LIBYA'S GREAT MANMADE RIVER PROJECT: PLANS AND REALITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00706R000600520002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of secret
Intelligence 25X1
Libya's Great Manmade River
Project: Plans and Realities
Secret
GI 87-10088
NESA 87-10055
IA 87-10074
December 1987
copy 4 7 3
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Intelligence 25X1
Project: Plans and Realities
Libya's Great Manmade River
This paper was prepared by
Office of Global Issues;
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis;
OGI
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Strategic Resources Division,
Reverse Blank Secret
GI 87-10088
NESA 87-10055
IA 87-10074
December 1987
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Libya's Great Manmade River
Project: Plans and Realities
Summary Libya is facing serious water supply problems. Many of the overused
Information available aquifers along the densely populated Mediterranean coast have been
as of 15 September 1987 damaged by the infiltration of seawater, a process that cannot be reversed.
was used in this report.
To help offset this loss and also to meet future water needs, Muammar Qa-
dhafi embarked on an enormous project in 1983 called the Great Man-
made River Project (GMRP)-two pipeline systems designed to bring large
volumes of subsurface water from deep under the southern desert to water-
short regions along the Mediterranean coast. Construction has been under
way for about three years, and the project will probably take another
decade to complete. Although construction costs will strain the economy,
we believe that this project is the only realistic option the Libyans have to
ease growing water problems and that any successor to Qadhafi will also
regard it as essential.
Our technical analysis of the Al Kufra and Sirte Basins in southeastern
Libya-the water sources for the project-indicates that surprisingly large
amounts of high-quality subsurface water are present there. Indeed, we
estimate that the volume of water in both basins could approach that of
Lake Ontario, about 1.5 trillion cubic meters (m3), and probably is three
times higher, or the equivalent of Lake Michigan. Even at the low end of
the range, we believe that, with prudent water resource management, this
vast amount of water is more than ample to support planned extraction of
5 million m3 daily and to allow the Libyans to sustain this rate indefinitely.
Internally, the Great Manmade River Project has major implications for
the Libyan economy. The planned extraction rate nominally represents:
? Almost two-thirds of Libya's present water needs and possibly one-third
of the country's requirements by the year 2000.
? Enough water to allow, in principle, a doubling of Libya's present
amount of irrigated land.
The GMRP will continue to absorb a very large share of Libya's
investment budget-about $30 billion over the next 10 to 15 years.
Nevertheless, we believe the Libyans can cover the cost of this project out
of current revenues, not debt.
iii Secret
GI 87-10088
NESA 87-10055
IA 87-10074
December 1987
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Despite Qadhafi's claim, our analysis indicates that this project will not
allow Libya to become self-sufficient in food production even if it is fully
completed. The increased supply of water would, however, give the Libyans
a chance to limit food import dependency, a major national vulnerability.
Without a project of this scale, Libyan food import dependency would
inevitably increase in response to a rapidly growing population, an outcome
that Qadhafi regards as politically unacceptable.
On the international front, the Great Manmade River Project could
become the source of new friction in Libyan-Egyptian relations. Geologi-
cally, the subsurface structures in southeastern Libya extend into western
Egypt and provide the only water source for oases in that region. Our
analysis indicates that the Libyans can extract planned amounts of water
and still not interrupt the natural flow into western Egypt. Only if the
Libyans were to dramatically exceed planned volumes would Egypt's water
supply in that region be threatened, but such extraction rates would
increase the risk of serious long-term damage to the basins supplying
Libyan water. Nonetheless, a Cairo perception that the Great Manmade
River Project poses a threat to future water supplies in western Egypt could
serve to aggravate already strained relations.
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Summary
Background
Water Supply Issues 1
Domestic Water Requirements 1
The Agricultural Base and Import Dependency 3
The Great Manmade River Project 3
Recharge Capacity 6
Engineering and Manufacturing Considerations 7
... For Libyan-Egyptian Relations 13
... For Other Water-Short Regions 14
The Water Potential of the Al Kufra and Sirte Basins: An Estimating Approach 15
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Scope Note This Research Paper reviews the background, specifics, progress, expecta-
tions, and implications of Qadhafi's much publicized Great Manmade
River Project. Central to this assessment is a comprehensive analysis of the
water potential of the Al Kufra and Sirte Basins in southeastern Libya, the
water sources for the project. The CIA has developed a new methodology
to estimate water volumes that are likely to be present in these basins. Spe-
cialists at the US Geological Survey have reviewed the methodology and
agree with our evaluations. Although Libya has discussed plans to also
exploit the vast water resources of western Libya, we believe that this area
will not be developed until well after the turn of the century.
