CUBA: TRAINING THIRD WORLD GUERRILLAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000400500001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Pit
Cuba: Training
Third World Guerrillas
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ALA 86-10050
December / 6
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Cuba: Training
Third World Guerrillas
This paper was prepared by
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Office of
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Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division ALA_
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Secret
ALA ALA 86-10050
eceD mber 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of 15 October 1986
was used in this report.
Cuba: Training
Third World Guerrillas
Over the past 27 years, Cuba's training and support of Third World
guerrillas have become institutionalized within its political and govern-
mental system. The complex network backing these programs involves
party, foreign ministry, military, and intelligence elements. Even Cuba's
mass organizations and commercial and cultural entities contribute to the
training, equipping, funding, and transporting of leftist groups around the
globe. The development of this apparatus into an international operation
capable of training hundreds of insurgents per year portends continuing
challenges for the United States as it grapples with Havana's efforts to
elsewhere.
export revolution to the Third World.
Despite Cuba's current economic crunch, we see little likelihood that
Havana will soon reduce its support to radicals. Moreover, there are
increasing signs that Cuba-because of Nicaragua's widening participa-
tion in the training of guerrilla forces-may now be able to improve some
insurgent groups' chances for success by focusing its resources on providing
more specialized training, individually tailored to their needs. Over the
longer term, this development could foreshadow stronger insurgent pres-
sure on those governments targeted by Cuba in Latin America and
leftist groups.
he decision to assist a
particular guerrilla group ultimately rests with Fidel Castro and the top
members of the Cuban Communist Party. Responsibility for implementing
the party's "liberation" programs in the Western Hemisphere falls to the
Central Committee's America Department (AD), while its General Depart-
ment of Foreign Relations (DGRE) handles these duties elsewhere. We
believe that both of these organizations are given wide latitude by Castro in
coordinating Havana's provision of training, supplies, and funds to radical
guerrillas sent to Cuba for training
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probably are turned over to the Ministry of Interior's General Directorate
of Special Troops (DGTE)-an elite paramilitary force of some 2,000
personnel. Cuba's guerrilla training 25X1
programs consist of highly specialized and structured courses of instruction
in infantry and artillery tactics, explosives, communications, frogman
training, concealment techniques and devices, photography, and false
documentation. 25X1
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of at least two major guerrilla training centers in Cuba, and we
have located several other facilities that probably function at least
periodically in the training of insurgents. In our judgment, most of the
groups that we have identified as currently being trained by Cuba can
probably be accommodated in these training facilities, which we conserva-
tively estimate are handling some 600 to 800 trainees per year. In addition,
other, more specialized training-for which we are unable to calculate the
number of trainees-almost certainly occurs at other military installations
scattered throughout Cuba.
Clientele for Cuba's guerrilla training programs include groups from
Central and South America as well as Africa and the Middle East. In
Central America, the survival of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua-
where Cuba's training efforts are now focused on conventional military
programs-remains Havana's highest priority. Guerrilla forces in El
Salvador and Guatemala still receive attention from Havana, but the
Honduran and Costa Rican radicals have become attractive to the Cubans
as they search for ways to reduce pressure on their Nicaraguan ally.
Castro also apparently sees new opportuni-
ties in southern Africa, where he has shown an uncommon interest in South
Africa's mounting domestic problems. As a result, the Cuban leader
appears to be gambling that increased Cuban support for terrorist opera-
tions in South Africa will aid regional radical groups-and ultimately
Havana's major ally in the region, Angola-by causing Pretoria to become
preoccupied with internal security.
Castro's fervor for promoting armed revolution, long regarded as the core
of Cuban Communist philosophy, underscores his willingness to act boldly.
In this regard, we see no evidence of a slackening of effort by Havana to
carry out its strategy of subversion, although Cuba presumably will remain
responsive to outside pressures in its choice of tactics. In the aftermath of
the US action in Grenada and Libya, we believe Havana is likely to
sidestep requests for support that might be construed as direct Cuban
sponsorship of terrorist acts against Americans, lest they elicit such a
strong response from Washington that Cuba itself could be threatened.
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Summary
Insurgent Training Apparatus
Major Guerrilla Training Camps 9
Suspected Training Facilities 13
A. Clients for Cuba's Guerrilla Training Programs
B. Photography of Selected Guerrilla Training Facilities in Cuba 29
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Scope Note This paper examines the large, permanent, guerrilla training apparatus
that Cuba has developed for promoting international subversion.
taking an in-depth look at various aspects of the guerrilla training
infrastructure within Cuba, including the state and party organizations
responsible for its administration, the various insurgent training facilities
and their curriculum, and the Third World clientele making use of these
programs. Finally, it assesses the direction and impact of Cuba's guerrilla
training programs and the implications for the United States.
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Figure 1
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Cuba: Training
Third World Guerrillas
The Republic of Cuba ... recognizes the legitimacy
of the wars of national liberation ... and considers
that its help to those under attack and to the peoples
that struggle for their liberation constitutes its inter-
nationalist right and duty.
Extract from Article 12 of the
Cuban Constitution
Since 1959, Cuban President Fidel Castro has viewed
the support of Third World revolutionary movements
as a vital instrument of Cuba's foreign policy. Re-
garded by Castro as a highly effective means of
carrying out his "liberation" policies outside normal
diplomatic or political channels, Havana's guerrilla
training programs have evolved over the years to
become an institutionalized part of Cuba's political
and governmental infrastructure. Discouraged by the
failure of several Cuban-backed insurgencies in Afri-
ca and Latin America during the early and middle
1960s, Moscow pressed Havana to shift its support
away from regional guerrilla groups to local Commu-
nist party affiliates as the primary means of carrying
out the revolutionary struggle-a policy that lasted
through the mid-1970s. By 1978, however, the Castro
regime-encouraged by the success of its expedition-
ary forces in Angola and Ethiopia-began to re-
appraise its policy regarding the support of groups
that advocate armed struggle to seize power.
