ZAIRE: CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR MOBUTU

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Zaire: Challenges
Ahead for Mobutu
Secret
ALA 86-10003
January 1986
Copy 362
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Zaire: Challenges
Ahead for Mobutu
This paper was prepared by I Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA 25X1
Secret
ALA 86-10003
January 1986
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Zaire: Challenges
Ahead for Mobutu
Secret
Key Judgments President Mobutu-a staunch ally of Washington-has achieved a stron-
Information available ger political position over the past three years. His energetic rule has been
as of I January 1986 highlighted by unprecedented perseverance in a tough austerity program,
was used in the report.
substantial improvement in ties to his key Western backers, and greater
involvement in regional affairs. We expect Mobutu's politically skillful
leadership and pervasive patronage system to ensure the stability of his
regime over the next two years or more, but daunting economic problems
and increasing political disgruntlement are likely to slowly erode his
authority over the longer term.F-
Although Zaire's adherence to a stringent IMF-supported reform program
has halted the country's economic decline, according to recent economic
data, a growing debt service burden and low world prices for its major ex-
ports leave poor prospects for growth. We estimate that real GDP growth
for 1985 was about 2 percent, well below the IMF target of 4 percent, and
barring a major turnaround in commodity prices we believe Zaire will
experience slow economic growth through the end of the decade and a
continuation of the 10-year decline in per capita GNP. A shortage of
foreign exchange has again fueled inflation and contributed to a slowing of
business activity. Because of budgetary constraints in donor nations and
the reluctance of private investors and commercial banks to put new money
in Zaire, we doubt that Kinshasa can attract sufficient external funds to
spur growth. F_~
Reporting from the US Embassy) (suggests that 25X1
Mobutu-like the Zairian public-is becoming increasingly unhappy with
the slow results of the economic reform program. Moreover, his disappoint-
ment is likely to increase if his efforts to gain IMF support for more
expansionary policies and increased Western support are not successful, as
we believe will happen. He also is likely to become increasingly frustrated
with the greater involvement of IMF and World Bank officials in Zaire's
policy decisions and what he perceives as IMF insensitivity to the political
consequences of its program. While Mobutu may threaten to abandon the
program, we believe he will stick with it for at least another year. As the
painful aspects of austerity continue past 1986, however, we believe
Mobutu will be increasingly tempted to backslide or even abandon the
program, particularly if he perceives his political position to be weakening.
Secret
ALA 86-10003
January 1986
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While Mobutu's political flanks are secure, we believe public discontent
over declining living standards and over the absence of political competi-
tion may very well set the stage for increasing signs of protest, such as la-
bor slowdowns or strikes, student agitation, and other antigovernment
demonstrations. Simmering ethnic tensions among the ruling elite also
probably will challenge Mobutu's political skills. We are fairly confident
that Mobutu's long practice in the use of co-optation, compromise, and
coercion will remain effective. If he missteps, however-for example, by
employing excessive repression-such a miscalculation could fuel opposi-
tion and undermine confidence in his rule among the domestic elite, foreign
backers, and the military leadership.
Small-scale rebel activity continues in the east, and, although dissident
groups pose no threat to the regime now, Libyan support may make them
more of a challenge. Libya has stepped up efforts to subvert Mobutu, and,
in our judgment, is moving to gain influence in neighboring countries in or-
der to launch operations against Zaire. In our view, the possibility of
Libyan-sponsored terrorism, particularly an attempt on Mobutu's life, has
grown. Moreover, we believe Mobutu's current plans to improve military
and security capabilities will have to be scaled back severely because of
economic and other constraints.
In the foreign policy arena we expect that Mobutu's efforts to enhance his
stature with other black nations will yield only mixed results. We believe
he will gain some influence by providing military training to other
moderate regimes in the region designed to counter Libyan activity, but
most of his bids for regional stature-such as his proposal to establish an
organization solely for black African states-will be rejected because his
close ties to the West and Israel will continue to isolate Zaire from the Af-
rican mainstream. In dealing with the conflict in Angola, we believe
Mobutu will continue his dual-track policy of providing covert logistic
support to UNITA while maintaining a dialogue with Luanda. Because of
his growing concern with the increased Soviet and Cuban presence in
Angola, we believe he would welcome Western assistance to UNITA and
be willing again to provide airfields, personnel, and intelligence support,
despite the risks of Angolan retaliation.
We foresee no major changes in Zaire's close relations with the West, but
frictions with Washington are likely to arise over the level of US help and
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possibly over trade and commodity issues. Mobutu probably will publicly
criticize the West on Third World debt issues and look for limited aid from
non-Western sources, but he would probably stop short of jeopardizing the
European and US ties he has nurtured so carefully.
Mobutu's death would greatly increase the potential for serious unrest, and
a troubled transition period would open new opportunities for Soviet and
Libyan inroads. We believe all of the identifiable contenders for power
would continue a pro-US policy. It is possible, but we believe unlikely, that
elements to which US officials have no access-such as lower ranking
military officers who harbor anti-US views-could gain authority in a
period of intense political infighting among elites.
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Key Judgments
Keeping in Compliance
Political and Security Challenges 9
Libyan-Backed Dissidence 10
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Figure 1
Zaire's Neighbors
Metal refining
I Oilfield
II& Oil refinery
Copper-cobalt-zinc
mineral zone
Diamond deposit
Major coffee-growing region
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Zaire: Challenges
Ahead for Mobutu
The past few years have been ones of accomplishment
for President Mobutu. Through strong leadership he
has been able to implement a rigorous IMF-supported
austerity program, further consolidate his political
power, somewhat improve military capabilities, and
reenergize crucial Western support for his regime.
Looking ahead, however, a variety of key issues will
become more difficult for him to address: formidable
economic problems stemming from a growing debt
service burden and low world prices for major exports,
simmering public frustration with both declining liv-
ing standards and the autocratic political system, and
increasing Libyan subversion because of Mobutu's
close ties to the United States and Israel.
to seize power from civilian hands.