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Figure 1
Libya's Great Manmade River Project
Algeria
Concrete pipe plant
Water well field
TRIPOLI
Sarir-to-Surt water pipeline
(under construction)
Tazirbu/AI Kufra-to-Banghazi
water pipeline (planned)
TAzirbU
Chad
Egypt
Sudan
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Libya's Great Manmade River
Project: Plans and Realities
Lack of adequate supplies of high-quality water is one
of the key constraints on Libyan economic develop-
ment. Tripoli's only reasonable option is to continue to
invest huge sums in an enormous, long-term effort-
the Great Manmade River Project (GMRP)-whose
practical benefits are still many years off. Without
adequate water supplies, Libya's food import depen-
dency will continue to grow, undercutting Qadhafi's
long-term goal of achieving self-sufficiency in food
production (figure 1).
Water Supply Issues
Typical of many countries in the Middle East, Libya
depends on subsurface water sources to meet virtually
all of its requirements. Surface water sources are
scanty at best. No perennial lakes or rivers exist in the
country, and in vast portions of Libya no measurable
rainfall occurs for several years. Even in northern
Libya, where the rainfall is greatest, the wadis dry up
within a few hours after a heavy rainfall, which
usually occurs between November and March.' The
small amount of surface water available is also highly
saline, making it unsuitable for irrigation and barely
fit for human consumption.
least $2 per cubic meter, according to Libyan
claims-almost 10 times the cost of underground
water. Desalinized water therefore cannot be used
economically for irrigation. Simply put, barring a
huge jump in world commodity prices, it is cheaper
for the Libyans to import food than to attempt to
grow an equivalent amount using this very expensive
water. According to Libyan claims, desalinization
capacity is scheduled to triple to about 1 million m'/d
by the year 2000. Even if this goal were achieved,
however, this amount, in principle, still represents
only about 5 percent of the amount of water Libya
projects it will need by then.
Domestic Water Requirements
Although we have no firm information on Libya's
water requirements, a reasonable estimate of total
usage can be made by looking at probable sectoral
consumption levels. On the basis of an analysis of
probable per capita needs and possible agricultural
needs, we estimate that Libya's current water require-
ments amount to between 7 and 9 million m'/d. This
estimate suggests that Libya's water needs are rough-
ly four times that of Jordan, and about two times that
of Israel. In terms of US comparisons, Libyan water
consumption is about triple that of Los Angeles
County and about five times the consumption of the
Libya has mounted an impressive effort to build
desalinization plants to help meet the country's grow-
ing water needs. Using
open source material, we have identified 14 such
plants along the Mediterranean coast that have been
built since the mid-1970s (figure 2). Output of desali-
nized water has increased dramatically, from about
5,800 cubic meters per day (m'/d) in 1976 to almost
345,000 m'/d in 1986.1 Despite this increase, desalini-
zation plants account for only about 5 percent of
Libya's current estimated water requirements. More-
over, desalinized water is extremely expensive-at
except for brief periods after rainfall.
Washington metropolitan area (figure 3).
Looking at water usage from a sectoral perspective,
Libyan water needs can be subdivided into consump-
tion for agriculture, personal usage, and industries.
Agriculture alone accounts for about 60 percent of
Libyan water consumption. Irrigation techniques in
Libya are primitive, usually consisting of little more
than crude ditches, and much of the water is lost to
evaporation or runoff. Although precise comparisons
are not possible, on a per hectare basis, Libyan water
use for agriculture is probably five times as much as
Jordan's and about 10 times as much as Israel's,
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Figure 2
Distribution of Major Desalinization Plants and Annual Rainfall Patterns
Q Desalinization plant
-50- Mean annual rainfall
(in millimeters)
200 Kilometers
I I
200 Miles
Chad
Q
Ajdabiy
Marsa at
fl4lraygah
Al Ba ' Darnah
_200-- -" Tobruk
~_..- 100 ,
Egypt
Libya
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Figure 3
Comparison of Water
Requirements and Population
Libya
Israel
? Los Angeles
Jordan
Washington, D.C.
