MADAGASCAR: PRESIDENT RATSIRAKA'S BALANCING ACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000400440001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Madagascar:
President Ratsiraka's
Balancing Act
An Intelligence Assessment
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October 1986
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Reverse Blank
Madagascar:
President Ratsiraka's
Balancing Act
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with
contributions from
the Office of Leadership Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA'
Secret
ALA 86-10045
October 1986
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 22 September 1986
was used in this report.
Madagascar:
President Ratsiraka's
Balancing Act
Secret
Madagascar, the largest, most populous, and most strategically situated of
the southwestern Indian Ocean island states, is undertaking a measured
shift away from close ties to the Soviet Union in an attempt to assume a
more nonaligned posture. In our view, however, after more than a decade in
power the often unpredictable 49-year-old Malagasy President, Didier
Ratsiraka, has become accommodating to the West because of sheer
economic necessity rather than because of any fundamental change in
ideology. Madagascar's need for financial aid nevertheless provides the
West opportunities to counter Soviet influence in the region.
Ratsiraka's attempt to use Western economic prescriptions to remedy years
of failed socialist policies is politically risky, since the austerity-driven
economic reforms will keep feeding popular discontent over the short to
medium term. The program not only will further depress living standards
across the board, but could cost Ratsiraka support from entrenched
political interests that support a continuance of socialist policies and a
more pro-Soviet tilt.
We expect Ratsiraka to seek improved relations with the West?particu-
larly the United States and France?but to take care not to threaten
seriously ties to Moscow, which has supplied the bulk of Madagascar's
military training and equipment since 1975. Despite some domestic
criticism that he has not moved close enough to the West, we expect
Ratsiraka to be mindful that a major policy shift could prompt the Soviets
to move against him, by either cutting off military assistance or by using
their influence with the armed forces to foment opposition to him.
Despite Ratsiraka's domestic concerns and his relationship with the Soviet
Union, there is ample evidence that he has held the line on some key
economic issues as well as on denying Moscow military access to Malagasy
air and naval facilities. We believe he will continue to prohibit access by
nonlittoral powers to Malagasy facilities such as Antsiranana (Diego
Suarez)?one of the world's best natural deepwater harbors and the former
headquarters of French naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Ratsiraka knows
that granting such access to Western nations would lead the Soviets to
apply pressure for reciprocal privileges.
Although Ratsiraka will be increasingly beset by conflicting pressures
regarding both foreign and domestic policies, we judge that he has a good
chance of managing the challenges to this balancing act through the
iii
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presidential election scheduled for 1989. He has preserved his political
dominance thus far by exploiting his image as a strong national leader and
by judiciously accommodating, co-opting, or ruthlessly cracking down on
political opponents. A combination of other factors also will favor
Ratsiraka:
? The current gloomy economic picture is likely to brighten over the next
few years, and, with the harsher social impact of the reform program
behind him, Ratsiraka should have increasing flexibility to follow
through on additional reforms.
? The political opposition is divided along ethnic, regional, and ideological
lines, and has no leader able to match Ratsiraka's national stature or
mobilize broad-based popular support.
? Ratsiraka has strong military backing. We expect the security forces to
remain apolitical and loyal so long as Ratsiraka is able to assure them a
steady flow of military assistance and to protect other service-related
interests.
? While the Soviets probably do not like Ratsiraka's warming toward the
West, they probably do not yet view it as a major threat to their present
or long-term interests in the region. They appear willing to go along with
Ratsiraka for the time being to safeguard their existing equities.
Even so, although Ratsiraka's cunning has served him well, his
behavior may at some point lead him into a potentially fatal error.
If he were overthrown?an event we now think unlikely
we doubt that a new leadership would make dramatic policy shifts. Any
new government almost certainly would be enticed by Soviet offers of
security assistance while it attempted to consolidate its hold on power and
would be vulnerable to new pressures for Soviet access to Malagasy
facilities. At the same time, Madagascar's economic needs and the
probable inability of the Soviet Bloc to provide substantial economic
assistance would encourage a new government to retain aid and trade ties
to the West.
Secret
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
iii
Introduction
1
The Balancing Act
1
Dabbling in Economic Reform
1
But Still a Socialist Authoritarian at Heart
3
Playing to Both East and West
5
But Dependence on the Soviets Remains
5
Facing the Challenges
9
Divided Political Opposition
11
Social Pressure
12
The Role of the Military and Soviet Influence
14
Outlook
15
Scenarios for Change
16
Popular Uprising
16
Military Coup or Assassination
17
Implications for the United States
17
Appendix
Profile of the National Front
19
V Secret
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Madagascar:
President Ratsiraka's
Balancing Act
Introduction
Madagascar, nearly the size of Texas and, with close
to 10 million inhabitants, the most populous of the
southwestern Indian Ocean island states, has increas-
ingly become a focus of interest for the United States
and the Soviet Union. The island is situated along
major sea lanes, so air and naval facilities are militari-
ly attractive to foreign powers; foremost among these
facilities is the port at Antsiranana (Diego Suarez)?
one of the world's best natural deepwater harbors and
the former headquarters of French naval forces in the
Indian Ocean. Its unique ethnic mix and historical
development make Madagascar culturally complex,
and the society is marked by seemingly contradictory
characteristics.
To some extent, the country's leadership reflects the
anomalies that pervade Malagasy culture. Soon after
Madagascar's President, Didier Ratsiraka, was elect-
ed in 1975, he aligned his country with the Soviet
Bloc and radical Third World states and embarked on
what proved to be a disastrous "socialist revolution."
Since the early 1980s, however, Ratsiraka has been
gradually shifting toward a more moderate posture,
reflecting an acknowledgement of Madagascar's dire
economic straits and need for Western assistance.
This paper assesses the various political and economic
pressures on Ratsiraka as a result of his shift, his
efforts to balance conflicting forces, and prospects for
stability of the regime.
The Balancing Act
President Ratsiraka's leadership skills increasingly
are being put to the test as he attempts to revive
Madagascar's ailing economy by reducing state con-
trols while not undermining his socialist credentials.
Ratsiraka fears that
moving too far and too quickly in new directions not
only could play into the hands of his leftist opposition,
but could also alienate the Soviet-trained and
1
-equipped military forces and damage ties to Moscow.
The President is well aware that previous govern-
ments have fallen over economically generated unrest,
and, in our view, feels increasing pressure to respond
to the concerns of some elements of the middle class
and growing numbers of urban poor who have suf-
fered under his socialist policies. But he also must
deal with resistance to his reforms by entrenched
political interests that he has co-opted, including other
segments of the middle class, and most government
technocrats and officials of state-run enterprises. We
believe that Ratsiraka's divided but increasingly criti-
cal political opposition mirrors these pressures both
for and against reform. His balancing act is made
more delicate by subsurface strains of ethnic rivalry
between the highlanders, the traditionally prominent
Merina and Betsileo ethnic groups, and the other,
mostly coastal, less influential ethnic groups, collec-
tively referred to as the cotier who compete for
political and economic dominance in the capital.