This paper focuses on the principal challenges Mo-
butu faces over the next two or three years. Although
we expect Mobutu to continue in power during this
period, Zaire's political stability remains fragile. Be-
cause of the relative importance of Zaire in US
dealings with black Africa, this report explores the
forces working to weaken Mobutu's political position.
It also analyzes some of the implications if Mobutu
passed away unexpectedly or the military felt forced
As Mobutu enters his 21st year in power, we believe
he is increasingly concerned with his place in history,
and thus more sensitive to long-term issues such as
economic development and Zaire's regional and inter-
national image. Regardless of the exact reasons,
Mobutu-following a spell of lackluster leadership-
has emerged over the past three years as active,
strong, and self-confident.' During this period he has
shown the ability to work with the IMF, improved the
capabilities of key military units in the capital, contin-
ued to keep his opposition divided despite broad
discontent with economic and political conditions, and
smoothed relations with foreign backers.
of funds into the pockets of the ruling elite.
On the economic front, Mobutu has publicly pro-
claimed development as the first priority of his re-
gime. Since 1983, US Embassy reporting shows he
has actively encouraged economic reform and demon-
strated unusual perseverance in implementing tough
austerity measures designed to set the stage for future
economic expansion-a marked departure from the
past in which four IMF programs failed between 1976
and 1981. Zaire successfully completed a 15-month
standby arrangement that began in December 1983,
and in the first half of 1985 reached agreement on a
one-year IMF follow-on program and another debt
rescheduling with the Paris Club. According to the
US Embassy, a market-based exchange rate-which
has reduced use of the parallel foreign exchange
market-and lower budget deficits were instrumental
in substantially lowering the inflation rate. Moreover,
external debt obligations have been met on time, price
liberalization has led to slightly improved agricultural
production, and reforms have helped reduce diversions
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Over the past few years, Mobutu has also been
consolidating his political base. According to diplo-
matic reporting, Mobutu has continued to master
Zaire's politics, relying on manipulation, co-optation,
and coercion to stymie the opposition and to defuse
discontent among labor and students:
? He initiated an amnesty program several years ago
that has led a number of prominent political
exiles-including notables such as former Prime
Minister Nguza-to reconcile with the regime, ac-
cording to the US Embassy.
? The US Embassy also reports that Mobutu has kept
a tight rein on labor activism through his control of
the country's only labor union and has closed several
university campuses at the first signs of student
unrest.
In addition, he has devoted substantial time, energy,
and financial resources to the pervasive and highly
personalized patronage system that we believe serves
as the font of his power.
Mobutu's recent track record also shows some gains
in improving Zaire's security infrastructure. His con-
cerns about Libyan hostility and subversion, the poor
performance of units in eastern Zaire, and widespread
discontent among enlisted men and junior officers
with living conditions probably prompted the recent
attention to his military and security services. Mobutu
has made wholesale leadership changes, announced an
increase from 70,000 to 100,000 men in the armed
forces, and created several new security units. Also
created an armed forces Inspector General
Staff to reduce fraud and improve the living standards
of enlisted personnel, and, with French assistance,
plans to form a second parachute brigade. Based
mostly on Embassy reporting, we believe Mobutu's
concern with the threat of Libyan-sponsored terrorism
and distrust of the existing National Gendarmerie-
an ineffective, quasi-military police force-led him to
create the Civil Guard, a national police force whose
responsibilities will include border patrol, counterter-
rorism, and counterespionage.
Mobutu's efforts have not been limited to the domes-
tic arena. In our judgment, Mobutu has been highly
effective in regaining crucial Western support that
had eroded in the early 1980s because of his intransi-
gence on economic reform and repression of political
opponents. According to diplomatic reporting, his
visits over the past two years to the capitals of all his
key foreign backers-Belgium, France, Israel, United
States, and West Germany-have been highly suc-
cessful, often setting the stage for new economic and
military aid programs. He has, however, been less
successful with his sometimes grandiose schemes to
establish his nonaligned credentials and to gain a
leadership role in the region. For example,
his bid to form a
new organization solely for black African states is
going nowhere.F_~
Despite Mobutu's successes to date, Zaire faces a
growing array of problems. Economics is at the heart
of Mobutu's long-term difficulties, and, from a do-
mestic standpoint, a failure to tackle the country's
economic needs will only further complicate the nu-
merous political and security challenges facing Mo-
butu further down the road. Meeting IMF-sponsored
program targets are Mobutu's most immediate con-
cern. Over the longer haul, Mobutu faces additional
problems-a growing debt burden, stagnant export
revenues, insufficient foreign exchange for essential
imports, limited foreign aid and investment, and
political constraints. F_~
Keeping in Compliance
In our view, Mobutu's most immediate economic
challenge is keeping the budget in line with IMF
performance criteria through March 1986 in order to
complete successfully the one-year follow-on program.
According to the US Embassy, Mobutu believes this
will improve Kinshasa's negotiating position with the
IMF and Western donors, and perhaps induce them to
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Figure 3
Zaire: Economic Indicatorsa
of Exports
Percent
Non-OPEC
LDC
Zambia
Non-OPEC
Zimbabwe
LDC
Nigeria
Nigeria
Zimbabwe
Kenya
Zambia
Zaire
Non-OPEC
LDC
Kenya
Zambia
Zaire
Nigeria
Principal Export as a Share Inflation, 1984
of Total Exports, 1984 Percent
Percent
Nigeria
Zambia
Zaire
Kenya
Zimbabwe
1 22
Nigeria
Zambia
Zaire
Zimbabwe
Kenya
Note: Data for non-OPEC LDCs are average figures.
_a Estimates quoted for non-OPEC LDCs, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
unless otherwise stated.
b Annual average.