I
for the population.
indicating the large amount of waste and mismanage-
ment of water resources in Libya's agricultural sector.
Human consumption-virtually all of which is cen-
tered along the Mediterranean coast-accounts for
most of Libya's remaining needs. Industrial water
requirements are very small, probably no more than
5 percent of total water needs. Libyan specialists
estimate that the country's water requirements will
increase to about 15 million m3/d by the turn of the
century. Although we have no data on which to base
an independent projection, the Libyan estimate seems
reasonable and is very close to projected growth rates
The Agricultural Base and Import Dependency
Although Libya devotes the bulk of its water re-
sources to agriculture, crop yields still fall short of
internal food requirements. Over the last 10 years,
total agricultural output has increased by about
30 percent, but the gain was wiped out by the
40-percent increase in population. Libya's food import
dependency has grown steadily since the early 1970s,
and in 1986 imports accounted for about 60 percent of
Libya's food supply and about 20 percent of its total
import bill. Given steady increases in population, we
see little likelihood that Libya will be able to prevent
further increases in food dependency, at least for the
foreseeable future. In addition to limited amounts of
arable land-only about 2 percent of the land is
suitable for agriculture because of poor soil composi-
tion and lack of moisture-growing shortages of
water are increasingly hampering Libyan agricultural
development.
The Great Manmade River Project
Libya has admitted publicly that it is facing serious
water supply problems, especially along the Mediter-
ranean coast. In essence, the aquifers-subsurface
structures that hold water-now being exploited there
have been severely depleted by overpumping. Around
some of the densely populated cities, such as Tripoli,
Banghazi, and Surt, the aquifers have also been
severely damaged by the infiltration of seawater,
rendering much of the water unsuitable for irrigation,
industrial purposes, or human consumption (figure 4).
Once an aquifer has been infiltrated by seawater, few
practical steps can be taken to correct the problem. As
the population increases, the increase in water needs
will result in even greater demands on the existing
aquifers. Libyan leaders are clearly aware of their
growing water shortage vulnerability, and, based on
recent commitment of resources, they have made
development of new water resources second only to
defense as a national priority.
To deal with the problem of diminishing supplies of
high-quality water, Qadhafi embarked on an enor-
mous engineering project designed to exploit the vast
underground water potential known to exist in south-
eastern Libya. Trade and industry journals have
dubbed this effort as the Great Manmade River 25X1
Project. According to Libyan Government claims, the
project is designed to transport for 50 years about 5
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Figure 4
Quality of Groundwater
Fair to saline
(greater than 3,500 ppm)
Good to fair
(1,000-3,500 ppm)
Excellent to good
(less than 1,000 ppm)
Salinity of groundwater is
shown in parts per million (ppm).
0 200 Kilometers
i I I I
0 200 Miles
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In nontechnical terms, saltwater intrusion (infiltra-
tion) of an aquifer occurs when fresh water is extract-
edfaster than it can be recharged. When saltwater
moves into the aquifer to replace the excess fresh
water withdrawn, the fresh water nearest the contact
boundary quickly becomes useless for human con-
sumption, agriculture, or industrial purposes. Salt-
water infiltration can be prevented by reinjecting
fresh water-rainfall or treated sewage from rein-
jection wells that must be located on the seaward side
of the producing wells. But reinjection is extremely
expensive. Almost without exception, wells that be-
come infiltrated with saltwater are abandoned.
million m'/d of high-quality water from aquifers in
the Al Kufra and Sirte Basins through buried con-
crete pipelines to water-short regions in the northern
part of the country.
To illustrate the volume of water involved, 5.0 million
m'/d represents in principle:
? About one-third of the average daily waterflow in
the Potomac River at the Great Falls.
? Roughly one-third of Libya's projected water re-
quirements by the year 2000.
? Enough water to irrigate at least 100,000 hectares
of land, nominally a 50-percent increase in Libya's
present irrigated land.
