THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CORE FOUR: COPING WITH NICARAGUA AND THE CONTRAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000200250001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Central American
Core Four: Coping With
Nicaragua and the Contras
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PRQTFCT NUMBER ' 33 0 - ~r(o
PAGE NOMBEFLS
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES 3CJ
DISSEM DATE 7
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ALA 86-10026
May 1986
Copy 2 7 9
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Central American
Core Four: Coping With
Nicaragua and the Contras
contributions were made by
This paper was prepared byl (Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. Major
Operations
Division, ALA
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 86-10026
May 1986
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STAT
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Secret
The Central American
Core Four: Coping With
Nicaragua and the Contras
Key Judgments The commitment of Central America's "Core Four" countries-Honduras,
Information available Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador-to sign a regional peace treaty
as of 15 May 1986 by early June suggests a critical juncture for their policies and for US
was used in this report.
interests in the region. Pressures are increasing that forbode an erosion of
support for the US position because the Core Four will be lobbied more
heavily by the Contadora mediators to show flexibility and are more likely
to agree to a treaty that falls short of US policy objectives.
Although the Sandinistas have said they would not sign a treaty unless the
United States ended its "aggression," we believe that Nicaragua could
reverse its stance if the Core Four agreed to an accord that lacks
verification or postpones discussion of key provisions-such as democratic
reform. In this scenario, the Sandinistas might calculate that they could
draw out subsequent negotiations on arms levels and verification, effective-
ly freezing the regional arms balance in their favor. The Sandinistas, for
example, have already publicly asserted they will not surrender any of their
arms.
In the absence of a Contadora agreement, we believe US consideration of
substantially increased military aid for the anti-Sandinistas will spur a
search for alternative diplomatic solutions. Such initiatives, in our opinion,
may provide opportunities for Managua to project a superficial image of
cooperation and to intensify efforts toward bilateral, piecemeal agree-
ments. Insurgent military prospects will be a key variable shaping Core
Four attitudes, however, and significant progress by the Contras will
stiffen opposition toward Managua and encourage greater cooperation with
the Nicaraguan rebel effort.
Over the last three years, the Core Four have attempted to reconcile their
opposition to Managua with the fear of appearing opposed to the peaceful
resolution of regional problems and of being perceived as subservient to the
United States. Key factors in this tension include:
? Fears of damage to their standing in Latin America and Western
Europe, where there is opposition to military pressure on the Sandinistas
and a disposition to settle for a. weaker Contadora treaty.
Secret
ALA 86-10026
May 1986
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? Increasing frustration over what the Core Four regard as a lack of
military progress by the guerrillas.
We believe there is likely to be a continued tendency of Core Four leaders
criticize or distance themselves from US policies in public statements.
These differences largely reflect the sensitivity of the Core Four to
international opinion, and to a lesser extent represent dissenting voices and
lack of coordination in their foreign policy establishments. The military is a
major constraint on civilian policymakers in El Salvador, Honduras, and
Guatemala, but there do not appear to be serious splits between the
executive and the military in any of those countries.
has been an erratic backer over t he last two years, however,
because of doubts about the US commitment to the insurgency and the
guerrillas' military ability, as well as concern over Sandinista incursions
that have exposed insurgent use of Honduran territory.
We expect Tegucigalpa periodically will attempt to "up the ante" with the
United States by threatening to withhold cooperation with the insurgents.
Honduras is likely to demand that the United States
press the guerrillas to make
military progress, including moving operations inside Nicaragua; provide
increased military and economic aid to Honduras; and give clearer and
more direct signs of security backing. Should it appear to Tegucigalpa that
the insurgents have no chance of victory, we believe Honduras would
solution with Managua.
begin to work for a bilateral
Costa Rica's policies toward Nicaragua and the insurgents have vacillated
in recent years between hostility and accommodation, with the balance now
tipping toward a more accommodationist policy toward Managua.
this stance reflects changing views of
anti-Sandinista prospects, shifts in Costa Rican public opinion, the stale-
mate at Contadora, and a desire to appear more independent of the United
States. A Costa Rican bilateral accord with Managua-if concluded
before a multilateral treaty-would shift the focus of negotiations away
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from a comprehensive regional settlement, complicate insurgent opera-
tions, and subject the United States to strong pressures to respect the
agreement.
Guatemala's President Cerezo believes his domestic standing and the
country's international position are best protected by a policy of "active
neutrality." This means, in our view, he is likely to remain distant from at-
tempts to press Nicaragua and probably will not fully identify with the
Core Four.
El Salvador remains the most vocal critic of the Sandinistas in the region
President Duarte probably will continue to stop short of endorsing US
military aid to the Contras, however, because he fears that this would
create the impression abroad of aiding aggression against Nicaragua, and
thereby undermine his case that El Salvador is the victim of Nicaraguan
aggression.
Core Four leaders have launched several initiatives designed to recapture
the political initiative and to press Nicaragua, including a proposal to force
Nicaragua to accept a timetable for democracy and President Duarte's
offer to reopen talks with Salvadoran rebels if Nicaragua conducts a
dialogue with the anti-Sandinista insurgents. In our view, these proposals
are unlikely to trigger Sandinista concessions because Managua's behavior
to date suggests the Sandinista leadership believes it can sidestep such
commitments without paying any political price. For example, Cerezo's
proposal for a Central American parliament is unlikely to isolate Nicara-
gua-even if the Sandinistas accept the idea of direct elections to choose
national representatives-and probably will divert attention from the
multilateral approach.
Nicaragua probably sees the new democratic governments in the region as
a mix of increased challenges and new opportunities. The Sandinistas
probably view Costa Rica as the most vulnerable of their neighbors
because of its lack of an army and its responsiveness to public sentiment fa-
voring neutralism. They are also likely to believe they can cultivate
President Cerezo and turn his avowed neutrality policy to their favor. On
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the other hand, Nicaragua probably sees little prospect for better relations
with El Salvador. Although Managua probably believes that the Azcona
administration in Honduras is no improvement over its predecessor, the
Sandinistas, in our view, calculate that greater military successes against
the rebels will erode Tegucigalpa's support for the insurgents.