Percent
Non-OPEC
LDC
Nigeria
Zaire
Zambia
Kenya
Zimbabwe
Non-OPEC LDCs
(Million US $)
(9.0)
Africa-9
(22.2)
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The austerity measures implemented in 1983 had a
magnified impact on outlying regions such as Shaba,
according to US Embassy reporting. Although copper
and cobalt mined in Shaba generate the bulk of
Zaire's foreign exchange, Kinshasa's dominance of
the country's economic sector has prevented most of
the wealth from returning to the province. Import
liberalization has led to an influx of inexpensive
basic consumer goods from Europe and South Africa
that has replaced the higher priced locally manufac-
tured products, further depressing private-sector ac-
tivity. Moreover, unlike the inhabitants of Kinshasa,
Shaban urban workers and rural farmers have not
recovered from the massive devaluation in late 1983
that significantly reduced their purchasing power.
According to the US Embassy, small businesses in
Shaba's capital, Lubumbashi, have steadily gone
bankrupt and larger businesses such as local produc-
ers of beer, soap, and textiles are vroducing at less
than 50 percent capacity.
Unlike the economy of Kinshasa, Lubumbashi does
not have a diversified private sector and, consequent-
ly, has scarcely bengfited from the economic reforms
of the past three years. GECAMINES, Zaire's huge
state mining enterprise, and SNCZ, the country's
state railroad system, dominate Shaba's economy,
which depends on expenditures by and service to their
We believe analysis of yearend 1985 data now under
way will show that Zaire met-although just barely-
December 1985 performance targets and thereby has
positioned itself to begin negotiations for another
program in 1986. In the event Kinshasa failed to pass
the review, however, negotiations would be delayed
and Mobutu's frustration with the IMF would proba-
bly increase, leading him to be less flexible in negoti-
ating a new IMF program, in our view. According to
the US Embassy, Mobutu now believes that Zaire's
continued sacrifice in 1985 obliges creditor nations to
grant better terms in 1986, and he is likely to present
a forceful case for more expansionary policies. He
believes he has new leverage because of his good track
workers. Although the elimination of many corrupt
practices has improved the financial position of
GECAMINES, the firm continues to encounter prob-
lems in meeting production goals.
Although farmers have
fared well since the decontrol of prices for their corn,
agricultural growth is threatened by several factors,
including a severe shortage of credit needed by
merchants to finance purchases of corn and competi-
tion from smuggled subsidized Zambian corn. Farm-
ers also suffer from chronic fuel shortages and a
deteriorating road and rail network that impede their
ability to get goods to market.
The unsettled security situation in eastern Zaire has
also damaged the commercial sector in Shaba Prov-
ince. According to the US Embassy, there has been a
virtual shutdown of economic activity in the Moba
and Kalemie areas. In addition, persistent border
problems with Zambia throughout 1984 impeded
trade.
over the past three years and what he views as the
West's desire to use Zaire as an example for the rest
of Africa. In the event that Mobutu's requests for
increased Western support are not met, he probably
will threaten to abandon the IMF program and
publicly berate creditor nations, but will unenthusias-
tically push ahead with economic reform and agree to
another IMF program-recognizing the IMF and
Western prescriptions as Zaire's best hope for long-
term economic growth. As the painful aspects of
austerity continue through 1986, however, Mobutu
will be increasingly tempted to backslide or even
abandon the program.
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Growing Debt Burden
Another major challenge facing Mobutu is servicing
the $5 billion debt. For the past few years, financial
statistics show that debt servicing is absorbing an
increasing share of the country's scarce foreign ex-
change. According to the US Embassy, debt repay-
ments in 1985 will total close to 25 percent of export
earnings and about 55 percent of the government's
budget. By contrast, in 1982 the shares were only 16
percent and 10 percent, respectively.
given current lender attitudes.
a comprehensive multiyear rescheduling is unlikely,
by 1990.
Given the problems in meeting debt servicing require-
ments, Zaire has turned to debt rescheduling. While
this has reduced the burden in the short term, it has
only delayed the problem and increased the overall
size of the financial burden. We see little alternative
to continued annual reschedulings of principal and
interest payments. Without annual reschedulings,
debt service ratios would range from 55 to 60 percent,
contrasted with 25 to 30 percent with rescheduling.
We calculate that annual reschedulings through the
end of the decade at similar terms as in 1985 will add
at least $1.5 billion in capitalized interest to total debt
London Clubs increase substantially.
Domestically, we believe the effect of debt service on
the budget has been compounded in recent years by
Kinshasa's moves to hold down spending and deficit
financing in order to reduce inflation and stay in
compliance with IMF performance targets. According
to the US Embassy, debt service, salaries, and nondis-
cretionary expenditures now represent 80 percent of
total government spending, leaving only 20 percent of
the budget for public investment and operational
expenses'. Moreover, we believe that under current
rescheduling practices and prevailing interest rates
Zaire will pay an ever-increasing portion of export
earnings to debt service in the next few years, as
nonreschedulable debt payments to multilateral lend-
ers increase slowly and payments under the Paris and
Foreign Exchange Constraints
If Zaire is to meet its longer run debt obligations and
still have currency to fund development programs, a
healthy export performance is critical. Unfortunately,
world prices for major exports-copper, petroleum,
diamonds, and cobalt-remain low, and most com-
modity experts see little prospect for a turnaround any
time soon. Exports will remain about the same in
1985 at $1.8 billion-significantly below IMF projec-
tions of a 12-percent jump-according to preliminary
Zairian and' IMF figures. Petroleum exports, largely
responsible for the improved export picture in 1984,
are likely to be about $100 million lower than expect-
ed for 1985 because of persistent production problems
and declining world prices. The US Embassy estimat-
ed that low prices for diamonds, zinc, and coffee
reduced expected export earnings in 1985 by another
$35 million. Only copper and cobalt revenues met
government goals.'
The shortage of foreign exchange has already weak-
ened growth prospects by slowing business activity.
