CUBA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000200180001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Cuba:
Implications of the Third
Communist Party Congress
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April 1986
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cuba:
Implications of the Third
Communist Party Congress
An Intelligence Assessment
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Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Division, ALA,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 86-10018
April 1986
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Cuba:
Implications of the Third
Communist Party Congress
Key Judgments The recently concluded Third Congress of the Cuban Communist Party
Information available made sweeping personnel changes in the party's Politburo and Central
as of 10 March 1986 Committee, critically evaluated the nation's economic performance, and
was used in this report.
set forth domestic and foreign policy goals for the next five years. Our as-
sessment of the party personnel shifts and policy pronouncements suggests
that the regime perceives the next several years as a period of increased
stress and hopes to buy time with limited changes while laying the basis for
more extensive regimentation of the people.
In the foreign policy arena, Castro's typically tough rhetoric suggests he
has largely discounted the possibility or desirability of seeking improved
relations with Washington any time soon. The Cuban leader may calculate
that efforts to improve relations would only serve to undermine what will
be a growing need to play up the US threat to justify the austerity and po-
litical regimentation programs he will be imposing on his people. Unlike
past congresses, Castro had no real victories over "imperialism" to herald
this year, and his tough words with regard to Angola and Nicaragua
probably reflect his concern over US policy resolve in the Third World in
general and, more specifically, the US domestic debate over assistance to
insurgents in those countries.
The dramatic personnel changes, which included the removal of three
members of Castro's revolutionary elite from the Politburo, appear aimed
at:
? Removing leaders whose political or administrative credentials had
become tarnished.
? Moving more technocrats and qualified administrators into the upper
reaches of the party hierarchy to implement the new policy directions and
address Cuba's economic ills.
? Creating a new party leadership at least superficially more representative
of Cuban society in its age, sex, and racial composition.
Despite these changes, the leadership, at least for the next few years, will
continue to be dominated by the Castro brothers and their ex-guerrilla
colleagues who have controlled the government since they assumed power
in January 1959. Indeed, Fidel named Raul as his successor at the congress
and some influential "Raulistas" have been moved onto the Politburo. On
balance, these changes are likely to strengthen the anti-US element in the
Politburo.
Secret
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The Central Committee also had about a one-third turnover, with many
young and minority members added. Most of these changes seem primarily
symbolic, however, and we expect the relatively lightweight new member-
ship to function as a rubberstamp for Castro's policy decisions.
The five-year economic plan for 1986-90 and the economic sections of the
party program reflect even more strongly the austerity and conservation
measures implemented by Castro last year. The introduction of limited
economic liberalization and a greater reliance on market mechanisms
reflect, in our opinion, Soviet pressures on Havana to improve economic
efficiency and the rising influence of more technically skilled advisers.
These proposals include such concepts as profit-oriented enterprises,
worker incentives, and reduced subsidies on a number of basic consumer
goods.
Even if Castro actually implements these measures-hardliners in the
leadership may hinder or block anything more than limited reform-the
short-term outlook for the Cuban economy remains poor. Hard currency
markets for Cuba's primary exports-nickel, sugar, and reexported Soviet
oil-are likely to remain weak, and, in our opinion, Cuba will fall well
short of its 3.5-percent growth target for 1986. The serious drought and
devastating hurricane that struck Cuba last year will substantially reduce
this year's sugar harvest-perhaps by as much as 2 million metric tons
(25 percent)-and Havana's commitment to meeting CEMA quotas will
limit exports to the West.
In the political arena, the draft party program emphasizes that increased
discipline will be imposed not only in the economic sector, but also in the
government, the party, and among the masses. The program reflects the re-
gime's concern with worker apathy as well as increasing street crime and
corruption, and seems to point to increasing regimentation of daily life. The
program's emphasis on a "war of all the people" and the need for
intensified indoctrination of Cuba's armed forces suggest that Havana will
continue to use the alleged threat from the United States to justify ever-
greater sacrifices on the part of the population.
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In his presentation of the Main Report, Castro's rhetoric on many foreign
policy issues was so uncompromising that two days later a separate, hastily
drafted resolution on foreign policy was approved, explicitly supporting
US-Soviet dialogue and peaceful coexistence. We believe Soviet pressures
may have been responsible for the document. On balance, the Soviets were
probably pleased with the congress's moves toward domestic reform-
Moscow has been pressing for improved efficiency and production-
although piqued at Castro's familiar recalcitrance on specific issues in the
foreign policy arena.
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Dramatic Personnel Changes
The New Party Program 8
Renewing Foreign Policy Commitments 10
B. The Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, February 1986 17
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Figure 1. Cuban President
Castro reading the six-hour
Main Report on 4 February
1986, the first day of the Third
Congress of the Cuban Com-
munist Party. Castro's Report,
presented to some 1,784 party
delegates and 500 foreign
guests, was generally critical of
Cuban economic performance
during the five years since the
second congress and projected
further austerity and tough
times for the Cuban people.
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Cuba:
Implications of the Third
Communist Party Congress
Introduction
The Cuban Communist Party's Congress, held ap-
proximately every five years, is billed by Havana as
an occasion for party revitalization, renewal of its
membership, and setting out policy guidelines for the
future. The Castro regime's Third Congress, held in
February, focused on four main tasks. The principal
action was the selection of the party's leadership-the
Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee. Sec-
ond, the Cuban leadership presented its evaluation of
the country's economic performance over the past five
years and outlined the economic plan for 1986-90.
The congress also thrashed out ideological issues and
presented a draft party program aimed at improving
revolutionary fervor. Finally, President Fidel Castro
outlined the party's foreign policy views in his two
major speeches of the congress.
This paper examines the personnel changes made in
the party's Politburo and Central Committee, assess-
ing their impact on the regime's future policy direc-
tions. It also analyzes the degree to which the con-
gress addressed Cuba's weakening economic situation,
Soviet dissatisfaction with Cuban economic manage-
ment, and US pressures on Cuba's foreign policy
interests in the Third World. Finally, the paper
considers the implications of the party congress for
the United States.
