NICARAGUA'S AIR AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES: CAPABILITIES AND PROJECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000300320005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Nicaragua's Air and
Air Defense Force:
Capabilities and Projections
Secret
August 1986 (~
Copy d 1 1 R
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Nicaragua's Air and
Air Defense Force:
Capabilities and Projections
This paper was prepared by
Analysis, the Office of Global Issues, the
Directorate of Operations, and the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 86-10033C
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Nicaragua's Air and
Air Defense Force:
Capabilities and Projections
Key Judgments The Sandinista Air and Air Defense Force, despite continuing personnel
Information available and equipment constraints, has markedly improved its overall capabilities
as of 15 June 1986 was during the past three years and provides the regime with its most
used in this report.
significant advantage in the war against the insurgents. After coming to
power in 1979, the Sandinistas-with Cuban and Soviet Bloc assistance-
set out to transform their armed forces into the largest and best equipped in
Central America. Frustrated in its efforts to acquire modern jet fighters
and facing a growing insurgent threat, the Air Force has shifted its
emphasis since 1983 from developing conventional capabilities to enhanc-
ing its ability to carry out counterinsurgency missions.
In conventional forces, the lack of jet fighters. or strike aircraft leaves the
Sandinista Air Force inferior to those of Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala. Nevertheless, Nicaragua has continued to prepare airbases
and a nationwide air surveillance radar network that will allow it to employ
jet fighters in the future. Ground-based air defenses, which currently offer
little protection because of their short range, probably will improve during
the next 18 months as the regime expands its air surveillance tracking
network, acquires more modern equipment, and gains experience. The lack
of trained Nicaraguan operators and maintenance personnel means that
additional Cubans will be needed to staff and maintain the radar network.
The regime's more effective use of airpower in the counterinsurgency effort
results from the acquisition of 40 Soviet-built MI-8, MI-17, and MI-25
helicopters, along with training, technical, and operational support from
the Cubans. The construction of forward airbases and helicopter landing
zones near guerrilla operating areas has improved the government's ability
to provide close air support, transport troops and supplies, and evacuate
casualties. Nevertheless, the force suffers significant constraints that
continue to limit its effectiveness. These include a shortage of pilots,
equipment limitations, inexperienced leadership, inefficient command and
control, difficulties posed by terrain and weather, and training and
maintenance problems.
We expect the Air and Air Defense Force to continue to improve during
the next 18 months through additional experience and a growing equip-
ment inventory, but it is unlikely to overcome its difficulties fully. The
Soviets have greatly increased their deliveries of helicopters in recent
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weeks, but Nicaragua may not have enough trained pilots to take full
advantage of them, and additional Cuban helicopter pilots probably will be
required. We doubt that the Soviet Union will deliver MIG-21s to
Nicaragua during the next 18 months because of the risk of triggering US
military retaliation, but Moscow may provide Czechoslovak-built L-39s or
an equivalent jet trainer to counter US aid to the guerrillas. The L-39
serves as a basic flight trainer in both the Cuban and Soviet Air Forces for
pilots who later fly MIG-21s, and it would give the Sandinistas a means to
train pilots and gain experience operating jet aircraft before bringing in
MIGs.
The acquisition of additional combat helicopters and increased experience
in their use will affect US interests in Central America by gradually
enhancing the government's ability to take the war to the insurgents.
Moreover, as long as they lack adequate air defenses, the rebels will be
constrained from moving beyond small unit engagements to seize and hold
towns or operate in the more populated and open terrain of the Pacific low-
lands. Over time, expanded radar coverage and better coordination of air
defenses, leading to the possible introduction of radar-guided surface-to-air
missiles, could threaten insurgent aerial resupply, deter Honduras from
using its Air Force to retaliate for Sandinista cross-border operations, and
threaten US reconnaissance aircraft operating over or near Nicaragua.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Shifting Goals
Growing Counterinsurgency Capability 3
Command and Control and Training
Outlook and Implications for the United States
1. Sandinista Air Force Facilities
Weapons Acquired by Nicaragua, 1979-86
Nicaraguan M1-25 Helicopter Gunship
San Jose de Bocay Remote Airbase
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Figure 1
Sandinista Air Force Facilities
Honduras
North
Pacific Ocean
t Transport
Light transport
Helicopter
50 Kilometers
50 Miles
8oundery representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Nicaragua's Air and
Air Defense Force:
Capabilities and Projections
The Sandinista Air and Air Defense Force, largely
through Cuban and Soviet assistance, has grown from
a poorly equipped arm inherited from the government
of former President Somoza to an increasingly capa-
ble component of the Nicaraguan military. Since
1983, Nicaragua has tailored this force to meet the
country's most immediate threat-the insurgency-
while laying the groundwork, for acquisition of more
sophisticated equipment. So far, constraints imposed
by international politics and resource limitations have
prevented Managua from acquiring modern fighter
aircraft.
