SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1990S: DECADE OF DRAMATIC CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000100150003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of 0 CC
Intelligence
South Africa in the 1990s:
Decade of Dramatic Change
An Intelligence Assessment
eLre
ALA 86-10015L
April 1986
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
South Africa in the 1990s:
Decade of Dramatic Change
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
he Office of African and Latin
American Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa
Division
Secret
ALA 86-10015L
April 1986
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Overview
Information available
as of 20 March 1986
was used in this report.
South Africa in the 1990s:
Decade of Dramatic Change
Secret
From time to time the Directorate of Intelligence publishes reports that
attempt to examine key international trends from a broad and longer term
perspective. This speculative paper is designed to provide policymakers
with a context for long-range planning by assessing the likelihood of
political change in South Africa and its implications for the United States.
This report analyzes the patterns of black protest and white response in
South Africa and, projecting ,beyond the trend analysis of previously
published intelligence reports,' lays out the dynamic for fundamental
political change in the 1990s.
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In preparing this assessment, we employed a task force approach that 25X1
included roundtable discussions with policymakers, interviews with aca-
demics and other experts, The task force 25X1
sought and obtained a wide range of perspectives on the issues discussed in
this paper. In addition, this assessment draws upon the work already
published by the Directorate of Intelligence on South Africa. 25X1
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ALA 86-100I5L
April 1986
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Contents
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Page
Overview
iii
Key Judgments
vii
Introduction
1
Before the Choice?The Failure of Managed Reform
I
Economic Growth
3
Containing Black Unrest
4
Co-opting Blacks To Compromise
6
A Consistent Approach to Reform
6
Avoiding Sanctions
7
The 1990s?Moving Beyond the Stalemate
7
Implications for the West
9
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 20 March 1986
was used in this report.
South Africa in the 1990s:
Decade of Dramatic Change
Dramatic political change is already taking place in South Africa and by
the end of this century we believe the transition to black majority rule in
Pretoria will be well under way, if not complete. Nevertheless, we believe
there will not be a convulsive violent revolution because blacks will not
have the capacity to overthrow the government by force given Pretoria's
overwhelming security apparatus. The specific nature of a new black
majority government?that is, whether it is a federal system or based
solely on the principle of one man?one vote?and of the guarantees
provided whites will depend in large part on the circumstances and events
preceding that government's formation. We believe, however, that black
willingness to compromise will diminish over time, and that the rights and
privileges retained by whites will depend upon how quickly whites agree to
negotiate with blacks on a solution to the country's racial crisis.
In our judgment, current political, social, and economic trends in South
Africa work against the program of incremental reform pursued by the
white regime:
? The South African economy is unlikely to grow vigorously during the
coming years, undermining government efforts to assuage black frustra-
tions through the provision of economic benefits. The inability of the
South African economy to provide an improved standard of living for the
country's rapidly growing black population is, in our view, the fundamen-
tal reason why the government's incremental reforms will fail to meet
black expectations and reduce racial tensions. In the absence of economic
solutions, blacks will seek political answers to their problems.
? Black unrest will continue and will impact more directly on whites.
? Blacks will become increasingly radical in their political views and less
likely to settle for political reforms short of black majority rule.
? The government reform program will continue to appear inconsistent,
undercutting Pretoria's efforts to attract moderate black support.
? International economic pressure on South Africa?including sanctions?
is likely to increase.
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As these trends become more acute during the 1990s, we believe that the
strategy of managed reform will be discredited?not only in black eyes but
for whites as well. Whites probably will then have to choose between two
stark options: either impose a massive security crackdown involving the
deaths of thousands of blacks and the complete suspension of many civil
liberties, or agree to negotiations with black leaders to develop a new
political system for the country.