We agree with the US Embassy assessment that the
poor export performance caused a loss of approxi-
mately $55 million in the government's overstretched
foreign currency budget in 1985-three-fifths of
which would have been available to the liquidity-
starved private sector. Domestic firms are having to
reduce essential imports as limited foreign exchange is
used by the government for debt service and other
nondiscretionary expenditures, according to the US
Embassy:' Moreover, the IMF balked at a govern-
ment request last August to raise commercial credit
ceilings, arguing that it would only lead to inflation-
already on the rise again after a drop in 1984-while
not alleviating either the shortage of funds for public
] A 1-cent-per-pound change in average annual copper prices
represents approximately $5 million in Zairian export earnings,
while a $1-per-pound change in cobalt prices represents approxi-
mately $37 million in revenue. We estimate that copper prices will
remain sluggish for at least the next two years, averaging 60 to 65
cents per pound, but cobalt will remain close to its current price of
$11.70 per pound.
'Preliminary figures and our estimates point to an increase in
imports of about 3 percent in 1985, well below the IMF projected
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Table 2
Zaire: Scheduled Debt Service Payments, 1985-90
Short
Term
Table 3
Zaire: Debt Service Payments With Rescheduling, 1986-90 a
a Using table 2 figures as a base, we assumed that Zaire would
continue to obtain annual rescheduling of principal and interest. To
take rescheduling into account, we made the following assumptions:
all scheduled interest payments are capitalized; all scheduled short-
term debt is repaid with a six-year maturity with a four-year grace
period; all long-term principal is repaid as scheduled; capitalized
interest is repaid with a 10-year maturity with a four-year grace
period. These terms are similar to those contained in previous
reschedulings, although greatly simplified for ease of anaylsis.
Interest Payments Total Scheduled
Debt Service
Interest Payments Total Debt
Service
These numbers do not include payments on any new debt incurred
after 1984, excluding capitalized interest that totals nearly $1.5
billion by 1990. Should any new borrowing occur, the debt service
figures will understate the actual level of debt service for the 1985-
90 period. The results are not to be taken as definitive, but as a
guide to the impact of future rescheduling on debt service pay-
ments. Further information on the computation of debt service
payments can be obtained from the author.
On Previously Scheduled
Capitalized Interest Long Term
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Table 4
Zaire: Projected Growth of Import Capacity
Under Alternative Scenarios a
Plus gross borrowing
0.88
0.75
0.73
0.72
0.77
0.87
0.86
Plus other services balance
-0.68
-0.82
-0.82
-0.82
-0.82
-0.82
-0.82
Less debt service b
0.65
0.44
0.42
0.41
0.46
0.56
0.55
Less change in foreign exchange
reserves
0.16
0
Balance (import capacity)
1.16
1.12
1.16
1.26
1.38
1.50
1.61
Change in import capacity
(percent over previous year)
-3.4
3.6
8.6
9.5
8.7
7.3
Less change in foreign exchange
reserves
0.16
0
Balance (import capacity)
1.16
1.12
1.15
1.21
1.29
1.39
1.48
Change in import capacity
(percent over previous year)
-3.4
2.7
5.2
6.6
7.8
6.5
a To assess the probable impact of projected exports, debt servicing,
and new credit availability on import capacity and economic
recovery, we derived a methodology that linked our expectations
for export growth, our figures for debt service payments, our
estimate of the services balance (excluding interest payments), an
assumption that the level of new credit extended to Zaire remains
constant at the 1985 level, and an assumption that foreign exchange
reserves remain unchanged at this year's level. We then used these
estimates of import capacity to assess the potential for economic
growth.
b Debt service figures include short-term payments.
Unlike the baseline scenario that assumes 3-percent growth per
year in the OECD countries, the recession scenario assumes an
OECD recession. Since Zaire ships over 90 percent of its exports to
the OECD, a drop in OECD real income growth, such as occurred
in 1982-83, would reduce export gains, leaving Zaire with less
foreign exchange to meet debt service payments and boost import
growth. To quantify the impact of a recession in developed
countries on Zaire's exports, we altered the baseline scenario so that
OECD real GNP growth falls to 1.5 percent in 1986 and - I
percent in 1987, recovering to 1.5 percent in 1988 and 3 percent per
year thereafter.
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according to the US Embassy.
investment or the liquidity squeeze in the private
sector. The shortage of foreign exchange is creating
excess demand for hard currency and putting down-
ward pressure on Zaire's currency, which in relation
to the dollar depreciated by about 35 percent in 1985,
corruption and economic mismanagement.
Other potential sources of hard currency funds are
also likely to be limited in the foreseeable future.
Although international financial statistics show do-
nors have responded to Kinshasa's reform efforts by
providing increased bilateral aid over the past three
years, we judge the prospects for massive aid increases
unlikely, given Western budget constraints.' Even
given present aid levels, the net flow of funds is
negative. Indeed, according to World Bank statistics,
in the past two years Kinshasa paid out approximately
$440 million more to medium- and long-term credi-
tors than it received in new loan funds. Further,
reporting from international financial observers hold
little hope that commercial banks or private investors
will be willing to put much money into Zaire over the
next several years. Despite an improved climate for
foreign businesses-profits and dividends are being
remitted for the first time since the mid-1970s-
foreign investors remain deterred by the country's
weak and declining infrastructure and history of
Political Constraints
Mobutu's style and political imperatives work against
good economic decision making, in our view. Al-
though IMF and World Bank programs have signifi-
cantly improved fiscal management,
government officials
still siphon off public funds for personal gain. From
Mobutu's standpoint, some graft is almost inevitable.
Indeed, among the elite it constitutes the mainstay of
his patronage system and among the workers it serves
as an essential supplement to their meager salaries. At
a more personal level, Mobutu's penchant for central-
ized control-a style well documented in diplomatic
in financing over the next three years to achieve real economic
growth. Kinshasa claims to have acquired $860 million of this
amount, leaving a financing deficit of $2.8 billion, which they hope
reporting-probably will be an obstacle to moving the
country toward more market-oriented poli6ies. A good
example of Mobutu's preference for centralization, in
our view, was the creation in March 1985 of
SONATRAD. It is responsible for purchasing sup-
plies for all state enterprises and, according to the US
Embassy, may become one of the largest state enter-
prises despite objections from the World dank, West-
ern donors, and senior Zairian officials. World Bank
officials, concerned that SONATRAD will increase
inefficiency and provide additional opportunities for
large-scale corruption, have delayed the disbursement
of two large loans until Kinshasa reduces he role of
SONATRAD in purchasing decisions an `adopts
improved accounting procedures, according to the US
Embassy.
