CUBA: SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES IN 1985

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000400460001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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6-11-20 CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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GI 86-10072D
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Intelligence 25X1
Deliveries in 1985
Cuba: Soviet Military
ALA 86-10046D
GI 86-10072D
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Deliveries in 1985
Cuba: Soviet Military
This paper was prepared by
the Office of
Division, ALA
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 86-10046D
GI 86-10072D
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Cuba: Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1985
Scope Note This paper is the fifth in a series of annual assessments produced since
1981 that detail shipments of arms and military-associated equipment from
the Soviet Union to Cuba; it examines all available information on these
shipments during 1985. It also identifies and discusses trends in weapons
deliveries, as well as the impact of this new equipment on Cuba's military
capabilities and the implications of this for the United States.
iii Secret
ALA 86-10046D
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Cuba: Soviet Military
Key Judgments In 1985, as it has every year since 1980, the Soviet Union delivered a large
Information available quantity of military goods to Cuba. The tonnage of arms delivered,
as of1 October 1986 however, declined sharply from the record high levels of the preceding four
was used in this report.
years-an indication that the cycle of rapid expansion of the Cuban Armed
Forces that began in 1981 may be nearing an end. Nonetheless, military
deliveries in 1985 remained well above the levels of the late 1970s, and as a
result of the major expansion and modernization of the Armed Forces that
has taken place over the last five years, Cuba's military capabilities and op-
erational readiness are at an alltime high. Soviet deliveries continue
gradually to improve Cuba's defensive capabilities and raise the potential
cost to the United States of any attempt to neutralize Cuban forces by in-
vasion, airstrike, or blockade.
Key features of the 1985 deliveries were:
? Shipments of military equipment dropped some 40 percent-from an
average of 58,000 metric tons per year in 1981-84 to 34,000 metric tons.
? Shipments from East European countries, including small arms, ammu-
nition, and light aircraft, amounted to 10,000 tons-double the tonnage
for each of the last two years.
? Among the most important items delivered were 75 medium tanks and
more than 80 other armored vehicles.
? The Cuban Navy received its first deliveries of Stenka patrol boats, and
the SSC-3 antiship missile system was deployed for the first time in
Cuba, while the air defense forces received SA-13 surface-to-air missile
launchers and state-of-the-art jamming equipment.
In addition, Cuba's Air Force benefited from the delivery of at least one
MIG-21 and two MIG-23 fighters, and two MI-17 helicopters-although
these deliveries represented a decrease from 1984. A second IL-76 heavy-
lift transport aircraft was delivered to Cubana Airlines, giving a boost to
Cuba's military airlift capability. The Cuban Navy continued to modernize
its mine warfare fleet with the acquisition of two Sonya-class coastal
minesweepers.
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Most of the military goods delivered to Cuba probably have remained in
that country. however,
that Cuba continues to serve as a conduit for the transfer of Soviet military
equipment to other Third World countries, particularly Nicaragua and
Angola.
The drop in deliveries suggests that Soviet arms shipments to Cuba have
begun to stabilize at a new level-lower than the record deliveries of the
last four years, but substantially higher than those of the previous decade.
We do not expect this decline to affect Cuba's ability to operate the large
numbers of fighters, missiles, tanks, armored vehicles, and naval combat-
ants already in the Armed Forces inventory. Replacements and spare parts
are available for most equipment; pilots and technicians have become
proficient on new weapons; and a number of military projects, such as the
upgrading of air and naval facilities, the addition of new command and
control systems, and the hardening of air defense command centers, have
been completed recently.
Although the drop in 1985 deliveries may signal a curtailment of Havana's
rapid expansion program, the improvement in the Cuban Armed Forces
since 1980 has been dramatic. Even without taking hostile action, Cuba's
Navy and Air Force could have a significant impact on the allocation of
US naval and air forces in time of war or crisis because of the potential
threat to merchant shipping and troop convoys entering and exiting the
Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. Moreover, the appearance of
ground-launched antiship missiles in Cuba for the first time in over 15
years strengthens Havana's ability to threaten Caribbean shipping lanes in
time of war. Cuba's small but growing offensive capability and its potential
for intervention in the Caribbean and Central America also threaten US
interests, because many states in the region have little ability to defend
themselves and would look to the United States for protection.