Given the determination of South African whites, particularly Afrikaners,
and their fears concerning black majority rule, we believe it more likely
that Pretoria will first try to use force to quash black unrest. Such a
development, in our view, could easily lead to bloody racial conflict. Racial
strife claiming thousands of white and black lives could last for many
years, given the resources of the white security establishment, but it is our
judgment that whites could not endure indefinitely the political, economic,
and human costs of a state of siege. Pretoria would eventually seek a
negotiated end to the conflict, but with a black population willing to accept
little less than white surrender. A less destructive transition to black-white
power sharing is possible, in our view, only if a courageous and visionary
Afrikaner leader emerges who is willing to drag whites into negotiations
with blacks even in the absence of white consensus and before violence
exhausts white determination to remain in power.
The United States and other Western nations will have scant ability to
influence South Africa's Afrikaner leaders to pursue a negotiated solution.
The impetus for a dramatic reversal in white policies toward blacks will
most likely have to come from within the white community.
If South African whites attempt to force blacks into submission and
essentially abandon reform efforts, opportunities for Soviet and Commu-
nist influence among nonwhites will grow. In addition, the United States
and the West will:
? Be accused of supporting the white regime in international forums,
despite the absence of effective Western leverage over Pretoria.
? Be hard pressed to keep other black states in the region from becoming
involved in the conflict, particularly if the Soviet Union increases its
influence with these governments.
? Be expected to insulate neighboring states from the effects of economic
sanctions imposed on South Africa.
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? Find it increasingly difficult to maintain useful contacts with black South
Africans. Militant blacks may increasingly reject any cooperation with
whites or the West.
If and when whites agree to negotiate with blacks on a transition to black
majority rule, Pretoria may ask the United States and other Western
countries to exert pressure on blacks in hopes of gaining their agreement to
guaranteed protection of white minority rights. A new black government in
South Africa will face significant economic problems as it attempts to
improve conditions for millions of impoverished homeland blacks, and the
West may be able to use promises of economic aid to persuade black
leaders to moderate their demands.
The emergence of a black government in Pretoria certainly will not end the
country's political and economic problems, and some of those problems will
even worsen. Nevertheless, we do not expect trends in South Africa to
mirror exactly those in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, in part because of a
higher level of economic development, a vibrant private sector?black and
white?and a sense of nationhood not often evident elsewhere in Africa.'
As the West develops relations with a new black-dominated government in
South Africa, it probably will be called upon not only to provide financial
support but also to ease black South Africa's entry into African politics and
rebuff attempts by the Soviet Union to support leftist parties' efforts to
gain control of the government. At the same time, the United States will
probably find itself in an environment where it needs to counter black
suspicion of US intentions and operate diplomatically in an unsettled arena
where rival black tribal and political groups maneuver to gain dominance.
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Figure 1
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"Independent" black homeland
(not recognized by the US)
--- Province boundary
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South Africa in the 1990s:
Decade of Dramatic Change
Introduction
During the 1990s, the future of South Africa will be
the key African issue for the United States because of
the strong influence that events there have on US
domestic politics and because of southern Africa's
strategic and economic importance. US policymakers
will face many difficult, seemingly no-win decisions,
both because the policies and attitudes of white and
black political leaders will leave much to be desired
and because, given the uniqueness of the South
African situation, it will be difficult to ascertain just
how quickly change will come.
We believe that developments in South Africa will be
erratic and volatile in nature. Already, seemingly
isolated and insignificant events?such as a rent
boycott in several black townships and a decision by
one Western bank to curtail operations?have had
wide-ranging political and economic repercussions. As
the crisis in South Africa continues into the 1990s, we
expect that the chances will increase that one event or
a series of seemingly unrelated events could start a
process that culminates in fundamental political
change
While analysts disagree on many of the specifics of
change?the where, what, when, why, and how?most
believe that South Africa by the year 2000 either will
have decided to negotiate the transition to black
majority rule before suffering a full-scale race war, or
will have already plunged into a conflict that can only
end, in our view, with black rule. Some analysts
believe, however, that the whites can muddle through
and that South Africa by the year 2000 will look
much as it does today. It is also possible that South
African whites?much like the political elites in Iran
during the late 1970s?will suddenly lose their will
and capitulate rapidly and without much violence.