The Sandinista overthrow of the Somoza regime in
Nicaragua in July 1979 clearly had a profound effect
on Castro's thinking regarding Cuban support of
subversion in Latin America, resulting in a return to a
more active policy of supporting guerrilla movements
in the region, especially in Central America.
Castro, apparently confident that events in Nicaragua
would lead to revolution throughout Central America,
moved to increase Cuba's training and logistic support
for the insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala. The
failure of the Salvadoran guerrillas' "final offensive"
in January 1981, and active US moves to stem the
flow of Cuban arms into the region, however, handed
Havana a series of political and military setbacks.
These were compounded by US willingness to use
military force to protect its interests abroad-as
demonstrated in Grenada in October 1983 and
against Libya in 1986-as well as by the reemergence
of democratic institutions throughout Latin America.
Although these events-as with the failures of the
1960s-probably have caused Havana again to re-
evaluate its tactics, we believe Castro's longtime
strategy for promoting and supporting armed revolu-
tion in the Third World remains virtually undis-
turbed.
Insurgent Training Apparatus
Over the past 27 years, the guerrilla training appara-
tus in Cuba has matured into a complex network of
party, foreign ministry, military, and intelligence
elements. Even mass organizations, as well as com-
mercial and cultural entities, contribute to the train-
ing, equipping, transporting, and funding of leftist and
revolutionary groups around the globe. This extensive
infrastructure has as its principal long-term goal the
systematic destabilization of governments targeted for
overthrow by Havana.
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u a as:
? Trained members of some two dozen African and
Latin American insurgent groups in urban and rural
guerrilla warfare.
? Supplied or arranged for the provision of arms and
ammunition to radical elements dedicated to the
overthrow of both elected and dictatorial
governments.
? Funded and offered materiel assistance to regional
leftist organizations in an effort to unify splintered
radical groups.
? Sought to use its aid and advisory assistance to gain
influence over local guerrilla fronts and leftist gov-
ernments sympathetic to the Cuban cause.
Major Components
As the regime's highest policymaking body, the Cu-
ban Communist Party's 14-member Politburo theo-
retically functions as the chief decisionmaking and
oversight body for Havana's tightly controlled guerril-
la support program. In practice, however, these re-
sponsibilities fall to specific components of the larger
Central Committee.
the AD) is responsible for providing cohesion and
direction to Cuba's "liberation" programs in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Since June 1974, the AD
has been headed by Manuel Pineiro Losada, a charter
member of Cuba's guerrilla "elite" and a favorite of
the Castro brothers.' Charged with undermining US
influence in the region and supporting local liberation
movements, Pineiro's organization operates largely
behind the scenes.
the AD,
which we currently estimate has some 200 personnel,
has conducted a variety of traditional intelligence
activities such as penetration and agent-of-influence
operations. The AD periodically conducts its activities
openly, however, contacting other Communist or left-
ist parties and personalities, disseminating official
Cuban Communist Party propaganda, and providing
support to exile groups in the host country or in Cuba.
Nonetheless, the principal role of the AD, in our
judgment, has been to coordinate Havana's provision
of training, supplies, and funds to guerrilla organiza-
tions and other radical leftist groups-actions that
have touched most of the countries in this hemisphere.
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it is
within these departments that the party's operational
plans are initially developed. Our research-docu-
mented in appendix A and elsewhere in this paper-
reveals, for example, the direct involvement of some
half dozen senior Cuban officials in the orchestration
of Havana's subversive activities in or from nearly
every country in the Western Hemisphere and many
countries in Africa. Moreover, it appears certain that
such plans must first pass muster with Cuban Presi-
dent and Party First Secretary Fidel Castro before
rubberstamp approval is granted by the Politburo. It
is at this point, in our opinion, that the responsible
Central Committee department begins marshaling
resources from within the Cuban Government to
carry out a designated party program or plan of
action.
Policy Coordination and Implementation.
the
America Department of the Central Committee of the
Cuban Communist Party (PCC/CC/AD, or simply
The AD has traditionally been organized into at least
four regional sections: North America, South Ameri-
ca, Central America, and the Caribbean. More re-
cently, however, this bureaucratic structure may have
' Prior to 1974, Cuba's "liberation" work was carried out by the
National Liberation Department (NLD), which, by late 1961, had
evolved into the General Intelligence Directorate (DGI) of the
Interior Ministry (MININT). Pineiro, who was the first chief of the
DGI, took personal charge of the activities of the NLD until late
1969, when he was given exclusive control of the newly formed
Liberation Directorate (LD)-in effect, a MININT task force-
now separated from the more "classical" overseas intelligence-
collection-oriented DGI. Dissolution of the LD followed in June
1974, when Havana announced that the party's old department of
foreign relations had been replaced by two new departments: the
AD (under Pineiro), and a General Department responsible for
affairs outside the Western Hemisphere. F__1
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Figure 2
Cuba: The America Department (AD)
Guyana/Suriname
United States
Southern Cone Branch
Jamaica /Trinidad and
Canada
Argentina
Tobago
L
Puerto Rico
Uruguay
Para
uay
French Antilles
g
French Guiana
Mexico
Brazil
Dominican Republic
Panama
Haiti
Costa Rica
Eastern Caribbean
Chile
Peru
Belize
Bolivia
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Venezuela b
Colombia
Ecuador
a Section believed to be divided into three branches. Nicaragua
may now be a section in its own right due to Nicaragua's
importance in Cuban eyes.
bPresumed branch.