Dabbling in Economic Reform
Ratsiraka's socialist experiment produced many fail-
ures?including chronic shortages of food and con-
sumer goods?that have led him to face the need to
attack such problems as mismanaged state enter-
prises, lack of producer incentives, poor distribution
networks, and black marketeering. The US Embassy
reports that the scarcity of domestically produced
food has resulted in malnutrition, increased cattle
rustling and crop thefts, and a weakening social
structure in which the elderly, especially, suffer. We
believe that the regime's failure to regain self-
sufficiency in rice?the main dietary staple?remains
one of Ratsiraka's chief concerns.
In an effort to reverse the economic decline, according
to US Embassy reporting, Ratsiraka in 1982 installed
a team of pragmatic economic technocrats to launch a
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Strategic Overview
Madagascar, slightly smaller than Texas, is located
some 300 miles off the east coast of Africa near
major Indian Ocean shipping routes. Its size, loca-
tion, and variety of natural and mineral resources
make the country, independent since 1960, attractive
to both the West and the Soviet Bloc. Madagascar's
colonial experience, however, together with French
dominance well into the _first decade of independence,
has soured the Malagasy on foreign involvement in
their national affairs, according to academic studies
and US Embassy reporting.
For over a decade after independence, Madagascar
granted the United States and France access to local
facilities. The United States received permission in
1963 to construct a NASA satellite, tracking station
near the capital of Antananarivo, but, when relations
with Washington began to cool, the Ratsiraka regime
closed down the installation in 1975. France contin-
ued to station its Indian Ocean military forces in
Madagascar until the early 1970s, primarily at the
naval base at Antsiranana (Diego Suarez) and at
Iavoto military ailfield near the capital.
Antananarivo terminated its military accord with
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Paris in 1972 for nationalistic reasons, and French
forces relocated to nearby Reunion and Mayotte.
The waning of Western influence, at a time when
Madagascar began to turn increasingly toward so-
cialism, opened the door for Soviet offers of military
assistance, through which Moscow almost certainly
hoped to gain access to the military facilities vacated
by the French. Although these probably are not vital
to Soviet naval operations in the region, we believe
that access to Diego Suarez would enhance Moscow's
military capabilities in the southwestern Indian
Ocean. Despite Ratsiraka's leftist orientation and his
acceptance of Soviet military assistance since 1975,
his xenophobic regime thus far has firmly denied
Soviet forces access to Malagasy military facilities.
Academic studies and US Embassy reports indicate
that Madagascar possesses a rich variety of minerals,
but these are scattered and relatively inaccessible;
Madagascar's mineral wealth has yet to be profitably
exploited. Mining is hampered by reduced world
demand and transportation difficulties. Mineral ex-
ports?primarily chromite, graphite, and mica?
make up less than 5 percent of total export revenue.
There also are proven resources of nickel, bauxite,
iron, ilmenite, and uranium that Malagasy officials
hope will become of greater commercial interest as an
alternative to South African reserves, according to
the US Embassy. Madagascar has not yet exploited
its scattered deposits of beryl, used in missile nose
cones and brake drums of high-performance aircraft,
mainly because of excessive costs.
Madagascar has significant energy deposits of coal,
lignite, oil shale, and tar sands. Profitable exploita-
tion of coal reserves?estimated at 1 billion metric
tons?now is prohibited by high mining and transpor-
tation costs. Petroleum exploration has been under
way since the 1960s and several Western oil compa-
nies have sunk exploratory wells. Given present low
world oil prices, however, we believe that these
operations are uneconomical and will be cut back.
3
modest structural reform program in line with recom-
mendations by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank. Embassy officials observe
that some of his moves to reduce state control in
industry, transportation, and the predominant agricul-
tural sector appear promising, but probably will force
cuts in government employment. We believe that
Ratsiraka's boldest moves have been in liberalizing
the policies as well as the administration of the key
rice subsector, which Embassy officials say is rife with
cronyism and corruption. The government has in-
creased producer prices, relaxed pricing and market-
ing controls, and reluctantly agreed to IMF restric-
tions on rice imports. The Embassy comments that
following through on pledges to the World Bank to
deregulate the rice market completely will require
considerable political persuasion by Ratsiraka to over-
come opposition to these moves by proponents of
socialism.
Ratsiraka is attempting to make structural changes in
other areas of the economy as well. The US Embassy
reports that the regime has liberalized general import
and export procedures in an effort to encourage
private initiative; more significantly, in our view, it is
opening up new sectors of the economy to private
enterprise, both local and foreign. Ratsiraka also is
promoting a revised investment code in an effort to
attract greater Western investment to Madagascar.
The code, drawn up under prompting by international
financial institutions in 1984, subsequently was wa-
tered down because of political pressure in the legisla-
ture and was adopted last year only after considerable
lobbying by the President
But Still a Socialist Authoritarian at Heart
Ratsiraka's desire to maintain his image as a forceful
socialist leader and to limit criticism from the left
probably means he will not go much beyond these
modest initiatives for now. His public statements
indicate he wants to mold Madagascar into a society
similar to North Korea, which he greatly admires. US
Embassy reporting indicates that the government still
considers the President's philosophy, published in
1975 as the "Charter of the Malagasy Socialist
Revolution" and focusing on opposition to capitalism
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Malagasy Ethnic Groups
The admixture of settlers from Malaysia, Africa, and
Europe has produced about 20 ethnic groups unique
to Madagascar, although the differences between
these groups often are very subtle. The major division
is between the predominately Malayo-Indonesian eth-
nic groups of the central highlands and the coastal
peoples?collectively referred to as the cotier?large-
ly drawn from Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite histori-
cal and physical differences, however, the Malagasy
people as a whole share a common language, social
values, customs, and a veneer of Christianity that
overlies traditional practices of ancestor worship.
The central highlanders historically have been the
best educated and most influential of the ethnic
groups. One highland group, the Merina, accounts for
almost 16 percent of the Malagasy population. By the
early 1800s, the Merina kingdom had subjugated
most of the other ethnic groups and established its
political hegemony over the entire island. The Mer-
inas developed a relatively modernized, Western-style
society, and successfully resisted French attempts to
colonize Madagascar until the end of the century.
The importance of ethnic identities declined during
the colonial and early postindependence periods as
Malagasy nationalism began to take root. We believe,
however, that the emerging social divisions between
the highlanders?the Merinas and related Betsi-
leos?and the cotier have since assumed greater
political significance. President Ratsiraka, a Betsi-
misaraka from the eastern coast, developed his so-
cialist revolution primarily to promote the welfare 'of
the more disadvantaged cotiers, according to US
Embassy reporting. This in turn has exacerbated
ethnic and class tensions between the ethnic groups.
The capital, located in the highlands, has been
inundated with cotier migrants seeking employment
and improved living standards, raising concern
among the highland peoples over challenges to their
privileged positions. Increasing joblessness and social
decay, combined with distress over the general eco-
nomic malaise, contribute to acts of urban violence
that, in our view, often take on ethnic and political
overtones.