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Key Judgments
Major Arms Deliveries
2
Shipments From Eastern Europe
3
Transshipment of Arms to Third World Nations
3
Impact of Arms Deliveries on Cuban Military Capabilities
7
Benefits to the
Soviet Union of Military Aid to Cuba
10
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Cuba: Soviet Military
Deliveries in 1985
This paper details the available information on ship-
ments of major arms and military-associated equip-
ment to Cuba from the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe during 1985, identifies and discusses trends in
weapons deliveries, and assesses the impact of these
acquisitions on Cuban military capabilities.
there are limitations to the data on which this paper is
based:
Figures for tonnage of seaborne deliveries
which there is only tenuous information. While this
procedure may result in some underestimation of
the flow of arms and supplies, we believe that these
procedures assure meaningful comparability across
the years.
? Except for aircraft actually flown into Cuba from
the Soviet Union-such as the IL-76 deliveries-
shipments by air are excluded. While certain fragile
or high-priority equipment may be delivered by air,
the magnitude of these shipments probably is not
significant.
? Our highest level of confidence in delivery estimates
is attached to the identification of large items of
military equipment-particularly aircraft and naval
combatants. We have somewhat less confidence in
identifying specific types of ground force equip-
ment, such as tanks and artillery. There is substan-
tial uncertainty regarding the volume of small arms
and ammunition delivered, and in the composition
of military cargo.
month.
General Patterns
The overall tonnage of Soviet seaborne military deliv-
eries to Cuba in 1985 was some 40 percent less than
the average volume of deliveries in the previous four
years (table 1).' We estimate that 34,000 metric tons
were shipped on 35 Soviet-flag voyages in 1985,
compared with almost 55,000 tons aboard 52 voyages
in 1984. Deliveries during the first six months of the
year remained near the low levels of late 1984-about
3,000 tons per month-then dropped slightly in the
second half of the year to an average of 2,500 tons per
Cuba receives all of its military equipment from the
Soviet Union free of charge. We estimate the market
value of the equipment received in 1985 at US $350
million. Compared with the $4.5 billion per year in
economic aid and subsidies Cuba has received from
the USSR in recent years, we do not consider this an
inordinate amount for the Soviets to spend in ensuring
Cuba's effective participation in Communist military
activities in the Third World.
The Soviets increasingly are using commercial ship-
ping containers for arms deliveries to Third World
clients. The use of containers thus
far has been primarily for munitions shipments, but
other military items, such as small arms, spare parts,
and accessories, are also well suited for containeriza-
tion. Increasing containerization will provide the
Soviets a more secure and rapid means of shipping
arms and make it more difficult to distinguish arms
shipments from commercial cargo at Soviet and Third
World ports.
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Table 1
Soviet Deliveries of Military Goods
to Cuba, 1962-85, Selected Years
includ-
ing naval craft carried on the decks of merchant ships. Beginning
with 1982, the tonnage of all naval craft and vessels delivered is
listed separately.
n Cargo for military use such as trucks, field kitchens, bulldozers,
transport helicopters, and so forth that were shipped to Cuba from
ports other than Nikolayev South is recorded beginning with 1981.
Naval Deliveries Total
Metric Tons
Beginning with 1982, estimates of naval deliveries from all Soviet
ports are listed as a separate category; includes for the first time
ships delivered under tow or their own power as well as small naval
craft such as patrol boats carried by merchant ships, which were
included in prior years' tonnages.
Major Arms Deliveries
In 1985, the volume of Soviet military shipments to
Cuba from the Black Sea port of Nikolayev South
amounted to 23,868 tons-down 43 percent from the
41,870 tons delivered in 1984. Military deliveries
from other Soviet ports remained at about the same
level-8,448 tons, compared with 8,510 tons in 1984.
The tonnage of naval vessels delivered declined sharp-
ly, dropping to 1,830 tons from 4,220 tons the year
before.
Among the most important items of equipment deliv-
ered in 1985 were at least 75 medium tanks-25
T-62s and 50 T-54/55s-and more than 80 other
armored vehicles. The Cuban Air Force received a
handful of jet fighters, including one MIG-21 and two
MIG-23s, as well as two MI-17 helicopters.' Cuban
air defenses were strengthened by the delivery of 12
SA-13 surface-to-air missile launchers and state-of-
the-art Soviet air defense jamming equipment. The
Navy received its initial shipment of three Stenka
patrol boats and five additional Zhuk patrol boats-
which may be passed on to Nicaragua-and doubled
the number of coastal minesweepers in its inventory
with the delivery of two more Sonya minesweepers.