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America Department Officials: Architects of Revolution
Manuel Pineiro Losada
AD chief Manuel Pineiro, 53, is Cuba's principal proponent and focal point for
subversive activities, including the export of revolution to other countries. A
member of the revolutionary guerrilla elite that fought in the mountains with
Fidel Castro and his brother Raul, he enjoys their trust and confidence. Pineiro,
an original member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, is
close to President Castro ideologically, which we believe enables him to have
considerable freedom of action in his sphere of influence.
its importance to Havana, may now be a separate
Jose Arbesu Fraga
Veteran intelligence officer Jose Arbesu, 46, an AD deputy chief, has been
responsible for North American and Caribbean matters for about 10 years. Acting
as a backchannel contact to sound out officials of the US Interests Section in Ha-
vana, he seeks to gauge Washington's reaction to Cuban policy.
Traveling frequently to the United States, he has participated
in bilateral immigration talks and attended UN General Assembly and Decoloni-
zation Committee meetings. During the 1960s, Arbesu was a department head for
Central and West Africa in the Foreign Ministry. He has served abroad as a
counselor at Cuba's Embassies in Cairo and Algiers; in Algeria, he was also chief
of center for the DGI.
It is likely, therefore, that Nicaragua, because of Once Castro determines-presumably with the pro
forma concurrence of other Politburo members-that
a particular operation is feasible and grants his
approval for its implementation, we believe the AD is
then given substantial latitude by the Cuban leader to
decide how best to carry out the mission. An elite
corps of AD officers-aside from the normal section,
branch, and country desk personnel-apparently is
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Ramiro Abreu Quintana
A longtime intelligence officer and Latin America specialist, AD Central America
section chief Ramiro Abreu, 42, plays a key role in channeling political, -financial,
and logistic assistance to Nicaragua and revolutionary movements in the region.
He is also Cuba's unofficial observer at the Contadora peace negotiations.
Abreu enjoys access to, and the
secretary and in Mexico as consular affairs officer.
foreign Communist party, guerrilla, and government leaders on their behalf.
Abreu's earlier assignments included tours at Cuba's Embassy in Chile as third
confidence of, Cuba's top policymakers. He accompanies Fidel Castro and
Manuel Pineiro to meetings both in Havana and on trips abroad, and meets with
Hector Duran Villavicencio
Hector Duran, 41, is Havana's South America chief charged with overseeing the
AD's activities in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. Duran only recently replaced longtime
AD official Hector Humberto Sanchez Gonzalez, who was arrested in June on
corruption charges. Before his dismissal, Sanchez had been heavily involved in
coordinating support for Chilean exile and leftist groups since Augusto Pinochet
came to power in 1973-duties that we believe Duran will now assume. Duran
previously had been ostensibly attached to the Foreign Ministry for over 15 years,
and, before receiving his current assignment, he had been posted to Peru as first
secretary and then as charge d'affaires.
More of a generalist than other AD officials, Duran
-has-worked in the Foreign Ministry's Directorates of International Organizations,
of Africa, of Socialist Countries, and of Latin America. He has also been a third
secretary and consul general in Czechoslovakia.
charged with carrying out special clandestine opera-
The implementation of the Central Committee's poli-
cy directives outside the Western Hemisphere falls to
the AD's sister organization in the party, the General
Department of Foreign Relations (DGRE).F-
the responsibilities of the DGRE-like
those of the AD-include liaison with Communist
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Figure 3
Cuba: The General Department of Foreign Relations(DGRE)
Sub-Saharan Asia Eastern Europe Western Europe North Africa/ USSR
Africa Middle East
a Information on the DGRE's organization beyond the section
level is sketchy. Some similarities apparently exist between the
geographic responsibilities of the DGRE and those of the Cuban
Foreign Ministry, however, suggesting that individual branches
probably are dedicated to the areas of heaviest Cuban
involvement: Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, for example.
and leftist parties, information collection, propaganda
dissemination, and influencing organizations and indi-
viduals that could prove useful to Cuba's foreign
policy objectives. Although it apparently shares re-
sponsibility with the AD for the coordination and
implementation of party policy dictates, the DGRE In our view, however, the DGRE's role in insurgent
generally is less involved with supporting Third World training has been less visible than that of the AD
radicals. largely as a result of Cuba's more overt involvement
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Figure 4. Since 1979, the DGRE had been headed by Jesus
Montane Oropesa, a longtime Castro confidant, who, until losing
his seat during the Third Party Congress last February, was a
member of the Party Secretariat and an alternate member on the
Politburo. Montane evidently lost his DGRE post as well at the
Congress, although his successor has not yet been disclosed. F_
in Africa, and Havana's preference for localized
training of groups such as the African National
Congress (ANC) and the South-West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO). Nonetheless, Havana has
been embroiled in a series of largely low-intensity
conflicts in Africa since the mid-1970s, and has
longstanding ties to nearly a dozen African and
Middle Eastern revolutionary groups; these ties prob-
ably are at least brokered through the DGRE.
after an initial screening process, guerrilla trainees
sent to Cuba for paramilitary training probably are
turned over to the General Directorate of Special
Troops (DGTE).2 The Special Troops are an elite,
highly trained, brigade-size paramilitary force under
the direct control of the Minister of Interior that
provides training and advisers to various guerrilla
groups and foreign governments.
the Special Troops were
among the first Cuban units sent to Angola in 1975,
and DGTE personnel participated in the Sandinistas'
overthrow of Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979.
Logistic Support.
Cubana Airlines, the state-run airline
is used extensively in transporting insurgents to and
from Cuba for training, as well as ferrying arms and
supplies to regional radicals.