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The Regional Setting: Concerns and Policies 1
Looking at Managua and the Insurgents 1
B. Nicaragua's Regional Strategy
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Boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
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The Central American
Core Four: Coping With
Nicaragua and the Contras
During the last three years, Nicaragua's Central
American neighbors-Honduras, Guatemala, Costa
Rica, and El Salvador-have generally opposed the
Sandinistas at regional peace talks
also for US interests in the region as well.
Four" have attempted to reconcile their opposition to
Managua with the fear of appearing opposed to a
peaceful resolution of regional problems or being
perceived as subservient to the United States. Manag-
ing this tension has been a central issue for newly
elected governments in Honduras, Guatemala, and
Costa Rica, as they seek to define their positions and,
in some cases, launch new political initiatives. The
Core Four are committed to signing a peace treaty by
early June 1986, suggesting a critical juncture not
only for their diplomatic policies toward Managua but
policies for the United States.
This paper evaluates the major foreign policy and
domestic concerns affecting the policies of each coun-
try and identifies key institutional factors that influ-
ence the decisionmaking process. It then analyzes
policy directions the Core Four countries are likely to
take toward Nicaragua and the anti-Sandinistas dur-
ing the midterm-six to 12 months-both in the
Contadora negotiations and via separate Core Four
initiatives. Finally, it assesses the implications of these
Looking at Managua and the Insurgents
Reporting from US Embassies indicates that the Core
Four countries share the view that Nicaragua poses a
threat to their fragile democratic institutions. The
Presidents of the developing democracies of El Salva-
dor, Honduras, and Guatemala, as well as Costa
Rica's President Arias, have expressed on numerous
occasions their concern that Nicaragua's military
buildup-begun shortly after the 1979 revolution and
aided by Cuban and Soviet Bloc military and civilian
advisers-puts at Managua's disposal a military force
capable not only of solidifying Sandinista domestic
control but also of subverting their governments.
All recognize the validity of evi-
dence that details Managua's involvement in provid-
ing financial, training, and material support for insur-
gent movements throughout the region.
ers
share the view that without strong
military pressure Managua is unlikely to alter its
domestic and foreign policies. Guatemala's President
Cerezo told US officials in late February, for exam-
ple, that without
such pressure Nicaragua would not make any conces-
Regional perceptions of the seriousness of the Nicara-
guan threat, however, vary from country to country.
the
former military regime in Guatemala, and now the
Cerezo government, feel little immediate threat from
Managua and prefer to avoid taking positions that
either criticize or defend the Sandinistas. On the
other hand, El Salvador believes that Managua's
support for Salvadoran rebels is a major factor in
helping sustain the insurgency in El Salvador, accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting.
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Private Statements of Core Four Leaders
Supporting US Assistance to the Contras
Core Four leaders generally have been reluctant to
support US military aid to the anti-Sandinista insur-
gents in their public statements
Costa Rica
In a meeting with US officials in February 1986,
former President Monge expressed great interest in
prospects for US Congressional approval of aid for
the Contras, lamenting that the United States could
not go ahead with a covert program should the
Congress refuse the request. He stressed how unhelp-
ful President-elect Arias had been in publicly oppos-
ing US aid and pledged to work with him over the
coming weeks to repair the damage as much as
possible.
Arias, who assumed office in early May, told US
officials in February that he favored a moratorium
on US aid to be used to pressure the Sandinistas to
agree to a negotiated agreement. In a subsequent
meeting he said he would seek to gain Western
support for a timetable for Sandinista democratiza-
onduran President
Azcona favors US military aid to the anti-Sandinis-
tas, although his public comments in support of US
assistance have been circumspect.
Guatemala
President Cerezo told US officials in late February
that he was surprised at Arias's statements, saying he
had no intention of involving himself in internal US
Fairs. Cerezo said that, while he could not openly
support US assistance to the Nicaraguan insurgents,
the United States could be confident that he would
not oppose it.
told US officials in March, for example, he was
worried that a failure to supply aid would undermine
the resolve of the other Central American democra-
cies. Duarte has told the US Embassy that he cannot
strongly support US aid publicly for fear of under-
mining El Salvador's position that it is a victim of
Nicaraguan aggression. He said he
did not wish to be drawn into US
defeat a Communist-sponsored insurgency.
political debates, but at the same time there should
be no doubt that he regarded the Contras as a barrier
to Sandinista support for Salvadoran guerrillas. The
President added that he had also told his visitors
that anything that aided the Nicaraguan resistance
contributed directly to El Salvador's struggle to
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At the same time, the
Core Four countries, especially Costa Rica and Hon-
duras, also question the viability of the anti-Sandinis-
ta insurgency. Although all have provided
support to the insurgents, it has been
tempered by frustration over what the Four see as a
lack of significant military progress.
IUs
Embassy reports suggest that Central American offi-
cials also fear that more open and active support for
the insurgents would be viewed as aggression by other
Latin Americans and West Europeans, and thereby
undermine the Core Four's international image.
There have been a number of instances in which Core
Four officials have criticized proposed US military
aid to the guerrillas, and at best the public statements
of Central American leaders have supported US aid
indirectly.
The Core Four and Contadora
The Core Four have attempted to compel Managua to
accept a verifiable multilateral peace agreement, but
the Contadora process has proved to be a difficult
policy arena for the regional democracies. They have
had problems maintaining unity and devising a coor-
dinated strategy, a situation exacerbated by Costa
Rica's willingness to enter bilateral talks with Mana-
gua and Guatemala's tendency to remain apart from
group meetings and demarches. In addition to the
Core Four's internal difficulties, the Contadora medi-
ators-Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama-
have actively intervened in the talks, frequently mak-
ing recommendations for treaty language favoring
Nicaraguan positions out of their desire for a quick
settlement. The Contadora group, for example, has
pushed for signature of a treaty before negotiating
specific arms and troops levels, a violation of the
Contadora principle of adopting a simultaneous solu-
tion of all problems. Moreover, the creation of the
four-country support group-Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
and Uruguay-has generally worked to Nicaragua's
advantage because of the group's repeated calls for an
end to US aid to the insurgents and its endorsement of
a resumption of US-Nicaraguan bilateral talks. F_
In our view, the Sandinistas have been more skillful
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than the Core Four in keeping their positions in the
forefront of public attention.