The pattern of construction activities to date suggests
that the magnitude of the GMRP is such that it will
have to be carried out in two stages, resulting in two
pipeline systems. The first stage-the Sarir-Surt pipe-
line-will bring water from 126 wells near Sarir (in
the Sirte Basin), north to a holding reservoir near
Ajdabiya and then west to Surt on the Mediterranean
coast. This pipeline system will stretch about 1,000
kilometers (km). The second stage, or the Tazirbu-
Banghazi line, will bring water from 108 wells near
Tazirbu (in the Al Kufra Basin), north to Ajdabiya
and then northeast to Banghazi. This pipeline system
will run about 900 km.
Many factors come into play in the assessment of any
engineering project as massive as the GMRP. There
must be a careful assessment of the amount of water
that exists in the aquifers and the amount of rainfall
that is available to feed them. In addition, the engi-
neering considerations involved in transporting the
huge volumes of water must be examined in detail.
Finally, basic economic factors related to the invest-
ment costs and economic trade-offs need to be
analyzed.
Subsurface Water Resources
The existence of large subsurface water potential in
southeastern Libya is well known. Occidental Petro-
leum made the initial water discoveries in this area in
the early 1960s. Subsequent investigations of the Al 25X1
Kufra and Sirte Basins conducted by US and several
West European exploration firms have consistently
indicated the presence of large amounts of water. A
study conducted by the United Nations Conference
on Desertification in 1978 placed the water potential
of the Al Kufra Basin at 3.0 trillion m'. On the basis
of our geological and hydrological assessment of the
conditions likely to exist in both basins, we estimate
that:
? There is only a small chance that the volume of
water will be as low as 1.5 trillion m', roughly the
water volume of Lake Ontario.
? There is an excellent chance that the volume of
water will be about 5 trillion m', slightly more than
Lake Michigan.
? There is an outside chance that the volume of water 25X1
could be as much as 9 trillion m', about the same as
Lake Superior (figure 5).'
Given the size of the aquifers known to exist in
southeastern Libya, we believe that about 75 percent
of the water resources-some 3.7 trillion m' in our
middle estimate-are in the Al Kufra Basin (table 1).
Although different in size, the Al Kufra and Sirte
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Figure 5
Subsurface Water Potential of Basins in Eastern Libya
Compared With the Volume of the Great Lakes
,Represents one trillion
g Represents
meters (tcm).
The combined volume of
the two basins within
Libya is likely to be
Basins are hydrologically similar. As detailed in the
appendix, both basins have aquifers at shallow depths
and should pose no major problem in terms of bring-
ing water to the surface. Geochemical analysis of
water taken from these basins indicates that the water
is uniformly excellent in quality for irrigation or
human consumption.
Recharge Capacity
Despite the vast subsurface water potential involved,
the Libyans cannot extract water volumes indiscrimi-
nately. Indeed, Libyan technicians need to plan care-
fully so that the amount of water taken from the
aquifers roughly balances with the amount of natural
recharge (replenishment).' If the extraction were to
exceed the recharge, the aquifers could be irreversibly
damaged by the infiltration of saltwater. Given the
enormous volume of water involved, however, the
' Recharge only affects so-called unconfined aquifers. Confined
aquifers are sealed by impermeable caprock, which rainfall cannot
damage to the aquifers probably would not become
apparent for five to 10 years after the initial infiltra-
tion started.
We examined historical data on precipitation patterns
in southern Libya and northern Chad, the sources for
the underground water in the Al Kufra and Sirte
Basins, to calculate the probable rate of natural
recharge. Although considerable variations exist in
annual rainfall patterns, we estimate that rainfall
averages about 22 billion m'/yr in this area. Because
of the topography, we estimate that between 50 to 75
percent of the annual rainfall would contribute to the
groundwater of Libya; the remainder would drain into
northern Chad and Sudan. According to studies of
other parts of the Middle East where soil and climato-
logical conditions are similar to Libya's, only about 10
percent of the precipitation will percolate down to the
water table. Most of the remainder will be lost to
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Table 1
Estimates of Libyan Subsurface
Water Resources a
a Variations in our estimates primarily reflect uncertainties in
thickness of aquifers and variation in storage coefficients.
evaporation. Taking all of these factors into account,
we estimate that about 1.4 billion m3/yr of water will
be available on average as a recharge for the aquifers
in the Al Kufra and Sirte Basins. Because of the
many uncertainties that exist in our technical data, we
believe that the recharge capacity could be as low as
1.1 billion m3/yr or as high as 1.7 billion m3/yr
(figure 6).