Several small groupings of Asian and Muslim peo-
ples have not intermingled with the Malagasy. Their
aloofness and industriousness provoke popular re-
sentment against them, particularly since they have
managed to prosper by engaging in small private
trade activities?such as textiles?even after the
advent of socialism, according to US Embassy report-
ing. Political opposition groups have been exploiting
this resentment, stressing the possibility that
Ratsiraka 's loosening of the economy will redound to
the further benefit of these nonindigenous groups.
and "neocolonialism," to be the ultimate doctrinal
framework for Madagascar's future. Moreover, in his
New Year's speech in January 1986, Ratsiraka em-
phasized he would not abandon his socialist ideals,
although for the first time he openly acknowledged
the country's economic troubles.
The government still controls the principal sectors of
the country's economy. Private companies national-
ized in the mid-1970s remain under state control and
the government holds majority shares in 70 percent of
the major companies, including foreign ventures en-
gaged in oil exploration. Although the revised invest-
ment code offers a larger role to the private sector in
industry, agriculture, and tourism, it reserves for state
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control economic activity in certain key sectors,
including banking, energy, and mining.
In contrast to some lessening of centralized control
over the economy, Ratsiraka continues to circum-
scribe most political activity through a mix of organi-
zational control and restrictive policies.
the Supreme Revolutionary
Council?composed of the President and political and
military officials and nominally constituting the pri-
mary executive decisionmaking body?is in fact dom-
inated by Ratsiraka and exerts little influence on
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,
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policy. All Malagasy political parties are required
under the Constitution to belong to the National
Front for the Defense of the Malagasy Socialist
Revolution, a political umbrella organization created
by Ratsiraka, and must formally support his socialist
platform to have representation in the National As-
sembly (see appendix). Ratsiraka's Advance Guard of
the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA) party, which has
a broad base of support among a variety of ethnic
groups, is the dominant member of the seven-party
National Front, according to US Embassy reporting.
We refer to the other six National Front parties as the
opposition. The government censors the press and
tolerates criticism of official policies only within the
institutional framework of the National Front.
Secret
South African air and naval threats to Malagasy
territory. The equipment, capable of monitoring the
communications and locations of Western ships and
aircraft throughout the southwestern Indian Ocean
region, was installed at three sites?Toamasina (Ta-
matave), Diego Suarez, and Majunga
Playing to Both East and West
Ratsiraka is attempting to strike a balance between
West and East, probably in the hope of gaining as
much aid as possible from both sides. According to
US Embassy reporting, he is cautiously trying to
attract much-needed Western investment and eco-
nomic assistance without provoking the Soviets to cut
back their military aid or undermining what he
perceives to be his standing as a nonaligned, Third
World leader. Ratsiraka, for example, balanced his
trips in 1985 to Washington?his first since he as-
sumed the presidency?and to Paris, with subsequent
trips to Moscow, P'yongyang, and Beijing. Ratsiraka
also appears to be attempting to patch up his often
prickly relations with France. Although he had ig-
nored such meetings in the past, Ratsiraka again
traveled to Paris in February 1986 to make an
unprecedented appearance at a conference of French-
speaking nations. He also held discussions in Paris on
continued French economic support and bilateral
relations, according to the US Embassy. US officials
at the United Nations note that Madagascar is slowly
moderating its previously pro-Soviet voting record.
In what we believe was a litmus test of his new
evenhandedness, Ratsiraka responded early last year
to a US request to dismantle three Soviet-supplied
signals intelligence sites (see figure 3). The US Em-
bassy reports that the Soviets provided the intercept
equipment through East Germany in response to
Ratsiraka's plea in 1983 for assistance in detecting
5
tThe installations appeared vir-
tually complete by mid-1984 and we believe the
intercept network was on the verge of becoming
operational by the time Ratsiraka responded to the
US demarche. The last site was dismantled in early
1985, although the equipment remains in storage in
the country. Ratsiraka may have calculated that
dismantling the network would increase Madagas-
car's chances of obtaining greater amounts of West-
ern economic assistance.
Ratsiraka has made other gestures toward the West.
For example,
Ratsiraka
in early 1986 allowed a French naval training vessel
to call at two ports, the first official calls by a
Western power since he became President. Ratsiraka,
if pressed, probably would claim the French visits
technically are consistent with Malagasy policy be-
cause Paris administers the Indian Ocean island of
Reunion as an overseas department of France and
thus can be considered a littoral power.
But Dependence on the Soviets Remains
Just as Ratsiraka's economic reform policies are
constrained by his socialist convictions, we judge that
his political shift toward a genuinely nonaligned
posture is tempered by his heavy dependence on
Moscow for military aid. The record reveals that over
the past decade Ratsiraka has relied largely on Soviet
assistance to help train, maintain, and equip the
present 21,000-man Army and 500-man Aeronaval
Forces. The Soviets also provide, fly, and maintain the
six military cargo aircraft used to transport military
supplies throughout the country and, given the deteri-
orating state of Madagascar's roads and railways, the
government probably views this as a vital service.
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Sluggish Economic Recovery
Madagascar is one of the world's poorest countries,
with per capita GDP of
about $240, and the country's infrastructure?in-
cluding irrigation systems, roads, ports, and rail-
roads?is in shambles. Agriculture dominates the
Malagasy economy, supplying most of the country's
food and raw materials for local manufacturing. The
agricultural sector employs 87 percent of the labor
force and provides over 80 percent of foreign ex-
change earnings. The major export crops?coffee,
vanilla, and cloves?contribute over two-thirds of
total export receipts. Local industries include food
processing, textiles, and clothing.
The government's socialist-oriented policies during
the 1970s were designed to reduce foreign involve-
ment and increase state control over economic activi-
ty. These policies?particularly under Ratsiraka?
included nationalization, the imposition of various
administrative controls, and prudent balance-of-pay-
ments, public finance, and external debt management.
Economic growth, however, was slow and erratic,
averaging less than 0.5 percent real growth annually.
Ratsiraka 's policies significantly reduced the poten-
tial for economic growth, in our judgment. The
government generally fixed agricultural prices at
levels that provided little incentive to producers,
while its cumbersome import and export procedures
inhibited foreign trade. Government investment poli-
cies severely restricted the role of the private sector,
while inefficient public enterprises became a heavy
burden on the government budget.
Ratsiraka attempted in 1978 to reverse the economic
stagnation by implementing an extensive public-sec-
tor investment program that, in our view, largely
contributed to Madagascar's current financial
difficulties. The investment program was poorly
planned and contributed little to Madagascar's pro-
ductive capacity, As a
result, both the government budget and current ac-
count deficits grew considerably by 1980. The govern-
ment financed these deficits primarily through in-
creased external borrowing with little heed to the
repayment burden. Spiraling increases in debt service
payments, in conjunction with only meager growth in
productive capacity, contributed to a critical shortage
of foreign exchange.