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Managua has devoted considerable re-
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achieve this objective whereas other Central Ameri-
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foreign opinion.
until recently Nicaragua's ability to manipulate the
meeting agendas had generally kept the Core Four on
the negotiating defensive.
After three years of negotiations, the Contadora
process has reached a critical stage. At a Contadora-
Central American Foreign Ministers meeting in early
April 1986, the Core Four agreed to the mediators'
proposal that additional talks be limited to two sub-
jects-arms levels and military maneuvers-and that
they sign a treaty by 6 June. Nicaragua refused to
sign the communique at this meeting-despite great
Contadora pressure, according to US Embassy re-
ports-saying it could not discuss arms control as long
as US "aggression" persisted. The Sandinistas modi-
fied their position a few days later, however, to end
their isolation and growing Latin American criticism
of their intransigence. Nicaragua offered to sign the
treaty on 6 June if "US aggression totally ceases."
Although they agreed to discuss arms levels, the
Sandinistas continued to maintain that security con-
cerns would prevent them from agreeing to any
reduction. The Contadora countries, meanwhile, have
become increasingly impatient with a process that has
failed to produce results.
they are considering abandoning it and moving the
talks to the Organization of American States (OAS)
or the United Nations if the deadlock persists.
Country Perspectives
Honduras
Honduras has remained a firm opponent of the Sandi-
nista regim
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took power in 1979~Tegucigalpa has been
seriously troubled by the Sandinista military buildup,
numerous border incidents, the transportion of arms
to Salvadoran guerrillas across Honduran territory,
and Nicaraguan support for Honduran subversive
groups.
Honduras has attempted to induce the Unit-
ed States to assume greater and more direct responsi-
bility for the guerrillas' military progress. Over the
past two years, government leaders have increasingly
attempted to define the insurgency as strictly a US
program.
Honduran a rehensions
were heightened by the cutoff
of US aid to the anti-Sandinistas and by Tegucigal-
pa's perception that they were making little military
progress. In addition, press reporting
Honduras also recognizes that its open politi-
cal climate and new democratic institutions make it
vulnerable to meddling by an entrenched Communist
regime in Managua. In 1983 and 1984 Nicaragua
infiltrated two groups of guerrillas into Honduras-
totaling about 100 men-in an unsuccessful attempt
to foment an insurgency. In 1985 smaller numbers of
cadre reportedly infiltrated from Nicaragua to recruit
and build a guerrilla infrastructure.
the Sandinistas have
continued to train and arm up to several hundred
Honduran leftists in Nicaragua.
Lacking the military and security resources needed
effectively to counter Nicaragua's border buildup and
subversive efforts, Honduras has responded by sup-
porting the anti-Sandinista insur ents.
Since 1984, however, Tegucigalpa's support for the
insurgency has been erratic and qualified, largely
because of its belief the rebels are incapable of
overthrowing the Sandinistas and doubts over the US
commitment to support them.
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ment and raised doubts about the military's ability to
counter escalating Sandinista incursions.
the Hondurans are concerned that the guerrillas could
become more of a security threat than a defense
buffer because of increasing numbers of Sandinista
attacks and Nicaraguan refugees in the border area,
as well as the growth in rebel troops-surpassing the
strength of Honduras's own ground forces.
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advisers-at times in contradiction to military state- 25X1
ments-has not only given his administration an
image of confusion and weakness, but has also rein-
forced the military's suspicions that some of Azcona's
firmer security pledges.
Probably believing that its support for the insurgents
has given it some leverage over the United States,
Tegucigalpa has pressed for more economic aid and
advisers are too leftist.
Presi-
dent Azcona and the military high command appear
to have improved their coordination on policy toward
Nicaragua and the insurgents.
persuaded that Azcona's positions to a large extent
We expect both sides will work hard to preserve this
more cooperative relationship, realizing that their
interests, at least in the short run, are best served by
avoiding confrontations. Nevertheless, a number of
issues-including differences over how to respond to
subversive activities
-will continue to test this relationship. In
making concerning Nicaragua.
Who Decides? US Embassy report-
ing indicates that the Honduran military high com-
mand is the dominant partner in government decision-
although civilian and military leaders
appear to agree on the benefits and risks of supporting
the insurgency, the domestic consensus has been
complicated by poor communication and mutual sus-
military excluded the President from most major
decisions on cooperation with the rebels. The Presi-
dent's inability to control press statements by his
addition, continued Nicaraguan border incursions or a
decline in insurgent prospects probably will sharpen
the policy debate in both civilian and military circles
and could prompt the armed forces to seek to renew
its exclusive control over policymaking concerning the
rebels.
Likely Moves. We expect Honduras will threaten
more forcefully to withhold cooperation with the
insurgents, although it is unlikely to remove its sup-
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In tandem with its support for military pressure on
Managua, we expect the Azcona administration to
intensify efforts to achieve a Contadora treaty.
although Hondu-
ras believes a comprehensive and verifiable Contadora
agreement will be difficult to achieve, it considers a
negotiated settlement to be the most practical hope
for long-term regional peace because the insurgents
are not capable of overthrowing the Sandinista re-
gime. Tegucigalpa is likely to try to keep up its
behind-the-scenes pressure on Costa Rica, El Salva-
dor, and Guatemala, which Honduras believes have
not done their part to keep Contadora on an anti-
Sandinista track, and often have left Tegucigalpa
Costa Rica
San Jose's policies toward Nicaragua have vacillated
in recent years between confrontation and accommo-
dation, but the balance now appears to have tipped
toward a softer line. On the one hand, US Embassy
reporting indicates that Nicaraguan cross-border in-
cursions have fanned anti-Sandinista sentiment in
Costa Rica and prompted sharp official protests.