Dramatic Personnel Changes
In our view, the dramatic changes made in the Cuban
Communist Party leadership at the congress under-
score the regime's concern about its economic plight
as well as its public image. An examination of the
personnel shifts in the Politburo and Central Commit-
tee indicates an effort to remove those whose political
or administrative credentials had become tarnished,
and to replace them with technocrats that have the
skills needed to address the country's economic ills.' A
broader role in government-perhaps moving
into one of Fidel's jobs as chairman of the
Council of Ministers. His frequent public appear-
ances throughout the country over the past year
had all the earmarks of a public relations cam-
paign to bolster his popular appeal preparatory
to expanding his governmental responsibilities.
Although Raul was not named to any new posts
at the congress, such a development could result
from the next scheduled meeting of the Central
Committee or National Assembly in late June, or
could come at any time in the form of an edict
from the Politburo or the Council ofState.F
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second objective, based on our analysis of the public
speeches during the congress, was to eliminate the
popular perception that the party leadership was not
representative of Cuban society as a whole.2 Despite 25X1
the influx of new faces, however, many of them a
generation younger than Fidel Castro, a review of the
personnel of the new Politburo reflects continued
domination by the Castro brothers and their ex-
guerrilla colleagues who took control in 1959. F
Politburo Castoffs. In the biggest shakeup of the
Politburo since it was created in 1965, nine of the 24
' For a detailed statistical analysis of the ersonnel changes in the
Central Committee, see appendix A.I p
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 well-earned reputation for ruthlessness. He was
unable, however, to halt the steady increase in
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Full Members
Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary
Raul Castro Ruz, Second Secretary
(B)
Juan Almeida Bosque
Julio Camacho Aguilera
Osmany Cienfuegos Gorriaran
(N)
(B)
Esteban Lazo Hernandez
Jose Ramon Machado Ventura
Pedro Miret Prieto
(N)
Abelardo Colome Ibarra
Jorge Risquet Valdes
(N) (F)
Vilma Espin Guillois
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
Alternates
Armando Hart Davalos
(N)
Roberto Veiga Menendez
(N)
Luis E. Alvarez de la Nuez
Jose Ramirez Cruz
ueiro
Senen Casas Re
(N)
Julian Rizo Alvarez
g
(N)
Jose R. Fernandez Alvarez
(N)
Ulises Rosales del Toro
(N)
(F)
Yolanda Ferrer Gomez
(N)
(F)
Rosa Elena Simeon Negrin
(N)
(N)
(B)
(F)
(B)
R
ne
bl
fe
aul Michel Vargas
w.
ack/mulatto.
male.
(N)
Lazaro Vasquez Garcia
incumbents were replaced by new faces.' Three hon-
ored veterans of the Sierra Maestra guerrilla cam-
paign of the 1950s-Ramiro Valdes, Sergio del Valle,
and Guillermo Garcia-lost the seats they had held
since 1965. Their formal departures will help dampen
criticism that guerrilla veterans-many of them ad-
ministrative incompetents-hold too many positions
of influence. All three retained their seats on the
Central Committee, however, and probably will con-
tinue to play an important advisory role.
Most of the Politburo castoffs lost their positions
because of diminished competence or major slip-ups:
? Valdes, who was dismissed as Interior Minister in
December, had been in charge of Cuba's police and
internal security apparatus and had developed a
' The 1980 Politburo had 27 members. Two have since died and
one was removed.F____1
street crime in recent years; and,
his own ministry had
become infected by the corruption that it was
tasked to eliminate. As the US Interests Section in
Havana noted, his heavyhanded methods were no
longer appropriate in the era of "socialist legality"
that Castro is now promoting. Valdes is not in
disgrace, however, and he has been put in charge of
developing an electronics industry in Cuba.
? Former Public Health Minister Sergio del Valle
also lost his ministerial rank in December. Accord-
ing to an official announcement, he asked to be
replaced in that position, which he had held since
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1979, by "another comrade with more technical
knowledge and organizational experience in the
area of public health."
? Guillermo Garcia was removed in June 1985 from
his post of Minister of Transportation. F_
? The removal of 78-year-old Blas Roca was expect-
ed. Roca, who had served since 1934 as the Secre-
tary General of the pre-Castro Communist party,
has been in poor health for years and asked to be
released from his duties. He apparently will now
devote all his energies to overseeing the legal team
that is drafting Cuba's new civil code.
? The ouster of Politburo alternate member Hum-
berto Perez was also expected. He had lost his job as
Minister-President of the Central Planning Board in
mid-1985 and had exhausted his political credibil-
? Division General Sixto Batista lost his seat as
alternate Politburo member, apparently as a result
of the poor performance of the few dozen Cuban
military officers in Grenada during the US-led
intervention in October 1983. He was ousted as
head of the Armed Forces Ministry's Central Politi-
cal Directorate-which is responsible for ideological
preparation of the troops-in mid-1984 following a
formal probe of the Grenada affair. His subsequent
assignment as head of the Central Committee's
Military Department, however, as well as his ap-
pointment at the congress to the party Secretariat,
suggest that Batista has not fallen from grace with
Castro.
? Armando Acosta, who heads the regime's largest
mass organization-the Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution (CDRs)-also lost his alternate
seat on the Politburo. He apparently fell out of favor
in 1980 as a result of the Peruvian Embassy
incident (when many local CDR functionaries
joined the 10,000 Cubans seeking asylum in the
Embassy) and the Mariel boatlift.
IHe probably
was not penalized at the Second Party Congress in
December 1980 because the leadership wanted to
maintain an aura of unity.
? The removal of Jesus Montane, a participant in
both the historic attack on Moncada Barracks in
1953 and the Granma landing in 1956, from his
alternate Politburo seat was unexpected. Although
he retained his Central Committee seat, he appar-
ently was removed as head of the Central Commit-
tee's General Department of Foreign Relations,
which handles party-to-party relations with coun-
tries outside the Western Hemisphere. He is now
described in the Cuban media as simply an assistant
to Fidel. His removal was unexplained, although
according to the US Interests Section, diplomats in
Havana attribute it to health problems.
? The ouster of Miguel Cano Blanco, party chief in
Holguin Province, also was unexplained. He was
named an alternate Politburo member in 1980, but
his service at the national level during the past five
years seems to have been singularly unexceptional.