These latter two scenarios?which the majority of
analysts believe are unlikely?are described in the
1
inset "South Africa: Could Things Be Different in the
1990s?" The analysis that follows reflects the major-
ity view that by the end of the century the transition
to black majority rule in South Africa will be well
under way, if not complete.
Before the Choice?the Failure of Managed Reform
At some point in the 1990s, if events proceed as we
believe most South African whites would prefer,
South Africa would have a complex and unique form
of government and society that would allow for much
greater intermingling of the races in economic, social,
and even some government arenas. In this system,
however, blacks would participate in national deci-
sionmaking forums but whites would retain control
over the most important national issues, such as
security and economic policy. Under this government-
imposed scenario, most Coloreds and Asians and a
substantial number of blacks would be satisfied with
this national accommodation, largely because of the
benefits derived from cooperation. South Africa
would still be a violent society, but unrest there would
increasingly be viewed by all races as counterproduc-
tive and would be carried out by hooligan elements
that have little political or moral support within their
communities.
Despite white hopes and intentions, we believe the
prospects are slim that South Africa will evolve into
such a benevolent form of white domination. If South
Africa is to proceed along a path of government-
managed reform, certain minimum conditions must
be met. In our judgment, however, current political
and economic trends, both domestic and international,
work against these conditions being fulfilled, and we
expect that most of these trends will become more
acute during the next few years.
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South Africa: Could Things Be
Different in the 1990s?
A convulsive, violent revolution in South Africa is
extremely unlikely, in our view, during this century.
Although revolutionary fervor could increase mark-
edly among nonwhites over the next 15 years, they
will not have the capacity to overthrow the govern-
ment by force, given the government's overwhelming
security apparatus. The following scenarios are plau-
sible alternatives to what we believe are the dynamics
that are likely to force fundamental change in South
Africa by the year 2000.
Whites Stay in Control by Sharing Power to a
Limited Extent. The government under the National
Party proposes a national convention to write a new
constitution. Participation in the convention is care-
fully circumscribed to eliminate the more militant
nonwhite groups. Homeland leaders and other coop-
erative blacks are included. The result is an extreme-
ly complex confederal system that appears to offer
power sharing to blacks but leaves whites in control
of the economy and national security forces. Because
of the poor state of the economy, gains by nonwhites
are made at the expense of whites, leaving all groups
dissatisfied and forcing the government to perform a
perpetual economic balancing act. The West tenta-
tively applauds the new system, although many ob-
servers warn that black aspirations will continue to
be thwarted. Black areas?including urban commu-
nities?are given more autonomy, and there is some
breakdown in apartheid as blacks are allowed to buy
land in white areas and property ownership becomes
the basis for citizenship in specific federal areas.
Violence continues, but the reforms buy time and
allow a white-dominated government to survive be-
yond the year 2000.
White Rule Collapses. The government under the
National Party proceeds with its program of incre-
mental racial reform amid a high level of township
unrest and guerrilla operations that cause many
white casualties. By the end of this decade, black
leaders?although still deeply divided?are able to
organize repeated general strikes. Many workers are
killed?especially in the mines?as the government
tries unsuccessfully to break the strikes. At the same
time, the government continues with its measured
plans to liberalize apartheid laws. Economic condi-
tions become chaotic with hyperinflation, shortages
of essential goods, and interruptions in basic services.
Emigration of highly skilled whites escalates.
The whites who stay, convinced their survival is in
immediate danger, become highly polarized and the
National Party splits. One camp urges the govern-
ment to negotiate quickly with credible black leaders
before it is too late to obtain some guarantees for
whites. Other whites pressure the government to stop
its reform program, eliminate black leaders, and put
down unrest with massive use of force. The govern-
ment, paralyzed by a similar conflict within its own
ranks, does neither. Instead, in a desperate attempt
for a mandate, new elections are called.
Results are inconclusive but a shaky parliamentary
coalition is formed and demands the resignation of
the State President. The divisive process of selecting
a successor dissolves the parliamentary coalition.
