MEXICO: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1985 EARTHQUAKES--A COMPARISON WITH NICARAGUA AND GUATEMALA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000200160001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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With Nicaragua and Guatemala
Mexico: Political Implications of the
1985 Earthquakes A Comparison
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ALA 86-/0016
April 1986
366
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Mexico: Political Implications of the
1985 Earthquakes A Comparison
With Nicaragua and Guatemala
Division, ALA,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 86-100/6
April 1986
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Mexico: Political Implications of the
1985 Earthquakes-A Comparison
With Nicaragua and Guatemala
Key Judgments The two earthquakes that struck Mexico last September added to the
Irl/ormation available short-term difficulties facing the government of President de la Madrid,
as of 15 March /986 but-if the government maintains its initial performance-they seem
was used in this report.
unlikely to affect the country's long-term political stability. We compared
Mexico's emergency performance and consequent political fallout with the
experiences of Nicaragua and Guatemala following similar disasters in
1972 and 1976, respectively. Although the Mexican performance is mixed,
it seems sufficiently differentiated from the Nicaraguan example and
similar to the Guatemalan experience to warrant the conclusion that the
earthquakes will not prompt a serious challenge to the present political
structure. Several factors unique to the Mexican experience seem to
reinforce this conclusion.
Nicaragua and Guatemala were selected for benchmark comparison
because, while both their earthquakes were devastating, there is a generally
held belief that Nicaragua's quake in 1972 contributed to the eventual
overthrow of the Somoza government, while Guatemala's response to its
disaster in 1976 strengthened backing for the regime. Using 16 generally
accepted instability indicatorsmodified to make them quake relevant-
we compared these earthquakes with the recent disaster in Mexico. Our
comparative analysis of the Mexican, Nicaraguan, and Guatemalan
experiences highlighted three variables where responses were divergent and
which may serve as indicators of quake-related instability in Mexico:
? Corruption in the relief process.
? Portion of affected populace assisted.
? Ability to handle the quake.
Quake-related corruption is unlikely to influence future political stability
in Mexico, in our judgment. Although some business leaders in the
opposition and quake survivors have complained of improprieties in the
relief effort, we have no evidence of major misuse of emergency aid for per-
sonal gain. Most charges have been tied to individual acts by low-level
officials and military personnel, not the type of widespread corruption
likely to threaten stability. In Nicaragua, the exposure of large-scale
corruption during relief efforts contributed to a decline in the legitimacy of
the regime, according to our analysis. Guatemala's performance in the
aftermath of its quake was characterized by little disaster-related corrup-
tion and the government's efforts were generally viewed by the population
as honest and efficient, according to published accounts of the period.
iii Secret
ALA 86-100/6
April 1986
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We believe most Mexicans affected by the quake should eventually receive
some benefits, even though Mexico's reconstruction effort is somewhat
lacking in direction and is achieving mixed results. This appears to be an
important factor in minimizing public discontent. In Nicaragua, the
distribution of emergency supplies and reconstruction planning were
determined by favoritism and class bias, adding to the alienation of large
portions of society. In Guatemala, by contrast, most of those affected by
the quake benefited from the relief and reconstruction efforts.
Mexico's initial lack of ability in dealing with the quakes highlighted
weaknesses in the government that could have posed a threat to stability
had not Mexican authorities feverishly tried to correct their mistakes.
Various published accounts of the Nicaraguan disaster note that the
Somoza leadership was viewed by the people as inept in handling their
needs, and its poor response worked to weaken the stability of the regime.
Guatemala, however, again followed a course that was stability enhancing.
Its government was perceived as skillful in providing initial relief and in re-
turning many essential services as early as one day after the quake struck,
according to press and other reports.
During our analysis of the earthquakes, we noted three developments that
were unique to the Mexican disaster:
? The lesser level of destruction.
? The supportive role of the military.
? The formation of popular self-help groups.
Mexico's position for the first two factors is generally favorable for
stability. Comparing the amount of destruction in each of the three
countries, Mexico clearly can absorb the impact of the quake more easily.
For example, less than 2 percent of Mexico City was destroyed, leaving
fewer than 1 percent of its population homeless. In Managua and
Guatemala City, however, 80 percent and 20 percent of habitable build-
ings, respectively, were destroyed, with 75 percent and 17 percent of the re-
spective populations left homeless.
The relative lack of damage did not prevent Mexico from attempting to ex-
ploit the quakes to strengthen its case for financial assistance. The
government successfully used the disaster to obtain asix-month deferment
of a $950 million principal payment due in installments on 1 October and
4 November 1985. Beyond this, however, creditors were unwilling to
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provide additional debt relief. In their estimation, the damage was not
sufficient to justify most Mexican requests. The quakes have thus ceased to
be a justification for Mexico's inability to pay creditors since the govern-
ment now explains its financial gap as a result of decreased oil revenues.
