Assembly to curtaii
Sarney?s powers now
NOB challenge to
Defeated; Ulysses
Prevented leitist
election of Chamber
Suimaraes elected
critic of Sarney
of Deputies
from leading the
President
Chamber
Motion to delay
3efeated Congrese
Setback IC 'letISI
opening of Congress
will meet
plans to interlere
until Constitution
concurrently
with mcutive
completed
powers and current
policy
Election of PMDB
NOB leftist
Aebuff to '3arney's
majority leader in
elected; Sarney
leadership of the
the Chamber
selects his uwn
pointman In the
party
Chamber
Motion to call
DeFeated
Vote could ,.`Awa, 3(ez
Finance Minister
precedent
Funaro to account
.for
Assembly to
for economic crisis
interfere with
before Assembly
executive operations
PM0B?Inspired rules
giving Assembly
Vote postponed
conservative
Emergence of ,
rightwing block
unlimited powers
opposition snd PFL
lessens Sarney's
united sgainst PMDB
dependence on
rebellious PMDE
Note: Brazil's Congress , Chamber of Deputies (Lowe. housej and Senate (Upper house).
The Constituent Assembly is composed of both houses and will omplete a new
constitution this year. The PFL (Liberal Front Party) and the PMDB
(Brazilian Democratic 'Mobilization Party) comprise Sarney's coalition.
Secret 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
secret
We also have indications of a continuing decline in
political support for Sarney's coalition government
among Brazil's civilian elites. Sarney's stubborn
refusal to implement traditional fiscal and monetary
measures to restrain inflation has alienated his former
supporters in the conservative media and business
community. The press, spurred by business unease
with Sarney's programs, has run a series of critical
editorials against the government since March. In
fact, the President's recent meeting with the nation's
leading entrepreneurs in Sao Paulo failed to change
Sarney's position on the issues, and generally
frustrated the business leaders
Critical Signs To Watch
To track evolving political events in Brazil, we have
identified two different scenarios for 1987, and
produced a checklist of specific signs to watch. Our
indicators provide a reference tool for analyzing
current reporting from the press, Embassy.
These indicators have
consistently been identified in academic studies as the
key factors signaling a breakdown of civilian rule in
Brazil. The checklist consists of expected events that
would help identify the outcome of a particular
scenario for 1987.
Sarney Remains, But Is Weakened Politically
Our most likely scenario foresees a general worsening
of political and economic conditions, a loss of
authority for Sarney, but not an abrupt end to his
administration by legal or extralegal means. In this
scenario, Sarney will be unable to take the tough
5
economic measures needed to reverse economic
stagflation and to reconcile with foreign creditors.
Social restiveness spearheaded by labor disturbances
will continue, and the PMDB-controlled Constituent
Assembly probably will succeed in curtailing the
President's executive powers and schedule direct
presidential elections in 1989 or 1990. Nevertheless,
Sarney probably will remain in office on the strength
of military backing and a popular reluctance to
jeopardize the democratic experiment.
25X1
We would look for the following events to occur if this 25X1
scenario plays out:
? Sarney's decisionmaking becomes increasingly
erratic, reversing his own policy decisions frequently
in the face of criticism.
? Domestic economic conditions worsen as inflation
continues at a 10- to 15-percent monthly rate and
unemployment rises.
? Brazil remains cut off from Western finance
because of its refusal to negotiate with the IMF, and
its commercial negotiations occur in fits and starts
while interest payments remain suspended.
? Numerous wildcat strikes give way to fewer, albeit
larger, industrywide strikes directed at disrupting
the economy.
? Opinion polls show growing public support for
reducing Sarney's term and scheduling presidential
elections before 1991.
? Civilian elites step up their criticism of the 25X1
government in the press.
? Lack of confidence in Sarney and declining salaries
provoke scattered, peaceful protests by enlisted men
and junior officers.
? Leftist activities, particularly strikes, increase.