Politburo Newcomers. Three of the alternate mem-
bers on the old Politburo were promoted to full
membership. The most significant of these moves was
that of Division Gen. Abelardo Colome Ibarra, one of
three First Vice Ministers of the Armed Forces. His
promotion may presage a reshuffling in the Armed
Forces Ministry in which Colome Ibarra would take
over as minister if Army Gen. Raul Castro resigns-
to as-
sume a much broader role in government. Colome
Ibarra, one of only three Cubans to be awarded the
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Figure 3
Cuba: Prominant Politburo Winners
First Vice Minister of the Ministry of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces ... named Hero of the Republic in 1984,
one of only three so honored ... has had extensive
overseas military experience in both Angola and Ethiopia
... likely candidate to replace Raul Castro in top Armed
Forces post if Raul moves on to broader responsibilities in
the government.
Heads Federation of Cuban Women ... first woman
named as full member of Politburo ... viscerally anti-
American ... married Raul Castro in 1959.
Ranks fourth in Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces hierarchy ... served in Angola during 1976 ...
studied from 1977-79 at Soviet Military Academy of the
General Staff ... described as intelligent and capable.
Relative unknown ... former party secretary for Matanzas
Province ... second black on Politburo ... appointment
intended to improve regime's image on racial matters ...
expected to play visible role as regime spokesman on
African issues.
Professional military officer under Batista jailed in 1956 for
plotting against him ... right-hand man to Raul Castro in
Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces from 1959-69 ...
currently Education Minister but expected to assume
broader responsibilities.
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nation's highest distinction of Hero of the Republic,
has served in Angola and Ethiopia and is in charge of
all Cuban military forces abroad.'
Also promoted from alternate to full membership
were Vilma Espin and Roberto Veiga. Espin, a guer-
rilla veteran of the Sierra Maestra campaign, is more
widely known for her advocacy of women's rights in
Cuba as president of the regime's mass organization
for women, the Cuban Women's Federation. Veiga
also heads a mass organization-the Central Organi-
zation of Cuban Workers-which includes all of
Cuba's legally recognized unions. His promotion, in
our opinion, is meant to give the impression that
organized labor in Cuba has a representative at the
highest level of the regime. Veiga played little or no
role in the revolution and apparently has not served
overseas in either a military or civilian capacity,
which is likely to put him at a serious disadvantage in
three provincial first secretaries of the party, Luis
Alvarez de la Nuez (Havana Province), Raul Michel
Vargas (Guantanamo Province), and Lazaro Vasquez
Garcia (Camaguey Province). A fourth provincial first
secretary, Esteban Lazo Hernandez of Matanzas
Province, was given full membership in the Politburo.
Of these eight, we believe only Fernandez Alvarez is
likely to carry much weight in Politburo debate in the
near term. Alvarez is a protege of Raul Castro and a
professional military officer who received training in
the United States during the early 1950s. One of Raul
Castro's top aides, he played a major role in the defeat
of the exile contingent at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and
is generally credited with turning Castro's ill-educat-
ed rebel band into a professional military establish-
ment, rising to the position of Armed Forces vice
minister before being reassigned to the Education
Politburo debate.
There are nine newcomers to the Politburo. The
appointment of Division Gen. Ulises Rosales del Toro
as an alternate member seems designed to fill the seat
vacated by Division General Batista. Rosales del
Toro's presence-he is the most junior of the three
First Vice Ministers of the Armed Forces-means
that the regime's top-ranking military officers, includ-
ing Fidel and Raul Castro, presently hold five of the
24 full or alternate seats on the Politburo. Like
Colome Ibarra, Rosales del Toro saw duty in Africa,
and, as chief of the General Staff, he plays an
important role in military operations overseas. Ac-
cording to press reports, for example, he was the
military representative on a delegation that went to
the USSR recently to take part in a high-level Soviet-
Cuban-Angolan meeting on southern Africa.
The backgrounds of the remaining new Politburo
members are varied. Jose Ramon Fernandez Alvarez,
who is Minister of Education, was elevated to the
Politburo as an alternate, as were Julian Rizo Alva-
rez, a member of the party Secretariat; Rosa Elena
Simeon de Negrin, head of the Academy of Sciences;
Yolanda Ferrer, a women's organization official; and
' The other two are Arnaldo Ochoa, a key actor in Cuba's overseas
military interventions, and Arnaldo Tamayo, the Cuban cosmo-
Ministry as a troubleshooter in 1970.
None of the other new Politburo alternates can match
Fernandez Alvarez's executive experience or his long-
standing links to Raul Castro. Most were probably
appointed primarily for symbolic reasons. Lazo Her-
nandez, for example, is a black party official who is
only 42 years old. Too young to have participated in
the revolution, Lazo may owe his lofty appointment to
his race. His presence avoids a further reduction in
the number of blacks or mulattoes in the Politburo
that would have been caused by the retirement of Blas
Roca. Since 1980, the high percentage of whites on
the party's most important body has been an embar-
rassment for a regime that openly boasts of Cuba's
African heritage and the leadership's alleged lack of
racial prejudice.
Similarly, Rosa Elena Simeon de Negrin and Yolanda
Ferrer almost certainly were appointed because of
their sex. Neither is known to have taken part in the
revolutionary struggle, and neither has played a politi-
cal role in the last 20 years that was significant
enough to gain attention in the Cuban media. Simeon
de Negrin's area of expertise, for example, appears to
be animal husbandry-she was head of the Agricul-
ture Ministry's National Animal Health Center for
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seven years prior to her recent appointment as presi-
dent of the Academy of Sciences-and there is little
in her background to suggest she merits an alternate
seat on the party's highest decisionmaking body. Her
Politburo role is likely to be that of an adviser to
provide technical assistance to Castro when questions
concerning his latest pet project-biotechnology-
arise. Much the same is true of the three provincial
first secretaries who won alternate seats; they have
had no national political exposure and their appoint-
ments, in our estimation, were intended to signal the
party's middle-level officials that the leadership is
aware of and interested in their concerns.
Focus on the Economy
The Cuban leadership's concern over economic issues
was underscored in Castro's Main Report to the
congress, which dwelled on inefficiency, and the
continued need for austerity and consumer sacrifice.