Significant black groups, meanwhile, sensing their
white opponents are in disarray, agree to joint action
and approach a new white coalition willing to negoti-
ate majority rule. Senior military leaders, anxious to
play a role in restoring order to the country and
impatient with an equivocating white government,
also support a plan for black majority government.
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Figure 2. Millions of blacks
live in squatter settlements in
rapidly urbanizing South
Africa
Prospects for managed reform satisfying to the major-
ity of both whites and nonwhites are extremely bleak,
in our view, unless South Africa:
? Has vigorous economic growth that allows for the
emergence of a large black middle class.
? Contains unrest in black areas.
? Co-opts a majority of the new black middle class by
convincing its members that economic gains out-
weigh majority political rights, while showing urban
blacks in general that the government will not be
forced to give up control over national decisionmak-
ing regardless of the tactics blacks employ.
? Adopts a more consistent approach to racial reform.
? Avoids the imposition of stringent economic sanc-
tions by the world community.
Economic Growth
It is unlikely that South Africa's economy will grow
fast enough or that economic resources will be redis-
tributed sufficiently to permit a dramatic and broad-
based increase in nonwhite living standards and the
3
development of a large black middle class. The specif-
ics of South Africa's economic constraints are stag-
gering. Urban blacks suffer from housing shortages,
inadequate community facilities, dismal schooling
systems, and widespread unemployment and under-
employment. Just to bring the black education system
to white standards by 1990, Pretoria, by its own
estimation, would have to spend annually an addition-
al $2.7 billion or 18 percent of the total current
budget (see figure 3).
Between now and 1990, South Africa's economy is not
expected to grow nearly fast enough to allow Pretoria
to deal with any of these economic problems. CIA
calculations indicate that, at the present level of
production, the economy must grow at a sustained
annual rate of about 5 percent simply to absorb new
black entrants into the labor force, now estimated at
about 1,000 per day. We expect?as at least one
major international economic forecasting service pre-
dicts? that South Africa's annual rate of real eco-
nomic growth for the remainder of this decade will be
no greater than that realized in the first half of the
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Figure 3
Expected Growth in South African Population
Million persons
F-1 January 1985 South African Government figures Total: 32.4
r7 Projected for year 2000 by US Census Bureau Total: 44.9
Total
Blacks
Whites
Coloreds
Indians
366.354 2-86
(73)
(77)
(15)
(13;
1(o)
I (8)
(3)
] (2)
10 20 30 40
(% of population)
50
1980s?or about 2 to 3 percent at best. This rate
could be lower if the price of gold falls, the world
economic recovery slows sharply, or South Africa's
economic isolation increases
Given these economic constraints, we do not believe
that a large, privileged, nonwhite middle class will
emerge during the 1990s. In our judgment, black
townships will continue to be divided communities,
with some residents enjoying improved living stand-
ards but with the majority existing much as they do
now?working in menial jobs, often unemployed, liv-
ing in overcrowded conditions, and sending their
children to inadequate schools. Many of these resi-
dents will stand to lose little if they engage in political
protests or commit criminal acts out of boredom and
frustration.
Containing Black Unrest
Given the lack of economic opportunity for most
urban blacks?particularly those under 18, who make
up over 50 percent of the population?we believe that
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the next five years will be characterized by persistent
violence in the black townships. Much of this violence
will at first glance appear self-destructive, with many
militant blacks killing those who "collaborate" with
the white regime and destroying facilities within their
own townships.
As the unrest persists, however, we believe that it will
increasingly strike directly at whites and be more
difficult to control. In our view, current trends in the
violence?particularly in the already more radicalized
Colored and black townships of Cape Province?
provide early indicators of how nonwhite protest will
evolve throughout the country during the next few
years.
A review of unrest over the past 18 months suggests
that among the most significant characteristics of
nonwhite unrest are:
? The ability of black and Colored communities?
particularly in the Eastern Cape?to sustain lengthy
boycotts against white businesses. These boycotts
have hurt white businessmen, forcing some into
bankruptcy and leading others to seek accommoda-
tions with black activists. When local negotiations
have failed to stem unrest, white communities have
begun to put pressure on the national government to
be more forthcoming in addressing black demands.