? Military leaders make public statements supporting
Sarney and democracy, but privately pressure 25X 1
Sarney to adopt hardline measures against the left 25X1
and strikers in return for continued support.
? The Constituent Assembly advocates a
parliamentary system and support grows for
shortening Sarney's term. 25X1
25X1
Sarney Legally Removed From Office
Our more pessimistic scenario, which we view as less
likely to occur, presupposes a galloping monthly
inflation rate and the beginning of a recession. These
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
conditions almost certainly would result in widespread
unemployment, protests and demonstrations by labor
and the left, and a ground swell of pressure from the
hard-hit working and middle classes on the
Constituent Assembly to replace Sarney. The revival
of the left and increased labor unrest would risk
political polarization?undercutting Sarney's
legitimacy and causing the military and civilian elites
to withdraw their support in favor of another civilian
leader, probably from the majority party. Instead of a
military coup, however, we believe Sarney would be
replaced via early elections.
We would look for the following events if this scenario
plays out:
? Sarney's decisionmalcing becomes erratic and his
policies become more populist as he tries to preempt
leftist pressure.
? Domestic economic chaos takes hold as monthly
inflation reaches 25 to 30 percent, and negative
monthly growth rates result in rapidly rising
unemployment.
? On the external front, the moratorium begins to
affect trade adversely, as exports and imports
decrease markedly and cause increasing shortages.
? Skyrocketing urban unemployment prompts
protests, high crime, and the return of vigilante and
death squad activity.
? Opinion polls indicate public disgust with both the
executive and legislative branches.
? Politicians call for Sarney to resign and rumors of
military coup plotting abound.
? Military discipline is jeopardized by short mutinies
of enlisted men and leftist agitation.
? Extremists undertake scattered incidents of urban
terrorism.
? Business and political elites consult with military
leaders to speed up the timetable for presidential
elections, or to approach Sarney to resign.
Economic setbacks will contribute to the deepening
malaise of the populace. In addition, we expect labor
unrest to continue this year, and there is a growing
possibility that the labor leadership will be able to
orchestrate a nationwide strike more disruptive than
the one in December. The military's restiveness, in
our view, will continue in the face of labor strife,
challenges to the government by the Constituent
Assembly, and economic deterioration.
At this juncture, however, we do not know if the
military has the leadership, desire, and civilian
support necessary for another intervention in
Brazilian politics. Nevertheless, there is an even
chance that some type of political crisis will take place
in 1987.
Implications for the United States
In our view, Brazil's transition to democracy will be
seriously tested in the months ahead. Moreover,
steady political disintegration would probably lead to
greater calls for economic nationalism and trade
protection measures that could hurt US businesses
operating in Brazil. As the situation polarized, we
would expect a tougher position on repayment of the
foreign debt to emerge, and calls for outright
repudiation would increase. Lastly, a setback for the
democratic process would have a negative
demonstration effect on other struggling Latin
American democracies, including some, such as Peru
and Argentina, with severe civil-military strains.
Outlook
Brasilia has shown little inclination to adopt a
coherent anti-inflation program following its
moratorium?a prerequisite of its commercial
creditors for renegotiation of the debt. Investment is
also likely to suffer in this climate of uncertainty,
thereby worsening growth and export prospects this
year.
Secret
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
R
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X11
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
Latin America: Developments and
Trends in Terrorism and
Insurgency
Insurgent groups in both Peru and Colombia are
using new tactics as they attempt to expand their
campaigns against the regimes in Lima and Bogota.
Guerrilla attacks in Peru have become increasingly
violent during the past month, resulting in higher
casualties. Sendero Luminoso (SL) terrorists have
escalated urban violence and for the first time have
tried to assassinate a foreign businessman. Violence is
also increasing in Colombia as the largest insurgent
group tests the government's resolve to maintain its
faltering three-year-old truce. Moreover, efforts are
under way by all major Colombian insurgent groups
to coordinate political and operational activities.