Although the Cuban leader pointed to several positive
indicators-such as a claimed (but inflated) average
annual growth rate of over 7 percent and a 25-percent
decline in energy consumption over the 1981-85 peri-
od-the overall thrust of his economic remarks was
critical. The Cuban leader castigated bad manage-
ment in agriculture and industry, inadequate central
planning, and failure to adopt new technologies.
Castro's harsh assessment probably was stimulated by
Cuba's poor performance in its 1981-85 Five-Year
Plan (see table 1). According to official Cuban statis-
tics, actual production fell short in at least 12 of 18
major areas. In fact, available production data in nine
major areas indicate Cuba even failed to reach the
1980 goal. Looking ahead to the next five-year plan,
Castro reiterated the austerity or "economic war"
theme introduced in late 1984 and emphasized that
worker productivity must improve.
Table 1
Cuba: Comparison of Production
Goals With Actual Performance
Thousand Metric Tons
(except where noted)
1980
Goal
Percent 1985
Achieved Goal
Percent
Achieved
Sugar
8,000-
8,700
80
10,000-
10,500
75-80
Seafood
350
42
NA
NA
Domestic crops
Rice
600
59
630-640
78-80
Milk
1,000
70
1,100-
1,300
60-70
Pork
80
76
85
106
Beans
NA
NA
35
11
Eggs b
167
100
192
100
industry
Nickel
100
38
69
48
Steel
440
74
1,800-
2,000
20-22
Electric power c
9,000
100
NA
NA
Cement
5,000
53
4,900
62
Textiles
260
58
325
62
Shoesd
35
51
29
40
Refrigerators e
100
55
NA
NA
a Estimated.
b Million dozen.
Million kilowatt hours.
d Million pairs.
Thousand units.
Havana's strategy for resolving its economic difficul- criticisms of Cuban inefficiency and the tightening up
ties was outlined in the 1986-90 Five-Year Plan that of Soviet economic aid to Cuba
was unveiled at the congress. The plan's major fea-
tures suggest that it was heavily affected by Moscow's
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the Soviets were
reportedly calling the Cuban rationing system a politi-
cal embarrassment, and were censuring Havana for
wasting oil and for investing in the depressed sugar
These developments probably
convinced Havana that it would have to assume more
responsibility for its own economic welfare, continue
its austerity program, and liberalize the economy to
capita
(percent
change)
Austerity and Limited Reform. The plan indicates
that economic policy will feature further austerity,
increased integration with other CEMA countries,
and a number of small steps toward liberalization,
such as greater reliance on market mechanisms. Aus-
terity is highlighted by the importance placed on
energy conservation, import substitution, and a reallo-
cation of budget priorities from social welfare to the
productive sector. In addition, the plan calls for a
move away from rationing by reducing subsidies on a
number of basic consumer products. The plan also
stresses that Cuba must fulfill its trade obligations
and meet delivery schedules with CEMA partners,
implicitly acknowledging such shortcomings in recent
years.
It is clear that the Cuban consumer is given lowest
priority under the plan. Much of the country's re-
sources will be devoted to increasing production for
export, either to the West in exchange for badly
needed hard currency or to CEMA. Reduction of
subsidies deals an additional blow to the Cuban
worker. The 1986 national budget-with its cuts in
social welfare programs such as health and educa-
tion-is a preview of the austere days ahead for the
Cuban consumer. Ironically, the harsh treatment of
the Cuban worker, in our judgment, will help under-
mine the incentives introduced in other parts of the
plan
Table 2
Cuba: Estimated Gross National
Product, 1981-85
GNP
produced
11,972
12,288
13,025
13,843
14,722
Agriculture 1,739
1,723
1,759
1,702
1,800
Industry 3,462
3,473
3,632
3,729
3,847
Services
6,771
7,092
7,634
8,412
9,075
Note: There is no estimate for a real US dollar/Cuban peso
exchange rate; thus, the series is presented in pesos. The official
exchange rate, which overvalues the peso, in 1985 was US $1.08=
1 Cuban peso.
Table 3
Cuba: Estimated Soviet Economic
Assistance, 1981-84
Total
4,555
4,666
4,260
4,620
Economic aid
1,415
975
1,070
1,000
Trade a
912
481
500
460
Development aid a
453
444
520
490
Technical services
50
50
50
50
Trade subsidies
3,140
3,691
3,190
3,620
Sugar
1,365
2,580
2,740
3,420
Petroleum
1,655
1,006
345
100
Nickel
120
105
105
100
a On the basis of estimated balance-of-payments aid necessary to
cover Cuban soft currency trade deficits with the USSR, Cuban
purchases of capital goods from Moscow, and public statements by
Cuban and Soviet officials concerning the amount of development
aid extended.
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The reform aspects of the plan, and of other docu-
ments unveiled at the congress, all stress greater use
of market forces in the economy. The primary ele-
ments of this policy shift include decentralization of
decisionmaking to lower levels; increased use of
prices, profits, and labor incentives; reduced subsidies;
and less emphasis on consumer welfare. These initia-
tives are intended to help Cuba achieve increased
efficiency, a more dynamic application of science and
technology, and improved product quality.
For example, the plan indicates that "economic incen-
tives should become a real lever" promoting worker
efficiency, and that the use of profitability as an
indicator of efficiency will be "fundamental and
decisive." In addition, payrolls are to be tightened in
order to increase profits. The plan also hopes to
improve labor productivity by linking pay to the
quality and quantity of output and calling for better
use of bonuses and premiums. The wholesale and
retail pricing systems are to be reformed so that they
play an important part in saving scarce resources-
especially energy-and in regulating the distribution
of various goods and services.
Any benefits to the Cuban economy from liberaliza-
tion measures will, in our opinion, be slow in coming.
Hardliners in the regime have opposed such reforms
in the past for ideological reasons and can be expected
to again resist anything more than limited reforms.