Since President Monge took office in 1982, Costa
Rica has spoken out in diplomatic forums against
Sandinista sponsorship of subversion in the region. On
the other hand, Costa Rica's pacifist traditions and
desire to avoid being seen as a surrogate for US policy
led Monge to declare that San Jose must remain
neutral in the Nicaraguan conflict.
President Arias-inaugurated in May 1986-has em-
phasized those aspects of Costa Rica's public position
that call for reaching a bilateral agreement with
Managua and restricting rebel military operations.
San Jose's
increasing disposition to reach a bilateral understand-
ing with Managua is keyed to a series of factors that
include changing views of anti-Sandinista insurgent
prospects, shifts in Costa Rican public opinion, the
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alone in its opposition to Managua.
Should it appear that the rebel cause has been
damaged beyond repair, either because of decreased
external support or military setbacks, Honduran fears
would probably grow that they were about to be left
wit no
hope o a multilateral peace agreement. Under this
scenario, we believe Tegucigalpa would feel it had no
choice but to threaten to withhold permanently all
support if Washington did not take more direct
responsibility for the insurgency. Failing that, and
perhaps at the same time, Tegucigalpa would proba-
bly begin to distance itself from the conflict by
working openly and seriously toward reaching a bilat-
eral solution with Managua.
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need to appear more independent of Washington.
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is now convinced that the Sandinista regime is too
well entrenched to be ousted by the rebels. Its toler-
ance for the rebels also has been strained by allega-
tions of their involvement in arms and drug smuggling 25X1
on the border. Moreover, Costa Rica fears a pro-
longed conflict that ended with the collapse of the
rebels would result in a massive influx of anti-
Sandinista exiles that would seriously strain the coun-
try's already fragile economy. US Embassy reporting
indicates government leaders have been able to draw
some support and justification for their growing incli-
nation for accommodation with the Sandinistas from
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conflict
public opinion polls that indicate that while most
Costa Ricans oppose the regime in Managua they also
do not want to become more directly involved in the
Embassy reporting also suggests Costa Rica's disbe-
lief that a comprehensive Contadora treaty can be
engineered has made a bilateral deal with Managua
more attractive. In early 1986 President Monge's
decisions to normalize diplomatic relations with Nica-
ragua and request formation of a joint border com-
mission reflected, in our judgment, Costa Rica's belief
that it could not rely on multilateral solutions to
protect its interests.
zation.
US Embassy reports indicate that the attitudes of
West European socialists and some Latin American
governments have also been an important factor
influencing San Jose's declaration of neutrality and
its receptivity to bilateral talks. The Costa Ricans
were particularly disappointed at the failure of the
Latin democracies to back them when San Jose
brought a complaint of a border clash with Nicaragua
before the OAS last year. Costa Rica's governing
National Liberation Party was so angered by Socialist
International criticism of official complicity with anti-
Sandinista attacks on Nicaragua in mid-1985 that
some party leaders urged withdrawal from the organi-
to be granted much autonomy.
Who Decides? US Embassy reporting suggests Presi-
dent Arias plans to bring a stronger sense of direction
and a more assertive style to the presidency than did
his predecessor. President Monge often was willing to
delegate authority in dealing with Managua to the
foreign ministry and to the security ministry for
contacts with the anti-Sandinistas. According to US
Embassy reports, Arias is an introspective intellectual
who depends on only a small inner circle of advisers.
With greater need to retain control over decisionmak-
ing, we expect Arias to try to keep a tight rein on the
foreign ministry. US Embassy reports suggest that,
while the new foreign minister was appointed by Arias
primarily because of his pro-US views, he is not likely
Likely Moves. We expect President Arias will try to
stay on the fine line that allows him to maintain close
ties to Washington but coexist with Managua. US
Embassy reporting suggests Arias may believe that a
more neutralist foreign policy could win more eco-
nomic aid, investment, and tourism from West Euro-
pean and Latin American countries. Nevertheless,
Costa Rica's need for US economic aid to help
stabilize the economy is likely to prove an incentive
for Arias to proceed cautiously.
We expect continuing discrepancies between private
remarks by government officials supporting US policy
and their public statements. In private, Arias, like his
predecessor, is likely to seek to reassure Washington
that he understands its position. He told US officials
in February, for example, that he would back lethal
aid to the Nicaraguan rebels or even direct US
military intervention if the Sandinistas did not re-
spond to international pressure and accept a timetable
for democratization and demilitarization. In addition,
Arias repeatedly has assured the US Embassy that he
prefers a comprehensive, rather than a bilateral,
accord. In public, however, Arias has been critical of
US policy and in April, while on an official visit to
South America, again denounced US military aid to
the insurgents. He is likely to continue to stress that
political solutions to the regional conflict deserve
priority.
We believe Arias will proceed with negotiations for a
bilateral agreement, especially if multilateral talks
falter. From his perspective, he probably can justify
such an accord on the basis of public opinion polls, a
longstanding Costa Rican pacifist tradition, the lack
of a military counterforce to Managua, and the
chance to bolster his standing in Madrid and other
European capitals. At the same time, Arias is likely to
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send messages to Washington that any changes are
much less significant than may appear on the surface
and do not signal a "fundamental" or "radical" shift
in San Jose's policies.
In our judgment, a formal bilateral agreement be-
tween Managua and San Jose is likely to lead to
international pressure on Honduras to sign a similar
accord and, at a minimum, to complications for
insurgent military operations and resupply activities
across the Costa Rican border. The proposed interna-
tional border patrols probably would be small and
face considerable difficulty monitoring the 300-
kilometer border, but the Costa Ricans are likely to
cooperate with such an international force
On the basis of Costa Rica's longstand-
ing tradition of hospitality to political exiles, we think
Arias is unlikely to agree to close insurgent political
offices located in San Jose.
Guatemala
US Embassy reporting suggests
President Cerezo believes his domestic standing and
Guatemala's international position are best served by
pursuing a vaguely defined policy of "active neutral-
ity." He is convinced that, in order to gain the more
visible regional role for Guatemala he seeks, he must
avoid either open support or condemnation of Nicara-
gua or the anti-Sandinistas.