This paper examines the evolution of the Sandinista
Air and Air Defense Force, its counterinsurgency and
conventional capabilities, the constraints it still must
overcome, prospects for continued expansion, and the
implications of these developments for the United
States.
and SA-7 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile launch-
ers were delivered by Cuba, Libya, Algeria, and
Bulgaria over the next few years.
The Air Force, initially equipped with only a few
older piston-engine aircraft and jet trainers left be-
hind by Somoza's forces, set out to acquire new ones.
Nicaragua obtained three MI-8 armed transport heli-
copters from the USSR in 1981; and in 1982 four SF-
260 light attack/trainers and two MI-2 helicopters
from Libya and two rocket-equipped Alouette heli-
copters from France
reporting from defectors, and public statements
yy Sandinista leaders.
up to 12 MIG-21s
The regime clearly planned to acquire jet fighters as
well Nicaraguans were
sent to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia in the early
intended for Nicaragua have been stationed in Cuba
1980s for MIG-21 pilot training 25X1
indicated that construction 0:25X25X1
a new military airbase with a 3,000-meter runway 25X1
and 16 jet fighter-type revetments was begun with
Cuban assistance at Punta Huete in 1982. Moreover,
Libya made an unsuccessful attempt to deliver at
least one L-39 jet trainer to Nicaragua in April 1983.'
The development of Nicaragua's Air and Air Defense
Force has followed the regime's shifting perceptions of
military threats.
the unprecedented military buildup initiated by the
Sandinistas soon after they came to power in mid-
1979 was intended not only to ensure their internal
control but also to prepare for possible confrontations
with the United States as well as Central American
countries they considered hostile.
The acquisition of relatively modern air and air
defense weapons apparently was an initial key goal of
the Nicaraguan military buildup. The first known
arms shipment to the new regime in 1979 consisted of
antiaircraft guns sent by Cuba, according toF--
since late 1984, and that Nicaraguan pilots conduct
proficiency training there. Pressure from the United
States to prevent the introduction of MIG fighters has
delayed their arrival
' According to press and US Embassy reporting, Libya tried to send
four planeloads of military equipment including one disassembled
L-39 to Nicaragua in April 1983. The flights were turned back by
Brazilian authorities after the cargo was discovered during a
refueling stop at Manaus, Brazil.
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Figure 2
Weapons Acquired by Nicaragua, 1979-86a
Air Defense Light Antiaircraft Artillery
SA-7
Radars
4
2
3
2
mom av
1 10
6
1
2
7
2
1
2
1
8
5
gM
4
11
8
48
48
56
36
38
18
30
379
ri...
5
8
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a These represent aircraft delivered to Nicaragua since the Sandinista takeover.
Some of these may no longer be operational, due to losses or damage.
b January through June.
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Although the establishment of a nationwide air sur-
veillance tracking network, begun in 1983, was
spurred by the growth of the insurgency, it was, in our
opinion, intended to serve both conventional and
counterinsurgency functions. The Sandinistas proba-
bly planned to set up such a system as a prelude to
acquiring jet fighters so that Soviet instructors could
teach their system of control, which requires aircraft
to be monitored and directed by controllers on the
ground. Nonetheless, attacks in September 1983 by
insurgent light aircraft against targets in Managua,
Corinto, and other areas probably were an added
incentive to setting up an air surveillance tracking
network. The first radar station was established near
Masaya just two months later,
and others subsequently were built at
Esteli, Toro Blanco, and San Juan del Sur. A fifth
site, at Cerro Penas Blancas, was operative for several
months starting in late 1985 but was later deacti-
vated. These stations can provide continuous, overlap-
ping radar coverage of the western half of the country
at all altitudes above 500 meters, except where
masked by mountains.