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Havana's Guerrilla-Makers: Top Guns in the Ministry of Interior
Division General Jose Abrantes Fernandez
Soviet-trained counterintelligence and subversion expert Division General Jose
Abrantes, 54, became Interior Minister in December 1985 after having served 23
years as MININT Vice Minister for Security. An original member of the Cuban
Communist Party's Central Committee and long responsible for Fidel Castro's
personal security at home and abroad, Abrantes is fiercely loyal to, and has the
ear of, the President. A former student activist in the prerevolutionary Commu-
nist Party's youth wing, Abrantes joined the "Fidelista" ranks in the mid-1950s
and lived as an exile in the United States and in Mexico to procure arms for his
anti-Batista guerrilla comrades located in the Cuban mountainside. After Castro
came to power, Abrantes returned to Havana
Brigadier General Alejandro Ronda Marrero
MININT Special Troops chief Brigadier General Alejandro Ronda, 43, is one of
Havana's key contacts for Cuban support to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
He has held this post since at least 1983, and his election as an alternate member
of the Central Committee in February suggests that he has performed well.
Ronda,
has operated in the
Latin America arena throughout his career.
His earlier assignments included stints at the Cuban Embassy in Chile ostensibly
as a logistics officer and in Argentina as an attache.
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insurgents, and its training programs offered little
more than rudimentary instruction in small-arms
familiarization, small-unit tactics, and ideology.
Moreover, the groups that Havana trained had little
success or, in the case of Che Guevara's ill-fated
expedition to Bolivia, met with glaring defeat. None-
theless, the demand for Cuban training by regional
radicals grew. Encouraged by its clients and the
Soviet Union-which also provides training to insur-
gents-to expand its training capabilities, Havana has
developed the infrastructure necessary to meet these
demands.
Major Guerrilla Training Camps. On the basis of a 25X1
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panning many years, we have con-
firmed that there are at least two major guerrilla
training centers in Cuba, although several other mili-
tary installations also are probably used at least
periodically for guerrilla training. The most promi-
nent of these facilities, Guanabo Military Camp, is
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located east of Havana and is operated by 25X1
the DGTE's Special Troops. I 25X1
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the camp is subdivided mtc25X1
several housing and training areas to segregate differ-
ent national groups-apparently for security reasons.
The facilities at Guanabo, which include infiltration
courses, a mock airstrip, and hand-to-hand combat
pits, suggest that its primary function is to train
personnel in guerrilla warfare
mission of the Cuban personnel stationed at Guan-
"foreign troops in terrorist activities.
Training and Support Facilities
During the early 1960s, Cuba used the existing
military and police facilities inherited from the de-
posed Batista government to train small groups of
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Cuba's Propaganda Apparatus
Cuba has long made use of its mass media network-
managed by the Central Committee's Revolutionary
Orientation Department-to disseminate propaganda
in support of regional insurgent and leftist organiza-
USSR in a reciprocal arrangement that allows the
Soviets the use of two shortwave transmitters in Cuba
for Radio Moscow broadcasts to Latin America.
Prensa Latina
With 41 offices worldwide, the Cuban news service
transmits stories in four languages and publishes a
variety of magazines and news periodicals that are
disseminated around the globe. Aside from its jour-
nalistic endeavors, however, the news agency some-
times carries out covert operations or intelligence
gathering.
Radio Havana
Once used to send coded messages to Che Guevara in
Bolivia, Radio Havana historically has been regard-
ed by Havana as a vital instrument in its export of
the revolution. Today, it frequently broadcasts insur-
gent "war bulletins "from its eight transmitters in
Cuba that extol, for example, guerrilla actions in El
Salvador and Guatemala. In addition, Radio Ha-
vana, which broadcasts in eight languages, extends its
coverage by maintaining two transmitters in the
Official Liaison Offices
Among the several insurgent and terrorist organiza-
tions represented in Havana are: Uruguay's Monton-
ero and Tupamaro groups, El Salvador's Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the Guate-
malan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), Na-
mibia's South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO), and South Africa's African National Con-
gress (ANC).
we believe
these "services" cooperate closely with the Cuban
media, particularly on matters of propaganda inter-
Cuban Institute of Friendship Among Peoples (ICAP)
Bringing foreign groups to Cuba-where they may be
exploited for their propaganda value-is a major
responsibility of ICAP, which is estimated to have
about 113 such friendship organizations around the
world. Soon after its establishment in December
1960, ICAP set about forming various friendship
associations among foreigners residing in Cuba.
These societies provided Havana not only with a
registry of aliens that could prove useful to Cuban
intelligence and operational needs in the individuals'
homelands, but also formed a mechanism for mobi-
lizing foreign nationals to lobby against their own
governments on issues opposed by Havana. I
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Figure 5. As chief of Cuba s Kevotunonary urtentanon juepart-
ment and a propaganda and political mobilization specialist,
Carlos Aldana, 44, is the Cuban Communist Party's ideology Figure 6. Bolivian officers display the corpse of Ernesto "Che"
producer-director and scriptwriter. Aldana is a protege and key Guevara following his death at the hands of the Bolivian military
aide to Cuba's number-two man, Raul Castro, having gained his on 8 October 1967. As a revered revolutionary in Latin American
current post after serving as Raul's executive assistant and leftist circles, the death of Guevara, which epitomized a series of
speechwriter. Elected a member of the Cuban Communist Party's failed insurgencies and other setbacks suffered by Havana, is
Central Committee in 1980, he has appeared with increasing regarded by many as the watershed in Cuban support to Third
frequency in the company of the country's top leadership at home World revolutionary groups during the late 1960s. In the decade
and abroad. Aldana, who was a teenage member of the Rebel that followed Guevara's death, Havana-under pressure from
Army that fought against the Batista regime, became involved in Moscow to reduce its support for guerrilla movements in favor of
organizin mass support for Castro when he came to power. assisting local Communist parties-adopted a generally more
Aldana, pragmatic policy of offering training and financial backing to
Opreviously has headed indoctrination sections of the insurgent groups, which it assessed as having at least some modest
A similar military camp at Candelaria-located in a Dolores, some 8 kilometers west of the Candelaria
remote mountainous area of western Cuba-also has camp. The Dolores camp has a mock airstrip, hand-
been used for the to-hand combat pits, and additional barracks and
training of foreign guerrillas. Che Guevara reportedly training areas.