Fidel Castro himself has been a stumblingblock to
decentralizing decisionmaking, and he could be
swayed relatively easily by the arguments against
reform from the ideologues in his inner circle. Even if
Castro implements these measures, however, the
short-term outlook for the Cuban economy remains
poor, and, in our opinion, Havana will fall well short
of its 3.5-percent growth target for 1986. Hard cur-
rency markets for Cuba's primary exports-nickel,
sugar, and reexported Soviet oil-are likely to remain
weak. It is also unlikely that Cuba will be able to
diversify its export base enough to increase its hard
currency earnings significantly. Moreover, the serious
drought and devastating hurricane that struck Cuba
last year will substantially reduce this year's sugar
harvest-perhaps by as much as 2 million tons-and,
combined with Havana's commitment to meet CEMA
trade quotas, will limit Cuba's exports to the West.
The New Party Program
The party program-which embodies the party's ideo-
logical guidelines for the next five years-introduced
at the congress was, by prior decision of the Politburo,
approved only in draft form. Cuban officials an-
nounced last year that the congress is to be recon-
vened in late 1986 in one last session to give it final
approval. The drafting of the program, which is based
on the "programmatic platform" approved during the
party's first congress in 1975, began in 1984 but,
according to the US Interests Section in Havana, was
not completed until just before the congress convened
on 4 February. According to party spokesmen, the
unprecedented delay in approving the party guidelines
is designed to permit grassroots discussion of the
program and allow it to be "enriched" with contribu-
tions from the rank and file of the party, the party's
youth arm, the mass organizations, and the personnel
of the Armed Forces and Interior Ministries.
We believe that this process of "broad discussion" is
being instituted to sell what essentially is an unpleas-
ant dose of medicine to the Cuban people. Rather
than presenting the population with an unpalatable
fait accompli, the regime wants to have the opportuni-
ty to explain the program's features, give the people
the chance to let off steam through debate with local
officials, allow time for the gradual acceptance of the
program's provisions, and lay the groundwork for the
eventual claim that the program has the support of
the masses. Unless the regime detects massive resent-
ment of specific elements of the program during the
discussion process, we believe the present version of
the program will be finally approved with only minor
modifications. In the meantime, the Cuban media will
portray the discussion process to the world as the
purest form of democracy.
Among a number of specific trouble spots addressed
by the draft program, two-worker apathy and anti-
social behavior-are given special attention. At the
same time, the program provides ideological under-
pinnings for dealing with these problems. Viewing the
entire program, the regime clearly is focusing on
overcoming ideological problems, especially flagging
revolutionary commitment, and is looking to the party
rank and file and the media to take a strong role in
boosting morale.
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The Party Program
The Cuban Communist Party's draft program is a
187 page document that defines the character of the
Cuban revolution and outlines the "objectives and
tasks of the Cuban Communist Party in carrying out
the construction of socialism in Cuba. " It discusses
economic, political, and social strategy, Havana's
foreign policy goals, national defense, and ideological
responsibilities. The document, which will be dis-
cussed at all levels of the party, mass organizations,
and the Interior and Armed Forces Ministries over
the next six months, will serve as official guidelines
for all party work over the next five years. In late
1986, the Third Party Congress will be reconvened to
approve the program in final form. F
Worker Apathy. The program addresses apathy as one
of the main stumblingblocks to a solution of the
country's economic ills. It calls for making wider use
of monetary/market relationships and states that the
"distribution of goods according to work will be the
main method of satisfying the needs of the popula-
tion." It also demands "strictest labor and technical
discipline" to help meet efficiency goals.
The program calls for a gradual reduction in rationing
and the sale of more goods on the higher priced,
parallel market, thus giving hard workers, who earn
bonuses, additional work incentive. While Cuba's
rationing system has resulted in a more equitable
distribution of the limited supply of goods, Cuban
planners may have concluded that it has also tended
to generate worker apathy.
The program also directs all branches of the economy
to organize workers into "productive brigades" and to
pay them based upon the total production of their
brigade. The adoption of this "brigade" concept, an
obvious effort to mobilize social pressure to force poor
performers to work harder, has already been tried in
selected industries. Widespread application of the
scheme could backfire, in our opinion, because apathy
is so prevalent and the peer pressure and harassment
may only cause further resentment among Cuban
workers.
Antisocial Behavior. The program indirectly acknowl-
edges Cuba's growing street crime and corruption. It
gives new emphasis to the roles in society of "socialist
legality" and respect for the law. Ignoring the fact
that most street crime is the work of the postrevolu-
tionary generation, the program describes antisocial
behavior as a legacy of the pre-Castro era that is
being exploited by US propaganda.
The new emphasis on "socialist legality" suggests the
regime is still trying to recover from the scandal
uncovered in the judiciary in 1983 and other more
recent instances of corruption.
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F
or acquittal verdicts and light sentences had appar-
ently become so commonplace that the Ministry of
Justice was shaken from top to bottom when scores of
defense attorneys and judges-including most sitting
on the Supreme Court-were jailed during a lengthy
investigation by the Interior Ministry. In the midst of
the affair, Politburo member and Justice Minister
Dorticos committed suicide. Even the Interior Minis-
try, charged with rooting out graft, was embarrassed
when its own high officials were found to be taking
bribes and embezzling government funds.
In dealing with antisocial behavior, the party program
warns against failing to make a distinction between
political subversion and a lack of misunderstanding of
the standards of socialist society. This is an indirect
but damaging admission that, after 27 years of total
control, the regime's political education apparatus has
done a poor job of indoctrinating the masses.
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More Indoctrination. To cope with these problems in
the coming years, the party program places the largest 25X1
part of the burden on the regime's propaganda ma-
chinery. In Cuba's closed society, the media's role is
one of educating the masses on the goals of the
regime, explaining how and why the population
should contribute to the achievement of those goals.
The party's Secretariat, through the various working
departments of the Central Committee, establishes
rigid ideological guidelines for all press, radio, televi-
sion, and educational and cultural entities in the
country; and the program will serve as a basic work-
ing document for these departments and their govern-
mental affiliates over the next five years.
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The program announced that steps will be taken to
"elevate the role and responsibilities of journalists and
the press as a whole." These include institutional
reorganization as well as better training for press
personnel and the adoption of unspecified measures of
a legal and professional nature. These are designed to
enable the press to carry out its "most important daily
task," which the program defines as promoting the
ideological development of the population.