The buildup of the Sandinista Air and Air Defense
Force, like the other branches of service, has taken
place with substantial assistance from Havana and
Moscow.
we believe that some 60
to 70 Cubans presently serve in advisory and opera-
tional capacities, including flying combat missions.
Over the years, according to defectors
Cubans have served as staff advisers,
trainers, pilots, radar operators, ground coordinators
of air operations, and maintenance personnel. They
also have helped design and build various airfields and
radar sites. A majority of the estimated 60 to 100
Soviet military personnel in Nicaragua are involved in
advising the Air and Air Defense Force, according to
defector reporting.
Growing Counterinsurgency Capability
While the Sandinista Air Force faces numerous prob-
lems, it has attained a significant counterinsurgency
capability since late 1984, thanks in large part to the
delivery of more than 30 new Soviet-built helicopters
and a dozen AN-2 and AN-26 transport aircraft. The
construction and upgrading of forward airfields and
support facilities near guerrilla operating areas has
improved the regime's ability to provide close air
support and transport supplies and reinforcements.
The Air Force also has carried out bombing, recon-
naissance, medical evacuation, convoy escort, and
forward control missions with varying degrees of
success. Nevertheless, the force suffers significant
constraints in pilot availability, leadership, command
and control, and training and maintenance.
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Nicaragua: Air and Air Defense Force Org
The Sandinista Air and Air Defense Force
quartered at Sandino Airfield in Managua
it comprises
a headquarters and staff`, and five functional bri-
gades-air, antiaircraft, radio-technical, mainte-
nance, and rear services. We estimate the force has a
total active-duty strength of 2,000 to 2,300 personnel.
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and is organized into combat,
and transport squadrons.
the air brigade shifted some
new airfield at Punta Huete.
as many as 15 aircraft have been based at
Punta Huete since November, although there are no
aircraft support or maintenance buildings there.
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The antiaircraft brigade operates and maintains the
guns and SA-7 surface-to-air missile launchers that
defend Nicaraguan airfields, radar stations, and key
governmental targets in the Managua area,
The rest of the light
antiaircraft weapons and SA-7 launchers reportedly
are subordinate to the Army and the Navy. The
radio-technical brigade operates and maintains the
air surveillance radar stations
the Army ss seven
headquarters serve as air defense command and
control authorities, receiving tracking reports and
authorizing antiaircraft units to fire on targets flying
in their airspace
altitude and their enormous firepower. Rebel com-
manders admit their fear of air attack has caused
them to cut short operations and retreat before reach-
ing their objectives.
Sandinista offi-
cers have been counting on the helicopters-especially
the MI-25s-to provide the firepower and mobility to
break up rebel concentrations while protecting gov-
ernment troops. Rebel commanders have credited
government helicopters with causing many casualties,
noting especially the
surprise achieved when they approach suddenly at low
Transport. The Air Force's improved transport capa-
bilities and the use of newly constructed airstrips to
move supplies to remote areas are allowing the Sandi-
nista Army to conduct operations over a broader area
of the country and to maintain ground forces near the
Honduran and Costa Rican borders to interdict rebel
and fixed-wing aircraft to support operations against
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Transport capabilities have been enhanced by nearly
doubling the number of AN-2 light transports during
the past nine months
seven AN-2s were delivered to Nicaragua in early
1986-some of them returning from overhaul in
Cuba-giving the Sandinistas a total of 16. These
small transports are being used to assist Army efforts
to maintain garrisons and support bases near insur-
gent operating areas. The AN-2s also allow the
Sandinistas greater flexibility in prosecuting the war
because they can take advantage of the existence of
dozens of small, unimproved agricultural and munici-
pal airfields in remote areas
Bombing Missions. Soviet-built AN-26 transports
and MI-8 helicopters have been used effectively by
the Air Force to bomb rebel positions in Nicaragua
and the border areas of Honduras and Costa Rica.