Although disputes over control of relief operations strained the relationship
between military and civilian leaders in Mexico, the armed forces per-
formed well and remained steadfastly loyal to the government. The
government continues to seek ways to lessen this strain; however, in our
judgment, additional attempts to diminish the role of the military would
jeopardize the traditional supportive relationship between the two groups.
This was not a problem in either Nicaragua or Guatemala. The military
leadership in Nicaragua remained supportive of Somoza throughout the
disaster; and, in Guatemala, a military leader ruled the country.
The third area, formation of popular groups, is being closely monitored by
de la Madrid. Such popular groups were not in evidence in Nicaragua and
Guatemala after their disasters, so it is difficult to fully assess the longer
term threat they might pose to the Mexican ruling party's hold on power, if
any. In our judgment, the Mexican Government's monitoring of these
groups virtually ensures that they will not suddenly become a threat to
stability.
Overall, we consider the direct risk of political instability resulting from
the aftermath of the quake as small. Although Mexico will continue to face
increased problems in other areas, particularly economic, the disaster, in
our judgment, should not make these existing difficulties insurmountable.
There are several indicators, however, that we believe would be warning
signs of an increased threat. These include:
? Large-scale increases in corruption involving high-ranking government
officials, particularly if these abuses are publicized or widely known.
? Failure to follow through on reconstruction efforts, particularly housing
for quake victims.
? Additional civilian usurpation of what the military considers its role, or
military disaffection with civilian leadership.
? Increased activity from the newly formed quake-relief groups, or the
emergence of a charismatic leader among them, rather than the now
widely expected, gradual fading away of these organizations.
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Key Judgments
Introduction
Methodology
Overview of Survey Results
-_ _ -- --
Factors To Watch
Corruption in the Relief Process (Variable A)
Portion of Affected Populace Assisted (Variable B)
__- -- - --
Ability To Handle the Quake (Variable C)
Unique Mexican Developments
The Role of the Military
New Popular Organizations
Complete Country Survey
Multidimensional Scaling
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Figure 1
Central American Major Earthquake Epicenters
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Mexico: Political Implications of the
1985 Earthquakes-A Comparison
With Nicaragua and Guatemala
This paper assesses the potential impact of Mexico's
recent earthquakes on political stability by contrast-
ing the de la Madrid administration's postdisaster
efforts with the reactions of the respective govern-
ments to two other regional quakes-in Nicaragua in
1972 and in Guatemala in 1976. These countries were
selected because their quakes were devastating, and
because there is a generally held belief that Nicara-
gua's quake contributed to the eventual overthrow of
the Somoza government, while Guatemala's response
strengthened the support for the regime.
An explanation of the methodology used for this
comparison is included in the first section of this
paper. The study then focuses on three earthquake-
related factors that were determined to be possible
indicators of impending political instability. In addi-
tion, other developments, which our analysis identi-
fied as unique to the Mexican disaster, are examined
in a separate section. An overall assessment is includ-
ed in the final section.
Analysts currently working on Guatemala, Nicara-
gua, and Mexico ranked their countries on a scale of 1
to 5 for each variable at periods of six months and two
years (except Mexico) after their respective quakes.
These responses were also coordinated with published
accounts of the period. In each case, a ranking of 1 or
2 was considered conducive to stability, 3 indicated no
change, and 4 or 5 represented a possible threat to
political stability (see table 1). By contrasting the
Guatemalan and Nicaraguan experiences, patterns
emerged indicating which variables were more or less
likely to affect political stability. Comparing the
current situation in Mexico with these experiences, we
could then judge whether the de la Madrid adminis-
tration was effectively handling the quake-related
problems that might threaten stability.
During this examination, we also identified three
developments unique to the Mexican quake that could
influence stability. The areas were: level of destruc-
tion, the military's role, and the formation of popular
groups. These areas, which could have an impact on
political stability, are examined in a separate section.
Our method for determining the possible effects of an
earthquake on political stability focused on identify-
ing and examining key indicators before and after the
disaster. The Office of Global Issues has defined 85
indicators associated with instability. Using that
work, we modified some questions-making them
quake relevant-and developed a list of I6 variables
to study the events surrounding earthquakes that may
lead to political instability (see appendix A). These
variables were grouped into the following five
categories:
? Level of alienation.
? Ruling elite cohesion.
? Government repression.
? Opposition activity.
? Economic changes.
This methodology has limitations. It would have been
desirable to have had more cases for comparison.
However, the Mexican disaster was only the 10th
major earthquake in Latin America since 1900. Of
the nine previous quakes, relatively little data were
available on the five disasters prior to 1971. One,
which occurred in 1985, could not be used to provide
examples of long-term effects. Two of the three
remaining earthquakes were selected because the
results in each case provided clear examples of a
positive and a negative outcome. Another limitation
was that it was not always possible to determine if a
change was attributable to the quake or to some other
event, particularly if a year or more had intervened
since the quake. The fact that the Mexican quakes
occurred relatively recently and definitive information
on their implications is not yet available also con-
strains this analysis. It should also be noted that we do
not consider the variables used as an all-inclusive list.