Radiobroadcasting, according to the program, will get
"priority attention," and an effort will be made to
improve the quality of television programing and
expand regional television broadcasting. News person-
nel of both the printed and electronic media are urged
to develop better contact with the masses and to
engage in criticism "as a means of achieving political,
educational, and ideological goals." The program
identifies the countering of "imperialist propaganda"
as one of the media's most important tasks, which
tends to confirm
that Cubans in increasing numbers are
listening to broadcasts from outside the country.
As part of the indoctrination process, Castro also
seems quite willing to use alleged external threats to
fortify revolutionary fervor. The program strongly
reinforces the propaganda line that an invasion by the
United States is being prepared and uses it to justify
the continuation of measures designed to increase the
regimentation of the entire population. The praise
devoted by the program to the concept of the "war of
all the people" appears intended to create a siege
mentality and suggests to us that the Cuban leader-
ship perceives the next several years as a time of trial
in which it will be subjected to stresses in several
different areas-political and economic, internal and
external.
Renewing Foreign Policy Commitments
The uniformity that characterized the congress on
economic and ideological issues was less evident on
foreign policy matters. Nevertheless, several main
themes emerged in Castro's speeches:
? He contrasted Cuba's solidarity with the Third
World with the alleged deliberate heightening of
tensions there by the United States and, although he
left the door ajar for an eventual improvement in
US-Cuban relations, gave no indication that he will
make any effort toward a rapprochement.
Secret
? Castro praised the Soviet-Cuban relationship, but
he may have irked Moscow by concentrating far
more on Latin America and regional issues than on
East-West strategic concerns.
? Although he struck a moderate pose and empha-
sized Havana's solidarity with new civilian govern-
ments in Latin America, Castro strongly reiterated
Cuba's support of key clients Nicaragua and Ango-
la, and threatened to increase aid to them if the
United States increased assistance to rebels.
Although Castro did not set any dramatic new direc-
tions, he tried to demonstrate that increased US
pressure would cause Cuba to strengthen, rather than
back off, its commitment to Third World socialist
governments and revolutionary movements. His hard
line on Nicaragua and Angola, however, as well as his
warning that Soviet-US "detente," if it comes, will
not affect Washington's policy in regional trouble
spots, betrays Castro's grave concern about continu-
ing US foreign policy resolve in those areas.
Relations With Moscow. In the Main Report, Castro
thanked Moscow for its longstanding and continuing
military and economic assistance, and noted again
that Soviet-Cuban economic relations should serve as
a model for relations between underdeveloped and
developed countries. He asserted, however, that all
members of the socialist community, regardless of
their size, deserve "absolute reciprocal respect," im-
plying perhaps Cuban bitterness over Moscow's aid
levels to its Third World allies in recent years.
Castro probably annoyed Moscow by glossing over
contentious Soviet-US strategic issues, such as the
Strategic Defense Initiative. The Cuban leader also
barely acknowledged recent Soviet initiatives on arms
control for which Moscow is actively seeking interna-
tional support.
We believe that these omissions resulted in pressure
from the Soviet delegation, which may have led to the
hasty preparation and approval of a resolution on
foreign policy two days later. Fidel Castro played no
part in the presentation of the resolution, which was
read by Cuban Vice President Rodriguez instead of
being distributed to the delegates in advance. The
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document contained much more explicit statements of
Cuban support for continuing dialogue between Mos-
cow and Washington and emphasized the need for all
socialist states to "struggle for peace." It called for
peaceful coexistence, constructive negotiations, gener-
al and complete disarmament, and a broad and active
international campaign to oppose the alleged US
policy of confrontation.
Soviet assistance.
Despite Soviet and Cuban differences in emphasis-
Moscow's focus on strategic issues and Havana's
concern with regional conflicts-Castro's addresses
reinforced the coherence of their foreign policy views
in a number of areas. His positive remarks on China
parallel the warming trend in Sino-Soviet relations
over the past two years. Moreover, the overall domes-
tic thrust of Castro's Main Report, that of economic
reform and improved efficiency, is sure to please the
Soviet leadership, which has been pressing Cuba to
improve its economic performance and stop wasting
and the arms race."
Relations With the United States. Castro's Main
Report did not deviate from his established anti-US
line. He charged that, even if the Reagan administra-
tion reached agreements with the Soviet Union on
strategic weapons, its "aggressive attitude" toward
regional conflicts will not necessarily change. In his
closing speech to the congress-which he delivered
without a prepared text-Castro was far more vitriol-
ic, indirectly comparing President Reagan to Hitler
and castigating capitalist society for "living off war
Although Castro reiterated his familiar line that
Cuba is willing to discuss its problems with the United
States and seek better relations, his vituperative lan-
guage demonstrated that he was not offering to make
the first move. He cited the immigration accord
reached in late 1984 as evidence of Cuba's willingness
to negotiate, but claimed that he breached the agree-
ment because the initiation of Radio Marti broadcasts
indicated that the United States was not yet ready to
deal with Cuba on the basis of "sovereign equality."
Promoting Third World Solidarity
Castro devoted the major portion of his foreign policy
comments in the Main Report to developments in
Latin America, portraying, once again, the United
States as the aggressor in the hemisphere. He stated,
for example, that the Reagan administration-de- 25X1
spite "recent signs of the possibility of a return to
detente'-is increasing its role as "imperialist gen-
darme" in Central America and other regional flash-
points. In his highly charged closing speech, Castro
said that, if more US aid is extended to the Nicara-
guan insurgents, Cuba would do everything possible
to increase its assistance to the Sandinistas.
Consistent with his public relations campaign of the
past year or so, the Cuban leader tried to project an
image of himself as a moderate and flexible regional
partner and saluted the rise of civilian, democratic
governments in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. He 25X1
portrayed the election last year of Cuba's National
Assembly into the Latin American Parliament as "a
great expression of solidarity. " Castro again ex-
pressed support for the Contadora negotiations, not-
ing that they are an expression of Latin America's
growing independence from the United States. F_
Castro addressed the Latin American debt issue by
repeating his view that the debt is unpayable, but
tried to project the reasonable-rather than revolu-
tionary-nature of his ideas by denying that he was
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tem. He then reiterated his proposal that the devel-
oped, creditor nations assume the Third World debt
by saving 12 percent of their annual defense expendi-
tures to pay off the loans.
apartheid is abolished in South Africa.