? The widespread disruption of the nonwhite educa-
tion system caused by constant boycotts by black
and Colored youths. Militant, idle youth have been
the principal instigators of violence in the townships.
The disruption of their education has long-term
implications as well?many will be unable to find
jobs in the future, adding to the pool of frustrated,
unemployed blacks in the townships, and further
diminishing prospects that a stable black middle
class will emerge and be willing to cooperate with
the plans of white politicians.
? The growing distrust of South African security
services by even politically moderate or apathetic
blacks. According to press and US Embassy report-
ing, many "middle class" parents condone, or at
least excuse, the violence perpetrated by radical
youth.
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Figure 4. Government attempts
to clamp down on unrest have
failed to discourage young
blacks from engaging in violent
protest.
? The greater willingness of the militant youth?
including the Coloreds of the Western Cape?to
engage in random violence against whites.
? The refusal of many black protestors to be intimi-
dated by police actions and reprisals.
? The frequent attacks on black collaborators, which
have, according to press and US Embassy reporting,
disrupted the informer networks of the South
African police.
? The tendency of black and Colored activists to
organize more informally, thus making it difficult
for the security services to contain unrest through
detentions.
? The attempt to create "liberated" areas in some
black communities, particularly in the Eastern Cape
townships, which security services hesitate to enter.
We believe that the declining control of South Afri-
can security services over some black townships will
make it easier for insurgent groups such as the exiled
5
African National Congress and Pan-Africanist Con-
gress to operate in black communities. We expect that
in coming years and during the 1990s the ANC and
PAC will no longer have to depend almost exclusively
upon operatives infiltrated from neighboring black
countries for the execution of terrorist operations.
These organizations, or new terrorist groups that may
emerge, will be able to recruit and maintain agents in
the black townships who are able to elude police
detection.
Over time, persistent unrest in South Africa will drag
down the country's economy. There is yet no firm
accounting available of how the current violence has
affected the economy, but the instability in the East-
ern Cape already has had a spillover economic effect
on the region. We expect that widespread unrest will
lead to longer and more politically inspired strikes by
black workers and damage even further South
Africa's poor economic prospects.
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Sustained unrest in the black townships, in our view, 25X1
also will increasingly create a social climate that
encourages violence and rewards the militants. This is
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a difficult phenomenon to quantify, but experience in
numerous diverse countries?Lebanon, Uganda,
Northern Ireland?have led academics to theorize
that once violence destroys the rhythm of everyday
life, people become inured to its consequences and a
new generation emerges whose lifestyle and morals
are geared to coping with a violent existence. New
leaders emerge in the communities who may not be
particularly skillful at political compromise, but who
do command the militants who control the streets.
Already in South Africa, the press and US Embassy
reports point to the fact that gangs of young blacks
led by obscure radicals are disrupting their communi-
ties, closing down the schools, destroying facilities,
committing random crimes, and intimidating the po-
litically uninvolved. We believe black political leaders
will find it increasingly difficult to control the militant
youth in the townships and, as a consequence, the
whites will be less able to cut political deals to
dampen unrest.
Co-opting Blacks To Compromise
In our view, the depressed economy and the persistent
violence in black communities will increasingly under-
mine the white leadership's chances of satisfying
black demands without relinquishing political control
at the national level. Most urban blacks will not,
during the 1990s, experience a significant improve-
ment in their standard of living. Under such condi-
tions, we consider it unlikely that most influential
moderate black leaders will have either enough sup-
port or enough courage to step forward and openly
support the political reforms that Pretoria is likely to
offer.
This will not stop Pretoria from pursuing its own
incremental reform agenda, at least initially. But
subsequent alterations in the apartheid system will
not, in our judgment, quell township violence or black
demands for political power at the national level.
Reporting from press sources and from our Embassy
and consulates in South Africa is consistent?blacks
already demand an effective political role at the
national level and want to be consulted before a new
political dispensation is announced. Pretoria's contin-
ued offers of limited reforms and economic improve-
ments will become increasingly irrelevant to black
demands.