(According to US Embassy re-
porting, Cerezo recognizes that Managua presents a
threat, albeit limited in his judgment, to Guatemala's
domestic security.
Cerezo's stance is based on a number of foreign policy
currents:
? Guatemala's long-held sense that its size, popula-
tion, and relative economic and military strength
entitle it to play a leadership role in the region.
? A belief that a more neutral policy toward Nicara-
gua can more quickly end Guatemala's internation-
al isolation and secure foreign assistance.
? A desire to avoid offending Mexico, its major
petroleum supplier.
? A belief that the Guatemalan insurgents' use of
Mexican territory is a more important factor for
their survival than is support provided by Nicara-
gua.
Guatemalan officials have told the US Embassy they
agree in principle with most positions held by fellow
Core Four members, but that Cerezo is intent on
maintaining a separate and distinct role for their
country. Guatemala, for example, has not participated
in most Core Four strategy sessions since Cerezo's
inauguration. US Embassy reports suggest that
Cerezo views his proposal for a Central American
parliament primarily as a means to project Guatema-
la's role and diminish the influence of the Contadora
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Who Decides? US Embassy report- 25X1
ing indicates President Cerezo has clear ideas about
the tone and direction of Guatemala's foreign policy
and has moved quickly to assert policy leadership. 25X1
Nevertheless, his freedom of action is circumscribed
by the need to accommodate the interests of the 25X1
military. the military
wants to avoid direct involvement in the regional 25X1
conflict while opposing moves to develop friendly
relations with Managua. Thus far, according to US
initiatives, and
sees his policies as little more than public posturing
that could help ease Guatemala's isolation and keep
pressure on the Sandinistas.
Cerezo's policy leadership has also been complicated
by competing voices within the foreign ministry. A
lack of coordination often has resulted in the issuance
of conflicting public statements, according to US
Embassy reports. In March 1986, for example, at a
time when President Cerezo was attempting to avoid
being drawn into the debate over the US Congres-
sional vote on aid to the anti-Sandinistas, several
foreign ministry officials were making comments to
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the press expressing Guatemalan opposition to aid to
the insurgents. The US Embassy expects, and we
agree, that this pattern is likely to continue and that
debates within the government over policy are likely
to find their way into the public arena.
Managua.
Likely Moves. In our judgment, Cerezo is likely to
remain committed to a regional policy that attempts
to gain greater prestige for Guatemala by remaining
distant from attempts to pressure Nicaragua. Cerezo
probably will adopt a slightly more cooperative posi-
tion in the Core Four group in the Contadora talks,
but he is unlikely to fully identify with it. In discus-
sions with US officials, we believe Cerezo will contin-
ue to say he recognizes the Nicaraguan regional
security threat, but he is likely to argue that diplomat-
ic pressure is a more effective way to deal with
believe
Nor do we expect Cerezo to see any advantage to
altering his position toward the anti-Sandinistas. In
public, he probably will attempt to avoid specific
reference to the rebels while stressing the need for a
regional and nonmilitary solution to the conflict. At
the same time, however, he is likely to continue to
If other regional govern-
suit.
ments, such as Venezuela and El Salvador, were to
extend more aid to the anti-Sandinistas, we believe
Cerezo's government would be more likely to follow
El Salvador
El Salvador remains the most vocal critic of Nicara-
gua in the region. Press and US Embassy reporting
indicates that since his election in 1984 President
Duarte has intensified this criticism of Managua,
scoring the regime for attempting to export its revolu-
tion to the region and for failing to restore civil
liberties at home. In public forums, Duarte has been
openly supportive of US policy toward Nicaragua,
although his statements have endorsed US aid to the
anti-Sandinistas only indirectly.
regime.
In our judgment, El Salvador's primary goal in its
policy toward Nicaragua has been, limiting and,
ultimately, eliminating Sandinista support-including
training, resupply, and funding-for El Salvador's
leftist rebels. Duarte has supported the need for a
Contadora agreement but believes that a Marxist
government in Managua will not honor a treaty
commitment to nonintervention, according to US
Embassy reporting. Duarte apparently believes multi-
lateral pressure can focus attention on Nicaragua's
intransigence and could force the Sandinistas to make
at least cosmetic changes at home. He fears, however,
that the newly elected governments in Honduras,
Guatemala, and Costa Rica lack the long-term re-
solve needed to oppose the Sandinistas and that San
Salvador could be left politically isolated as the
region's only staunch opponent of the Sandinista
ing indicates that, although President Duarte and his
close advisers make policy toward Nicaragua and the
anti-Sandinistas, they pay close heed to the attitudes
and concerns of the Salvadoran militaryF____1
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ome, ike arme orces chie
Blandon and Air Force chief Bustillo, may in fact
favor even more dramatic action, such as breaking
diplomatic relations. The military has been suspicious
of negotiations with the Salvadoran rebels, but the
President reportedly has been able to convince Army
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officers that his call for simultaneous Salvadoran and
Nicaraguan negotiations has put greater pressure on
the Sandinistas.
Likely Moves. We see little likelihood that President
Duarte-or the military high command will alter
substantially their positions toward Nicaragua or the
anti-Sandinistas. We believe Duarte will continue
publicly to criticize the Sandinistas' domestic and
regional policies, while working to build Core Four
unity. Nevertheless, Salvadoran officials probably will
continue to stop short of publicly endorsing US
military aid to the anti-Sandinistas.
President Duarte's proposal to reopen talks with the
Salvadoran rebels if Nicaragua would begin talks
with the anti-Sandinistas was presented as a step to
comply with the Contadora principle of national
reconciliation. Backed by other Core Four leaders, it
was timed to be of specific use to US policy goals.
Although Duarte gained a slight propaganda advan-
tage from Managua's immediate rejection of the
offer, in our view, the initiative has not put effective
pressure on the Sandinistas because it has not been
consistently reiterated by El Salvador or the Core
Four, nor presented formally to the Contadora group.