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Figure 2
Soviet Military Deliveries, by Month, 1981-85
A
o Jan
1981
Jan
82
Jan
83
Jan
84
Jan
85
Dec
85
the SSC-3
coastal defense missile system-with a maximum
range of 45 nautical miles-was noted for the first
time in Cuba
Shipments From Eastern Europe
As in the past two years, a substantial volume of
military items, not included in the tonnage figures
presented here, was delivered by East European sup-
pliers in 1985. Because much of the equipment from
non-Soviet sources is military associated-ammuni-
tion, small arms, spare parts, transport vehicles, and
electronics-there is substantially greater uncertainty
in assessing these shipments. Nonetheless, it is clear
that the volume of deliveries from Eastern Europe
rose dramatically in 1985.
Deliveries of some 400 trucks and jeeps from
Romania, a large quantity of small arms from Yugo-
slavia, light aircraft from Czechoslovakia, and air-
craft spare parts and ammunition from Poland sharp-
ly increased the tonnage of East European shipments
last year. Although our assessment of military ship- 25X1
ments from Bulgaria, East Germany, and Hungary is
less precise, even conservative estimates of the ton-
nage delivered by sea suggest that the volume of Eas25X1
European military deliveries in 1985 was more than 25X1
double that for each of the previous two years. We
estimate that these shipments amounted to at least
10,000 tons in 1985-a substantial figure compared
with Soviet deliveries of 34,000 tons. Although no
major weapon systems were delivered to Cuba from
Eastern Europe during the year,
Zlin-142 light aircraft shipped from Czechoslovakia
reconnaissance squadron last year.
Transshipment of Arms to
Third World Nations
Cuba serves as a conduit for arms and military
equipment to other Soviet client states in the Third
World, particularly Angola and Nicaragua. Most
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Table 2
Observed Soviet Military Deliveries to Cuba:
Selected Weapon Systems and Equipment a
Tank, T-54/55,
medium
Tank, T-62, 50 10 107 45 25 237
medium, 115-mm
Armored personnel
carrier, BTR-60, 60P,
660PB
Infantry fighting 24 6 9 42 81
vehicle, BMP
Antitank gun, 57-mm,
M-1943, ZIS-2
Antitank gun, 85-mm
M-45
Antitank gun, I00-mm,
T-12
Air defense artillery, 15
self-propelled, 23-mm
ZSU-23/4
Air defense artillery,
23-mm, ZU-23
Air defense artillery, 36
57-mm, S-60
Rocket launcher, 40
122-mm, BM-21
Howitzer, self-propelled,
122-mm, M-1974
Howitzer, 122-mm,
D-30
Field gun, 130-mm,
M-46
Howitzer, self-
propelled, 152-mm,
M-1973
Fighter, MIG-21, 3 13 14 2 21 26 35 6 4 1 125
Fishbed/Mongol
Fighter, MIG-23,
Flogger
Footnotes appear at end of table.
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Table 2 (continued)
Missile, SAM, SA-2,
Guideline
Missile launcher, SAM, 9 3 6
SA-3, Goa
Missile launcher,
SAM, SA-6
Missile launcher,
SAM, SA-9
Missile launcher, SAM,
SA-13
Electronic warfare
equipment
Submarine, Foxtrot class 1 1 I 3
Hydrofoil patrol craft, 2
Turya class
Coastal minesweeper,
Sonya class
Inshore minesweeper, 2 1 2
Yevgenya class
Degaussing ship,
Pelym class
Landing ship, medium,
Polnocny class
21 multiple rocket launchers, include deliveries both to Cuban
forces and, possibly, to the Soviet brigade there.
b Absence of data for ground force equipment delivered in 1982 is
assessed as due largely to increased Cuban concealment and
deception measures. The increase in data for ground force equip-
ment delivered since 1982 may be the result of a relaxation of those
measures.