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Table 1
Variable Data
Level of alienation
A. Skillful/inept in dealing with quake? I
B. Relief aid benefits elite or many? 2
C. Example of success or failure? 1
Ruling elite cohesion
D. Conflict increase among ruling elite? 3
E. Military view of civilian actions? 3
F. Win/lose major postquake elections? 3
Government repression
G. More crackdowns on the people? 4
H. Change in government repression? 4
1. Change in reasonable concessions? 4
Opposition activity
J. Increase in opposition groups? 4
K. More foreign aid to opposition? 3
L. Increase in riots/protests? 4
M. Growing sympathy for opposition? 4
N. Growing criticism from common people? 4
Economic changes
The data in table 1 show that responses for most
variables were similar, suggesting that many quake-
related factors have little unique impact on the long-
term political stability of a country. Moreover, similar
occurrences, such as increased repression and opposi-
tion activity, followed the quakes in both Guatemala
and Nicaragua, suggesting that these factors alone
cannot be considered indicators of the potential threat
an earthquake can unleash for the future stability of a
government.
Significant differences surfaced, however, between
the responses for Nicaragua and Guatemala as con-
cerns the following three alienation and one economic
variables:
? Was the government skillful or inept in dealing with
a quake? (Variable A)
? Did most people or only the elite benefit from relief
efforts? (Variable B)
? Was the government's handling of the disaster
viewed as a success or a failure? (Variable C)
? Were there changes in foreign aid or investment as
a result of the quake? (Variable P)
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Figure 2
MDS Scattergram Showing Similarity
Between Variables
L N
O?
J
K
This observation is supported by examining all the
factors with a statistical research technique known as
multidimensional scaling (MDS) (see appendix B).
Figure 2, produced by using MDS, shows the similar-
ity between the variables. Twelve of the 16 are loosely
clustered in the center of the diagram, representing
the relative similarity of most variables. Four points
(A, B, C, and P) are clearly distinct from this group
and could therefore be considered the best indicators
to explain why the earthquakes affected political
stability in Nicaragua and Guatemala so differently.
The diagram also provides a graphic representation
that the economic factor (P) varies in a different,
almost opposite, manner than the alienation variables
(A, B, and C). Closer examination reveals that Nicar-
agua's results on the economic variable were signifi-
cantly more positive, indicating that it was acting as a
force for political stability. The effect of this factor,
however, was apparently overridden by the extensive
government corruption that negated its impact. Con-
sequently, we concluded that the economic variable
was misleading as a predictive variable in this case.
The three variables concerning alienation are treated
in the following section as factors that may have an
impact on political stability. Mexico's current condi-
tion is compared with that of Guatemala and Nicara-
gua for each point. The remaining 12 variables are
not examined because they did not show variation
and, therefore, cannot be used as indicators.
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Guatemala and Nicaragua:
Conditions Before the Quake
Guatemala
The political order in place at the time of the 1976
earthquake was based on an informal coalition of
military officers, wealthy businessmen and plantation
owners, and some rightwing middle-class politicians.
This group, which dominated Guatemalan politics for
most of this century, was overwhelmingly conserva-
tive and opposed to social, economic, and political
reform. One of the primary concerns of the succession
of military or military-backed regimes that ruled
Guatemala after 1954 was the largely rural insurgen-
cy that had been active sporadically since the early
1960s. As the Army extended its presence into isolat-
ed guerrilla-infested areas, it could justify use of
national resources and foreign military assistance for
counterinsurgency efforts, to the exclusion ojeco-
nomic development.
Prior to the quake, Guatemala was undergoing a slow
process of political moderation to stem the tide of
urban political violence of the early 1970s that was
marked by the persecution of labor unions and
middle-class critics. President Kjell Laugerud Garcia
came under increasing criticism from the right for his
tolerance of unions and his support for cooperatives.
The quake struck just as Guatemala was beginning to
feel the negative effects of the sharp increase in world
oil prices and reduced revenues for traditional
Nicaragua
Some 10 months before the 1972 quake, President
Anastasio Somoza's National Liberal Party (PLNJ
defeated the opposition Conservative Party (PCJ by
almost a 10-to-1 vote margin. Based on apre-election
agreement to circumvent a constitutional mandate
limiting the President to one term, atriumvirate-
consisting of two members of the winning PLN and
one from the losing PC-was formed to rule the
country. This arrangement left the opposition virtual-
ly powerless because the junta answered to Somoza,
allowing him to maintain control without the title of
president.
Opposition parties found it difficult to contend with
Somoza's divide and conquer tactics. Formation of
the three-member junta, for example, two of whom
were Somoza's supporters, fostered another split in
the opposition. Its leaders disagreed over joining an
alliance in which they would lack power but add to
the legitimacy of the regime.