Although ostensibly civilian transports, AN-26's have
a larger bomb load capacity than other aircraft in the
Sandinista inventory and can avoid insurgent antiair-
craft fire and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles by flying
higher than 2,000 meters. The Air Force has used
them to try to disrupt rebel logistics by attacking
border-area airstrips and resupply drop zones. For
example, bombing by Sandinista helicopters last Sep-
tember apparently forced the closure of one rebel 25X1
resupply base in a remote region of the Honduran-
Nicaraguan border for several months. 25X1
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Interdicting Aerial Resupply. The Sandinistas also
have attempted to counter insurgent aerial supply
flights to units inside Nicaragua, but have had only
limited success. Until late 1983 rebel aircraft could
overfly Nicaragua with little danger of being detected
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Airfield Upgrading
The regime's only apparent success was
the Sandinistas have
been constructing new airfields and upgrading exist-
ing ones that will allow them to expand ground
attack and logistic support for the counterinsurgency
effort and eventually to field a jet fighter-interceptor
force. The new Punta Huete Airfield was built specif-
ically to accommodate jet fighters. Its runway-some
3,000 meters long-is capable of landing any type of
Soviet aircraft. As of May 1986 four jet fighter-type
revetments had been completed and 12 others were
under construction. No aircraft hangars, fuel storage,
or maintenance facilities, however, have been con-
structed. Secondary airfields capable of handling jet
fighters have been completed at Puerto Cabezas and
Bluefields. Both have new asphalt runways exceeding
2,000 meters but also lack hangars and maintenance
facilities. There are 17 underground fuel tanks at
Puerto Cabezas with a combined capacity of 935,000
liters and five at Bluefields with a combined capacity
of 275,000 liters.
The Sandinistas also have prepared graded-earth
runways at Esteli, Matagalpa, Wiwili, and San Jose
de Bocay that are being used by light transport
aircraft and helicopters.
the runway at Esteli was regraded in 1984 and
lengthened to 1,400 meters, a six position antiaircraft
site was set up, and light attack aircraft and helicop-
ters were deployed to the airfield for six weeks. In
September 1985 construction began on four 35-meter-
diameter revetments and a dispersal taxiway. Esteli
Airfield has a nearby 16-tank, 880,000-liter, under-
ground fuel-storage facility and functions as a tempo-
rary forward staging base to refuel combat aircraft.
The 600-meter airstrip at Wiwili, completed in June
1985, has four aboveground fuel tanks with a total
capacity of 220,000 liters. A new 700-meter airstrip
was constructed at Matagalpa last fall, and another
new airstrip was begun at San Jose de Bocay in
February he Air
Force is using these airfields, as well as facilities at
Mulukuku, Jinotega, and Juigalpa to resupply bor-
der garrisons and to support counterinsurgency oper-
ations.
the downing of a C-47 in August 1984-possibly with
an SA-7, according to press
reporting-which resulted in the suspension of resup-
ply missions deep inside Nicaragua for almost a year.
Since the insurgents' supply flights resumed in June
1985, Sandinista forces
have fired at them on numerous occasions with SA-7s,
machineguns, and light antiaircraft weapons and
Other Capabilities. The Air Force performs addition-
al missions in support of the counterinsurgency in-
cluding medical evacuations, convoy security, and
forward air control, with varying degrees of effective-
ness.
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Limited Conventional Role
Managua's concern about US reaction to the acquisi-
tion of jet fighter aircraft, the government's increased
attention to the counterinsurgency, and the Nicara-
guans' lack of experience and technical proficiency
apparently have limited the development of conven-
tional air and air defense capabilities. Nevertheless,
the Sandinistas have continued to prepare the airfield
facilities and radar network they would need to
employ jet aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems
in the future.