Because of natural recharge rate, we believe Libya's
goals for water extraction are realistic. According to
official plans, Libya intends to pump 730 million
m3/yr during the first phase of the GMRP and
eventually boost this volume to 1.8 billion m3/yr.
With our midrange estimate of the average annual
recharge-1.4 billion m3/yr-the Libyans would not
have to exceed the annual recharge rate during the
first phase of the project. Moreover, they would have
to extract only an additional 400 million m3/yr during
the second phase, and this additional rate of with-
drawal would not significantly reduce the water re-
serves held in the aquifers for 50 years or more.
Engineering and Manufacturing Considerations
Although a huge project, the GMRP is not a techni-
cally complicated one. Indeed, the technology needed
to produce the large-diameter concrete pipe-which is
the heart of the project-dates from the 1950s and is
well known.
prestressed concrete pipe for the project is being
produced at two plants in Marsa al Burayqah and
Sarir that were built with South Korean assistance
expressly for that purpose (figure 7). Both plants are
now fully operational.
The track of the pipeline also poses no formidable
engineering problems. Over the course of the pipeline,
the terrain is generally flat with a slight natural
gradient that will allow water to flow by gravity from
the aquifers in the south to the reservoir at Ajdabiya.
Pumping stations may be required for sections of the
pipeline that extend from Ajdabiya west to Surt and
north to Banghazi. No mountain ranges will need to
be transversed, nor will any tunneling be required.
Despite the technical simplicity of the GMRP, there
will be problems to overcome. The major problems, in
our view, will come from the novelty of transporting
water via buried concrete pipelines, and the Libyans
clearly will be learning by trial and error. According
to press reports, problems such as leakage around the
pipe joints have already emerged and have been one of
the factors causing the project to fall behind schedule.
Another possible problem is that the highly saline
desert soil may have a corrosive effect on the pipe,
especially in areas subject to intermittent rainfall. The
Libyans may need to apply special paints or corrosive-
resistant coatings to protect the pipeline. In time and
with continued financing, the Libyans should be able
to solve these engineering and physical problems.
Finally, although the water is high quality it contains
fairly high concentrations of carbon dioxide, a gas
that is corrosive to many types of steel. Therefore, the
Libyans will have to use stainless steel or other
corrosive-resistant materials-products readily avail-
able from many suppliers-especially in pumping
stations along the coastal sections of pipeline.
The Economic Dimension
The GMRP is by far Libya's most important econom-
ic development project. Although expensive, the pro-
ject appears to enjoy Qadhafi's unqualified support.
Contrary to almost all of the other development
projects, which have been halted or slowed in recent
years because of lower oil revenues, work on the
GMRP has moved along steadily, experiencing only
technical delays.
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Figure 6
Groundwater Migration Along the Libya-Egypt Border
Sardinia :,erg
Algeria
Tunisia TRIPOLI
Libya
Lake Chad
Boundary rep ese n tatio its
not n4cessarit' authoritative
Al Kufra
Basin
Waha Siwah, CAIR
E9 p
?AI Wahat~=
al Bahnyali
~Wa'hat al
Farfifirah
W hat ad
Dakhilah.
Al Wahat
at Kharijah
'Saudi
Ar,:~l a
Approximate extent of subsurface basin
Direction of groundwater migration
Selected oasis
E,th
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Despite the financial burden the GMRP imposes, we
believe that Qadhafi will continue this project-even
if the costs prove higher-to reduce Libyan vulnera-
bilities on the food front. Qadhafi has repeatedly
stated that Libya must become self-sufficient in food
production, arguing that a food importer can never be
independent of foreign pressure. Although we believe
that there is virtually no possibility that Libya will
become self-sufficient in food production, the GMRP
at least offers some possibility for reducing food
imports or, in view of the growing population, for
preventing import increases. As a very rough esti-
mate, the amount of water that will become available
in the initial phase of the project-730 million
m3/yr-would be enough to irrigate about 40,000
hectares. Assuming this land were used for wheat and
that yields were similar to those in Egypt-about
3.5 metric tons per hectare-production could in-
crease by 140,000 tons per year, roughly 30 percent of
Libya's wheat imports in 1985. Obviously, as the
GMRP begins to reach capacity and more water
becomes available, the nominal amount of additional
wheat (or other crops) that could be produced will
increase in tandem.