Although Mobutu is in firm control, his political skills
are likely to be tested over the next several years. The
regime's economic problems will, in our view, only
compound continuing demands for a more open politi-
cal system, ethnic tensions, expectations of better
living standards, Libyan-backed rebel activity, and
the need to improve military performance.
Domestic Political Pressures
While Mobutu has proved himself adept at maintain-
ing his personal rule through Zaire's sole legal par-
ty-the Popular Movement for the Revolution that he
formed in 1967-we believe pressures for a more
participatory system are growing. The US Embassy
reports that, despite government intimidation, the
illegal Union for Democratic and Social Progress
(UDPS) continues to agitate for recognition as a
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Mobutu has made clear his intolerance for competi-
tion; in 1985 he jailed several UDPS leaders when,
during reconciliation talks, they refused to drop their
transportation fees, and late salary payments. Work-
ers are not the only dissatisfied group. US Embassy
reporting has pointed to other areas:
insistence on recognition as a second party.
Simmering ethnic tensions are another source of
pressure. Based on the way Mobutu has manipulated
tribal rivalries, we believe ethnic issues have factiona-
lized the ruling elite and led to ethnic tensions
throughout the party, government, and military. Ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting, most key govern-
ment and military positions are held by members of
Mobutu's Ngbandi tribe from his home region of
Equateur, and this almost certainly has fanned deep-
seated jealousies among other groupings. Mobutu's
placement of mulattoes-who are dependent on Mo-
butu because they lack a tribal base-and non-
Ngbandi Equateurians into prominent positions has
created further problems. The US Embassy has also
reported that competition in the inner circle between
the mulattoes and black Equateurians is constant and
often bitter. Although Mobutu exploits this strife to
ensure his political control, these tensions contribute
to mismanagement and poor performance throughout
the system, and, in our opinion, are likely to make
difficult a smooth transition when Mobutu passes
from the scene.
In dealing with the pressure for greater political
participation and the fallout from ethnic divisions,
Mobutu will also have to cope with the impact of
austerity. We believe keeping the lid on discontent
with the harsh austerity program will become increas-
ingly difficult for Mobutu. In our view, resentment is
particularly strong among public-sector employees, as
expectations for higher wages and better health
care-raised by Mobutu's speeches over the past
year-go unmet. Labor union members are increas-
ingly unhappy with declining living standards and
with the passivity and corruption of government-
controlled union leaders,
Moreover, the US Embassy
reports that workers in several state enterprises and
banks have used work stoppages over the last several
months to protest inadequate wages, rising school and
? Rising frustration among members of the ruling
party's Central Committee and private business-
men, who complain that the government is meeting
IMF demands at the expense of wage increases,
credit for businesses, and development plans.
? Cutbacks in education have provoked strikes at a
number of universities in the last year, leading
Mobutu to close several campuses and arrest some
students and teachers.
We suspect that such sentiment is probably spread
throughout all of society.
Libyan-Backed Dissidence
While Mobutu is balancing internal forces, he also
has to take into account an external threat. Even
though the Zairian dissident movement is ethnically
divided, disorganized, and militarily weak, F_
Libyan support is aimed at improving its
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Table 5
Principal Zairian Dissident Groups
Ethnic and Regional
Power Base
Front for the National
Liberation of the Congo
(FLNC)
None, numerous factions
Shaba Province (former
Katangan gendarmes)
Congolese National Move-
ment, Lumumba Faction
(MNC/L)
Francois Lumumba
Shaba Province
Coalition of National
Unity (CUN)
President Lt. Gen.
Mbumba (former
President of FLNC)
Composed of MNC/L
and FLNC cadres
Congolese Liberation
Party (PLC)
Antoine Kibingu
Marundura (former
FLNC Central
Committee member)
Bovira and Bafulero
tribes of eastern Zaire
Popular Revolutionary
Party (PRP)
Laurent Kabila
Eastern Zaire
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ing to the US Embassy, is based in the rugged The potential for Libyan-backed terrorism in
mountains between Moba and Kalemie and in west- Kinshasa-particularly an attempt on Mobutu's
ern Tanzania. life-is of growing concern among security officials,
government. Various attacks against government eastern Zaire, and
troops and economic targets appear to have been
carried out by a 75- to 100-man group from the they are growing rapidly.
Popular Revolutionary Party (PRP)-which, accord-
eastern Zaire, long a hotbed of opposition to the the rebels are successfully recruiting in
Libya is behind the recent increase in rebel activity in Nevertheless,
Primary Base Membership a
of Operation
Angola and 4,000 to 6,000
northwestern Zambia
Brussels and Congo 150
Tanzania
Eastern Zaire and 50 to 100
Tanzania
Eastern Zaire and 200
western Tanzania
recently surrendered under Mobutu's amnesty pro-
according to the US Embassy Mobutu believes that gram because of a lack of supplies and poor morale.
The group's longer run staying power is
uncertain, however. According to the US Embassy,
the rebels are poorly trained and equipped, and the
Zairian military claims that a number of PRP rebels
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1,000 primarily based in Angola, USSR, Cuba FLNC grew out of the Katangan secession movement led by Moshe Tshombe in
Angola (no military support the early 1960s. Katangan gendarmes formed the FLNC in 1975 and with
since 1981) Angolan and Soviet support invaded the Shaba region in 1977 and 1978. Since
1978, however, the group has been inactive because of inadequate external
support, ethnic divisions, leadership struggles, and UNITA's control of much of
Angola's border with Zaire. In the past few years, FLNC cadres have been
integrated into Angolan military units to fight UNITA.
Libya (small amount of MNC/L was founded by Francis Lumumba, son of Patrice Lumumba in the
funds, arms, and training) mid-1960s. Reportedly responsible for the bombs set off in Kinshasa in early
1984.