The Shift Toward Reform
The regime in the early 1980s embarked on a struc-
tural reform effort with IMF and donor assistance,
with the goal of stimulating economic growth and
easing the foreign exchange shortage. Madagascar
has been working closely with the World Bank to
liberalize its rice marketing system, for example.
Major IMF-backed adjustments have included in-
creases in agricultural producer prices and some
decontrol of prices in the manufacturing sector, the
introduction of a flexible exchange-rate policy, and
additional measures to improve fiscal, monetary, and
balance-of-payments performance. We believe Ratsir-
aka's recent decision to completely liberalize the rice
trade and his pledges to implement additional agri-
cultural reforms have increased donor confidence
that the government will continue along the desired
path. Multilateral and bilateral donors?France is
the major single-country donor?have committed
$630 million for the 1986-87 period, surpassing the
1983-85 annual average by 50 percent.
Madagascar's economic indicators (see figure 2) re-
veal that Ratsiraka has been partially successful in
reversing the erosion of the economy. Declines in real
GDP were reversed in 1983, although real GDP in
1985 was no higher than it was in 1971. Budget
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Ratsiraka also looks to the Soviets to help meet about
half of the country's total fuel requirements at least
through 1987
deficits have declined notably and inflation was
running at about 11 percent in 1985, down from 29
percent in 1982. Current account deficits also have
been reduced, but the overall balance-of-payments
position remains weak because of poor export perfor-
mance and heavy debt service payments. Moreover,
the standard of living for the Malagasy people has
generally deteriorated. Per capita GDP in 1985 was
only about 80 percent of the level achieved in 1980,
while wages have fallen 50 percent against the cost of
living IMF standby
arrangements have contributed to falling living stan-
dards by raising the price of imports and utility
services, restricting government hiring, and tightening
credit.
Without additional donor support and further eco-
nomic policy reforms, we believe that Madagascar's
economy will experience stagnant or negative eco-
nomic growth and financial deterioration. Madagas-
car almost certainly will require substantial external
assistance into the 1990s because of the funds it will
require to meet unmanageably large debt service
obligations, as well as for imports, if per capita GDP
is to resume some growth. High world coffee prices,
falling oil prices, and increased donor commitments
brighten the near-term perspective. We believe longer
term economic gains and continued donor support
hinge on Ratsiraka 'S willingness to utilize fully poli-
cy adjustments already in place. They also depend on
his willingness to embark on a more rigorous?but
politically risky?effort to restructure the economy
along market lines, stimulate exports, make public
enterprises more efficient, and encourage foreign in-
vestment. In our judgment, significant increases in
foreign investment will depend on how Madagascar
packages its few profitable economic ventures and,
thus, assuages the concerns about the government's
commitment to foreign investors.
7
While plummeting world oil prices may reduce some-
what the leverage the Soviets once expected to gain by
providing oil, Moscow's ability to pressure the govern-
ment by playing its military card is almost certainly
worrisome to Ratsiraka. A US Embassy officer notes
that Soviet officials in Madagascar often attempt to
intimidate and bully the government in an effort to
extract new concessions?such as allowing an increase
in the number of technical advisers. They employed
these tactics, for example, in early 1985 after the
government had made a gesture favorable to the West
of permitting Western naval ships to call unofficially
with humanitarian assistance following a cyclone,
according to US Embassy officials.
Despite apparent setbacks in relations as a result of
Ratsiraka's warming to the West, Moscow, at least
for the moment, does not appear to see a substantial
threat to its basic interests in the country. We believe
that the Soviets have four primary policy objectives in
Madagascar: reducing Western influence, denying
Western access to Malagasy facilities and gaining
Soviet access, obtaining Malagasy diplomatic support
for Soviet initiatives elsewhere, and building long-
term influence in key Malagasy institutions. The
record shows that Moscow's military advisory, supply,
and training relationship is its favored and most
effective instrument for pursuing these goals in Mad-
agascar and other socialist African states.:
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Figure 2
Madagascar: Economic Indicators,
1981-85
Note changes in scale
Real GDP Growth
5
0
?5
Major Sectors of the Economy
Percent as a Share of the GDP, 1985
?10 1981 82 83 84 85a
Percent
Agriculture, 43
Industry, 15
Services, 42
Total Debt Service
as a Share of Exports b
100
Percent Total Debtb
3
75
50
25
0
1981 82 83 84 85
Billion US $
2
1
0
1981 82 83 84 85
Current Account Deficit
as a Share of GDP
20
Percent Inflation Rate
40
1981 82 83 84 85a
a Estimated.
b CIA estimates.
Central Government Deficit
Percent as a Share of GDP
20
30
20
10
0
Unless noted, source: IMF.
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Percent
15
10
5
1981 82 83 84 85a 0 1981 82 83 84 85a
8
310622 1086
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we judge it will continue to use
military largess to maintain its military advisory
presence in Madagascar. In the context of Moscow's
broader interests, we believe that Madagascar, like
the other southwestern Indian Ocean island states, is
relatively less important than Angola, Ethiopia, and
South Yemen, where the Soviets have devoted major
resources and gained considerable political influence
and varying degrees of military access.
9
Facing the Challenges
As Ratsiraka seeks to gain breathing room to deal
with Madagascar's economic plight, we believe he will
face increasing pressure from a variety of interest
groups that, if not adroitly managed, could over time
threaten his rule. Complicating his task, in our view,
are Ratsiraka's often exaggerated and sometimes
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Military and Economic Assistance to Madagascar
The Soviet Union and its allies are the primary
suppliers of military assistance to Madagascar. From
1976 to 1985 Soviet Bloc countries had agreed to
provide $35 million in military assistance, of which
about $13 million worth has been delivered, accord-
ing to the latest available data. The US Embassy
reports that Soviet deliveries in 1985 included light
tanks, armed personnel carriers, a cargo transport
aircraft, a troop transport helicopter, and spare parts
and communications equipment. About 70 Soviet
advisers are attached to the Army and the Aeronaval
Forces, and between 40 and 60 North Koreans pro-
vide training on North Korean?supplied combat air-
craft in the Malagasy inventory. East Germany and
Cuba in the past provided advisers to the internal
security service, according to the US Embassy. In
1985, approximately 170 officers received training in
the Soviet Union, and 96 received training in France.
That same year, about 33 Army officers were trained
in the Soviet Union, while probably a smaller number
went to France.
The US Embassy also reports that France provides a
handful of advisers to assist at the naval repair
shipyard at Antsiranana (Diego Suarez), has supplied
the Army with vehicles, ammunition, uniforms, and
radio equipment and, in late 1985, delivered a land-
ing craft to the Aeronaval Forces. In 1985 the United
States initiated a $2 million Military Assistance
Program. In addition, a small US Navy Seabee unit
is assisting the Malagasy Army engineer forces.
The West supplies the bulk of economic aid to
Madagascar, used for balance-of-payments support
and project assistance. France continues to provide
the greatest amount of bilateral assistance?close to
$100 million annually, according to the US Embassy.