Continuing its efforts to undermine the Garcia
government's agricultural reforms, SL assassinated
the president of the Junin Development Corporation
and tried unsuccessfully to ambush a vehicle carrying
senior development officials. The insurgents view
these development programs as a threat to their
recruitment efforts.
Peruvian Sendero Luminoso insurgents have
sustained their frequent targeting of ruling American
Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) officials and
buildings in their pattern of selective assassinations
and attacks. In the past month an APRA governor,
assistant governor, mayor, and two APRA activists
were assassinated, and an attempt was made to kill an
APRA leader. The insurgents also bombed an APRA
office in Trujillo during a meeting attended by 100
party members, injuring eight people, including the
mayor of Trujillo and a district governor. Guerrillas?
presumably SL?attacked the homes of two APRA
leaders and bombed 10 APRA offices in Lima.
SL guerrillas have begun to claim
credit for their attacks in propaganda. A three-person
hit squad left a note after killing an Army major on
16 March, claiming responsibility for the attack. SL
also reportedly has threatened Lima newspapers and
magazines with reprisals if they publish items that are
unfavorable to SL, indicating that the insurgents have
become more concerned with their public image.
Insurgent attacks on military installations and
personnel have escalated. Insurgents killed 11 soldiers
and four civilians during an Easter Sunday bomb
attack on a troop truck near Huancavelica, the
deadliest single attack against the military during the
seven-year insurgency. In another recent assault,
terrorists wearing police uniforms killed two
policemen guarding a train station in Cusco. An SL
commando unit wounded four soldiers in an attack on
an Army barracks in Ayacucho. The guerrillas used
long-range weapons and bombs in an attempt to free
two terrorists being held at the barracks. On 9 April
SL terrorists bombed a restaurant near a military
complex north of Lima, killing six, including two
Army officers, and wounding at least 10 others.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
In the first known attack against a foreign business
official, SL attempted to assassinate the manager of
the Bank of Tokyo in Lima on 23 March, injuring the
banker and his driver. The Japanese were targeted
possibly because of their support for development
projects in Peru. Banks may be increasingly at risk.
SL exploded a bomb outside the Bank of London
office in Lima on 20 March, critically injuring four 25X1
people and causing structural damage. Insurgents
bombed six other banks, including US Citibank, on
31 March.
Another new strategy has been SL's increasing
attacks on the economic infrastructure, particularly
the railroads, which have been attacked twice in the
past month. In early April, terrorists dynamited a
cargo train of Centromin-Peru Enterprise traveling
from La Oroya to Cerro de Pasco, destroying 40
meters of track and causing $2 million in damages.
Two railroad workers were seriously injured. In a
similar attack, terrorists damaged 50 meters of track
11
Secret
ALA LAR 87-010
24 April 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
Peru: Insurgency Casualties
October 1986 - March 1987
Oct 86 Nov
NIncludes military and police
Dec
and caused $300,000 in damage to an Enafer-Peru
(state railroad enterprise) locomotive pulling nine cars
loaded with zinc. On 11 April terrorists destroyed the
Antahuaro Bridge near La Oroya in Junin
Department with powerful explosives detonated by
remote control. The loss of the bridge will block
traffic indefinitely on the Lima-Pucallpa road.
Attacks by the Lima-based Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) also have become
increasingly lethal, resulting in higher government
and civilian casualties. MRTA attempted
simultaneous raids on three Lima shoe stores on
28 March, reportedly to steal shoes to distribute in
poor neighborhoods. The attacks resulted in 12
injuries. MRTA has recently expanded its operations
to Peru's northern coast and to Tacna Department on
the border with Chile. In early April, MRTA
13
Jan 87
Feb
Mar
GovernmentN
Insurgent
Civilian
guerrillas armed with automatic weapons and
explosives attacked the police station in the coastal
town of Puerto Eten, outside Chiclayo, killing two
policemen. A second attack on the same station on
8 April was repelled by police. On 1 April, MRTA
guerrillas took over a radio station in the southern
port city of Tacna to broadcast a propaganda
message. This was the first time MRTA operations
have been documented in this area.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
Developments To Watch For
We expect that the Peruvian insurgent groups may
attempt the following actions:
? Additional SL attacks on foreign business interests.