Castro went on to score the Reagan administration
for its southern Africa policy, using UNITA leader
Savimbi's visit to Washington earlier this year as his
point of attack. In his emotional closing speech, he
rejected the notion that US support to the Angolan
insurgents could achieve a Cuban troop withdrawal
and asserted that Cuba is willing to keep its troops in 25X1
Angola for up to 30 years; he implied that a total
withdrawal of Cuban forces could only occur after
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Outlook and Implications for the United States
We believe the Third Party Congress marked the first
significant step toward broadening the base of the
leadership since Castro assumed power in 1959.F_
The ouster of such hallowed figures as
Valdes, Garcia, and del Valle from the Politburo
appears to have convinced many Cubans that Havana
is finally making a break with the past. The new
Politburo will probably be seen by the average Cuban
as more competent than its predecessor, and, in our
judgment, the replacement of some of the old guard
has bought the leadership some time to regroup and
try to come to grips with the country's economic
problems.
The Politburo changes are likely to have fallout for
Cuban foreign policy. In our judgment, the makeup of
the new Politburo increases the likelihood of friction
with the United States. The promotion of Vilma Espin
to full membership places in a key position a woman
who is said to be as antipathetic toward the United
States as Raul Castro. In international meetings and
in sessions of the Cuban National Assembly, she has
shown herself to be vehement, outspoken, strong-
willed, and prone to simplistic and sometimes extreme
solutions to problems. We believe she will continue
to display these characteristics in Politburo debate.
Several other Politburo members are also likely to
strengthen the anti-US sentiment of the Politburo.
For example, Abelardo Colome, now a full member, is
likely to take his cues on key issues from his mentor of
many years, Raul Castro, as will alternates Ulises
Rosales and Jose Fernandez, both of whom also owe
their rise to high office largely to Raul. The party
provincial officials added to the Politburo, on the
other hand, have weak revolutionary credentials and
little experience in politics at the national level; thus,
they are likely to play only a minor role in debating
matters of special importance. We doubt, for exam-
ple, that they would have the courage to oppose Fidel
or Raul on issues related to the United States. Gone
from the Politburo are those such as Blas Roca,
Armando Acosta, and Humberto Perez who might
argue for more pragmatism in dealing with
Washington.
Despite the personnel shifts, we believe Castro, at
least over the next several years, will continue to lean
heavily on his colleagues of the guerrilla struggle
when faced with critical decisions. He almost certain-
ly is wary of placing his faith in the younger element
of the new Central Committee and probably believes
they have not yet paid their dues in the revolutionary
society that he and his generation of rebels have
sacrificed so much to create. Many of the new faces-
such as Esteban Lazo and Yolanda Ferrer-clearly
were picked as window dressing, and these people
have no incentive to challenge Castro or the ranking
members of the leadership on any vital policy issue.
Given the nature of the Cuban political system, we
believe these new members of the party elite know
what their role is and will respond by giving Castro
their full support. They are unlikely, therefore, to
press for innovations in Cuban policy.
Castro gave several indications that he is concerned
that Washington will increase further its pressure on
Cuban interests in the Third World. His tough lan-
guage threatening to strengthen Cuba's commitment
to Angola and Nicaragua probably was intended, in
part, to influence US public and Congressionial opin-
ion on the issue of US assistance to insurgents in those
countries. Moreover, in contrast to his 1980 address to
the Second Congress, when he headlined Angola,
Nicaragua, and Grenada as evidence of the inevitable
swing in the balance of forces toward socialism, this
year he cited no similar "victories" for celebration.
Indeed, aside from congratulating Luanda, Managua,
and the Salvadoran insurgents for holding on against
their opposition, Castro was forced to hold up the
return of several Latin American governments to
democratic rule as the greatest "victory" against
imperialism over the past several years. In addition,
Castro's failure explicitly to back the prospect of
improved US-Soviet relations and any potential
agreement on strategic weapons may betray a real
concern that any improvement in Moscow's relations
with Washington could negatively affect its commit-
ment to its Third World allies.
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Appendix A
Statistical Analysis of
the New Central Committee
The Third Party Congress marked the first significant
expansion of the narrow-based representation on the
Central Committee since the Cuban Communist Par-
ty was formed in 1965. Although all the data are not
yet available, the preliminary statistical analysis that
follows indicates that the basic demographic composi-
tion of Cuba's party elite-as reflected by the Central
Committee-is changing. Early central committees
were clearly dominated by white males from Oriente
Province who had participated in the guerrilla strug-
gle against Batista. Our analysis of the changes in
central committees formed between 1965 and 1986
reveals that, for the first time, the new Central
Committee has increased the proportion of nonwhites
and younger individuals, but that little progress ap-
parently has been made in the proportional represen-
tation of females as full members.
Background
The Cuban Communist Party, in its present form, was
established in 1965 after a merger of Fidel Castro's
26 July Movement, the 18 March Student Revolu-
tionary Directorate, and the pre-Castro Communist
Party (then called the Popular Socialist Party). The
Central Committee named in 1965 consisted of
100 members, two-thirds of whom had military rank
in either the armed forces or the security services. The
First Party Congress-at which a new Central Com-
mittee was named-was not held until 1975. The
party statutes adopted at that time called for party
congresses to be held every five years hence, with a
new Central Committee being "elected" at each as a
means of renewal of the leadership. The Second Party
Congress was held in December 1980; thus, there
have been three Central Committees prior to the one
named in February, all of which have been headed by
Fidel Castro as First Secretary and Raul Castro as
Second Secretary
The Central Committee theoretically is the highest
decision-making body of the party, but in reality
functions only as a rubberstamp for policy decisions
made by Fidel Castro, usually after discussion in the
Politburo. The Central Committee convenes regularly
only twice a year. Unscheduled meetings are held
infrequently, primarily to provide the appearance of
unified leadership in support of major policy decisions
made by the Politburo.