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The government's experience with Coloreds already
presages, in our view, the impotency of the gradual
reform strategy.
the Coloreds were supposed to be easier to co-
opt than blacks?they already were better off eco-
nomically and the government even gave them their
own chamber in Parliament. But the willingness of
veteran Colored politicians to sign on to these reforms
has not insulated the Colored communities from the
same violence that has ravaged black areas.
A Consistent Approach to Reform
One of the principal characteristics of South Africa's
reform program to date has been its appearance of
inconsistency. The record repeatedly shows that just
when the stage is set for a significant announcement
on reform by the state President, white political
pressures or Cabinet indecisiveness lead the govern-
ment to postpone initiatives. Or, just after the govern-
ment has decided on a substantive reform, another
government component announces moves that smack
of old-fashioned apartheid. In our judgment, this
pattern has cost whites the support of nonwhite
moderates, who fear coming out in support of govern-
ment moves lest another bureaucrat in Pretoria make
a contradictory speech.
We expect that this fitful approach to reform will
continue during the next few years. Despite the not
insignificant support that will exist for more far-
reaching reforms?particularly among businessmen,
academics, and journalists?we believe that the Na-
tional Party, at least initially, will be unable to unite
behind a more ambitious reform program. Because of
its Afrikaner ethnic character, the National Party
tends to amplify the voices of conservative white
South Africans who favor only the most minor
changes in the apartheid system. Although recent
public statements indicate some Afrikaner leaders
favor more dramatic and risky reform initiatives,
public opinion polls suggest their base of support
within the party is limited.
The National Party, in our view, thus will continue to
hew to a middle-of-the-road policy that is reformist
but not daring enough to alienate conservative whites
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Figure 5. The white govern-
ment will .find its resources
strained as it attempts to hold
the line against mounting black
pressure.
or placate enough blacks. Conservative whites will
continue to insist that only the abandonment of the
reform effort and a return to the traditional principles
of apartheid and even harsher security measures will
restore order, while other reform-minded South Afri-
cans?most important, the businessmen?will remain
frustrated by their inability to influence National
Party policy.
Avoiding Sanctions
The South African Government will have a difficult
time avoiding the imposition of stiffer international
economic sanctions over the next few years, thus
making the implementation of costly reforms that
much harder. To date, most Western nations have
refrained from imposing extensive economic sanc-
tions, but continued violence and repressive security
measures on Pretoria's part will keep international
attention focused on South Africa and complicate
attempts by friendly governments to defer punitive
sanctions.
We believe that sanctions, independent of their effect
on white resolve, would damage further the govern-
ment's ability to meet black demands and defuse
black unrest. Specifically, sanctions would:
? Eventually result in lower growth rates for the
South African economy, further reducing the size of
the pie that whites have to share?however uneven-
ly--with blacks. South African economic official's
7
admitted openly, for example, that South Africa
could only generate a 2- to 3-percent growth rate if
it relied solely on domestic investment; the country
needs foreign capital to grow at the brisk rates
necessary to improve living conditions for a sub-
stantial number of urban blacks.
? Increase the blacks' confidence that their efforts are
having an impact not only in South Africa but also
abroad, and thus make them even less amenable to
limited reforms.
The 1990s?Moving Beyond the Stalemate
Rising black unrest and international criticism will at
some point in the 1990s, in our view, bring the white
regime to essentially two options: either institute a
massive and indefinite security crackdown to quash
black militancy or agree to negotiate with blacks on a
new political system that provides nonwhites with the
majority voice in the national government. Facing the
necessity of making such a decision will not be easy
for South African whites, and we expect that Pretoria
will first seek halfway measures that do not foreclose
either option. In fact, the white political leadership
may never consciously make this decision, but eventu-
ally, in our view, its policies, either by design or by
accident, will lead the country in one or the other
direction.
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In our view, it is more likely that the white regime will
attempt to use force to bring black unrest under
control. We expect that by the 1990s quashing black
militancy would require the imposition of harsh secu-
rity measures that would involve the permanent de-
tention and the killing of thousands of nonwhites.