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undermine his case that El Salvador is a victim of
external aggression in the form of Nicaraguan sup-
US Embassy reports suggest Duarte is unlikely to
adopt a softer line toward Nicaragua, not only be-
cause of Salvadoran military pressure and his govern-
ment's need for US aid, but also because of his
personal convictions. However, in our view, he might
publicly temper, but not abandon, his outspoken
stance if other Core Four governments moved to
accommodate the Sandinistas. We see little prospect
that El Salvador under Duarte would see any advan-
tage in seeking a bilateral agreement with Managua.
Recently, the Core Four nations have suggested some
new ideas designed to capture the political initiative,
demonstrate their flexibility, and pressure Nicaragua.
In our view, the proposals are unlikely to lead to
Nicaraguan concessions. Nevertheless, these propos-
als potentially offer a means to increase marginally
Managua's isolation in the region and perhaps influ-
ence other countries to pressure the Sandinistas.
President Cerezo of Guatemala hopes his proposal for
a Central American parliament, which has won Con-
tadora endorsement, can put pressure on Nicaragua
to hold elections for the body, supervised by indepen-
dent observers. Cerezo has told US officials he be-
lieves Nicaragua will be forced to open up its political
system or face international isolation. In our view,
however, the proposal may provide opportunities for
Managua to project a superficial image of cooperation
at little cost. Even if Nicaragua accepts the election
proposal, it is likely to adopt campaign rules similar to
those used in the Sandinista election of 1984, which
limited political competition. Moreover, the parlia-
ment's likely diverse political complexion probably
would diminish its potential to adopt resolutions em-
barrassing to Managua.
Both Cerezo and Arias have told US officials they
hope to use a Central American summit meeting-
now scheduled to be held in Guatemala in May-to
propose a timetable for democratization in Nicara-
gua. Spelling out a political timetable could help Core
Four efforts to define standards by which implemen-
tation of Contadora commitments could be judged.
Nevertheless, Nicaragua probably would reject the
idea as another Core Four attempt to interfere in its
internal affairs, while again asserting that it would
relax political restrictions if US "aggression" ceased.
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prehensive peace treaty.
We expect that the Core Four as a whole will focus
their policies toward Nicaragua on achieving a com-
=the governments, convinced Nicaragua will nev-
er agree to a treaty that fully implements Contadora
objectives, believe their best strategy is to attempt to
put the onus on the Sandinistas by presenting a draft
they have jointly approved and by announcing their
willingness to sign it. US Embassy reporting indicates
they believe they have the Nicaraguans on the defen-
sive as a result of the Sandinistas' behavior in the 5-7
April Contadora meeting in Panama. Moreover, con-
versations between Core Four officials and US diplo-
mats indicate the growing disposition of the four
governments not to be painted as the obstacles to
agreement. F__1
Core Four members on this issue is unlikely.
Core Four unity will probably be tentative and in-
creasingly tested, as it has been previously, by Conta-
dora pressures to make compromises in the draft
treaty, Costa Rica's potential bilateralism, and Gua-
temala's aloofness. Moreover, as a group, the Core
Four are growing less enthusiastic about the anti-
Sandinista insurgents and are increasingly likely to
view them as a burden if the guerrillas do not make
military progress. Aid to the insurgents is almost
certain to remain exclusively a subject of national
rather than regional policy, and cooperation among
establishments.
to criticize or
distance themselves from some US policies in public
statements. As in the past, these differences will
largely reflect the sensitivity of Central American
leaders to the prevailing international environment,
which opposes military pressure on the Sandinistas.
To a lesser extent, statements to the press that
criticize US policy also may reflect dissenting voices
or lack of coordination in their foreign policy
In our view, there is likely to be a continued tendency
of Core Four leaders
In the absence of a Contadora agreement, we believe
US policies and anti-Sandinista military prospects
will be key variables in shaping Core Four attitudes
over the next year. Although all Core Four countries
are likely to resist US efforts to secure their public
endorsement of military aid for the insurgents, they
all-especially Honduras and El Salvador-probably
look upon US aid to the guerrillas as a test of US
resolve. Costa Rica, however, probably will continue
to express misgivings about such aid publicly and is
unlikely to halt its steps to disengage from the
conflict. Tangible insurgent progress almost certainly
would stiffen Honduran resolve not to reach an
accommodation with Managua, even if the Sandinis-
tas were to retaliate for increased activities through
border violence. Lack of progress, however, is likely to
increase Honduran uncertainty and to cause new
tensions with the United States and the guerrillas.
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On balance, a slight shift in Core Four policies toward 25X1
Nicaragua and the insurgents that poses problems for
US interests appears to have taken place, and we
believe the chances are greater for an erosion of
support for US policies than for an increase in
backing for them. Costa Rica's new President, for
example, appears more committed to disengagement
than did his predecessor. Guatemala's "active neutra-
lity" probably will translate into more criticism of US 25X1
adequately considered.
policy, a reluctance to contribute to Core Four unity,
and the possible emergence of the Central American
parliament as a distraction. The Hondurans have
shown themselves willing to disrupt insurgent activi-
ties if they view Tegucigalpa's needs as not being
Because the Core Four will continue to feel pressure 25X1
from the Contadora meditators to show flexibility, we
doubt they can achieve a draft treaty that meets all
US policy objectives. In fact, the minimum treaty
requirements acceptable to the Core Four probably
fall considerably short of US goals. A stronger draft
treaty is probably unlikely without diplomatic assis-
tance from Washington to help redraft proposals and
mobilize Contadora support. A Costa Rican bilateral
accord with Nicaragua-if concluded before a multi-
lateral treaty-would shift the focus of negotiations
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away from a regional settlement, complicate insur-
gent resupply, and subject Washington to strong
pressure to respect such an agreement.