? More SL attacks against the economic
infrastructure.
? Increasingly violent attacks by MRTA resulting in
higher government and civilian casualties.
? Continued expansion of guerrilla activities into the
northern coast area and the extreme south.
Colombian Insurgent Developments
Colombia's largest insurgent group is preparing for a
major confrontation with the government, while an
alliance of other guerrillas continues to attack the
nation's major oil facilities. Guerrillas have increased
attacks on military and police patrols, political
leaders, and civilians.
Growing tension between the government and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
has raised the odds of a return to full-scale guerrilla
war. The group's failing three-year-old truce with
Bogota remains in place
President Barco continues to
parry intensified political and military attacks by
FARC as he speeds efforts to strengthen Bogota's
limited counterinsurgency capabilities.
FARC's strategy incorporates a range of
antigovernment activities. The rebels are emphasizing
political efforts to build public support and discredit
government programs and personnel, channeling
propaganda through their legal political front, the
Patriotic Union. FARC continues to demand that
Bogota order the military out of its territory
Secret
The trend toward greater political and operational
unity among Colombian insurgents continues. FARC,
the only group still participating in peace talks with
the government, appears to be increasing its political
cooperation with members of the National Guerrilla
Coordinator alliance, which includes the National
Liberation Army (ELN), the 19th of April Movement
(M-19), and the People's Liberation Army (EPL).
FARC and EPL leaders recently issued a joint
communique calling for national guerrilla unity?a
goal shared by both M-19 and ELN, the dominant
group in the alliance. One benefit of such cooperation
for FARC may be greater freedom to carry out
antigovernment attacks without breaking the truce:
Coordination among the insurgent groups is also
having an impact on guerrilla operations. The ELN is
exerting increasing influence over the Coordinator
alliance. It is attempting to organize a strong guerrilla
force in the area around Bogota, and probably had a
hand in M-19's recent decision to organize a unit in
the same region. Another indication of ELN's
growing power is the M-19's decision to form joint
military units with it.
shared propaganda tactics within the alliance: as part
of the ELN's efforts to build popular support for its
central guerrilla unit, the group is distributing food,
clothing, tools, and money to residents of poor
neighborhoods in and around the capital?an
approach very similar to that used by M-19 in Bogota.
In other developments, a wave of murders in early
April left 73 dead throughout Colombia, including at
least eight political leaders, according to press reports.
ELN insurgents continue to attack the Cano Limon?
Covenas pipeline in the northeastern oil region and to
14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
aecret
harry security forces on both sides of the Colombian-
Venezuelan border. In late March, the guerrillas
attacked units of the Venezuelan Naval Forces in an
attempt to dynamite dredges on the Arauca River.
Counterguerrilla efforts by security forces from the
two countries are often complicated by the guerrillas'
practice of wearing military uniforms?a factor that
has caused military casualties in at least one incident,
Guerrillas
also continue to hinder counternarcotics efforts: EPL
recently ambushed an antinarcotics patrol in western
Colombia, killing 11 police troops.
?
A possible decision by FARC to end the truce as a
result of government reprisals causing the death of
important FARC leaders that also provide the
rebels with propaganda.
? Greater political and military cooperation among
the insurgents, particularly formal or informal
agreements between FARC and the Coordinator
alliance.
.
Developments To Watch For
In the coming months, we expect the Colombian
insurgent groups to attempt the following actions:
? Effective organization of FARC commando forces
in Bogota, and of ELN and M-19 forces in the
capital and throughout the central region.
? Continued targeting of government troops by
FARC, especially attacks on unarmed civic action
crews or antinarcotics police.