Since the mid-1960s, Nicaragua had also enjoyed
some degree of economic stability. Inflation averaged
about 2.5 percent a year from 1965 to 1971, and the
country's balance of payments was stable, with the
public sector playing only a modest role in the
economy.
exports.
Corruption in the Relief Process (Variable A)
One notable outcome of the earthquake in Nicaragua
was the exposure of corrupt practices during relief
efforts, which, according to academic studies, contrib-
uted to a decline in the stability of the Anastasio
Somoza regime. Initially, Somoza used the disaster to
consolidate political power by brushing aside the
figurehead three-man junta, which then ruled the
country. He also assumed the position of head of the
National Emergency Committee. According to aca-
demic studies and press accounts, the former Presi-
dent profited from reconstruction efforts by purchas-
ing large parcels of quake-devastated land in
Managua and constructing high-rise apartment build-
ings on several of the sites. There were widespread
rumors at the time, which we generally accept as
accurate, that Somoza appropriated relief funds and
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never spent them on earthquake reconstruction. Press
reports indicate that some relief money was spent on
the luxury apartment buildings and land speculation,
rather than on low-income housing. In a book on
Somoza's life, a reporter who knew the family since
1952 reports that half of the $32 million in US
Government funds sent to Nicaragua were never
registered in the Nicaraguan treasury. According to
the biography, no one in authority was concerned with
finding an explanation for the discrepancy.
In contrast to Nicaragua's efforts, which highlighted
weaknesses in the political system, Guatemala's per-
formance in the aftermath of its quake was character-
ized by little disaster-related corruption. Then Presi-
dent Kjell Laugerud Garcia, possibly mindful of
Nicaragua's experience, kept corruption to a mini-
mum by appointing generally honest administrators,
according to published accounts. The government's
relief effort, coordinated by the National Reconstruc-
tion Committee and administered by the military, was
honest and efficient, these sources report. The Army,
although in control of the relief effort, allowed foreign
contributors to distribute their own relief supplies,
reinforcing a sense of Guatemalan honesty in the
international community. Some antigovernment pro-
tests were directed against the uneven or slow distri-
bution of disaster aid, but they were neither wide-
spread nor serious enough to raise doubt about the
efficiency of the national relief effort, according to
press reports.
Mexico, in our judgment, is pursuing a course that
more closely follows the Guatemalan example, sug-
gesting that quake-related corruption is unlikely to
influence future political stability. Although some
business leaders, opposition members, and survivors
have complained of improprieties in the relief effort,
we have no clear evidence to confirm or deny a major
misuse of emergency aid for personal gain. The lack
of an overall public perception of large-scale corrup-
tion, however, seems to suggest that this important
(Moreover, a variety of press reports
indicate that the de la Madrid administration is
requiring detailed accounting of quake reconstruction
money.
The US Embassy in Mexico City has noted that the
potential for official corruption in the relief effort
exists but is unlikely to become astability-threatening
problem for several reasons:
? Much of the cash aid has been donated directly to
private organizations or is being administered by the
donors themselves.
? The administration has announced steps to ensure
accountability.
? There have been fewer allegations of official corrup-
tion under de la Madrid than under his immediate
predecessor.
Most charges of corruption have been tied to individ-
ual acts by low-ranking officials and military person-
Although, in our judgment, large-scale official cor-
ruption is remote, the greatest potential, and therefore
an area to watch, lies in the government's expropria-
tion of quake-damaged property in the capital.
Mexican officials could use the decree to gain control
of property for personal profit, but there is no evi-
dence that this has yet occurred. Although the oppor-
tunity for fraud remains, such government expropria-
tion is still popular with the general populace,
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issue has not become a threat to stability.
according to the Embassy.
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Portion of Affected Populace Assisted (Variable B)
Nicaragua's relief effort alienated large portions of
the society by incorporating favoritism and class bias
in the distribution of emergency supplies and recon-
struction planning. According to a university study,
families of National Guard members and government
employees had preferential access to relief supplies,
which added to public discontent. Even businessmen
and professionals, traditionally supportive of the Pres-
ident, were dismayed by Somoza's profiteering during
the disaster's aftermath, according to published ac-
counts. Avariety of academic and press sources report
only a small group consisting of members of estab-
lished elites truly benefited from the quake assistance,
although about 75 percent of the residents in the
nation's capital were left homeless.
In contrast, various reports note most of those affect-
ed by Guatemala's quake felt the positive results of
the reconstruction effort, and Laugerud was success-
ful in using disaster aid to improve the general
condition of the nation. Press reports note that spend-
ing, while admittedly uneven, went toward repairing
housing, transportation, and other facilities, primarily
in the hard-hit rural areas. The government planned
an initial housing reconstruction program financed by
$17 million in foreign loans, two-thirds of which was
designated for rural areas. Unlike in Nicaragua,
however, the homeless in Guatemala benefited signifi-
cantly from reconstruction efforts.