Libya (small amount of Formed in mid-1984 when the Tanzania-based factions of the FLNC and the
funds, arms, and training) MNC/L merged. Libyans reportedly forced a merger by threatening to withdraw
Libya (small amount of
funds and arms)
aid to both groups. Although potentially the most capable Zairian dissident
groups, it has yet to carry out a military operation. Group suffers from ethnic
Formed in early 1984 when Antoine split from the Tanzania-based faction of the
FLNC after disagreements with Mbumba.
Probably Libya (small Formed in early 1960s and has long been active in antigovernment activity. Only
amount of funds and group to operate inside Zaire in recent years. Probably responsible for recent rebel
arms) attacks in eastern Zaire.
according to the US Embassy.
We believe Tripoli's efforts to expand its influence in
neighboring states are partly aimed at establishing
bases from which to launch operations against pro-
Western regimes.
Tanzania and Congo, in particular, have
turned a blind eye in the past year to Libyan activity
aimed at undermining Zaire and other moderate
central African regimes. Although we have no evi-
dence to indicate that Burundi supports Libyan sub-
version, Qadhafi's visit last May, a recent delivery of
Libyan military equipment, and promises of economic
aid indicate that Tripoli is making a concerted effort
to increase its leverage with Bujumbura. In our view,
Zaire will only be more concerned with Libyan
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neighboring Sudan and Uganda.
Constraints on the Military
A rebel attack during 1984 on Moba, a small town in
easter
(have
clearly demonstrated the incompetence of local mili-
tary units and pointed out problems such as the
shortage of military transport and poor logistics,
communications, and intelligence support to the
troops in the field. Units from Kinshasa and Lubum-
bashi were needed in November 1984 to retake Moba
from a rebel force we believe numbered fewer than
50, and, according to the US Embassy, military
officers were forced to commandeer transport and
food supplies from civilians to carry out the operation.
In addition, civilian casualties are fairly high during
combat operations, and government troops have ex-
torted funds and supplies from the local population to
supplement their meager military salaries.
tional C-130s-one of which is Mobutu's private
equipment. In addition, two C-130s and several other
aircraft remain in Italy because of Zaire's inability to
pay for repairs, leaving the military only two opera-
has been unable to take u advantage o srae i an
French training offers because of its inability to buy
As it is, th
eliminated ' f Zaire is to stay within IMF guidelines.
At a national level, budgetary problems are only
further complicating the situation for Mobutu. De-
spite the need to upgrade military units outside the
capital, we believe Mobutu's publicized plans to en-
large the Army, create the Civil Guard, expand
counterinsurgency training, and otherwise improve
capabilities will have to be scaled back sharply or even
military performance.
Numerous other problems will also probably affect
Moreover, we believe Mobutu will continue to
ensure that the elite Presidential Special Brigade and
other Kinshasa-based units receive a larger share of
the military resources, leaving troops in the outlying
regions reliant on corruption and harassment of the
civilian population.
While Mobutu is grappling with internal economic,
political, and security difficulties, he also faces a
number of delicate foreign policy challenges. In the
international arena he is trying to further solidify
Kinshasa's close relations with its key foreign backers,
enhance his limited influence in regional affairs, and
play a role in bringing about a solution to the conflict
in Angola.
Relations With Key Foreign Backers
We believe Mobutu's top foreign policy priority is
maintaining excellent relations with key foreign back-
ers. Without Western support not only would Zaire's
other foreign policy initiatives be greatly complicated
but Mobutu's internal challenges-especially on the
economic front-would also be greatly magnified.
Among key West European backers:
? Belgium has been Zaire's largest and most reliable
source of technical, budgetary, and security assis-
tance since independence in 1960. Brussels provided
about $90-100 million in economic and military
aid-one-third of its foreign aid budget-and 120
military advisers in 1985, according to the US
Embassy.
? France worked to improve bilateral ties last year,
according to the US Embassy, providing about $40-
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command and support the 31st Airborne Brigade-
a key Kinshasa-based unit.
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has agree to begin training a 25X1
second airborne brigade next year and is laying
groundwork for a pan-African armored warfare
training program near Kinshasa.
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1985,
Aside from European linkages, Mobutu considers
himself a staunch friend of the United States, which
has responded to calls for greater support by increas-
ing economic aid from $29 million in 1983 to $56
million in 1985, and by backing Zaire in the IMF,
World Bank, and Paris Club. In response to Kinsha-
sa's fears of Libyan subversion, Washington increased
military aid from $4 million in 1983 to $8 million in
and is considering helping with the refurbishing of
Kamina Air Base in central Shaba region.
military equipment over the next 10 years.
Mobutu also values his good relations with Israel.
According to US Embassy reporting, his state visit to
Tel Aviv last May solidified bilateral relations that
were renewed in 1982, when Kinshasa became the
first black African state to reestablish formal ties
since the Middle East war of 1967. Israel provides
important security assistance through its training and
material support to the elite Presidential Special
Brigade and the Shaba-based Kamanyola Division.
More recently, Tel Aviv gave Kinshasa an $8 million
grant in September for military equipment in return
for a promise to buy $10 million worth of Israeli
Regional Concerns
While US Embassy reporting underscores Mobutu's
pretentions to regional influence, we believe his ties to
the West and Israel will continue to isolate him from
affairs.
proposal for an organization of black African states.
Similarly, the Frontline States continue to reject his
attempts to get more involved in southern African
This is not to say Mobutu will not find ways to
improve his regional standing. Indeed, the US Embas-
sy reports he is attempting to find ways of directly and
indirectly supporting moderate states in the region
against countries that harbor Libyan-supported dissi-
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In our judgment, however, Zaire's lack of
resources severely limits Mobutu's ability to assist or
influence other moderate regimes in the region, except
at the margins.
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The 10-year-old conflict in Angola between the
MPLA regime and UNITA insurgents has long been
Mobutu's principal regional security concern, accord-
ing to the US Embassy, and he persists in promoting
himself as an "honest broker" in seeking a solution.