used the facility to train guerrillas for his ill-fated
Bolivian expedition of the mid-1960s
Candelaria is the location of Havana's School for
Rural Warfare. Candelaria has facilities for airborne
training, small-arms firing ranges, and isolated groups
of barracks capable of housing small numbers of
Another, smaller training facility that we be-
lieve to be associated with Candelaria is located at
the training facilities at Guanabo are more
extensive than those at Candelaria. Guanabo, for
example, has a permanent obstacle course, physical
training apparatus, and a swimming pool; however,
Candelaria has no such facilities. The Guanabo camp,
on the other hand, does not have the advantage of
being surrounded by rugged terrain that could provide
realistic practical exercises, because of its proximity
to urban areas. Nonetheless, both camps appear to
provide adequate facilities, and probably similar
training for the prospective guerrilla. The types of
training offered at these installations,
include infantry and artillery tac-
tics, explosives and field fortifications, politics and
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Figure 7
Guerrilla Training Facilities
Guanabo Military Camp One of two major guerrilla training facilitien Cuba ... home of the School for
Urban and Suburban Warfare ... manned by MININT Special Troops ... offers instruc-
tion in leadership, special skills ... subdivided into separate housing, training areas to segre-
gate groups and enhance security ... training facilities include a mock airstrip, obstacle
courses, hand-to-hand combat pits, as well as demolitions and firing ranges.
Candelaria Military Camp Identified, along with camp at Guanabo, as one of two major guerrilla training facilities in
Cuba ... location of the School for Rural Warfare ... probably in operation since the mid-
1960s, providing basic training and several leadership courses ... has facilities for airborne
training, small-arms firing ranges, and isolated barracks similar to those at Guanabo ...
remote, mountainous terrain provides guerrilla trainees with realistic practical exercises.
Lazaro Pena Workers School Suspected location of Cuba's School for Urban Warfare ... although purported to be a school
for training labor union cadre, it provides classroom instruction on the
Dolores Military Training Area Probably a subcamp of Candelaria some 8 kilometers to the east ... facilities include a mock
airstrip, hand-to-hand combat pits, and additional barracks and training areas.
El Cacho Military Camp Suspect guerrilla training facilit~ L . formerly an abandoned,
rundown military garrison renovated in 1984 ... remarkably similar in appearance to Cuban
guerrilla training camps at Guanabo, Candelaria, and Cuban-inspired facility at Jiloa,
Nicaragua ... training facilities include special-purpose firing ranges with popup targets, infil-
tration and assault courses, a mock airstrip, and a probable drop zone for airborne operations.
El Nicho Suspect Training Identified in June 1986 as a suspect training camp for insurgents ... remote and austere with
Area only a few relatively unsophisticated training areas ... shares some similarities in appearance
with Guanabo, Candelaria, and El Cacho.
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history, physical training, land navigation, communi-
cations, military hygiene and first aid, and enemy
order-of-battle studies.
Suspected Training Facilities. For several years,
the appearance and location of
the Lazaro Pena Workers School in Havana have led
us to suspect that it is a school for urban guerrillas. F
The El Nicho camp is located in a remote mountain-
ous area of south-central Cuba, approximately 35
kilometers east of Cienfuegos. A small training area
with derelict aircraft and a mock airstrip, other
training areas with defensive trenches, and a few
small buildings were identified
the school, located in an urban area, is
regularly maintained and has small military-related
training facilities such as an obstacle course, a troop
formation area, and a military vehicle display that is
changed periodically.
In addition to the Lazaro Pena facility, we have
identified two new camps within the past
14 months that may be associated with guerrilla
training. These installations-El Cacho in western
Cuba and El Nicho in south-central Cuba-have
training facilities similar to those at the guerrilla
training camps at Guanabo and Candelaria. The type
of facilities observed-mock airstrips with derelict
aircraft, special firing ranges, infiltration courses,
demolition training areas, and hand-to-hand combat
pits-are not usually seen at conventional military
garrisons in Cuba.
El Cacho, located in Pinar del Rio Province in western
Cuba, was an abandoned and rundown military garri-
son before its renovation in 1984. It is similar in
appearance to the training camps at Guanabo and
Candelaria, as well as to the Cuban-style training
camp at Jiloa in Nicaragua. Although we have no
evidence that foreigners have received guer-
rilla warfare training at El Cacho, its isolated location
and specialized training facilities-
make it
in our opinion, for such activity.
Other Training Facilities. In our judgment, most of
the guerrilla groups that are detailed in appendix A as
being trained in Cuba today could probably be accom-
modated by the training camps described above. On 25X1 X1
the basis of our evaluation of the two major guerrilla 25X1
training facilities at Guanabo and Candelaria, n L0X1
and
guerrilla war-
fare in Cuba between 1983 and 1985, we estimate-
conservatively-that these facilities are capable of
handling at least 600 to 800 guerrilla trainees each
year.
specialized training for a particu-
lar group or mission is occasionally conducted at a
number of remote, clandestine sites in Cuba
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Havana, in addition to institutionalizing its own
guerrilla training and support apparatus within
Cuba, has found a willing partner in the Sandinista
regime. Since coming to power in July 1979, the
Sandinistas-with Cuba's encouragement and assis-
tance-have increasingly provided support to radical
leftist elements in both Central and South America.