15
Reverse Blank
25X1
More violent tactics by Colombian insurgents,
particularly ELN. The group killed a civilian in 25X1
northeastern Colombia recently when it strafed a
small plane on a runway?a departure from its
usual tactics aimed at inflicting economic damage.
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
aeCiel
Latin America
Briefs
Uruguay Effort To Overturn Military Amensty
The Uruguayan left has launched a petition drive to call a referendum on a
proposal to nullify the amnesty declared by Congress last December for officers
accused of human rights abuses under the previous military government. The
Uruguayan Communist Party and the far-left Tupamaro movement are sponsoring
the effort, which began in February. Under Uruguayan law, the canvassers have
until 21 December to gather the support of at least 25 percent of the country's
registered voters?about 600,000 signatures?in order to hold a plebiscite. They
have so far collected between 260,000 and 300,000 signatures, according to the US
Embassy.
Although the proreferendum committee is claiming success, we believe the left will
be hard pressed to convoke a referendum. flost
Uruguayans no longer consider human rights violations to be a burning issue and
are wary of the political uncertainty that would ensue if the amnesty were
repealed. The signature collection effort is beginning to lag because of squabbling
between the Communists and the Tupamaros for control of the campaign.
Moreover, sporadic incidents of rightwing and leftwing violence surrounding the
drive may have alienated potential supporters.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Nicaragua New Human Rights Campaign
17
Secret
ALA LAR 87-010
24 April 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
secret
Managua's concern about the erosion of support for the regime in the West also
was reflected earlier this year in the creation of a committee, chaired by National
Directorate member Jaime Wheelock, to publicize insurgent abuses against
peasants and attacks on economic targets. According to press reports, the
committee will present its case later this year at the United Nations and the
Organization of American States.
Argentina Argentina's New Labor Minister: A Peace Offering?
Secret
President Alfonsin has named Carlos Alderete, a Peronist labor leader, Minister of
Labor and Social Security. The government is portraying the appointment as an
effort to give labor a voice in policy decisions, according to the US Embassy. The
General Confederation of Labor (CGT), a union umbrella organization, has
tentatively accepted the peace offering and begun "social pact" negotiations with
the government. Press reports indicate the administration and the CGT have
Carlos Elbid Alderete
Minister of Labor
(since 27 March 1987)
Carlos Alderete has been secretary general of Federation of Light and Power
Worker's union, affiliated with orthodox Peronist "15 Organizations" (large
industrial unions seeking accord with government) . . . lone Peronist at ministerial
level. . . champions wage bargaining talks, repeal of restrictive labor legislation
instituted by military government. . . likely to collaborate closely with
CGT. . . 48 years old.
18
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
agreed to work together to adjust wages for past price increases and to combat
future inflation. Moreover, labor's cooperation assures at least a temporary end to
disruptive strike activity and has reduced the influence of antigovernment
hardliners in the unions.
We believe the President's move will aid his party's prospects in the congressional
election scheduled for 6 September by reducing the credibility of the already
disorganized Peronist opposition. The presence of a Peronist labor leader in the
Cabinet, in our view, undermines the opposition's argument that the government is
not concerned about workers' issues. The social pact effort, however, entails
serious risks for Alfonsin. If the talks do not rapidly generate wage increases for
organized labor, militant labor leaders who favor confrontation with the
government could quickly seize control of the CGT. On the other hand, if the wage
increases are too great, the resulting high inflation would be likely to fan domestic
discontent and lose votes for the President's party in September.
Bolivia Labor Strife Intensifies (c NF)
Reverse Blank
Worker unrest is spreading, particularly in La Paz, where labor leaders and the
government remain deadlocked in negotiations. This month, the Bolivian Workers
Central rejected the government's offer of wage concessions, and a generally
peaceful protest on 14 April was marred when a homemade bomb thrown at the
US Chancery bounced into the crowd and injured several people, including the
Embassy's security officer. The government reportedly has stationed tanks in front
of the residence of President Paz, and the Embassy reports that Paz may impose
martial law.