The reconstruction effort in Mexico is somewhat
lacking in direction and is achieving mixed results.
Nonetheless, most people affected by the quake
should eventually receive some benefits, in our judg-
ment, minimizing public discontent with the adminis-
tration. Last November, de la Madrid announced a
public housing program in which $120 million would
be spent over the following 15 months to rebuild
homes damaged in the earthquakes. The government
news agency reported that the program would benefit
41,750 families left homeless. If fully implemented,
this program would house most of those the quakes
left homeless and limit threats to stability from public
discontent. Much will depend, however, on whether
the government delivers on its promises and does so
expeditiously. Meanwhile, political opposition groups
will continue to attempt to exploit the plight of the
Figure 4. Cleanu operations begin in Mexico
City.~~
homeless for political advantage.
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The government's land expropriation also exemplifies
the Mexican Government's desire to placate victims
of the disaster, while demonstrating the difficulties it
has experienced in implementing its plans.
the sudden expropriation of
private properties m ctober was intended to defuse
the threat of social unrest that some officials feared
was "hours away" in two suburbs of Mexico City.
Although, in our judgment, it is unlikely that the
capital was ever that close to major uprisings, this
display of concern for the poor and the homeless is
indicative of Mexico's desire to monitor and dampen
public discontent. The haste with which this action
was taken also highlights the difficulties the govern-
ment has had in attempting to meet the needs of the
affected populace. Numerous parcels of land unaf-
fected by the quake were included among the 7,000
properties originally seized. A special panel was estab-
lished to review these problems and some properties
were removed from the expropriation list, but com-
plaints continued. This action also shook the confi-
dence of Mexican businessmen when they were ini-
tially told they would be compensated over a 10-year
period, but only if the budget allowed it. In early
December, Mexico City announced a more immediate
compensation package, financed by the sale of bonds,
after the realization that the loss of business confi-
dence was a contributing factor to increased capital
flight.
Ability To Handle the Quake (Variable C)
In the case of Nicaragua, the capabilities of the
government were stretched beyond their limits, and
the inadequacies were apparent to all. A large portion
of Managua burned as long as 15 hours after the
quake struck and continued to smolder for several
days, according to press accounts of the disaster.
Three weeks after the quake, some essential services
were gradually being restored. The press also noted
that it was American, not Nicaraguan, experts who
repaired the capital's water, electricity, and communi-
cations systems. Although Somoza was originally
skillful in using the disaster to consolidate his political
power, his relief effort was viewed as inept and
tims,
the distribu-
tion of relief supplies could not take place without the
signature of a member of the Somoza family, so all
activity would occasionally stop.
the government held up food supplies in
refused to leave the devastated capital.
Somoza's administration was blamed for the rising
inflation that resulted from increased energy and food
costs in the quake's aftermath. Published accounts
note that increased labor militancy on the part of
construction and textile workers in 1973, as well as
strained economic growth, played a part in alienating
many in the business community.
By all accounts, the Government of Guatemala was
viewed as very skillful in its handling of the earth-
quake. One day after the disaster, water and electric-
ity were reconnected in the lightly damaged middle-
class neighborhoods, and some shops reopened,
according to press reports. The bulk of reconstruction
spending went toward public services, such as roads,
water systems, and buildings, mainly in the hard-hit
rural areas. Almost half the housing for the poor was
destroyed in the capital and over 1 million (one-sixth
of the population) left homeless countrywide, but the
government was swift in its rebuilding efforts. As a
result, increases in the price of food after the quake
were not blamed on Laugerud, but seen as due to
scarcity caused by hoarding and speculation, accord-
ing to independent open sources. Nonetheless, there
was noticeable criticism of the government and an
increase in strikes that were, in part, related to the
economic and social dislocations caused by the disas-
ter. In our judgment, however, the demonstrations
were not directed against the government's recon-
struction efforts but primarily against Guatemala's
generally poor economic conditions.
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Both ordinary citizens and opposition leaders have
criticized Mexico's handling of the relief effort as
often inept. The administration's actions highlighted
weaknesses in the government that could pose a threat
if Mexico were not trying to correct its mistakes.
almost $1.5 billion. Nationwide, 10 percent of the
industrial capacity, 50 percent of the commercial
capacity, and 70 percent of the government facilities
were inoperative, according to geographers, sociolo-
gists, and political scientists who studied the quake.
A public opinion poll
was published five weeks after the quakes by the
Mexican Institute for Public Opinion (IMOP), one of
Mexico's most respected and reliable polling firms,
according to the US Embassy. The IMOP survey of a
representative sample of 1,000 Mexico City residents
found that 56 percent of the respondents thought the
reaction of the authorities was not timely, and 57
percent felt it was inadequate. At the same time,
however, 73 percent rated the government's overall
response as fair to excellent. These results suggest
that, while discontent may have risen somewhat as a
consequence of the quake, it is not of stability-
threatening proportions.