Illustrative of Cuba's influence in this process was
the establishment in 1984 of a Department of Special
Operations-counterpart to the Cuban DOE-in
Nicaragua's Ministry of Interior (MINT)
The MINT's Special Troops installation in Jiloa,
located outside Managua, offers guerrilla
training to regional radicals-primarily Salvadoran
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and Honduran insurgents.
the courses taught by Cuban
and Sandinista instructors in Nicaragua run the
gamut from urban and rural guerrilla training, to
communications, sabotage, weapons and explosives,
ambush techniques, and assassination.
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Cuba's Guerrilla Clientele
The list of clientele for Cuba's guerrilla training
programs-discussed in detail in appendix A-in-
cludes groups from Central and South America as
well as Africa and the Middle East. In Central
America, the survival of the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua clearly remains Havana's highest priority.
However, the focus of Cuba's training for the Sandi-
nistas has shifted from guerrilla warfare to conven-
tional military programs.
the guerrillas in El Salvador
and, to a lesser extent, Guatemala still receive priority
attention from Havana; however, the training of
Honduran and Costa Rican radicals has become
increasingly attractive to Havana as it searches for
ways to reduce pressure on its Nicaraguan ally.
Castro apparently sees conditions as "ripe" for revolu-
tion in Chile, and
Castro wants to intensify armed resistance to
Pinochet and to make that regime his primary target
of subversion in South America. In Colombia, the
breakdown of the 1984 peace accord between the
government and the guerrillas, as well as other events,
may tempt Havana to step up its funding and training
assistance to Colombian insurgents.
expand Cuban influence in southern Africa.
we expect an increase in
Cuba's support for ANC terrorist operations in South
Africa. Castro also appears to be gambling that
increased terrorist activity by the ANC will aid
SWAPO-and ultimately Cuba's major ally in the
region, Angola-by causing the South African mili-
tary to become preoccupied with internal security.
We expect to see little or no change in Havana's
revolutionary philosophy or its support to regional
radicals. The institutionalized nature of Havana's
guerrilla training programs suggests that it will con-
tinue to be an integral part of Cuban foreign policy.
Havana, in our view, will continue to concentrate its
greatest resources and efforts on those insurgent or
radical groups that it assesses as having at least some
chance of success. Over the near term, for example,
we expect Cuba to intensify its efforts to train, fund,
and arm radical leftist groups in Chile and-albeit
probably to a lesser extent-Colombia. Cuba's proba-
ble role in providing Chilean extremists with nearly
100 metric tons of arms and supplies uncovered by
local security officials earlier this year demonstrates,
in our opinion, that there has been no slackening of
Havana's efforts to carry out its policy of subversion.
Even in those countries where the chances for gains
by revolutionaries are marginal, Castro is willing to
devote resources if he believes that his support to
these groups might further Cuba's revolutionary
goals. The training and financing of Honduran left-
ists, for example, has been under way for years, and,
more recently, the Cubans have enlisted radicals in
Costa Rica in their effort to foment regional unrest.
Both countries, in our judgment, are likely to receive
increased attention from Havana in coming months as
Cuba searches for ways to reduce pressure on its
Nicaraguan ally.
Another example is South Africa, where Castro has
been encouraged by mounting domestic turmoil and
Pretoria's increasing international isolation. If the
situation in South Africa continues to deteriorate, we
believe Havana may try to exploit Pretoria's difficul-
ties by expanding its African-based guerrilla training
operations, as well as increasing aid to guerrilla
groups combating the Botha government. The ANC
probably would be the chief beneficiary of any ex-
panded training program. Havana's disenchantment
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Will Austerity Dampen Havana's
Support for Revolution?
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the Armed Forces Ministry,
which oversees some of the military facilities and
bases used by the guerrilla trainees, is lumped under
the "defense and law enforcement" category in offi-
cially published accounts. Nonetheless, the an-
nouncement by Cuban officials this past January that
the declared budgetfor this category would be cut
from $1.6 billion to $1.4 billion in 1986-a drop of
some 11 percent from 1985-suggests that some
elements of the military, along with other government
ministries, may be asked to share the burden of
Cuba's flagging economy.
Aside from instructor salaries, however, we believe
the direct cost to Havana for running its guerrilla
training programs probably remains quite small.
Many items such as munitions, food, housing, and
clothing needed to support and train the guerrillas
either are included among the annual appropriations
to the Armed Forces, or, in the case of the military
installations and other government-owned and oper-
atedfacilties used by the trainees, are paid out over a
period of many years.
Despite worsening economic conditions and Castro's
call for additional austerity measures aimed at im-
proving the government's economic performance, we
believe Havana has little, if any, intention of cutting
back on its support of subversion-regarded by the
with the disunity of SWAPO guerrillas suggests that
Cuban aid to that organization will remain limited,
unless the situation worsens in South Africa.
The evolution of Cuba's guerrilla training apparatus
into a complex, highly institutionalized operation
dedicated to training hundreds of guerrillas from
around the world each year portends continuing chal-
lenges for the United States as it grapples with
Havana's efforts to export revolution to the Third
train regional revolutionaries in the rudimentary as-
pects of guerrilla warfare. This development, in our
opinion, allows Havana to focus its guerrilla training
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resources on more advanced course work for those
groups it assesses as having a more immediate chance
of success. Finally, Cuba's ability to offer an ever-
expanding spectrum of specially tailored training
courses potentially foreshadows stronger insurgent
pressure on governments in Latin America and else-
where.