Turmoil has been building in Bolivia's embittered work force for more than a year
due to poor pay and unemployment?officially estimated at 20 percent but
probably much higher. Neither the government, which is straining under a tight
budget, nor labor leaders, who are preparing for a national congress, are likely to
make acceptable concessions. More general strikes are planned for later this
month, but they reflect desperation tactics. Paz is seeking to end the monthlong
spate of protests without recourse to a state of siege, but he may be forced to
impose one if more violence occurs.
19
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
Cuba Chronology
February 1987
3 February
East German official Georg Stizlack signs a protocol following talks with Atomic
Energy chief Fidel Castro Diaz-Balart on Cuba's nuclear development, the results
of scientific-technical cooperation, and cooperation in nuclear safety.
Havana TV announces that a Cuban delegation headed by Justice Minister Juan
Escalona Reguera participated in the seventh session of the joint Cuba?Guinea-
Bissau Commission on Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation on 25-30
January.
The 11th National Education Seminar begins in Havana with some 3,700
participants. The seminar is being held as a result of proposals made by Fidel
Castro. The students' learning process and the evaluation system are discussed.
4 February Havana Radio reports the discovery of copper deposits in Pinar del Rio near the
Matahambre mine.
Fidel Castro Diaz-Balart says strict controls will guarantee safety at Cuba's
Soviet-built nuclear power plant, scheduled to go into operation in 1990.
Technicians from the USSR and East Germany have inspected the plant.
The National Institute of Tourism fulfilled its income plan by 103 percent in 1986.
This represents an $8 million increase in convertible currency compared to 1985.
5 February Nicosia press announces that President Spiros Kiprianou will pay an official visit
to Cuba 24-27 February at the invitation of Fidel Castro.
6 February
The second session of the Cuban-Burkinabe Joint Cooperation Commission, under
the chairmanship of Minister of External Relations and Cooperation Leandre
Bassolet, begins in Burkina. Minister of Justice Juan Reguera Escalona represents
Cuba.
Lima TV reports that three Cuban refugees seeking asylum at the Peruvian
Embassy in Havana have begun a fast.
Fidel Castro speaks at the closing session of the 11th National Education Seminar,
underscoring the great working spirit of teachers and professors and stressing the
fundamental role they play in the effort to improve quality in teaching.
21
Secret
ALA LAR 87-010
24 April 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
7 February The 12th session of the bilateral commission of Cuban-Angolan cooperation is held
in Havana. Politburo member Antonio dos Santos heads the Angolan delegation.
9 February
10 February
11 February
12 February
13 February
14 February
The Cuban Government suspends an offer to the three Cubans who have lived as
refugees in the Peruvian Embassy since 1980, which would have allowed them to
return to their homes without facing any charges.
Havana Radio Progreso reports that, according to the Transportation
Administration of the National Revolutionary Police, state-owned vehicles were
involved in 69 percent of the accidents occurring in 1986.
Brasilia press reports that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is expected to visit
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Peru, Nicaragua, and Cuba in August.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets with UNESCO General Deputy Director Henry
Lopez to discuss relations between that international organization and Cuba and
the activities of the regional UNESCO cultural office.
Fidel Castro tours the San Cristobal precooked rice plant, the only one of its kind
in Cuba. The precooked rice will be sold on the parallel market.
The "Builders of the Future"?a contingent of youths discharged from military
service or without jobs, and others preparing to serve laborers in CEMA member
countries?begin training in Guantanamo.
At the closing session of the annual radiobroadcasting assessment meeting in
Havana, Ismael Gonzalez, President of the Institute of Radio and Television,
expresses the need for more efficient radio programming.
Havana radio reports that over 300 physicians from the Vladimir Il'ich Lenin
Provincial Hospital will forgo collecting per diem payments that the state provides
doctors on night duty in order to support economic measures.