or other gun-armed light aircraft to intercept an
unarmed intruder. Because they lack air intercept
radars, however, Nicaraguan aircraft would have to
approach and engage targets visually, and their weap-
ons are effective only at ranges of less than 1,500
meters
Ground-based air defense is hampered by similar
equipment and operational limitations. The regiment
of 18 radar-directed 100-mm antiaircraft guns-
which have the capability to destroy targets at a
distance of up to 12,000 meters-probably could
defend point targets in the Managua area against a
small raid by slow-flying aircraft. They have a slow
rate of fire, however, and their 1950s-vintage radar is
vulnerable to jamming. Other weapons-an estimated
200 optically guided 37-mm, 23-mm, and 14.5-mm
antiaircraft guns and some 400 infrared-guided SA-7
launchers-generally are ineffective against targets
flying higher than 2,000 meters. Nonetheless, accord-
The fixed-wing aircraft currently in the Sandinista
inventory have few capabilities for conventional offen-
sive operations and pose only a minimal threat to
Nicaragua's neighbors. The three T-33s, the only jet
fighters in the force, are pre-Korean war US-built
attack trainers and would be no match for the Hondu-
ran Air Force's Super Mysteres. Although the AN-
26s could be used to bomb targets deep inside foreign
territory, as they have done against insurgent camps
along the border, this would be practical only in Costa
Rica, where there is no opposing air force.
Defensively, Sandinista aircraft can do little to pro-
tect Nicaraguan airspace. In areas of good radar
coverage, the Air Force might be able to direct a T-33
ing to
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defenses and, in considering future airstrikes-like
that in September 1985 to retaliate for Sandinista
cross-border shelling-would prefer to limit opera-
tions to soft targets in the immediate border area.
maintenance problems.
Constraints
While the Sandinista Air and Air Defense Force has
made considerable progress during the past two years,
it still exhibits a number of significant deficiencies
that hamper its effectiveness as both a conventional
and a counterinsurgency force. These include pilot
shortages, some antiquated aircraft, inexperienced
leadership, inefficient command and control, difficul-
ties posed by terrain and weather, and training and
A Shortage of Pilots. The most critical weakness, in
our view, is the Sandinistas' apparent inability to
recruit, develop, and retain new pilots from a reluc-
tant and technically illiterate population.
orce was not training enough pilots to replace those ,
lost and had been unable to keep up with new aircraft In the more modern helicopter fleet, the MI-8 assault
deliveries. He blamed this, in part, on the low pay transports have proved the most vulnerable.
offered to military pilots compared to commercial
aviation, and on the number of flying hours required
for copilots to become pilots-despite a relaxation of
relatively loose Soviet and Cuban standardsF__~
As of April,l most of the
28 pilots who had returned from MIG-21 training in
the USSR and Bulgaria were being retrained to fly
MI- 17 helicopters at Punta Huete Airfield.
Figure 4. Sandinista Air and
Air Defense Force Chief
Emmet Lang
fire at low altitude. The lack of appropriate weapons 25X1
for engaging rebel aircraft has hampered interdiction
efforts.
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Air and Air Defense Force Chief Emmett Lang 25X1
told a radio audience in January that Nicaraguan
helicopters were flying lower to avoid SA-7s and 25X1
consequently were more vulnerable to ground fire. 25X1
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Equipment. Most of the fixed-wing aircraft in the
force are antiquated many
are in poor condition. Cessna 0-2s an essna 185s,
which along with the helicopters are used primarily
for counterinsurgency operations, cannot carry heavy
ordnance loads, decreasing their time over targets and
their overall effectiveness. Moreover, all of the air-
craft are slow and therefore vulnerable to SA-7
surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft machinegun
Fear of losing an aircraft to rebel SA-7s apparently
has prompted helicopter pilots to fly either very high
or at treetop level, and to fire from farther than
optimal distances, according to 25X1
re orts. 25X1
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Finding and training qualified pilots has been diffi-
cult. Only a handful of pilots able to fly the aircraft
left behind by Somoza in 1979 joined the Sandinista
Air Force, and they quickly rose to top command
positions despite their relative youth.
Nicaragua's T-33s and T-28s were
flown by four to five Chileans, eight -to 10 Palestin-
ians, and an Uruguayan.
MI-8 helicopters
din 19821
were flown exclusively
have been greatly reduced
by Soviet pilots who were training the Nicaraguans.