Institution of a harsher security regime will only
further politicize and polarize black attitudes. One of
the new characteristics of the current unrest has been
the failure of blacks?particularly militant youth?to
buckle under in the face of constant and often brutal
police reprisals. We expect this militancy to deepen
and spread in the black communities. A massive
security sweep against blacks could touch off a na-
tionwide spasm of violence, strikes, and boycotts that
would force Pretoria to commit much of the white
male labor force to restoring order, cause severe
economic dislocation, and end all chance that South
African blacks would agree to a political solution that
offered even minimal guarantees of white minority
rights.
South African leaders will hesitate to launch a mas-
sive crackdown precisely because they are aware, in
our view, that such actions could end all prospects for
gradual reform. The longer Pretoria waits before
bringing the full force of its security services to bear
against blacks, however, the more likely it becomes, in
our view, that such a crackdown would precipitate a
widespread and even bloodier racial conflict.
If an aggressive and coordinated crackdown does
occur, the implications would be wide-reaching:
? The South African economy would enter a severe
depression as blacks withdrew their labor, as every-
day commerce and trade were disrupted, and as a
result of the international economic sanctions that
would probably be imposed.
? South Africa's black neighbors?probably with So-
viet encouragement?would be more likely to ex-
tend additional support to black insurgent groups,
for example, by allowing them greater freedom to
operate from their territories. The leaders of black
neighboring states probably would still be concerned
Secret
about the threat of South African reprisals, but
they would also want to support the black opposi-
tion in order to gain entree to those who would
eventually form the new black South African
government.
? The South African military would assume broad
powers subverting civilian authority and bringing
the country under de facto martial law.
? White casualties would rise significantly.
? Black homeland leaders would begin to lose control
over their populations, and South Africa would have
to spread its overextended security forces even
further to maintain order in rural areas.
Racial strife claiming thousands of white and black
lives could last for many years given the resources of
the white security establishment, but it is our judg-
ment that whites could not long endure the political,
economic, and human costs of a state of siege. While a
massive security crackdown might bring a respite, it
would not provide whites with a long-lasting solution
to their racial problems. As the consequences of the
state of siege become more acute, South African
white political leaders will be reluctantly drawn to the
option they had earlier ignored?negotiations with
black political leaders. Whites, however, will probably
find themselves negotiating with more radicalized
blacks who will be less willing to settle for something
less than one man?one vote in a unitary state.
Despite the counterproductive nature of a massive
security response, most observers believe South Afri-
can whites are unlikely to negotiate seriously with
blacks unless they have first failed to suppress a major
insurrection and suffered a significant increase in
white casualties.
According to polls and a review of
Afrikaner press, whites consistently favor a strong
law-and-order stance, and they sincerely fear that
black majority rule would eventually lead to the
destruction of their standard of living and bring South
Africa to the sorry state of most black African
nations.
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Nevertheless, we believe it is possible?although we
disagree to what extent?that the futility of reform
imposed from above and mounting black unrest will
lead more South African politicians and other elites,
even among the Afrikaners, to realize that consider-
able concessions will have to be made to prevent a
major racial conflict, including an agreement to nego-
tiate with blacks on a new political system for the
country. Such views today are held by a minority,
particularly among Afrikaners, but there are those
even in the National Party who believe that whites
must take bold and risky actions.
This less destructive transition to black-white power
sharing is possible, in our view, only if a courageous
and visionary Afrikaner leader emerges who is willing
to drag whites into negotiations with blacks even in
the absence of a white consensus and before violence
exhausts white determination to remain in power. Any
South African leader who offered to negotiate with
blacks on an equal basis would have a difficult time
convincing blacks of his sincerity, not to mention
getting black agreement to a political system that is
sensitive to white concerns in such areas as the
economy, education, and foreign policy. Whites would
enter such negotiations still hoping to play upon black
divisions and planning to draw out the talks as long as
possible (see also inset, "South Africa: Could Things
be Different in the 1990s?").