Construction of the GMRP has been under way for
about three years. As of August 1987,
a considerable amount of support and ancil-
lary construction has either been finished or is in a
late stage of construction. For example:
? The pipeline service road between Sarir, Ajdabiya,
and Surt has been completed.
? The pipe plants at Sarir and Marsa al Burayqah are
operational, and at least 4,000 pipe sections have
already been produced.
? The huge holding reservoir at Ajdabiya is in the late
stage of construction (figure 8).
? Trench digging is in progress between Ajdabiya and
Jalu (figure 9).
? Surveys of the Sarir well field have been completed.
. In any event, given the overall
status of construction, we believe that major pipe-
laying activity on the Sarir-to-Surt pipeline will prob-
ably begin within the next year and that completion of
the pipeline will take several more years.
The GMRP will continue to absorb a very large share
of Libya's investment budget for many years. We do
not have enough information to assess how the total
costs of the GMRP will be apportioned, however. The
bulk of the expenditures clearly will be for construc-
tion of pipe and for laying the pipe. Drilling the large
number of water wells in the Al Kufra and Sirte
Basins will also be costly. The Libyans claim that the
cost of the GMRP will be entirely covered by current
revenues, not debt. This claim seems reasonable in
view of the fact that Libya has a comparatively small
foreign debt and current cash reserves are high. Oil
exports should continue to generate substantial export
earnings well into the next century.
Cost overruns and delays, however, have plagued the
GMRP since the initial planning of the project in
1983. According to the original schedule announced
by Tripoli, the project would cost about $10 billion
and operations would begin in 1989. On the basis of
installation needs and engineering expenses, we calcu-
late that the project will cost more than $30 billion
spread over 10 to 15 years and will probably take until
the turn of the century to complete. Although pricing
increases account for most of the higher cost, various
other factors have contributed to the delays.FI
? The prime contractor apparently did not realize that
some sections would go through particularly hard
ground, and therefore substantial blasting will be
required.
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? After the US bombing in 1986, Tripoli decided to
lay the pipe deeper than originally planned, further
slowing digging operations and requiring the pipe
segments to be wrapped in more expensive wire
mesh to prevent fatigue and corrosion.
? Most of the sections laid leak and will have to be
repaired or replaced. We believe this problem does
not stem from basic flaws in the production technol-
ogy but instead is a result of inexperience and poor
workmanship, conditions which should get better
with time.
? Maintenance requirements will be more extensive
than initially planned because long sections of the
pipeline are laid through salty soil, which has caused
corrosion to occur faster than anticipated.
Despite these problems, we expect that the pace of
delay will ease over time. Given the relatively simple
nature of the technology and, in our view, the basic
engineering soundness of the project, the chances
appear good that the current problems-frequently
encountered in the initial stages of construction-will
be overcome, and fewer new ones are apt to appear as
the Libyans gain practical experience.
The ability of the Libyans to maintain production of
concrete pipe sections seems to be one of the factors
that will determine the overall pace of construction.
As noted, the first stage of the project-from Sarir to
Surt-will cover more than 1,000 km. Each pipe
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range.
section is 7.5 meters in length, implying that about
133,000 sections will be needed. The pipe plants at
Sarir and Marsa al Burayqah are designed to produce
the equivalent of 1,650 meters per day. If the output
of both plants is directed toward the Sarir-to-Surt
pipeline, this line will require roughly two years'
output from both plants. Although crude, the calcula-
tion suggests that it will take until at least the early
1990s before any water will be available from the
southeastern basins. The capacity of pipe plants also
suggests that the Libyans will not be able to construct
both pipelines simultaneously, and overall construc-
tion time could easily be in the four- to five-year
Although subject to considerable uncertainty, our best
estimate is that the Sarir-to-Surt pipeline should be
complete, or nearly so, by the early 1990s. Plans call
for initially transporting 730 million m3/yr through
this line. We believe that the Libyans will start by
pumping small volumes to test the line for leaks and
gradually gear up to capacity levels-a test period
that could take from six months to a year.