Moreover, Cuba's reliance on commercial, diplomatic,
and state-run bodies as an integral part of its guerrilla
support apparatus, and its use of conventional military
facilities for training insurgents, are likely to make
detection of Cuba's subversive efforts even more
difficult. Havana, for example, already uses its exten-
sive network of front organizations and other com-
mercial assets to mask its involvement in the transfer
of arms and funds to various insurgent groups.
Indeed, Castro's fervor for the promotion of armed
revolution-long regarded as the core of the Cuban
Communist philosophy-underscores his willingness
to act boldly if he perceives that the potential gains
outweigh the immediate risks. We see no evidence, for
example, that Castro has moderated his revolutionary
strategy, although Cuba's tactics presumably remain
responsive to outside pressures.
In this regard, we believe the US military action
against Libya, like Havana's earlier reversal in Gre-
nada, has given Castro cause-at least in the tactical
sense-to be more cautious in doling out support to
regional radicals whose position is especially weak.
Even before the US attack on Libya in April, Havana
counseled many of its leftist clients in the
Caribbean to move cautiously and to avoid entangle-
ments with Tripoli. We also believe Havana is likely
to sidestep requests for support that might ultimately
be construed by Washington as direct Cuban sponsor-
ship of terrorist acts against Americans, lest they
elicit a strong negative response from the United
States that could threaten the security of Cuba itself.
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Appendix A
Clients for Cuba's
Guerrilla Training Programs
Nicaragua
Since the overthrow of the Somoza regime in July
1979, helping the Sandinistas consolidate power in
Nicaragua has remained Havana's top priority in
Central America. Ha-
vana was responsible for the training of several hun-
dred Sandinista insurgents before and immediately
after the ouster of Somoza. Cuban training programs
during this decade, however, have shifted from guer-
rilla warfare training to helping the Nicaraguan
military become a conventional military force.0
The Cubans still provide some guerrilla training to the
Sandinistas, however, apparently to provide Managua
with a nucleus of guerrilla cadre to advise and train
radical groups in neighboring Honduras and Costa
Rica, as well as insurgents from Latin America and
El Salvador
The five Salvadoran guerrilla organizations still
receive priority attention from Havana, especially
regarding training.
as many as several hundred
insurgents per year from these factions benefit from
Cuba's guerrilla training programs or its surrogate
training efforts in Nicaragua.
of ammunition, money, and other supplies uncovered
during an investigation of an automobile accident in
Honduras late last year, also back our judgment that
the guerrillas in El Salvador continue to receive a
variety of arms and supplies from Cuba via Nicara-
gua. Nonetheless, the declining fortunes of the rebel
alliance since mid-1984 appear to have resulted in a
reduced level of Cuban and Nicaraguan support.
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Figure 9. The Cuscatlan bridge over the Lempa River in central El
Salvador is seen here after it was destroyed by Cuban-trained
guerrillas on 1 January 1984. The ensuing disruption of transpor-
tation and trade caused by the bridge's destruction typifies the
economic damage that has resulted from the many attacks carried
out against the country's infrastructure by the Salvadoran guerril-
las during the nearly eight-year-long war. F__1
Guatemala
Data compiled on the 26-year-old insurgency by the
US Embassy in Guatemala City in late 1985 indicate
that some 25 percent of Guatemalan guerrillas proba-
bly have received training in Cuba. Over the last four
years, however, Havana has seen the Guatemalan
guerrilla force whittled back by an effective govern-
ment counterinsurgency program from an estimated
3,000 full-time combatants in early 1982 to about
1,500 members at present. More important, in our
view, is that the dwindling of popular support for the
insurgency is being hastened by the military's orderly
transfer of power earlier this year to the first popular-
ly elected civilian government in Guatemala in 19
years. Havana apparently is undaunted by these
setbacks, however;
According to US Embassy
~, the three major guerrilla
factions in Guatemala maintain contact with Havana
through the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, or use
their Havana-based representative to the URNG-
the insurgent umbrella organization formally estab-
lished under Cuban and Nicaraguan tutelage in Feb-
ruary 1982-to lobby Havana for aid. Cuba's frustra-
tion with the inability of the Guatemalan guerrilla
factions to unite, however, has periodically resulted in
Havana's threatening to cut off arms supplies. This
suggests that the level of Cuban support for these
groups-in the absence of a unified command-is
likely to remain modest.
Honduras
The Cubans, with the assistance of the Sandinistas,
apparently have resumed their efforts to foment un-
rest in Honduras, despite the failure of their efforts in
1983 and 1984 to ignite a rural insurgency.
The two previous
attempts to infiltrate guerrillas into Honduras-one
in 1983 involving 96 Honduran insurgents trained in
Cuba and Nicaragua, and another in 1984 involving
at least 20 guerrillas-failed when the Honduran
military killed or captured most of the infiltrators.
Costa Rica
Officials in Costa Rica also appear to be concerned
about Cuban meddling. In July 1985, Costa Rica's
Deputy Minister of Security publicly characterized
the situation in his country as "dangerous," alleging
that several hundred Costa Rican leftists had received
military training in Cuba during the previous four
years. Although we believe that Costa Rican radi-
cals-whose alleged number appears inflated-are
unlikely to initiate an armed insurgency at this time,
Havana probably hopes that its training of insurgents
targeted against Nicaragua's neighbors ultimately
will help to relieve pressure on Managua by shifting
the United States' attention elsewhere and weakening
the resolve of US allies in the region.