Of 76 medium tanks delivered in 1984, only 24 were identifiable
as to type (T-54/55s). As an approximation, the 1983 distribution
between T-54/55s and T-62s was applied to 1984; hence, of the 76, 25X1
31 are assumed to be T-54/55 types, and the remainder assumed to
be the more modern T-62. Of the 76 single-tube field artillery, 46 25X1
were identifiable as 122-mm, D-30 howitzers; the remainder were
assumed to be M-46s, which featured prominently in 1983
deliveries.
d Two AN-26 aircraft were delivered in 1984, but were probably
assigned to Cubana Airlines.
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Mechanics of Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba
military deliveries to these countries, however, contin-
ue to be shipped directly from the Soviet Union. We
cannot quantify the proportion of Soviet military
deliveries to Cuba in 1985 that were shipped to other
countries, but we believe that most equipment has
remained in Cuba.
Cuban merchant ships that regularly (up to five times
per month) sail to Corinto, Nicaragua, apparently
deliver some military or military-related equipment to
the Sandinistas. Nicaraguan merchant ships also trav-
el periodically between Cuba and ports on
Nicaragua's east coast-taking advantage of the
Cuban Receiving Ports
Mariel is the primary Cuban arms-receiving port. It
is also the major transshipment port for weapons
being sent overseas from Cuba. Mariel's location
about 40 kilometers west of Havana affords a degree
of security during loading and unloading operations.
The cargo-handling capacity of the port of Marie! has
been expanded greatly since 1983, and construction of
a new mole and two large warehouses is also under
way. When complete, the warehouses will permit
easier concealment of arms being delivered to or
shipped from Cuba. All of the 13 Soviet arms
shipments n 1985
went to Mariel.
Moa and Nuevitas, in eastern Cuba.
Ships) bring-
ing military or military-associated cargoes to Cuba
typically unload at Havana because of the commer-
cial consignments also on board. Of the 15 voyages
carrying such cargoes to Cuba in 1985, 13 went to
Havana. The other two delivered their cargoes at
greater security of this route, which avoids the Pana-
ma Canal-to bring in arms and military equipment
as well as general cargo. Between mid-September and
early October 1985, three Nicaraguan ships shuttled
between Cuba's principal arms-receiving port at Mar-
iel-where Bulgarian, Soviet, and Cuban arms carri-
ers were concurrently in port-and ports in Nicara-
gua. At least one Sheet Bend coastal defense radar
and some 10 to 18 heavy truckloads of small arms and
ammunition probably were delivered to Nicaragua by
these ships. These vessels also probably returned to
Nicaragua one MI-8 helicopter and several AN-2
transport aircraft that were overhauled in Cuba.
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Figure 3. Deliveries of Soviet BMP infantry
combat vehicles (left) and T-62 tanks (right)
improved the mobility and firepower of Cuba's
Military air shipments from Cuba to
Nicaragua were interrupted for several months in
early 1985 following the crash of a Cuban IL-18
transport on a flight to Managua
. The flights re-
sumed by midyear following an investigation. Cuba
flies up to 30 military and civilian aircraft a month
between Havana and Managua;
military cargo is loaded aboard
regularly scheduled Cubana Airlines flights at
Havana's Jose Marti International Airfield in an area
that is out of view of the general public.
Seaborne shipments of arms from Cuba to Angola
usually consist of heavier, and usually older, military
equipment-such as T-34 or T-54/55 tanks and
BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, for example-
and typically occur at least once per quarter. More
modern weapons, for Cuban or Angolan use, are
shipped directly to Angola from the Soviet Union.
Impact of Arms Deliveries on Cuban
Military Capabilities
Most of the modern weapons and major items of
equipment now in Cuban operational inventories were
delivered since 1980. The military equipment deliv-
ered in 1985 will enhance Cuba's Ground Forces
capabilities, strengthen its coastal defenses, and up-
grade its airlift capability.