Despite longstanding distrust between the two capi-
tals, Mobutu has maintained a dialogue with Luanda;
he met with Angolan President dos Santos last Febru- 25X1
ary in Kinshasa where they concluded several eco-
nomic and security agreements.
at the same time, however, Mo-
butu meets regularly with UNITA leader Savimbi
and-as Luanda and Frontline leaders suspect-he
to UNITA through Zaire.
We suspect Mobutu's longstanding fear of Commu-
nism-he openly refers to the "red belt" around
Zaire-has intensified in recent months because of
growing Soviet and Cuban support to Luanda. Cer-
tainly, Mobutu fears a UNITA defeat that would
leave Zaire prey to a Soviet-backed regime with a
Cuban-based army. Because of his growing concern,
we believe Mobutu would welcome Western assis-
tance to UNITA and be willing again to provide
airfields, personnel, and intelligence support. In our
judgment, he sees Western backing for UNITA as
substantively and symbolically important in blunting
Communist inroads in the area, and also as an
opportunity to gain additional economic and military
aid for Zaire.
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The Angolan-based Front for the Liberation of Congo
(FLNCJ, at one time Zaire's principal opposition
group, has been inactive since it invaded Shaba
Province in 1978,
Although there is no hard figure, we estimate from
fragmentary information that there are 4,000 to
6,000 FLNC members spread throughout Angola-at
least 1,000 of whom are armed and have fought
UNITA unenthusiastically in recent years in return
for being allowed to remain in Angola.F___-]
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harsh living conditions in Angola and the return to
Zaire of former Prime Minister Nguza-a Shaban
who claims substantial support within the FLNC-
has led a number of senior FLNC military command-
ers and several hundred of their supporters to consid-
er returning to Zaire under Mobutu's amnesty pro-
gram.
directly supporting Zairian dissidents.
Mobutu's willingness to support Savimbi more openly,
however, will be constrained by his fear of Angolan
retaliation and concern that he will become more
isolated in the region. According to the US Embassy,
Mobutu is worried that Luanda, possibly with Soviet
and Cuban backing, may decide to renew support to
Zairian dissidents in Angola, which could lead to a
rebel threat to western Shaba Province (see inset). In
addition, he realizes that closer association with Sa-
vimbi would tie him to South Africa in the eyes of
many black Africans, and could lead some neighbor-
ing states like Congo, Burundi, or Tanzania to begin
Although we expect Mobutu's political authority to
remain intact over the next two years at least, we see
Nevertheless, the FLNC remains a potential threat to
Mobutu, particularly if Luanda renews its support in
an effort to press Mobutu to end his aid to UNITA.
Over 1,000 FLNC members have military experience,
and, in our view, the poor economic situation in
Shaba provides fertile ground for recruiting young
Zairians. In our judgment, Luanda is likely to have
difficulties informing a viable military force from the
disparate factions spread throughout Angola because
of ethnic divisions and the lack of a unifying leader.
Moreover, Luanda would have to provide significant
material support and relocate the dissidents to camps
near the Zairian border before they could begin to
conduct cross-border activity. In our view, however,
Mobutu would be hard pressed without outside assis-
tance to cope with renewed significant cross-border
activity from Angola, particularly if rebels in the east
remain active.
the potential for other possible outcomes. There is
always the risk Mobutu could pass from the scene
unexpectedly. Alternatively, mounting economic
problems and public frustration coupled with serious
internal missteps could lead to urban unrest that
becomes destabilizing to the regime. If Mobutu over-
reacted in suppressing discontent, he would probably
speed erosion of his position. In the event the military
begins to lose confidence in Mobutu, or Libyan-
sponsored dissident attacks affect major urban areas,
a military coup or assassination will become increas-
ingly likely.
Mobutu's Death
Mobutu's death would greatly increase the potential
for serious unrest. In the unlikely event that medical
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problems force Mobutu-now in good health, accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting-to relinquish power,
or, if he is assassinated, we would expect intense
political maneuvering. Mobutu's highly personalistic
rule has precluded the development of political insti-
tutions, the grooming of a successor, or legal proce-
dures that would facilitate smooth succession.' More-
over, Mobutu's exploitation of rivalries among senior
military officers and government leaders has created
divisions among the ruling elite that will make the
consolidation of power in the post-Mobutu era diffi-
cult. A protracted leadership struggle, particularly if
combined with urban unrest, rebellion in outlying
provinces, or foreign-inspired rebel attacks probably
would convince the military to step in. Kinshasa-
based commanders, especially Presidential Guard
leader Nzimbi, are best placed to lead a coup. In our
judgment, however, the military lacks the expertise to
govern on its own and would almost certainly bring in
civilians to run most ministries and key agencies.
wildcat strikes and labor demonstrations probably
would act initially as a catalyst to unrest, but we
would expect students, small businessmen, and the
urban unemployed to participate as well. Longstand-
ing ethnic tensions would only add fuel to the fire. If
the violence spread from Kinshasa to other urban
areas such as Lubumbashi or Kisangani, we believe it
would be difficult for the military to control. More-
over, if the military were called on to quell public
demonstrations, junior officers and enlisted men-
also suffering under austerity-could begin coup plot-
ting, while senior officers would almost certainly
question Mobutu's policies. Should Mobutu respond
to military discontent by becoming paranoid about his
personal security-as we believe he might be prone to
do-he might arrest popular senior officers, thus
We believe a relatively smooth succession would occur
if civilian and military leaders from Mobutu's Equa-
teur region could be united to protect their interests
and quickly agreed on a presidential candidate. We do
not believe that Mobutu's son Niwya has adequate
support among the Equateurian elite to succeed his
father. In our view, the new leader probably would be
a compromise candidate without the political skills
necessary to consolidate control, leading to a period of
political uncertainty until a new strongman-proba-
bly from within the military-emerges. F_~
setting the stage for a military coup.