During our analysis of the earthquakes, we noted
three developments that were unique to the Mexican
disaster as contrasted with the Guatemalan and Nica-
raguan examples. They were the comparatively lesser
extent of destruction, the generally supportive role of
the military, and the postquake formation of public,
self-help groups. The first two developments clearly
are generally favorable. The spontaneous formation of
popular groups, however, could become a threat to the
ruling party's grip on power if the government's
awareness of and attention to this potential problem
wanes. These points are examined in more detail in
the following sections.
Level of Destruction
The quake that struck Nicaragua in December 1972
was devastating. The official death toll reached
10,000, but private estimates went as high as 20,000.
Official announcements and press reports estimate
that more than 30,000 people were injured and dam-
age was $1 billion, with a reconstruction cost of
In the capital, Managua, the extent of the destruction
was even more dramatic, covering 589 city blocks-a
6-square-kilometer area. Of the population estimated
at 420,000, at least 4,200 were dead and 16,800 were
injured. The press noted that only 20 percent of the
city's structures were intact, and nearly 75 percent of
the population were homeless. Fifty percent of those
previously employed were jobless. Although construc-
tion jobs increased in the wake of the quake, they
absorbed only half the positions lost elsewhere,
Many observers consider the earthquake that hit
Guatemala an even worse disaster, at least in human
terms. More than 25,000 people were killed and more
than 74,000 injured. Three hundred villages suffered
extensive damage and many were completely de-
stroyed. Over 1 million people were left homeless
countrywide and President Laugerud estimated dam-
age at $1 billion. A missionary involved in relief
efforts in both countries had no doubt that the extent
of the destruction and loss of life were greater than in
Nicaragua
There was little damage to Guatemala's economy,
however, and the capital, Guatemala City, survived
with relatively less damage than Managua. Only
1,000 people died in the capital, compared with
13,500 of the nation's dead from a band of settlements
in the adjacent department of Chimaltenango, ac-
cording to press reports. Twenty percent of all build-
ings in Guatemala City were destroyed, although
most hotels, office buildings, and homes in upper-class
neighborhoods survived. Press reports also note that
the collapse of 60,000 houses in the capital left
250,000 people, or 17 percent of the city's population,
homeless.
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Table 2
Devastation Comparison
~~ Percentage of people in the capital city left homeless.
b Percentage of the capital city destroyed.
Homeless Damage Damage Damage in the Capital City
(billion as a
US $) Percent Homeless d Destroyed e
of GDP
Compared with these quakes, the damage in Mexico
would have to be considered relatively minor, making
the disaster less of a threat to stability (see table 2).
Less than 2 percent of Mexico City was destroyed,
according to Embassy and press reports. The Embassy
estimates that, of the approximately 1 million build-
ings in the capital, only 3,000 were damaged. Of
these, just over one-third were demolished or consid-
ered beyond repair. The homeless amounted to less
than 1 percent of the city's population. Areas outside
the capital were less severely hit, even though the
damage in at least a half dozen central and western
states was still significant.
Little damage was done to the country's industry and
manufacturing, although some 1,300 small-scale tex-
tile plants in the downtown area of Mexico City were
destroyed. The country's petroleum facilities, largely
concentrated in southeastern Mexico, were virtually
untouched. While the number killed and injured-
10,000 and 30,000, respectively-is similar to Nicara-
gua's casualties, population differences make the im-
pact less severe in Mexico. And, when damage esti-
mates are considered as a part of a country's GDP,
Mexico is again in a significantly more positive
position.
of decreased oil revenues.
The relative lack of damage did not prevent Mexico
from attempting to strengthen
its case for financial assistance. The government
successfully used the disaster to obtain asix-month
deferment of a $950 million principal payment due in
installments on 1 October and 4 November 1985.
Beyond this, however, creditors were unwilling to
provide additional debt relief. In their estimation, the
damage was not sufficient to justify most Mexican
requests. The quakes have thus ceased to be a justifi-
cation for Mexico's inability to pay creditors since the
government now explains its financial gap as a result
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The Role of the Military
The role of the military in maintaining order and its
relationship with the civilian leadership is clearly
tested during a natural disaster, and the Mexican and
Guatemalan experiences were generally positive. By
contrast, the quake in Nicaragua may have under-
scored the military leadership's support for Somoza,
but it negatively highlighted its command structure
and internal discipline. In the aftermath of the quake,
public order dissolved. Many members of the Nation-
al Guard based in Managua left to tend to their
families, while some joined in the looting of the
commercial sector, according to US Embassy report-
ing. Somoza could barely raise 100 men and, by his
own admission, had to ask for all available troops
from the rest of the nation to reconstitute the military
and police forces in the capital.
Somoza retained the loyalty of his military
leaders throughout the disaster, however, prefiguring
the support he would later receive from them during
the revolution that ended his reign.