Other leading Western donors?Japan, West
Germany, and Canada?contributed a combined to-
tal of almost $177 million during the period 1980-83,
according to the latest available data. During the
same period, multilateral agencies gave over $300
million. In terms of project assistance, the People's
Republic of China and Switzerland follow France as
major aid donors. The United States increased assis-
tance levels to $19 million in 1985 alone, having
provided about $35 million between 1980 and 1983.
Between 1980 and 1984 the Soviet?Bloc extended
close to $ 430.4 million in credits and grants, but the
Malagasy thus far have drawn on only a small
portion of this aid. More recently, the Soviets provid-
ed credits for oil imports, and they supply almost
half the country's fuel requirements under an agree-
ment that probably expires at the end of 1987. The
US Embassy estimates that overall Malagasy indebt-
edness to the Soviet Union is between $250 million
and $300 million.
France provided 588 civilian technical advisers to
Madagascar in 1980, but budgetary restrictions for
1986 have cut that number to about 430. The US
Embassy estimates that in 1985 the Soviet Union
provided about 130 technical and educational advis-
ers. North Korea had 25 agricultural technicians;
North Vietnam, 47 professors; and East Germany, 15
communications technicians and four professors in
Madagascar that same year. In 1984, the latest year
for which data are available, 285 Malagasy scholar-
ship students were studying in Eastern Bloc coun-
tries.
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irrational perception of the threats he faces and his
deep-seated fear of assassination, according to US
Embassy reports. One example of his often skewed
perception of events is his belief that the possibility of
South African aggression?in retaliation for his al-
lowing the African National Congress to open an
office in Antananarivo in the late 1970s?is the single
greatest threat to national security. Driven by a
unique set of ideology and fears, he overreacts, often
unpredictably, to both real and imaginary threats to
his position; thus far this behavior has effectively
cowed any opposition, according to US Embassy
officials, but a serious miscalculation on his part could
have repercussions he may be unable to control.
Divided Political Opposition
Ratsiraka's political opponents remain divided and
preoccupied with parochial issues; in our view, they
offer no major challenge to his leadership at present.
US Embassy officials note that opposition leaders
have only narrow bases of support and thus lack
sufficient national stature to wield significant clout.
The President apparently has been successful in using
the powers and privileges of his office to manipulate
the opposition, keep it divided, and co-opt its leaders
to participate in the government-controlled political
system. He skillfully neutralizes threats from these
opponents by placing them under surveillance and
encouraging defections to his own party, according to
a US Embassy official. Ratsiraka probably fears,
however, that over the longer term the opposition
groups?most of which are socialist in orientation?
might find common cause against him if he turns too
abruptly to the West or is unable to assuage popular
discontent over the decline in living standards that
result from economic reform measures. Ratsiraka's
efforts over the years to establish a one-party state
apparently were intended to either co-opt or preempt
latent oppositioni
most of the Mala-
gasy political parties continue to oppose policy shifts
that would repudiate Madagascar's form of socialism
11
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and bring in greater foreign influence. According to
the US Embassy, the Marxist, Soviet-funded Con-
gress Party for Malagasy Independence (AKFM),
which has support in the capital and among urban
intellectuals, is critical on ideological grounds of
initiatives to open up the economy. More serious from
Ratsiraka's point of view is the potential threat posed
by two populist parties?the Militants for the Estab-
lishment of a Proletarian Regime (MFM) and the
National Movement for the Independence of Mada-
gascar (MONIMA-K). US Embassy reporting sug-
gests that these parties over time might seek to play
on Malagasy xenophobia to foster popular resentment
over the new opportunities for foreigners and minority
ethnic groups to benefit from liberalization measures.
According to press reports, the small, hardworking
Asian and Muslim communities already are viewed
among the generally less industrious populace as
having a stranglehold on the limited private sector.
We believe that Ratsiraka feels pressure from the
right end of the political spectrum as well. Some
members of the opposition, almost certainly the mi-
nority, charge that he is not going far enough with his
reforms./
Even though we believe that the opposition parties in
the National Front for the moment pose little threat
to Ratsiraka, a US Embassy official has noted that
the President tends to overestimate their strength and
unity because he is concerned about factionalism
within his own AREMA party.
We believe this concern has been a factor in
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Didier Ratsiraka: Profile of an Enigmatic Leader
Didier Ratsiraka is 49 and in good health. He often
displays such erratic and unpredictable behavior
that, according to one US diplomat, "nobody knows
what makes him tick." He is intolerant of corruption
and, unlike many other African leaders, has not
surrounded himself with members of his family or
the Betsimisaraka ethnic group to which he belongs.
Reporting from a variety of Western diplomats pre-
sents a portrait of a complex, erudite individual
capable of articulate, reasoned arguments?yet prone
to wild harangues at subordinates when angered. At
times suave and charming
The US Embassy reports that
he has no close advisers, treats subordinates with
disdain, distrusts everyone, and is quick to blame
others for his mistakes. Despite his personal quirks,
he appeals to the psyche of the docile Malagasy who,
in our view, generally respond more favorably to
forceful leadership and a commanding presence than
to personal charm.
Ratsiraka was raised a Roman Catholic and claims
to read the Bible regularly, but he also shares the
traditional Malagasy belief in the occult,l
/The President has a well-known,
deep-seated fear of assassination-
and he
always surrounds himself with bodyguards during his
infrequent public appearances.
Egocentric World View
According to US diplomats, Ratsiraka fancies him-
self an international statesman, and yet, like most
Malagasy, he distrusts all foreigners. US Embassy
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causing him to implement his reforms at a slow pace.
His efforts to preserve AREMA's dominance will
continue to influence the timing and scope of the
economic reform program, in our view.
Social Pressure
US Embassy officials say that the passive and apa-
thetic nature of the Malagasy people continues to
work in Ratsiraka's favor and tends to mute popular
reaction to the harsh effect of the current economic
reforms. Ratsiraka is well aware, however, that popu-
lar tolerance has limits; he remembers the aberrant
violent popular reaction that has flared twice since
independence when Malagasy governments failed to
alleviate intolerable economic conditions. In 1972,
laborers, peasants, and the unemployed joined in
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student strikes that culminated in bloody clashes in
the capital and forced the dissolution of the govern-
ment of Madagascar's first President, who turned
power over to the Army. His successor was no more
adept at improving the economy, and a combination
of riots, strikes, and an ethnically motivated military
coup plot prompted his resignation in early 1975.
In our view, Ratsiraka knows he must keep a close eye
on the popular response to his limited reforms as the
social costs begin to mount. The price of rice, for
example, although now stable and fairly low, fluctuat-
ed by almost 200 percent for a few months after the
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officials explain his willing dependence on Soviet
military assistance in part by his fear of South
African aggression. These same officials report that,
although the President dislikes the French, he proud-
ly quotes from Gallic literature and philosophy. He
delivered his keynote speech to the 1986 Francophone
summit in impeccable French, according to US Em-
bassy reporting. US Embassy reporting also indicates
that he, like most Malagasy, feels culturally and
racially superior to black Africans because of
Madagascar's unique ethnic heritage. He views Afri-
can forums, however, as a stage upon which to play
an international role. Ratsiraka apparently does feel
an affinity for North Africa?particularly Algeria?
because of similar colonial experiences, and often
dons a long white cape in imitation of Algerian
President Chadli Bendjedid. US diplomats report
that Ratsiraka admires North Korea for the disci-
pline and productivity of its society, and would like to
build for himself a personality cult like that of
President Kim ll-Song.