Since 1984 the Soviet and Palestinian roles appear to
source of the
hat all Aeronica pilots serve as reserve
officers in the Air Force and that military use of
civilian aircraft and pilots was common. Another
hat, because of
Numerous reports
pilots for several years. In 1981,
Leadership Deficiencies. The Sandinistas, who had
only a few transport pilots during their struggle to
topple Somoza, have had to build their Air Force
leadership from scratch. Even now, Managua appears
to rely heavily on former guerrillas who bring little
experience to their jobs. Current Air Force Chief
Emmett Lang, for example, formerly was Army Chief
of Logistics and Personnel, and was a close revolution-
ary associate of the Ortega brothers. He almost
certainly was chosen for his political reliability since
he was not a pilot and had only minimal dealings with
the Air Force before his selection in February 1985.
According to a defector, Air Force pilots do not rate
the pilot shortage, civilian pilots and aircraft were
used tofy reconnaissance missions against US war-
ships.
of combat missions.
him as a good leader and fault his lack of knowledge
Command and Control. Inadequate and inefficient
command and control frequently have been major
problems.
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The Sandinistas' inability thus far to challenge insur-
gent aerial resupply successfully is largely due, in our
view, to the failure of regional military headquarters
to coordinate target tracking by radar sites with the
operations of friendly aircraft and antiaircraft artil-
lery. Antiaircraft units have shot down several crop
dusters and civilian air taxis after being advised to fire
on any aircraft overflying their area
Military aircraft, in-
cluding a C-47 and an SF-260 in 1983, also have been
Terrain and Weather. Nicaragua's physical geogra-
phy and weather make the inherently difficult prob-
lem of locating, identifying, and targeting small guer-
rilla units from the air even more problematical. The
areas of the most intense insurgency are the moun-
tains of northwest and central Nicaragua, where there
is abundant foliage throughout the year and where
annual rainfall exceeds 250 centimeters. In the south-
eastern coastal region, heavy jungle provides conceal-
ment for insurgent operations, and precipitation dur-
ing the rainy season (May to January) normally
exceeds 610 centimeters. Ground units operating in
the mountains and other remote areas rely heavily on
aircraft for mobility and resupply during the rainy
season because many roads are rendered impassable
by mud and swollen streams.
of humidity and unfavorable look angles
Terrain also interferes with radar coverage. The
mountain ranges, with some peaks exceeding 1,500
meters, block low-altitude radar over large segments
of insurgent operating areas. Only the air surveillance
site at Esteli is positioned to provide coverage of
insurgent aircraft flying in from Honduras, and the
lack of radar coverage in eastern Nicaragua allows
insurgent aircraft to evade radar detection by flying
along the eastern slopes of the mountains. Air surveil-
lance radars that were temporarily located on the
mountaintop at Cerro Penas Blancas east of Lago de
Apanas in late 1985 probably were removed because
Maintenance. Another problem facing the Air Force
has been obtaining spare parts for US-manufactured
aircraft, such as Cessna O-2s, T-33s, and Cessna
185s. Some parts have been acquired through Mexico,
Canada, and Panama, but
the shortage of parts and the lack of
well-trained maintenance technicians result in long
Spare parts for Soviet aircraft are said to be in good
supply, but some aircraft have to be shipped to Cuba
for repair and overhaul. As many as five AN-2s and
at least two MI-8s were shipped from Nicaragua to
Cuba during 1984 and 1985,
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The Sandinistas are aware of the constraints under
which their Air and Air Defense Force is operating
and have made plans-at least on the equipment
side-to effect improvements. We expect the force to
continue to grow in size over the next 18 months, but
rapid shifts in performance and capability are unlike-
ly because of manpower and training requirements.
new aircraft have
arrived from the Soviet Union in recent weeks, and
steps have been taken to upgrade both air and air
defense command and control. As Nicaraguan pilots,
radar operators, and command personnel gain more
combat experience, the effectiveness of the Air and
Air Defense Force will probably improve, but some of
the more significant constraints are unlikely to be
overcome in the near term.
Aircraft Acquisitions
The Air Force, with substantial Soviet assistance,
currently is addressing its most critical problem, the
need for additional transport aircraft and helicopters
to counter a more sustained, multifront insurgency.
have been delivered since late April 1986,
The new MI-17s will allow the Air Force to form an
additional squadron and to continue to increase the
use of helicopters to support ground operations in
remote areas. Until now the Sandinistas have had the
capability to transport only one company of troops at
a time. The second squadron will enable them to keep
12 or more aircraft at forward bases for a month or
more, while maintaining a full squadron in the Mana-
gua area for training. The extended forward basing of
helicopters should provide ground commanders not
only increased mobility but also greater flexibility and
quicker response to insurgent movements and attacks.