Ground Forces
Cuba's Ground Forces, which are the least modern of
the three armed services, received the bulk of the
military equipment delivered in 1985. The addition of
some 75 T-62 and T-54/55 tanks and 80 other
armored vehicles to an already substantial armored
inventory has enabled Cuba to effect a major restruc-
turing of five of its nine active motorized infantry
divisions. A light tank brigade-a combined-arms
unit composed of tanks, BMP armored personnel
carriers, self-propelled antiaircraft and field artillery,
and combat engineers-has now replaced the motor-
ized infantry regiments in each of these divisions, and
provides greater firepower and protection. The Soviet
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Table 3
Inventory of Selected Cuban
Ground Forces Weapons and Equipment a
T-54/55
(400)
630
784
Other armored vehicles
BMP infantry combat vehicle
0
30
81
BTR-60 armored personnel
carrier
(80)
340
453
BRDM reconnaissance vehicle
(40)
90
130
Field artillery
M-1973 SP 152-mm howitzer
0
0
6
M-1974 SP 122-mm howitzer
0
6
18
B-21 122-mm multiple rocket
launcher
(0)
40
72
130-mm field gun
(100)
110
176
122-mm howitzer
(140)
160
225
armor deliveries also have allowed the Cubans to
replace most of the T-54/55 tanks and BTR-60
armored personnel carriers they had shipped to Ango-
la during the previous year.
Air defense of Cuban ground force units also has been
improved with the delivery last year of 12 SA- 13
surface-to-air missile launchers. This short-range,
low-level air defense system was seen for the first time
with a Cuban unit.
An improvement over the SA-9 mobile launcher, the
SA-13 launcher is mounted on a tracked vehicle for
better mobility, and the SA-13 missile has slightly
better range and altitude characteristics than the
SA-9. The SA-9 and SA- 13 systems are both effective
against helicopters and subsonic fixed-wing aircraft,
and in the Soviet military they both appear in the air
defense battery of motorized rifle or tank regiments.
Naval and Coastal Defense Forces
The Soviets delivered only two coastal minesweepers
and eight patrol boats to Cuba in 1985. This made the
tonnage of naval vessels delivered last year substan-
tially less than the deliveries during 1984, when two
major combatants-a Koni frigate and an F-class
submarine-and nine Zhuk patrol boats were received
by Cuba.
The most notable of last year's naval shipments was
the delivery of three Stenka patrol boats. The Stenka
is used by the Soviet KGB as a border patrol craft and
had not been exported previously by the USSR. The
version shipped to Cuba, however, had the torpedo
tubes, depth charge racks, and dipping sonar removed,
and was equipped with a quadruple SA-N-5 surface-
to-air missile launcher, twin 30-mm gun mounts fore
and aft, and two 16-barrel chaff launchers astern. A
significant feature of these boats is the inclusion of a
satellite navigation system that heretofore had been
found only on large Soviet combatants. The arma-
ment and outfitting of the Stenkas suggest that they
will be employed in a border guard role. Five addi-
tional Zhuk patrol boats also were delivered last
year-on top of the nine delivered in 1984-most of
which probably will be passed on to Nicaragua.
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Table 4
Inventory of Selected Cuban
Navy Assets a
Torpedo boats
P-4/P-6/Komar conversion
(24)
(19)
13
Turya hydrofoil
0
4
9
Patrol boats
Zhuk
(0)
12
26
Stenka
0
0
3
Two Sonya minesweepers delivered in 1985 doubled
the Navy's inventory of coastal minesweepers and are
a major improvement over the smaller Yevgenya
inshore minesweepers that have been the mainstay of
Cuba's mine warfare capability. The new minesweep-
ers are bigger, faster, better equipped and can stay at
sea longer than the smaller Yevgenyas, and give the
Cuban Navy greater flexibility in performing a vari-
ety of roles other than minesweeping, such as mine-
laying and antisubmarine warfare.
Cuba's coastal defenses were significantly improved
in 1985 with the deployment of the SSC-3 ground-
launched antiship missile system. This truck-
mounted, highly mobile missile system has a range of
some 45 nautical miles, posing a significant threat to
shipping lanes in the Caribbean-especially the
Florida Straits, Yucatan Channel, and Windward
Passage. With a greater range than the cruise missiles
Figure 5. The most notable naval shipments in
1985 were three Stenka patrol boats equipped
with SA-N-5 surface-to-air missiles, twin 30-mm
gun mounts fore and aft, and two 16-barrel chaff
launchers astern. The armament and outfitting of
the Stenkas suggest that they will be used in a
carried aboard Cuba's Osa patrol boats-and the
added advantage of greater concealment afforded to a
land-based system-the new missile system gives
Cuba an effective means of challenging US control
over Caribbean sea lines of communication in time of
war, and could threaten US freedom of navigation
operations in peacetime as well.