In the event the Core Four agree to sign a regional
treaty lacking strong arms control, verification, and
democratization provisions, we believe Nicaragua
could also sign, as all sides try to avoid being blamed
for being the obstacle to a settlement. The Sandinistas
might calculate that any treaty-imposed restraints on
their policies would only last five years-the projected
duration of the agreement-while allowing them to
concentrate on destroying the insurgent forces. The
Nicaraguans may condition their final ratification of
the document on US agreement to respect it, judging
that the United States eventually would be forced to
accept any treaty that all the Central American
governments have agreed to. They almost certainly
would attempt to draw out subsequent negotiations on
arms levels and verification, believing international
pressure on Honduras and the United States would
force them to end their aid immediately to the anti-
Sandinista insurgents. In our view, a weak treaty
would amount to international protection for the
consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist state in Central
America. It could freeze the regional arms balance in
Managua's favor-the Sandinistas already have pub-
licly asserted they will not surrender any of their
arms. It would, meanwhile, restrict US military aid to
El Salvador in its war against the Communist insur-
gents while Managua, in our judgment, would contin-
ue to supply some assistance to the Salvadoran rebels.
The Contadora mediators, having successfully bro-
kered a reduction in regional tensions, probably would
be reluctant to abandon the accord in the event that
the Sandinistas refused to relax their domestic con-
trol.
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Appendix A
the Contadora mediators
The Contadora talks have made only halting progress
since they began in January 1983 under the mediation
of Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, and Panama. The
Core Four, although often disunited, have generally
focused on obtaining a multilateral treaty that would
address all key issues simultaneously-including sup-
port for subversion, arms and troop levels, foreign
military advisers, and internal democracy-with in-
ternational verification of compliance. Nicaragua's
strategy has centered on restricting the US military
role in the region, minimizing the impact of the treaty
on its arms levels or internal policies, and attempting
to give priority to bilateral border agreements.
have been primarily concerned with avoiding an esca-
lation of tensions that they believe could lead to a US
intervention. Such a development, they believe, would
complicate relations with Washington, hand leftists at
home a political issue, and promote even greater
regional instability. Statements by the Contadora
parties to US officials indicate that their priority has
been to keep Nicaragua in the talks and to reach an
agreement promptly. They believe that even an imper-
fect treaty or one that resolves only some issues is
preferable to no agreement. On balance, we believe
the group's compromise proposals have tended to
favor Managua's positions for this reason. In addition,
the mediators may have attempted to soften some
Core Four proposals out of a traditional Latin Ameri-
can reticence to accept treaties that sacrifice sover-
eignty.
treatment of security and verification issues in the
draft, a deficiency that the mediators eventually
recognized.
Nicaragua's Boycott Tactics
Subsequent negotiations have been interrupted by
Nicaragua on several occasions. Usually, the media-
tors have revived the talks by making concessions to
meet Sandinista demands. Managua bolted the talks
in June 1985, for example, protesting that the Conta-
dora should focus on the US economic embargo and
resumption of aid to the insurgents. Nicaragua also
proposed enlargement of the Contadora group in an
attempt to include South American countries that it
believed would favor its interests. These countries-
Brazil, Peru, Argentina, and Uruguay-formed a
"support group" in August, with Contadora concur-
rence. The mediators used the tactic of meeting
individually with the Central Americans to pressure
them to make concessions, resulting in a new treaty
The Contadora group has assumed an active media-
tion role, formulating its own treaty drafts based on a
21-point "Document of Objectives" that all parties
signed in September 1983. Nicaragua announced that
it was ready to sign a draft proposed in September
1984, but conditioned its acceptance on the exclusion
of any changes. The Core Four countries demanded
more talks to remedy what they saw as inadequate
draft in September 1985 (see table).
Objecting to some proposed changes in the 1985 draft,
the Sandinistas refused to negotiate and asked for a
six-month suspension of the treaty talks. Managua
insisted that the United States cease "aggression" and
formally agree to support a Contadora agreement as
preconditions for negotiations. In January 1986 the
Contadora countries and the support group attempted
to break the impasse at their meeting in Caraballeda,
Venezuela. They supported US-Nicaraguan bilateral
talks-a key Sandinista demand-and called for a
series of simultaneous steps to achieve peace. US
Embassy reports indicated that the mediators intend-
ed to defer resumption of negotiations on the draft
treaty while pressuring for US and Central American
gestures to improve the political climate for talks.
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troop levels before signature; pro- "offensive" weapons; a freeze
posals would require Nicaraguan would give treaty sanction to a
cuts. regional arms imbalance in Nicara-
gua's favor.
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Key Provisions of the September 1985 Treaty Draft a
Issue Proposals of the
Contadora Mediators
Simultaneous treatment of all Immediate ban on support to in- Proposes to negotiate all issues Staggered process means a lack of
issues surgent groups and freeze on before signature. simultaneity; Nicaragua likely to
arms imports upon signature; draw out negotiations on arms and
arms levels to be negotiated with- troop levels while attempting to de-
in three months after signature; feat the insurgents.
verification mechanism may be
negotiated after signature.
National reconciliation Calls for measures to improve Believes it is politically unrealis- Managua interprets this to mean it
democratic systems; free access tic to insist on Nicaraguan talks can refuse to negotiate with its
to periodic electoral process; en- with anti-Sandinista insurgents. armed opponents, and Contadora
courages national reconciliation, does not insist otherwise.
"within existing national laws."
Arms and troop ceilings Arms limits to be recommended
by verification commission within
60 days based on inventories pro-
vided by parties 15 days after
signing; additional 30 days for
parties to agree on recommenda-
tions and set limits and schedules
for reduction.
Foreign/ military security ad- Each country to submit census of Accepts draft.
visers advisers within 15 days after
signing; foreign military advisers
and other personnel in military,
paramilitary, and security activi-
ties to leave within 180 days;
limits to be set on other military
advisers with technical duties.
Regime has always claimed much
lower number of Cubans than In-
telligence Community estimates;
likely to falsify census; have provid-
ed some Cubans with Nicaraguan
identities; no constraints on civilian
advisers with military capabilities.
Military exercises Permits one foreign military exer- Proposes limits on size and dura- Managua insists on total elimina-
cise per year with view to elimi- tion of foreign maneuvers within tion of US exercises; treaty theoret-
nation; sets limits on participants 30 km of the border; no limits ically sanctions Nicaraguan exer-
and 15-day length; requires 90 outside the border zone. cises with Cuban or Soviet forces.
days' prior notice; prohibition to
take effect once arms and troop
ceilings are set; requires 30-day
notification for national maneu-
vers.