Childhood and Early Career
The son of a senior colonial civil servant, Ratsiraka
attended the best schools in Madagascar where,
because of his cotier background as a member of the
coastal Betsimisaraka ethnic group, he was exposed
early on to discrimination by the socially advantaged
Merina and developed a resentment for colonial elites
as well as a drive to excel. Prior to independence in
1960, he studied at the French Naval Officer's school
and was commissioned into the French Navy. Embas-
sy officials believe that Ratsiraka's exposure to
European socialism through his contacts with the
intellectual left in Paris in the 1960s helped to form
the basis of his own political ideals. After he returned
to Madagascar, he served as Commander of the
Navy. He was Minister of Foreign Affairs during
1972-75. When President Ratsimandrava was assas-
sinated after only six days in office in early 1975,
Ratsiraka became part of the interim National Mili-
tary Directorate before his election as President in
December 1975. He was reelected to a second seven-
year term in late 1982. Ratsiraka was promoted to
the rank of admiral by a vote of the legislature in
1983, although he is no longer active in naval affairs.
His wife, Celine, is an outspoken woman who heads
Ratsiraka's faction within his own AREMA party.
regime relaxed price controls to match free market
prices, hurting urban consumers who had grown used
to subsidies for this dietary staple. The US Embassy
further reports that deregulation of rice distribution
has resulted in an often irregular supply from inacces-
sible rural markets to urban centers. In addition, rural
migrants to the cities are now flooding the job market,
causing a further drain on social services and increas-
ing the crime rate in the overcrowded capital. US
Embassy reporting indicates that urban anger toward
government institutions periodically runs high and
erupts into isolated strikes and small-scale demonstra-
tions and clashes, which, however, the security forces
quickly quash.
despite these minor eruptions the generally declining
standard of living thus far has failed to spark a
significant political backlash among the public.
The record shows that, unlike his predecessors, Rat-
siraka is actively working to improve economic condi-
tions and to avoid serious domestic unrest through a
mix of concrete actions and political persuasion. We
believe that some of Ratsiraka's decisions, such as
negotiating with Western donors and international
financial institutions for buffer stocks of imported
rice, may help to soften the adverse effects of reform
measures on living standards. He also has given
numerous assurances to Western donors that he in-
tends to pursue economic liberalization, which inter-
national financial institution officials believe will help
Madagascar achieve minimal self-sufficiency in rice
and other agricultural products in three to five years.
According to the US Embassy, most Malagasy elite
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Figure 4. View of
Antananarivo
\??,`
now appreciate the difficulties posed by the current
economic crisis and appear to accept the need for
reforms. Further, US Embassy reporting indicates
that, since Ratsiraka's acknowledgement of the trou-
bled economy in his January 1986 speech, the popu-
lace has appeared content to wait for economic condi-
tions to improve.
We believe Ratsiraka has learned from the past and is
determined not to make the missteps that helped
topple his predecessors. In our view, Ratsiraka is a
cunning politican who has the skill and resourceful-
ness to contain potentially threatening unrest over the
next few years. According to US Embassy reporting,
Ratsiraka thus far has managed to prevent large-scale
violence largely through a mix of authoritarianism,
political persuasion, timely concessions, and, as a last
resort, a willingness to use force against opponents.
For example, a US Embassy official notes that in
1985 a harsh security clampdown against a vigilante
group effectively intimidated the populace and rein-
forced Ratsiraka's image as a strong leader.
extreme distrust of foreigners, but may also indicate
his sensitivity to the potential for politicization as the
forces are used more often for internal security.
We have reports of occasional morale problems in the
military but, according to US Embassy
reporting, Ratsiraka effectively curtails mili-
tary dissent by shuffling assignments and by detain-
ing, surveilling, or retiring potential troublemakers.
His success in retaining the loyalty of his security
forces probably results also from his efforts to assign
command positions evenly among the ethnic groups
and to balance priorities and resources among the
three main components?the 21,000-man Popular
Army, the 500-man combined Aeronaval Forces, and
the 5,000-man National Gendarmerie. For example,
udi-
The Role of the Military and Soviet Influence
The transition from French to Soviet influence in the
armed forces over the past decade has had no discern-
ible effect on the-character of the military, which we
believe remains apolitical. Ratsiraka nevertheless
takes pains to assure the loyalty of the officer corps
and to minimize the potential for Soviet meddling in
armed forces affairs. His concern probably reflects his
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ciously divided the Soviet shipment of armored vehi-
cles delivered in mid-1985 between the Gendarmerie
and the Army. These tactics appear to be paying off.
Last year the Army and Gendarmerie demonstrated a
high degree of cooperation and support for the regime
in a joint internal security crackdown.
We have seen no sign that the security forces oppose
Ratsiraka's overtures to the West, and we believe they
will continue to support the regime as long as their
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interests and the means to carry out their mission are
protected. In the unlikely event Moscow were to sever
its ties to Ratsiraka and stop the flow of assistance,
however, military morale and backing probably would
plunge. Ratsiraka almost certainly is aware that
military support for the regime is to a great extent
contingent upon his ability to obtain external military
assistance. Rat-
siraka has put out tentative feelers to the West in a
bid for some military equipment and security assis-
tance. He may be gambling that improving relations
with the West, and with France in particular, will
provide him alternative sources of military assistance
should Moscow cease deliveries.
present position or long-term goals in the region, and
seem willing to do their best to protect their equities
in Madagascar.
/ On the basis of Moscow's
record of dealing with other self-styled socialist Afri-
can states?such as Guinea, Mali, and Congo?that
are dependent on both Soviet military assistance and
Western economic aid, we believe that the Soviets will
continue to mark time in Madagascar. While the
Soviets almost certainly are seeking at least to main-
tain their contacts in the Malagasy military, (
The President has taken a number of steps to circum-
scribe Soviet influence.
the approximately 70 Soviet advisers now in
the country are primarily confined to sectors where
they have little access to key military decisionmakers.
J we cannot rule out future Soviet med-
dling in internal affairs as circumstances change.
appointed pro-Western officers to key Outlook
command positions in the Air Force./
Over the past year or so, Ratsiraka has made other
moves to monitor the Soviets.
that the government has denied Soviet advis-
ers access to military air facilities currently under
construction. \
We doubt that Moscow intends to react punitively to
Ratsiraka's actions. The Soviets probably do not view
these precautionary moves so far as injurious to their
15
President Ratsiraka probably will be able to balance
competing domestic and foreign interests successfully
and remain in power over the next two to three years.