Air and Air Defense Force
Soviet deliveries of fighter aircraft to Cuba decreased
significantly in 1985, amounting to only one MIG-21
and two MIG-23s, compared to four MIG-21s and
three MIG-23s in 1984. Moreover, there were no
observed deliveries of surface-to-air missiles-aside
from the SA-13 system that went to Cuba's Ground
Forces. Other air-related shipments in 1985 included
the transfer of a new IL-76 heavy-lift transport, the
most modern Soviet air defense jamming equipment,
and two MI-17 helicopters.
The delivery of a second IL-76 transport to Cuba in
June 1985 increases Havana's heavy airlift capability
and improves its potential for providing long-range
logistic support to its allies and forces overseas.
Although the IL-76s are subordinate to Cuba's
national airline Cubana, and carry its markings, the
aircraft were designed to serve as military transports.
Like all Cubana aircraft, they are the property of the
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Figure 6. The SSC-3 ground-launched antiship
missile system was noted for the first time in
Cuba in 1985. This truck-mounted, highly mo-
bile missile system has a range of some 45
nautical miles and could pose a significant threat
Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.
The acquisition of the IL-76 transports has given
Cuba the ability to airlift heavier loads-40 tons
instead of the 20-ton capacity of the IL-62-any-
where in the Caribbean Basin. In addition, small
payloads of about 10 tons can be flown up to a
distance of 5,000 nautical miles. Each aircraft also
can carry up to 140 passengers or 125 fully equipped
paratroops. Before the arrival of the IL-76, Cuba had
no capacity to airlift bulky or heavy items, such as
armored personnel carriers, light aircraft, or large
loads of ammunition. Thus far, Cuba has used the
IL-76s principally for commercial flights to Panama.
The growing sophistication of Cuba's air defense
system was demonstrated by the appearance in 1985
of ground-based air defense jamming equipment simi-
lar to that of a Soviet air defense jamming battalion.
This equipment complements air defense weapons by
jamming the bombing and navigation radars-and
probably terrain-following radars as well-on intrud-
ing interceptors and fighter-bombers. These systems
give Cuba for the first time a radioelectronic air
combat capability that probably will be used to
augment air defense systems around key facilities.
Table 5
Inventory of Selected Cuban Air
and Air Defense Force Weapons
and Equipment a
1975
1980
1985
Modern jet fighters/trainers b
MIG-23
0
12
44
MIG-21 c
(95)
138
161
L-39 trainers
0
0
30
Other aircraft b
MI-24 attack helicopters
0
0
11
MI-8/17 helicopters
(3)
30
58
AN-24/26 transports
(2)
24
30
Surface-to-air missile launchers
SA-2 d
102
120
132
SA-3 d
6
24
42
SA-9
0
0
20
SA-13
0
0
12
a Operational inventory only.
b Through 1980 there were also decreasing numbers of older
aircraft.
Includes MIG-21 H (reconnaissance) but excludes older MIG-21
variants whose operational status is uncertain.
d Includes only launchers associated with sites assessed to be
primary occupied/operational sites (excludes dispersal sites).
Note: Based on a recent reassessment. Parentheses denote substan-
tially greater uncertainty.
Benefits to the Soviet Union of
Military Aid to Cuba
The USSR does not charge Cuba for the military aid
it supplies, but these costs are more than offset by the
military and political benefits it derives from support-
ing the Castro regime. These have included the use of
Cuban troops as a surrogate force, most notably in
Angola, Cuban assistance in penetrating Western
governments and influencing nonaligned nations, and
the use of Cuban territory as a base for signals and
electronic intelligence collection against the United
States. Perhaps the greatest benefit to the Soviets,
however, is that the growing Cuban military threat
could force US military planners to allocate resources
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Figure 7. The acquisition of two IL-76 transport
aircraft gives Cuba the ability to airlift heavier
for maintaining the security of vital sea lanes of the
Caribbean Basin in times of war, thereby diluting US
forces available for deployment to Europe or other
potential areas of US-Soviet confrontation.