The response of Guatemala's military was immediate
and effective-providing a positive example of its
ability to maintain control. The government immedi-
ately declared a state of "national catastrophe,"
mobilized the Army and the police, and began relief
efforts under the National Emergency Committee
(NEC) headed by Defense Minister Fernando Romeo
Lucas. The relationship between the government and
the military was not a problem because a military
leader ruled the country. Within hours of the earth-
quake, the NEC was urging residents of the capital to
bury their dead to avert an epidemic, according to
independent press reports. Food, shelter, and other
relief supplies began arriving the following day. To
help maintain control, Laugerud ordered soldiers to
shoot looters on sight. Press reports indicate that at
least seven looters were shot and little subsequent
looting or public disorder occurred in the capital.
If civilian authorities had allowed the Mexican mili-
tary to fully institute its disaster plan, Mexico City's
response to the earthquakes would have been even
closer to the reaction in Guatamala, in our judgment.
The Mexican armed forces immediately began imple-
menting their plan and maintained their command
and control structure throughout the emergency, a
positive sign of the military's abilities, if called upon
by the government, to assure stability in a civil crisis.
Three thousand troops were on the scene within an
hour. The military was soon relegated to providing
support to the civilian effort, however, after an ad hoc
civilian coordinating committee, headed by Mexico
City Mayor Aguirre, assumed control at the Presi-
dent's direction.
The Mexican administration's rapid decision to put
the relief effort under civilian control demonstrates, in
our view, its nervousness over ahigh-visibility role for
the military, and shows something of a weakness in
the Mexican system that could threaten stability
during a time of prolonged crisis. The military had
successfully implemented the disaster relief plan be-
fore, assisting more than 20,000 people following the
eruption in March 1982 of a volcano in southern
Mexico, and it probably fully expected to lead the
relief efforts in the aftermath of the 1985 quakes. De
la Madrid's decision created strains between the
Although we judge that the military remains stead-
fastly loyal to the government, future incidents simi-
lar to or more severe than this might increase strains
to the breaking point. The government, for its part,
clearly recognizes the need for a supportive military,
and has taken a number of steps to smooth its ruffled
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New Popular Organizations
One of the greatest concerns of the Mexican Govern-
ment, which did not fully develop in Nicaragua or
Guatemala, has been the spontaneous formation of
new popular organizations in the aftermath of the
earthquake.
high-ranking officials have become increasingly wor-
ried because these groups have filled a vacuum creat-
ed by the failure of the traditional political parties to
respond to the disaster and they could grow to become
a threat to stability. We believe alarm on the part of
these officials may be premature, however. According
to a study of disaster responses by a sociologist at the
University of Denver, formation of such groups is a
natural and expected response to a disaster of this
magnitude. The organizations form with a specific
goal-some type of relief-and usually disappear
within a short period following the emergency as the
immediate concerns of the disaster fade. The US
Embassy in Mexico City reports that many of these
groups have already begun to dissolve, and those that
The de la Madrid government has done a sufficient
job, in our judgment, to prevent instability arising as a
direct result of the earthquake. In light of additional
considerations, particularly the relative lack of dam-
age, Mexico is almost certainly in a better position
than Guatemala as it goes through the postquake
period. The government has also shown adequate
concern for monitoring quake-related events; reports
to the President and other government leaders on
these activities should give the government notice of
potential destabilizing factors and provide time for the
leadership to react.
of these organizations.
Although Mexico will continue to face other acute
problems, particularly economic, the disaster by itself
should not greatly exacerbate these existing difficul-
ties, in our judgment. While we consider the direct
risk of instability from the quake small, there are
several indicators that should be regarded as warning
signs of an increased threat. These include:
? Large-scale increases in corruption involving high-
ranking government officials.
? Failure to follow through on reconstruction efforts,
particularly housing for quake victims.
? Additional civilian usurpation of what the military
considers its role, or military disaffection with civil-
ian leadership.
? Increased activity from the public self-help groups,
or the emergence of a charismatic leader from
among them, rather than the expected fading away
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Appendix A
Complete Country Survey
The following is a listing of the political instability
variables used in this study on the possible impact of
earthquakes:
Level of Alienation
A. Was the government viewed as skillful or inept in
dealing with the disaster?
1. Very skillful
2. Somewhat skillful
3. Neither skillful nor inept
4. Somewhat inept
5. Very inept
B. Did government relief efforts associated with the
quake benefit a small group or the entire affected
population?
1. Entire population felt helped
2. Most were helped
3. Middle class and above were helped
4. Few were helped
5. Only elites were helped
C. Was the government's handling of the disaster
used by the ruling party as an example of success or
by the opposition to show failures?
1. Complete government success
2. Some government success
3. Not used by government or opposition
4. Some government failure
5. Complete government failure
Ruling Elite Cohesion
D. Did conflict increase or decrease among the groups
that make up the ruling elite or between ruling and
supporting elites as a result of the earthquake?