He has survived for over a decade because of a
combination of factors that we expect to prevail at
least until the presidential election in 1989:
? Although Ratsiraka is not popular, he is widely
feared and respected, and, as an elected leader, his
legitimacy is unquestioned.
? The President's political opponents have been un-
able to develop a broad base of national support, and
they are unlikely to do so over the near term, in our
view. No other political leader or party at this time
represents the spectrum of ethnic, political, and
social interests found in AREMA under Ratsiraka's
leadership.
? Ratsiraka's candor in addressing the economy and
his efforts to stem the decline probably have won a
grace period from the public and he should have
some time to implement the planned reforms.
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? Military backing for Ratsiraka is likely to continue
if, as we believe likely, Ratsiraka can assure a
reasonably steady flow of military assistance and
continues to distribute resources evenly.
International financial officials believe that the cur-
rent gloomy economic picture could begin to brighten
over the next few years if Ratsiraka presses on with
reform. While austerity will continue to be felt over
the near term, we believe that the people already have
absorbed its harshest effects. Popular unrest should
diminish further if Ratsiraka's reforms begin to edge
living standards upward over the next year or so. With
rice prices now stabilized at fairly low levels, the
regime will have greater freedom to introduce struc-
tural reforms in other sectors of the economy where
the impact on living standards will be less painful.
External assistance will continue to be instrumental in
assuring the government's stability. As long as Ratsir-
aka continues to implement his economic reforms,
Western donor confidence in the regime should re-
main fairly high. We expect Ratsiraka to seek to
ensure continued development assistance from the
West by improving his relations with the United
States and France. We foresee no major changes in
relations with Moscow, at least for the near term, and
believe Ratsiraka will avoid any actions?such as
granting port visits for Western naval ships?that
could induce the Soviets to increase pressure on him
for similar privileges or to curtail or cease their
military assistance. Ratsiraka will continue to rely on
Moscow to meet his military needs, but he also may
explore options for gaining some Western military
assistance as a hedge against a change of heart by
Moscow.
Scenarios for Change
If Ratsiraka fails to balance competing domestic and
foreign interests in order to maintain stability, or if
his sometimes erratic behavior leads him to misstep
badly, we see two scenarios for a change of leadership
that could come into play.
Popular Uprising. We believe that the government
could be brought down if either economically or
politically motivated urban demonstrations and
Secret
violence got out of hand, although
Ratsiraka's government is
better positioned today to preempt such a develop-
ment than were the governments of 1972 and 1975. A
combination of events?such as a government failure
to ensure adequate food supplies or a brutal crack-
down against opponents?could lead to widespread
urban unrest. If, in such circumstances, the military
lost confidence in the government and failed to con-
tain the violence, we judge that the President would
be compelled to resign.' At present we believe there is
no more than a low to moderate chance of such a
scenario developing within the next two or three years.
If violent social unrest were about to precipitate a
government collapse, we see the possibility that, rath-
er than follow the constitutional procedures instituted
in 1975, Ratsiraka could follow earlier precedents and
turn power over to the military in an effort to restore
order. We judge that the military probably would not
seek to retain power, but rather, as it did in 1975,
would govern for an interim period until a new
government, possible comprising both military and
civilian officials, could be formed. We do not know
who would eventually assume power under this sce-
nario. We believe, however, that a successor regime
would not cut off the country's military ties to
Moscow. An inexperienced military leadership, or a
civilian leadership from the more populist political
parties?such as the MFM and MONIMA-K?most
likely would continue Ratsiraka's pragmatic balanc-
ing of economic and military interests to assure both
Western and Soviet Bloc support. On the basis of the
public record of the parties to date, an AKFM-based
regime almost certainly would align more closely with
Moscow, while a VONJY-led government would turn
more to the West.
' The Malagasy Constitution provides that in the event of the
president's resignation, incapacitation, or assassination, the dean of
the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) is to assume government
control until an election, which must be scheduled within the next
60 days, is held. The current dean of the SRC is Arsene Ratsife-
hera?a staunchly pro-Soviet leading member of the Congress
Party for Malagasy Independence.
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Military Coup or Assassination. Chances are good
that the armed forces would move against Ratsiraka
if his more moderate economic and foreign policies
provoked a cutoff in Soviet aid. If the military toppled
the regime, we believe, on the basis of precedent, it
would eventually form a government that would
include civilians, possibly opposition leaders and tech-
nocrats from Ratsiraka's government. Any new gov-
ernment would be sensitive to the military's interests
and most likely would seek to restore ties to Moscow
to ensure a flow of military assistance
Ratsiraka, mindful that his immediate predecessor
was assassinated during a chaotic transition of power
one week after assuming the presidency, has built up
his personal security regiment and has carefully
guarded his public movements. Despite his security
precautions, however, Ratsiraka could be assassinat-
ed, a development that almost certainly would usher
in a period of uncertainty during which moderate and
radical political elements would contend for power.
We believe that the military, if it deemed it necessary,
would step in to restore order, and probably would
have a major voice in designating a new government
in order to ensure that the government would be
favorable toward the military's interests.
Implications for the United States
Ratsiraka's continuing efforts to balance competing
interests will provide increasing opportunities for the
United States and the West to counter Soviet influ-
ence in the region. Soviet involvement in Madagascar
probably will remain at current levels as long as
Ratsiraka can assure stability and resist Moscow's
pressure to expand its presence and obtain access to
Malagasy air and naval facilities. Although US Em-
bassy reporting indicates that Ratsiraka would like to
allow Western naval ships to call, he undoubtedly will
continue to deny access to all nonlittoral powers both
to maintain his nonaligned credentials and to forestall
Soviet requests for reciprocity. We believe this situa-
tion helps assure continued safe passage for Western
ships transiting nearby Indian Ocean shipping lanes.
Reverse Blank
17
To a large extent, the interests of the United States in
Madagascar will continue to overlap those of France.
The US Embassy reports that, because of France's
island possessions of Reunion and Mayotte, Paris
seeks to preserve Western influence in the southwest-
ern Indian Ocean and is willing to provide large
amounts of economic assistance to Madagascar, in
part to woo Malagasy cooperation. We expect that
France will remain the preeminent source of Western
influence in Madagascar as Franco-Malagasy rela-
tions quietly continue to improve. At present, we
believe that, although US political influence in Mada-
gascar is growing because of Ratsiraka's moves to-
ward a more genuinely nonaligned posture, US com-
mercial leverage will remain far behind that of France
because of both Madagascar's remote location and
limited export base.
Ratsiraka's suspicious nature will keep him wary of
Soviet involvement in Madagascar. He is likely to
circumscribe internal Soviet activity to the extent
possible without risking the loss of military assistance.
If Ratsiraka loses his grip on power, which we judge
to be unlikely at least for the near term, successor
regimes would require substantial backing from the
military, and therefore would be reluctant to reduce
ties to Moscow further.