The Soviets also maintain a presence in Cuba of
nearly 13,000 personnel, more than half of whom are
military advisers. Some 7,000 to 8,000 Soviet military
personnel are associated with the Soviet combat bri-
gade, the signals intelligence facility at Lourdes, and
the Soviet Military Advisory Group. The effort ex-
pended by the Soviets to train and equip their ally in
the Caribbean reflects not only the importance of
Cuba's location and military forces to the Soviet
Union, but also Moscow's confidence in Cuba's ability
to disseminate Soviet military doctrine throughout the
Third World.
Outlook and Implications for
the United States
We judge-based on the downward trend in military
deliveries seen in the past two years-that Cuba will
continue to modernize its Armed Forces during the
rest of the decade, but probably at a more moderate
pace. The rate of growth in Cuba's military capabili-
ties will continue to depend on Moscow's assessment
of Cuban usefulness to Soviet aims, and its evaluation
of the risk of provoking the United States. In our
view, Soviet deliveries to Cuba over the past five years
indicate that Moscow is firmly committed to strength-
ening Cuba's defenses against a possible US attack or
blockade, but that it understands that the introduc-
tion of purely offensive weapons, such as medium
bombers, would cause a crisis. While the Soviets
appear willing to help Cuba improve its regional
intervention capabilities, they probably will move
cautiously to gauge US reactions.
of more radars, missiles, and communications equip-
ment. Cuban forces in
Angola operate at least one missile system that has
tral and eastern Cuba will in turn require the delivery
Cuba probably will continue to develop its ground-
based air defenses; for example, the expansion of
surface-to-air missile forces already underway in cen- 25X1
this system is a likely candidate for future deliveries.
Another, but less likely possibility, would be the
SA-5-a long-range, high-altitude system that the
Soviets have supplied to Syria, and more recently, to
Libya.
We believe that the Soviet Union will continue to
supply Cuba with replacement aircraft for the five
fighters lost in accidents in 1985, but that Cuba's
inventory of fighter aircraft will remain relatively
stable for the next few years. The Air Force has just
completed a major reequipping and retraining pro-
gram, and therefore is not likely to acquire any new
types of aircraft in the near future. One possible
acquisition, if Moscow were willing to risk US reac-
tion to provide it, would be the MIG-25 Foxbat high-
altitude fighter. Cuban President Castro-long net-
tled over what he considers to be unnecessary and
provocative US SR-71 overflights-has challenged
the right of the United States to fly such missions and
probably wants a weapon, like the Foxbat, that could
threaten the SR-7 1. The Cubans may also want to
acquire the reconnaissance version of the MIG-25,
which they might fly near US borders in retaliation
for the SR-71 reconnaissance flights over Cuba. The
Soviets may provide Cuba with several more IL-76
transports, which would expand Cuba's capability to
deploy troops and military equipment over long dis-
tances-although it would still be dependent on the
USSR for any large-scale redeployment of forces.
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Cuba can be expected to continue replacing its older
T-54/55 tanks with T-62s, and to acquire sufficient
armor for adding tank brigades to the three remaining
active motorized infantry divisions. Air defense of
Cuban Ground Forces units also probably will contin-
ue to improve with the acquisition of additional SA-9
and SA-13 missile launchers, and perhaps several
more SA-6 launchers.
Based on our assessment of trends in past deliveries,
we believe the Cuban Navy probably will receive at
least one major surface combatant or submarine from
the USSR during 1987. By the end of the decade, it
could acquire one more Koni frigate, one or two more
amphibious landing ships, and perhaps as many as
three additional submarines. Cuba's acquisition of the
Nanuchka-class missile patrol boat is also a possi-
bility, since it uses the same missile as the SSC-3
ground-launched missile system. Cuba also may ac-
quire more SSC-3 launchers, and is almost certain to
continue modernizing its minesweeper force by ac-
quiring more Sonya coastal minesweepers.
In time of war or crisis, Cuba's regular Armed Forces
could threaten merchant shipping passing through the
Caribbean or exiting the Gulf of Mexico, and, even
without taking hostile action, would likely cause US
military planners to divert air and naval assets to
protect troop convoys bound for Europe. The substan-
tial improvements in Cuba's Armed Forces over the
past five years also would raise the cost to the United
States of any attempt to neutralize Cuban forces.
Cuba's small, but growing, military airlift and sealift
capabilities also pose a potential threat to neighboring
countries in the Caribbean and Central America.
Many of these countries have no conventional armed
forces, and we believe that in a crisis they would look
to the United States for protection from any Cuban
threat.
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