We doubt that the Libyans could even begin construc-
tion of the Tazirbu-Banghazi line until the line from
Sarir-Surt is much further along. As noted, the
combined output of both plants would not be suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of both lines if they
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Although the Libyans clearly will encounter many
problems building the GMRP, we are convinced that
these problems do not stem from basic flaws in the
technology but rather from the size of the undertak-
ing and the inexperience of the construction crews.
Indeed, somewhat similar problems have occurred in
the United States in projects involving the transporta-
tion of large water volumes. Perhaps the closest US
analogy to the GMRP is the huge Feather River
Project in California-a successful engineering effort
to transport more than 7 million m3/d from northern
California to water-short regions in the southern part
of the state. Although different in design, in the early
stages of construction of the Feather River Project,
numerous problems were encountered with leaks at
holding reservoirs, aqueducts, and pumping stations.
Similarly, thefinal cost of the project was three times
more than estimated and completion took several
years longer than planned.
the Libyans are concentrating on the
Sarir-Surt pipeline. If the Libyans were to start
building the required infrastructure for the Tazirbu-
Banghazi line now, construction would probably take
about two to three years. Assuming pipeline construc-
tion will start around 1990, this line could become
available some time in mid-decade. When both lines
are fully operational, plans call for transporting about
1.8 billion m3/yr. With continued investment, we
believe the Libyans stand a chance of approaching
this goal sometime near the turn of the century.
... For Libya
In our view, Libya has little choice but to go forward
with the GMRP. The Libyans will be increasingly
hard pressed, even with this project, simply to meet
the essential water needs of the population. At the
same time, the GMRP poses potentially serious risks
for Qadhafi. The GMRP will continue to drain
resources, probably for at least another decade, and
require more austerity measures in the domestic
economy. As Qadhafi restrains current consumption
and postpones or cancels other development projects,
popular discontent could increase, especially if the
GMRP experiences long delays. Clearly, the regime's
prestige will decline further in the event that
Qadhafi's pet project does not deliver the benefits
promised.
small
... For Libyan-Egyptian Relations
The GMRP is a potential flashpoint in Libyan-
Egyptian relations. From the extensive technical liter-
ature available, geologists have known for many years
that the groundwater in southeastern Libya migrates
slowly to the north and northeast and is discharged in
western Egypt at oases in Wahat Siwah, Wahat Al
Farafirah, Al Wahat Al Kharijah, and Wahat Al
Dakhilah (figure 6). We estimate total water dis-
charge in these oases at about only 1.5 million m3/d,
but this is adequate because western Egypt is sparsely
populated and regional water needs are extremely
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We see little chance that the GMRP will pose a 25X1
serious threat to the water supply of western Egypt, 25X1
but it could serve to aggravate Libyan-Egyptian
relations. Egyptian subsurface water resources would
be at risk only if Tripoli extracted water at rates
substantially in excess of the natural recharge of the
Libyan aquifers. Over time, such an outcome would
drastically reduce the natural waterflow into western
Egypt. It would also be self-defeating for the Libyans
because their own water resources would be seriously
damaged. Because these are highly technical issues
not generally understood, Cairo could perceive that
the mere existence of the GMRP would threaten 25X1
future water supplies in western Egypt. This alone
would add to already strained relations with Tripoli.
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... For Other Water-Short Regions
If the GMRP proves to be technically feasible, as we
believe it will, it could well serve as a model for many
other water-short countries. A US company has al-
ready conducted a prefeasibility study for the Saudis,
assessing the possibility of transporting water from
two rivers in Turkey through Syria, Iraq, and Kuwait
into northern Saudi Arabia. Turkey is reportedly
pushing the idea hard because of the revenue it would
bring, and the Saudis may be receptive because the
costs of the delivered water would be far cheaper than
the desalinized water that they currently rely on.
The African Sahel could also be a future candidate
for a pipeline approach similar to the GMRP. Various
studies have consistently pointed to the possibility of
substantial groundwater potential in eastern Sudan,
and southern parts of Niger, Kenya, and Ethiopia as
well. Given the poverty of the nations in this region,
however, any construction project would clearly need
to be carried out with Western assistance, and its
scale would be likely to be modest.