If social conditions began to spiral downward we
would expect Mobutu to abandon the IMF program,
in the belief that the short-term political and financial
gains would take priority over the longer term eco-
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scaring off foreign financial support. At the same
time, the UDPS, in our view, would take advantage of
the unsettled situation to publicly challenge Mobutu
to move toward a more democratic political system,
while exploiting public frustration to expand its base
of support. The situation would only be complicated if
Libyan-backed dissidents tried to exploit the situation
by launching attacks in eastern Zaire or terrorist
attacks in Kinshasa, or if Angola rearmed the FLNC
and encouraged the rebels to conduct cross-border
Military Coup
In our view, continued austerity-particularly limited
wage increases and little public investment in health
care and schools-in the face of rising inflation could
set the stage for open unrest among various domestic
interest groups who have quietly accepted the past
three years of austerity. This, in turn, could spark the
military to seize control. Under such a scenario,
' Zaire's Constitution specifies that the 80-man central committee
of Zaire's sole political party is to assume collective leadership
exercised through the committee's septuagenarian dean, Deri-
koye-a tribal chief from Haut Zaire region who has little political
power. The committee must nominate a presidential candidate and
schedule popular elections within 30 to 60 days. F1
raids into western Zaire.
If the senior officer corps, faced with such a deterio-
rating situation, overcame the divisions Mobutu has
fostered and seized control, it would confront the
same set of problems facing any successor regime.
Although another military strongman might quickly
emerge, we believe it more likely that a coalition of
civilian and military leaders would be formed. In our
view, given the ethnic and ideological makeup of key
military and civilian leaders at this time, such a
coalition probably would be dominated by Equateur-
ians and would look to the West for support.
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Still less likely, but possible in our view, would be a
power grab by junior officers or enlisted men able to
win broad support among their colleagues in key units
like the Presidential Special Brigade and the 31st
Zaire, is likely to seek US support for a 2- to 3-year
moratorium on principal payments and a multiyear
rescheduling of interest payments
Airborne Brigade.
there has long been considerable resentment
among lower ranking personnel over low pay, chronic
shortages of food and other supplies, Mobutu's tribal-
regional favoritism, and the corruption that has en-
riched many senior officers. US officials have little
access to junior officers or enlisted men, and we
therefore are not sure whether radical elements are
influential in these quarters.
in central Africa.
Because his regime is viewed throughout the region as
a most consistent and staunch African ally of Wash-
ington, we believe Mobutu's fortunes will serve as a
gauge of the value of close association with the United
States. Diplomatic reporting suggests that Kinshasa's
economic reform experiment is being closely scruti-
nized by the rest of Africa, and, in our view, if the
program results in putting Zaire on a relatively better
economic growth path, other countries will be encour-
aged to emulate it. We believe Zaire's regional impor-
tance also has the potential to grow, at least at the
margins, because of Kinshasa's willingness to play an
increasingly active role in obstructing Libyan inroads
Keeping Mobutu on the hard road to success, howev-
er, will be increasingly difficult as the President grows
more frustrated with the slow pace of recovery, unmet
expectations for higher levels of Western aid and
investment, less-than-generous debt reschedulings,
He probably views as unfair the fact
that the net flow of funds from Washington to
Kinshasa will be near zero for 1985 and probably
negative in 1986 because Zairian debt repayments are
growing faster than new US aid disbursements. Mo-
butu, in an effort to reduce the flow of funds out of
Other sore points are likely to distract him from
hewing to the austerity program. He resents the
unwillingness of US private investors and commercial
banks to put new money into Zaire. Human rights
abuses in Zaire, US policy on Angola, and trade
issues also are potential problems. According to the
US Embassy, Mobutu vigorously protested US plans
to sell cobalt from its strategic stockpile, claiming this
over the low
levels of military aid, given the-negative effect of
budget austerity on the armed forces and what they
see as a significant increase in the Libyan threat. In
the now unlikely event that the rebels were able to
launch attacks that threatened major towns or vital
mining enclaves in the Shaba region, we believe
Mobutu would request US logistic assistance to help
move elite troops and equipment from Kinshasa.
Mobutu would also call on France and Belgium for
support, and we believe both Paris and Brussels would
again send troops as they did in 1977 and 1978 if the
regime's stability were threatened by foreign-backed
rebels
We see only a slight chance that Mobutu's disappoint-
ment with the level of US generosity would alter his
generally unfriendly relations with the Soviet Union.
He remains a staunch anti-Communist and deeply
distrustful of Moscow's motives in Africa. Mobutu,
however, could come to think a gesture toward the
East would gain him leverage with Washington, and
make a move-such as reopening the Aeroflot office
in Kinshasa or agreeing to a development project-
that would provide Moscow opportunities it now lacks
in Zaire.
If Mobutu died or were ousted, we believe Western
interests would be protected if a successor emerged
2`25X1
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from the ruling party or military hierarchy. Countries
such as Libya, Angola, or the Soviet Union, however,
might try to exploit such a vulnerable transition
period to either increase subversion or make a bid for
influence. A prolonged succession crisis would, of
course, raise the possibility for a radical leader to
emerge as a new strongman, although even in this
case we believe economic necessity would work to
Western advantage.
A resurgence of intertribal warfare-reminiscent of
the first few years after Zaire's independence in
1960-is also possible under almost any regime in the
post-Mobutu period. Various groups may look upon
Mobutu's departure as an opportunity to settle old
scores. Nevertheless, we believe that there is a greater
sense of national identity today and that most Zair-
ians want no repetition of the anarchy and bloodshed
of the early 1960s. In view of these conflicting factors,
the ability of a post-Mobutu regime to minimize
violence and instability may depend on the extent to
which it is seen by the populace as firm and decisive,
representative of the main tribal groupings, and genu-
inely attempting to address economic problems. In our
view, a key factor in a successor regime's ability to
consolidate control would be the degree to which
Western countries-particularly Belgium, France,
and the United States-demonstrated economic, po-
litical, and military backing.
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Secret
Secret
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