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Appendix
Profile of the National Front
Most existing Malagasy political parties were
formed?some clandestinely?during the latter part
of the colonial era. Despite ideological differences, the
parties shared a desire for Malagasy independence
and an impulse of staunch nationalism as a way to
overcome entrenched French interests. As they
achieved their common goals with Madagascar's
movement away from France and toward greater
control over its own affairs, this broad consensus
eroded. The parties fragmented and their popular
support waned. Shortly after coming to power Ratsir-
aka established the broad-based National Front for
the Defense of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution as a
means to co-opt political opponents and rally support-
ers under his socialist banner. Most existing parties,
including the more rightwing groups, agreed to join
the National Front. US Embassy reporting indicates
that, although the political identities of the other
members of the National Front have been weakened
by continued close association with Ratsiraka's domi-
nant Advance Guard of the Malagasy Revolution
(AREMA), they pose a latent, but fragmented, oppo-
sition to the President.
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Advance Guard of the Malagasy Revolution
(AREMA)
Ratsiraka established AREMA in early 1976 as the
nucleus for a one-party state, and he remains the
party chief. Opposition to the one-party concept led
Ratsiraka to form the National Front later that year,
a move that gave AREMA a prominent role in the
umbrella organization. According to US Embassy
sources, AREMA is the only party to have
a national constituency and a broad base of support
among most ethnic groups and economic classes.
The
preeminent Red AREMA faction, composed of a
variety of ethnic groups, follows Ratsiraka's ideology
closely and espouses unswerving support for North
Korean?styled socialism. The small but influential
White AREMA, predominately Merina, is supported
by government technocrats and is less dogmatic. The
lackluster AREMA/Fianarantsoa faction caters al-
most exclusively to Betsileo interests and is openly
critical of pro-cotier policies.
Richard Andriamanjato Congress Party for Malagasy Independence
(AKFM)
Established in the late 1950s, the AKFM is strongly
pro-Soviet and widely known to receive funding from
Moscow, according to the US Embassy. It has links to
African nationalist movements and European Com-
munist parties. The AKFM advocates total land
redistribution and nationalization, and provides politi-
cal counterpressure to Ratsiraka's initiatives on open-
ing the economy. Based in the capital, with some
support in Antsiranana (Diego Suarez), the AKFM
has little appeal to the working class. It derives
support mainly from middle- and upper-class intellec-
tuals in the Merina and Protestant strongholds in the
Founder of AKFM . frequently engages in anti-US
rhetoric, advocates closer ties to the Soviet Union,
widely regarded as a Soviet errand boy. . . member of
the Supreme Revolutionary Council, but has limited
influence with the President . . . Pastor of the largest
Protestant congregation in Madagascar, longtime
mayor of the capital. . . sophisticated, engaging
personality, brilliant orator . . . about 56 years old.
capital./
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Manandary Militants for the Establishment of a Proletarian
Rakotonirina Regime (MFM)
Established in the early 1970s, the Marxist-oriented
MFM poses the most serious opposition to Ratsiraka,
according to the US Embassy. The MFM has a
populist base of support among peasants, laborers,
and the unemployed. Its ideology?advocating Chi-
nese-style agrarian reform and opposing the Soviet
model for industrialization and state capitalism?also
appeals to radical intellectuals, including many uni-
versity professors, students, and some government
workers. The MFM has opposed Ratsiraka's moves
toward increased privatization and foreign invest-
ment.
Founder of MFM . . . advocates radical change,
acknowledged spokesman for group representing in-
terests of the unemployed . . . wary of the United
States, distrusts all foreigners . . . astute politician,
one of the most influential members of the Supreme
Revolutionary Council . . . suspected of coup plotting
and has been imprisoned on several occasions . . .
sociology lecturer . . . about 38 years old.
Marojama
Razanabahiny
Cofounder of VONJY. . . generally viewed as the
, most moderate member of the Supreme Revolution-
ary Council. . . politically ambitious, may be a
contender in 1989 presidential election . . . head of
. Libyan-Malagasy Friendship Society, has close ties
to the French Socialist Party . . . warm and friendly
in dealings with US officials, visited the United
States under International Visitor grant in 1984 . . .
French-trained gynecologist . . . 55 years old.
Movement for National Unity (VONJY)
More right wing than most of the other parties,
VONJY is critical of Ratsiraka's continued close ties
to the Soviets at the expense of better relations with
the West The cotier-
based party is strongest in the western provinces, but
is attempting to extend its base of support. VONJY
leadership currently is attempting to revitalize the
party, following a loss of popular confidence in 1982
when internal rifts prevented it from emerging as a
viable opposition to Ratsiraka in the presidential
election.
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Jaona Remanindry
Founder of breakaway MONIMA faction . . . oppor-
tunistic, politically ambitious but lacks an indepen-
dent power base. . . favors Chinese development
model . . . expelled from Supreme Revolutionary
Council for supporting Monja Jaona 's candidacy in
1982 presidential election.
Monja Jaona
Founder of MONIMA -K . . . popular national figure
for over 20 years . . . views himself as the conscience
of the revolution and the leading Malagasy opposi-
tion leader. . . political maverick, self-described
Maoist, outspokenly anti-Soviet . . . rumored to be
involved in numerous coup plots, according to the US
Embassy . . . placed under house arresr for eight
months in 1983 for advocating a nationwide strike . . .
residual distrust of the West, probably stemming
from colonial experience . . . in his late seventies.
Socialist Organization MONIMA (VS MONIMA)
VS MONIMA is a small, lackluster offshoot of
MONIMA-K that remained within the National
Front after Monja Jaona temporarily pulled
MONIMA-K out of the organization in protest
against government policies in 1977. The more mod-
erate VS MONIMA coexists with MONIMA-K,
largely in an effort to retain the privileges of belong-
ing in the National Front.
National Movement for the Independence of
Madagascar (MONIMA-K)
Established before independence, MONIMA-K is a
staunchly nationalist party with support mainly
among the less educated, and the herders and subsis-
tence farmers in the southern province of Tulear.
Virulently anti-Soviet but one of the more radical
leftist groups, it has resorted to violence in opposing
the government in the past. The US Embassy reports
that Ratsiraka probably does not regard its elderly
leader, Monja Jaona, as a threat, since he allowed
Jaona to stand as the opposition candidate in the
presidential election in 1982.
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Founder of UDECMA . . . member of the Supreme
Revolutionary Council . . . expressed interest in es-
tablishing ties between UDECMA and US political
parties. . . shy, modest. . . Roman Catholic. . . about
52 years old.
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Malagasy Christian Democratic Union (UDECMA)
Probably the most marginal member of the National
Front, UDECMA was established in the late 1970s in
an effort to unite the divided Protestant and Roman
Catholic communities. Backed largely by leftwing
Christians in the capital and in the coastal city of
Toamasina (Tomatave), UDECMA is moderate and
anti-Communist and advocates policies that improve
the quality of peasant life. The US Embassy notes
that the UDECMA leadership to some degree com-
promised its principles when it joined the National
Front.
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