To continue expanding, however, the Air Force will
have to increase the training program for new pilots or
bring in more Cubans to fly combat missions.
The construction of Punta Huete Airfield and its
fighter revetments
and public assertions by Sandinista leaders of their
right to obtain fighters are the most convincing
evidence that Nicaragua intends to acquire jet combat
aircraft if this becomes politically possible. We be-
lieve, however, that under current conditions, the
USSR probably will continue to estimate that the
risks of delivering them to Nicaragua outweigh the
ately.
Nevertheless, we expect the Sandinistas to continue
preparing for the acquisition of hi h- erformance jet
fighters construc-
tion of barracks at Punta Huete has begun and could
be completed in early 1987, but no progress currently
is being made on construction of hangars, fuel stor-
age, or maintenance areas. Radars capable of being
used to control fighter operations are present at the
base, and we believe landing aids eventually will be
installed and ground-based air defense missiles de-
ployed to protect the airfield. There are no indica-
tions, however, that preparations have yet begun. In
addition, at least some of the pilots who have been
trained to fly MIGs probably will receive refresher
training in Cuba so that MIGs could be flown to
Nicaragua and become operational almost immedi-
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In the meantime, Managua may seek, intermediate jet
L-39 performs well as a ground attack aircraft, has a
greater capability to intercept insurgent resupply air-
craft than any aircraft now in Nicaragua, and might
be perceived as less likely to provoke a US reaction
because it would not give the Sandinistas air superior-
ity over Honduras. Because the L-39 serves as a basic
flight trainer in both the Cuban and Soviet Air Forces
for pilots who later fly MIG-21s, it would give the
Sandinistas a means to train pilots and gain experi-
ence in operating a more modern air force before
bringing in MIGs.
Acquisition of the L-39-or a comparable aircraft-
would improve Sandinista counterinsurgency capabili-
ties and provide quicker response time and greater
weapons payload than current fixed-wing aircraft.
L-39s would free Sandinista Cessna O-2s and AN-26s
for reconnaissance and transport duties and probably
would be much more effective in attacking rebel
camps and supply bases in the border area. In any
potential clash with Honduras, however, they would
be vulnerable to the Honduran Air Force's Super
Mystere fighters, which have greater speed and are
equipped with more capable air-to-air weapons.
Possible Air Defense Acquisitions
Air defense acquisitions during the next 18 months
are likely to include more air surveillance radars to
expand coverage nationwide. We have identified
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Sandinistas want to establish an extensive and redun-
dant air surveillance radar system prior to any poten-
tial acquisition of radar-guided surface-to-air missiles
such as the SA-2 or SA-3.
We expect the Sandinistas to continue diversification
and extension of their air defense capabilities through
procurement of more radar-guided antiaircraft artil-
lery and possibly radar-guided surface-to-air missiles.
Airstrikes by the Honduran Air Force in September
1985 demonstrated Nicaraguan vulnerability to even
relatively unsophisticated aircraft like the A-37. We
believe the Sandinistas may opt for S-60 57-mm
radar-directed guns with substantially higher rates of
fire-105 rounds per minute versus 15 for the Sandin-
ista's 100-mm guns-to improve protection against
command and control problems are unlikely to be
resolved in the near future, however. These are diffi-
cult tasks, and even Cuba, which has had the benefit
of Soviet tutelage since 1962, frequently has failed to
perform them well. As long as the regime lacks
automated data-relay systems and command and
control computers, progress in the effective employ-
ment of air defense assets will be slow.
It will be much more difficult for the Sandinistas, in
our opinion, to find and train enough pilots to expand
the helicopter force to cope with the burdens of a
Fear of US airstrikes similar to those against Libya in
April could provide the rationale for Sandinista acqui-
sition of radar-guided surface-to-air missile systems
such as the SA-2, SA-3, or the mobile SA-6 and
SA-8. Although these systems most likely would
initially protect the Managua area, their deployment
to the northern border area would severely reduce the
prospect of attacks by the Honduran Air Force or
insurgent aerial resupply flights. In June 1985, Sandi-
nista National Directorate member Bayardo Arce
to operate the SA-3.