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Figure 10
Probable Cuban-Supplied Arms Seized in Chilean Caches
6 August-9 September 1986
Bulgarian PG-7 rounds
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the
Castro regime is devoting an increased amount of
attention to Chile, and, in our opinion, has made the
Pinochet government its primary target in South
America. As early as February 1985, Cuban AD chief
Manuel Pineiro-in uncharacteristic candor-admit-
ted to US officials that Cuba was providing support to
insurgents in Chile, as well as in El Salvador and
Guatemala. Moreover, this past August and Septem-
ber, Chilean security forces uncovered several massive
arms caches-unprecedented in Latin America-in-
tended for the Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) and
its terrorist affiliates, and the available evidence
points strongly to Cuba as the likely supplier.
Castro has publicly) encouraged the
overthrow of the Pinochet regime, whose reputation as
an international pariah practically assures a minimum
of political risk for Havana in advocating its downfall.
Figure 11. Cuban AD chief Manuel Pineiro applauds then Colom-
bian M-19 guerrilla leader Rosenberg Pabon (victory sign raised)
on his arrival in Cuba in April 1980. Pabon and other M-19
members were accompanied on their flight to Havana by 11 of the
hostages they had held for 61 days in the Dominican Republic's
Embassy in Bogota, Colombia.
Ha-
vana, despite its endorsement of a negotiated truce
between Colombian insurgents and the Betancur gov-
ernment in 1984, has continued to provide training
and other support to M-19 guerrillas and other Co-
lombian radicals. AD chief Pineiro, during his talks
with US officials in February 1985, denied that Cuba
had aided any Colombian guerrilla group since the
inauguration of President Betancur in August 1982.
He explained, however, that Havana's training and
provisioning of the M-19 had been under way for
years and lamely blamed bureaucratic inertia for the
return of Cuban-trained M- 19 insurgents to Colombia
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Figure 12. Carlos Pizarro has headed the Colombian M-19
guerrilla group and its affiliates-the National Guerrilla Coordi-
nating Committee and the multinational American Battalion-
since his predecessor was killed in March 1986. Regarded as a
military commander rather than a politician, he is among the
many Latin American insurgent leaders who have received guerril-
la training in Cuba over the years. Now in his thirties, Pizarro
credits his father-once Commander in Chief of the Colombian
Argentina
Cuba is continuing to provide
limited funding and training to the Montoneros and
Bolivia
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Despite Castro's desire for improved relations with
Bogota, we believe the unraveling of the 1984 truce
and Betancur's departure from office in August 1986
could prompt Havana to step up its funding and
training assistance to the Colombian insurgents.
Paz Estenssoro took office in 1985.
some funding to the Alfaro Vive, Carajo (AVC)
Ecuador
Havana provides training and perhaps
the Tupamaro guerrilla group
Uruguay
Cuba presumably funds and trains some members of
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Havana's support to Caribbean radicals dates back to
the unsuccessful Cuban-backed expeditions against
the Dominican Republic and Haiti in 1959. However,
the embarrassing reversal suffered by Cuba in Grena-
da three years ago apparently has caused Castro to
adopt a long-term program to rebuild Cuba's influ-
South America, is content for now to concentrate on
trying to build up Havana's bilateral political and
economic relations in the region. The Cuban leader
also is encouraging regional leftists to organize quietly
under the umbrella of legitimate political parties so
that they can compete for power through elections.
Nonetheless, Cuba continues to provide small-scale
military assistance, including training, to regional
radicals in order to prepare for a climate of instability.
Castro apparently calculates that the
"irreversible crisis of apartheid" in South Africa
presents new opportunities to expand his regime's
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the bulk of Cuban
training for members of the Sudanese People's Liber-
ation Army (SPLA) probably is conducted at bases
inside Ethiopia, although limited numbers of SPLA
personnel may also be undergoing training in Cuba.
Namibia
Cuban assistance to SWAPO began only months after
Cuban troops began arriving in neighboring Angola in
late 1975.
training for SWAPO guerrillas is carried
out by Cuban, East German, and Soviet advisers at
the organization's operational headquarters in south-
central Angola. We believe that Cuban and Soviet
advisers help plan and direct the operations of
SWAPO's 7,000 to 8,000 armed personnel.
but apparently receives only limited materiel and
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic
More popularly referred to as the Polisario-the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra
and Rio de Oro-this mix of Saharan nationalist and
tribal groups has longstanding political ties to Cuba,
training assistance from Havana.
Polisario, but that Algerian objections to such aid
have stymied Havana's efforts. In early 1983, for
example, Algeria's objection to the Cubans' wanting
to train some 50 to 100 Polisario troops locally
necessitated that these personnel travel to Cuba for
this training,
more aid, including money, weapons, and munitions,
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and that the Cubans have offered to supply military
and civilian schooling, ammunition. and other assis-
tance such as medical aid.
an estimated 2,000 to 3,500 combat-age dissidents
from the Front for the National Liberation of the
Congo (FLNC) received military training in Cuba.
Nonetheless,
Cuban support to the FLNC-whose military capa-
bilities have significantly deteriorated in the past
eight years because of inadequate external support,
ethnic divisions, and dispersion to numerous camps in
the Angolan interior-has declined since the late
1970s, when Havana helped to fund FLNC attacks
into Zaire's Shaba region. We believe Havana proba-
bly would renew its support to Zairian dissidents at
Luanda's request, however, if the dos Santos regime
decided to revive the nearly moribund group for new
attacks into the Shaba region in retaliation for Presi-
dent Mobutu's support to Angolan guerrillas.
Palestinian Terrorist Groups
Cuba has been providing limited support, including
political and military training, to several Palestinian
terrorist groups since at least the early 1970s.
the majority of Cuba's assis-
tance probably has gone to Yasir Arafat's Fatah;
however, Havana has also developed warm relations
with the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) and its splinter group, the Demo-
cratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)-the
umbrella organization for most of the Palestinian
groups-established a permanent office in Havana in
1974, and both the PFLP and DFLP later followed
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