While it lacks power, the Central Committee does
possess significant political symbolism. Virtually ev-
ery individual holding a key post in the government,
party, armed forces, or mass organizations is a mem-
ber of the Central Committee. Membership is rarely a
source of an individual's elite status; instead, it almost
always is evidence of that status. Committee members
form the political elite of the Cuban political system
(See appendix B).
Trends in Leadership Composition
In 1965, when the Castro regime established the party
and appointed its first Central Committee, the impor-
tance of ideological correctness and participation in
the guerrilla struggle was reflected in the membership
of the committee. The committee as a whole con-
firmed the political dominance of those who had
participated most closely with Castro in the guerrilla
struggle and represented an extremely narrow band of
the political spectrum. Many elements of the loose
coalition that had participated in the anti-Batista
struggle gained only token representation.
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When the party held its First Congress in December
1975 and appointed its second Central Committee,
the revolution had long since been consolidated. The
Castro regime had a clear opportunity to broaden the
base of its leadership and incorporate the representa-
tives of new sectors or groupings that had been
excluded in 1965 or had appeared during the ensuing
decade. This opportunity, however, was ignored. Even
though the turnover in personnel was large, the 25X1
composition of the new committee virtually duplicated
that of its predecessor and reconfirmed the dominance
of the guerrilla elite.
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By the 1980 party congress, the Castro regime had
just experienced the massive emigration of the Mariel
refugee boatlift. we
believe the Cuban leadership was fearful that the
country could experience internal problems similar to
those in Poland, and Havana made a number of
symbolic changes to "close the gap" that had devel-
oped between the party and the masses. The number
of members on the Central Committee increased
dramatically, and the position of alternate Politburo
member was created. In a bid to increase the popular
base of the party, the chiefs of the four mass organiza-
tions were all added as Politburo alternates. Nonethe-
less, the narrow demographic base that had character-
ized the full members of the 1975 Central Committee
remained unchanged in 1980.
Age. The individuals who joined the guerrilla struggle
were, for the most part, relatively young when Castro
achieved power in 1959. Castro himself was 32, and
many of his guerrilla comrades were even younger.
More than half of the 1965 Central Committee
members belonged to the "guerrilla generation" born
between 1925 and 1937. A comparison of age profiles
of the 1965 and 1975 Central Committees shows that
little effort was made to incorporate younger age
groups into the leadership (see table 4).
Comparing the 1975 and 1980 Central Committees,
however, we see the beginnings of a greater represen-
tation of the postrevolutionary generation, with the
number of members born after 1938 growing by
9 percentage points, although the guerrilla generation
retained a majority. By the 1986 Central Committee,
however, the guerrilla-veteran age group had fallen by
11 percentage points from 51 percent in 1980. Al-
though the data show that the membership born after
1938 has grown only slightly since 1980, a large
proportion of members in the unknown age category
probably also belong to the post-1938 generation.
Despite the probable growth in later generation mem-
bership, however, at least 40 percent of the Central
Committee still belongs to the guerrilla-veterans age
group.
Comparing the average age of the party leadership
over time gives us another indication of Castro's
recent willingness to gradually bring members of the
postrevolutionary generation into the leadership ranks
(table 4). In December 1965, the average age of
members was less than 38 years. Ten years later, the
average had increased to over 46, an increase of
almost 9 years. Clearly, there had been no real effort
to bring in younger members. By 1986, however, the
average age of those full members whose age is known
was 54, an increase of only 7 years, indicating an
infusion of younger members.'
Race. More than 50 percent of the Cuban population
can be classified as black or mulatto, but the Central
Committees have done a poor job of mirroring the
racial composition of Cuban society (see figure 4). The
membership of the 1965 Central Committee was
predominately white, with only 11 percent black or
mulatto. There was no effort made in 1975 or 1980 to
alter this situation; the percentage of blacks and
mulattoes showed virtually no change. The most
dramatic change in racial composition was evident in
the 1986 Central Committee, in which 21 percent of
the full members could be described as black or
mulatto-an increase of more than 60 percent since
1980. This figure still falls far short of representing
the true racial makeup of the Cuban people, however,
and maintains the predominately white character of
Cuban leadership.
Provincial Origins. Most of the guerrilla struggle
that brought Castro to power was waged in Oriente
Province in eastern Cuba: the heavy dominance of
members from this region in the early Central Com-
mittees is, thus, not surprising (see figure 5). Of the
members of the 1965 Central Committee whose birth-
places were known, nearly half were "Orientales."
There was virtually no change in this pattern when
the 1975 Central Committee was selected; however,
the 1980 membership reflects a decline in members
born in Oriente Province. Even so, none of the other
original five provinces came close to matching the
number of those born in Oriente, including the far
more heavily populated province of Havana! In 1986,
' The date of birth is known for some 75 percent of the full
members. Virtually all of those whose ages are not known are new
members and it is expected that most are younger than the average
age. 0
' Cuba implemented a redistricting plan in 1976 that expanded the
number of provinces from six to 14. Oriente Province was divided
into five new provinces: Las Tunas, Holguin, Granma, Santiago de
Cuba, and Guantanamo. For purposes of statistical comparison,
members of the 1980 and 1986 Central Committees who were born
in those five provinces are considered "Orientales." F__~
25X1
25X1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200180001-5
Secret
Table 4
Cuba: Generation Groups of the Leadership a
1965
1975
1980
1986
Central Committee
Central Committee
Central Committee
Central Committee
Full Members
Full Members
Full Members
Full Members
1938+ postrevolution era
11 14.7 23.1 24.6
Unknown
0 4.5 6.8 25.3
a The Cuban youth of Castro's era were strongly sensitive to the
generation factor. In their view, the injustices of Cuban society
were the products of the old political class, generally known as the
"generation of 1930."
Figure 4
Cuba: Central Committee Full Members
1980 (n=137) 49.9
1975 (n=101) 46.4
89.0
87.5
86.4
78.8
11.6
12.9
21.2
0
0 0 0.7 0 Unknown
1965 1975 1980 1986
~W Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 :CIA-RDP88T00768R000200180001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200180001-5
Figure 5
Cuba: Central Committee Full Members
Oriente Havana born
Other lJ Unknown
\1
1975 10.7 1986
45.5 43.8