Implications for the West
We believe that the United States and other Western
counties will have limited leverage to influence South
Africa's Afrikaner leaders to pursue a negotiated
solution. International attempts to facilitate negotia-
tions are also likely to have little impact, given the
whites' belief that institutions such as the United
Nations are basically hostile to their interests. The
impetus for a dramatic reversal in white policies
toward blacks, in our view, will have to come from
within the white community. US and Western experi-
ence in dealing with Pretoria has consistently demon-
strated that South African politicians do not respond
to outside pressure, particularly in regard to domestic
policy. The West instead will probably have to spend
most of its energies in ensuring that the South African
9
domestic crisis does not become a regional one and in
preventing the Soviet Bloc from acquiring too much
influence with the increasingly radicalized black
groups.
If South African whites during the 1990s attempt to
force blacks into submission, we believe that opportu-
nities for Soviet and Communist influence among
nonwhites will be even greater. Soviet-supported black
insurgent groups will become more active as South
African security forces are preoccupied with quelling
growing domestic unrest. The Soviet Bloc's willing-
ness to provide at least prompt rhetorical support for
even some of the more militant nonwhite demands
will probably win it new friends. Moscow, however,
will face its own problems in dealing with the South
African crisis. Although Soviet ties to the ANC are
well-established, many of its Communist supporters in
the organization are white, Colored, or Asian. In
addition, Moscow's access to other black militant
groups within South Africa will be likely to remain
limited, and some of these new black leaders probably
will compete with the ANC for the support of the
black majority. The Soviet Union probably will try to
expand its contacts among blacks to accommodate the
likely growth of exclusive, radical black consciousness
among South African blacks and perhaps even within
the ANC. We believe the Soviets will place a high
priority on maintaining Marxist governments in coun-
tries such as Angola, and developing new Marxist
allies in countries such as Zimbabwe to serve as
models for future South African black leaders and to
allow the Soviets to use these governments to main-
tain contact with black militants. Moscow's ability to
increase its influence with South Africa's black neigh-
bors will improve if Pretoria?as seems likely?con-
tinues to attempt to destabilize these governments to
prevent them from supporting black insurgent groups.
As racial unrest worsens in South Africa, we believe
the United States and the West will:
? Be accused of supporting the white regime in inter-
national forums. Despite the absence of effective
Western leverage over Pretoria, many governments,
particularly in the Third World, will hold the West
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responsible for black deaths and expect Western
governments to impose a solution. At the same
time, Pretoria will attempt to depict the struggle
solely in East-West terms, and will ask the United
States and other countries for military assistance.
? Be hard pressed to keep other black African states
neutral, particularly if the Soviet Union increases its
influence with these governments.
? Be expected to insulate neighboring African states
from the effects of economic sanctions imposed on
South Africa. Black governments will press the
West for increased economic assistance to compen-
sate for the spillover effects of sanctions.
? Be increasingly rebuffed by black South Africans.
Western governments will find it difficult to main-
tain useful contacts with militant blacks who may
increasingly reject any cooperation with whites.
If and when South African whites do attempt to
negotiate a transfer to black majority rule, the West
may find itself intimately involved in the process.
Whites, for example, may ask the United States and
other Western countries to offer promises of economic
assistance in return for concessions from blacks. Black
leaders, in fact, are likely to realize the potential for
instability in the impoverished black homelands even
after South Africa comes under black majority rule,
and may be willing to guarantee some white minority
rights in return for a massive Western economic aid
program for the homelands.
Secret
In our opinion, the emergence of a black government
in South Africa will not end the country's political or
security problems, and will exacerbate economic diffi-
culties. Black politics are likely to be unstable; blacks
will be divided along tribal, class, and ideological
lines. The Soviet Union will support leftist parties in
their attempt to gain control over the government. In
addition, a black South Africa will not easily fit into
the politics of the African continent because South
Africa, with its much larger economy and sophisticat-
ed and relatively advanced military, is likely to have
interests different from those of the other Sub-Saha-
ran countries. The United States and other Western
nations probably will still be caught in tensions
between the new South Africa and its African
neighbors.
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