Foreign military bases or schools Accepts draft.
to be proscribed; existing bases to
be dismantled six months after
signing.
Upon signature, Contadora will
propose membership of commis-
sion to be approved by parties.
- Issues of arms levels, military maneuvers, and verification were
still under discussion last fall when Nicaragua called for a tempo-
rary suspension of the talks.
Sandinistas claim there are no such
bases in Nicaragua.
Believes provisions on verification Verification likely to prove diffi-
are weak and intends to strength- cult, particularly on political provi-
en before signature. sions; parties may agree to
non-Latin American troops, which
would establish a hemispheric
precedent.
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New Pressure for a Treaty
The Contadora countries reversed course at a meeting
in Panama in early April, again pushing for a final
round of treaty talks, despite Nicaragua's refusal to
negotiate. In our view, this change reflected the strong
US and Core Four stance in favor of negotiations and
the mediators' belief that progress was necessary to
forestall renewal of US aid to the anti-Sandinistas.
The mediators declared that only two issues remained
to be resolved-arms control and military maneu-
vers-and imposed a 6 June deadline for completion
of the treaty. US Embassy reports indicate that the
Contadora group is likely to mount heavy pressure for
signature of the treaty, arguing that details on verifi-
cation and "implementation" can be worked out later.
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Appendix B
Nicaragua's Regional Strategy
their support for US policies.
Since they came to power in 1979, the Sandinistas
have followed a strategy designed to induce their
neighbors to reach an accommodation with their
revolutionary government. In our judgment, Nicara-
gua's immediate foreign policy goal is to generate
internal and external pressures on Honduras and
Costa Rica that would deny safehaven and end their
assistance to the anti-Sandinista insurgents. The San-
dinistas' medium-term objective is to coerce the other
Central American governments into taking a more
benign attitude toward Nicaragua and into reducing
anti-Sandinista insurgents,
Nicaragua has preferred a bilateral approach to reso-
lution of problems with its neighbors, in our view,
because it does not want a comprehensive accord that
could interfere with its domestic policies and military
posture. Once involved in a multilateral peace process,
however, the Sandinistas saw opportunities to turn it
to their advantage. They probably offered to sign the
Contadora-proposed treaty draft of September 1984
because its provisions were relatively weak and they
saw it as a means of checking US military activities in
the region. At the same time, they tried to cut a
bilateral deal with the United States-the Manzanillo
talks-that would obviate the need for a regional
solution. Managua became intransigent after the trea-
ty draft was modified to take account of some Core
Four objections. Nicaragua was especially dissatisfied
with provisions that permitted international military
maneuvers and that seemed to endorse talks with the
Moreover, the breakoff of talks with the
United States-along with US statements insisting on
treaty verification and the need for dialogue with the
Contras-probably persuaded the Sandinistas that
Washington was unwilling to be bound by a weak
regional settlement. Given these circumstances, the
Sandinistas refocused attention on their bilateral
strategy. Although Managua was largely successful in
early 1986-it stalled the regional talks, rekindled
interest in a border agreement with Costa Rica, and
gained Contadora endorsement for a renewal of the
Manzanillo talks-the renewed push for a treaty by
the Contadora countries, the Core Four, and the
United States has forced Managua to return to the
multilateral forum.
The Sandinistas probably see the new democratic
governments in the region as a volatile mix of in-
creased challenges and new opportunities.
Costa Rica
The Sandinistas almost certainly view the Costa
Ricans as the most vulnerable of their neighbors
because they lack a military and because Costa Rican
public opinion has shown concern over potential hos-
tilities with Managua and a preference for official
neutrality in the regional conflict. Although Nicara-
gua attaches priority to concluding a border agree-
ment in pursuit of its larger strategy, we believe
Managua may pursue a tough line in the negotia-
tions-without jeopardizing them-because of per-
ceptions of Costa Rican weakness. Nicaragua proba-
bly would seek to avoid border incidents that could
damage prospects for an agreement, but it is likely to
continue its efforts to train and arm Costa Rican
Communists, some of whom have fought alongside
Sandinista forces in Nicaragua.
Guatemala
The Sandinistas probably believe they can cultivate
President Cerezo and turn his policy of "active neu-
trality" to their advantage. In our view, Nicaragua
has welcomed Cerezo's proposal for a Central Ameri-
can parliament as a way to divert attention from
discussions of a multilateral treaty. Managua will be
wary of Cerezo's prodemocratic stance, and, should
his efforts begin to affect the regime adversely, it will
almost certainly raise questions about Guatemala's
alleged neutrality and cast Cerezo as a lackey of
Washington. We do not expect the Sandinistas to
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decrease their support to the Guatemalan insurgents,
probably calculating that it is sufficiently clandestine
and modest to avoid a Guatemalan response.
Honduras
In our view, the Sandinistas probably calculate that
greater Nicaraguan military successes against the
rebels-and the resulting spillover of combat and
refugees into Honduras-will erode Tegucigalpa's
support for the insurgents.
several occasions in the past, Nicaragua has attempt-
ed to lay the groundwork for a rural insurgency in
Honduras, and we believe that at a minimum the
regime will continue to give military training to
Honduran radicals.
El Salvador
Nicaragua probably sees little prospect for improved
relations with El Salvador. The Sandinistas may
renew offers to meet with President Duarte as part of
their regional strategy, but they are unlikely to make
any commitments that would compromise their sup-
port of the Salvadoran insurgents. The Sandinistas
are almost certain to continue to resist efforts to
establish a linkage between government-insurgent di-
alogue in El Salvador and their own situation.
Nicaragua has again
requested the Salvadoran insurgents to lower their
profile in Managua, but this action has not affected
the command and control apparatus that the guerril-
las maintain in Nicaragua. Moreover, the discovery in
Honduras last December of a vehicle carrying muni-
tions and communications gear to El Salvadoq___-]
provide the rebels with material aid.
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