1. Tremendous decrease in conflict
2. Noticeable decrease
3. No change
4. Noticeable increase
5. Tremendous increase
E. How did senior personnel in the military and
security services view the actions or policies of the
civilian leadership after the quake?
1. Very pleased by civilians
2. Somewhat pleased
3. Indifferent
4. Somewhat displeased
5. Very displeased
F. Did the government win or lose in the major
elections after the quake?
1. Substantially more victories
2. More victories
3. No changes
4. More losses
5. Substantially more losses
Government Repression
G. Did the government introduce reforms or crack
down on the people as a result of the quake?
1. Numerous reforms
2. Some reforms
3. No change
4. Some crackdowns
5. Numerous crackdowns
H. Was there a change in government repression as a
result of the earthquake?
1. Tremendous decrease
2. Noticeable decrease
3. No change
4. Noticeable increase
5. Tremendous increase
I. Was there a change in reasonable concessions,
without appearing weak, on the part of the
government?
1. Tremendous increase
2. Noticeable increase
3. No change
4. Noticeable decrease
5. Tremendous decrease
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Opposition Activity
J. Was there an increase in the strength of opposition
groups or a formation of new groups as a result of the
earthquake?
(Same scale as H)
K. Did opposition forces receive additional aid from
foreign groups as a result of the quake?
(Same scale as H)
L. Were demonstrations/riots/protests increasing in
frequency, scope, or scale as a result of the
earthquake?
(Same scale as H)
M. Was there growing sympathy for the demonstra-
tors/rioters from the people?
(Same scale as H)
N. Was there growing criticism of the government
from the people, media, middle class, workers, or
.business not present before the earthquake?
(Same scale as H)
Economic Changes
O. Were there sudden changes in food, energy, or
housing prices as a result of the earthquake?
(Same scale as H)
P. Were there changes in foreign aid and investment
as a result of the earthquake?
(Same scale as I)
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Appendix B
Multidimensional Scaling
Multidimensional scaling requires measurement of
the similarity between every pair of objects (in this
case, quake-related variables). The measurements
used in this study are euclidian distance matrices.
Table 3 is an example of such a matrix. It shows the
computed euclidian distances between each pair of
variables on the questions relating to quake responses
in each country. The distances in the matrix represent
degrees of similarity between each pair of variables.
The smaller the distance value, the greater the simi-
larity between the two variables on the responses in
question. Thus, H and M show the greatest similarity
(0.0); conversely, A and P show the least similarity
(1.000). The multidimensional scaling program takes
this information and depicts it graphically in terms of
distances between the objects. Thus, the data shown
in table 3 are depicted visually in figure 2. As in the
euclidian distance matrix, the H and M variables are
on the same position and the A is farthest from P.~
The program produces the graphs by first placing the
objects in a space of N dimensions and replicating the
distances between each pair of objects as shown in the
euclidian distance matrix. It finds the most satisfac-
tory configuration by starting with a random configu-
ration and moving all the points a bit to decrease the
"stress," a measure of "goodness" of the solution.
This stress value is at a minimum for the best solution
and increases sharply when too few dimensions are
used. This procedure is repeated over and over until
some stopping criterion is reached. A guideline devel-
oped for interpreting stress is as follows:
Good
Fair
Poor
In all euclidian distance matrices produced during our
analysis, the stress value was always well within the
excellent range.
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Table 3
Multidimensional Scaling Matrix for Figure 2
0.293
0.0
0.293
0.239
0.0
O.S35
0.561
0.561
0.0
O.S61
0.632
0.676
0.293
0.0
0.447
0.338
0.414
0.293
0.414
0.0
0.756
0.655
0.655
0.338
0.561
0.378
0.0
0.775
0.717
0.717
0.293
0.535
0.414
0.169
0.0
0.737
0.676
0.717
0.293
0.414
0.338
0.293
0.239
0.655
0.632
0.676
0.169
0.338
0.338
0.293
0.239
0.632
0.609
0.609
0.239
0.378
0.293
0.338
0.293
0.655
O.S35
O.S86
0.293
0.478
0.239
0.169
0.239
0.775
0.717
0.717
0.293
O.S35
0.414
0.169
0.0
0.632
0.561
0.609
0.239
0.378
0.293
0.239
0.293
0.655
O.S35
0.586
0.293
0.478
0.239
0.169
0.239
1.000
0.956
0.956
O.S61
0.676
0.632
O.S07
0.414
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
0.0
0.239
0.0
0.169
0.293
0.0
0.239
0.239
0.293
0.0
0.239
0.239
0.293
0.239
0.0
0.293
0.169
0.338
0.169
0.293
0.0
0.239
0.239
0.293
0.0
0.239
0.169
0.0
0.338
O.S35
0.378
O.S35
0.414
0.609
O.S35
0.0
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