A ceremony commemorating the 27th anniversary of the reestablishment of
Soviet-Cuban economic relations is held in Havana. Vice President of the Cuban-
Soviet Friendship Association Julio Chaviano says economic relations are
unbreakable.
Fidel Castro receives Lt. Gen. Antonio dos Santos Franca, member of the
Politburo of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola to discuss
existing bilateral cooperation and the international situation.
Secret 22
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18 : CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
15 February
18 February
19 February
20 February
23 February
24 February
The Cuban Government bestows the 30th Revolutionary Armed Forces
Anniversary Medal on Mexico's Secretary of Defense, Gen. Juan Arevalo
Gardoqui, and Secretary of the Navy Adm. Miguel Gomez Ortega.
Vice Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon arrives in Lima to coordinate the coming
meeting of the Nonaligned Movement's Executive Council with Peruvian officials.
The meeting will be held in Guyana 9-12 March.
Rosendo Canto, Director of the Casa de Cuba in Madrid, tells the press that the
Cuban Government is planning to free some political prisoners whose release was
requested by Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez during his trip to Cuba last
November.
Two former Cuban political prisoners, Arcadio Peguero Ceballos and Sixto Nicot
Sosavila, arrive in Miami. They were released from prison last May. Havana Tele-
Rebelde announces that the Fifth Congress of Union of Young Communists will
be held in Havana from 1-4 April.
Foreign Trade Minister Ricardo Cabrizas and Mexican Commerce and Industrial
Development Secretary Hector Hernandez sign documents to increase trade
relations.
Radio Rebelde reports that general assembly meetings will be held throughout the
country from 15 March to 15 April to announce the 1987 economic plan guideline
figures.
In a report for Radio Cadena Nacional, Fidel Castro says the United States is
solely responsible for drug trafficking, as it is the largest drug consumer in the
world. He also says that Cuba's relations with Colombian guerrillas are eminently
political.
Cypriot President Spiros Kiprianou arrives in Havana and is greeted by Fidel
Castro, Jorge Risquet, Osmani Cienfuegos, Jose Ramon Machado, Isidoro
Malmierca, and Jose Ramon Fernandez.
Fidel Castro tells President Kiprianou that Cuba will continue its firm support for
Cyprus's struggle for freedom and vindication. Kiprianou briefs Fidel on
developments in Cyprus.
23
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
25 February
26 February
27 February
28 February
National Coordinator of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
Armando Acosta Cordero stops in East Germany en route to Libya. He meets with
National Front President Lothar Kolditz to exchange views on domestic and
foreign policy.
Indian Deputy Prime Minister Y. S. Das and Vice Foreign Minister Giraldo
Mazola sign a cooperation protocol for 1987-89 in Havana to include culture,
education, science, radio, television, and sports.
Politburo member Jorge Risquet meets in Havana with a delegation of the Soviet
Committee for Solidarity With Latin American Peoples, headed by Deputy
Chairman Peter Nikolayev, to discuss the Central American situation.
Cuba and the USSR sign a cooperation agreement on the solidarity between the
two countries and the peoples of Latin America, pledging to defend peace and
policies for disarmament, detente, condemnation of the arms race, and cold war
policies.
Cuba and East Germany sign a cooperation agreement to develop the Cuban
electronics industry, including electronic calculation techniques and the
manufacture of microelectronic elements.
Foreign Minister Malmierca and his Cypriot counterpart, George Iacovou, sign a
cooperation protocol laying the foundation for broadening trade and considering
the exchange of 33 agricultural and industrial goods.
Havana Radio Reloj announces that the communications Ministry will establish
greater demands and improve supervision over the quality of the scheduled
maintenance programs of domestic and international service.
Havana Radio Rebelde announces that Cuba has launched a coffee recovery
program that includes the development of new areas and permanent incorporation
of hundreds of agronomic engineers.
Secret 24
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9
Secret
.,
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/18: CIA-RDP88T00792R000100020026-9