Nicaraguans have been trained in Cuba and Bulgaria
America
publicly stated at a gathering of the Socialist Inter-
national in Stockholm that Nicaragua would soon
have defensive missiles never seen before in Central
Command and Control and Training
qualified pilots capable of performing well in combat
takes a minimum of one to two years after basic flight
school, however, and the continued expansion of the
Air Force over the next 18 months probably will
require even greater reliance on the Cubans.
Similarly, the lack of trained radar operators and
technicians probably will prevent Nicaraguan air
defenses from performing effectively during the next
18 months unless Cuban or Soviet personnel take on a
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greater role in combat operations.
morale and capabilities.
close air support and threaten rebel resupply flights
during daylight. The loss of even one resupply aircraft
by the rebels, given their present thin capabilities in
this area, would be a serious blow. As Air Force
proficiency grows and more equipment, including
additional transport assets, is acquired, Sandinista
ground units will be more confident of receiving close
air support, troop reinforcements, replenishment, and
medical evacuation-with positive effects on Army
Outlook and Implications for the United States
We expect the developing Sandinista airpower will
pose an increasing threat to the insurgents during the
next 18 months. No sudden or dramatic improve-
ments are likely, however, because solving pilot short-
ages, equipment and maintenance problems, and com-
mand and control deficiencies will be a slow and
labor-intensive process. Moreover, a survey of scholar-
ly studies shows that airpower alone has never been
.the decisive factor in any counterinsurgency, and we
believe it will not enable the Sandinistas to defeat the
guerrillas unless their ground forces improve as well.
reach targets at a distance of up to 2,000 meters
recently were moved out of Managua to east-central
Nicaragua for the first time, but their radar is highly
vulnerable to jamming. The current early warning
and air surveillance tracking system leaves most of
the eastern half of the country uncovered, and there
are gaps in other areas, particularly at low-to-medium
altitudes. The most significant threat would be posed
by SA-7s and light antiaircraft weapons that are
likely to be encountered near Sandinista troop concen-
trations and major airfields and ports.
and improvement of Nicaragua's air defenses.
The Air and Air Defense Force could be expanded
more rapidly if more Cuban pilots and radar operators
are provided and their role in combat operations is
increased. That might be one option the Sandinistas
and their allies could adopt to up the ante if the rebels
obtain air defense weapons that threaten to negate the
regime's airpower advantage.
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Threat to the Insurgency
The Sandinistas' effective use of helicopter gunships
will constrain the rebels' ability to mass forces and
hold towns and villages, especially if they try to move
into the more open terrain of the Pacific lowlands
where most Nicaraguans live. The Air Force's acqui-
sition of L-39 or comparable aircraft would increase
the regime's edge by enhancing its ability to provide
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Threat to Nicaragua's Neighbors
The growth of Sandinista airpower will affect the
military balance throughout the Central American
region, particularly if the Sandinistas acquire jet
fighter aircraft. The arrival of MIG-21s almost cer-
tainly would prompt Honduras to demand as a price
for continued support of the insurgents a US guaran-
tee of its security as well as speedy delivery of F-5 or
possibly F-16 fighters to restore its position of air
superiority. Moreover, MIG-21s in Nicaragua would
be in range of the Panama Canal, and there are at
We expect the Sandinistas would have to rely on
Cuban pilots to fly MIG-21s for a year or two
following delivery.
present no air defenses at the Canal.
Soviet military clients in Angola, Ethiopia, and other
African countries who received MIG-21s with no
-prior experience and minimally trained aircrews were
unable to operate them effectively without relying on
Cuban pilots. Although current radar sites have most
of the equipment necessary for ground-controlled
intercept operations, there are few trained operators,
and equipment reliability is poor.
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Notice to recipients of DI Research Paper ALA 86-10033C,
August 1986, Nicaragua's
Air and Air Defense Force: Capabilities and Projections.
on P-15,the
second sentence should be changed to read "A few radar-directed 100-mm guns
that can reach targets at a distance of up to 12,000 meters ..."
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