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Appendix
The Water Potential of the
Al Kufra and Sirte Basins:
An Estimating Approach
The CIA performed detailed technical assessments of
three basic factors to estimate the water potential of
the Al Kufra and Sirte Basins. Essentially, we
assessed:
? The type of aquifers in these basins.
? The physical volumes of these aquifers.
? The amount of water these aquifers can realistically
contain.
We used slightly different approaches to calculate
potential water volumes, depending on the type of
aquifer involved. Because any estimate of subsurface
water resources involves many uncertainties, it is best
viewed as a range. In all cases, we estimated what, in
our view, represents reasonable minimum and maxi-
mum values for the amount of water that may be
present. Our "best" estimate is simply our subjective
evaluation of the most reasonable figure near the
midpoint of the estimated range.
Two types of aquifers exist in the Al Kufra and Sirte
Basins. Technically, these aquifers are defined as:
? Confined or artesian aquifers where the water is
held in an enclosed geologic structure, somewhat
like an oil reservoir.
? Unconfined or water table aquifers where the water
is not held in an enclosed geologic structure. Water
enters the aquifer at points nearest the surface,
seeps through pores in the underground rocks, and is
discharged at surface points.
Water can be taken from either type of aquifer,
although drilling costs will be higher in the case of
confined aquifers because of the greater depths in-
volved. We estimate that about 55 percent of the total
water resources in the Al Kufra and Sirte Basins
appear in confined aquifers.
For Confined Aquifers
Estimating the water potential of confined aquifers
involved a two-step calculation. We measured the
physical volume of the aquifer by first determining its
surface area (areal extent), and then by multiplying
the surface area by the average thickness of the
aquifer. Using this technique, we estimate that the
volume of the confined aquifers in the Al Kufra and
Sirte Basins is about 350 trillion cubic meters (m') and
160 trillion m', respectively. We excluded parts of the
Sirte Basin above 281 north latitude because it is
possible that saltwater infiltration may have already
occurred in this area.
When the volume of the confined aquifers had been
determined, the potential amount of water was calcu-
lated by multiplying that volume by the "storage
coefficient" of the aquifer. Simply put, the storage
coefficient is the amount of water per unit volume of
the aquifer. Libyan data along with technical data on
hydrologically similar aquifers in Egypt allowed us to
determine probable minimum and maximum values
for this coefficient. Taking all of these factors togeth-
er, we estimate that the amount of water in the Al
Kufra and Sirte Basins probably ranges between 1.6
and 4.1 trillion m', or an average amount of about 2.8
trillion m' (table A-1).
For Unconfined Aquifers
We took a slightly modified approach to estimate the
water potential of the unconfined aquifers in the Al
Kufra and Sirte Basins. In the case of confined
aquifers, we have more confidence in our estimate of
the volume of the aquifer and somewhat less in the
estimate for the storage coefficient. To establish a
reasonable range, we held the volume constant and
varied the value of the storage coefficient. In the case
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Table A-1
Libya: Water Potential of Confined and Unconfined
Aquifers in the Al Kufra and Sirte Basins
Confined
Area X
Thickness
Volume X
Storage =
Water a
Aquifers
(kilometer)
(meter)
(trillion cubic
meters)
Coefficient
(trillion cubic
meters)
Volume
(trillion cubic
meters)
0.003
1.0
0.005
1.9
0.008
2.8
Sirte
400,000
400
160
0.003
0.6
0.005
0.9
0.008
1.3
Unconfined
Aquifers
Al Kufra
350,000
250
87.5
0.01
0.9
500
175
0.01
1.8
1,000
350
0.01
3.5
50
20
0.01
0.2
100
40
0.01
0.4
200
80
0.01
0.8
of unconfined aquifers, we took the opposite approach. possible range of thickness of the aquifer. Based on
We have more confidence in the probable value for this approach, we estimate that the amount of water
the storage coefficient and less confidence in the in the unconfined aquifers in the Al Kufra and Sirte
possible volume of these aquifers. Taking this ap- Basins ranges between 1.1 and 4.3 trillion m3, or an
proach, we held the storage coefficient constant and average amount of about 2.7 trillion m3.
varied the volume of the aquifer by specifying a
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